[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 7 (Thursday, January 10, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 2214-2223]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00237]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 7 / Thursday, January 10, 2013 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 2214]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

[NRC-2011-0018]
RIN 3150-AI49


Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Supplemental proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is proposing regulations that would implement its authority under 
Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and 
revise existing regulations governing security event notifications. The 
NRC proposed new regulations on February 3, 2011, that would implement 
its authority under Section 161A. The NRC is now proposing to further 
revise its regulations that address the voluntary application for 
enhanced weapons authority, preemption authority, and the mandatory 
firearms background checks under Section 161A to include as a class of 
designated facilities at-reactor, independent spent fuel storage 
installations (ISFSIs).

DATES: Submit comments on this supplemental proposed rule by February 
25, 2013. Submit comments specific to the information collection burden 
aspects of this supplemental proposed rule by February 11, 2013. 
Comments received after these dates will be considered if it is 
practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure consideration only 
for comments received on or before these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related 
to this supplemental proposed rule, which the NRC possesses and are 
publicly available, by searching on http://www.regulations.gov under 
Docket ID NRC-2011-0018. You may submit comments by any of the 
following methods (unless this document describes a different method 
for submitting comments on a specific subject):
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: [email protected].
     Email Comments to: [email protected]. If you do 
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact 
us at 301-415-1677.
     Fax Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission at 301-415-1101.
     Mail Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff.
     Hand Deliver Comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern Time) Federal 
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Margaret E. Stambaugh, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-7069; email: 
[email protected]; or Mr. Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear 
Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6557; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
II. Background
III. Discussion
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Writing
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2011-0018 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information for this supplemental proposed 
rule. You may access information related to this supplemental proposed 
rule, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC 
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number 
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is 
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS 
accession numbers are provided in a table in Section VIII, 
``Availability of Documents,'' of this document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2011-0018 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your 
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into 
ADAMS.

[[Page 2215]]

The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove 
identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Background

A. Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA

    On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section 
653 of the EPAct amended the AEA by adding Section 161A, ``Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel'' (42 U.S.C. 2201a). Section 161A of the 
AEA provides the NRC with authority that will enhance security at 
designated NRC licensee and certificate holder facilities. As required 
by Section 161A.d, the provisions of Section 161A took effect when the 
Commission, with the approval of the U.S. Attorney General, published 
the approved Firearms Guidelines in the Federal Register (FR) on 
September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46800). The issued Firearms Guidelines may be 
found on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket IDs NRC-2008-0465 and 
NRC-2011-0018.
    Section 161A requires the Commission to designate the classes of 
facilities, radioactive material, and other property eligible to apply 
for preemption or enhanced weapon authority. Section 161A also mandates 
that all security personnel with duties requiring access to covered 
weapons, as defined in the Firearms Guidelines, who are engaged in the 
protection of Commission-designated facilities, radioactive material, 
or other property owned or operated by an NRC licensee or certificate 
holder, be subject to a fingerprint-based background check by the U.S. 
Attorney General and a firearms background check against the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Background Check 
System (NICS).

B. October 2006 Proposed Rule--Implementation of Section 161A of the 
AEA

    In parallel with the development of the Firearms Guidelines, the 
NRC initiated a rulemaking to develop implementing regulations. On 
October 26, 2006, the NRC published proposed regulations (71 FR 62664) 
to implement the provisions of Section 161A as part of a larger 
proposed amendment to its regulations under parts 50, 72, and 73 of 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Power Reactor 
Security Requirements.'' These proposed implementing regulations were 
based upon the draft version of the Firearms Guidelines that existed in 
September 2006.
    The NRC had proposed that the provisions of Section 161A would 
apply only to power reactor facilities and Category I Strategic Special 
Nuclear Material (Cat. I SSNM) facilities (i.e., facilities possessing 
or using formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear 
material). This would permit these two highest risk classes of licensed 
facilities to apply to the NRC for Section 161A authority (either 
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or stand-
alone preemption authority). The NRC had also indicated that it would 
consider making Section 161A authority available to additional classes 
of facilities, radioactive material, or other property (including 
ISFSIs) in a separate, future rulemaking.

C. February 2011 Proposed Rule--Implementation of Section 161A of the 
AEA

    Once the approved Firearms Guidelines were published in the FR on 
September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46800), the NRC continued developing the 
proposed rulemaking based upon the Firearms Guidelines. On February 3, 
2011, the NRC published proposed regulations in the FR (76 FR 6200) 
that would implement the provisions of Section 161A and make several 
changes to the security event notification requirements in 10 CFR part 
73 to address imminent attacks or threats against power reactors as 
well as suspicious events that could be indicative of potential 
reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security systems by 
adversaries. The public was provided a total of 180 days to review and 
comment on the February 2011 proposed rule and associated guidance.

III. Discussion

    Section 161A allows the NRC to authorize licensees and certificate 
holders to use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded 
arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-automatic, large-
capacity, assault weapons. As indicated in the February 2011 proposed 
rule, an NRC licensee or certificate holder interested in obtaining 
Section 161A authority (either combined enhanced weapons authority and 
preemption authority or preemption authority alone) could voluntarily 
apply to the NRC to take advantage of this new authority. Licensees and 
certificate holders within the designated classes eligible to apply for 
Section 161A authority would be required to complete the firearms 
background check requirements mandated by Section 161A and the Firearms 
Guidelines.
    In a recent letter, a licensee requested that the NRC grant 
preemption authority for two operating power reactors and the at-
reactor ISFSI co-located at the plant site (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML113610556). The February 2011 proposed rule did not contemplate at-
reactor ISFSIs under the applicability statement, but rather identifies 
ISFSIs as a class of facility that would be considered for inclusion 
under a future rulemaking. The staff's intent in the February 2011 
proposed rule was first to establish the regulatory framework for 
granting preemption and enhanced weapons authority to those facilities 
deemed to be of greatest significance (i.e., power reactors and Cat. I 
SSNM facilities). In light of the request from the licensee, the staff 
recommended to the Commission in SECY-12-0027 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML113130015) that at-reactor ISFSIs be designated as a class of 
licensees eligible to apply for the authority granted under Section 
161A. In Staff Requirements Memorandum SRM-SECY-12-0027 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML12124A377), the Commission disapproved the staff's 
recommendation in SECY-12-0027 regarding the issuance of confirmatory 
orders for at-reactor ISFSIs. Instead, the Commission directed the 
staff to consider expanding the scope of the current enhanced weapons 
rule to include at-reactor ISFSIs. This supplemental proposed rule 
responds to the Commission's direction.
    In this supplemental proposed rule, the NRC would add at-reactor 
ISFSIs to the scope of the enhanced weapons proposed rule. The NRC 
considers an at-reactor ISFSI to be an ISFSI whose physical security 
program is conducted as a support activity of the co-located power 
reactor facility licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. As previously 
noted, the NRC is taking this approach to address the facilities of 
highest concern first. At-reactor ISFSIs have been added

[[Page 2216]]

to the facilities of highest concern because the same security 
personnel and weaponry that protect a power reactor, also protect the 
at-reactor ISFSI. An ISFSI that is co-located with a power reactor 
facility that has been decommissioned (i.e., the power complex and 
spent fuel pool have been removed), but has not yet terminated its 
reactor license, does not rely on the power reactor security force to 
implement its protective strategy. Therefore, an ISFSI co-located at a 
decommissioned power reactor is not considered an at-reactor ISFSI for 
the purposes of this supplemental rule. The NRC considers this approach 
consistent with that for a standalone ISFSI, which was never co-located 
with a power reactor.
    The February 2011 proposed rule recommends adding two new sections 
to 10 CFR part 73. The proposed Sec.  73.18(c) would identify the 
specific classes of licensee facilities, radioactive material, and 
other property designated by the Commission under Section 161A that 
would be eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or for 
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority. The 
proposed Sec.  73.19(c) would identify the specific classes of 
facilities, radioactive material, and other property designated by the 
Commission under Section 161A that would be subject to the firearms 
background check requirements. In this supplemental proposed rule, the 
NRC would designate three classes of facilities as subject to the 
requirements of proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19: power reactor 
facilities, at-reactor ISFSIs, and Cat. I SSNM facilities.
    In the February 2011 proposed rule that would implement the 
Firearms Guidelines, the NRC proposed amendments to 10 CFR part 73 by 
adding new definitions, processes for obtaining enhanced weapons, 
requirements for firearms background checks, and event notification 
requirements for stolen or lost enhanced weapons. This supplemental 
proposed rule continues those proposed changes and adds to or modifies 
the following regulations in 10 CFR part 73:
     Section 73.2, Definitions.
     Section 73.18, Authorization for use of enhanced weapons 
and preemption of firearms laws.
     Section 73.19, Firearms background checks for armed 
security personnel.
     Section 73.51, Requirements for the physical protection of 
stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

A. Overview

    The following section-by-section analysis discusses proposed 
revisions to the NRC's regulations that were not part of the proposed 
rule published on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200). At this time, the NRC 
is only seeking comments on the revisions proposed by this supplemental 
rule. The NRC will address public comments on both the February 2011 
proposed rule and this supplemental proposed rule in the Federal 
Register notice for the final rule.
    This supplemental proposed rulemaking to 10 CFR part 73 would 
revise two new sections (Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19) proposed to be 
added to the NRC's regulation in the February 2011 rule, and revise two 
existing sections (Sec. Sec.  73.2 and 73.51) to make conforming 
changes.

B. Definitions (Sec.  73.2)

    New definition for the term At-reactor independent spent fuel 
storage installation or at-reactor ISFSI would be added in alphabetical 
order to the definitions in Sec.  73.2(a). The NRC would consider an 
at-reactor ISFSI to be an ISFSI whose physical security program is 
conducted as a support activity of the co-located power reactor 
facility licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52.

C. Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of Firearms 
Laws (Sec.  73.18)

    Paragraph (c) would list the designated classes for either stand-
alone preemption authority or combined enhanced weapons authority and 
preemption authority. In addition to the classes of facilities 
identified in the February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC would include 
at-reactor ISFSIs within the designated classes. The NRC continues to 
intend to specify any additional classes of authorized facilities, 
radioactive material, and other property in a separate, future 
rulemaking.

D. Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel (Sec.  
73.19)

    In paragraph (c), the NRC would designate the classes of 
facilities, radioactive material, and other property that are 
appropriate for firearms background checks. In addition to the classes 
of facilities identified in the February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC 
would include at-reactor ISFSIs within the designated classes. The NRC 
intends to specify any additional classes of authorized facilities, 
radioactive material, and other property in a separate, future 
rulemaking.

E. Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear 
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (Sec.  73.51)

    In paragraph (b)(4), the NRC would add a conforming change to 
provide a cross reference to the new firearms background check 
requirements in Sec.  73.19 for armed security personnel. Additionally, 
the NRC would provide implementation schedule information for future 
licensees. This conforming change is identical to the conforming 
changes proposed to Sec. Sec.  73.46 and 73.55 for Cat. I SSNM and 
power reactor facilities, respectively, in the February 2011 proposed 
rule (see Sections V.F and V.G at pp 6221 and 6222 of that Federal 
Register notice).

V. Guidance

    The NRC prepared a new draft regulatory guide (DG), DG-5020, 
``Applying for Enhanced Weapons Authority, Applying for Preemption 
Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms Background Checks under 10 CFR 
part 73'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML100321956), which contains detailed 
guidance on the implementation of the proposed requirements for 
applying for enhanced weapons and conducting firearms background 
checks. The DG was made available for public comment on February 3, 
2011 (76 FR 6086). Public comments and supporting materials related to 
DG-5020 can be found on http://www.regulations.gov by searching on 
Docket ID NRC-2011-0015.
    However, DG-5020 did not include at-reactor ISFSIs under the 
applicability section; rather, the DG reserved a section for additional 
facilities to be added by future rulemakings or Commission orders. The 
addition of at-reactor ISFSIs facilities to the DG as an eligible class 
of licensees to receive preemption authority would not appreciably 
change the guidance contained in the DG. A licensee with an at-reactor 
ISFSI would have to take the same steps to request this authority as 
the facilities currently listed in the DG (i.e., power reactor and Cat. 
I SSNM facilities).
    The NRC will issue a final regulatory guide coincident with the 
publication of a final rule that will include at-reactor ISFSIs in the 
applicability section of DG-5020 so that it conforms to the 
requirements of the supplemental proposed rule. Since those conforming 
changes to the DG do not constitute a significant change to the 
guidance, the NRC has determined that further public

[[Page 2217]]

and stakeholder opportunity to comment on DG-5020 is not necessary for 
this supplemental proposed rule notice.

VI. Criminal Penalties

    For the purposes of Section 223 of the AEA, as amended, the 
Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR part 73 under Sections 161b, 
161i, or 161o of the AEA. Criminal penalties, as they apply to 
regulations in 10 CFR part 73, are discussed in Sec.  73.81. The new 
Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 
161o of the AEA. Violations of these new sections are subject to 
possible criminal penalties; and therefore they are not included in 
Sec.  73.81(b).

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

    Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20, 
1997, and published in the FR (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 
supplemental proposed rule is classified as compatibility Category 
``NRC'' and new Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19 are designated as Category 
``NRC'' regulations. Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' 
regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that 
relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA 
or the provisions of Title 10 of the CFR, and although an Agreement 
State may not adopt program elements reserved to the NRC, it may wish 
to inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is 
consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws, 
but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.

VIII. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified in the following table 
available to interested persons through one or more of the following 
methods as indicated.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Document                         PDR              Web                NRC Library (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firearms Guidelines.......................               X                X   ML082560848
Environmental Assessment (October 2006                   X                X   ML061920093
 proposed rule).
Regulatory Analysis Regulatory Analysis-                 X                X   ML061380803
 appendices (October 2006 proposed rule).                                     ML061380796
                                                                              ML061440013
Information Collection Analysis...........               X                X   ML092640277
NRC Form 754..............................               X                X   ML092650459
Commission: SECY-08-0050 (April 17, 2008).               X                X   ML072920478
Commission: SECY-08-0050A (July 8, 2008)..               X                X   ML081910207
Commission: SRM-SECY-08-0050/0050A (August               X                X   ML082280364
 15, 2008).
Letter Opinion from Bureau of Alcohol,                   X                X   ML090080191
 Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives' Office
 of Enforcement on the Transfer of
 Enhanced Weapons (January 5, 2009).
Proposed Enhanced Weapons, Firearms                      X                X   ML103410132
 Background Checks, and Security Event
 Notifications rule (February 3, 2011).
DG-5020 ``Applying for Enhanced Weapons                  X                X   ML100321956
 Authority, Applying for Preemption
 Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms
 Background Checks under 10 CFR Part 73''
 (February 3, 2011).
Letter of Christopher E. Earls, on Behalf                X   ...............  ML110480470
 of Nuclear Energy Institute, on the
 proposed ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms
 Background Checks and Security Event
 Notifications'' rule, Request for 90-Day
 Extension to Comment Period (February 15,
 2011).
Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2, Independent                X   ...............  ML113610556
 Spent Fuel Storage Installation,
 Application for Stand-Alone Preemption
 Authority Under 42 U.S.C. 2201a (December
 22, 2011).
Commission: SECY-12-0027 (February 17,                   X                X   ML113130015
 2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0027 (May 3, 2012)               X                X   ML12124A377
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis                     X                X   ML042820192
 Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission,'' Revision 4 (September 30,
 2004).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Plain Writing

    The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274), requires Federal 
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized 
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the 
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain 
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 
31883). The NRC requests comment on the supplemental proposed rule with 
respect to the clarity and effectiveness of the language used.

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. 104-113), requires that Federal agencies use technical standards 
that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, 
unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is 
otherwise impractical. In this supplemental proposed rule, the NRC 
proposes to use standards from applicable firearms standards developed 
by nationally recognized firearms organizations or standard setting 
bodies or from standards developed by (1) Federal agencies, such as the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Training Center, and 
the U.S. Department of Defense; (2) State law-enforcement training 
centers; or (3) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) Training Academies. The NRC invites comment on the use 
of consensus standards.

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact

    In the proposed rule published on February 3, 2011, the Commission 
determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 
amended, and the Commission's regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR part 
51, that the proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment 
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
    The determination of the environmental assessment for this

[[Page 2218]]

supplemental proposed rule is that there will be no significant offsite 
impact to the public from this action. Availability of the 
environmental assessment is provided in Section VIII, ``Availability of 
Documents,'' of this document. Due to the nature of the changes to the 
firearms background checks and enhanced weapons provisions presented in 
this supplemental proposed rule, the assumptions in the February 2011 
proposed rule have not changed. Accordingly, the Commission is not 
seeking additional comments on the environmental assessment.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    The proposed rule published on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), would 
impose new or amended information collection requirements that are 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C 3501, et 
seq.). These new or amended information collection requirements were 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under 
clearance numbers 3150-0002 and 3150-0204. The existing requirements 
for part 73 were previously approved by OMB, approval number 3150-0002.
    This supplemental proposed rule does not contain new or amended 
information collection requirements not already identified in the 
February 3, 2011, proposed rule. However, it would apply these 
requirements to the at-reactor ISFSI class of designated facilities. 
The estimated number of respondents and licensee burden remain 
unchanged from the February 2011 proposed rule. The inclusion of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities will be reflected in the revised OMB clearance 
package prepared for the final rule.
    The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the 
information collections contained in this supplemental proposed rule 
and on the following issues:

    1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the 
NRC to properly perform its functions? Does the information have 
practical utility?
    2. Is the burden estimate accurate?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity 
of the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the information collection be 
minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or 
other forms of information technology?

    A copy of the OMB clearance package for the proposed rule may be 
viewed free of charge at the NRC PDR, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Room O1-F21, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The OMB 
clearance package and supplemental proposed rule are available at the 
NRC's Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/ for 
30 days after the signature date of this document.
    Send comments on any aspect of these proposed regulations related 
to information collections, including suggestions for reducing the 
burden and on the above issues, by February 11, 2013 to the Information 
Services Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 205550001, or by email to [email protected]; 
and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
NEOB-10202 (3150-0002 and 3150-0204), Office of Management and Budget, 
Washington, DC 20503. You may also email comments to [email protected] or comment by telephone at 202-395-4718.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

XIII. Regulatory Analysis

    The NRC prepared a draft regulatory analysis for the proposed rule 
published on February 3, 2011, (see Section VIII, ``Availability of 
Documents,'' of this document). The analysis examined the costs and 
benefits of the Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA. The 
regulatory analysis has been updated to reflect the addition of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities.
    The NRC is taking action to conform implementing regulations to the 
Firearms Guidelines issued by the Commission, with the approval of the 
U.S. Attorney General. The requirements identified by this supplemental 
proposed rule were also identified in the February 2011 proposed rule. 
In this regulatory analysis, the NRC is providing a summary of the cost 
and benefit estimates from the February 2011 proposed rule and noting 
the changes necessitated by this supplemental proposed rule. The NRC 
considers the costs and benefits associated with applying for enhanced 
weapons to be unchanged from those described by the draft regulatory 
analysis in the February 2011 proposed rule, as the plans and analysis 
required to accompany an application have not changed. However, 
additional requirements have been added because of the addition of at-
reactor ISFSI facilities. These proposed regulations have been 
developed to be consistent with the issued Firearms Guidelines. This 
regulatory analysis was developed following the guidance contained in 
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission,'' Revision 4, issued September 2004 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML042820192).

1. Statement of the Problem and Objective

    The NRC is proposing regulations that would implement its authority 
under Section 161A of the AEA and revise existing regulations governing 
security event notifications. On September 11, 2009, with the approval 
of the U.S. Attorney General, the NRC published the Firearms Guidelines 
(74 FR 46800); these guidelines relate to the NRC's implementation of 
the new statutory authority.
    The NRC proposed new regulations on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), 
that would implement the new statutory authority. The NRC is now 
proposing further revisions that will address the voluntary application 
for enhanced weapons and the mandatory firearms background checks under 
Section 161A to include as a class of designated facilities called at-
reactor ISFSIs.

2. Identification and Analysis of Alternative Approaches to the Problem

    Because this rulemaking is in response to the statutorily mandated 
provisions of Section 161A of the AEA and the direction provided by the 
Firearms Guidelines issued by the Commission, there are no acceptable 
alternatives to the proposed rulemaking. Application for enhanced 
weapons authority and preemption authority under Section 161A is 
voluntary; however, licensee and certificate holder compliance with the 
firearms background checks under Section 161A is mandatory for certain 
designated classes of licensees. Consequently, the no-action option is 
used only as a basis against which to measure the costs and benefits of 
this rulemaking.

3. Estimation and Evaluation of Values and Impacts

    In general the parties that would be affected by this supplemental 
proposed rule are the licensees and certificate holders (there is no 
impact on applicants since they are not subject to the firearms 
background check requirements), the NRC, the public surrounding the 
plants, the on-site employees of the licensees and certificate holders, 
the FBI, and the

[[Page 2219]]

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).
    The following attributes are expected to be affected by this 
rulemaking. Their impacts are quantified where possible. Impacts to 
accident-related attributes are qualified because estimates of 
occurrences of possible attacks and their successful repulsions are 
unknown. Further, even if reliable estimates were available, they would 
be considered Safeguards Information and not to be released for public 
dissemination.
     Safeguards and Security Considerations--The proposed 
actions regarding access to enhanced weapons and mandatory firearms 
background checks will comply with statutory requirements and provide 
high assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and 
security will be enhanced because of licensees' and certificate 
holders' increased ability to repulse an attack.
     Industry Implementation--The supplemental proposed rule 
would require licensees and certificate holders with at-reactor ISFSI 
facilities to subject their security personnel to a fingerprint-based 
background check and a firearms background check against the NICS. 
Also, the rule would give licensees and certificate holders in 
Commission-designated classes of facilities the option to apply for 
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or 
standalone preemption authority. If a licensee or certificate holder is 
so inclined, it must submit plans and analysis to the NRC on their 
proposed deployment of enhanced weapons. The NRC must then act on the 
request. If the NRC approves the request, a licensee or certificate 
holder would apply to ATF to transfer the authorized enhanced weapons 
to its facility. Industry would need to develop procedures to comply 
with these requirements.
    For purposes of this analysis, the NRC staff assumed that all 
licensees and certificate holders who fall within the proposed 
designated classes of facilities would take advantage of making use of 
enhanced weapons protection (i.e., 65 operating power reactor sites 
(which includes 53 at-reactor ISFSI facilities), 15 decommissioning 
power reactor sites, and 2 Cat. I SSNM facilities for a total of 82 
facilities). The staff assumed that the licensee's or certificate 
holder's security personnel required to protect the operating power 
reactor site would also protect any at-reactor ISFSI facility without 
any increase in onsite staff. Since the total number of facilities is 
the same as was used in the draft regulatory analysis in the February 
2011 proposed rule, the industry implementation cost and assumptions 
have not changed and are summarized in Table 1.

                                 Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Enhanced Weapons Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhanced weapons cost per site........................           $50,000
\1/2\ staff year to change security, training and                 80,000
 qualification, contingency response plans and
 security event notification reports and to develop
 the weapons safety assessment and submit these
 documents to the NRC for its review and approval per
 site.................................................
\1/4\ staff year to complete ATF paperwork, acquire               40,000
 the enhanced weapons, develop new training standards
 and then train security personnel, and deploy the
 weapons per site.....................................
                                                       -----------------
    Total individual site's implementation cost for              170,000
     the voluntary enhanced weapons regulations.......
                                                       -----------------
    Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the        13,940,000
     industry \1\.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Firearms Background Checks Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1/6\ staff year to establish a program for the                   26,700
 mandatory firearms background checks per site........
                                                       -----------------
    Total program cost for mandatory firearms                  2,190,000
     background checks to industry \1\................
                                                       -----------------
NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for              11,400
 the mandatory firearms background checks for each
 operating reactor and Cat. I SSNM facility...........
NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for               5,700
 the mandatory firearms background checks for each
 decommissioned reactor site..........................
                                                       -----------------
    Total industry cost for performing the first-time            849,000
     background checks................................
                                                       -----------------
    Total industry implementation costs...............        16,979,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Please note that throughout this analysis sums may not equal shown
  total values because of rounding. Also, this cost analysis does not
  include any transfer tax payments required from a licensee to register
  an enhanced weapon with ATF under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C.
  Chapter 53), since those costs fall under ATF's sole regulatory
  purview.

     Industry Operation--Enhanced weapon inventories' 
requirements of the February 2011 proposed rule, both monthly and semi-
annually, would result in operating expenses for industry. Since the 
total number of facilities, including sites with at-reactor ISFSIs, are 
the same as was used in the draft regulatory analysis in the February 
2011 proposed rule, the industry inventory cost and assumptions have 
not changed and are summarized in Table 2.

[[Page 2220]]



                                 Table 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Annual Enhanced Weapons Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly and semi-annual automatic weapon inventories cost         $5,600
 per site..................................................
                                                            ------------
    Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the           460,000
     industry..............................................
                                                            ------------
    Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the         6,100,000
     industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining
     lifetime..............................................
                                                            ------------
    Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the        11,200,000
     industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining
     lifetime..............................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Annual Firearms Background Checks Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual mandatory firearms background checks per site.......        3,800
                                                            ------------
    Total program cost for mandatory firearms background       3,401,000
     checks to industry with a 7 percent discount rate over
     remaining lifetime....................................
                                                            ------------
    Total program cost for mandatory firearms background       6,468,000
     checks to industry with a 3 percent discount rate over
     remaining lifetime....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the security event notification reporting 
requirements, cyber and physical intrusions, suspicious activity 
reports, unauthorized operation or tampering events, reporting enhanced 
weapons being lost or stolen or adverse ATF findings, and the impact of 
events requiring entry in the safeguards event log the addition of at-
reactor facilities will not have an impact on this analysis.
    The total industry operating costs are the sum of the recurring 
inventory requirements ($6.1 million given the 7 percent real discount 
rate and $11.2 million with the 3 percent rate), the background checks 
($3.7 million at 7 percent and $6.5 million at 3 percent), and the 
security event notification reports ($15.1 million using the 7 percent 
rate and $28.6 million with the 3 percent rate). This total is 
estimated to range from $24.9 million (7 percent) to $46.3 million (3 
percent rate) which is unchanged from the February 2011 proposed rule.
     NRC Implementation--The NRC's implementation costs include 
the labor cost for the development of the final rule and the supporting 
regulatory guidance (two regulatory guides and the weapons safety 
assessment). The NRC would also need to develop appropriate inspection 
procedures to confirm compliance with this rule. As with the cost 
associated with the industry implementation, the addition of the at-
reactor facilities will not increase the labor cost to the NRC beyond 
what was outlined in the February 2011 proposed rule. The NRC's 
implementation costs are summarized in Table 3.

                                 Table 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        NRC Implementation Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop final rule, final regulatory guidance, and              $280,000
 inspection procedures.....................................
NRC review of each licensee's and certificate holder's         3,280,000
 security plan, training and qualification plan,
 contingency response plan, weapons safety assessment, and
 one round of Requests for Additional Information questions
                                                            ------------
    Total NRC Implementation Costs.........................    3,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     NRC Operation--The NRC would need to inspect the 
licensees' and certificate holders' periodic inventories, 
recordkeeping, and training and qualification of enhanced weapons as a 
result of this rule. The addition of the at-reactor facilities will not 
increase the operational cost to the NRC beyond what was assumed in the 
February 2011 proposed rule. The NRC's operational costs are summarized 
in Table 4.

                                 Table 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     NRC Inventory Inspection Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st year of NRC inspections of licensee's and certificate       $131,200
 holder's automatic weapon inventories.....................
Annual NRC inspections of licensee's and certificate              65,600
 holder's automatic weapon inventories after 1st year......
                                                            ------------
    Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee's and            934,000
     certificate holder's automatic weapon inventories of
     the industry with a 7 percent discount rate over
     remaining lifetime....................................
                                                            ------------
    Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee's and          1,665,000
     certificate holder's automatic weapon inventories of
     the industry with a 3 percent discount rate over
     remaining lifetime....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      NRC Records Inspection Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st year of NRC record inspections of licensee's and             131,200
 certificate holder's background checks....................
Annual NRC record inspections of licensee's and certificate       65,600
 holder's background checks after 1st year.................
                                                            ------------

[[Page 2221]]

 
    Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee's         934,000
     and certificate holder's background checks of the
     industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining
     lifetime..............................................
                                                            ------------
    Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee's       1,665,000
     and certificate holder's background checks of the
     industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining
     lifetime..............................................
                                                            ------------
    NRC's total operating costs with a 7 percent discount      1,900,000
     rate..................................................
                                                            ------------
    NRC's total operating costs with a 3 percent discount      3,300,000
     rate..................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Regulatory Efficiency--The proposed action would result in 
enhanced regulatory efficiency through regulatory and compliance 
improvements based upon statutory mandates involving the voluntary 
possession of enhanced weapons and mandatory firearms background checks 
at power reactor facilities, at-reactor ISFSIs, and Cat. I SSNM 
facilities. The proposed action would also result in enhanced 
regulatory efficiency involving the NRC's ability to monitor ongoing 
security events at a range of licensed facilities, and the ability to 
rapidly communicate information on security events at such facilities 
to other NRC-regulated facilities and other government agencies, as 
necessary.
     Public Health (Accident)--The proposed action could reduce 
the risk that public health will be affected by radiological releases 
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an 
attack.
     Occupational Health (Accident)--The proposed action could 
reduce the risk that occupational health will be affected by 
radiological releases because of the increased likelihood of a 
successful repulsion of an attack.
     Off-Site Property--The proposed action could reduce the 
risk that off-site property will be affected by radiological releases 
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an 
attack.
     On-Site Property--The proposed action could reduce the 
risk that on-site property will be affected by radiological releases 
because of the increased likelihood of a successful repulsion of an 
attack.
     Other Government Agencies--The FBI would be affected by 
this rule because of its role in processing the mandatory fingerprint 
checks and firearms background checks the statute requires. The ATF 
would be affected by this rule because of its involvement with the 
approval to transfer enhanced weapons to and from an authorized NRC 
licensee or certificate holder. Note: The FBI's fees for fingerprinting 
checks are incorporated within the NRC's fee previously discussed. The 
FBI does not charge a fee for processing firearms background checks. 
Also, as previously noted in the February 2011 proposed rule, the ATF 
taxes to transfer enhanced weapons are not included in this analysis.
    Attributes that are not expected to be affected under any of the 
rulemaking options include the following: occupational health 
(routine); public health (routine); environmental considerations; 
general public; improvements in knowledge; and antitrust 
considerations.

4. Presentation of Results

    Section 161A of the AEA requires several modifications to 10 CFR 
part 73. The pertinent sections and appendices which are being revised 
in this supplemental proposed rule are Sec. Sec.  73.2, 
``Definitions,'' 73.18, ``Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and 
preemption of firearms laws,'' 73.19, ``Firearms background checks for 
armed security personnel,'' and 73.51, ``Requirements for the physical 
protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste.''
    The fundamental incentive for a licensee or certificate holder to 
choose to obtain enhanced weapons is to increase their defensive 
capabilities to provide high assurance that public health and safety 
and the common defense and security will be adequately protected from 
any attempts at radiological sabotage. A licensee's or certificate 
holder's decision to apply for enhanced weapons authority is voluntary. 
They must evaluate for their specific site whether the costs and 
benefits of using enhanced weapons are appropriate in general; and if 
appropriate in general, which specific types of weapons are appropriate 
for their particular site and protective strategy. The firearms 
background checks will provide assurance that security personnel 
possessing enhanced weapons are not barred under Federal and State law 
from receiving, possessing, transporting, or using any covered weapons 
and ammunition. The NRC staff notes that while licensees and 
certificate holders would be required to pay an excise tax when 
transferring enhanced weapons, the tax is not considered a cost of this 
proposed rule because it is a result of ATF regulations.
    The total industry enhanced weapons implementation costs is 
$13,940,000. The total enhanced weapons mandatory background checks 
program costs to the industry is $2,190,000, and the total first-time 
background checks for the industry is $849,000. The sum of the total 
industry implementation cost is $17.0 million. The industry operating 
costs for this supplemental proposed rule when discounted as flows of 
funds and based on the assumed lengths of lives of the various 
facilities ranged from $9.5 million to $17.7 million, given the 7 
percent and 3 percent real discount rates, respectively.
    The total costs to industry, including both implementation and 
operating expenses for this supplemental proposed rule are estimated to 
range from $26.5 million to $34.7 million, again given the 7 percent 
and 3 percent real discount rates, respectively.
    The NRC's implementation costs are almost $3.6 million. The 
recurring or annual costs are calculated to have a present value of 
$1.9 million (7 percent rate) to $3.3 million (3 percent rate). 
Therefore, the total estimated NRC costs range from about $5.5 million 
(7 percent rate) to $6.9 million (3 percent rate).
    The total quantitative costs estimates for this supplemental 
proposed rulemaking are estimated to be from $32.0 million (7 percent) 
to $41.6 million (3 percent).
     Disaggregation
    In order to comply with the guidance provided in Section 4.3.2 
(Criteria for the Treatment of Individual Requirements) of the NRC's 
Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, the NRC conducted a screening review to 
ensure that the aggregate analysis does not mask the inclusion of 
individual rule provisions that are not cost-beneficial when considered 
individually and not necessary to meet the goals of the rulemaking. 
Consistent with the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, the NRC evaluated, 
on a disaggregated basis, each new regulatory provision expected to 
result in incremental costs. Given that the NRC is required to comply 
with Section 161A of the AEA, the NRC

[[Page 2222]]

believes that each of these provisions is necessary and cost-justified 
based on its resulting qualitative benefits, as previously discussed.

5. Decision Rationale

    Relative to the ``no-action'' alternative, the supplemental 
proposed rule would cost the industry from around $26.5 million to 
$34.7 million over the average lifetime of the plants. The total NRC 
costs would range from $5.5 million to slightly under $7 million. Total 
costs of the supplemental proposed rule are estimated to range from 
around $32 million to $42 million. The requirements in this 
supplemental proposed rule are the result of the new Section 161A of 
the AEA. The NRC concluded that for all of these requirements, and 
their corresponding costs, the proposed approach is appropriate.
    Although the NRC did not quantify the benefits of this rule, the 
staff did qualitatively examine benefits and concluded that the rule 
would provide safety and security-related benefits. Offsetting this net 
cost, the NRC believes that the rule would result in substantial non-
quantified benefits related to safety and security, as well as enhanced 
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, the NRC believes 
that the rule is cost-justified for several qualitative reasons. First, 
the supplemental proposed rule would provide increased defensive 
capability of licensees and certificate holders and thus would increase 
the assurance that a licensee can adequately protect an at-reactor 
ISFSI facility against an external assault. Second, the supplemental 
proposed rule would provide a mechanism to accomplish a statutory 
mandate to verify that security officers protecting such facilities are 
not disqualified under Federal or State law from possessing or using 
firearms and ammunition. Lastly, as previously indicated, application 
for enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority under Section 
161A is voluntary.
    Based on the NRC's assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
supplemental proposed rule on licensee and certificate holder 
facilities, the agency has concluded that the supplemental proposed 
rule provisions would be justified.

6. Implementation

    The final rule is to take effect 60 days after publication in the 
FR. A compliance date of 180 days after publication of the final rule 
will also be established for some provisions of this rule. The NRC 
staff does not expect this rule to have any impact on other 
requirements.

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the NRC certifies that this rule would not, if promulgated, 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. With respect to the enhanced weapons and firearms background 
check provisions, this supplemental proposed rule affects only the 
licensing and operation of nuclear power reactors, at-reactor ISFSIs, 
and fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess and use Category I 
quantities of SSNM. The companies that own or operate these facilities 
or conduct these activities do not fall within the scope of the 
definition of ``small entities'' presented in the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 
2.810).

XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality

    The NRC evaluated the aggregated set of requirements in this 
supplemental proposed rule that constitute backfitting in accordance 
with 10 CFR 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, and the finality provisions in 10 CFR 
part 52. The NRC's evaluation of changes in accordance with 10 CFR 
10.109, 70.76, and the finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52 is 
described in the draft regulatory analysis on the proposed rule 
published on February 3, 2011. The Availability information for the 
draft regulatory (and backfit) analysis is provided in Section VIII, 
``Availability of Documents,'' of this document. This analysis examined 
the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the NRC. The 
regulations in 10 CFR 72.62 pertain to changes in requirements for 
ISFSI facilities, which is the subject of the supplemental proposed 
rule. However, the supplemental proposed rule will not change the 
requirements from the proposed rule; it simply applies the proposed 
requirements to an additional class of facilities. Therefore the 
evaluation of changes presented in the proposed rule from February 2011 
also applies to this supplemental proposed rule and the evaluation is 
in accordance with 10 CFR 72.62.
    The provisions of this supplemental proposed rule do not constitute 
backfitting because they are voluntary in nature, and would therefore 
not impose modifications or additions to existing structures, 
components, or designs, or existing procedures or organizations. These 
provisions include those related to application for the use of enhanced 
weapons and/or preemption authority. Other provisions of the rule 
implementing Section 161A of the AEA, such as the mandatory firearms 
background checks, are not backfits because they implement mandatory 
provisions required by statute.
    To the extent that some of the specific implementing details of the 
firearms background checks described in this proposed rule are not 
specifically mandated by statute, or the Firearms Guidelines issued by 
the Commission with the approval of the U.S. Attorney General, the 
Commission believes that such measures are essential for the effective 
implementation of the rule's requirements, and thus necessary for the 
adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and are in 
accord with the common defense and security.
    Therefore, for the reasons previously stated, a backfit analysis is 
not required and has not been completed for any of the provisions of 
this supplemental proposed rule.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

    Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation, 
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the AEA, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; 
and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC proposes to amend 10 CFR part 73 and proposes 
to further amend 10 CFR part 73, as proposed to be amended at 76 FR 
6200, February 3, 2011, as follows:

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

0
1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Atomic Energy Act sections 53, 147, 161, 223, 234, 
1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2273, 2282, 2297(f), 
2210(e)); Energy Reorganization Act sections 201, 204 (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5844); Government Paperwork Elimination Act section 1704, 112 
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
    Section 73.1 also issued under Nuclear Waste Policy Act sections 
135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued 
under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

0
2. In Sec.  73.2, paragraph (a), a definition for ``At-reactor 
independent spent fuel storage installation'' is added in alphabetical 
order to read as follows:


Sec.  73.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *

[[Page 2223]]

    At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installation or at-
reactor ISFSI means an ISFSI whose physical security program is 
conducted as a support activity of the co-located power reactor 
facility licensed under parts 50 or 52 of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
3. In Sec.  73.18, paragraph (c), as proposed to be added at 76 FR 
6233, February 3, 2011, is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  73.18  Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption 
of firearms laws.

* * * * *
    (c) Applicability. (1) Stand-alone preemption authority. The 
following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other 
property are designated by the Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
    (i) Power reactor facilities;
    (ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a 
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (Gy) (100 Rad) per hour at 
a distance of 1 meter (m) (3.3 feet [ft]), without regard to any 
intervening shielding; and
    (iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
    (2) Combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority. 
The following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other 
property are designated by the Commission under 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
    (i) Power reactor facilities;
    (ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a 
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gy (100 Rad) per hour at a 
distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), without regard to any intervening shielding; 
and
    (iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
* * * * *
0
4. In Sec.  73.19, paragraph (c), as proposed to be added at 76 FR 
6237, February 3, 2011, is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  73.19  Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.

* * * * *
    (c) Applicability. For the purposes of firearms background checks, 
the following classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other 
property are designated by the Commission at 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
    (1) Power reactor facilities;
    (2) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a 
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (100 Rad) per hour at a 
distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet), without regard to any intervening 
shielding; and
    (3) At-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations.
* * * * *
0
5. In Sec.  73.51, paragraph (b)(4) is added to read as follows:


Sec.  73.51  Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4)(i) The licensee shall ensure that the firearms background check 
requirements of Sec.  73.19 of this part are met for all members of the 
security organization whose official duties require access to covered 
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
    (ii) For licensees who are issued a license after [effective date 
of final rule], the licensee shall ensure that the firearms background 
check requirements of Sec.  73.19 of this part are met for all members 
of the security organization whose official duties require access to 
covered weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons. Additionally and 
notwithstanding the implementation schedule provisions of Sec.  
73.19(b), such licensees shall ensure that the firearms background 
check requirements of Sec.  73.19 are satisfactorily completed within 
180 days of the issuance of the license, or within 180 days of the 
implementation of a protective strategy that uses covered weapons, 
whichever is later.
    (iii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to 
licensees subject to this section who store spent nuclear fuel in an 
at-reactor ISFSI.
* * * * *

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of December, 2012.
R.W. Borchardt,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-00237 Filed 1-9-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P