[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 250 (Monday, December 31, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77094-77111]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-31339]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Apple, Inc., Hachette Book Group, Inc.,
HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C., Verlagsgruppe Georg Von Holtzbrinck
Gmbh, Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC D/B/A Macmillan, The Penguin Group, A
Division of Pearson PLC, Penguin Group (USA), Inc., and Simon &
Schuster, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
United States of America v. Apple, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 12-CV-
2826 (DLC). On April 11, 2012, the United States filed a Complaint
alleging that the defendants agreed to raise the retail price of e-
books, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. On
September 6, 2012, a Final Judgment as to defendants Hachette Book
Group, Inc., HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C., and Simon & Schuster,
Inc. was entered by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. On December 18, 2012, the United States filed a
proposed Final Judgment as to defendants The Penguin Group, a division
of Pearson plc, and Penguin Group (USA), Inc.--to return pricing
discretion to e-book retailers and comply with other obligations
designed to end the anticompetitive effects of the conspiracy.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street NW., DC 20530 Suite 1010 (telephone: 202-514-2481), on the
Department of Justice's Web site at http://www.justice.gov/atr, and at
the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the
copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments will be filed with the Court and will either be
published in the Federal Register or, with the permission of the Court,
will be posted electronically on the Department of Justice's Web site.
Comments should be directed to John R. Read, Chief, Litigation III
Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530 (telephone: 202-307-0468).
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Apple, Inc., Hachette Book
Group, Inc., Harpercollins Publishers L.L.C., Verlagsgruppe Georg Von
Holtzbrinck Gmbh, Holtzbrinck Publishers, Llc d/b/a Macmillan, The
Penguin Group, A Division Of Pearson Plc, Penguin Group (Usa), Inc.,
And Simon & Schuster, Inc., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-02826.
Judge: Cote, Denise.
Date Filed: 04/11/2012.
Description: Antitrust.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust
action against Defendants Apple, Inc. (``Apple''); Hachette Book Group,
Inc. (``Hachette''); HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C.
(``HarperCollins''); Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH and
Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan (collectively,
``Macmillan''); The Penguin Group, a division of Pearson plc and
Penguin Group (USA), Inc. (collectively, ``Penguin''); and Simon &
Schuster, Inc. (``Simon & Schuster''; collectively with Hachette,
HarperCollins, Macmillan, and Penguin, ``Publisher Defendants'') to
obtain equitable relief to prevent and remedy violations of Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1. Plaintiff alleges:
I. Introduction
1. Technology has brought revolutionary change to the business of
publishing and selling books, including the dramatic explosion in sales
of ``e-books''--that is, books sold to consumers in electronic form and
read on a variety of electronic devices, including dedicated e-readers
(such as the Kindle or the Nook), multipurpose tablets, smartphones and
personal computers. Consumers reap a variety of benefits from e-books,
including 24-hour access to product with near-instant delivery, easier
portability and storage, and adjustable font size. E-books also are
considerably cheaper to produce and distribute than physical (or
``print'') books.
2. E-book sales have been increasing rapidly ever since Amazon
released its first Kindle device in November of 2007. In developing and
then mass marketing its Kindle e-reader and associated e-book content,
Amazon substantially increased the retail market for e-books. One of
Amazon's most successful marketing strategies was to lower
substantially the price of newly released and bestselling e-books to
$9.99.
3. Publishers saw the rise in e-books, and particularly Amazon's
price discounting, as a substantial challenge to their traditional
business model. The Publisher Defendants feared that lower retail
prices for e-books might lead eventually to lower wholesale prices for
e-books, lower prices for print books, or other consequences the
publishers hoped to avoid. Each Publisher Defendant desired higher
retail e-book prices across the industry before ``$9.99'' became an
entrenched consumer expectation. By the end of 2009, however, the
Publisher Defendants had concluded that unilateral efforts to move
Amazon away from its practice of offering low retail prices would not
work, and they
[[Page 77095]]
thereafter conspired to raise retail e-book prices and to otherwise
limit competition in the sale of e-books. To effectuate their
conspiracy, the Publisher Defendants teamed up with Defendant Apple,
which shared the same goal of restraining retail price competition in
the sale of e-books.
4. The Defendants' conspiracy to limit e-book price competition
came together as the Publisher Defendants were jointly devising schemes
to limit Amazon's ability to discount e-books and Defendant Apple was
preparing to launch its electronic tablet, the iPad, and considering
whether it should sell e-books that could be read on the new device.
Apple had long believed it would be able to ``trounce Amazon by opening
up [its] own ebook store,'' but the intense price competition that
prevailed among e-book retailers in late 2009 had driven the retail
price of popular e-books to $9.99 and had reduced retailer margins on
e-books to levels that Apple found unattractive. As a result of
discussions with the Publisher Defendants, Apple learned that the
Publisher Defendants shared a common objective with Apple to limit e-
book retail price competition, and that the Publisher Defendants also
desired to have popular e-book retail prices stabilize at levels
significantly higher than $9.99. Together, Apple and the Publisher
Defendants reached an agreement whereby retail price competition would
cease (which all the conspirators desired), retail e-book prices would
increase significantly (which the Publisher Defendants desired), and
Apple would be guaranteed a 30 percent ``commission'' on each e-book it
sold (which Apple desired).
5. To accomplish the goal of raising e-book prices and otherwise
limiting retail competition for e-books, Apple and the Publisher
Defendants jointly agreed to alter the business model governing the
relationship between publishers and retailers. Prior to the conspiracy,
both print books and e-books were sold under the longstanding
``wholesale model.'' Under this model, publishers sold books to
retailers, and retailers, as the owners of the books, had the freedom
to establish retail prices. Defendants were determined to end the
robust retail price competition in e-books that prevailed, to the
benefit of consumers, under the wholesale model. They therefore agreed
jointly to replace the wholesale model for selling e-books with an
``agency model.'' Under the agency model, publishers would take control
of retail pricing by appointing retailers as ``agents'' who would have
no power to alter the retail prices set by the publishers. As a result,
the publishers could end price competition among retailers and raise
the prices consumers pay for e-books through the adoption of identical
pricing tiers. This change in business model would not have occurred
without the conspiracy among the Defendants.
6. Apple facilitated the Publisher Defendants' collective effort to
end retail price competition by coordinating their transition to an
agency model across all retailers. Apple clearly understood that its
participation in this scheme would result in higher prices to
consumers. As Apple CEO Steve Jobs described his company's strategy for
negotiating with the Publisher Defendants, ``We'll go to [an] agency
model, where you set the price, and we get our 30%, and yes, the
customer pays a little more, but that's what you want anyway.'' Apple
was perfectly willing to help the Publisher Defendants obtain their
objective of higher prices for consumers by ending Amazon's ``$9.99''
price program as long as Apple was guaranteed its 30 percent margin and
could avoid retail price competition from Amazon.
7. The plan--what Apple proudly described as an ``aikido move''--
worked. Over three days in January 2010, each Publisher Defendant
entered into a functionally identical agency contract with Apple that
would go into effect simultaneously in April 2010 and ``chang[e] the
industry permanently.'' These ``Apple Agency Agreements'' conferred on
the Publisher Defendants the power to set Apple's retail prices for e-
books, while granting Apple the assurance that the Publisher Defendants
would raise retail e-book prices at all other e-book outlets, too.
Instead of $9.99, electronic versions of bestsellers and newly released
titles would be priced according to a set of price tiers contained in
each of the Apple Agency Agreements that determined de facto retail e-
book prices as a function of the title's hardcover list price. All
bestselling and newly released titles bearing a hardcover list price
between $25.01 and $35.00, for example, would be priced at $12.99,
$14.99, or $16.99, with the retail e-book price increasing in relation
to the hardcover list price.
8. After executing the Apple Agency Agreements, the Publisher
Defendants all then quickly acted to complete the scheme by imposing
agency agreements on all their other retailers. As a direct result,
those retailers lost their ability to compete on price, including their
ability to sell the most popular e-books for $9.99 or for other low
prices. Once in control of retail prices, the Publisher Defendants
limited retail price competition among themselves. Millions of e-books
that would have sold at retail for $9.99 or for other low prices
instead sold for the prices indicated by the price schedules included
in the Apple Agency Agreements--generally, $12.99 or $14.99. Other
price and non-price competition among e-book publishers and among e-
book retailers also was unlawfully eliminated to the detriment of U.S.
consumers.
9. The purpose of this lawsuit is to enjoin the Publisher
Defendants and Apple from further violations of the nation's antitrust
laws and to restore the competition that has been lost due to the
Publisher Defendants' and Apple's illegal acts.
10. Defendants' ongoing conspiracy and agreement have caused e-book
consumers to pay tens of millions of dollars more for e-books than they
otherwise would have paid.
11. The United States, through this suit, asks this Court to
declare Defendants' conduct illegal and to enter injunctive relief to
prevent further injury to consumers in the United States.
II. Defendants
12. Apple, Inc. has its principal place of business at 1 Infinite
Loop, Cupertino, CA 95014. Among many other businesses, Apple, Inc.
distributes e-books through its iBookstore.
13. Hachette Book Group, Inc. has its principal place of business
at 237 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017. It publishes e-books and print
books through publishers such as Little, Brown, and Company and Grand
Central Publishing.
14. HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C. has its principal place of
business at 10 E. 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022. It publishes e-books
and print books through publishers such as Harper and William Morrow.
15. Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan has its principal
place of business at 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. It publishes
e-books and print books through publishers such as Farrar, Straus and
Giroux and St. Martin's Press. Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH
owns Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan and has its principal
place of business at G[auml]nsheidestra[szlig]e 26, Stuttgart 70184,
Germany.
16. Penguin Group (USA), Inc. has its principal place of business
at 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014. It publishes e-books and
print books through publishers such as The Viking Press and Gotham
Books. Penguin Group (USA), Inc. is the United States
[[Page 77096]]
affiliate of The Penguin Group, a division of Pearson plc, which has
its principal place of business at 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, United
Kingdom.
17. Simon & Schuster, Inc. has its principal place of business at
1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020. It publishes e-books
and print books through publishers such as Free Press and Touchstone.
III. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Interstate Commerce
18. Plaintiff United States of America brings this action pursuant
to Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 4, to obtain equitable
relief and other relief to prevent and restrain Defendants' violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C 1.
19. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action
under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, and 28 U.S.C. 1331,
1337(a), and 1345.
20. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant and
venue is proper in the Southern District of New York under Section 12
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391, because each
Defendant transacts business and is found within the Southern District
of New York. The U.S. component of each Publisher Defendant is
headquartered in the Southern District of New York, and acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in this District. Many thousands
of the Publisher Defendants' e-books are and have been sold in this
District, including through Defendant Apple's iBookstore.
21. Defendants are engaged in, and their activities substantially
affect, interstate trade and commerce. The Publisher Defendants sell e-
books throughout the United States. Their e-books represent a
substantial amount of interstate commerce. In 2010, United States
consumers paid more than $300 million for the Publisher Defendants' e-
books, including more than $40 million for e-books licensed through
Defendant Apple's iBookstore.
IV. Co-Conspirators
22. Various persons, who are known and unknown to Plaintiff, and
not named as defendants in this action, including senior executives of
the Publisher Defendants and Apple, have participated as co-
conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed
acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.
V. The Publishing Industry and Background of the Conspiracy
A. Print Books
23. Authors submit books to publishers in manuscript form.
Publishers edit manuscripts, print and bind books, provide advertising
and related marketing services, decide when a book should be released
for sale, and distribute books to wholesalers and retailers. Publishers
also determine the cover price or ``list price'' of a book, and
typically that price appears on the book's cover.
24. Retailers purchase print books directly from publishers, or
through wholesale distributors, and resell them to consumers. Retailers
typically purchase print books under the ``wholesale model.'' Under
that model, retailers pay publishers approximately one-half of the list
price of books, take ownership of the books, then resell them to
consumers at prices of the retailer's choice. Publishers have sold
print books to retailers through the wholesale model for over 100 years
and continue to do so today.
B. E-books
25. E-books are books published in electronic formats. E-book
publishers avoid some of the expenses incurred in producing and
distributing print books, including most manufacturing expenses,
warehousing expenses, distribution expenses, and costs of dealing with
unsold stock.
26. Consumers purchase e-books through Web sites of e-book
retailers or through applications loaded onto their reading devices.
Such electronic distribution allows e-book retailers to avoid certain
expenses they incur when they sell print books, including most
warehousing expenses and distribution expenses.
27. From its very small base in 2007 at the time of Amazon's Kindle
launch, the e-book market has exploded, registering triple-digit sales
growth each year. E-books now constitute at least ten percent of
general interest fiction and non-fiction books (commonly known as
``trade'' books \1\) sold in the United States and are widely predicted
to reach at least 25 percent of U.S. trade books sales within two to
three years.
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\1\ Non-trade e-books include electronic versions of children's
picture books and academic textbooks, reference materials, and other
specialized texts that typically are published by separate imprints
from trade books, often are sold through separate channels, and are
not reasonably substitutable for trade e-books.
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D. Publisher Defendants and ``The $9.99 Problem''
28. The Publisher Defendants compete against each other for sales
of trade e-books to consumers. Publishers bid against one another for
print- and electronic-publishing rights to content that they expect
will be most successful in the market. They also compete against each
other in bringing those books to market. For example, in addition to
price-setting, they create cover art and other on-book sales
inducements, and also engage in advertising campaigns for some titles.
29. The Publisher Defendants are five of the six largest publishers
of trade books in the United States. They publish the vast majority of
their newly released titles as both print books and e-books. Publisher
Defendants compete against each other in the sales of both trade print
books and trade e-books.
30. When Amazon launched its Kindle device, it offered newly
released and bestselling e-books to consumers for $9.99. At that time,
Publisher Defendants routinely wholesaled those e-books for about that
same price, which typically was less than the wholesale price of the
hardcover versions of the same titles, reflecting publisher cost
savings associated with the electronic format. From the time of its
launch, Amazon's e-book distribution business has been consistently
profitable, even when substantially discounting some newly released and
bestselling titles.
31. To compete with Amazon, other e-book retailers often matched or
approached Amazon's $9.99-or-less prices for e-book versions of new
releases and New York Times bestsellers. As a result of that
competition, consumers benefited from Amazon's $9.99-or-less e-book
prices even if they purchased e-books from competing e-book retailers.
32. The Publisher Defendants feared that $9.99 would become the
standard price for newly released and bestselling e-books. For example,
one Publisher Defendant's CEO bemoaned the ``wretched $9.99 price
point'' and Penguin USA CEO David Shanks worried that e-book pricing
``can't be $9.99 for hardcovers.''
33. The Publisher Defendants believed the low prices for newly
released and bestselling e-books were disrupting the industry. The
Amazon-led $9.99 retail price point for the most popular e-books
troubled the Publisher Defendants because, at $9.99, most of these e-
book titles were priced substantially lower than hardcover versions of
the same title. The Publisher Defendants were concerned these lower
[[Page 77097]]
e-book prices would lead to the ``deflation'' of hardcover book prices,
with accompanying declining revenues for publishers. The Publisher
Defendants also worried that if $9.99 solidified as the consumers'
expected retail price for e-books, Amazon and other retailers would
demand that publishers lower their wholesale prices, further
compressing publisher profit margins.
34. The Publisher Defendants also feared that the $9.99 price point
would make e-books so popular that digital publishers could achieve
sufficient scale to challenge the major incumbent publishers' basic
business model. The Publisher Defendants were especially concerned that
Amazon was well positioned to enter the digital publishing business and
thereby supplant publishers as intermediaries between authors and
consumers. Amazon had, in fact, taken steps to do so, contracting
directly with authors to publish their works as e-books--at a higher
royalty rate than the Publisher Defendants offered. Amazon's move
threatened the Publisher Defendants' traditional positions as the gate-
keepers of the publishing world. The Publisher Defendants also feared
that other competitive advantages they held as a result of years of
investments in their print book businesses would erode and, eventually,
become irrelevant, as e-book sales continued to grow.
E. Publisher Defendants Recognize They Cannot Solve ``The $9.99
Problem'' Alone
35. Each Publisher Defendant knew that, acting alone, it could not
compel Amazon to raise e-book prices and that it was not in its
economic self-interest to attempt unilaterally to raise retail e-book
prices. Each Publisher Defendant relied on Amazon to market and
distribute its e-books, and each Publisher Defendant believed Amazon
would leverage its position as a large retailer to preserve its ability
to compete and would resist any individual publisher's attempt to raise
the prices at which Amazon sold that publisher's e-books. As one
Publisher Defendant executive acknowledged Amazon's bargaining
strength, ``we've always known that unless other publishers follow us,
there's no chance of success in getting Amazon to change its pricing
practices.'' In the same email, the executive wrote, ``without a
critical mass behind us Amazon won't `negotiate,' so we need to be more
confident of how our fellow publishers will react. * * *''
36. Each Publisher Defendant also recognized that it would lose
sales if retail prices increased for only its e-books while the other
Publisher Defendants' e-books remained competitively priced. In
addition, higher prices for just one publisher's e-books would not
change consumer perceptions enough to slow the erosion of consumer-
perceived value of books that all the Publisher Defendants feared would
result from Amazon's $9.99 pricing policy.
VI. Defendants' Unlawful Activities
37. Beginning no later than September 2008, the Publisher
Defendants' senior executives engaged in a series of meetings,
telephone conversations and other communications in which they jointly
acknowledged to each other the threat posed by Amazon's pricing
strategy and the need to work collectively to end that strategy. By the
end of the summer of 2009, the Publisher Defendants had agreed to act
collectively to force up Amazon's retail prices and thereafter
considered and implemented various means to accomplish that goal,
including moving under the guise of a joint venture. Ultimately, in
late 2009, Apple and the Publisher Defendants settled on the strategy
that worked--replacing the wholesale model with an agency model that
gave the Publisher Defendants the power to raise retail e-book prices
themselves.
38. The evidence showing conspiracy is substantial and includes:
Practices facilitating a horizontal conspiracy. The
Publisher Defendants regularly communicated with each other in private
conversations, both in person and on the telephone, and in emails to
each other to exchange sensitive information and assurances of
solidarity to advance the ends of the conspiracy.
Direct evidence of a conspiracy. The Publisher Defendants
directly discussed, agreed to, and encouraged each other to collective
action to force Amazon to raise its retail e-book prices.
Recognition of illicit nature of communications. Publisher
Defendants took steps to conceal their communications with one another,
including instructions to ``double delete'' email and taking other
measures to avoid leaving a paper trail.
Acts contrary to economic interests. It would have been
contrary to the economic interests of any Publisher Defendant acting
alone to attempt to impose agency on all of its retailers and then
raise its retail e-book prices. For example, Penguin Group CEO John
Makinson reported to his parent company board of directors that ``the
industry needs to develop a common strategy'' to address the threat
``from digital companies whose objective may be to disintermediate
traditional publishers altogether'' because it ``will not be possible
for any individual publisher to mount an effective response,'' and
Penguin later admitted that it would have been economically
disadvantaged if it ``was the only publisher dealing with Apple under
the new business model.''
Motive to enter the conspiracy, including knowledge or
assurances that competitors also will enter. The Publisher Defendants
were motivated by a desire to maintain both the perceived value of
their books and their own position in the industry. They received
assurances from both each other and Apple that they all would move
together to raise retail e-book prices. Apple was motivated to ensure
that it would not face competition from Amazon's low-price retail
strategy.
Abrupt, contemporaneous shift from past behavior. Prior to
January 23, 2010, all Publisher Defendants sold their e-books under the
traditional wholesale model; by January 25, 2010, all Publisher
Defendants had irrevocably committed to transition all of their
retailers to the agency model (and Apple had committed to sell e-books
on a model inconsistent with the way it sells the vast bulk of the
digital media it offers in its iTunes store). On April 3, 2010, as soon
as the Apple Agency Agreements simultaneously became effective, all
Publisher Defendants immediately used their new retail pricing
authority to raise the retail prices of their newly released and
bestselling e-books to the common ostensible maximum prices contained
in their Apple Agency Agreements.
A. The Publisher Defendants Recognize a Common Threat
39. Starting no later than September of 2008 and continuing for at
least one year, the Publisher Defendants' CEOs (at times joined by one
non-defendant publisher's CEO) met privately as a group approximately
once per quarter. These meetings took place in private dining rooms of
upscale Manhattan restaurants and were used to discuss confidential
business and competitive matters, including Amazon's e-book retailing
practices. No legal counsel was present at any of these meetings.
40. In September 2008, Penguin Group CEO John Makinson was joined
by Macmillan CEO John Sargent and the CEOs of the other four large
publishers at a dinner meeting in ``The Chef's Wine Cellar,'' a private
room at Picholene. One of the CEOs reported that business matters were
discussed.
[[Page 77098]]
41. In January 2009, the CEO of one Publisher Defendant, a United
States subsidiary of a European corporation, promised his corporate
superior, the CEO of the parent company, that he would raise the future
of e-books and Amazon's potential role in that future at an upcoming
meeting of publisher CEOs. Later that month, at a dinner meeting hosted
by Penguin Group CEO John Makinson, again in ``The Chef's Wine Cellar''
at Picholene, the same group of publisher CEOs met once more.
42. On or about June 16, 2009, Mr. Makinson again met privately
with other Publisher Defendant CEOs and discussed, inter alia, the
growth of e-books and Amazon's role in that growth.
43. On or about September 10, 2009, Mr. Makinson once again met
privately with other Publisher Defendant CEOs and the CEO of one non-
defendant publisher in a private room of a different Manhattan
restaurant, Alto. They discussed the growth of e-books and complained
about Amazon's role in that growth.
44. In addition to the CEO dinner meetings, Publisher Defendants'
CEOs and other executives met in-person, one-on-one to communicate
about e-books multiple times over the course of 2009 and into 2010.
Similar meetings took place in Europe, including meetings in the fall
of 2009 between executives of Macmillan parent company Verlagsgruppe
Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH and executives of another Publisher
Defendant's parent company. Macmillan CEO John Sargent joined at least
one of these parent company meetings.
45. These private meetings provided the Publisher Defendants' CEOs
the opportunity to discuss how they collectively could solve ``the
$9.99 problem.''
B. Publisher Defendants Conspire To Raise Retail E-book Prices Under
the Guise of Joint Venture Discussions
46. While each Publisher Defendant recognized that it could not
solve ``the $9.99 problem'' by itself, collectively the Publisher
Defendants accounted for nearly half of Amazon's e-book revenues, and
by refusing to compete with one another for Amazon's business, the
Publisher Defendants could force Amazon to accept the Publisher
Defendants' new contract terms and to change its pricing practices.
47. The Publisher Defendants thus conspired to act collectively,
initially in the guise of joint ventures. These ostensible joint
ventures were not meant to enhance competition by bringing to market
products or services that the publishers could not offer unilaterally,
but rather were designed as anticompetitive measures to raise prices.
48. All five Publisher Defendants agreed in 2009 at the latest to
act collectively to raise retail prices for the most popular e-books
above $9.99. One CEO of a Publisher Defendant's parent company
explained to his corporate superior in a July 29, 2009 email message
that ``[i]n the USA and the UK, but also in Spain and France to a
lesser degree, the `top publishers' are in discussions to create an
alternative platform to Amazon for e-books. The goal is less to compete
with Amazon as to force it to accept a price level higher than 9.99. *
*''* I am in NY this week to promote these ideas and the movement is
positive with [the other four Publisher Defendants].'' (Translated from
French).
49. Less than a week later, in an August 4, 2009 strategy memo for
the board of directors of Penguin's ultimate parent company, Penguin
Group CEO John Makinson conveyed the same message:
Competition for the attention of readers will be most intense from
digital companies whose objective may be to disintermediate traditional
publishers altogether. This is not a new threat but we do appear to be
on a collision course with Amazon, and possibly Google as well. It will
not be possible for any individual publisher to mount an effective
response, because of both the resources necessary and the risk of
retribution, so the industry needs to develop a common strategy. This
is the context for the development of the Project Z initiatives [joint
ventures] in London and New York.
C. Defendants Agree To Increase and Stabilize Retail E-book Prices by
Collectively Adopting an Agency Model
50. To raise e-book prices, the Publisher Defendants also began to
consider in late 2009 selling e-books under an ``agency model'' that
would take away Amazon's ability to set low retail prices. As one CEO
of a Publisher Defendant's parent company explained in a December 6,
2009 email message, ``[o]ur goal is to force Amazon to return to
acceptable sales prices through the establishment of agency contracts
in the USA . . . . To succeed our colleagues must know that we entered
the fray and follow us.'' (Translated from French).
51. Apple's entry into the e-book business provided a perfect
opportunity for collective action to implement the agency model and use
it to raise retail e-book prices. Apple was in the process of
developing a strategy to sell e-books on its new iPad device. Apple
initially contemplated selling e-books through the existing wholesale
model, which was similar to the manner in which Apple sold the vast
majority of the digital media it offered in its iTunes store. On
February 19, 2009, Apple Vice President of Internet Services Eddy Cue
explained to Apple CEO Steve Jobs in an email, ``[a]t this point, it
would be very easy for us to compete and I think trounce Amazon by
opening up our own ebook store.'' In addition to considering
competitive entry at that time, though, Apple also contemplated
illegally dividing the digital content world with Amazon, allowing each
to ``own the category'' of its choice--audio/video to Apple and e-books
to Amazon.
52. Apple soon concluded, though, that competition from other
retailers--especially Amazon--would prevent Apple from earning its
desired 30 percent margins on e-book sales. Ultimately, Apple, together
with the Publisher Defendants, set in motion a plan that would compel
all non-Apple e-book retailers also to sign onto agency or else, as
Apple's CEO put it, the Publisher Defendants all would say, ``we're not
going to give you the books.''
53. The executive in charge of Apple's inchoate e-books business,
Eddy Cue, telephoned each Publisher Defendant and Random House on or
around December 8, 2009 to schedule exploratory meetings in New York
City on December 15 and December 16. Hachette and HarperCollins took
the lead in working with Apple to capitalize on this golden opportunity
for the Publisher Defendants to achieve their goal of raising and
stabilizing retail e-book prices above $9.99 by collectively imposing
the agency model on the industry.
54. It appears that Hachette and HarperCollins communicated with
each other about moving to an agency model during the brief window
between Mr. Cue's first telephone calls to the Publisher Defendants and
his visit to meet with their CEOs. On the morning of December 10, 2009,
a HarperCollins executive added to his calendar an appointment to call
a Hachette executive at 10:50 a.m. At 11:01 a.m., the Hachette
executive returned the phone call, and the two spoke for six minutes.
Then, less than a week later in New York, both Hachette and
HarperCollins executives told Mr. Cue in their initial meetings with
him that they wanted to sell e-books under an agency model, a dramatic
departure from the way books had been sold for over a century.y
55. The other Publisher Defendants also made clear to Apple that
they
[[Page 77099]]
``certainly'' did not want to continue ``the existing way that they
were doing business,'' i.e., with Amazon promoting their most popular
e-books for $9.99 under a wholesale model.
56. Apple saw a way to turn the agency scheme into a highly
profitable model for itself. Apple determined to give the Publisher
Defendants what they wanted while shielding itself from retail price
competition and realizing margins far in excess of what e-book
retailers then averaged on each newly released or bestselling e-book
sold. Apple realized that, as a result of the scheme, ``the customer''
would ``pay[] a little more.''
57. On December 16, 2009, the day after both companies' initial
meetings with Apple, Penguin Group CEO John Makinson had a breakfast
meeting at a London hotel with the CEO of another Publisher Defendant's
parent company. Consistent with the Publisher Defendants' other efforts
to conceal their activities, Mr. Makinson's breakfast companion wrote
to his U.S. subordinate that he would recount portions of his
discussion with Mr. Makinson only by telephone.
58. By the time Apple arrived for a second round of meetings during
the week of December 21, 2009, the agency model had become the focus of
its discussions with all of the Publisher Defendants. In these
discussions, Apple proposed that the Publisher Defendants require all
retailers of their e-books to accept the agency model. Apple thereby
sought to ensure that it would not have to compete on retail prices.
The proposal appealed to the Publisher Defendants because wresting
pricing control from Amazon and other e-book retailers would advance
their collusive plan to raise retail e-book prices.
59. The Publisher Defendants acknowledged to Apple their common
objective to end Amazon's $9.99 pricing. As Mr. Cue reported in an
email message to Apple's CEO Steve Jobs, the three publishers with whom
he had met saw the ``plus'' of Apple's position as ``solv[ing the]
Amazon problem.'' The ``negative'' was that Apple's proposed retail
prices--topping out at $12.99 for newly released and bestselling e-
books--were a ``little less than [the publishers] would like.''
Likewise, Mr. Jobs later informed an executive of one of the Publisher
Defendant's corporate parents that ``[a]ll major publishers'' had told
Apple that ``Amazon's $9.99 price for new releases is eroding the value
perception of their products in customer's minds, and they do not want
this practice to continue for new releases.''
60. As perhaps the only company that could facilitate their goal of
raising retail e-book prices across the industry, Apple knew that it
had significant leverage in negotiations with Publisher Defendants.
Apple exercised this leverage to demand a thirty percent commission--a
margin significantly above the prevailing competitive margins for e-
book retailers. The Publisher Defendants worried that the combination
of paying Apple a higher commission than they would have liked and
pricing their e-books lower than they wanted might be too much to bear
in exchange for Apple's facilitation of their agreement to raise retail
e-book prices. Ultimately, though, they convinced Apple to allow them
to raise prices high enough to make the deal palatable to them.
61. As it negotiated with the Publisher Defendants in December 2009
and January 2010, Apple kept each Publisher Defendant informed of the
status of its negotiations with the other Publisher Defendants. Apple
also assured the Publisher Defendants that its proposals were the same
to each and that no deal Apple agreed to with one publisher would be
materially different from any deal it agreed to with another publisher.
Apple thus knowingly served as a critical conspiracy participant by
allowing the Publisher Defendants to signal to one another both (a)
which agency terms would comprise an acceptable means of achieving
their ultimate goal of raising and stabilizing retail e-book prices,
and (b) that they could lock themselves into this particular means of
collectively achieving that goal by all signing their Apple Agency
Agreement.
62. Apple's Mr. Cue emailed each Publisher Defendant between
January 4, 2010, and January 6, 2010 an outline of what he tabbed ``the
best approach for e-books.'' He reassured Penguin USA CEO David Shanks
and other Publisher Defendant CEOs that Apple adopted the approach
``[a]fter talking to all the other publishers.'' Mr. Cue sent
substantively identical email messages and proposals to each Publisher
Defendant.
63. The outlined proposal that Apple circulated after consulting
with each Publisher Defendant contained several key features. First, as
Hachette and HarperCollins had initially suggested to Apple, the
publisher would be the principal and Apple would be the agent for e-
book sales. Consumer pricing authority would be transferred from
retailers to publishers. Second, Apple's proposal mandated that every
other retailer of each publisher's e-books--Apple's direct
competitors--be forced to accept the agency model as well. As Mr. Cue
wrote, ``all resellers of new titles need to be in agency model.''
Third, Apple would receive a 30 percent commission for each e-book
sale. And fourth, each Publisher Defendant would have identical pricing
tiers for e-books sold through Apple's iBookstore.
64. On January 11, 2010, Apple emailed its proposed e-book
distribution agreement to all the Publisher Defendants. As with the
outlined proposals Apple sent earlier in January, the proposed e-book
distribution agreements were substantially the same. Also on January
11, 2010, Apple separately emailed to Penguin and two other Publisher
Defendants charts showing how the Publisher Defendant's bestselling e-
books would be priced at $12.99--the ostensibly maximum price under
Apple's then-current price tier proposal--in the iBookstore.
65. The proposed e-book distribution agreement mainly incorporated
the principles Apple set out in its email messages of January 4 through
January 6, with two notable changes. First, Apple demanded that the
Publisher Defendants provide Apple their complete e-book catalogs and
that they not delay the electronic release of any title behind its
print release. Second, and more important, Apple replaced the express
requirement that each publisher adopt the agency model with each of its
retailers with an unusual most favored nation (``MFN'') pricing
provision. That provision was not structured like a standard MFN in
favor of a retailer, ensuring Apple that it would receive the best
available wholesale price. Nor did the MFN ensure Apple that the
Publisher Defendants would not set a higher retail price on the
iBookstore than they set on other Web sites where they controlled
retail prices. Instead, the MFN here required each publisher to
guarantee that it would lower the retail price of each e-book in
Apple's iBookstore to match the lowest price offered by any other
retailer, even if the Publisher Defendant did not control that other
retailer's ultimate consumer price. That is, instead of an MFN designed
to protect Apple's ability to compete, this MFN was designed to protect
Apple from having to compete on price at all, while still maintaining
Apple's 30 percent margin.
66. The purpose of these provisions was to work in concert to
enforce the Defendants' agreement to raise and stabilize retail e-book
prices. Apple and the Publisher Defendants recognized that coupling
Apple's right to all of their e-books with its right to demand that
those e-books not be priced higher on the iBookstore than on any other
Web site effectively required that each Publisher Defendant take away
retail pricing control from all other e-book
[[Page 77100]]
retailers, including stripping them of any ability to discount or
otherwise price promote e-books out of the retailer's own margins.
Otherwise, the retail price MFN would cause Apple's iBookstore prices
to drop to match the best available retail price of each e-book, and
the Publisher Defendants would receive only 70 percent of those reduced
retail prices. Price competition by other retailers, if allowed to
continue, thus likely would reduce e-book revenues to levels the
Publisher Defendants could not control or predict.
67. In negotiating the retail price MFN with Apple, ``some of [the
Publisher Defendants]'' asserted that Apple did not need the provision
``because they would be moving to an agency model with [the other e-
book retailers,]'' regardless. Ultimately, though, all Defendants
agreed to include the MFN commitment mechanism.
68. On January 16, 2010, Apple, via Mr. Cue, offered revised terms
to the Publisher Defendants that again were identical in substance.
Apple modified its earlier proposal in two significant ways. First, in
response to publisher requests, it added new maximum pricing tiers that
increased permissible e-book prices to $16.99 or $19.99, depending on
the book's hardcover list price. Second, Apple's new proposal mitigated
these price increases somewhat by adding special pricing tiers for e-
book versions of books on the New York Times fiction and non-fiction
bestseller lists. For e-book versions of bestsellers bearing list
prices of $30 or less, Publisher Defendants could set a price up to
$12.99; for bestsellers bearing list prices between $30 and $35, the e-
book price cap would be $14.99. In conjunction with the revised
proposal, Mr. Cue set up meetings for the next week to finalize
agreements with the Publisher Defendants.
69. Each Publisher Defendant required assurances that it would not
be the only publisher to sign an agreement with Apple that would compel
it either to take pricing authority from Amazon or to pull its e-books
from Amazon. The Publisher Defendants continued to fear that Amazon
would act to protect its ability to price e-books at $9.99 or less if
any one of them acted alone. Individual Publisher Defendants also
feared punishment in the marketplace if only its e-books suddenly
became more expensive at retail while other publishers continued to
allow retailers to compete on price. As Mr. Cue noted, ``all of them
were very concerned about being the only ones to sign a deal with us.''
Penguin explicitly communicated to Apple that it would sign an e-book
distribution agreement with Apple only if at least three of the other
``major[]'' publishers did as well. Apple supplied the needed
assurances.
70. While the Publisher Defendants were discussing e-book
distribution terms with Apple during the week of January 18, 2010,
Amazon met in New York City with a number of prominent authors and
agents to unveil a new program under which copyright holders could take
their e-books directly to Amazon--cutting out the publisher--and Amazon
would pay royalties of up to 70 percent, far in excess of what
publishers offered. This announcement further highlighted the direct
competitive threat Amazon posed to the Publisher Defendants' business
model. The Publisher Defendants reacted immediately. For example,
Penguin USA CEO David Shanks reported being ``really angry'' after
``hav[ing] read [Amazon's] announcement.'' After thinking about it for
a day, Mr. Shanks concluded, ``[o]n Apple I am now more convinced that
we need a viable alternative to Amazon or this nonsense will continue
and get much worse.'' Another decisionmaker stated he was ``p****d'' at
Amazon for starting to compete directly against the publishers and
expressed his desire ``to screw Amazon.''
71. To persuade one of the Publisher Defendants to stay with the
others and sign an agreement, Apple CEO Steve Jobs wrote to an
executive of the Publisher Defendant's corporate parent that the
publisher had only two choices apart from signing the Apple Agency
Agreement: (i) accept the status quo (``Keep going with Amazon at
$9.99''); or (ii) continue with a losing policy of delaying the release
of electronic versions of new titles (``Hold back your books from
Amazon''). According to Jobs, the Apple deal offered the Publisher
Defendants a superior alternative path to the higher retail e-book
prices they sought: ``Throw in with Apple and see if we can all make a
go of this to create a real mainstream e-books market at $12.99 and
$14.99.''
72. In addition to passing information through Apple and during
their private dinners and other in-person meetings, the Publisher
Defendants frequently communicated by telephone to exchange assurances
of common action in attempting to raise the retail price of e-books.
These telephone communications increased significantly during the two-
month period in which the Publisher Defendants considered and entered
the Apple Agency Agreements. During December 2009 and January 2010, the
Publisher Defendants' U.S. CEOs placed at least 56 phone calls to one
another. Each CEO, including Penguin's Shanks and Macmillan's Sargent,
placed at least seven such phone calls.
73. The timing, frequency, duration, and content of the Publisher
Defendant CEOs' phone calls demonstrate that the Publisher Defendants
used them to seek and exchange assurances of common strategies and
business plans regarding the Apple Agency Agreements. For example, in
addition to the telephone calls already described in this complaint:
Near the time Apple first presented the agency model, one
Publisher Defendant's CEO used a telephone call--ostensibly made to
discuss a marketing joint venture--to tell Penguin USA CEO David Shanks
that ``everyone is in the same place with Apple.''
After receiving Apple's January 16, 2010 revised proposal,
executives of several Publisher Defendants responded to the revised
proposal and meetings by, again, seeking and exchanging confidential
information. For example, on Sunday, January 17, one Publisher
Defendant's CEO used his mobile phone to call another Publisher
Defendant's CEO and talk for approximately ten minutes. And on the
morning of January 19, Penguin USA CEO David Shanks had an extended
telephone conversation with the CEO of another Publisher Defendant.
On January 21, 2010, the CEO of one Publisher Defendant's
parent company instructed his U.S. subordinate via email to find out
Apple's progress in agency negotiations with other publishers. Four
minutes after that email was sent, the U.S. executive called another
Publisher Defendant's CEO, and the two spoke for over eleven minutes.
On January 22, 2010, at 9:30 a.m., Apple's Cue met with
one Publisher Defendant's CEO to make what Cue hoped would be a ``final
go/no-go decision'' about whether the Publisher Defendant would sign an
agreement with Apple. Less than an hour later, the Publisher
Defendant's CEO made phone calls, two minutes apart, to two other
Publisher Defendants' CEOs, including Macmillan's Sargent. The CEO who
placed the calls admitted under oath to placing them specifically to
learn if the other two Publisher Defendants would sign with Apple prior
to Apple's iPad launch.
On the evening of Saturday, January 23, 2010, Apple's Cue
emailed his boss, Steve Jobs, and noted that Penguin USA CEO David
Shanks ``want[ed] an assurance that he is 1 of 4 before signing.'' The
following Monday morning, at 9:46 a.m., Mr. Shanks called another
Publisher Defendant's CEO and
[[Page 77101]]
the two talked for approximately four minutes. Both Penguin and the
other Publisher Defendant signed their Apple Agency Agreements later
that day.
74. On January 24, 2010, Hachette signed an e-book distribution
agreement with Apple. Over the next two days, Simon & Schuster,
Macmillan, Penguin, and HarperCollins all followed suit and signed e-
book distribution agreements with Apple. Within these three days, the
Publisher Defendants agreed with Apple to abandon the longstanding
wholesale model for selling e-books. The Apple Agency Agreements took
effect simultaneously on April 3, 2010 with the release of Apple's new
iPad.
75. The final version of the pricing tiers in the Apple Agency
Agreements contained the $12.99 and $14.99 price points for
bestsellers, discussed earlier, and also established prices for all
other newly released titles based on the hardcover list price of the
same title. Although couched as maximum retail prices, the price tiers
in fact established the retail e-book prices to be charged by Publisher
Defendants.
76. By entering the Apple Agency Agreements, each Publisher
Defendant effectively agreed to require all of their e-book retailers
to accept the agency model. Both Apple and the Publisher Defendants
understood the Agreements would compel the Publisher Defendants to take
pricing authority from all non-Apple e-book retailers. A February 10,
2010 presentation by one Publisher Defendant applauded this result
(emphasis in original): ``The Apple agency model deal means that we
will have to shift to an agency model with Amazon which [will]
strengthen our control over pricing.''
77. Apple understood that the final Apple Agency Agreements ensured
that the Publisher Defendants would raise their retail e-book prices to
the ostensible limits set by the Apple price tiers not only in Apple's
forthcoming iBookstore, but on Amazon.com and all other consumer sites
as well. When asked by a Wall Street Journal reporter at the January
27, 2010 iPad unveiling event, ``Why should she buy a book for * * *
$14.99 from your device when she could buy one for $9.99 from Amazon on
the Kindle or from Barnes & Noble on the Nook?'' Apple CEO Steve Jobs
responded, ``that won't be the case * * * the prices will be the
same.''
78. Apple understood that the retail price MFN was the key
commitment mechanism to keep the Publisher Defendants advancing their
conspiracy in lockstep. Regarding the effect of the MFN, Apple
executive Pete Alcorn remarked in the context of the European roll-out
of the agency model in the spring of 2010:
I told [Apple executive Keith Moerer] that I think he and Eddy
[Cue] made it at least halfway to changing the industry permanently,
and we should keep the pads on and keep fighting for it. I might regret
that later, but right now I feel like it's a giant win to keep pushing
the MFN and forcing people off the [A]mazon model and onto ours. If
anything, the place to give is the pricing--long run, the mfn is more
important. The interesting insight in the meeting was Eddy's
explanation that it doesn't have to be that broad--any decent MFN
forces the model.
79. Within the four months following the signing of the Apple
Agency Agreements, and over Amazon's objections, each Publisher
Defendant had transformed its business relationship with all of the
major e-book retailers from a wholesale model to an agency model and
imposed flat prohibitions against e-book discounting or other price
competition on all non-Apple e-book retailers.
80. For example, after it signed its Apple Agency Agreement,
Macmillan presented Amazon a choice: adopt the agency model or lose the
ability to sell e-book versions of new hardcover titles for the first
seven months of their release. Amazon rejected Macmillan's ultimatum
and sought to preserve its ability to sell e-book versions of newly
released hardcover titles for $9.99. To resist Macmillan's efforts to
force it to accept either the agency model or delayed electronic
availability, Amazon effectively stopped selling Macmillan's print
books and e-books.
81. When Amazon stopped selling Macmillan titles, other Publisher
Defendants did not view the situation as an opportunity to gain market
share from a weakened competitor. Instead, they rallied to support
Macmillan. For example, the CEO of one Publisher Defendant's parent
company instructed the Publisher Defendant's CEO that ``[Macmillan CEO]
John Sargent needs our help!'' The parent company CEO explained,
``M[acm]illan have been brave, but they are small. We need to move the
lines. And I am thrilled to know how A[mazon] will react against 3 or 4
of the big guys.''
82. The CEO of one Publisher Defendant's parent company assured
Macmillan CEO John Sargent of his company's support in a January 31,
2010 email: ``I can ensure you that you are not going to find your
company alone in the battle.'' The same parent company CEO also assured
the head of Macmillan's corporate parent in a February 1 email that
``others will enter the battle field!'' Overall, Macmillan received
``hugely supportive'' correspondence from the publishing industry
during Macmillan's effort to force Amazon to accept the agency model.
83. As its battle with Amazon continued, Macmillan knew that,
because the other Publisher Defendants, via the Apple Agency
Agreements, had locked themselves into forcing agency on Amazon to
advance their conspiratorial goals, Amazon soon would face similar
edicts from a united front of Publisher Defendants. And Amazon could
not delist the books of all five Publisher Defendants because they
together accounted for nearly half of Amazon's e-book business.
Macmillan CEO John Sargent explained the company's reasoning: ``we
believed whatever was happening, whatever Amazon was doing here, they
were going to face--they're going to have more of the same in the
future one way or another.'' Another Publisher Defendant similarly
recognized that Macmillan was not acting unilaterally but rather was
``leading the charge on moving Amazon to the agency model.''
84. Amazon quickly came to fully appreciate that not just Macmillan
but all five Publisher Defendants had irrevocably committed themselves
to the agency model across all retailers, including taking control of
retail pricing and thereby stripping away any opportunity for e-book
retailers to compete on price. Just two days after it stopped selling
Macmillan titles, Amazon capitulated and publicly announced that it had
no choice but to accept the agency model, and it soon resumed selling
Macmillan's e-book and print book titles.
D. Defendants Further the Conspiracy by Pressuring Another Publisher To
Adopt the Agency Model
85. When a company takes a pro-competitive action by introducing a
new product, lowering its prices, or even adopting a new business model
that helps it sell more product at better prices, it typically does not
want its competitors to copy its action, but prefers to maintain a
first-mover or competitive advantage. In contrast, when companies
jointly take collusive action, such as instituting a coordinated price
increase, they typically want the rest of their competitors to join
them in that action. Because collusive actions are not pro-competitive
or consumer friendly, any competitor that does not go along with the
conspirators can take more consumer friendly actions and see its market
share rise at the expense of the conspirators. Here, the Defendants
[[Page 77102]]
acted consistently with a collusive arrangement, and inconsistently
with a pro-competitive arrangement, as they sought to pressure another
publisher (whose market share was growing at the Publisher Defendants'
expense after the Apple Agency Contracts became effective) to join
them.
86. Penguin appears to have taken the lead in these efforts. Its
U.S. CEO, David Shanks, twice directly told the executives of the
holdout major publisher about his displeasure with their decision to
continue selling e-books on the wholesale model. Mr. Shanks tried to
justify the actions of the conspiracy as an effort to save brick-and-
mortar bookstores and criticized the other publisher for ``not
helping'' the group. The executives of the other publisher responded to
Mr. Shanks's complaints by explaining their objections to the agency
model.
87. Mr. Shanks also encouraged a large print book and e-book
retailer to punish the other publisher for not joining Defendants'
conspiracy. In March 2010, Mr. Shanks sent an email message to an
executive of the retailer complaining that the publisher ``has chosen
to stay on their current model and will allow retailers to sell at
whatever price they wish.'' Mr. Shanks argued that ``[s]ince Penguin is
looking out for [your] welfare at what appears to be great costs to us,
I would hope that [you] would be equally brutal to Publishers who have
thrown in with your competition with obvious disdain for your welfare.
. . . I hope you make [the publisher] hurt like Amazon is doing to [the
Publisher Defendants].''
88. When the third-party retailer continued to promote the non-
defendant publisher's books, Mr. Shanks applied more pressure. In a
June 22, 2010 email to the retailer's CEO, Mr. Shanks claimed to be
``baffled'' as to why the retailer would promote that publisher's books
instead of just those published by ``people who stood up for you.''
89. Throughout the summer of 2010, Apple also cajoled the holdout
publisher to adopt agency terms in line with those of the Publisher
Defendants, including on a phone call between Apple CEO Steve Jobs and
the holdout publisher's CEO. Apple flatly refused to sell the holdout
publisher's e-books unless and until it agreed to an agency
relationship substantially similar to the arrangement between Apple and
the Publisher Defendants defined by the Apple Agency Agreements.
E. Conspiracy Succeeds at Raising and Stabilizing Consumer E-book
Prices
90. The ostensible maximum prices included in the Apple Agency
Agreements' price schedule represent, in practice, actual e-book
prices. Indeed, at the time the Publisher Defendants snatched retail
pricing authority away from Amazon and other e-book retailers, not one
of them had built an internal retail pricing apparatus sufficient to do
anything other than set retail prices at the Apple Agency Agreements'
ostensible caps. Once their agency agreements took effect, the
Publisher Defendants raised e-book prices at all retail outlets to the
maximum price level within each tier. Even today, two years after the
Publisher Defendants began setting e-book retail prices according to
the Apple price tiers, they still set the retail prices for the
electronic versions of all or nearly all of their bestselling hardcover
titles at the ostensible maximum price allowed by those price tiers.
91. The Publisher Defendants' collective adoption of the Apple
Agency Agreements allowed them (facilitated by Apple) to raise, fix,
and stabilize retail e-book prices in three steps: (a) they took away
retail pricing authority from retailers; (b) they then set retail e-
book prices according to the Apple price tiers; and (c) they then
exported the agency model and higher retail prices to the rest of the
industry, in part to comply with the retail price MFN included in each
Apple Agency Agreement.
92. Defendants' conspiracy and agreement to raise and stabilize
retail e-book prices by collectively adopting the agency model and
Apple price tiers led to an increase in the retail prices of newly
released and bestselling e-books. Prior to the Defendants' conspiracy,
consumers benefited from price competition that led to $9.99 prices for
newly released and bestselling e-books. Almost immediately after Apple
launched its iBookstore in April 2010 and the Publisher Defendants
imposed agency model pricing on all retailers, the Publisher
Defendants' e-book prices for most newly released and bestselling e-
books rose to either $12.99 or $14.99.
93. Defendants' conspiracy and agreement to raise and stabilize
retail e-book prices by collectively adopting the agency model and
Apple price tiers for their newly released and bestselling e-books also
led to an increase in average retail prices of the balance of Publisher
Defendants' e-book catalogs, their so-called ``backlists.'' Now that
the Publisher Defendants control the retail prices of e-books--but
Amazon maintains control of its print book retail prices--Publisher
Defendants' e-book prices sometimes are higher than Amazon's prices for
print versions of the same titles.
VII. Violation Alleged
94. Beginning no later than 2009, and continuing to date,
Defendants and their co-conspirators have engaged in a conspiracy and
agreement in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce,
constituting a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
This offense is likely to continue and recur unless the relief
requested is granted.
95. The conspiracy and agreement consists of an understanding and
concert of action among Defendants and their co-conspirators to raise,
fix, and stabilize retail e-book prices, to end price competition among
e-book retailers, and to limit retail price competition among the
Publisher Defendants, ultimately effectuated by collectively adopting
and adhering to functionally identical methods of selling e-books and
price schedules.
96. For the purpose of forming and effectuating this agreement and
conspiracy, some or all Defendants did the following things, among
others:
a. Shared their business information, plans, and strategies in
order to formulate ways to raise retail e-book prices;
b. Assured each other of support in attempting to raise retail e-
book prices;
c. Employed ostensible joint venture meetings to disguise their
attempts to raise retail e-book prices;
d. Fixed the method of and formulas for setting retail e-book
prices;
e. Fixed tiers for retail e-book prices;
f. Eliminated the ability of e-book retailers to fund retail e-book
price decreases out of their own margins; and
g. Raised the retail prices of their newly released and bestselling
e-books to the agreed prices--the ostensible price caps--contained in
the pricing schedule of their Apple Agency Agreements.
97. Defendants' conspiracy and agreement, in which the Publisher
Defendants and Apple agreed to raise, fix, and stabilize retail e-book
prices, to end price competition among e-book retailers, and to limit
retail price competition among the Publisher Defendants by fixing
retail e-book prices, constitutes a per se violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
98. Moreover, Defendants' conspiracy and agreement has resulted in
obvious and demonstrable anticompetitive effects on consumers in the
trade e-books market by depriving consumers of the benefits of
competition among e-book retailers as to both retail prices and retail
innovations (such as e-book clubs and subscription plans), such that it
[[Page 77103]]
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
99. Where, as here, defendants have engaged in a per se violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, no allegations with respect to the
relevant product market, geographic market, or market power are
required. To the extent such allegations may otherwise be necessary,
the relevant product market for the purposes of this action is trade e-
books. The anticompetitive acts at issue in this case directly affect
the sale of trade e-books to consumers. No reasonable substitute exists
for e-books. There are no technological alternatives to e-books,
thousands of which can be stored on a single small device. E-books can
be stored and read on electronic devices, while print books cannot. E-
books can be located, purchased, and downloaded anywhere a customer has
an internet connection, while print books cannot. Industry firms also
view e-books as a separate market segment from print books, and the
Publisher Defendants were able to impose and sustain a significant
retail price increase for their trade e-books.
100. The relevant geographic market is the United States. The
rights to license e-books are granted on territorial bases, with the
United States typically forming its own territory. E-book retailers
typically present a unique storefront to U.S. consumers, often with e-
books bearing different retail prices than the same titles would
command on the same retailer's foreign Web sites.
101. The Publisher Defendants possess market power in the market
for trade e-books. The Publisher Defendants successfully imposed and
sustained a significant retail price increase for their trade e-books.
Collectively, they create and distribute a wide variety of popular e-
books, regularly comprising over half of the New York Times fiction and
non-fiction bestseller lists. Collectively, they provide a critical
input to any firm selling trade e-books to consumers. Any retailer
selling trade e-books to consumers would not be able to forgo
profitably the sale of the Publisher Defendants' e-books.
102. Defendants' agreement and conspiracy has had and will continue
to have anticompetitive effects, including:
a. Increasing the retail prices of trade e-books;
b. Eliminating competition on price among e-book retailers;
c. Restraining competition on retail price among the Publisher
Defendants;
d. Restraining competition among the Publisher Defendants for
favorable relationships with e-book retailers;
e. Constraining innovation among e-book retailers;
f. Entrenching incumbent publishers' favorable position in the sale
and distribution of print books by slowing the migration from print
books to e-books;
g. Making more likely express or tacit collusion among publishers;
and
h. Reducing competitive pressure on print book prices.
103. Defendants' agreement and conspiracy is not reasonably
necessary to accomplish any procompetitive objective, or,
alternatively, its scope is broader than necessary to accomplish any
such objective.
VIII. Request for Relief
104. To remedy these illegal acts, the United States requests that
the Court:
a. Adjudge and decree that Defendants entered into an unlawful
contract, combination, or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of
interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1;
b. Enjoin the Defendants, their officers, agents, servants,
employees and attorneys and their successors and all other persons
acting or claiming to act in active concert or participation with one
or more of them, from continuing, maintaining, or renewing in any
manner, directly or indirectly, the conduct alleged herein or from
engaging in any other conduct, combination, conspiracy, agreement,
understanding, plan, program, or other arrangement having the same
effect as the alleged violation or that otherwise violates Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, through fixing the method and manner in
which they sell e-books, or otherwise agreeing to set the price or
release date for e-books, or collective negotiation of e-book
agreements, or otherwise collectively restraining retail price
competition for e-books;
c. Prohibit the collusive setting of price tiers that can de facto
fix prices;
d. Declare null and void the Apple Agency Agreements and any
agreement between a Publisher Defendant and an e-book retailer that
restricts, limits, or impedes the e-book retailer's ability to set,
alter, or reduce the retail price of any e-book or to offer price or
other promotions to encourage consumers to purchase any e-book, or
contains a retail price MFN;
e. Reform the agreements between Apple and Publisher Defendants to
strike the retail price MFN clauses as void and unenforceable; and
f. Award to Plaintiff its costs of this action and such other and
further relief as may be appropriate and as the Court may deem just and
proper.
Dated: April 11, 2012
For Plaintiff United States Of America:
Sharis A. Pozen,
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Joseph F. Wayland,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Gene Kimmelman,
Chief Counsel for Competition Policy and Intergovernmental
Relations.
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement, Mark W. Ryan, Director of Litigation,
[email protected].
John R. Read,
Chief. David C. Kully, Assistant Chief, Litigation III Section,
[email protected].
Daniel Mccuaig,
Nathan P. Sutton,
Mary Beth Mcgee,
Owen M. Kendler,
William H. Jones Ii,
Stephen T. Fairchild,
Attorneys for the United States, Litigation III Section, 450 Fifth
Street NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 307-
0520, Facsimile: (202) 514-7308, [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected].
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Apple, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 12-CV-2826 (DLC) ECF Case
Competitive Impact Statement
Pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act (``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), Plaintiff United
States of America (``United States'') files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment against Defendant
Penguin Group (USA), Inc. and The Penguin Group, a division of Pearson
PLC, (collectively these two entities are referred to herein as
``Penguin''), submitted on December 18, 2012, for entry in this
antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On April 11, 2012, the United States filed a civil antitrust
Complaint alleging that Apple, Inc. (``Apple'') and five of the six
largest publishers in the United States (``Publisher Defendants'')
restrained competition in the sale of electronic books (``e-books''),
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Shortly
after filing the Complaint, the United States filed a proposed final
judgment (``Original Judgment'') with respect to Defendants
[[Page 77104]]
Hachette Book Group, Inc. (``Hachette''), HarperCollins Publishers
L.L.C. (``HarperCollins''), and Simon & Schuster, Inc. (``Simon &
Schuster''). That Original Judgment settled this suit as to those three
defendants. Following a thorough Tunney Act review process, the Court
granted the United States' Motion for Entry of the Original Judgment.
(Docket No. 119).
Penguin has now agreed to settle on substantially the same terms as
those contained in the Original Judgment. A proposed Final Judgment
with respect to Penguin (``Penguin Final Judgment'' or ``PFJ'') that
embodies that settlement was filed today. Of course, the case against
the remaining Defendants--Apple, Inc., Verlagsgruppe Georg von
Holtzbrinck GmbH, and Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan--will
continue.
The Penguin Final Judgment is described in more detail in Section
III below. Because the language of the Penguin Final Judgment closely
follows the language of the Original Judgment, this Competitive Impact
Statement incorporates but does not repeat the extensive record
relating to the Original Judgment.
The United States and Penguin have stipulated that the Penguin
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA, unless
the United States withdraws its consent. Entry of the Penguin Final
Judgment would terminate this action as to Penguin, except to the
extent that Penguin has stipulated that it will cooperate in the United
States' ongoing prosecution of the remaining Defendants, and that this
Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, and enforce the
Penguin Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof.
II. Brief Summary of the Events Giving Rise To the Alleged Violation of
the Antitrust Laws
As described in detail in the United States' Complaint (Docket No.
1), and the Competitive Impact Statement relating to the Original
Judgment (``Original CIS,'' Docket No. 5), Publisher Defendants desired
to raise retail prices for e-books. (Compl. ] 3.) They were primarily
upset by Amazon.com, Inc.'s (``Amazon's'') pricing of newly released
and bestselling e-books at $9.99 or less. (Compl. ]] 32-34.) Publisher
Defendants feared that Amazon would resist any unilateral attempt to
force an increase in e-book prices and that, even if an individual
Publisher Defendant succeeded in such an attempt, that Publisher
Defendant would lose sales to any competitors that had not forced the
price of their books to supracompetitive levels. (Compl. ]] 35-36, 46.)
They met privately to discuss ways to collectively solve ``the $9.99
problem.'' (Compl. ]] 39-45.) Ultimately, Publisher Defendants agreed
to act collectively to raise retail e-book prices. (Compl. ]] 47-50.)
Apple's entry into the e-book business provided a perfect
opportunity to coordinate the Publisher Defendants' collective action
to raise e-book prices. (Compl. ] 51.) At the suggestion of two
Publisher Defendants, Apple began to consider selling e-books under an
``agency model,'' whereby the publishers would set the prices consumers
ultimately paid for e-books and Apple would take a 30 percent
commission as the selling agent. (Compl. ]] 52-54, 63.) Apple
recognized that, under this scheme, ``the customer'' would ``pay[] a
little more,'' but that Apple would realize margins far in excess of
what other retailers then averaged on their sales of newly-released and
bestselling e-books. (Compl. ] 56.) To achieve this goal, Apple first
expressly proposed to each Publisher Defendant that it adopt an agency
pricing model with every outlet that would compete with Apple for
retail e-book sales, Compl. ] 58, and later replaced that express
requirement with a unique most favored nation (``MFN'') pricing
provision that effectively enforced the Publisher Defendants'
commitment to impose the agency pricing model on all other retailers.
(Compl. ]] 65-66.) This MFN protected Apple from price competition from
other retailers, guaranteeing that its 30 percent margin would not be
disturbed. (Compl. ] 65.) Apple kept each Publisher Defendant informed
about the status of its negotiations with other Publisher Defendants.
(Compl. ] 61.) In January 2010, Apple sent to each Publisher Defendant
substantively identical term sheets that Apple told them were devised
after ``talking to all the other publishers.'' (Compl. ]] 62-64.) Those
term sheets formed the basis of the nearly identical agency agreements
signed by each Publisher Defendant (``Apple Agency Agreements''). The
purpose of these agreements was to raise and stabilize e-book prices.
(Compl. ] 66.) Apple CEO Steve Jobs explained to one Publisher
Defendant that the Apple Agency Agreements provided a path for the
Publisher Defendants away from $9.99 and to higher retail e-book
prices. (Compl. ] 71.) He urged the Publisher Defendants to ``[t]hrow
in with Apple and see if we can all make a go of this to create a real
mainstream e-books market at $12.99 and $14.99.'' Id. Apple and the
Publisher Defendants adopted these price points in all of the Apple
Agency Agreements, which all were signed within a three-day span in
January 2010. (Compl. ]] 74-75.) As a result of Defendants' illegal
agreement, consumers have paid higher prices for e-books than they
would have paid in a market free of collusion. (Compl. ]] 90-93.)
III. Explanation of the Penguin Final Judgment
The language and relief contained in the Penguin Final Judgment is
largely identical to the terms included in the Original Judgment.
Below, we describe, in abbreviated form, the purpose of each provision
of the Penguin Final Judgment. Penguin's decision to join the other
settling Publisher Defendants in agreeing to the settlement terms will
provide prompt, certain, and effective remedies that will continue the
effort to restore competition to the marketplace. Settlement likely
will lead to lower e-book prices for many Penguin titles; prices for
titles offered by HarperCollins, Hachette, and Simon & Schuster fell
soon after those publishers entered into new contracts as a result of
the Original Judgment.\2\ The requirements and prohibitions included in
the Penguin Final Judgment will eliminate Penguin's illegal conduct,
prevent recurrence of the same or similar conduct, and establish a
robust antitrust compliance program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., Scott Nichols, HarperCollins Offering Discounted
eBooks After Price Fixing Settlement, TechRadar (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.techradar.com/news/portable-devices/portable-media/harpercollins-offering-discounted-ebooks-after-price-fixing-settlement-1096467 (``Bestselling ebooks from the publisher such as
`The Fallen Angel' and `Solo' can now be found for $9.99 on Amazon,
Barnes and Noble, and other online retailers.''); Nate Hoffelder,
Hachette Has Dropped Agency Pricing on eBooks, The Digital Reader
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.the-digital-reader.com/2012/12/04/hachette-has-dropped-agency-pricing-on-ebooks/(``Amazon is
discounting the ebooks by $1 to $4 from the list price, and both
Barnes & Noble and Apple are making similar discounts''); Jeremy
Greenfield, Simon & Schuster Has a New Deal With Amazon, Other
Retailers, Digital Book World (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2012/looks-like-simon-schuster-has-a-new-deal-with-amazon-other-retailers/(``Ebook prices were lowered for
Simon & Schuster titles over the weekend on sites like Amazon and
Nook.com to levels several dollars below what they had been earlier
in the week.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Required Conduct (Section IV) \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Like the Original Judgment, Sections I-III of the Penguin
Final Judgment contain a statement acknowledging the Court's
jurisdiction; definitions; and a statement of the scope of the
proposed Final Judgment's applicability. As with the settling
defendants in the Original Judgment, the definition of Penguin has
been drafted to ensure that the Judgment does not bind subsidiaries
of Penguin's parent corporation that are not in the book publishing
business. Additionally, the definition has been modified to avoid
any doubt that if Penguin and Random House, Inc. combine, as
recently proposed, the future entity will be subject to the decree.
See PFJ Sec. II.K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Penguin Final Judgment begins by addressing those agreements
used
[[Page 77105]]
collusively to raise and stabilize e-book prices across the industry,
requiring that Penguin terminate its Apple Agency Agreement within
seven days of this Court's entry. See PFJ Sec. IV.A. Because this
agreement included an MFN clause--ensuring that Penguin would remove
retail pricing control from e-book retailers--Section IV.B requires
that Penguin's contracts with retailers that restrict retailer pricing
or include a Price MFN also be terminated. See PFJ Sec. IV.B. Penguin
must take the steps required under each contract to terminate beginning
no later than ten days after the Court enters the Penguin Final
Judgment. Section IV.B also allows any retailer with such a contract
the option to terminate its contract with Penguin on 30 days notice.
See also Original CIS Sec. III.A.1.
Further, in order to reduce the risk that Penguin may use future
joint ventures to eliminate competition among Publisher Defendants,
Section IV.C requires that Penguin provide advance notice to the
Department of Justice before forming or modifying a joint venture
between it and another publisher related to e-books. See also Original
CIS Sec. III.A.2. Anticipating this requirement, the Penguin Final
Judgment notes that Penguin already has provided appropriate notice to
the United States of its intent to form a joint venture with Random
House, Inc.
Finally, to ensure Penguin's compliance with the Penguin Final
Judgment, Section IV.D requires that Penguin provide, on a quarterly
basis, each e-book agreement it has reached with any e-book retailer on
or after January 1, 2012.
B. Prohibited Conduct (Section V)
In order to ensure that e-book retailers can compete on the price
of e-books sold to consumers in the future, the Penguin Final Judgment
also prohibits terms that prevent retail price competition. Sections
V.A, V.B, and V.C limit Penguin's ability to enter new agreements (and
enforce old agreements) that contain two components of the Apple Agency
Agreements: the ban on retailer discounting, and the retail price-
matching MFNs that ensured agency terms were exported to all e-book
retailers. Sections V.A. and V.B. prevent Penguin, for a two-year
period, from forbidding retailers to offer price promotions or
discounts on its e-books. Allowing e-book retailers to negotiate new
contracts with Penguin, without permitting Penguin, for a set period,
to prohibit retailers from discounting, will help ensure that new
contracts will not be set under the collusive conditions that produced
the Apple Agency Agreements. See PFJ Sec. Sec. V.A-B. For a five-year
period, Section V.C also stops Penguin from entering into an agreement
with an e-book retailer that contains a Price MFN (defined as an MFN
relating to price, revenue share or commission available to any
retailer). This will eliminate Penguin's ability to use these MFNs to
achieve, for a second time, the results of the collusive agreements.
See also Original CIS Sec. III.B.1.
Further, Penguin may not retaliate against or punish an e-book
retailer based on the retailer's e-book prices or its discounting or
promotional choices. PFJ Sec. V.D. Nor may Penguin repeat its previous
attempt to retaliate by proxy, as this provision bars Penguin from
encouraging another company to retaliate against an e-book retailer on
its behalf. However, the anti-retaliation provision does not prohibit
Penguin from unilaterally entering into and enforcing agency agreements
with e-book retailers after the two-year proscription, required in
Sections V.A and V.B, has expired. See also Original CIS Sec. III.B.2.
In addition to addressing terms used in the Apple Agency Agreements
to implement the conspiracy, the Penguin Final Judgment also forbids a
recurrence of the alleged conspiracy, and prohibits industry practices
that facilitated it. Section V.E prohibits Penguin from agreeing with
other Defendants or e-book publishers to raise or set e-book retail
prices or coordinate terms relating to the licensing, distribution, or
sale of e-books. Section V.F likewise prohibits Penguin from directly
or indirectly conveying confidential or competitively sensitive
information to any other e-book publisher. Banning such communications
is critical here, where communications among publishing competitors
were a common practice, and led directly to the collusive agreement
alleged in the Complaint. See also Original CIS Sec. III.B.3.
C. Permitted Conduct (Section VI)
The Penguin Final Judgment also specifically carves out some
conduct--which normally is permitted under the antitrust laws--that
Penguin may unilaterally pursue. Section VI.A of the Penguin Final
Judgment allows Penguin to compensate e-book retailers for services
that they provide to publishers or consumers and help promote or sell
more e-books. Section VI.B permits Penguin to negotiate a commitment
from an e-book retailer that a retailer's aggregate expenditure on
discounts and promotions of Penguin's e-books will not exceed the
retailer's aggregate commission under an agency agreement in which
Penguin sets the e-book price and the retailer is compensated through a
commission. These provisions allow Penguin to prevent a retailer
selling its entire catalogue at a sustained loss, while still
permitting retailers to offer discounts under Sections V.A and V.B.
Absent the collusion here, the antitrust laws would normally permit a
publisher unilaterally to negotiate for such protections. See also
Original CIS Sec. III.C.
D. Antitrust Compliance (Section VII)
As outlined in Section VII, Penguin also must designate an
Antitrust Compliance Officer, who is required to distribute copies of
the Penguin Final Judgment; ensure training related to the Penguin
Final Judgment and the antitrust laws; certify compliance with the
Penguin Final Judgment; and conduct an annual antitrust compliance
audit. This compliance program is necessary considering the extensive
communication among competitors' CEOs that facilitated Defendants'
agreement. See also Original CIS Sec. III.D.
IV. Alternatives To the Penguin Final Judgment
The United States considered, as an alternative to the Penguin
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against Penguin. The United
States believes that the relief contained in the Penguin Final Judgment
will more quickly restore retail price competition to consumers.
V. Remedies Available To Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the Penguin Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
16(a), the Penguin Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against the Defendants.
[[Page 77106]]
VI. Procedures Available for Modification of the Penguin Final Judgment
The United States and Penguin have stipulated that the Penguin
Final Judgment may be entered by this Court after compliance with the
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry of the decree upon
this Court's determination that the Penguin Final Judgment is in the
public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding
the effective date of the Penguin Final Judgment within which any
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the
Penguin Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so
within sixty (60) days of publication of this Competitive Impact
Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a
newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement,
whichever is later.
All comments received during this period will be considered by the
United States Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its
consent to the Penguin Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's
entry of judgment. The comments and the responses of the United States
will be filed with the Court and published either in the Federal
Register or, with the Court's permission, on the Department of Justice
Web site.\4\ Written comments should be submitted to: John Read, Chief,
Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
450 5th Street, NW., Suite 4000,y Washington, DC 20530.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The United States posts or links to all public materials
regarding United States v. Apple, Inc. at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/applebooks.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Penguin Final Judgment provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court
for any order necessary or appropriate for modification,
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment
VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Penguin Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination,
the court is directed to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification,
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived
from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B); see generally United States v. KeySpan
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (WHP) (discussing
Tunney Act standards); United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing standards for public interest
determination).
In other words, under the Tunney Act, a court considers, among
other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether
the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are
sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1458-62 (DC Cir.
1995). The court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the
government is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.'' Id. at 1461;
accord United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v.
KeySpan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (same). With respect to the adequacy of
the relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.''
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see
also Alex. Brown & Sons, 963 F. Supp. at 238. Instead, the court should
grant due respect to the United States' ``prediction as to the effect
of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its
view of the nature of the case.'' United States v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003). After all, the court
is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one
that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is ``within
the reaches of the public interest.'' Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Alex. Brown, 963 F. Supp.
at 238.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's
``ultimate authority under the [Tunney Act] is limited to approving
or disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette
Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (the court is constrained
to ``look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a
microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass''). See generally
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ``the remedies
[obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations
charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of the public
interest''').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials or documents within the
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in
formulating the Penguin Final Judgment.
December 18, 2012
Respectfully submitted,
s/Mark W. Ryan.
Mark W. Ryan,
Lawrence E. Buterman,
Daniel McCuaig,
Stephanie A. Fleming,
Attorneys for the United States,
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 532-4753.
[email protected].
Certificate of Service
I, Stephen T. Fairchild, hereby certify that on December 18, 2012, I
caused a copy of the United States' Competitive Impact Statement to be
served by the Electronic Case Filing System, which included the
individuals listed below.
For Apple:
Daniel S. Floyd,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 333 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 4600, Los
Angeles, CA 90070, (213) 229-7148, [email protected].For Macmillan
and Verlagsgruppe Georg Von Holtzbrinck GMBH:
Joel M. Mitnick
Sidley Austin LLP, 787 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10019, (212) 839-
5300, [email protected].
For Penguin U.S.A. and the Penguin Group:
Daniel F. McInnis,
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20036, (202) 887-4000, [email protected].
[[Page 77107]]
For Hachette:
Walter B. Stuart, IV,
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY
10022, (212) 277-4000, [email protected].
For HarperCollins:
Paul Madison Eckles,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Four Times Square, 42nd Floor,
New York, NY 10036, (212) 735-2578, [email protected].
For Simon & Schuster:
Yehudah Lev Buchweitz,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (NYC), 767 Fifth Avenue, 25th Fl., New York,
NY 10153, (212) 310-8000 x8256, [email protected].
Additionally, courtesy copies of this Competitive Impact Statement
have been provided to the following:
For the State of Connecticut:
W. Joseph Nielsen,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Office of the Attorney
General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, CT 06106, (860) 808-5040,
[email protected].
For the Private Plaintiffs:
Jeff D. Friedman,
Hagens Berman, 715 Hearst Ave., Suite 202, Berkeley, CA 94710, (510)
725-3000, [email protected].
For the State of Texas:
Gabriel R. Gervey,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Office of the Attorney
General of Texas, 300 W. 15th Street, Austin, Texas 78701, (512) 463-
1262, [email protected].
Stephen T. Fairchild,
Attorney for the United States, United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC
20530, (202) 532-4925, [email protected].
United States District Court
United States Of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Apple, Inc., et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-2826 (DLC)
ECF Case
[Proposed] Final Judgment as to Defendants the Penguin Group, A
Division of Pearson PLC, and Penguin Group (USA), Inc.
Whereas, Plaintiff, the United States of America filed its
Complaint on April 11, 2012, alleging that Defendants conspired to
raise retail prices of E-books in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Plaintiff and Penguin, by their
respective attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law;
And Whereas, this Final Judgment does not constitute any admission
by Penguin that the law has been violated or of any issue of fact or
law, other than that the jurisdictional facts as alleged in the
Complaint are true;
And Whereas, Penguin agrees to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And Whereas, Plaintiff requires Penguin to agree to undertake
certain actions and refrain from certain conduct for the purpose of
remedying the loss of competition alleged in the Complaint;
And Whereas, Penguin has represented to the United States that the
actions and conduct restrictions can and will be undertaken and that it
will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as grounds for
asking the Court to modify any of the provisions contained below;
Now Therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of Penguin,
it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action
and over Penguin. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be
granted against Penguin under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. ' 1.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Agency Agreement'' means an agreement between an E-book
Publisher and an E-book Retailer under which the E-book Publisher Sells
E-books to consumers through the E-book Retailer, which under the
agreement acts as an agent of the E-book Publisher and is paid a
commission in connection with the Sale of one or more of the E-book
Publisher's E-books.
B. ``Apple'' means Apple, Inc., a California corporation with its
principal place of business in Cupertino, California, its successors
and assigns, and its parents, subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors,
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
C. ``Department of Justice'' means the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice.
D. ``E-book'' means an electronically formatted book designed to be
read on a computer, a handheld device, or other electronic devices
capable of visually displaying E-books. For purposes of this Final
Judgment, the term E-book does not include (1) an audio book, even if
delivered and stored digitally; (2) a standalone specialized software
application or ``app'' sold through an ``app store'' rather than
through an e-book store (e.g., through Apple's ``App Store'' rather
than through its ``iBookstore'' or ``iTunes'') and not designed to be
executed or read by or through a dedicated E-book reading device; or
(3) a media file containing an electronically formatted book for which
most of the value to consumers is derived from audio or video content
contained in the file that is not included in the print version of the
book.
E. ``E-book Publisher'' means any Person that, by virtue of a
contract or other relationship with an E-book's author or other rights
holder, owns or controls the necessary copyright or other authority (or
asserts such ownership or control) over any E-book sufficient to
distribute the E-book within the United States to E-book Retailers and
to permit such E-book Retailers to Sell the E-book to consumers in the
United States. Publisher Defendants are E-book Publishers. For purposes
of this Final Judgment, E-book Retailers are not E-book Publishers.
F. ``E-book Retailer'' means any Person that lawfully Sells (or
seeks to lawfully Sell) E-books to consumers in the United States, or
through which a Publisher Defendant, under an Agency Agreement, Sells
E-books to consumers. For purposes of this Final Judgment, Publisher
Defendants and all other Persons whose primary business is book
publishing are not E-book Retailers.
G. ``Hachette'' means Hachette Book Group, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New York, New York,
its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
and partnerships, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
H. ``HarperCollins'' means HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business
in New York, New York, its successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and partnerships, and their directors,
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
I. ``Including'' means including, but not limited to.
J. ``Macmillan'' means (1) Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a
Macmillan, a New York limited liability company with its principal
place of business in New York, New York; and (2) Verlagsgruppe
[[Page 77108]]
Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH, a German corporation with its principal
place of business in Stuttgart, Germany, their successors and assigns,
and their parents, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, and
partnerships, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
K. ``Penguin'' means (1) Penguin Group (USA), Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New York, New York;
(2) The Penguin Group, a division of U.K. corporation Pearson plc with
its principal place of business in London, England; (3) The Penguin
Publishing Company Ltd, a company registered in England and Wales with
its principal place of business in London, England; and (4) Dorling
Kindersley Holdings Limited, a company registered in England and Wales
with its principal place of business in London, England; and each of
their respective successors and assigns (expressly including Penguin
Random House and any similar joint venture between Penguin and Random
House Inc.); each of their respective subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
partnerships; and each of their respective directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees. Where Section IV.A, IV.B, IV.D, or VII
imposes an obligation on Penguin to engage in certain conduct by either
a date certain or by a specified day after entry of this Final
Judgment, any successor or assign whose acquisition of or combination
or other relationship with Penguin is consummated after entry of this
Final Judgment shall meet each such obligation within thirty days after
consummation. The prohibitions of Section V.A of this Final Judgment
shall expire for any successor or assign of Penguin on the dates on
which such prohibitions would have expired for Penguin had the
acquisition, combination, or other relationship not occurred. Where the
Final Judgment imposes an obligation on Penguin to engage in or refrain
from engaging in certain conduct, that obligation shall apply to
Penguin and to any joint venture or other business arrangement
established by Penguin and one or more Publisher Defendants.
L. ``Penguin Random House'' means the joint venture entities, which
will operate under the name ``Penguin Random House,'' that will be
formed pursuant to the Contribution Agreement, dated October 29, 2012,
by and between Pearson plc and Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA.
M. ``Person'' means any natural person, corporation, company,
partnership, joint venture, firm, association, proprietorship, agency,
board, authority, commission, office, or other business or legal
entity, whether private or governmental.
N. ``Price MFN'' means a term in an agreement between an E-book
Publisher and an E-book Retailer under which
1. the Retail Price at which an E-book Retailer or, under an Agency
Agreement, an E-book Publisher Sells one or more E-books to consumers
depends in any way on the Retail Price, or discounts from the Retail
Price, at which any other E-book Retailer or the E-book Publisher,
under an Agency Agreement, through any other E-book Retailer Sells the
same E-book(s) to consumers;
2. the Wholesale Price at which the E-book Publisher Sells one or
more E-books to that E-book Retailer for Sale to consumers depends in
any way on the Wholesale Price at which the E-book Publisher Sells the
same E-book(s) to any other E-book Retailer for Sale to consumers; or
3. the revenue share or commission that E-book Retailer receives
from the E-book Publisher in connection with the Sale of one or more E-
books to consumers depends in any way on the revenue share or
commission that (a) any other E-book Retailer receives from the E-book
Publisher in connection with the Sale of the same E-book(s) to
consumers, or (b) that E-book Retailer receives from any other E-book
Publisher in connection with the Sale of one or more of the other E-
book Publisher's E-books.
For purposes of this Final Judgment, it will not constitute a Price
MFN under subsection 3 of this definition if Penguin agrees, at the
request of an E-book Retailer, to meet more favorable pricing,
discounts, or allowances offered to the E-book Retailer by another E-
book Publisher for the period during which the other E-book Publisher
provides that additional compensation, so long as that agreement is not
or does not result from a pre-existing agreement that requires Penguin
to meet all requests by the E-book Retailer for more favorable pricing
within the terms of the agreement.
O. ``Publisher Defendants'' means Hachette, HarperCollins,
Macmillan, Penguin, and Simon & Schuster. Where this Final Judgment
imposes an obligation on Publisher Defendants to engage in or refrain
from engaging in certain conduct, that obligation shall apply to each
Publisher Defendant individually and to any joint venture or other
business arrangement established by any two or more Publisher
Defendants.
P. ``Purchase'' means a consumer's acquisition of one or more E-
books as a result of a Sale.
Q. ``Retail Price'' means the price at which an E-book Retailer or,
under an Agency Agreement, an E-book Publisher Sells an E-book to a
consumer.
R. ``Sale'' means delivery of access to a consumer to read one or
more E-books (purchased alone, or in combination with other goods or
services) in exchange for payment; ``Sell'' or ``Sold'' means to make
or to have made a Sale of an E-book to a consumer.
S. ``Simon & Schuster'' means Simon & Schuster, Inc., a New York
corporation with its principal place of business in New York, New York,
its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
and partnerships, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
T. ``Wholesale Price'' means (1) the net amount, after any
discounts or other adjustments (not including promotional allowances
subject to Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(d)),
that an E-book Retailer pays to an E-book Publisher for an E-book that
the E-book Retailer Sells to consumers; or (2) the Retail Price at
which an E-book Publisher, under an Agency Agreement, Sells an E-book
to consumers through an E-book Retailer minus the commission or other
payment that E-book Publisher pays to the E-book Retailer in connection
with or that is reasonably allocated to that Sale.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to Penguin and all other Persons in
active concert or participation with Penguin who receive actual notice
of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
IV. Required Conduct
A. Within seven days after entry of this Final Judgment, Penguin
shall terminate any agreement with Apple relating to the Sale of E-
books that was executed prior to Penguin's stipulation to the entry of
this Final Judgment.
B. For each agreement between Penguin and an E-book Retailer other
than Apple that (1) restricts, limits, or impedes the E-book Retailer's
ability to set, alter, or reduce the Retail Price of any E-book or to
offer price discounts or any other form of promotions to encourage
consumers to Purchase one or more E-books; or (2) contains a Price MFN,
Penguin shall notify the E-book Retailer, by January 8, 2013, that the
E-book Retailer may terminate the agreement with thirty-days notice and
shall, thirty days after the E-book Retailer provides such notice,
release the E-book Retailer from the agreement. For each such agreement
that the E-book
[[Page 77109]]
Retailer has not terminated within ten days after entry of this Final
Judgment, Penguin shall, as soon as permitted under the agreement, take
each step required under the agreement to cause the agreement to be
terminated and not renewed or extended.
C. Penguin shall notify the Department of Justice in writing at
least sixty days in advance of the formation or material modification
of any joint venture or other business arrangement relating to the
Sale, development, or promotion of E-books in the United States in
which Penguin and at least one other E-book Publisher (including
another Publisher Defendant) are participants or partial or complete
owners. Such notice shall describe the joint venture or other business
arrangement, identify all E-book Publishers that are parties to it, and
attach the most recent version or draft of the agreement, contract, or
other document(s) formalizing the joint venture or other business
arrangement. Within thirty days after Penguin provides notification of
the joint venture or business arrangement, the Department of Justice
may make a written request for additional information. If the
Department of Justice makes such a request, Penguin shall not proceed
with the planned formation or material modification of the joint
venture or business arrangement until thirty days after substantially
complying with such additional request(s) for information. The failure
of the Department of Justice to request additional information or to
bring an action under the antitrust laws to challenge the formation or
material modification of the joint venture shall neither give rise to
any inference of lawfulness nor limit in any way the right of the
United States to investigate the formation, material modification, or
any other aspects or activities of the joint venture or business
arrangement and to bring actions to prevent or restrain violations of
the antitrust laws.
The notification requirements of this Section IV.C shall not apply
to ordinary course business arrangements between Penguin and another E-
book Publisher (not a Publisher Defendant) that do not relate to the
Sale of E-books to consumers, or to business arrangements the primary
or predominant purpose or focus of which involves: (i) E-book
Publishers co-publishing one or more specifically identified E-book
titles or a particular author's E-books; (ii) Penguin licensing to or
from another E-book Publisher the publishing rights to one or more
specifically identified E-book titles or a particular author's E-books;
(iii) Penguin providing technology services to or receiving technology
services from another E-book Publisher (not a Publisher Defendant) or
licensing rights in technology to or from another E-book Publisher; or
(iv) Penguin distributing E-books published by another E-book Publisher
(not a Publisher Defendant). The notification requirements of this
Section IV.C shall also not apply to the formation of Penguin Random
House, review of which is pending before the Department of Justice.
D. Penguin shall furnish to the Department of Justice (1) by
January 8, 2013, one complete copy of each agreement, executed,
renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2012, between Penguin and
any E-book Retailer relating to the Sale of E-books, and, (2)
thereafter, on a quarterly basis, each such agreement executed,
renewed, or extended since Penguin's previous submission of agreements
to the Department of Justice.
V. Prohibited Conduct
A. For two years, Penguin shall not restrict, limit, or impede an
E-book Retailer's ability to set, alter, or reduce the Retail Price of
any E-book or to offer price discounts or any other form of promotions
to encourage consumers to Purchase one or more E-books, such two-year
period to run separately for each E-book Retailer, at Penguin's option,
from either:
1. the termination of an agreement between Penguin and the E-book
Retailer that restricts, limits, or impedes the E-book Retailer's
ability to set, alter, or reduce the Retail Price of any E-book or to
offer price discounts or any other form of promotions to encourage
consumers to Purchase one or more E-books; or
2. the date on which Penguin notifies the E-book Retailer in
writing that Penguin will not enforce any term(s) in its agreement with
the E-book Retailer that restrict, limit, or impede the E-book Retailer
from setting, altering, or reducing the Retail Price of one or more E-
books, or from offering price discounts or any other form of promotions
to encourage consumers to Purchase one or more E-books.
Penguin shall notify the Department of Justice of the option it
selects for each E-book Retailer within seven days of making its
selection.
B. For two years after Penguin's stipulation to the entry of this
Final Judgment, Penguin shall not enter into any agreement with any E-
book Retailer that restricts, limits, or impedes the E-book Retailer
from setting, altering, or reducing the Retail Price of one or more E-
books, or from offering price discounts or any other form of promotions
to encourage consumers to Purchase one or more E-books.
C. Penguin shall not enter into any agreement with an E-book
Retailer relating to the Sale of E-books that contains a Price MFN.
D. Penguin shall not retaliate against, or urge any other E-book
Publisher or E-book Retailer to retaliate against, an E-book Retailer
for engaging in any activity that Penguin is prohibited by Sections
V.A, V.B, and VI.B.2 of this Final Judgment from restricting, limiting,
or impeding in any agreement with an E-book Retailer. After the
expiration of prohibitions in Sections V.A and V.B of this Final
Judgment, this Section V.D shall not prohibit Penguin from unilaterally
entering into or enforcing any agreement with an E-book Retailer that
restricts, limits, or impedes the E-book Retailer from setting,
altering, or reducing the Retail Price of any of Penguin's E-books or
from offering price discounts or any other form of promotions to
encourage consumers to Purchase any of Penguin's E-books.
E. Penguin shall not enter into or enforce any agreement,
arrangement, understanding, plan, program, combination, or conspiracy
with any E-book Publisher (including another Publisher Defendant) to
raise, stabilize, fix, set, or coordinate the Retail Price or Wholesale
Price of any E-book or fix, set, or coordinate any term or condition
relating to the Sale of E-books.
This Section V.E shall not prohibit Penguin from entering into and
enforcing agreements relating to the distribution of another E-book
Publisher's E-books (not including the E-books of another Publisher
Defendant) or to the co-publication with another E-book Publisher of
specifically identified E-book titles or a particular author's E-books,
or from participating in output-enhancing industry standard-setting
activities relating to E-book security or technology.
F. Penguin (including each officer of each parent of Penguin who
exercises direct control over Penguin's business decisions or
strategies) shall not convey or otherwise communicate, directly or
indirectly (including by communicating indirectly through an E-book
Retailer with the intent that the E-book Retailer convey information
from the communication to another E-book Publisher or knowledge that it
is likely to do so), to any other E-book Publisher (including to an
officer of a parent of a Publisher Defendant) any competitively
sensitive information, including:
1. its business plans or strategies;
2. its past, present, or future wholesale or retail prices or
pricing
[[Page 77110]]
strategies for books sold in any format (e.g., print books, E-books, or
audio books);
3. any terms in its agreement(s) with any retailer of books Sold in
any format; or
4. any terms in its agreement(s) with any author.
This Section V.F shall not prohibit Penguin from communicating (a)
in a manner and through media consistent with common and reasonable
industry practice, the cover prices or wholesale or retail prices of
books sold in any format to potential purchasers of those books; or (b)
information Penguin needs to communicate in connection with (i) its
enforcement or assignment of its intellectual property or contract
rights, (ii) a contemplated merger, acquisition, or purchase or sale of
assets, (iii) its distribution of another E-book Publisher's E-books,
or (iv) a business arrangement under which E-book Publishers agree to
co-publish, or an E-book Publisher agrees to license to another E-book
Publisher the publishing rights to, one or more specifically identified
E-book titles or a particular author's E-books.
VI. Permitted Conduct
A. Nothing in this Final Judgment shall prohibit Penguin
unilaterally from compensating a retailer, including an E-book
Retailer, for valuable marketing or other promotional services
rendered.
B. Notwithstanding Sections V.A and V.B of this Final Judgment,
Penguin may enter into Agency Agreements with E-book Retailers under
which the aggregate dollar value of the price discounts or any other
form of promotions to encourage consumers to Purchase one or more of
Penguin's E-books (as opposed to advertising or promotions engaged in
by the E-book Retailer not specifically tied or directed to Penguin's
E-books) is restricted; provided that (1) such agreed restriction shall
not interfere with the E-book Retailer's ability to reduce the final
price paid by consumers to purchase Penguin's E-books by an aggregate
amount equal to the total commissions Penguin pays to the E-book
Retailer, over a period of at least one year, in connection with the
Sale of Penguin's E-books to consumers; (2) Penguin shall not restrict,
limit, or impede the E-book Retailer's use of the agreed funds to offer
price discounts or any other form of promotions to encourage consumers
to Purchase one or more E-books; and (3) the method of accounting for
the E-book Retailer's promotional activity does not restrict, limit, or
impede the E-book Retailer from engaging in any form of retail activity
or promotion.
VII. Antitrust Compliance
Within thirty days after entry of this Final Judgment, Penguin
shall designate its general counsel or chief legal officer, or an
employee reporting directly to its general counsel or chief legal
officer, as Antitrust Compliance Officer with responsibility for
ensuring Penguin's compliance with this Final Judgment. The Antitrust
Compliance Officer shall be responsible for the following:
A. Furnishing a copy of this Final Judgment, within thirty days of
its entry, to each of Penguin's officers and directors, and to each of
Penguin's employees engaged, in whole or in part, in the distribution
or Sale of E-books;
B. furnishing a copy of this Final Judgment in a timely manner to
each officer, director, or employee who succeeds to any position
identified in Section VII.A of this Final Judgment;
C. ensuring that each person identified in Sections VII.A and VII.B
of this Final Judgment receives at least four hours of training
annually on the meaning and requirements of this Final Judgment and the
antitrust laws, such training to be delivered by an attorney with
relevant experience in the field of antitrust law;
D. obtaining, within sixty days after entry of this Final Judgment
and on each anniversary of the entry of this Final Judgment, from each
person identified in Sections VII.A and VII.B of this Final Judgment,
and thereafter maintaining, a certification that each such person (a)
has read, understands, and agrees to abide by the terms of this Final
Judgment; and (b) is not aware of any violation of this Final Judgment
or the antitrust laws or has reported any potential violation to the
Antitrust Compliance Officer;
E. conducting an annual antitrust compliance audit covering each
person identified in Sections VII.A and VII.B of this Final Judgment,
and maintaining all records pertaining to such audits;
F. communicating annually to Penguin's employees that they may
disclose to the Antitrust Compliance Officer, without reprisal,
information concerning any potential violation of this Final Judgment
or the antitrust laws;
G. taking appropriate action, within three business days of
discovering or receiving credible information concerning an actual or
potential violation of this Final Judgment, to terminate or modify
Penguin's conduct to assure compliance with this Final Judgment; and,
within seven days of taking such corrective actions, providing to the
Department of Justice a description of the actual or potential
violation of this Final Judgment and the corrective actions taken;
H. furnishing to the Department of Justice on a quarterly basis
electronic copies of any non-privileged communications with any Person
containing allegations of Penguin's noncompliance with any provisions
of this Final Judgment;
I. maintaining, and furnishing to the Department of Justice on a
quarterly basis, a log of all oral and written communications,
excluding privileged or public communications, between or among (1) any
of Penguin's officers, directors, or employees involved in the
development of Penguin's plans or strategies relating to E-books, and
(2) any person employed by or associated with another Publisher
Defendant, relating, in whole or in part, to the distribution or sale
in the United States of books sold in any format, including an
identification (by name, employer, and job title) of the author and
recipients of and all participants in the communication, the date,
time, and duration of the communication, the medium of the
communication, and a description of the subject matter of the
communication (for a collection of communications solely concerning a
single business arrangement that is specifically exempted from the
reporting requirements of Section IV.C of this Final Judgment, Penguin
may provide a summary of the communications rather than logging each
communication individually); and
J. providing to the Department of Justice annually, on or before
the anniversary of the entry of this Final Judgment, a written
statement as to the fact and manner of Penguin's compliance with
Sections IV, V, and VII of this Final Judgment.
VIII. Compliance Inspection
U. For purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege,
from time to time duly authorized representatives of the Department of
Justice, including consultants and other persons retained by the
Department of Justice, shall, upon written request of an authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to Penguin, be permitted:
1. Access during Penguin's office hours to inspect and copy, or at
the option of the United States, to require Penguin to provide to the
United States hard copy or electronic copies of all books, ledgers,
accounts, records, data,
[[Page 77111]]
and documents in the possession, custody, or control of Penguin,
relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. to interview, either informally or on the record, Penguin's
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel
present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or
interference by Penguin.
V. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Penguin
shall submit written reports or respond to written interrogatories,
under oath if requested, relating to any of the matters contained in
this Final Judgment as may be requested. Written reports authorized
under this paragraph may, in the sole discretion of the United States,
require Penguin to conduct, at their cost, an independent audit or
analysis relating to any of the matters contained in this Final
Judgment.
W. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this Section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
X. If at the time information or documents are furnished by Penguin
to the United States, Penguin represents and identifies in writing the
material in any such information or documents to which a claim of
protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and Penguin marks each pertinent page of such
material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United States shall
give Penguin ten calendar days notice prior to divulging such material
in any civil or administrative proceeding.
IX. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to apply to
this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment,
to modify any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish
violations of its provisions.
X. No Limitation on Government Rights
Nothing in this Final Judgment shall limit the right of the United
States to investigate and bring actions to prevent or restrain
violations of the antitrust laws concerning any past, present, or
future conduct, policy, or practice of Penguin.
XI. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall
expire five years from the date of its entry.
XII. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 16, including making copies available to the
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and
any comments thereon and the United States' responses to comments.
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Date: -----------------------------------------------------------------
Court approval subject to procedures set forth in the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge
[FR Doc. 2012-31339 Filed 12-28-12; 8:45 am]
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