[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 13, 2013)]
[Pages 15931-15932]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-05854]



Sunshine Act Meeting; Request for Comments on Draft Evaluation of 
Recommended Practice on Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel 
in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries

TIME AND DATE:  April 24, 2013; 9:30 a.m. EDT.

PLACE: Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Horizon 
Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004.

STATUS: Open to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (CSB) will convene a public meeting on Wednesday, April 24, 2013, 
starting at 9:30 a.m. EDT at the Ronald Reagan Building and 
International Trade Center, Horizon Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20004. At the meeting, CSB will consider and vote on the 
status of Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-7 issued to the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) and the United Steelworkers International 
Union (USW) in March 2007. This recommendation urged API and USW to 
jointly lead the development of an ANSI consensus standard with 
guidelines for fatigue prevention. The CSB based this recommendation on 
its investigation of explosions and fires that occurred at BP's Texas 
City Refinery on March 23, 2005.
    In addition the Board intends to consider status designations for 
the following recommendations to the U.S. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration: 2001-05-I-DE-1 (Process Safety Management 
coverage of atmospheric storage tanks); 2005-04-I-TX-9 (Process Safety 
Management requirement for organizational management of change 
reviews); 2010-07-I-CT-1 (Regulations addressing fuel gas safety). 
Subject to the call of the chairperson, the Board may consider other 
recommendations-related items that have been calendared for 
consideration at a public meeting.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 23, 2005, explosions and fires in 
an isomerization unit (ISOM) at BP's Texas City Refinery caused 15 
deaths, 180 injuries, and significant economic losses. The CSB's 
investigation found that the incident was caused by multiple technical, 
system, and organizational deficiencies. For detailed information on 
the incident and the CSB's investigation, please refer to the CSB's 
investigation report on the CSB's Web site, www.csb.gov.
    Among its most important findings, the CSB concluded that the ISOM 
operators were likely fatigued from working 12-hour shifts, some 
working as many as 29 consecutive days during the turnaround of the 
unit prior to startup, and that, as a result, the operators' judgment 
and problem-solving skills were likely degraded, hindering their 
ability to determine that a distillation tower in the ISOM unit was 
overfilling with hydrocarbons and to take prompt corrective steps. 
Accordingly, the CSB issued Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-7 to API 
and the USW which reads in pertinent part as follows:

    [D]evelop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and 
petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of 
work and address shift work.

Both API and USW initially accepted the recommendation. The API, formed 
an ANSI committee that the USW joined. In August 2009, however, the USW 
withdrew from the committee in protest of what it perceived to be an 
imbalance in voting members (management vs. union and other 
representatives). The API proceeded with the committee's work and 
issued an ANSI-approved Recommended Practice (RP 755) in April 2010.
    After review, the CSB staff found that RP 755 makes a contribution 
to chemical safety by explicitly stating that ``workplace fatigue is a 
risk to safe operations'' and also by suggesting various measures to 
manage fatigue risks. However, the staff determined that RP 755 does 
not fully meet the intent of the CSB recommendation in multiple 
important respects, and therefore has urged the Board to vote 
designating the status of Recommendation No. 2005-4-I-TX-7 as ``Open-
Unacceptable Action.''
    At the meeting on April 24, 2013, the staff will present its 
analysis to the Board. Following the staff presentation, the Board will 
hear comments from the public. Following the conclusion of the public 
comment period, the Board will consider whether to approve the proposed 
evaluation and to change the status of Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-
7 to ``Open-Unacceptable Action'' or to some other status in accordance 
with Board Order 22.

REQUEST FOR COMMENTS: The Board welcomes public comment on the staff 
evaluation and proposed disposition of Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-
7. The detailed draft evaluation will be posted on the CSB Web site by 
March 11, 2013, and will be available for review and comment until 5 
p.m. E.D.T. on April 12, 2013. CSB encourages electronic submission of 
comments. Comments should be submitted by email to 
[email protected]. Comments may also be submitted by mail to 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Attn: Amy McCormick, 
2175 K Street, NW., Suite 650, Washington, DC 20037.
    Comments may be submitted in the body of the email message or as an 
attached PDF, MS Word, or plain text ASCII file. Files must be virus-
free and unencrypted. Include CSB-13-01 in the subject line of the 
message. Please ensure that the comments themselves, whether in the 
subject line, the body of the email or in attached files, include the 
docket number (CSB-13-01), the agency name, and your full name and 
    All comment and submissions must include the agency name and docket 
number. All comments received, including any personal information 
provided, will be made available to the public without modifications or 
deletions. While the public comments submitted before and during the 
meeting will be carefully analyzed by CSB staff and the Board, the 
Board does not assume any obligation to respond to comments 
individually or during the public meeting. Comments received by the CSB 
will be posted online in the Open Government section of the CSB Web 
site, http://www.csb.gov/open.aspx.
    To ask any question regarding the submission of comments or to 
establish times to review these documents at CSB headquarters, please 
call Amy McCormick, Board Affairs Specialist, at (202) 261-7630.
    No factual analyses, conclusions, or findings presented by staff 
should be considered final. Only after the Board has considered the 
staff presentations, listened to public comments, and voted to approve 
a change in status of the recommendation should that status be 
considered final.
    The meeting will be free and open to the public. If you require a 
translator or interpreter, please notify the individual listed below as 
the ``Contact Person for Further Information,'' at least five business 
days prior to the meeting.
    The CSB is an independent Federal agency charged with investigating 
serious accidents that result in the release of extremely hazardous 
substances. The agency's Board

[[Page 15932]]

Members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. CSB 
investigations look into all aspects of accidents, including physical 
causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in 
regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

Communications Manager, [email protected] or (202) 446-8094. 
General information about the CSB can be found on the agency Web site 
at: www.csb.gov.

    Dated: March 8, 2013.
Daniel M. Horowitz,
Managing Director.
[FR Doc. 2013-05854 Filed 3-11-13; 8:45 am]