[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 7 (Thursday, January 10, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 2214-2223]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00237]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 7 / Thursday, January 10, 2013 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 2214]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[NRC-2011-0018]
RIN 3150-AI49
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Supplemental proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is proposing regulations that would implement its authority under
Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and
revise existing regulations governing security event notifications. The
NRC proposed new regulations on February 3, 2011, that would implement
its authority under Section 161A. The NRC is now proposing to further
revise its regulations that address the voluntary application for
enhanced weapons authority, preemption authority, and the mandatory
firearms background checks under Section 161A to include as a class of
designated facilities at-reactor, independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs).
DATES: Submit comments on this supplemental proposed rule by February
25, 2013. Submit comments specific to the information collection burden
aspects of this supplemental proposed rule by February 11, 2013.
Comments received after these dates will be considered if it is
practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure consideration only
for comments received on or before these dates.
ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related
to this supplemental proposed rule, which the NRC possesses and are
publicly available, by searching on http://www.regulations.gov under
Docket ID NRC-2011-0018. You may submit comments by any of the
following methods (unless this document describes a different method
for submitting comments on a specific subject):
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: [email protected].
Email Comments to: [email protected]. If you do
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact
us at 301-415-1677.
Fax Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission at 301-415-1101.
Mail Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Hand Deliver Comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern Time) Federal
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
For additional direction on accessing information and submitting
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Margaret E. Stambaugh, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-7069; email:
[email protected]; or Mr. Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6557; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
II. Background
III. Discussion
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Writing
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2011-0018 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this supplemental proposed
rule. You may access information related to this supplemental proposed
rule, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS
accession numbers are provided in a table in Section VIII,
``Availability of Documents,'' of this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2011-0018 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into
ADAMS.
[[Page 2215]]
The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.
II. Background
A. Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA
On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section
653 of the EPAct amended the AEA by adding Section 161A, ``Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel'' (42 U.S.C. 2201a). Section 161A of the
AEA provides the NRC with authority that will enhance security at
designated NRC licensee and certificate holder facilities. As required
by Section 161A.d, the provisions of Section 161A took effect when the
Commission, with the approval of the U.S. Attorney General, published
the approved Firearms Guidelines in the Federal Register (FR) on
September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46800). The issued Firearms Guidelines may be
found on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket IDs NRC-2008-0465 and
NRC-2011-0018.
Section 161A requires the Commission to designate the classes of
facilities, radioactive material, and other property eligible to apply
for preemption or enhanced weapon authority. Section 161A also mandates
that all security personnel with duties requiring access to covered
weapons, as defined in the Firearms Guidelines, who are engaged in the
protection of Commission-designated facilities, radioactive material,
or other property owned or operated by an NRC licensee or certificate
holder, be subject to a fingerprint-based background check by the U.S.
Attorney General and a firearms background check against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Background Check
System (NICS).
B. October 2006 Proposed Rule--Implementation of Section 161A of the
AEA
In parallel with the development of the Firearms Guidelines, the
NRC initiated a rulemaking to develop implementing regulations. On
October 26, 2006, the NRC published proposed regulations (71 FR 62664)
to implement the provisions of Section 161A as part of a larger
proposed amendment to its regulations under parts 50, 72, and 73 of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Power Reactor
Security Requirements.'' These proposed implementing regulations were
based upon the draft version of the Firearms Guidelines that existed in
September 2006.
The NRC had proposed that the provisions of Section 161A would
apply only to power reactor facilities and Category I Strategic Special
Nuclear Material (Cat. I SSNM) facilities (i.e., facilities possessing
or using formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear
material). This would permit these two highest risk classes of licensed
facilities to apply to the NRC for Section 161A authority (either
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or stand-
alone preemption authority). The NRC had also indicated that it would
consider making Section 161A authority available to additional classes
of facilities, radioactive material, or other property (including
ISFSIs) in a separate, future rulemaking.
C. February 2011 Proposed Rule--Implementation of Section 161A of the
AEA
Once the approved Firearms Guidelines were published in the FR on
September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46800), the NRC continued developing the
proposed rulemaking based upon the Firearms Guidelines. On February 3,
2011, the NRC published proposed regulations in the FR (76 FR 6200)
that would implement the provisions of Section 161A and make several
changes to the security event notification requirements in 10 CFR part
73 to address imminent attacks or threats against power reactors as
well as suspicious events that could be indicative of potential
reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security systems by
adversaries. The public was provided a total of 180 days to review and
comment on the February 2011 proposed rule and associated guidance.
III. Discussion
Section 161A allows the NRC to authorize licensees and certificate
holders to use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded
arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-automatic, large-
capacity, assault weapons. As indicated in the February 2011 proposed
rule, an NRC licensee or certificate holder interested in obtaining
Section 161A authority (either combined enhanced weapons authority and
preemption authority or preemption authority alone) could voluntarily
apply to the NRC to take advantage of this new authority. Licensees and
certificate holders within the designated classes eligible to apply for
Section 161A authority would be required to complete the firearms
background check requirements mandated by Section 161A and the Firearms
Guidelines.
In a recent letter, a licensee requested that the NRC grant
preemption authority for two operating power reactors and the at-
reactor ISFSI co-located at the plant site (ADAMS Accession No.
ML113610556). The February 2011 proposed rule did not contemplate at-
reactor ISFSIs under the applicability statement, but rather identifies
ISFSIs as a class of facility that would be considered for inclusion
under a future rulemaking. The staff's intent in the February 2011
proposed rule was first to establish the regulatory framework for
granting preemption and enhanced weapons authority to those facilities
deemed to be of greatest significance (i.e., power reactors and Cat. I
SSNM facilities). In light of the request from the licensee, the staff
recommended to the Commission in SECY-12-0027 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML113130015) that at-reactor ISFSIs be designated as a class of
licensees eligible to apply for the authority granted under Section
161A. In Staff Requirements Memorandum SRM-SECY-12-0027 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML12124A377), the Commission disapproved the staff's
recommendation in SECY-12-0027 regarding the issuance of confirmatory
orders for at-reactor ISFSIs. Instead, the Commission directed the
staff to consider expanding the scope of the current enhanced weapons
rule to include at-reactor ISFSIs. This supplemental proposed rule
responds to the Commission's direction.
In this supplemental proposed rule, the NRC would add at-reactor
ISFSIs to the scope of the enhanced weapons proposed rule. The NRC
considers an at-reactor ISFSI to be an ISFSI whose physical security
program is conducted as a support activity of the co-located power
reactor facility licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. As previously
noted, the NRC is taking this approach to address the facilities of
highest concern first. At-reactor ISFSIs have been added
[[Page 2216]]
to the facilities of highest concern because the same security
personnel and weaponry that protect a power reactor, also protect the
at-reactor ISFSI. An ISFSI that is co-located with a power reactor
facility that has been decommissioned (i.e., the power complex and
spent fuel pool have been removed), but has not yet terminated its
reactor license, does not rely on the power reactor security force to
implement its protective strategy. Therefore, an ISFSI co-located at a
decommissioned power reactor is not considered an at-reactor ISFSI for
the purposes of this supplemental rule. The NRC considers this approach
consistent with that for a standalone ISFSI, which was never co-located
with a power reactor.
The February 2011 proposed rule recommends adding two new sections
to 10 CFR part 73. The proposed Sec. 73.18(c) would identify the
specific classes of licensee facilities, radioactive material, and
other property designated by the Commission under Section 161A that
would be eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or for
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority. The
proposed Sec. 73.19(c) would identify the specific classes of
facilities, radioactive material, and other property designated by the
Commission under Section 161A that would be subject to the firearms
background check requirements. In this supplemental proposed rule, the
NRC would designate three classes of facilities as subject to the
requirements of proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19: power reactor
facilities, at-reactor ISFSIs, and Cat. I SSNM facilities.
In the February 2011 proposed rule that would implement the
Firearms Guidelines, the NRC proposed amendments to 10 CFR part 73 by
adding new definitions, processes for obtaining enhanced weapons,
requirements for firearms background checks, and event notification
requirements for stolen or lost enhanced weapons. This supplemental
proposed rule continues those proposed changes and adds to or modifies
the following regulations in 10 CFR part 73:
Section 73.2, Definitions.
Section 73.18, Authorization for use of enhanced weapons
and preemption of firearms laws.
Section 73.19, Firearms background checks for armed
security personnel.
Section 73.51, Requirements for the physical protection of
stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
A. Overview
The following section-by-section analysis discusses proposed
revisions to the NRC's regulations that were not part of the proposed
rule published on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200). At this time, the NRC
is only seeking comments on the revisions proposed by this supplemental
rule. The NRC will address public comments on both the February 2011
proposed rule and this supplemental proposed rule in the Federal
Register notice for the final rule.
This supplemental proposed rulemaking to 10 CFR part 73 would
revise two new sections (Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19) proposed to be
added to the NRC's regulation in the February 2011 rule, and revise two
existing sections (Sec. Sec. 73.2 and 73.51) to make conforming
changes.
B. Definitions (Sec. 73.2)
New definition for the term At-reactor independent spent fuel
storage installation or at-reactor ISFSI would be added in alphabetical
order to the definitions in Sec. 73.2(a). The NRC would consider an
at-reactor ISFSI to be an ISFSI whose physical security program is
conducted as a support activity of the co-located power reactor
facility licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52.
C. Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of Firearms
Laws (Sec. 73.18)
Paragraph (c) would list the designated classes for either stand-
alone preemption authority or combined enhanced weapons authority and
preemption authority. In addition to the classes of facilities
identified in the February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC would include
at-reactor ISFSIs within the designated classes. The NRC continues to
intend to specify any additional classes of authorized facilities,
radioactive material, and other property in a separate, future
rulemaking.
D. Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel (Sec.
73.19)
In paragraph (c), the NRC would designate the classes of
facilities, radioactive material, and other property that are
appropriate for firearms background checks. In addition to the classes
of facilities identified in the February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC
would include at-reactor ISFSIs within the designated classes. The NRC
intends to specify any additional classes of authorized facilities,
radioactive material, and other property in a separate, future
rulemaking.
E. Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (Sec. 73.51)
In paragraph (b)(4), the NRC would add a conforming change to
provide a cross reference to the new firearms background check
requirements in Sec. 73.19 for armed security personnel. Additionally,
the NRC would provide implementation schedule information for future
licensees. This conforming change is identical to the conforming
changes proposed to Sec. Sec. 73.46 and 73.55 for Cat. I SSNM and
power reactor facilities, respectively, in the February 2011 proposed
rule (see Sections V.F and V.G at pp 6221 and 6222 of that Federal
Register notice).
V. Guidance
The NRC prepared a new draft regulatory guide (DG), DG-5020,
``Applying for Enhanced Weapons Authority, Applying for Preemption
Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms Background Checks under 10 CFR
part 73'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML100321956), which contains detailed
guidance on the implementation of the proposed requirements for
applying for enhanced weapons and conducting firearms background
checks. The DG was made available for public comment on February 3,
2011 (76 FR 6086). Public comments and supporting materials related to
DG-5020 can be found on http://www.regulations.gov by searching on
Docket ID NRC-2011-0015.
However, DG-5020 did not include at-reactor ISFSIs under the
applicability section; rather, the DG reserved a section for additional
facilities to be added by future rulemakings or Commission orders. The
addition of at-reactor ISFSIs facilities to the DG as an eligible class
of licensees to receive preemption authority would not appreciably
change the guidance contained in the DG. A licensee with an at-reactor
ISFSI would have to take the same steps to request this authority as
the facilities currently listed in the DG (i.e., power reactor and Cat.
I SSNM facilities).
The NRC will issue a final regulatory guide coincident with the
publication of a final rule that will include at-reactor ISFSIs in the
applicability section of DG-5020 so that it conforms to the
requirements of the supplemental proposed rule. Since those conforming
changes to the DG do not constitute a significant change to the
guidance, the NRC has determined that further public
[[Page 2217]]
and stakeholder opportunity to comment on DG-5020 is not necessary for
this supplemental proposed rule notice.
VI. Criminal Penalties
For the purposes of Section 223 of the AEA, as amended, the
Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR part 73 under Sections 161b,
161i, or 161o of the AEA. Criminal penalties, as they apply to
regulations in 10 CFR part 73, are discussed in Sec. 73.81. The new
Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
161o of the AEA. Violations of these new sections are subject to
possible criminal penalties; and therefore they are not included in
Sec. 73.81(b).
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the FR (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this
supplemental proposed rule is classified as compatibility Category
``NRC'' and new Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19 are designated as Category
``NRC'' regulations. Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC''
regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that
relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA
or the provisions of Title 10 of the CFR, and although an Agreement
State may not adopt program elements reserved to the NRC, it may wish
to inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws,
but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.
VIII. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the documents identified in the following table
available to interested persons through one or more of the following
methods as indicated.
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Document PDR Web NRC Library (ADAMS)
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Firearms Guidelines....................... X X ML082560848
Environmental Assessment (October 2006 X X ML061920093
proposed rule).
Regulatory Analysis Regulatory Analysis- X X ML061380803
appendices (October 2006 proposed rule). ML061380796
ML061440013
Information Collection Analysis........... X X ML092640277
NRC Form 754.............................. X X ML092650459
Commission: SECY-08-0050 (April 17, 2008). X X ML072920478
Commission: SECY-08-0050A (July 8, 2008).. X X ML081910207
Commission: SRM-SECY-08-0050/0050A (August X X ML082280364
15, 2008).
Letter Opinion from Bureau of Alcohol, X X ML090080191
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives' Office
of Enforcement on the Transfer of
Enhanced Weapons (January 5, 2009).
Proposed Enhanced Weapons, Firearms X X ML103410132
Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications rule (February 3, 2011).
DG-5020 ``Applying for Enhanced Weapons X X ML100321956
Authority, Applying for Preemption
Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms
Background Checks under 10 CFR Part 73''
(February 3, 2011).
Letter of Christopher E. Earls, on Behalf X ............... ML110480470
of Nuclear Energy Institute, on the
proposed ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms
Background Checks and Security Event
Notifications'' rule, Request for 90-Day
Extension to Comment Period (February 15,
2011).
Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2, Independent X ............... ML113610556
Spent Fuel Storage Installation,
Application for Stand-Alone Preemption
Authority Under 42 U.S.C. 2201a (December
22, 2011).
Commission: SECY-12-0027 (February 17, X X ML113130015
2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0027 (May 3, 2012) X X ML12124A377
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis X X ML042820192
Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,'' Revision 4 (September 30,
2004).
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IX. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274), requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31883). The NRC requests comment on the supplemental proposed rule with
respect to the clarity and effectiveness of the language used.
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104-113), requires that Federal agencies use technical standards
that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is
otherwise impractical. In this supplemental proposed rule, the NRC
proposes to use standards from applicable firearms standards developed
by nationally recognized firearms organizations or standard setting
bodies or from standards developed by (1) Federal agencies, such as the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Training Center, and
the U.S. Department of Defense; (2) State law-enforcement training
centers; or (3) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice
Services (DCJS) Training Academies. The NRC invites comment on the use
of consensus standards.
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
In the proposed rule published on February 3, 2011, the Commission
determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as
amended, and the Commission's regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR part
51, that the proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
The determination of the environmental assessment for this
[[Page 2218]]
supplemental proposed rule is that there will be no significant offsite
impact to the public from this action. Availability of the
environmental assessment is provided in Section VIII, ``Availability of
Documents,'' of this document. Due to the nature of the changes to the
firearms background checks and enhanced weapons provisions presented in
this supplemental proposed rule, the assumptions in the February 2011
proposed rule have not changed. Accordingly, the Commission is not
seeking additional comments on the environmental assessment.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The proposed rule published on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), would
impose new or amended information collection requirements that are
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C 3501, et
seq.). These new or amended information collection requirements were
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under
clearance numbers 3150-0002 and 3150-0204. The existing requirements
for part 73 were previously approved by OMB, approval number 3150-0002.
This supplemental proposed rule does not contain new or amended
information collection requirements not already identified in the
February 3, 2011, proposed rule. However, it would apply these
requirements to the at-reactor ISFSI class of designated facilities.
The estimated number of respondents and licensee burden remain
unchanged from the February 2011 proposed rule. The inclusion of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities will be reflected in the revised OMB clearance
package prepared for the final rule.
The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the
information collections contained in this supplemental proposed rule
and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the
NRC to properly perform its functions? Does the information have
practical utility?
2. Is the burden estimate accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the information collection be
minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology?
A copy of the OMB clearance package for the proposed rule may be
viewed free of charge at the NRC PDR, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Room O1-F21, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The OMB
clearance package and supplemental proposed rule are available at the
NRC's Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/ for
30 days after the signature date of this document.
Send comments on any aspect of these proposed regulations related
to information collections, including suggestions for reducing the
burden and on the above issues, by February 11, 2013 to the Information
Services Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 205550001, or by email to [email protected];
and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
NEOB-10202 (3150-0002 and 3150-0204), Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503. You may also email comments to [email protected] or comment by telephone at 202-395-4718.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XIII. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC prepared a draft regulatory analysis for the proposed rule
published on February 3, 2011, (see Section VIII, ``Availability of
Documents,'' of this document). The analysis examined the costs and
benefits of the Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA. The
regulatory analysis has been updated to reflect the addition of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities.
The NRC is taking action to conform implementing regulations to the
Firearms Guidelines issued by the Commission, with the approval of the
U.S. Attorney General. The requirements identified by this supplemental
proposed rule were also identified in the February 2011 proposed rule.
In this regulatory analysis, the NRC is providing a summary of the cost
and benefit estimates from the February 2011 proposed rule and noting
the changes necessitated by this supplemental proposed rule. The NRC
considers the costs and benefits associated with applying for enhanced
weapons to be unchanged from those described by the draft regulatory
analysis in the February 2011 proposed rule, as the plans and analysis
required to accompany an application have not changed. However,
additional requirements have been added because of the addition of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities. These proposed regulations have been
developed to be consistent with the issued Firearms Guidelines. This
regulatory analysis was developed following the guidance contained in
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,'' Revision 4, issued September 2004 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML042820192).
1. Statement of the Problem and Objective
The NRC is proposing regulations that would implement its authority
under Section 161A of the AEA and revise existing regulations governing
security event notifications. On September 11, 2009, with the approval
of the U.S. Attorney General, the NRC published the Firearms Guidelines
(74 FR 46800); these guidelines relate to the NRC's implementation of
the new statutory authority.
The NRC proposed new regulations on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200),
that would implement the new statutory authority. The NRC is now
proposing further revisions that will address the voluntary application
for enhanced weapons and the mandatory firearms background checks under
Section 161A to include as a class of designated facilities called at-
reactor ISFSIs.
2. Identification and Analysis of Alternative Approaches to the Problem
Because this rulemaking is in response to the statutorily mandated
provisions of Section 161A of the AEA and the direction provided by the
Firearms Guidelines issued by the Commission, there are no acceptable
alternatives to the proposed rulemaking. Application for enhanced
weapons authority and preemption authority under Section 161A is
voluntary; however, licensee and certificate holder compliance with the
firearms background checks under Section 161A is mandatory for certain
designated classes of licensees. Consequently, the no-action option is
used only as a basis against which to measure the costs and benefits of
this rulemaking.
3. Estimation and Evaluation of Values and Impacts
In general the parties that would be affected by this supplemental
proposed rule are the licensees and certificate holders (there is no
impact on applicants since they are not subject to the firearms
background check requirements), the NRC, the public surrounding the
plants, the on-site employees of the licensees and certificate holders,
the FBI, and the
[[Page 2219]]
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).
The following attributes are expected to be affected by this
rulemaking. Their impacts are quantified where possible. Impacts to
accident-related attributes are qualified because estimates of
occurrences of possible attacks and their successful repulsions are
unknown. Further, even if reliable estimates were available, they would
be considered Safeguards Information and not to be released for public
dissemination.
Safeguards and Security Considerations--The proposed
actions regarding access to enhanced weapons and mandatory firearms
background checks will comply with statutory requirements and provide
high assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and
security will be enhanced because of licensees' and certificate
holders' increased ability to repulse an attack.
Industry Implementation--The supplemental proposed rule
would require licensees and certificate holders with at-reactor ISFSI
facilities to subject their security personnel to a fingerprint-based
background check and a firearms background check against the NICS.
Also, the rule would give licensees and certificate holders in
Commission-designated classes of facilities the option to apply for
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or
standalone preemption authority. If a licensee or certificate holder is
so inclined, it must submit plans and analysis to the NRC on their
proposed deployment of enhanced weapons. The NRC must then act on the
request. If the NRC approves the request, a licensee or certificate
holder would apply to ATF to transfer the authorized enhanced weapons
to its facility. Industry would need to develop procedures to comply
with these requirements.
For purposes of this analysis, the NRC staff assumed that all
licensees and certificate holders who fall within the proposed
designated classes of facilities would take advantage of making use of
enhanced weapons protection (i.e., 65 operating power reactor sites
(which includes 53 at-reactor ISFSI facilities), 15 decommissioning
power reactor sites, and 2 Cat. I SSNM facilities for a total of 82
facilities). The staff assumed that the licensee's or certificate
holder's security personnel required to protect the operating power
reactor site would also protect any at-reactor ISFSI facility without
any increase in onsite staff. Since the total number of facilities is
the same as was used in the draft regulatory analysis in the February
2011 proposed rule, the industry implementation cost and assumptions
have not changed and are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhanced Weapons Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhanced weapons cost per site........................ $50,000
\1/2\ staff year to change security, training and 80,000
qualification, contingency response plans and
security event notification reports and to develop
the weapons safety assessment and submit these
documents to the NRC for its review and approval per
site.................................................
\1/4\ staff year to complete ATF paperwork, acquire 40,000
the enhanced weapons, develop new training standards
and then train security personnel, and deploy the
weapons per site.....................................
-----------------
Total individual site's implementation cost for 170,000
the voluntary enhanced weapons regulations.......
-----------------
Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the 13,940,000
industry \1\.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firearms Background Checks Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1/6\ staff year to establish a program for the 26,700
mandatory firearms background checks per site........
-----------------
Total program cost for mandatory firearms 2,190,000
background checks to industry \1\................
-----------------
NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for 11,400
the mandatory firearms background checks for each
operating reactor and Cat. I SSNM facility...........
NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for 5,700
the mandatory firearms background checks for each
decommissioned reactor site..........................
-----------------
Total industry cost for performing the first-time 849,000
background checks................................
-----------------
Total industry implementation costs............... 16,979,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Please note that throughout this analysis sums may not equal shown
total values because of rounding. Also, this cost analysis does not
include any transfer tax payments required from a licensee to register
an enhanced weapon with ATF under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C.
Chapter 53), since those costs fall under ATF's sole regulatory
purview.
Industry Operation--Enhanced weapon inventories'
requirements of the February 2011 proposed rule, both monthly and semi-
annually, would result in operating expenses for industry. Since the
total number of facilities, including sites with at-reactor ISFSIs, are
the same as was used in the draft regulatory analysis in the February
2011 proposed rule, the industry inventory cost and assumptions have
not changed and are summarized in Table 2.
[[Page 2220]]
Table 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Enhanced Weapons Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly and semi-annual automatic weapon inventories cost $5,600
per site..................................................
------------
Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the 460,000
industry..............................................
------------
Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the 6,100,000
industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining
lifetime..............................................
------------
Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the 11,200,000
industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining
lifetime..............................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Firearms Background Checks Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual mandatory firearms background checks per site....... 3,800
------------
Total program cost for mandatory firearms background 3,401,000
checks to industry with a 7 percent discount rate over
remaining lifetime....................................
------------
Total program cost for mandatory firearms background 6,468,000
checks to industry with a 3 percent discount rate over
remaining lifetime....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the security event notification reporting
requirements, cyber and physical intrusions, suspicious activity
reports, unauthorized operation or tampering events, reporting enhanced
weapons being lost or stolen or adverse ATF findings, and the impact of
events requiring entry in the safeguards event log the addition of at-
reactor facilities will not have an impact on this analysis.
The total industry operating costs are the sum of the recurring
inventory requirements ($6.1 million given the 7 percent real discount
rate and $11.2 million with the 3 percent rate), the background checks
($3.7 million at 7 percent and $6.5 million at 3 percent), and the
security event notification reports ($15.1 million using the 7 percent
rate and $28.6 million with the 3 percent rate). This total is
estimated to range from $24.9 million (7 percent) to $46.3 million (3
percent rate) which is unchanged from the February 2011 proposed rule.
NRC Implementation--The NRC's implementation costs include
the labor cost for the development of the final rule and the supporting
regulatory guidance (two regulatory guides and the weapons safety
assessment). The NRC would also need to develop appropriate inspection
procedures to confirm compliance with this rule. As with the cost
associated with the industry implementation, the addition of the at-
reactor facilities will not increase the labor cost to the NRC beyond
what was outlined in the February 2011 proposed rule. The NRC's
implementation costs are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Implementation Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop final rule, final regulatory guidance, and $280,000
inspection procedures.....................................
NRC review of each licensee's and certificate holder's 3,280,000
security plan, training and qualification plan,
contingency response plan, weapons safety assessment, and
one round of Requests for Additional Information questions
------------
Total NRC Implementation Costs......................... 3,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Operation--The NRC would need to inspect the
licensees' and certificate holders' periodic inventories,
recordkeeping, and training and qualification of enhanced weapons as a
result of this rule. The addition of the at-reactor facilities will not
increase the operational cost to the NRC beyond what was assumed in the
February 2011 proposed rule. The NRC's operational costs are summarized
in Table 4.
Table 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Inventory Inspection Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st year of NRC inspections of licensee's and certificate $131,200
holder's automatic weapon inventories.....................
Annual NRC inspections of licensee's and certificate 65,600
holder's automatic weapon inventories after 1st year......
------------
Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee's and 934,000
certificate holder's automatic weapon inventories of
the industry with a 7 percent discount rate over
remaining lifetime....................................
------------
Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee's and 1,665,000
certificate holder's automatic weapon inventories of
the industry with a 3 percent discount rate over
remaining lifetime....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Records Inspection Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st year of NRC record inspections of licensee's and 131,200
certificate holder's background checks....................
Annual NRC record inspections of licensee's and certificate 65,600
holder's background checks after 1st year.................
------------
[[Page 2221]]
Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee's 934,000
and certificate holder's background checks of the
industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining
lifetime..............................................
------------
Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee's 1,665,000
and certificate holder's background checks of the
industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining
lifetime..............................................
------------
NRC's total operating costs with a 7 percent discount 1,900,000
rate..................................................
------------
NRC's total operating costs with a 3 percent discount 3,300,000
rate..................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Efficiency--The proposed action would result in
enhanced regulatory efficiency through regulatory and compliance
improvements based upon statutory mandates involving the voluntary
possession of enhanced weapons and mandatory firearms background checks
at power reactor facilities, at-reactor ISFSIs, and Cat. I SSNM
facilities. The proposed action would also result in enhanced
regulatory efficiency involving the NRC's ability to monitor ongoing
security events at a range of licensed facilities, and the ability to
rapidly communicate information on security events at such facilities
to other NRC-regulated facilities and other government agencies, as
necessary.
Public Health (Accident)--The proposed action could reduce
the risk that public health will be affected by radiological releases
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an
attack.
Occupational Health (Accident)--The proposed action could
reduce the risk that occupational health will be affected by
radiological releases because of the increased likelihood of a
successful repulsion of an attack.
Off-Site Property--The proposed action could reduce the
risk that off-site property will be affected by radiological releases
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an
attack.
On-Site Property--The proposed action could reduce the
risk that on-site property will be affected by radiological releases
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an
attack.
Other Government Agencies--The FBI would be affected by
this rule because of its role in processing the mandatory fingerprint
checks and firearms background checks the statute requires. The ATF
would be affected by this rule because of its involvement with the
approval to transfer enhanced weapons to and from an authorized NRC
licensee or certificate holder. Note: The FBI's fees for fingerprinting
checks are incorporated within the NRC's fee previously discussed. The
FBI does not charge a fee for processing firearms background checks.
Also, as previously noted in the February 2011 proposed rule, the ATF
taxes to transfer enhanced weapons are not included in this analysis.
Attributes that are not expected to be affected under any of the
rulemaking options include the following: occupational health
(routine); public health (routine); environmental considerations;
general public; improvements in knowledge; and antitrust
considerations.
4. Presentation of Results
Section 161A of the AEA requires several modifications to 10 CFR
part 73. The pertinent sections and appendices which are being revised
in this supplemental proposed rule are Sec. Sec. 73.2,
``Definitions,'' 73.18, ``Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and
preemption of firearms laws,'' 73.19, ``Firearms background checks for
armed security personnel,'' and 73.51, ``Requirements for the physical
protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste.''
The fundamental incentive for a licensee or certificate holder to
choose to obtain enhanced weapons is to increase their defensive
capabilities to provide high assurance that public health and safety
and the common defense and security will be adequately protected from
any attempts at radiological sabotage. A licensee's or certificate
holder's decision to apply for enhanced weapons authority is voluntary.
They must evaluate for their specific site whether the costs and
benefits of using enhanced weapons are appropriate in general; and if
appropriate in general, which specific types of weapons are appropriate
for their particular site and protective strategy. The firearms
background checks will provide assurance that security personnel
possessing enhanced weapons are not barred under Federal and State law
from receiving, possessing, transporting, or using any covered weapons
and ammunition. The NRC staff notes that while licensees and
certificate holders would be required to pay an excise tax when
transferring enhanced weapons, the tax is not considered a cost of this
proposed rule because it is a result of ATF regulations.
The total industry enhanced weapons implementation costs is
$13,940,000. The total enhanced weapons mandatory background checks
program costs to the industry is $2,190,000, and the total first-time
background checks for the industry is $849,000. The sum of the total
industry implementation cost is $17.0 million. The industry operating
costs for this supplemental proposed rule when discounted as flows of
funds and based on the assumed lengths of lives of the various
facilities ranged from $9.5 million to $17.7 million, given the 7
percent and 3 percent real discount rates, respectively.
The total costs to industry, including both implementation and
operating expenses for this supplemental proposed rule are estimated to
range from $26.5 million to $34.7 million, again given the 7 percent
and 3 percent real discount rates, respectively.
The NRC's implementation costs are almost $3.6 million. The
recurring or annual costs are calculated to have a present value of
$1.9 million (7 percent rate) to $3.3 million (3 percent rate).
Therefore, the total estimated NRC costs range from about $5.5 million
(7 percent rate) to $6.9 million (3 percent rate).
The total quantitative costs estimates for this supplemental
proposed rulemaking are estimated to be from $32.0 million (7 percent)
to $41.6 million (3 percent).
Disaggregation
In order to comply with the guidance provided in Section 4.3.2
(Criteria for the Treatment of Individual Requirements) of the NRC's
Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, the NRC conducted a screening review to
ensure that the aggregate analysis does not mask the inclusion of
individual rule provisions that are not cost-beneficial when considered
individually and not necessary to meet the goals of the rulemaking.
Consistent with the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, the NRC evaluated,
on a disaggregated basis, each new regulatory provision expected to
result in incremental costs. Given that the NRC is required to comply
with Section 161A of the AEA, the NRC
[[Page 2222]]
believes that each of these provisions is necessary and cost-justified
based on its resulting qualitative benefits, as previously discussed.
5. Decision Rationale
Relative to the ``no-action'' alternative, the supplemental
proposed rule would cost the industry from around $26.5 million to
$34.7 million over the average lifetime of the plants. The total NRC
costs would range from $5.5 million to slightly under $7 million. Total
costs of the supplemental proposed rule are estimated to range from
around $32 million to $42 million. The requirements in this
supplemental proposed rule are the result of the new Section 161A of
the AEA. The NRC concluded that for all of these requirements, and
their corresponding costs, the proposed approach is appropriate.
Although the NRC did not quantify the benefits of this rule, the
staff did qualitatively examine benefits and concluded that the rule
would provide safety and security-related benefits. Offsetting this net
cost, the NRC believes that the rule would result in substantial non-
quantified benefits related to safety and security, as well as enhanced
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, the NRC believes
that the rule is cost-justified for several qualitative reasons. First,
the supplemental proposed rule would provide increased defensive
capability of licensees and certificate holders and thus would increase
the assurance that a licensee can adequately protect an at-reactor
ISFSI facility against an external assault. Second, the supplemental
proposed rule would provide a mechanism to accomplish a statutory
mandate to verify that security officers protecting such facilities are
not disqualified under Federal or State law from possessing or using
firearms and ammunition. Lastly, as previously indicated, application
for enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority under Section
161A is voluntary.
Based on the NRC's assessment of the costs and benefits of the
supplemental proposed rule on licensee and certificate holder
facilities, the agency has concluded that the supplemental proposed
rule provisions would be justified.
6. Implementation
The final rule is to take effect 60 days after publication in the
FR. A compliance date of 180 days after publication of the final rule
will also be established for some provisions of this rule. The NRC
staff does not expect this rule to have any impact on other
requirements.
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the NRC certifies that this rule would not, if promulgated,
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. With respect to the enhanced weapons and firearms background
check provisions, this supplemental proposed rule affects only the
licensing and operation of nuclear power reactors, at-reactor ISFSIs,
and fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess and use Category I
quantities of SSNM. The companies that own or operate these facilities
or conduct these activities do not fall within the scope of the
definition of ``small entities'' presented in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR
2.810).
XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality
The NRC evaluated the aggregated set of requirements in this
supplemental proposed rule that constitute backfitting in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, and the finality provisions in 10 CFR
part 52. The NRC's evaluation of changes in accordance with 10 CFR
10.109, 70.76, and the finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52 is
described in the draft regulatory analysis on the proposed rule
published on February 3, 2011. The Availability information for the
draft regulatory (and backfit) analysis is provided in Section VIII,
``Availability of Documents,'' of this document. This analysis examined
the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the NRC. The
regulations in 10 CFR 72.62 pertain to changes in requirements for
ISFSI facilities, which is the subject of the supplemental proposed
rule. However, the supplemental proposed rule will not change the
requirements from the proposed rule; it simply applies the proposed
requirements to an additional class of facilities. Therefore the
evaluation of changes presented in the proposed rule from February 2011
also applies to this supplemental proposed rule and the evaluation is
in accordance with 10 CFR 72.62.
The provisions of this supplemental proposed rule do not constitute
backfitting because they are voluntary in nature, and would therefore
not impose modifications or additions to existing structures,
components, or designs, or existing procedures or organizations. These
provisions include those related to application for the use of enhanced
weapons and/or preemption authority. Other provisions of the rule
implementing Section 161A of the AEA, such as the mandatory firearms
background checks, are not backfits because they implement mandatory
provisions required by statute.
To the extent that some of the specific implementing details of the
firearms background checks described in this proposed rule are not
specifically mandated by statute, or the Firearms Guidelines issued by
the Commission with the approval of the U.S. Attorney General, the
Commission believes that such measures are essential for the effective
implementation of the rule's requirements, and thus necessary for the
adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and are in
accord with the common defense and security.
Therefore, for the reasons previously stated, a backfit analysis is
not required and has not been completed for any of the provisions of
this supplemental proposed rule.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the AEA, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended;
and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC proposes to amend 10 CFR part 73 and proposes
to further amend 10 CFR part 73, as proposed to be amended at 76 FR
6200, February 3, 2011, as follows:
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
0
1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act sections 53, 147, 161, 223, 234,
1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2273, 2282, 2297(f),
2210(e)); Energy Reorganization Act sections 201, 204 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5844); Government Paperwork Elimination Act section 1704, 112
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Section 73.1 also issued under Nuclear Waste Policy Act sections
135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued
under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
0
2. In Sec. 73.2, paragraph (a), a definition for ``At-reactor
independent spent fuel storage installation'' is added in alphabetical
order to read as follows:
Sec. 73.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
[[Page 2223]]
At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installation or at-
reactor ISFSI means an ISFSI whose physical security program is
conducted as a support activity of the co-located power reactor
facility licensed under parts 50 or 52 of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
3. In Sec. 73.18, paragraph (c), as proposed to be added at 76 FR
6233, February 3, 2011, is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.18 Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption
of firearms laws.
* * * * *
(c) Applicability. (1) Stand-alone preemption authority. The
following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other
property are designated by the Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
(i) Power reactor facilities;
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (Gy) (100 Rad) per hour at
a distance of 1 meter (m) (3.3 feet [ft]), without regard to any
intervening shielding; and
(iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
(2) Combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority.
The following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other
property are designated by the Commission under 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
(i) Power reactor facilities;
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gy (100 Rad) per hour at a
distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), without regard to any intervening shielding;
and
(iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
* * * * *
0
4. In Sec. 73.19, paragraph (c), as proposed to be added at 76 FR
6237, February 3, 2011, is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.19 Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.
* * * * *
(c) Applicability. For the purposes of firearms background checks,
the following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other
property are designated by the Commission at 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
(1) Power reactor facilities;
(2) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (100 Rad) per hour at a
distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet), without regard to any intervening
shielding; and
(3) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
* * * * *
0
5. In Sec. 73.51, paragraph (b)(4) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4)(i) The licensee shall ensure that the firearms background check
requirements of Sec. 73.19 of this part are met for all members of the
security organization whose official duties require access to covered
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
(ii) For licensees who are issued a license after [effective date
of final rule], the licensee shall ensure that the firearms background
check requirements of Sec. 73.19 of this part are met for all members
of the security organization whose official duties require access to
covered weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons. Additionally and
notwithstanding the implementation schedule provisions of Sec.
73.19(b), such licensees shall ensure that the firearms background
check requirements of Sec. 73.19 are satisfactorily completed within
180 days of the issuance of the license, or within 180 days of the
implementation of a protective strategy that uses covered weapons,
whichever is later.
(iii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to
licensees subject to this section who store spent nuclear fuel in an
at-reactor ISFSI.
* * * * *
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of December, 2012.
R.W. Borchardt,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-00237 Filed 1-9-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P