[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 180 (Monday, September 17, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57133-57154]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-22850]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 12-14]


T.J. Mcnichol, M.D.; Decision and Order

    On October 27, 2011, I, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension 
of Registration to T.J. McNichol, M.D. (Respondent), of Brandon, 
Florida. ALJ. Ex. 1. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of 
Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration FM0624139, which 
authorizes him to dispense controlled substances in schedules II 
through V, as a practitioner, and the denial of any pending 
applications to renew or modify his registration, on the ground that 
his ``continued registration is inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4)).
    As support for the proposed action and the immediate suspension, 
the Show Cause Order alleged that ``[o]n six separate occasions between 
approximately July 28 * * * and August 25, 2011, [Respondent] 
distributed controlled substances (oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, and alprazolam, a schedule IV controlled substance) by 
issuing `prescriptions' to [four] undercover law enforcement officers 
[hereinafter, UC or UCs] for other than a legitimate medical purpose or 
outside the usual course of professional practice.'' Id. at 2. More 
specifically, the Order alleged that on July 28, 2011, Respondent 
``distributed'' 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 60 tablets of 
alprazolam 1mg to UC1 on the

[[Page 57134]]

officer's ``first visit to [his] practice'' and that he did so ``after 
conducting only a cursory medical examination of [the officer] and 
despite [his] informing the [officer] that [his] physical exam did not 
correlate to any findings of pain as outlined'' on the officer's MRI, 
and although ``UC1 provided no history or illness that warranted the 
distribution of a controlled substance.'' Id. The Order further alleged 
that on August 25, 2011, Respondent distributed another 180 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg and 60 tablets of alprazolam 1 mg to UC1, although UC1 
``provided no history of injury or illness that warranted the 
distribution of a controlled substance'' and after performing ``a 
cursory physical examination.'' Id.
    Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that on July 28, 2011, 
Respondent distributed 150 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 90 tablets of 
alprazolam 1mg to UC2 on his initial visit, even though ``UC2 provided 
no history of injury or illness that warranted the distribution of 
controlled substances'' and that Respondent ``conduct[ed] only a 
cursory physical examination'' which lasted ``approximately two 
minutes'' and ``despite the officer telling [Respondent] that he 
experienced little pain.'' Id. The Order further alleged that on August 
25, 2011, Respondent distributed to UC2 an additional 150 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg and 90 tablets of alprazolam 1mg after performing '' a 
cursory medical examination'' which ``consisted only of [Respondent 
placing his] hands on the mid to lower back area of UC2 and asking if 
[he] experienced any pain in those areas.'' Id. The Order also alleged 
that ``UC2 provided no history of injury or illness that warranted the 
distribution of a controlled substance'' and that Respondent's ``total 
interaction * * * with UC2 lasted approximately two minutes.'' Id.
    With respect to UC3, the Show Cause Order alleged that on August 
25, 2011, Respondent distributed 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 30 
tablets of alprazolam 2mg to the UC at his first visit, ``while 
conducting only a cursory physical examination and despite the officer 
not providing any information in his medical questionnaire about 
experiencing any pain.'' Id. at 2-3. The Order also alleged that ``UC3 
provided no history of injury or illness that warranted the 
distribution of a controlled substance.'' Id. at 3.
    Finally, with respect to UC4, the Show Cause Order alleged that on 
August 25, 2011, Respondent distributed 210 tablets of oxycodone 30mg 
and 60 tablets of alprazolam 2mg to the UC at his first visit. Id. The 
Order alleged that Respondent ``conduct[ed] only a cursory physical 
examination'' and that ``UC4 provided no history of injury or illness 
that warranted the distribution of a controlled substance.'' \1\
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    \1\ Based on the above allegations, I concluded that 
Respondent's continued registration during the pendency of the 
proceeding ``constitute[d] an imminent danger to the public health 
and safety.'' ALJ Ex. 1, at 3. Accordingly, I ordered the immediate 
suspension of Respondent's registration. Id.
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    Respondent requested a hearing on the allegations; the matter was 
placed on the docket of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and 
assigned to ALJ Timothy D. Wing. Following pre-hearing procedures, the 
ALJ conducted a hearing on January 17-18, as well as April 10-11, 
2012.\2\ Upon conclusion of the hearing, the parties submitted briefs 
containing their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
argument.
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    \2\ While the ALJ noted the amount of time which has passed 
between the date of service of the Order to Show Cause and Immediate 
Suspension, ``which was exclusive of any delays attributable to 
Respondent,'' see ALJ at 43 n.72 (citations omitted), the record is 
devoid of any explanation as to why the hearing did not reconvene 
until April 10. Indeed, while the ALJ cited ALJ Ex. 26 in support 
for his calculation, id., this exhibit was not forwarded as part of 
the record. Nor was the record timely forwarded by the ALJ to this 
Office following the receipt of the Government's Exceptions.
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    On May 17, 2012, the ALJ issued his recommended decision. With 
respect to factor one--the recommendation of the state licensing 
board--the ALJ found ``that Respondent currently holds a valid, 
unrestricted medical license in Florida and has never been disciplined 
by the Florida Department of Health.'' ALJ at 45. The ALJ thus found 
that, while this factor is not dispositive, it ``weighs against a 
finding that Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent 
with the public interest.'' Id.
    With respect to factor three--Respondent's conviction record under 
Federal or State laws related to the manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensing of controlled substances--the ALJ found that there was no 
evidence that Respondent has been convicted of such an offense. Id. 
While noting that this factor also is not dispositive, the ALJ 
concluded that it ``weighs against a finding that Respondent's 
continued registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id.
    Next, the ALJ considered factors two--Respondent's experience in 
dispensing controlled substances--and four--Respondent's compliance 
with applicable laws relating to controlled substances, together. Id. 
at 46-91. The ALJ noted that, under Federal law, a prescription for a 
controlled substance must be ``issued for a legitimate medical purpose 
by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of 
professional practice.'' Id. at 46 (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a)).
    Reasoning that because ``Respondent's prescribing practices with 
regard to the undercover patients visits [were] not remotely close to 
`outright drug deals,''' and that ``the undercover patient visits 
objectively reflect that Respondent's prescribing practices included, 
to a degree, a documented medical history, physician examination, 
documented urinalysis testing, medical record release forms, and 
pharmacy prescribing profiles, * * * consistent with applicable Florida 
law,'' the ALJ explained that ``any finding that Respondent's 
prescribing conduct * * * was not for a legitimate medical purpose and 
outside the usual course of professional practice under the Florida 
Standards or standards generally recognized and accepted in the medical 
community will significantly depend on the evidentiary weight'' given 
to the opinion testimony of the Government's Expert. Id. at 50. The ALJ 
then explained that, while he found the Government's Expert ``qualified 
by education and experience generally,'' he did not find the Expert 
``qualified to render an expert opinion regarding Florida law and 
standards of medical practice'' because he was not aware of the current 
state standards and the ``significant change in the regulations as of 
October 2010.'' Id. at 51.
    The ALJ further stated that he found that the Expert's testimony 
included ``inconsistencies, factual errors, vague or nonresponsive 
answers to basic questions, and an overall lack of interest or even 
curiosity in examining all available information relevant to 
Respondent's prescribing conduct.'' Id. at 53. While acknowledging that 
the Expert's ``testimony at various points did find some support in the 
evidence, overall his testimony and related opinions repeatedly 
demonstrated an unwillingness to consider positive conduct by 
Respondent, or even inquire of any, beginning with his October 24, 2011 
report.'' Id. The ALJ also cited the Expert's financial interest as a 
Government Expert and what he characterized as a ``history of near 
uniformity of opinion testimony on behalf of the Government'' as 
grounds for his conclusion that the Expert's testimony lacked ``the 
necessary independence, objectivity, and factual basis to be relied 
upon.'' Id. at 57-58.
    Accordingly, based on what he deemed to be the absence of 
``credible medical opinion testimony,'' or other ``credible evidence of 
misconduct by Respondent,'' the ALJ rejected the allegations that 
Respondent lacked a

[[Page 57135]]

legitimate medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of 
professional practice in prescribing to each of the UCs. Id. at 69, 75, 
82, 91. The ALJ reached this conclusion notwithstanding his finding 
that Respondent prescribed Xanax to one of the UCs without any inquiry 
into ``the medical basis for continuing the prescription'' and that 
this ``arguably supports a finding that such a prescription lacks a 
legitimate medical purpose, or is outside the usual course of 
professional practice.'' Id. at 82. The ALJ thus concluded that factors 
two and four ``weigh heavily against a finding that Respondent's 
continued registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. at 91.
    With respect to factor five--such other conduct which may threaten 
public health and safety--the ALJ noted that Respondent, who had been 
called to testify by the Government, invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege and refused to testify. ALJ at 92. While the Government 
requested that the ALJ draw an adverse inference based on Respondent's 
refusal to testify, the ALJ declined to do so explaining that because 
the Government had failed to establish a prima facie case that 
``Respondent's conduct was contrary to the public interest,'' his 
``testimonial silence with regard to acceptance of responsibility'' was 
not relevant. Id. While acknowledging that an adverse inference may be 
permissible, the ALJ reasoned ``that the failure to testify alone may 
not be taken as an admission of wrongdoing, without regard to other 
evidence.'' Id. at 92-93. Noting that ``Respondent is facing uncertain 
criminal liability,'' the ALJ reasoned that he did ``not find his 
testimonial silence during this parallel administrative proceeding to 
make it more likely than not that he would dispute an untrue 
accusation.'' Id. at 93. The ALJ then explained that ``in light of the 
fact that the Government's evidence was insufficient to establish a 
prima facie case, particularly given the lack of credible medical 
expert testimony, Respondent's silence in and of itself does not 
appreciably tip the balance of evidence in favor of the Government.'' 
Id. The ALJ thus explained that even were he to draw an adverse 
inference, he would still find the evidence insufficient to conclude 
that Respondent's prescribing practices were unlawful. Id. Because in 
the ALJ's view, there was no other evidence that Respondent had engaged 
in conduct which may threaten public health or safety, the ALJ 
concluded that this factor also supported the continuation of 
Respondent's registration. Id. The ALJ thus recommended that the Order 
to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension be dismissed. Id. at 94.
    On June 5, 2012, the Government filed Exceptions to the ALJ's 
recommended decision. Thereafter, on June 14, 2012, the ALJ forwarded 
the record to me for Final Agency Action.
    I have carefully considered the entire record including the ALJ's 
recommended decision and adopt his findings with respect to factors one 
and three. However, I reject his findings with respect to factors two 
and four because, with respect to many of the prescriptions (especially 
those for alprazolam) Respondent issued to the undercover officers, 
expert testimony was not necessary to prove that he lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional 
practice in issuing them. Indeed, with respect to one of the undercover 
officers, the ALJ ignored nearly all of the evidence of the 
conversation which occurred between Respondent and the officer which 
shows that Respondent knew the undercover officer was a drug abuser and 
that he engaged in an outright drug deal.
    Likewise, with respect to the alprazolam prescriptions Respondent 
issued to three of the undercover officers, the ALJ entirely ignored 
relevant evidence and failed to discuss the evidence pertaining to 
these prescriptions. In other instances, the ALJ mischaracterized the 
evidence he cited. Finally, with respect to several issues, the ALJ 
failed to apply properly, or ignored entirely, precedents of both the 
Agency and federal courts.
    Accordingly, as ultimate factfinder, I reject the ALJ's legal 
conclusion that the Government has not met its prima facie burden of 
showing that Respondent has committed acts which render his continued 
registration inconsistent with the public interest. See Reckitt & 
Coleman, Ltd., v. Administrator, 788 F.2d 22, 26 (DC Cir. 1986) (citing 
5 U.S.C. 557(b) (``On appeal from or review of the initial decision, 
the agency has all the power which it would have in making the initial 
decision * * *'')). Because even assuming, without deciding, that the 
Expert's testimony is not entitled to weight (notwithstanding the ALJ's 
inconsistent statements regarding the weight he was giving it), the 
record still contains substantial evidence that Respondent violated 21 
CFR 1306.04(a) in issuing several of the prescriptions and he has 
offered no evidence that he acknowledges his misconduct and will 
refrain from engaging in similar acts in the future, I will order that 
Respondent's registration be revoked and that any pending application 
be denied.
    I make the following

Findings of Fact

Respondent Registration and Licensing Status

    Respondent is the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration 
FM0624139, which prior to the issuance of the Order of Immediate 
Suspension, authorized him to dispense controlled substances in 
schedules II through V as a practitioner, at the registered location of 
Quality Care Medical Group (hereinafter, QCMG), 143 Oakfield Drive, 
Suite 102, Brandon, Florida. GX 1-2. Respondent's registration does not 
expire until January 31, 2014. GX 2.
    Respondent is also the holder of an active medical license issued 
by the Florida Board of Medicine, which does not expire until January 
31, 2014. ALJ at 45 n.76. There is no evidence that Respondent's state 
license has been the subject of any disciplinary proceedings. See id.

The DEA Investigation of QCMG

    QCMG first came to the attention of DEA in early 2010, when a Task 
Force Officer (TFO) received information from various sources including 
citizens, anonymous callers and a cooperating defendant regarding a 
QCMG clinic located in Bradenton, Florida. Tr. 50-53. The information 
included a report that persons were traveling to QCMG from out-of-state 
locations, that QCMG allowed sponsors to bring groups of people into 
the clinic, and that persons were presenting fraudulent MRIs and 
prescription profiles to obtain admission as patients. Id. at 53-55.
    In June 2011, DEA commenced undercover operations at the Bradenton 
location and sent in several undercover officers who presented MRIs and 
patient profiles and were able to see the doctor who worked at that 
location. Id. at 61, 70-71. During the investigation, the officers 
determined that the owners of QCMG also had a clinic located in 
Brandon, Florida and decided to conduct undercover operations at the 
latter location as well. Id. at 72. In total, four undercover officers 
made visits to the Brandon location. Id. at 73. Two of the officers, 
who used the undercover names of Anthony Thompson and Robbie Payne, 
each made two visits to the Brandon clinic and saw Respondent on both 
occasions. Id. The other two officers, who used the undercover names of 
Mike Corleone and Eric McMillen, went to the Brandon location and saw 
Respondent once. Id.

[[Page 57136]]

The Undercover Visits of Robbie Payne

    On some date not specified in the record but shortly before July 
28, 2011, a Task Force Officer (TFO) using the undercover name of 
Robbie Payne went to the QCMG Bradenton clinic but was turned away 
because he did not have an appointment. Tr. 169-70. During a discussion 
following the operation, the investigators decided that the TFO would 
contact the Brandon clinic and make an appointment. Id. at 174. The TFO 
called the Brandon clinic and was able to make an appointment for July 
28th. Id.
    On July 28, the TFO went to the clinic, wearing a recording device, 
and brought an MRI and a profile purporting to show what prescriptions 
he had obtained; the latter showed that Payne had last received 
prescriptions for 210 tablets of oxycodone 30mg, 90 tablets of 
oxycodone 15mg, and 90 tablets of Xanax 2mg on April 10, more than 
three and a half months earlier.\3\ Id. at 174-77; RX 4, at 15; RX 1, 
at 36-39. The TFO testified that he was required to fill out various 
forms requiring personal information, waivers, and a questionnaire 
which included historical information, previous medications, pain 
levels, and how the pain ``affected'' his life. Tr. at 175. The TFO 
further testified that the questionnaire used a ``0 through 10'' pain 
scale and asked him to rate his ``pain at that moment'' and when he was 
``on medications.'' Id. at 175-76. While the TFO did not remember ``the 
exact number'' he wrote down for his pain at the present time, he 
testified that usually writes ``something between 0 and 4.'' Id. at 
176. With respect to what he wrote as his pain level with medications, 
Payne testified that he would write ``the same number.'' Id.
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    \3\ The profile also showed that Payne had filled prescriptions 
for the same three drugs and strengths on a monthly basis between 
December 10, 2010 and April 10, 2011.
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    The TFO did not, however, recall whether the questionnaire had any 
questions regarding whether he suffered from anxiety. Id. Eddie Gomez, 
Respondent's Medical Assistant, testified that the medical 
questionnaire which patients were required to fill out contained no 
information about anxiety. Id. at 984. However, Gomez then changed his 
testimony, explaining that the questionnaires, which were subsequently 
shredded under the clinic's policy, did ask about anxiety. Id. at 985-
86.
    The TFO also testified that one of the forms had a picture of a 
human body and that he ``deliberately'' circled a part of the body that 
was different than his MRI ``to disprove * * * the MRI.'' Id. at 180. 
After turning in his paperwork and paying for the visit, Payne took a 
seat in the waiting room. Id. at 176-77.
    The TFO was eventually summoned from the waiting room by Eddie 
Gomez, who identified himself as the office manager and Respondent's 
assistant. Id. at 178; GX 14, at 4. Gomez took the TFO's height, weight 
and blood pressure; Gomez then asked him whether he was going to 
another pain management clinic (with the TFO answering ``no'') and 
stated that the clinic reported doctor shoppers to the authorities. Tr. 
178; GX 14, at 4. Gomez explained that ``[t]hese are Schedule II drugs, 
C II drugs, uh * * * narcotics. You cannot share them, sell them, 
okay?,'' and asked the TFO if he was ``abusing pain meds or illegal 
substances.'' Id. at 5.
    Gomez then said that he was going to do a drug screen on the TFO 
and asked him when the last time was that he took his meds. Id. The TFO 
stated that he had been prescribed drugs ``a while ago,'' and Gomez 
acknowledged that ``April was the last script.'' Id. The TFO then added 
that ``that was the last time * * * that I actually saw a doctor, but I 
take them here and there, from * * * wherever.'' Id. Gomez asked if the 
TFO had taken drugs ``this morning?'' Id. The TFO replied ``[n]o, no, 
no'' and added that it was ``a week or two.'' Id. Gomez then asked how 
long the TFO had been on pain meds, with the latter replying that he 
had started about a year and a half to two years ago, but that it was 
``kind of sporadic.'' Id. at 6. Gomez then asked the TFO what clinic he 
had gone to; the TFO stated that the clinic was in south Florida and 
named ``Real Care'' but that he thought the clinic had gone out of 
business. Id.
    Gomez gave the TFO a cup for a urinalysis and the TFO provided a 
sample. Id. at 6-7. Gomez then tested the TFO's sample, which ``came 
back all negative.'' Tr. 179; GX 14, at 8. Gomez, however, prepared a 
Drug Urinalysis Test form on which he circled that the TFO was 
``positive'' for ``Oxy.'' RX 1, at 40. In his testimony, Gomez insisted 
that the TFO tested positive for oxycodone. Tr. 944-45, 959. However, I 
find (as did the ALJ) that Gomez falsified this form. Thereafter, Gomez 
escorted the TFO to an exam room.
    The TFO testified that Gomez did not ask him about the source of 
his pain, or whether he had any problems with anxiety or sleeplessness. 
Id. at 181-82. Gomez testified at the hearing that if the TFO ``was a 
new patient,'' Respondent (and not himself) would ask the patient if he 
had pain or anxiety. Id. at 959-60. Moreover, Gomez testified that one 
of his responsibilities was to review the information that the patients 
provided on their medical questionnaires and enter the information into 
the clinic's Electronic Medical Record System (EMR). Id. at 932, 952.
    Gomez testified that after the information was entered into the 
EMR, ``it was shredded.'' Id. at 940, 952.\4\ Gomez also testified that 
in doing the ``review of systems,'' his role was to review the 
patient's ``past medical history, social history, which was on the 
initial paperwork, [and] any family history, if they had any family 
history.'' Id. at 942.
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    \4\ When asked by Respondent's counsel whether there was ``a 
possible explanation'' for the various entries that the undercovers 
had no problems with anxiety and denied problems with mood 
disturbance, Gomez testified that the EMR system had various default 
entries, such that ``if something is not input or checked, it'll put 
whatever is on default.'' Tr. 1004. However, Gomez could not further 
identify what the default entries were for various sections of the 
medical record, id. at 1004-5, and did not know if there was a 
default entry for anxiety. Id. at 1008. In any event, if any of the 
undercovers had represented to Gomez or Respondent that he had 
anxiety, one must wonder why an entry documenting this would not 
have been made in the chart.
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    Respondent entered the exam room and introduced himself. GX 14, at 
9. Respondent noted that the TFO had been in pain management in south 
Florida but that ``they went out of business.'' Id. The TFO said 
``yes'' and Respondent surmised that his previous clinic had been 
``shut down.'' Id. The TFO replied that he did not ``know what happened 
to them.'' Id. at 10.
    Respondent reviewed the TFO's MRI, noting that it showed a ``mild 
disc bulge'' at ``two levels, without significant central canal or 
neuro.'' \5\ Id. Respondent then told the TFO that ``[t]he reason why 
they're out of business is cause they've been prescribing 
inappropriately. Okay?'' Id. The TFO replied, ``uh-hum,'' and 
Respondent stated: ``I can't give you near the pills that you were 
getting. Not even remotely close. You, I, I haven't even done a 
physical exam * * * Just based on your MRI here, its * * * I can't do 
it.'' Id.
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    \5\ The TFO's MRI stated that he had ``mild diffuse bulge of 
[the] L4-5 and L5-S1 discs, without any significant central canal or 
neural foraminal narrowing'' and that ``no other significant 
abnormality is detected in this study.'' RX 1, at 34.
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    The TFO replied that ``that's just what they prescribed, that's not 
what I actually took,'' and after Respondent said ``okay,'' the TFO 
added: ``So I didn't * * * I didn't, I can't * * * tell, you're the 
doctors, so I don't know * * * So that's just what they gave.'' Id. 
After acknowledging the TFO's statement, Respondent stated ``you know 
you got two bulging discs, with, and it doesn't talk about pushing on 
any

[[Page 57137]]

nerve roots or anything like that, I mean, this is as close to a normal 
MRI as you can get without it being actually normal. You see what I'm 
saying?'' Id. The TFO replied ``uh-hum,'' and Respondent added: ``I 
mean the most I can do for you would * * * And I'm telling you this in 
case you don't want to come here. Okay? Cause I hate for you to spend 
all of your money, coming here and not get what you need.'' Id.
    The TFO said ``alright'' and Respondent added: ``Okay? Could, and * 
* * what you should get, and what you need, often sometimes is two 
different things cause if you've been on a certain number of pills, for 
a long time, if you don't get those number of pills, you're going to be 
sick.'' Id. at 11. After the TFO said that he ``got that,'' Respondent 
stated: ``you know what I mean? So I mean, I'm at the point * * * I 
mean just by looking at this without even doing the physical exam yet. 
* * * I mean I'm looking at maybe a hundred and fifty of them.'' Id. 
The TFO replied: ``And honestly that's about where I was.'' Id. 
Respondent proceeded to conduct his physical exam which took all of one 
minute and thirty-nine seconds. GX 13.
    During the physical exam, Respondent asked the TFO various 
questions regarding the location of his purported pain. GX 14, at 11. 
For example, Respondent asked the TFO if most of his pain was in his 
lower back. Id. The TFO replied: ``uh-hum.'' Id. Next, Respondent 
asked: ``How about out to the sides, here?'' Id. at 12. The TFO again 
replied: ``uh-hum.'' Id. Respondent then asked: Down on this side?'' 
Id. The TFO replied: Yeah. Id. Respondent then asked ``anything like 
that?'' Id. The TFO answered: ``a little bit.'' Id. Respondent then 
asked: ``[a]nything on this side?'' Id. The TFO replied, ``Uh-hum * * * 
probably the same as the other side, I guess, yeah.'' Id.
    Following an apparent test of the TFO's reflexes, Respondent asked 
him to stick his legs out and whether doing so caused pain; the TFO 
stated ``not right now.'' Id. Respondent then asked the TFO to give him 
``a little twist'' and whether this caused pain; the TFO said ``not at 
the moment.'' Id. Respondent said ``that's fine,'' and asked the TFO to 
give him ``another little twist''; the TFO again denied that the 
movement caused any pain. Id. Respondent then noted that he was done 
with the physical exam. Id.
    Following a discussion of the EMR system, Respondent asked the TFO 
if he had been getting Xanax. Id. at 13. The TFO answered ``yes,'' and 
when Respondent asked ``for anxiety?'' the TFO said ``for sleep.'' Id. 
Respondent noted the TFO's answer and explained that he did not 
prescribe the two milligram dosage units of Xanax because of its ``a 
high street value'' and only prescribed the one milligram strength. Id. 
While Respondent told the TFO that he should not double up on the 
Xanax, he did not engage the TFO in any further discussion regarding 
his sleep problems. Id.
    After Respondent and the TFO discussed how the latter made his 
living, Respondent gave the TFO his ``new patient talk,'' which 
included telling him to take his medication as prescribed, and that 
there is ``no such thing in this clinic * * * of running out of 
medication. Id. at 14-16. Respondent further explained that ``one of 
the reasons why we don't run out here'' is because ``I don't want you 
taking medication, the way you want to take them, because that will put 
you in jeopardy of overdose.'' Id. at 16. Respondent added that ``I 
don't want you to do that, that, I don't want you to, risk my license 
by doing that, and on top of that I want to keep you in the clinic.'' 
Id. Respondent explained that the TFO would be subject to random urine 
testing and that it was a ``no tolerance clinic.'' Id. Respondent also 
told the TFO not give to give his ``medication to anybody else,'' or 
``take any from anybody else,'' and that if his medication was stolen, 
he needed a police report. Id. Respondent then asked the TFO if he had 
any questions; the TFO said no. Id. at 16-17.
    Respondent added: ``We're pretty strict here * * * but we do have 
fun also,'' a point which he reiterated. Id. at 17 (``We have fun, we, 
you know, we're a pretty fun office, uh, but we do, we uh strictly do 
things by the book.''). Respondent then showed the TFO the window where 
he would get his prescriptions and said that he would see him ``in a 
month.'' Id. at 17-18. The visit then concluded. Id. at 18.
    The evidence shows that Respondent wrote the TFO a prescription for 
150 tablets of oxycodone 30mg, and a prescription for 90 tablets of 
Xanax 1mg. GX 15, at 1. In the medical record for the visit, Respondent 
documented the TFO's pain level as a ``3'' and that it was of mild 
severity.\6\ RX 1, at 26. Moreover, in the physical exam portion of the 
record, Respondent documented having palpated the TFO's cervical spine 
as well as paravertebral muscle groups, yet the video recording of the 
visit clearly shows that this was never done. RX 1, at 28; GX 13. In 
addition, Respondent documented findings based on range of motion tests 
(rotation, bending, flexion, and extension) for all three portions of 
the TFO Payne's spine (cervical, thoracic and lumbar). RX 1, at 28. 
Here again, the video shows that while Respondent had the TFO twist his 
torso and do a straight leg raise of both legs, he did not test the 
TFO's range of motion on bending, extension or flexion. GX 13. Nor did 
he do any tests of the TFO's range of motion in his cervical spine. Id.
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    \6\ Mr. Gomez testified that the pain levels recorded in the EMR 
were with medications. Tr. 964-65. However, the TFO testified that 
he wrote the same pain number for his pain both with and without 
medications. Id. at 176. Notably, there is no evidence that 
Respondent addressed this with the TFO.
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    In the TFO's medical record, Respondent further recorded a 
diagnosis of ``generalized anxiety disorder,'' which he deemed to be 
``active'' and ``chronic,'' notwithstanding that under the 
``psychiatric'' section of the ``review of systems'' section, 
Respondent noted that ``Patient denied problems with mood disturbance. 
No problems with anxiety.'' RX 1, at 27-28.
    Likewise, under the ``psychiatric'' section of the physical 
examination, Respondent noted: ``Oriented with normal memory. Mental 
status, judgment and affect are grossly intact and normal for age.'' 
Id. at 20.\7\ See also Tr. 190-92 (TFO's testimony that Respondent did 
not discuss whether he had generalized anxiety disorder and whether he 
saw another physician for treatment of anxiety'').
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    \7\ Respondent also diagnosed the TFO as having lumbar disc 
displacement, lumbar lumbosacral disc degeneration, and backache 
unspecified, which was chronic and active. RX 1, at 28.
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    In addition, in the ``Instructions'' section of the medical record, 
Respondent wrote the following:

    Patient appears to understand risks. Patient instructed to RTC/
call clinic if patient experiences any non-urgent side effect such 
as constipation, nausea, itching, rash & etc. Return to clinic as 
scheduled. Patient instructed to go to emergency room immediately if 
the patient has any serious symptoms such as SOB, severe allergic 
reactions, LOC, Syncope, new neurologic deficits, bowel/bladder 
incontinence, excessive drowsiness and vomiting.

    RX 1, at 29. At no point during this visit, however, did Respondent 
discuss with the TFO any of these instructions. See GX 13-14. Most 
significantly, at no time did Respondent ask the TFO what caused his 
pain or injury and how he gotten by when his last prescriptions were 
issued more than three months earlier, or why he had tested positive 
for oxycodone given when he had purportedly last filled prescriptions 
for the drug.

[[Page 57138]]

    On August 25, the TFO, again wearing a recording device, returned 
to the Brandon clinic. Tr. 192. Upon his arrival, the TFO checked in 
with the receptionist and paid the fee for the visit. RX 4, at 21-22. 
Before even seeing Respondent, the receptionist gave the TFO an 
appointment for a follow-up visit. Id. at 22.
    After about twenty-five minutes, Eddie Gomez called the TFO back to 
the triage room and took his weight and blood pressure. GX 17, at 2-3. 
Gomez then told the TFO to return to the waiting room and that he would 
be called next. Id. at 3. After a short wait, Gomez told the TFO to go 
to an exam room. RX 4, at 22-23.
    Respondent entered the exam room and asked the TFO ``what's going 
on''; the TFO replied: ``How you doing?'' GX 17, at 4. Respondent 
answered, ``All right, what's up? How did your month go?'' Id. After 
the TFO said that ``everything is good,'' Respondent asked: 
``Medication treatin[g] your pain well?'' Id. The TFO answered 
``Yeah,'' and added that he had ``no problems or issues.'' Id. 
Respondent asked: ``No questions?'' The TFO replied: No, mm-mm. 
Everything is good.'' Id.
    Respondent then stated that he would ``be feeling [the TFO's] lower 
back and get you going''; Respondent then asked: ``[a]ny pain down in 
this areas here, how about here?'' Id. The TFO replied: ``Mm-mm.'' 
Respondent then asked: ``Anything out on the sides at all?'' The TFO 
answered: ``Nothing that was, uh, * * * any different than the last.'' 
Id. Respondent asked: ``Nothing was--nothing like this, right?'' Id. 
The TFO replied: ``Mm-mm.'' Id. Respondent then said ``all right. 
Questions? Nope, you are all set.'' Id. The TFO then thanked 
Respondent. Id. At the conclusion of the visit, Respondent issued the 
TFO prescriptions for another 150 oxycodone 30mg and 90 Xanax 1mg. GX 
18.
    The entire interaction between the TFO and Respondent lasted less 
than two minutes. GX 17. As the TFO wrote in his report for the visit:

    [Respondent] asked the UC ``are the meds treating your pain 
well?'' to which the UC replied ``yes, no issues.'' [Respondent] 
asked if the UC had any questions, and the UC replied that he did 
not. [Respondent] then got up and walked toward the door. Before 
exiting, [Respondent] stated ``let me feel your lowerback and get 
you going.'' The UC scooted forward in his chair and [Respondent] 
placed his right hand on the UC's lower back. [Respondent] asked, 
``pain down here in this area?'' to which the UC stated ``uh-huh.'' 
[Respondent] then moved his hand to the right and left of the UC's 
spine and asked ``anything over here?'' to which the UC stated 
``nothing is different than last time.'' [Respondent] removed his 
hand from the UC's lower back and stood straight up, asked if there 
are any more questions, to which the UC stated ``no,'' and then 
[Respondent] told the UC he was all set.

RX 4, at 23.
    Here again, evidence shows that Respondent made findings in the 
medical record notwithstanding that he never performed various tests. 
For example, the medical record for the visits noted that there was 
``no change'' in the pain's ``status,'' noted that it radiated into his 
``upper back,'' that the ``timing'' of the pain was ``constantly, 
during the day and EVENING,'' and that its ``quality'' was ``radiating 
and dull.'' The record further listed ``sleep and physical activity'' 
as ``affected daily activities.'' RX 1, at 30.
    Respondent also documented that he had done a neurologic 
examination, in which he found that the TFO had ``[n]ormal and 
symmetrical deep tendon reflexes with no pathological reflexes.'' RX 1, 
at 31. Likewise, Respondent made findings that he had palpated the 
TFO's cervical spine and the surrounding areas, as well as that he had 
had the TFO perform various range of motion tests of various portions 
of his spine. Id. at 31-32. However, as the TFO's report makes clear, 
Respondent did not do anything other than palpate his lower back area. 
RX 4, at 22-23.

The Undercover Visits of Anthony Thompson

    On July 27, 2011, a Special Agent, who used the name of Anthony 
Thompson, attempted to see a doctor at the QCMG clinic Bradenton. Tr. 
240. While the Agent was turned away because he was not thirty years of 
age and his MRI could not be verified, a staff member advised him to go 
to the Brandon clinic because it was not ``as strict as the Bradenton 
clinic.'' Id. at 240-41.
    The next day, the Agent, who was wearing a recording device, went 
to the Brandon clinic and presented an MRI\8\ and a prescription 
profile. Id. at 240-41. The Agent filled out various forms covering his 
personal information, past history and family history of illnesses, and 
a questionnaire regarding his pain levels. Id. at 243. The Agent did 
not recall the actual numbers he had written on the pain questionnaire, 
but stated that he would have written a five or below. Id. The Agent 
did not recall whether any of the questionnaires asked if he had 
anxiety. Id. at 244. According to the medical record, the Agent's pain 
was of ``mild'' severity and was ``4 on pain scale,'' and that it 
radiated into the ``neck and upper back.'' RX 1, at 15. In addition, 
while the medical record indicates that the Agent complained that his 
pain occurred ``frequently and nocturnally'' and was aggravated by 
sleeping, walking and standing for a long period of time,'' the Agent 
denied that he told this to either Mr. Gomez or Respondent. Tr. 282-83; 
RX 1, at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The MRI findings included: A ``[l]eft posterolateral disc 
herniation at L5-S1 with moderate ventral effacement of thecal sac 
and moderate effacement of the left S1 nerve root''; a ``[c]entral 
and left posterolateral disc herniation at L4-5 with moderate 
secondary central spinal stenosis''; ``[s]mall central disc 
herniation'' at both L2-3 and L1-2; and a ``[d]iffuse central disc 
bulging at L3-4.'' RX 1, at 23. The MRI included a notation that it 
was verified on ``7/28/11.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Gomez called the Agent and identified himself as the doctor's 
assistant. GX 7, at 3. Mr. Gomez proceeded to review the rules of the 
pain contract, told the Agent that the clinic reported doctor shoppers, 
asked if he was taking ``any illegal substances,'' and what pain 
management clinic he was going to. Id. The Agent replied that he had 
seen a Dr. Barton, who had since died. Id. Mr. Gomez then asked the 
Agent about Dr. Burns, a physician who was listed as the Agent's 
physician on the MRI. Id., RX 1, at 23. The Agent replied that Burns 
was ``somebody that the MRI place referred me to,'' noting that he 
``had to get a new MRI.'' GX 7, at 3. Gomez then asked the Agent when 
he had last gotten his pills and when he had last taken them; the Agent 
replied that he thought he had filled his prescriptions ``in the middle 
of June.'' Id. Gomez then said: ``So you shouldn't have anything in 
your system,'' and the Agent answered: ``Right, I don't have anything; 
I've been out for a while.'' Id. at 3-4. Gomez then said he was going 
to do a drug screen on the Agent. Id. at 4.
    After taking the Agent's weight and blood pressure, Gomez asked him 
about his employment status, education level, marital status, and 
whether he had kids; whether he smoked, used alcohol or caffeine; 
whether he had any blood transfusions; whether he had body piercings or 
tattoos; whether he exercised; and whether he had any significant 
family history. Id. at 5-6. Gomez then tested the Agent's urine sample. 
Id.
    According to the Drug Urinalysis Test form, the Agent tested 
positive for benzodiazepines and oxycodone. RX 1, at 24. At the 
hearing, however, the Agent testified that he did not take either 
benzodiazepines or oxycodone; that in his position, he was subject to 
drug testing; and that he could not take these medications unless they 
were prescribed to him. Tr. 301. While Gomez insisted in his testimony 
that the Agent had tested positive for these

[[Page 57139]]

drugs, and noted that the form was signed, Tr. 943-44, 962-63; the ALJ 
noted that the Agent did not recall signing the form and that both the 
recording and the Agent's report concerning the visit show that Gomez 
had confirmed that the test was negative. ALJ at 71. Accordingly, the 
ALJ did not find Gomez's testimony credible and I adopt this finding.
    Following a discussion of the clinic's recordkeeping system, Gomez 
took the Agent to an exam room. GX 7, at 7. Respondent eventually 
entered the room, introduced himself, and proceeded to look at the 
Agent's MRI. Id. at 7-8. Respondent then asked the Agent if most of his 
pain was in his lower back. Id. at 8. The Agent replied: ``Um kinda up 
towards the mid back too.'' Id. Respondent replied ok, and asked how 
the Agent ``hurt [his] back.'' Id. The Agent answered that ``[i]t's 
just something that, it's over time.'' Id. Respondent asked if it had 
``gotten worse?'' and the Agent said ``Ah huh.'' Id.
    Respondent said ``ok,'' and proceeded to conduct a physical exam 
which lasted less than two minutes. Id. During the exam, Respondent 
placed a stethoscope on the Agent's back and stomach and asked him to 
breath, tested the reflexes in the Agent's knees, and had him sit on 
the edge of an exam table and extend his legs out straight and asked if 
this caused pain in his back; the Agent replied: ``It's ok.'' Id. 
Respondent then placed his hands on the Agent's shoulder, and pressing 
downward, asked the Agent to turn his torso to each side and whether 
this was painful. Id; RX 4, at 4-5. The Agent replied ``mmm,'' to which 
Respondent said ``mmm? You don't have to; it doesn't mean anything it 
just helps me assess.'' GX 7, at 9. The Agent said ``ok,'' and the 
physical exam ended. Id.
    The Agent then asked Respondent how long he had been at the clinic; 
Respondent said that he had been there since February and that when he 
started there, the doctors who had come before him ``would basically 
give anything to anybody.'' Id. Respondent also stated that the clinic 
had had an employee, who ``was doing shady things'' but had since been 
fired and reported to DEA. Id. Respondent further maintained that he 
had ``clean[ed] the practice up a bit'' by ``dropping people down to 
reasonable levels on their medications, that * * * what the state and 
medical personnel would deem what is appropriate.'' Id. He also stated 
that ``it seemed like everyone was on'' the ``trifecta'' of Oxycodone, 
Xanax, and Soma, which was ``just asking for trouble'' in the form of 
overdose deaths. Id. Respondent noted that Soma metabolizes into a 
substance, which reacts and magnifies the effect of oxycodone and 
Xanax, which ``are respiratory suppressants to begin with.'' Id. 
Respondent then stated that ``we want to comply with all of the laws, 
we want to do things appropriately, and not piss the DEA or any law 
enforcement agency off.'' Id. Respondent added that ``we're na[iuml]ve 
to think they haven't sent people through here as fake patients'' but 
that he was fine with this because he doesn't ``do anything I'm not 
supposed to do.'' Id. at 9-10.
    Respondent then told the Agent that his physical exam did not ``one 
hundred percent correlate with [the] finding on your MRI,'' and that 
his ``physical exam [wa]s a lot better than your MRI,'' but that 
``there is some stuff on your MRI that would justify you having pain.'' 
Id. at 10. Respondent then asked ``why were they giving you 30's and 
15's?'' Id. The Agent replied, ``That's what he had prescribed.'' Id.
    Respondent replied that ``that's very odd'' because ``the 30's and 
15's are * * * both break through medications'' and ``do the same 
thing.'' Id. After the Agent interrupted, asking ``splitting them up 
like that?,'' Respondent stated that this was ``a common way for 
doctors to hide more medication.'' Id. Respondent then explained that 
``I wouldn't say hide'' but that ``the unofficial max is like 240, 210, 
240 on 30's,'' and that doctors would write ``a prescription for 240 
then they'll throw in a 120 15 * * * instead of writing 300 or so'' in 
the event ``they get investigated.'' Id. Continuing, Respondent added 
that he would ``rather not do both types of medications,'' meaning the 
30s and the 15's. Id.
    Respondent then told the Agent that based on the latter's MRI and 
physical exam, he would give him 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg but not 
the 15s. Id. The Agent replied ``ok,'' and Respondent added: ``Just to 
give you essentially the same amount of milligrams all along, * * * 
what I'd like to do is taper you down as far as we can go, where that 
you're still comfortable.'' Id. at 11. Respondent then noted that the 
Agent was ``fairly young, your [sic] 29'' and that most people under 
the age of 30 don't need to be on pain management.'' Id.
    Next, Respondent said: ``I take it you have some anxiety as well is 
that what's going on with you?'' Id. After the Agent replied, ``Yeah, 
that's the Zanny's help out,'' Respondent said: ``Ok, first of all let 
me tell you we don't call them Zanny's or bars or any of the street 
terms in here, ok, we call them Xanax or alprazolam, whichever one you 
want to call them.'' Id. Respondent then explained that ``I don't 
typically give the two milligrams out[,] I give the ones * * * the twos 
have too much of a street value.'' Id.
    Respondent then observed that ``on July 1st[,] the law states now 
that if the patient has a psychiatric um problem along with being on 
pain management the law states we have refer you to psychiatry.'' Id. 
After the Agent said ``ok,'' Respondent said ``that doesn't necessarily 
mean you have to follow up with that, that just means I have to tell 
you to go, which is I am telling you to go.'' Id.
    Respondent did not, however, provide the Agent with the name of any 
psychiatrist to see. Tr. 255. Moreover, in the psychiatric section of 
the ``review of systems,'' Respondent noted: ``Patient denies problems 
with mood disturbance. No problems with anxiety.'' RX 1, at 16. 
Likewise, in the psychiatric portion of the physical examination, 
Respondent documented: ``Oriented with normal memory. Mental status, 
judgment and affect are grossly intact and normal for age.'' Id. at 17. 
Respondent nonetheless recorded a diagnosis of ``Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder'' which was ``active'' and ``chronic.'' Id.
    Respondent then gave the Agent his ``new patient speech'' and the 
visit ended. Id. at 11-12. According to the medical record, Respondent 
diagnosed the Agent as having lumbar disc displacement, lumbar 
lumbosacral disc degeneration, and backache unspecified, all of which 
were ``active'' and ``chronic.'' RX 1, at 17. At the conclusion of the 
visit, Respondent issued the Agent prescriptions for 180 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg and 60 tablets of Xanax 1mg. GX 8, at 1.
    On August 25, 2011, the Agent returned to the clinic, and again 
wore a recording device. Tr. 256. The Agent met the receptionist, paid 
the fee for the visit and sat down in the waiting room. RX 4, at 10-11. 
After approximately thirty minutes, the Agent was called by Mr. Gomez 
for triage, who took his weight and blood pressure. GX 10, at 6; RX 4, 
at 11. Mr. Gomez did not, however, ask the Agent any questions 
regarding his health. GX 10, at 6; RX 4, at 11. The Agent then returned 
to the waiting room. RX 4, at 11. Moreover, the Agent testified that he 
did not recall filling out any forms at this visit. Tr. 295.
    Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gomez called the Agent and took him to an 
exam room. Respondent entered the exam room, and after exchanging 
pleasantries, asked the Agent if the ``medication is

[[Page 57140]]

working ok?'' GX 10, at 7. The Agent answered: ``Yep, great.'' Id. 
Respondent asked: ``Questions for me at all?'' Id. The Agent replied, 
``No, I'm good.'' Id. Respondent then asked: ``The medications are 
controlling your pain well?'' Id. The Agent replied: ``Yeah, 
everything's great.'' Id.
    Respondent then had the Agent stand up and explained that ``[t]he 
state makes me do a physical exam each time.'' Id. Respondent placed 
his hand on the Agent's mid to lower back and asked: ``Most of the pain 
in here at all? Is this where it is or is it down further.'' Id.; RX 4, 
at 12. The Agent stated: ``Right around that whole area.'' GX 10, at 7. 
Respondent replied: ``Right around this whole area? All right.'' Id. 
Respondent ``then directed the [Agent] out of the'' exam room and the 
two walked up to the receptionist's counter, where Respondent obtained 
two printed prescriptions, which he signed and gave to the UC. RX 4, at 
12. The prescriptions were for 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 60 
tablets of Xanax 1mg. GX 11.
    The medical record for this visit indicates that the Agent 
presented with low back pain, with a severity which was ``mild'' and a 
``4 on the pain scale,'' that there was ``no change'' in the pain's 
status, and that the pain radiated into the Agent's ``neck and upper 
back.'' RX 1, at 19. In the review of systems section, the record again 
states: ``Patient denied problems with mood disturbance. No problems 
with anxiety.'' Id. And, as before, in the psychiatric section of 
physical examination portion, the record states: ``Oriented with normal 
memory. Mental status, judgment and affect are grossly intact and 
normal for age.'' Id.
    The medical record further documents various tests as having been 
performed which clearly were not. For example, under the neurologic 
findings for the physical exam, the record states ``normal and 
symmetrical deep tendon reflexes with no reflexes.'' Id. Yet there is 
no evidence that Respondent tested the Agent's reflexes.
    Likewise, with respect to the Agent's lumbar spine, the record 
states: ``Full active ROM with rotation, Full active ROM with bending. 
Full active ROM with flexion and Full active ROM with extension.'' RX 
1, at 21. And with respect to the Agent's thoracic spine, the record 
states: ``Full active ROM with extension. Full active ROM with flexion. 
Full active ROM with bending. Full active ROM with Rotation.'' Id. at 
21. Here again, the evidence shows that these tests were not performed.

The Undercover Visit of Eric McMillen

    On August 25, 2011, another Special Agent, using the name of Eric 
McMillen, saw Respondent at the Brandon Clinic. However, on July 21, 
2011, the Agent had seen a Dr. Mosley at the QCMG Bradenton clinic. GX 
20; Tr. 348-55. The Agent acknowledged that he had provided a pharmacy 
profile and MRI,\9\ id. at 385 & 353; filled out a medical 
questionnaire at this clinic, which asked that he rate his pain, id. at 
349-50; that a physician's assistant had asked him some questions about 
the nature of his pain, as well as why he was in Bradenton when his 
driver's license indicated that he was from Fort Lauderdale, id. at 
352; that he had complained of pain in his ``lower back, specifically 
the lower back right side,'' id. at 355; and that it was possible that 
he had noted on the paperwork that when the pain was at its worst, he 
had ``some trouble sleeping.'' Id. at 356. The Agent further testified 
that he ``probably'' saw the doctor at the Bradenton clinic for ``at 
least thirty minutes,'' and on cross-examination agreed that Mosley's 
exam was ``pretty thorough.'' Id. at 413. At the conclusion of the 
visit, the Agent obtained prescriptions from Dr. Mosley for 180 tablets 
of oxycodone 30mg and 30 tablets of Xanax 2mg. Id. at 356-58; GX 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The pharmacy profile showed that McMillen had filled 
prescriptions for 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 60 tablets of 
Xanax 2mg issued by a Dr. Malcom Foster on March 14, April 12, May 
11, and June 10, 2011. RX 1, at 50-51.
    The MRI report noted a ``[s]mall posterocentral protrusion of 
L5-S1 disc, with annular tear, cause mild narrowing of the central 
canal,'' and a ``[m]ild diffuse bulge of L4-5 disc, with left 
extraforaminal annular tear, without any significant central canal 
or neural foraminal narrowing.'' GX 19. The MRI includes a notation 
that it was verified on the date of the Agent's Bradenton visit. RX 
1, at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agent's medical record also includes a chart for his initial 
visit with Dr. Mosley. RX 1, at 60-61. While the chart lists Dr. 
Mosley's prescriptions to include ``Xanax 2 mg qhs PRN Anxiety 
30,'' notably the chart contains no findings pertinent to the 
Agent's having anxiety (or sleeping problems) and Mosley did not list 
anxiety as one of his diagnoses in the diagnosis/assessment section of 
the chart. See id. Indeed, on the first page of the chart, under 
``Psych Hx,'' the block for anxiety (as well as other mental health 
conditions) is blank, and in the portion of the form for noting whether 
the patient had a family history of various conditions including 
``mental health,'' Mosley wrote ``none.'' Id. at 61.
    On August 25, 2011, the Agent, who wore a recording device, went to 
the Brandon clinic where he saw Respondent. Tr. 358-59, 363. While the 
Bradenton clinic was supposed to fax over the Agent's medical record, 
it had not done so; the Agent was subsequently required to fill out a 
medical questionnaire which asked about the location of the pain, how 
it had occurred, and what medications he was on. Id. at 365. However, 
the forms did not include a pain chart with a numeric scale. Id. at 
366.
    The Agent was eventually called by Mr. Gomez, who asked how tall he 
was and took his weight and blood pressure. Id. at 366; GX 22, at 3. 
Mr. Gomez then took him to an exam room. GX 22, at 4.
    After a short hiatus, Respondent entered the room, introduced 
himself, reviewed the Agent's paperwork, and began making entries on a 
touch screen computer monitor. RX4, at 44. Respondent asked if ``[m]ost 
of the pain [wa]s in his lower back'' and ``[h]ow it all happened?'' GX 
22, at 7. The Agent replied that he ``use [sic] to work in a warehouse 
lifting boxes and moving stuff'' but didn't ``remember the exact day.'' 
Id. Respondent asked: ``Wear and tear over time?'' Id. The Agent 
replied: ``Yeah.'' Id.
    Following a discussion of the EMR system, Respondent asked the 
Agent to lean forward, placed his stethoscope on the Agent's back and 
asked him to take a deep breath followed by a normal breath, and asked 
if the pain was ``down here in your lower back?'' Id. at 8. The Agent 
replied, ``Yeah, right around there.'' Id. Respondent then said he was 
going to press various places and instructed the Agent to tell him if 
he had pain; according to the Agent, Respondent proceeded to press 
various parts on the Agent's lower back. RX 4, at 44; GX 22, at 9. The 
Agent stated that he had ``a little bit'' on the left and that ``in the 
middle it's a little worse.'' GX 22, at 9. Respondent then asked: 
``[h]ow about over here?'' Id. The Agent replied: ``Yeah,'' Respondent 
noted that ``[i]t's significantly tighter right there''; the Agent 
stated: ``Yeah, on the right side.'' Id.
    Respondent then asked: ``How about over here?'' Id. The Agent 
replied: ``Yeah a little more * * * right around there.'' Id. 
Respondent asked: ``How about down in this area?'' Id. The Agent 
answered ``No.'' Id.
    Respondent stated ``okay'' and that he had ``just left [the Agent] 
on everything that you were on down there.'' Id. The Agent stated, 
``Okay, that's fine.'' Id. Respondent added: ``Okay, I usually don't 
try to mess with it * * *. you know, try to play with it * * * unless 
I'm trying to increase it or whatever.'' Id. The Agent replied: ``No 
problem.'' Id.

[[Page 57141]]

    Respondent then stated: ``Alright we have to have a plan at some 
point, okay? Cause you're not going to be able to be on these meds for 
the rest of your life. You know what I mean?'' Id. at 10. The Agent 
stated: ``Okay, yeah sure * * * I hope * * * I hope not,'' and 
Respondent told the Agent ``[y]ou're all set.'' Id. Respondent then 
escorted the Agent to the receptionist's desk and the receptionist gave 
the Agent prescriptions for 180 tablets of oxycodone 30mg and 30 
tablets of Xanax 2mg, each of which bore the signature of Respondent. 
RX 4, at 45; GX 23.
    The oxycodone prescription listed diagnoses of ``[l]umbar 
lumbosacral disc degeneration'' and ``lumbar disc displacement.'' GX 
23. The Xanax prescription listed a diagnosis of ``GENERALIZED ANXIETY 
DISORDER.'' Id. These diagnoses are also documented in the medical 
record as ``chronic'' and ``active.'' RX 1, at 43.
    However, in the psychiatric portion of the review of systems 
section of the medical record for the visit, Respondent wrote: 
``Patient denies problems with mood disturbance. No problems with 
anxiety.'' RX 4, at 41. Likewise, in the psychiatric portion of the 
physical examination section, Respondent noted: ``Oriented with normal 
memory. Mental status, judgment and affect are grossly intact and 
normal for age.'' Id. at 42.\10\ Notably, at no point during the 
Agent's visit with Respondent, did Respondent (or Gomez) ask the Agent 
whether he had anxiety or suffered from sleeplessness.\11\ GX 22; Tr. 
372, 377-78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The ALJ noted that the medical record for the August 25 
visit lists ``sleep, work, and physical activity'' as daily 
activities affected by the Agent's back pain, and that the Agent 
testified that he filled out a medical questionnaire but that 
``[t]he record is unclear on exactly what information [the Agent] 
provided in answering the medical questionnaires on August 25, 2011 
on the issue of anxiety, sleep disturbance, or pain.'' ALJ at 82. 
However, as noted above, the evidence showed that the questionnaires 
were shredded by Respondent's staff. And in any event, one would 
expect that a doctor would review with the patient his answers to 
questions pertinent to various conditions before prescribing a 
controlled substance to treat a condition.
    \11\ During cross-examination, Respondent's counsel engaged in 
the following colloquy with the Agent:
    Respondent's counsel: ``And you presented to them [i.e., the 
Bradenton clinic], a patient profile that showed that you had a 
history of having pain controlled by narcotic pain medication, 
correct?
    Agent: ``Yes sir.''
    Respondent's counsel: ``And alprazolam to help you with the 
anxiety or sleeping, right?''
    Agent: ``Yes sir.''
    Tr. 397. Notwithstanding the Agent's answers, a patient pharmacy 
profile does not establish that the drugs were prescribed for any 
legitimate medical condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Undercover Visit of Michael Corleone

    On August 25, 2011, a TFO, using the name Michael Corleone, also 
visited Respondent at the Brandon clinic. Tr. 447, 464. The TFO had 
made two previous visits to the QCMG clinic in Bradenton (June 15 and 
July 20, 2011), and saw Dr. Mosley on each occasion. GX 25; RX 4, at 25 
& 30.
    At his first visit (to Bradenton), the TFO provided his driver's 
license, an MRI, and a prescription profile to the receptionist and was 
given several forms to complete including a patient questionnaire. RX 
4, at 30-31. On the patient questionnaire, the TFO noted that he had 
``pain in the lower back and right shoulder,'' that his ``[c]urrent 
pain level was at a two'' and that his ``average maximum pain level was 
at a five'' on a one to ten scale, that the pain was ``a sharp ache,'' 
which ``occurs on a weekly basis,'' that it affected his ``sleep and 
physical activity,'' and that ``helpful treatments * * * included heat/
ice and physical therapy.'' Id. at 31. The TFO further noted that the 
receptionist had verified his MRI. Id. at 31-32.
    Shortly after paying the $300 office visit fee, the TFO was 
summoned by a nurse, who questioned him about his driver's license 
which listed his address as being in Orlando. Id. The nurse further 
told the TFO about the penalties for trafficking and doctor shopping, 
and that the clinic conducted urine drug tests, and that marijuana 
remains in the body for thirty days but that the clinic gave patients 
the option to reschedule their appointment if they tested positive. Id. 
at 31-32. Subsequently, the TFO was required to provide a urine sample, 
and after doing so, was told to return to the waiting room. Id. at 32.
    Later, the nurse called the TFO to another room where he proceeded 
to take the TFO's vital signs, asked various personal questions, and 
then asked about the location of his pain, his previous clinic and his 
current medications. Id. Upon completion of these tasks, the nurse 
escorted the TFO to Dr. Mosley's office. Id.
    Following a discussion of various non-medical subjects, Mosley 
asked the TFO where his pain was, with the TFO responding that it was 
in his lower back and right shoulder and that the pain was caused by 
playing softball. Id. at 32-33. Mosley proceeded to perform a physical 
exam, during which Mosley stated that the TFO's back felt tight. Id. at 
33. However, while Mosley had the TFO perform several movements, the 
TFO did not express any discomfort with the exception of one exercise 
when he said his back was sore. Id. at 33-34. Mosley then had the TFO 
sit on the exam table and placed his stethoscope on various portions of 
the TFO's back and chest and told the TFO to breath. Id. at 34. 
Thereafter, Mosley tapped the TFO's knees and then used a light to look 
into the TFO's eyes, mouth and nose. Id. According to the TFO, during 
this time, he was turning his upper body, with no discomfort, while he 
conversed with Mosley. Id. However, during direct examination, the TFO 
testified that he believed that he told Dr. Mosley that he ``had some 
trouble sleeping.'' Tr. 454. He also testified that Mosley's exam ``was 
fairly thorough.'' Id. at 455.
    Mosley returned to his desk and began completing paperwork. RX 4, 
at 34. Mosley then advised that he would not write the TFO 
prescriptions for 240 oxycodone and 90 alprazolam, which were the 
amounts the TFO had reported that he had previously received. Id. 
Mosley completed the paperwork, gave the file to the TFO, and told him 
to take it to the front desk, which the TFO did. Id. Upon arriving at 
the front desk, the receptionist opened the file and gave the TFO two 
prescriptions which were signed by Mosley: one for 199 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg, with the notation ``PRN pain,'' and one for 60 tablets 
of alprazolam 2mg ``PRN anxiety.'' Id.; see also GX 25.
    However, in the medical record for the TFO's initial visit, Dr. 
Mosley made no findings in the section for psychiatric history and did 
not check the line for anxiety. RX 1, at 5. In the family history 
section, which included a prompt for ``mental health,'' Mosley wrote 
``none.'' Id. Moreover, in the diagnosis section of the chart, Mosley 
wrote: ``mild diffuse bulge + small [supreg] paracentral tear L5-S1 
disc,'' and ``diffuse bulge L4-5 disc.'' \12\ Id. at 8. No diagnosis of 
anxiety was listed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The MRI presented by the TFO had listed as its 
``impression,'' a ``[m]ild diffuse bulge and small right paracentral 
annular tear of L5-S1 disc, causing mild narrowing of the central 
canal and neural foramina, bilaterally,'' and a [m]ild diffuse bulge 
of L4-5 disc, without any significant central canal or neural 
foraminal narrowing.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 20, 2011, the TFO returned to the Bradenton clinic and 
signed in. RX 4, at 25. After a short wait, the TFO was called by the 
receptionist, who collected the payment for the visit and gave him an 
appointment card for his next visit. RX 4, at 26. The receptionist also 
gave the TFO forms to complete, including one that asked about his 
current medications and pain level. Id. The TFO completed the forms and 
returned them to the receptionist. Id.
    Thereafter, the TFO was called to a room by a nurse, who took his 
weight

[[Page 57142]]

and blood pressure, and confirmed his name. Id. The nurse asked the TFO 
what his pain levels were with and without medication on a one to ten 
scale; the TFO replied that his pain was six or seven without 
medications and three with medications. Id. The nurse also asked the 
TFO if he had adverse reactions and if he used tobacco. Id. Upon 
completing the TFO's paperwork, the nurse took him to an exam room, 
which was across from Dr. Mosley's office, and left the exam room door 
open and placed the TFO's file in a tray on the door. Id. at 26-27.
    After a patient left Dr. Mosley's office, Mosley told the TFO to 
enter his office and bring his file; the TFO did as instructed and gave 
his file to Mosley, who was seated at his desk facing a computer. Id. 
at 27. Mosley and the TFO had a conversation in which they discussed 
the TFO's clothing, beard and tattoos. Id. Mosley asked the TFO a 
single question about his medication and did not perform a physical 
examination. Id. Mosley then completed the paperwork and handed the 
file to the TFO; the TFO took the file to the front desk and handed it 
to a clinic employee. Id. The employee opened the file and gave the TFO 
two prescriptions; the prescriptions were for 199 tablets of oxycodone 
30mg, with the notation ``PRN Pain,'' and 60 tablets of alprazolam 2mg, 
with the notation ``PRN anxiety.'' Id.; \13\ GX 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ While Respondent introduced medical records for the 
undercover officers, the record for Mike Corleone does not contain a 
progress note for his second visit with Dr. Mosley. See RX 1, at 1-
13. At several points in his recommended decision, including with 
respect to this undercover officer, the ALJ expressed that ``I have 
no confidence, based on the record evidence before me, that the 
Government produced all of the relevant portions of the patient 
files, particularly given various testimony at hearing that the 
Government has not `had time' to review much of the seized material 
since October 28, 2011.'' ALJ at 84 n.111; see also id. 69 n.95 
(noting absence of pharmacy profile in patient record for Anthony 
Thompson notwithstanding Agent's testimony that he had provided one 
at his initial visit). See also id. at 78 n.104 (reasoning that 
``[it] is also worth noting that the Government bears the initial 
burden of proof in this matter, yet it is not entirely clear from 
any of the testimony whether the undercover patient charts produced 
at hearing are complete'').
    The charts for the four undercover officers, however, were 
entered into evidence by Respondent and not the Government. 
Moreover, the custodian of records for the QCMG Brandon clinic 
testified that she had reviewed Respondent's Exhibit 1 
(which comprised the records maintained by the clinic on the four 
undercover officers) prior to the day of her testimony, and when 
asked whether the records were ``a fair and accurate representation 
of the medical charts,'' answered ``yes.'' Tr. 893-94; see also id. 
at 887. Indeed, Respondent has not contended that any of the charts 
pertaining to the undercover officers were incomplete.
    Nor does the testimony cited by the ALJs support his implication 
that the Government failed to turn over relevant evidence. While it 
is true that the TFO testified on the first day of the hearing, that 
she had not time to review the paper copy all of the records, she 
also testified that ``we don't have any of the UC files yet'' 
because ``[t]hey're all electronic.'' Tr. 140. The TFO was 
subsequently recalled to testify on the issue of when certain 
records were provided to the Government's Expert and testified that 
the Government had not obtained the electronic medical records until 
some point during or after February 2012, when it issued a subpoena 
to the entity which managed the EMR system. Id. at 1003. Moreover, 
both of Respondent's employees testified that various documents 
including patient IDs, MRIs, patient consents, and urinalysis 
results were scanned into the EMR, and that the clinic was not 
``keeping papers anymore.'' Tr. 891, 908, & 952. To the extent there 
were any missing documents (such as a pharmacy profile for Anthony 
Thompson or a progress note for Mike Corleone's second visit with 
Dr. Mosley, assuming Mosley even prepared one), given that the 
clinic was using the EMR system and did not have hard copies of the 
files for the four UCs, it is unclear why the electronic files did 
not contain this information. What is clear, however, is that the 
ALJ's implication is nothing more than speculation.
    In any event, for reasons explained in the discussion of the 
legality of the prescriptions issued to Bobby Payne, the existence 
of a pharmacy profile showing that a patient had obtained controlled 
substance from other physicians is not exculpatory evidence. As for 
the absence of a progress note for Mike Corleone's second visit with 
Dr. Mosley, there is no evidence that Mosley ever created one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 25, 2011, the TFO went to the Brandon clinic and saw 
Respondent. Tr. 464. The TFO signed in, and after a short wait, was 
called by the receptionist who asked for his driver's license and 
current address, and collected payment for the visit; the receptionist 
then provided the TFO with an appointment card for a visit of September 
22, 2011. RX 4, at 39. The TFO then took a seat in the waiting room. 
Id.
    Thereafter, the TFO was called by a male nurse to an exam room 
where he had his vital signs taken. Id. The nurse then told the TFO to 
return to the waiting room. Id. A short while later, the nurse took the 
TFO to another exam room and placed his file in a tray near the door. 
Id.
    Respondent removed the TFO's file, entered the room, and introduced 
himself. Id., GX 27, at 1. Respondent and the TFO discussed the reason 
why he had come to the Brandon clinic (``I don't know if it was just 
they couldn't get me in'' and ``[m]aybe, I told them I was thinking 
about moving up here''), how many times the TFO had seen Dr. Mosley 
(``twice''), whether the TFO lived in Orlando (``that's an old 
address'') and where he now lived (``Bradenton''), and his employment 
status (``I don't work right now''), and what he formerly did for 
employment (``a lot of warehouse stuff'' and ``some heavy lifting''). 
GX 27, at 1-2.
    Next, Respondent asked the TFO if he had insurance; the TFO said 
``No.'' Id. at 2. Respondent remarked, ``[o]k, so, you're getting two 
hundred of these pills, that's probably about four hundred fifty 
dollars. How are you affording all these meds?'' Id. The TFO answered 
that he ``had some money saved up from before,'' and Respondent said 
``ok.'' Id. Respondent and the TFO then discussed the problem of people 
not showing for their appointments and the clinic's policy for no 
shows. Id. at 2-3.
    Respondent then discussed the TFO's MRI, stating:

    Alright, so I reviewed your MRI. I mean, it's, you got a few 
things here and there, but not a ton. You know, my honest opinion, 
I'm a straight shooter, I don't BS anybody. Uh, my honest opinion is 
that you're a little bit over-medicated. But I'm going to leave you 
on what you've been on.

    Id. at 4. The TFO replied ``ok, thanks,'' and Respondent added: 
``we'll, you know if it comes down to it later, down the road that we 
need to bring you down a bit, we'll do it. But (at which point the TFO 
interjected with ``ok'') I don't think we'll need to. The only reason 
why we would need to is because if the government makes me.'' Id.
    The TFO replied, ``ok, gotcha, gotcha,'' Respondent stated ``So, 
um,'' and the TFO stated: ``Yeah, you guys get people in and out quick 
here. It's nice.'' Id. Respondent said ``yeah'' and that ``we try not 
to play around,'' and after the TFO said, ``Yeah,'' Respondent asked 
the TFO if he ``ha[d] any questions for me?'' Id. The TFO answered 
``nope.''
    Respondent then asked to feel the TFO's ``low back''; the TFO stood 
up, and Respondent pressed against the TFO's lower back in several 
locations, asking if it was painful. Id.; RX 4, at 39-40. The TFO 
replied, ``Yeah. It's a little sore,'' and then agreed with Respondent 
that it was ``more on the right.'' GX 27, at 4.
    The TFO was instructed to sit in a chair, and raise each leg 
separately and then simultaneously. Id. Respondent then asked, ``How's 
your range of motion, pretty good?'' Id. The TFO replied ``yeah, it 
gets better when it loosens up throughout the day. Like in the 
mornings, the mornings always rough.'' Id. Respondent said ``[r]ight,'' 
and the TFO added: ``And if I sit down for a long time, it hurts.'' Id. 
Respondent stated: ``Alright. You're all set,'' the TFO expressed his 
thanks, and Respondent took the TFO and the file to a reception area. 
Id. at 5. See also Tr. 469 (When asked to describe how brief 
Respondent's physical examination was, TFO testified: ``He pressed on 
my lower back and had me raise both of my legs, and that was it.'').

[[Page 57143]]

    Respondent then gave the TFO prescriptions for 210 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg and 60 tablets of alprazolam 2mg. RX 4, at 40; GX 28. On 
the oxycodone prescription, Respondent listed his diagnosis as 
``[l]umbar lumbosacral disc degeneration'' and ``[l]umbar disc 
displacement.'' GX 28. On the Xanax prescription, Respondent listed his 
diagnosis as ``generalized anxiety disorder.'' Id.
    With respect to his visit to the Brandon clinic, the TFO testified 
that he was not required to complete any paperwork. Tr. 464. In 
addition, with respect to the intake process at the Brandon clinic, the 
TFO testified that ``I met with the nurse and he took some information, 
as far as blood pressure and weight and that was really it. He also 
made some reference to my name,'' this being the same as that of one of 
the leading characters in the movie, ``The Godfather.'' Id. at 465. 
Based on the TFO's testimony and the report he filed for the visit, I 
conclude that the nurse did not ask the TFO any questions regarding his 
pain. Id.; see also RX 4, at 39.
    In the medical record documenting this visit, Respondent noted that 
there was ``[n]o change'' in the status of the TFO's pain, that the 
severity was ``4 on pain scale,'' that the pain radiated into his 
``shoulder blades and right arm,'' that the ``trend'' was ``tolerable'' 
and that the pain affected his ``sleep and physical activity.'' RX 1, 
at 9. Yet there is no evidence that any of these issues were raised by 
the Nurse or Respondent with the TFO.
    Also, in the psychiatric portion of the review of systems, the 
record states: ``Patient denies problems with mood disturbance. No 
problems with anxiety.'' Id. Likewise, in the psychiatric portion of 
the physical examination findings, the record states: ``Oriented with 
normal memory. Mental status, judgment and affect are grossly intact 
and normal for age.'' Id. at 10.
    Likewise, under the neurologic findings, Respondent noted that the 
TFO had ``[n]ormal and symmetrical deep tendon reflexes with no 
pathological reflexes.'' RX 1, at 10. Yet, the TFO testified that 
Respondent did not check his reflexes. Tr. 474. Moreover, for his range 
of motion findings with respect to the TFO's lumbar spine, Respondent 
noted that the he had ``[f]ull active ROM with rotation, [f]ull active 
ROM with bending, [f]ull active ROM with flexion and Full active ROM 
with extension.'' RX 1, at 11. Yet, the TFO testified that Respondent 
did not ask him to do any range of motion exercise ``other than just 
lifting up the legs.'' Tr. 474.

Respondent's Evidence

    In addition to the testimony of Mr. Gomez, which was discussed 
above, Respondent elicited testimony from Stephanie Baez, who was an 
employee of the QCMG Brandon clinic from January 2011 until the end of 
October 2011.\14\ Tr. 886-87. Ms. Baez testified that she was the 
clinic's custodian of records and handled ``all of the intake'' of 
patients. Id. at 887. She testified that as part of the intake process, 
she would collect a patient's photo ID, MRI, and pharmacy history, and 
that she would call the company that did the MRI and verify the 
patient's name, birth date, date of the MRI and the MRI's impressions. 
Id. at 888.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Respondent also called TFO Wendy Zarvis, who was involved 
in sending materials to the Expert for his review. Tr. 1013. 
Respondent called the Agent to impeach the testimony of the Expert 
regarding whether he had been provided certain documents at the time 
he produced his report, as well as to show what documents he had 
been provided and when he received them. Id. at 1017-18. Because for 
reasons explained later in this decision, the Expert's testimony is 
not necessary to decide this matter, I conclude that there is no 
need to make any findings regarding when she sent various documents 
to him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ms. Baez also testified that if a patient transferred from the 
Bradenton to Brandon clinic, his records would be transferred and that 
if any form was missing, the patient would have to complete the form 
again. Id. at 890-91. Ms. Baez also testified that the clinic required 
the patients to complete an authorization for release of their medical 
information from previous providers. Id. 899-900. While there are such 
releases in the patient files of Mike Corleone and Eric McMillan, both 
of whom completed these forms during the initial visits to the 
Bradenton clinic, but neither of which was filled out by listing their 
previous doctors, see RX 1, at 2 & 53, there are no such forms in the 
patient files of Anthony Thompson and Bobby Payne, both of whom 
initially presented at the Brandon clinic. See generally RX 1. 
Moreover, none of the four undercover patient files contain any medical 
records from prior physicians or clinics, even though they presented 
that they had been treated by other physicians, or notes indicating 
that the clinic attempted to obtain such records but could not do so. 
Id. Also, when questioned on cross-examination as to whether Respondent 
had attempted to verify whether several of the undercovers had been 
treated by another doctor, Ms. Baez testified that she did not know. 
Tr. 912 (testimony regarding whether Respondent verified that patient 
Corleone was treated by Coast to Coast clinic with either Dr. Mosley or 
Coast to Coast), id. at 925 (testimony regarding whether Respondent 
verified that patient McMillan was treated by Dr. Foster).
    Respondent was called to testify by the Government. However, he 
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and declined to answer any 
questions. Tr. 37-38. Nor, even after the Government presented its case 
in chief, did Respondent testify regarding any of the allegations.

Discussion

    Before proceeding to analyze the evidence under the public interest 
factors, a review of the ALJ's discussion of the Agency's obligation to 
disclose what he deemed to be exculpatory evidence is warranted. 
Therein, the ALJ noted that the Government had resisted turning over 
investigative reports prepared by the undercover officers (which were 
relied upon by the Government's Expert) until after Respondent's 
counsel had completed the first day of his cross-examination of the 
Government's Expert. ALJ at 10. However, the Government did eventually 
turn over the investigative reports and Respondent was able to cross-
examine the Expert with them. Notwithstanding his conclusion ``that 
denial of Respondent's motions for discovery were [sic] consistent with 
applicable legal precedent, and supported by other procedural 
deficiencies in Respondent's pleadings,'' and that, in fact, his 
discussion was entirely gratuitous because the Government did turn over 
the reports and Respondent raised no claim of prejudice in his post-
hearing brief, the ALJ found ``that [the] existing Agency holdings and 
practice with regard to exculpatory evidence warrants further 
discussion.'' Id.
    While noting that ``the term `exculpatory' should be carefully 
defined in the context of an administrative proceeding,''--an 
admonition which, as explained below, the ALJ promptly proceeded to 
ignore--the ALJ reasoned that ``other Agencies have found it 
appropriate to establish by regulation a practice of reviewing and 
disclosing exculpatory evidence to litigants during administrative 
hearings, while recognizing such disclosure is not constitutionally 
mandated.'' Id. at 12. After noting that three federal agencies have 
provided for disclosure of exculpatory evidence in administrative 
proceedings,\15\ the ALJ opined that ``[a]

[[Page 57144]]

disclosure practice that emphasizes only what is alleged in the [Order 
to Show Cause], along with only that evidence the Government chooses to 
disclose in its pre-hearing statement, supplements thereto, and related 
documentary evidence, by definition de-emphasizes any investigative 
interest in considering evidence favorable to a Respondent, which, by 
extension, permeates the entire record'' and that ``[s]uch a systemic 
practice may also contravene clear guidance from federal appellate 
courts.'' Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Most federal agencies do not, however, provide for the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence in administrative proceedings, 
and several federal appeals courts have held that Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963), does not apply in this type of proceeding. See 
Mister Discount Stockbrokers, Inc. v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th 
Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Nueva Eng. Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 
1985). Cf. Echostar Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749, 755-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (rejecting litigant's claim that ``the Agency's decision 
to deny it discovery * * * denied it due process''); Silverman v. 
CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977) (``There is no basic 
constitutional right to pretrial discovery in administrative 
proceedings.'') (citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ALJ then quoted from the unpublished decision of the Eleventh 
Circuit in Jayam Krishna-Iyer, which vacated an agency order for 
failing ``to consider [Dr. Krishna-Iyer's] experience with twelve 
patients whose medical charts were seized by the DEA * * * [or] 
consider any of Petitioner's positive experience in dispensing 
controlled substances.'' Id. at 13-14 (quoting Krishna-Iyer v. DEA, 249 
Fed. Appx. 159, 160 (11th Cir. 2007)). Notwithstanding that under the 
Eleventh Circuit's rules an unpublished opinion is not ``binding 
precedent,'' 11th Cir. R. 36-2, the ALJ then asserted that the ``impact 
of this [decision] as precedential authority in DEA decision-making, to 
include the interpretation of `positive experience,' apparently remains 
a matter of some confusion.'' ALJ at 14. The confusion, however, rests 
entirely with the ALJ, who ignored both the Agency's subsequent 
decision on remand in Krishna-Iyer, which addressed the role of 
``positive experience'' evidence in cases where the Government has 
proved intentional or knowing diversion, subsequent Agency cases 
applying this rule, and several court of appeals' decisions (including 
that of the Eleventh Circuit), which have since upheld the Agency's 
position.
    On remand in Krishna-Iyer, I assumed that the respondent's 
prescribing to not only the twelve patients whose files were seized, 
but also to the thousands of other patients (other than the undercover 
operatives to whom she had unlawfully distributed controlled 
substances) constituted evidence of dispensing controlled substances in 
circumstances which did not constitute diversion. However, as I 
explained, Dr. Krishna-Iyer's ``prescribings to thousands of other 
patients do not * * * render her prescribings to the undercover 
officers any less unlawful, or any less acts which are `inconsistent 
with the public interest.''' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 463 (2009). 
As I further explained:

under the CSA, a practitioner is not entitled to a registration 
unless she ``is authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances 
under the laws of the States in which [she] practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 
823(f). Because under law, registration is limited to those who have 
authority to dispense controlled substances in the course of 
professional practice, and patients with legitimate medical 
conditions routinely seek treatment from licensed medical 
professionals, every registrant can undoubtedly point to an 
extensive body of legitimate prescribing over the course of her 
professional career. Thus, in past cases, this Agency has given no 
more than nominal weight to a practitioner's evidence that he has 
dispensed controlled substances to thousands of patients in 
circumstances which did not involve diversion.

Id. (citing Paul J. Caragine, Jr., 63 FR 51592, 51600 (1998) (noting 
that ``even though the patients at issue are only a small portion of 
Respondent's patient population, his prescribing of controlled 
substances to these individuals raises serious concerns regarding [his] 
ability to responsibly handle controlled substances in the future'')); 
Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 386 & n.56 (2008) (even though 
pharmacy ``had 17,000 patients,'' ``[n]o amount of legitimate 
dispensings'' could render the pharmacy's ``flagrant violations [acts 
which are] `consistent with the public interest'''), aff'd, Medicine 
Shoppe-Jonesborough v. DEA, 300 Fed. Appx. 409 (6th Cir. 2008).
    Accordingly, in Krishna-Iyer, I held that ``evidence that a 
practitioner has treated thousands of patients [without violating the 
CSA] does not negate a prima facie showing that a practitioner has 
committed acts inconsistent with the public interest.'' 74 FR at 463. I 
further explained that ``[w]hile such evidence may be of some weight in 
assessing whether a practitioner has credibly shown that she has 
reformed her practices, where a practitioner commits intentional acts 
of diversion and insists she did nothing wrong, such evidence is 
entitled to no weight.'' Id.
    Subsequent to Krishna-Iyer, I adhered to this rule in Dewey C. 
MacKay, 75 FR 49956 (2010), pet. for rev. denied, MacKay v. DEA, 664 
F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2011). To be clear, the ALJ entirely ignored both 
the decision of the Agency as well as that of the Tenth Circuit in 
MacKay.
    In MacKay, I held that, based on the substantial evidence that the 
physician had knowingly diverted controlled substances to two patients 
who acted in an undercover capacity, the Government had satisfied its 
prima facie burden of showing that Respondent had committed acts which 
rendered his registration inconsistent with the public interest. 75 FR 
at 49977. Relying on the Agency's decision on remand in Krishna-Iyer, I 
rejected the physician's contention that ``[a] better assessment of 
[his] medical practice and habits can be ascertained from [his] 
numerous positive experiences in prescribing controlled substances, 
some of which were recounted by the patients themselves * * * at the 
hearing.'' Id. (quoting Resp. Br. at 3). I therefore held that ``even 
assuming, without deciding, that Respondent's prescribing practices to 
all of his other patients (including those whose medical records were 
reviewed by the Government's Expert but who did not perform undercover 
visits \16\) fully complied with the CSA and Utah law, these 
prescribings do not refute the evidence showing that he intentionally 
diverted to [the two undercovers] in violation of both the CSA and Utah 
law.'' 75 FR at 49977. Noting that Dr. MacKay had failed to testify and 
offer evidence that he recognized the extent of his misconduct and was 
prepared to remedy his prescribing, I revoked his registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ In light of the evidence provided by the undercover visits 
of the two patients, I found it unnecessary to make any findings 
based on the Expert's chart review. 75 FR at 49972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Tenth Circuit denied MacKay's petition for review. MacKay v. 
DEA, 664 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2011). Of relevance here, the Tenth 
Circuit specifically addressed and rejected MacKay's argument that the 
Agency had failed to consider his ``positive experience'' in dispensing 
controlled substances. As the Court of Appeals explained:

    Despite Dr. MacKay's claim to the contrary, the Deputy 
Administrator considered the entire record, including the evidence 
in Dr. MacKay's favor. She determined, however, that none of Dr. 
MacKay's evidence negated the DEA prima facie showing that Dr. 
MacKay had intentionally diverted drugs to K.D. and M.R. Indeed, she 
found that even if Dr. MacKay had provided proper medical care to 
all of his other patients, that fact would not overcome the 
government's evidence with regard to M.R. and K.D.
    None of the evidence presented by Dr. MacKay undermines the 
evidence relating to M.R. and K.D. Although numerous patients and 
colleagues of Dr. MacKay related their positive experiences with 
him, none had any personal knowledge regarding his treatment of M.R. 
and K.R. Notably, Dr. MacKay's medical expert, Dr. Fine, failed to 
specifically discuss and justify Dr. MacKay's treatment of M.R. and 
K.D. As a result, none of Dr. MacKay's evidence contradicts the 
testimony and evidence presented by the DEA relating

[[Page 57145]]

to the knowing diversion of drugs to these two patients.

664 F.3d at 819.

    The Court of Appeals thus concluded that ``[a]lthough Dr. MacKay 
may have engaged in the legitimate practice of pain medicine for many 
of his patients, the conduct found by the Deputy Administrator with 
respect to K.D. and M.R. is sufficient to support her determination 
that his continued registration is inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. Given that the Court of Appeals' decision in MacKay was 
circulated to the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and in any 
event, had been issued nearly five months prior to the ALJ's issuance 
of his recommended decision in this matter, it is inexplicable that the 
ALJ entirely ignored it.
    More recently, I revoked the registration of a Florida-based 
physician for violations of the CSA's prescription requirement. See 
Ronald Lynch, M.D., 75 FR 78745, 78750-54 (2010). The physician then 
filed a petition for review in the Eleventh Circuit. Before the court 
of appeals, the physician argued that the Agency's order was arbitrary 
and capricious because ``it limited its consideration of [his] 
experience to only ten prescriptions issued to out of state patients, 
the two undercover patients, and the use of a rubber stamp on nine 
prescriptions.'' Brief of Petitioner at 31, Lynch v. DEA, 2012 WL 
1850092 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-10207-EE). The physician further 
argued that the Agency had failed to ``consider the evidence that he 
had been dispensing controlled substances for over twenty years,'' that 
``[e]ven with respect to the undercover patients, the DEA Order did not 
consider the fact that the two undercover patients did not get the 
medication they requested or that the consultation [between the 
physician and the patients] was thoughtful and thorough,'' and that the 
Order ``ignore[d] the fact that one of the undercover patients asked 
[him] for stronger schedule II drugs'' and that he declined the 
request. Id. The physician thus contended that the Agency's order was 
arbitrary and capricious because it ``fail[ed] to consider any of [his] 
positive experiences with dispensing controlled substances.'' Id. at 32 
(citing Krishna-Iyer, 249 Fed. Appx. at 160).
    In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit denied Lynch's 
petition for review. See 2012 WL 1850092, *2. The Court of Appeals 
noted that ``[a]fter reviewing the record, reading the parties' briefs 
and having the benefit of oral argument,'' it had concluded that the 
Agency's order was supported by substantial evidence and that the 
revocation of Lynch's registration ``was not arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.'' Id. Significantly, the Court 
of Appeals did not deem Lynch's argument that the Agency had failed to 
consider his positive experience to warrant any discussion.
    Ignoring both MacKay and Lynch, the ALJ opined ``that the evidence 
of record in this case is fully consistent with an administrative 
practice that only focused on evidence in support of revocation to the 
virtual exclusion of any `positive experience' by Respondent, 
particularly relating to his prescribing practices and other conduct 
that may have evidenced compliance with applicable law and 
regulations.'' ALJ at 15. The ALJ then explained that:

    For purposes of this Recommended Decision, I have interpreted 
`positive experience' in a common sense fashion, which appears to me 
to have been the intent of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2007 given their decision not to define it further. In other words, 
if there is investigative evidence that refutes the allegations in 
the [Order to Show Cause] or materially supports a finding that 
Respondent's prescribing practices are consistent with the public 
interest, such as that found in patient files, it must be made 
available to a respondent, and if found to be `competent, relevant, 
material, and not unduly repetitious,' must be considered in any 
Agency decision.

Id. at n.16.

    As support for his contention that the Agency's investigation had 
failed to consider evidence of Respondent's positive experience, the 
ALJ cited a TFO's purported testimony that although she was aware that 
Respondent had stated to an undercover officer that he ``had previously 
reported misconduct by a clinic employee to DEA,'' the TFO ``testified 
that she did not view such information as `important' to the 
investigation and had not followed up on'' it. Id. (quoting Tr. 120-
21). The ALJ then asserted that ``[t]he significance and relevance of 
such positive conduct by Respondent, if confirmed to be true, could 
demonstrate Respondent's compliance with various applicable DEA 
regulations, and materially refute to a degree the allegation in the 
[Order to Show Cause] that Respondent's conduct was contrary to the 
public interest.'' Id. (citing 21 CFR 1301.76, which requires a 
registrant to report the theft or loss of controlled substances; 21 CFR 
1301.91, stating Agency's position that the employee of a registrant 
has an obligation to report diversion by another employee; and 21 CFR 
1301.92, stating Agency's position that where an employee engages in 
unlawful activities with controlled substances, employer should 
immediately assess the need for disciplinary actions).
    However, the Government did not allege that Respondent had failed 
to comply with any of the regulations cited by the ALJ. See ALJ Ex. 1, 
at 2-3 (Order to Show Cause); ALJ Ex. 5 (Gov. Pre-Hearing Statement). 
Rather, the Government's case was based entirely on the allegations 
that Respondent violated the CSA by ``issuing prescriptions to 
undercover law enforcement officers for other than a legitimate medical 
purpose or outside the usual course of professional practice.'' Order 
to Show Cause (ALJ Ex. 1), at 2.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Even if such conduct was relevant, Respondent's statement 
is hearsay, which was uncorroborated by any other evidence, and 
because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, could not be 
tested by examining him. See J.A.M. Builders, Inc., v. Herman, 233 
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2000).
    It is further noted that during the colloquy cited by the ALJ, 
the TFO was not questioned as to whether she found it significant 
that Respondent had stated to one of the undercovers that he had 
reported a clinic employee to the Agency. See Tr. 120-21. Rather, 
the question asked if she found it significant that Respondent had 
said to an undercover ``that he was cleaning up the clinic and had 
made reports of patients to the DEA.'' Id. at 120. In response, the 
TFO stated that she did not consider it significant ``because it was 
just constantly mentioned and it just doesn't seem the norm for a 
doctor to talk about DEA and law enforcement, during a patient 
visit, unless that's something that's a constant problem with a 
medical office.'' Tr. 120. This is just one of many instances in 
which the ALJ misstated the evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As set forth in countless cases brought under sections 303 and 304 
of the CSA, violations of the prescription requirement strike at the 
core of the Act's purpose of preventing the diversion of controlled 
substances. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135 (1975) 
(``Congress was particularly concerned with the diversion of drugs from 
legitimate channels to illegitimate channels. It was aware that 
registrants, who have the greatest access to controlled substances and 
therefore the greatest opportunity for diversion, were responsible for 
a large part of the illegal drug traffic.'') (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, the Agency has held that proof of a single act of 
intentional or knowing diversion is sufficient to satisfy the 
Government's prima facie burden of showing that a practitioner's 
continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest, and if 
unrebutted by a showing that the practitioner accepts responsibility 
for his misconduct and will not engage in future misconduct, warrants 
the revocation of a registration. See MacKay, 75 FR at 49977; see also

[[Page 57146]]

Alan H. Olefsky, 57 FR 928, 928-29 (1992) (revoking registration based 
on physician's presentation of two fraudulent prescriptions to 
pharmacist in single act where physician failed to acknowledge his 
misconduct). Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, whether Respondent 
complied with other provisions of the Agency's regulations does not 
``materially refute'' to any degree whether he violated the CSA's 
prescription requirement.
    The ALJ further faulted the Government for not having reviewed the 
patient charts, other than those for the four undercover officers, 
which had been seized pursuant to the search warrants which were 
executed at the Brandon and Bradenton locations. ALJ at 15-16. Noting 
the testimony of a TFO that she had reviewed only a part of those 
records, as well as the Expert's testimony that while he had received 
an additional fifteen patient charts approximately one week before the 
hearing but had not had time to review them, the ALJ reasoned that 
``[t]he lack of investigative effort or `time' to develop any evidence 
that might enlighten the administrative record of positive prescribing 
practices by Respondent, or permit access to such information by 
Respondent or the fact-finder, underscores the due process limitations 
of DEA's existing `discovery' practice.'' Id. at 15-16.
    Contrary to the ALJ's ludicrous suggestion, the Government was not 
required to go through all of Respondent's patient charts looking for 
evidence of his so-called ``positive prescribing practices'' and 
``develop evidence to enlighten the administrative record.'' See 
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 819. Having garnered evidence of what it believed 
to be unlawful prescriptions issued to the four undercover officers, 
the Government was entitled to go to hearing with that evidence. 
Whether the Government's evidence was sufficiently ``reliable, 
probative, and substantial'' to satisfy its burden of proof--after 
considering relevant and material evidence which might refute the 
allegations--is one thing. But as the Tenth Circuit recognized in 
MacKay, even if Respondent prescribed controlled substances to numerous 
other persons in circumstances which did not involve diversion, such 
evidence is not material to the allegations that he unlawfully 
prescribed to any of the four undercover officers and thus is not 
exculpatory.
    In short, the ALJ did not identify any undisclosed material 
evidence that would tend to exculpate Respondent from the allegations 
that, in prescribing to the undercover officers, he lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional 
practice. Indeed, no such claim is even raised by Respondent in his 
brief. And given that the Government fully disclosed the evidence it 
intended to rely on in proving the allegations, and Respondent has 
raised no contention that it was prejudiced by the lateness of the 
disclosure, the Government has satisfied due process. See Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (``where governmental action seriously 
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on 
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be 
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that 
it is untrue''); see also Bowman Transp., Inc., v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 (1974) (``A party is 
entitled * * * to know the issues on which [the] decision will turn and 
to be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for 
decision so that he may rebut it.'').\18\ Indeed, given that the 
Agency's procedures comply with the Supreme Court's (and various court 
of appeals') teachings as to the scope of due process, it is absurd to 
suggest, as the ALJ did, that the procedures are ``fundamentally at 
odds with basic concepts of fairness.'' ALJ at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ In any event, DEA precedent has already made clear that 
where an expert relies on data or documents in forming his opinions, 
the failure of the sponsoring party to produce the data or documents 
denies the other party a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the 
expert and show that his opinions are unfounded, and that where 
challenged by the other party, this also ``precludes a finding that 
the expert's conclusions are supported by substantial and reliable 
evidence.'' See CBS Wholesale Distributors, 74 FR 36746, 36749 
(2009); see also Bowman, 419 U.S. at 288 n.4 (``[T]he Due Process 
Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an 
opportunity to offer a contrary presentation.''). In short, if the 
Government fails to disclose underlying data or documents that its 
expert relied, it runs the very substantial risk that the expert's 
conclusions will be rejected. It is, however, for the Government to 
assess this risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In short, neither the Supreme Court, nor any federal appeals 
court--who, unlike the ALJ, are the ultimate arbiters of whether an 
Agency's procedures satisfy the fundamental fairness that the Due 
Process Clause requires--has ever held that the Clause imposes on any 
federal agency the far-reaching obligation proposed by the ALJ. I thus 
reject it.

The Public Interest Factors

    Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provides that 
a registration to ``dispense a controlled substance * * * may be 
suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the 
registrant * * * has committed such acts as would render his 
registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with the 
public interest as determined under such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) 
(emphasis added). With respect to a practitioner, the Act requires the 
consideration of the following factors in making the public interest 
determination:

    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled 
substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

Id. 823(f).

    ``[T]hese factors are * * * considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert 
A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). It is well settled that I 
``may rely on any one or a combination of factors, and may give each 
factor the weight [I] deem[] appropriate in determining whether a 
registration should be revoked.'' Id.; see also MacKay, 664 F.3d at 
816; Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoxie v. DEA, 
419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while I am required to 
consider each of the factors, I ``need not make explicit findings as to 
each one.'' MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816 (quoting Volkman, 567 F.3d at 222 
(quoting Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482)).\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ In short, this is not a contest in which score is kept; the 
Agency is not required to mechanically count up the factors and 
determine how many favor the Government and how many favor the 
registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses on protecting the 
public interest; what matters is the seriousness of the registrant's 
misconduct. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 462 (2009). Accordingly, 
as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, findings under a single factor 
can support the revocation of a registration. MacKay, 664 F.3d at 
821.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Government has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the requirements for revocation or suspension pursuant 
to 21 U.S.C. 824(a) are met. 21 CFR 1301.44(e). However, ``once the 
[G]overnment establishes a prima facie case showing a practitioner has 
committed acts which render his registration inconsistent with the 
public interest, the burden shifts to the practitioner to show why his 
continued registration would be consistent with the public interest. 
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 817 (citing Medicine Shopper-

[[Page 57147]]

Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008) (citing cases)).
    In this matter, while I adopt the ALJ's findings of fact and legal 
conclusions that neither factor one (the recommendation of the state 
licensing board), nor factor three (Respondent's conviction record 
under laws related to the manufacture, distribution or dispensing of 
controlled substances), supports the revocation of Respondent's 
registration, it has long been settled that neither factor is 
dispositive. See MacKay, 664 F.3d at 817; see also Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 
at 461; Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580, 6593 n.22 (2007), pet. for rev. 
denied 533 F.3d 828 (DC Cir. 2008); Mortimer B. Levin, 55 FR 8209, 8210 
(1990). Rather, the primary focus of this proceeding is whether, as 
alleged by the Government, Respondent violated the CSA's prescription 
requirement, 21 CFR 1306.04(a), when he prescribed to the undercover 
officers. Whether this conduct is considered under factor two--
Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled Substances--or factor 
four--Respondent's Compliance with Applicable Laws Related to 
Controlled Substances, or both factors, is of no legal consequence, 
because, if proven, the conduct would be sufficient to support a 
finding that Respondent ``has committed such acts as would render his 
registration * * * inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(4). See Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR at 462. Accordingly, I turn to 
whether the record as a whole supports the allegations.

Factors Two and Four--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled 
Substances and Record of Compliance With Applicable Controlled 
Substance Laws

    Under a longstanding DEA regulation, a prescription for a 
controlled substance is not ``effective'' unless it is ``issued for a 
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the 
usual course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Under 
the CSA, it is fundamental that a practitioner must establish a 
bonafide doctor-patient relationship in order to act ``in the usual 
course of * * * professional practice'' and to issue a prescription for 
a ``legitimate medical purpose.'' See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 
122, 142-43 (1975); United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 
(10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 657 (8th Cir. 
2009); see also 21 CFR 1306.04(a) (``an order purporting to be a 
prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment * 
* * is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of [21 U.S.C. 
829] and * * * the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties 
provided for violations of the provisions of law related to controlled 
substances'').
    As the Supreme Court recently explained, ``the prescription 
requirement * * * ensures patients use controlled substances under the 
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational 
abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients 
who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (citing Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135, 143 (1975)).
    The ALJ rejected each of the Government's allegations, explaining 
that he did ``not find Respondent's prescribing practices with regard 
to the undercover patient visits to be remotely close to `outright drug 
deals.'''' ALJ at 50 (quoting Cynthia M. Cadet, 76 FR 19450, 19450 n.3 
(2011)). The ALJ also reasoned that ``the undercover patient visits 
objectively reflect that Respondent's prescribing practices included, 
to a degree, a documented medical history, physical examination, 
documented urinalysis testing, medical record release forms, and 
pharmacy prescribing profiles, among other information, consistent with 
applicable Florida law.'' Id. (citations omitted). The ALJ thus 
reasoned that ``any finding that Respondent's prescribing conduct in 
this case was not for a legitimate medical purpose and outside the 
usual course of professional practice * * * will significantly depend 
on the evidentiary weight to be given to the opinion testimony of the 
Government's sole expert witness,'' whom the ALJ did not find credible. 
Id.
    However, with respect to the first undercover visit of Bobby Payne, 
the ALJ's conclusion that the evidence does not establish that 
Respondent's prescribing practices with respect to the undercover 
officers were ``remotely close to `outright drug deals,''' ignores 
nearly all of the evidence of the actual conversation which occurred 
between Payne and Respondent. See ALJ at 61-67. Nor, contrary to the 
ALJ's understanding, does the Agency's decision in Cadet stand for the 
proposition that the only circumstance in which expert testimony is not 
required to prove violations by a physician of 21 CFR 1306.04(a) is 
where a physician manifests his knowledge that he is engaging in an 
outright drug deal. Rather, as Cadet makes clear it, it simply cited a 
single example of where expert testimony is not required to prove a 
violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
    Indeed, the ALJ ignored numerous decisions of both federal and 
state courts in criminal cases (which require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt rather than simply a preponderance of the evidence) which have 
found violations of 21 CFR 1306.04(a) or 21 U.S.C. 841, or similar 
state laws, without requiring expert testimony. See United States v. 
Pellman, 668 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Armstrong, 550 F.3d 382, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2008) (``While expert 
testimony may be both permissible and useful, a jury can reasonably 
find that a doctor prescribed controlled substances not in the usual 
course of professional practice or for other than a legitimate medical 
purpose from adequate lay witness evidence surrounding the facts and 
circumstances of the prescriptions.'')); Armstrong, 550 F.3d at 389 
(``Jurors have had a wide variety of their own experiences in doctors' 
care over their lives, thus and expert testimony is not necessarily 
required for jurors to rationally conclude that seeing patients for as 
little as two or three minutes before prescribing powerful narcotics is 
not in the usual course of professional conduct.''). See also United 
States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bartee, 479 
F.2d 484, 488-89 (10th Cir. 1973); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212, 1215 
(La. 1981).
    The ALJ also ignored several decisions of this Agency which have 
found violations of the prescription requirement notwithstanding the 
absence of expert testimony. See Morris W. Cochran, 77 FR 17505, 17519-
20 (2011) (holding, without expert testimony, that prescriptions lacked 
a legitimate medical purpose where physician noted in patient medical 
records that patients had no pain, did not document any findings to 
support a diagnosis, and yet diagnosed patients as having chronic 
pain); Robert F. Hunt, 75 FR 49995, 50003 (2010) (holding, without 
expert testimony, that physician lacked a legitimate medical purpose 
based on statements made during undercover visits and falsification of 
chart). See also Jack A. Danton, 76 FR 60900, 60904 (2011).
    Thus, while it true that ``where a physician ma[kes] some attempt 
to comply with various state medical practice standards and the 
adequacy of those efforts is at issue,'' expert testimony is typically 
necessary to establish that a physician violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a), see 
id. & n.13, the facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 
prescription may nonetheless establish a violation even

[[Page 57148]]

without expert testimony. Here, while the ALJ noted that Respondent's 
prescribing practices included ``a medical history, a physical 
examination, documented urinalysis testing, medical record release 
forms, and pharmacy prescribing profiles,'' ALJ at 50, a fact-finder 
can nonetheless consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of 
the visit and conclude that a registrant did not prescribe in the 
course of legitimate medical treatment but rather was creating a sham 
justification to support an unlawful prescription.

The Prescriptions for Bobby Payne

    As found above, at Payne's first visit (July 28, 2011), he 
presented a prescription profile showing that he had filled 
prescriptions for 210 tablets of oxycodone 30mg, 90 tablets of 
oxycodone 15mg, and 90 tablets of alprazolam 2mg, on a monthly basis 
from December 10, 2010, but had last filled the prescriptions on April 
10, 2011, more than three and a half months before his visit. Moreover, 
Respondent's assistant falsified Payne's urine drug screen to show that 
he was positive for oxycodone. While the ALJ observed that there was no 
evidence to show that ``Respondent had any knowledge of the false 
entry,'' ALJ at 63, Respondent, notwithstanding the lengthy gap since 
Payne had last filled prescriptions for oxycodone, did not question him 
about why he had tested positive for the drug.
    Indeed, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent knew 
that Payne was not seeking treatment for a legitimate medical condition 
but was either engaged in self-abuse or diversion. Notably, without 
even discussing whether Payne had any symptoms or his pain levels, 
Respondent noted that Payne's MRI showed two mild disc bulges, that the 
reason Payne's prior clinic was out of business was because they were 
``prescribing inappropriately,'' and that based on the MRI and without 
even doing a physical exam, he could not give Payne ``near the pills 
that you were getting. Not even remotely close.''
    Moreover, even after Payne said that the amounts of his previous 
prescriptions were ``just what they prescribed, and ``that's not what I 
actually took,'' thus suggesting that he diverted some of his 
prescriptions to others, Respondent did not question him regarding what 
he did with the drugs he did not take. Thereafter, Respondent put to 
rest any doubt as to whether he knew Payne was not a legitimate 
patient, stating that Payne's MRI did not show any ``pushing on any 
nerve roots or anything like that'' and was ``as close to a normal MRI 
as you can get without it being actually normal,'' and adding: ``I mean 
the most I can do for you would * * * And I'm telling you this in case 
you don't want to come here. Okay? Cause I hate for you to spend all of 
your money, coming here and not get what you need.''
    This was followed by Respondent telling Payne that what he needed 
and what he should get ``sometimes is two different things,'' because 
if ``you've been on a certain number of pills, for a long time, if you 
don't get those number of pills, you're going to be sick.'' Respondent 
then stated that ``just by looking at this [the MRI] without even doing 
the physical exam,'' he was looking at prescribing ``maybe a hundred 
and fifty,'' the amount of oxycodone 30mg which he subsequently 
prescribed to Payne. Notably absent from Respondent's interaction with 
Payne was a discussion of the causes of his pain, its nature and 
intensity, and how it affected his ability to function. See Fla. Admin 
Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(a). In short, Respondent's comments manifest that 
he knew that Payne was an abuser of controlled substances; his 
negotiation with Payne over the amount of oxycodone he could prescribe 
based on his MRI and without even having performed a physical 
examination likewise manifests that this was not a legitimate medical 
evaluation but rather a drug deal.
    It is true that Respondent subsequently performed a physical exam. 
Yet throughout the exam, Payne generally denied that the various tests 
caused pain or gave vague responses such as ``uh-hum,'' and never 
complained that the tests caused anything more than ``a little bit'' of 
pain. Indeed, given Respondent's comments prior to the exam, it is 
manifest that the exam was done to go through the motions and not to 
engage in a legitimate clinical evaluation. Moreover, Respondent 
documented in the medical record that he palpated Payne's cervical 
spine area even though the video recording shows that he did not do so. 
He also documented having performed various range of motion tests on 
each portion of Payne's spine (including his lumbar region) even though 
the video shows that he did not do so.
    Furthermore, subsequent to the exam, Respondent made additional 
comments which demonstrate that he had knowledge that Payne was a self-
abuser. For example, during his ``new patient talk,'' Respondent 
stated: ``I don't want you taking medication, the way you want to take 
them, because that will put you in jeopardy of overdose,'' and that the 
UC's doing so, would place his license at risk. Respondent then added 
that while ``we're pretty strict here * * * we do have fun also,'' a 
point which he reiterated.
    As for the alprazolam prescription, while Respondent listed a 
diagnosis of ``generalized anxiety disorder,'' which he deemed to be 
``chronic'' and ``active,'' the medical record contains the findings 
that ``patient denies problems with mood disturbance. No problems with 
anxiety.'' In addition, Respondent documented that Payne's ``[m]ental 
status, judgment and affect are grossly intact and normal for age.''
    While Respondent offered the testimony of his medical assistant to 
the effect that the EMR provided certain default entries when 
information was not entered into the patient's record, he could not 
identify what any of the specific entries were. Moreover, if a patient 
had actually complained of anxiety and a discussion of his symptoms had 
occurred, one would expect that the complaint and the nature of the 
symptoms would be documented in the patient's record. Indeed, the rules 
of the Florida Board of Medicine require such. See Fla. Admin. Code 
r.64B8-9.003(3) (``The medical record shall contain sufficient 
information to identify the patient, support the diagnosis, [and] 
justify the treatment * * * .''); Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f) 
(``The physician is required to keep accurate and complete records * * 
* .''). Finally, other than his single question to the TFO of whether 
he was getting Xanax ``for anxiety,'' with Payne saying he was getting 
it for sleep, there is no evidence that Respondent (or Gomez for that 
matter) discussed with Payne any problems he had with anxiety or with 
sleeping.
    In rejecting the Government's evidence, the ALJ noted that at the 
time of Respondent's initial evaluation, he ``had evidence of [Payne's] 
prior treatment for pain from December 2010 until April 10, 2011, by 
two different physicians.'' ALJ at 67. This is a gross 
mischaracterization of the evidence, as Respondent did not have any 
medical records from the two physicians showing that they treated Payne 
for pain, but rather only a prescription profile showing that the two 
physicians had prescribed drugs to Payne. That profile, however, 
establishes only the dates and drugs that various doctors prescribed 
and says nothing about the legitimacy of the prescriptions. Moreover, 
given the date of the profile (June 14, 2011) and the absence of any 
prescriptions since April 10, one might reasonably ask whether the 
patient had been discharged by his prior doctor and attempt to contact 
that doctor. Beyond this, as Respondent's own comments

[[Page 57149]]

manifest, he surmised that Respondent's prior clinic had been shut down 
for prescribing inappropriately.
    The ALJ also noted that Respondent had a ``verified MRI report, 
correlating, to a limited extent, [the TFO's] statement of pain and 
reported history of `low back pain.' '' Id. The ALJ ignored, however, 
that Payne testified that one of the forms he filled out had a picture 
of a human body and that he deliberately circled a part of his body 
different than his MRI, to, in his words, ``disprove basically the 
MRI.'' Tr. 180; see also ALJ at 20 (ALJ finding that ``[w]ith regard to 
his stated pain complaint, [the] TFO * * * recalled one of the forms 
had a picture of a human body and he believed he circled part of the 
body that was different than his MRI, `just to disprove basically the 
MRI.'''). Notably, the ALJ did not reconcile his finding that the MRI 
correlated with Payne's ``reported history of `low back pain''' and his 
earlier finding that the TFO had circled a different part of the body 
as the area in which he had pain. See ALJ at 67. In addition, it should 
be noted that Respondent's own witness testified that the clinic 
shredded the patient questionnaires.
    The ALJ then noted that ``at the outset of the patient visit, 
[Respondent] made clear that he intended to decrease the amount of 
controlled substances [Payne] had previously been provided, 
particularly given the limited correlation of reported pain in the MRI 
report.'' Id. Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, that a practitioner 
prescribes a lesser quantity of a controlled substance than what a 
patient had previously received does not establish that the 
prescription was lawfully issued. Rather, what determines whether a 
prescription complies with Federal law is whether the physician had a 
legitimate medical purpose and acted within the usual course of 
professional practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a)
    The ALJ also reasoned that Respondent's statement that ``[w]hat you 
should get and what you need, oftentimes is two different things cause 
if you've been on a certain number of pills, for a long time, if you 
don't get those number of pills, you're going to be sick,'' 
``reflect[s] positively on his prescribing conduct or intent in this 
case.'' ALJ 66. However, when considered in the context of the entire 
conversation which occurred between Respondent and the TFO, and as 
demonstrated by Respondent's subsequent statement that ``I don't want 
you taking medication, the way you want to take them, because that will 
put you in jeopardy of overdose,'' it is clear that Respondent believed 
that Payne was a drug abuser.
    The ALJ's reasoning likewise reflects a stunning disregard for 
Federal law, which, however, does not permit a practitioner to 
prescribe schedule II controlled substances such as oxycodone to a 
narcotic dependent person for the purpose of maintaining him on 
narcotics and preventing withdrawal symptoms.\20\ See 21 CFR 
1306.04(c). Rather, when a patient presents as narcotic dependent, a 
practitioner may only administer (and not prescribe) narcotic drugs 
``for the purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when necessary 
while arrangements are being made for referral for treatment,'' may not 
administer more than ``one day's medication at a time,'' and may not do 
so ``for more than three days.'' 21 CFR 1306.07. Thus, contrary to the 
ALJ's understanding, there is nothing positive in Respondent's decision 
to prescribe 150 tablets of oxycodone 30mg (as well as Xanax) to a 
person he knew was a drug abuser.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ A practitioner may prescribe narcotic drugs for the purpose 
of maintenance or detoxification treatment only if ``the 
prescription is for a Schedule III, IV, or V narcotic drug approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration specifically for use in 
maintenance or detoxification treatment and the practitioner is in 
compliance with requirements in 1301.28 of this chapter.'' 21 CFR 
1306.04(c). Oxycodone is a Schedule II drug and cannot be prescribed 
for this purpose. Moreover, Respondent is not authorized to dispense 
narcotic drugs for maintenance or detoxification treatment under 
either 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) or 823(g)(2).
    \21\ So too, that Respondent explained various clinic policies 
in his new patient speech, see ALJ at 67, does nothing to refute the 
conclusion that he knowingly prescribed oxycodone to a drug abuser. 
Rather, it is simply a case of Respondent's going through the 
motions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I therefore conclude that Respondent lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional practice 
in prescribing oxycodone and Xanax (alprazolam) to Payne. Moreover, by 
themselves, Respondent's issuance of these two prescriptions is enough 
to establish a prima facie showing that he has committed such acts as 
to render his registration inconsistent with the public interest. 21 
U.S.C. 824(a)(4). See Dewey C. MacKay, 75 FR at 49977; Jayam Krishna-
Iyer, 74 FR at 463; Olefsky, 57 FR at 928-29 (revoking registration 
based on physician's presentation of two fraudulent prescriptions to 
pharmacy).
    Likewise, with respect to the TFO's second visit, the ALJ did not 
find the evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that Respondent 
violated federal law. According to the ALJ, the evidence showed that 
``Respondent did review the course of treatment with the patient, to 
include an inquiry about how the medication was working and a physical 
examination, albeit short.'' ALJ at 68. Indeed, the entire interaction 
between Respondent and Payne lasted two minutes. See Armstrong, 550 
F.3d at 389.
    Respondent is, of course, charged with the knowledge he obtained at 
Payne's first visit that he was a substance abuser, none of which is 
documented in the medical record. See Fla Admin Code r. 64B8-
9.013(3)(a) & (f) (requiring documentation of history of substance 
abuse). Moreover, while Respondent asked Payne if the medication was 
treating his ``pain well,'' neither Respondent nor Gomez asked Payne if 
there was any change in the status of his pain, whether it still 
radiated into his upper back, nor any questions about the timing and 
quality of the pain, and whether it still affected his sleep and 
physical activity. See id. r.64B8-9.013(3)(d). Yet such findings were 
documented in the medical record for the visit.
    Moreover, as found above, the medical record documented that 
Respondent had performed a neurologic exam, that he had palpated 
Payne's cervical spine and surrounding areas, and that he had required 
Payne to perform range of motion tests for various portions of his 
spine. However, Respondent did not perform a neurologic exam, nor any 
range of motion tests of any portions of Payne's spine, and the only 
area that he palpated was Payne's lower back. Once again, the evidence 
shows that Respondent falsified the medical record.\22\ Respondent also 
falsified the

[[Page 57150]]

record by documenting that Payne had ``active'' and ``chronic'' 
``generalized anxiety disorder.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ While the ALJ opined that there was no evidence that 
Respondent knowingly falsified the medical records, each of the 
visit notes (for all four UCs) prepared by Respondent includes the 
statement:
     I declare that I have read and verified the document.
    T.J. McNichol, MD.
    See RX 1, at 29; id. at 33. See also id. at 12(8/25/11 visit 
note for Mike Corleone); id. at 18 & 22 (7/28/11 and 8/25/11 visit 
notes for Anthony Thompson); id. at 44 (8/25/11 visit note for Eric 
McMillen).
    The ALJ also noted that ``[t]here are also various entries in 
the relevant patient chart for the[UCs] that do not correlate to 
other objective evidence and testimony of what transpired during the 
examination.'' ALJ at 70. As an example, the ALJ cited a statement 
in the chart for Anthony Thompson that ``there were `no external 
hemorrhoids or rectal masses. Stool Hemoccult was negative[,]' '' 
and that the Agent testified that ``no examination was performed 
consistent with such findings in the patient chart.'' Id. (quoting 
RX 1, at 17; and citing Tr. 253). The ALJ then reasoned that there 
was no evidence that ``the forgoing errors, such as gastrointestinal 
findings as to hemorrhoids, had any rational relationship to 
Respondent's prescribing of controlled substances[,]'' and that 
``[t]here is also no evidence that any of the discrepancies in the 
patient chart were * * * related in any material way to his 
prescribing of controlled substances in this case.'' Id.
     Even if gastrointestinal findings are not materially related to 
a complaint of lower back pain, as found above, there was evidence 
with respect to several of the undercovers (including the TFO who 
posed as Bobbie Payne) that Respondent documented various findings 
including having performed various range of motion tests on the 
TFO's lumbar spine, which was the area of his purported pain 
complaint. See RX 1, at 21. However, the ALJ entirely ignored this 
evidence. As for the ALJ's reasoning that there is no evidence these 
discrepancies were materially related to Respondent's prescribing, 
if findings related to the area of the body which a patient 
complains is causing him pain are not materially related to the 
making of the diagnosis and decision to prescribe controlled 
substances, then nothing in a medical record is material. The 
Florida standards, however, suggest otherwise. See Fla. Admin Code 
r.64B8-9.003(3) (``The medical record shall contain sufficient 
information to identify the patient, support the diagnosis, justify 
the treatment and document the course and results of treatment 
accurately, by including, at a minimum, * * * examination results. * 
* *'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Here again, the evidence shows that Respondent's evaluation of 
Payne was simply a case of going through the motions. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the substantial probative evidence of irregularities in 
his prescribing practices, Respondent failed to testify regarding them. 
Under these circumstances, an adverse inference is warranted that 
Respondent knowingly diverted oxycodone and alprazolam to Payne on his 
second visit as well.\23\ See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 
(1976) (``[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inference 
against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in 
response to probative evidence offered against them'') (emphasis 
added); MacKay, 664 F.3d  at 820 (quoting Keating v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1995) (``Not only is it 
permissible to conduct a civil [administrative] proceeding at the same 
time as a related criminal proceeding, even if that necessitates 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, but it is even permissible 
for the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences from the invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment in a civil [administrative] proceeding.''); Hoxie, 
419 F.3d at 483. See also 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Respondent's issuance of 
these prescriptions provides further support for the conclusion that he 
has committed acts which render his registration inconsistent with the 
public interest. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ I reject the ALJ's reasoning that ``in light of the fact 
that the Government's evidence was insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case * * * Respondent's silence in and of itself does not 
appreciably tip the balance of evidence in favor of the Government'' 
as contrary to settled law. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318. Here, the 
Government did not rely solely on Respondent's failure to testify to 
prove its case. Rather, it introduced independent and probative 
evidence as to the illegality of the prescriptions through the 
testimony of the undercovers officers and the recordings (and 
transcripts) of their visits. Moreover, Respondent's own evidence, 
which included the patient charts and the undercover officers' 
reports of investigation, also provides independent and probative 
evidence of Respondent's illegal conduct, which he failed to 
address. Accordingly, as ultimate factfinder, I conclude that an 
adverse inference is warranted with respect to the prescriptions 
issued to Payne, as well as the alprazolam prescriptions issued to 
the other three undercover officers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Prescriptions Issued To Anthony Thompson

    With respect to Thompson's first visit, the ALJ noted that there 
were ``various entries in the relevant patient charts for [this 
undercover], * * * that do not correlate to other objective evidence 
and testimony of what transpired during the examination,'' ALJ at 70, 
that Respondent's medical assistant had falsified the urine drug screen 
report to show that Thompson tested positive for benzodiazepines and 
oxycodone, id. at 71, and that Respondent's physical examination at the 
initial visit lasted all of two minutes. Id. at 72. The ALJ nonetheless 
concluded that these ``irregularities'' do not ``support a finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Respondent's prescribing conduct on 
July 28 * * * 2011, was not for a legitimate medical purpose or outside 
the usual course of professional practice.'' ALJ at 75.
    However, even if expert testimony was required to demonstrate that 
Respondent acted outside of the usual course of professional practice 
and lacked a legitimate medical purpose in issuing the oxycodone 
prescription, there is nonetheless substantial evidence to support the 
conclusion that Respondent's prescribing of alprazolam to Thompson 
lacked a legitimate medical purpose. Here, Respondent's discussion of 
Thompson's need for Xanax was limited to Respondent's asking: ``I take 
it you have some anxiety as well[,] is that what's going on with 
you?,'' with Thompson using the street term for Xanax to reply, ``Yeah, 
that's the Zanny's help out.'' While Respondent then advised Thompson 
that ``we don't call them Zanny's or bars or any of the street terms, 
here, ok?'' Respondent engaged in no further inquiry as to whether 
Thompson actually had symptoms consistent with generalized anxiety 
disorder, let alone symptoms which warranted the prescribing of 
alprazolam. Moreover, while Respondent then stated that under state law 
if a pain patient had a psychiatric problem, he had to be referred to 
psychiatry, he then added that Thompson did not necessarily have to go. 
Nor did Respondent provide the name of any psychiatrists to see.
    Most significantly, in the medical record for this visit, 
Respondent noted in the psychiatric portion of the review of systems 
that ``Patient denies problems with mood disturbance. No problems with 
anxiety.'' And in the physical examination findings, Respondent 
documented that Thompson's ``[m]ental status, judgment and affect are 
grossly intact and normal for age.'' Notwithstanding these findings, 
Respondent documented a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder which 
was ``active'' and ``chronic'' and prescribed 60 Xanax 1mg to 
Thompson.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The progress note for the visits of the Agent include the 
following statement under the caption of ``History of Present 
Illness'' and ``Low Back Pain'':
    Associated Conditions: None. Aggravated by standing, walking, 
and exercise. Denies None with pertinent positives of stiffness and 
anxiety and [sic] relieved by rest and pain medications.
    RX 1, at 15, 19. Similar statements are found in the progress 
notes for two of the other UCs. See RX 1, at 9 (Corleone; 
``Associated conditions: None. Aggravated by sitting, climbing 
stairs, cold, lifting, exercise, and driving. Denies None with 
pertinent positives of anxiety and [sic] relieved by ice, rest, and 
pain medications''); id. at 26 (Payne; ``Associated Conditions: 
None. Aggravated by movement, climbing stairs, and lifting. Denies 
None with pertinent positives of stiffness and anxiety and [sic] 
relieved by lying down, rest, and pain medications'').
    No explanation was offered as to how either Respondent or Gomez 
could have documented that the UCs had no history of associated 
conditions but nonetheless had ``pertinent positives'' of anxiety, 
and given that each of the charts contains the finding that the 
``Patient denies problems with mood disturbance. No problem with 
anxiety[,]'' see, e.g., RX 1, at 16, the statements are obvious 
gibberish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In his discussion of Thompson's visits, the ALJ completely ignored 
the evidence showing that: (1) Respondent's discussion of Thompson's 
use of Xanax was limited to a single question with Thompson using the 
street name for the drug and involved no discussion of the nature and 
duration of any symptoms which might support a diagnosis of ``chronic'' 
and ``active'' generalized anxiety disorder; (2) the evidence that 
Respondent documented that Thompson had ``[n]o problems with anxiety''; 
and (3) Respondent's finding that Thompson's ``mental status, judgment 
and affect are grossly intact and normal for age.'' See ALJ at 69-74. 
And while it is true that the Florida standards of practice do not 
mandate a referral for psychiatric treatment, see id. at 74 & n.98 
(characterizing Respondent's referral as ``half-hearted''), this does 
nothing to refute the

[[Page 57151]]

conclusion that Respondent lacked a legitimate medical purpose and 
acted outside of the usual course of professional practice in 
prescribing Xanax to Thompson.
    In short, where a medical record contains no findings that support 
a diagnosis, or, as in this case, those findings contradict a 
diagnosis, in the absence of credible testimony from Respondent 
explaining the reason for the inconsistency, expert testimony is not 
necessary to conclude that a prescription lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose. 21 CFR 1306.04(a); see also Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318; Cochrane, 
76 FR at 17519-20. I thus hold that there is substantial evidence to 
support the conclusion that the Respondent lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose and acted outside the course of professional practice when he 
prescribed Xanax to the Agent at the July 28 visit.
    Likewise, on Thompson's second visit, neither Respondent's 
assistant, nor Respondent, discussed with Thompson whether he had any 
symptoms consistent with an anxiety diagnosis and which warranted a 
prescription for Xanax. Moreover, here again, the medical record 
contains the same findings as on the previous visit that ``Patient 
denies problems with mood disturbance. No problems with anxiety'' and 
that Thompson's ``[m]ental status, judgment and affect are grossly 
intact and normal for age.'' Yet, once again, Respondent prescribed 
Xanax to Thompson.
    Here again, the ALJ failed to even consider any of the evidence 
regarding Respondent's prescribing of Xanax to Thompson. ALJ at 74-75. 
For the same reasons as discussed above, I conclude that Respondent 
lacked a legitimate medical purpose and acted outside of the usual 
course of professional practice in prescribing Xanax to Thompson at the 
latter's second visit. See 21 CFR 1306.04(a).

The Prescriptions Issued to Michael Corleone

    As found above, a TFO, using the name of Michael Corleone, saw 
Respondent on August 25, 2011, after having seen Dr. Mosley at the 
Brandon clinic on two prior occasions. With respect to Respondent's 
prescribing of controlled substance to Corleone, the ALJ noted 
Respondent's statements to the TFO that he believed that the TFO ``was 
`a little bit over-medicated,'' but that he was ``going to leave [him] 
on what [he had] been on,'' as well as his statement that ```you know 
if it comes down to it later, down the road that we need to bring you 
down a bit, we'll do it * * * I don't think we'll need to. The only 
reason why we would need to is because the government makes me.'' '' 
ALJ at 87.
    The ALJ further noted that Respondent ``conducted a brief physical 
examination * * * which in context appears to be somewhat perfunctory 
since Respondent had also communicated his intent to leave [the TFO] on 
his current medications prior to initiating the examination.'' Id. As 
the ALJ noted, the exam was limited to Respondent pressing against the 
TFO's lower back in several locations and asking if it was painful, 
with the TFO responding that his back was ``a little sore,'' as well as 
Respondent directing the TFO to sit in a chair and raise each leg both 
separately and simultaneously, with the TFO expressing ``no 
discomfort.'' Id.
    The ALJ then noted that ``[t]he forgoing evidence is certainly 
suggestive of questionable prescribing by Respondent in this instance, 
particularly given Respondent's comments about dosing and future 
reductions based on government action, rather than his medical 
judgment,'' and that ``Respondent's physical examination appears 
perfunctory since his decision to prescribe was made moments after his 
review of the patient file, apparently in reliance on the medical 
judgment of Dr. Mosley.'' Id. at 88. However, the ALJ explained that 
notwithstanding this evidence, ``Respondent's deference to another 
physician's medical judgment appears to be a relevant factor since a 
comparison of the limited patient files made available by the 
Government in this case reflects that Respondent initially prescribed 
lower doses of oxycodone and alprazolam to similarly situated patients 
than his colleague, Dr. Mosley.'' Id. The ALJ further noted the 
testimony of the Government's Expert that ``physicians can and do 
ascribe some deference to the prior prescriber's approach, assuming 
that the physician has either spoken with the prior prescriber or has 
the records from the prior prescriber's intervention.'' Id. (citing Tr. 
591).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ It is strange, given the ALJ's finding that the 
Government's Expert was so biased as to ``preclude[] any reliance on 
his opinion testimony,'' ALJ at 89 n.118 (emphasis added), that the 
ALJ then disregarded his own finding and relied on this testimony. 
However, the Expert's entire testimony was that ``it still is an 
absolute expectation of a physician, even if you've inherited a 
patient on certain medications, it's certainly--it's an expectation 
that a physician evaluate the database and form their own opinion.'' 
Tr. 591. Continuing, the expert testified that while the new 
physician's opinion ``can be influenced. It can be, in some ways, 
deferential to the prior prescriber, but it still is the individual 
physician[']s opinion and decision, when it comes to prescribing to 
that patient, when that physician has taken over the care of that 
patient.'' Id. at 591-92. No explanation was provided by the ALJ for 
disregarding the rest of the Expert's testimony on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is true that Respondent had available to him the TFO's medical 
records which were maintained by Dr. Mosley. However, in the absence of 
testimony by Respondent that he deferred to Dr. Moseley's medical 
judgment when he prescribed to the TFO, the ALJ's suggestion is 
unsupported by substantial evidence and is pure speculation. As the ALJ 
was want to explain, ``[s]peculation is, of course, no substitute for 
evidence.'' ALJ at 90 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    Moreover, even assuming, that under the Florida standards of 
medical practice, a physician can appropriately prescribe a controlled 
substance based on his review of the records from the patient's prior 
physician, the evidence still establishes that Respondent lacked a 
legitimate medical purpose when he prescribed alprazolam to the TFO. As 
the record for the TFO's first visit with Dr. Mosley shows, Mosley did 
not make any findings which support a diagnosis of anxiety.
    More specifically, in the section of the progress note for 
documenting Corleone's primary complaint, Mosley did not document a 
complaint of anxiety. Moreover, in the section for documenting 
Corleone's psychiatric history, Mosley did not check the blank for 
anxiety or any other mental illness. And in the section for documenting 
whether Corleone had a family history of mental health (as well as 
other conditions), Mosley wrote ``none.'' Finally, Mosley did not 
document a diagnosis of any type of anxiety disorder. Indeed, in the 
record for the visit, the only mention of anxiety is where Mosley 
listed the medications he was prescribing and wrote: ``Xanax 2mg, 
q12hrs, PRN anxiety  60.''
    Thus, there were no findings, let alone a diagnosis, to support the 
prescribing of Xanax for anxiety, in the record maintained by Dr. 
Mosley on the TFO. The ALJ did not, however, explain why it would be 
reasonable to defer to the medical judgment of a prior physician when 
that prior physician did not make any findings which would support a 
diagnosis, let alone a make a diagnosis of anxiety. Indeed, 
notwithstanding his surmise that Respondent had deferred ``to another 
physician's medical judgment'' when he prescribed controlled substances 
to Corleone, ALJ at 88, the ALJ completely ignored the evidence showing 
a total lack of documentation of findings to

[[Page 57152]]

support an anxiety diagnosis in the medical record created by Dr. 
Mosley.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ As found above, the patient file for Corleone does not 
contain a progress note for the TFO's second visit with Dr. Mosley, 
which was of an extremely short duration. Respondent produced no 
evidence that Mosley ever prepared a note for the visit, and in any 
event, Respondent did not testify and thus cannot claim to have 
relied on any findings contained in such a note when he decided to 
prescribe to the TFO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is true that in the medical record for the TFO's August 25 visit 
with Respondent, there is a notation that his pain affected his sleep 
and physical activity. Yet there is no evidence that any of these 
issues were raised by the nurse or Respondent with the TFO. Nor is 
there any evidence that Respondent discussed with the TFO whether he 
had anxiety.
    There is also evidence in the psychiatric portion of the record's 
review of systems section that ``[p]atient denies problems with mood 
disturbance. No problems with anxiety.'' Likewise, in the findings for 
the physical examination, Respondent wrote: ``Oriented with normal 
memory. Mental status, judgment and affect are grossly intact and 
normal for age.'' Yet Respondent diagnosed Corleone as having chronic 
and active generalized anxiety disorder and prescribed to him 60 
alprazolam 2mg.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ As found above, on the alprazolam prescription, Respondent 
listed his diagnosis as ``Generalized Anxiety Disorder.'' GX 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Just as he ignored the evidence showing that Mosley had failed to 
make any findings to support a diagnosis of anxiety, the ALJ entirely 
ignored the evidence showing that the findings Respondent made during 
the TFO's August 25 visit were inconsistent with his diagnosis of 
generalized anxiety disorder and did not support his prescription for 
alprazolam. See ALJ at 83-91. Here again, Respondent failed to testify 
and offer an explanation for the inconsistency between his findings and 
his diagnosis. I therefore conclude that Respondent lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional 
practice when he prescribed 60 tablets of alprazolam 2mg to the TFO.

The Prescriptions Issued To Eric McMillen

    As with the previous undercover officer, a DEA Special Agent, who 
used the name of Eric McMillen, initially saw Dr. Mosley at the 
Bradenton clinic prior to seeing Respondent. The Agent acknowledged 
that he had seen Mosley for at least thirty minutes and performed a 
physical exam, and on cross-examination, agreed that the exam was 
``pretty thorough.'' He also testified that it was ``possible'' that he 
noted on paperwork he completed that he had ``some trouble sleeping.'' 
At the conclusion of the visit, Dr. Mosley prescribed 180 tablets of 
oxycodone 30mg and 30 tablets of Xanax 2mg.
    Regarding the Agent's visit with Respondent, the ALJ found that 
Respondent had available to him the Agent's file including the progress 
note from the previous visit, as well as the information obtained 
during the triage procedures. ALJ at 79. The ALJ also noted that the 
Agent had filled out a medical questionnaire during his second visit. 
Id. However, the ALJ credited the Agent's testimony that during the 
triage procedures Mr. Gomez did not ask him about anxiety or 
sleeplessness. ALJ at 80 (citing Tr. 366-67). Moreover, at no point 
during the Agent's visit with Respondent did the latter ask the Agent 
whether he had problems with anxiety or sleeplessness.
    Regarding the alprazolam prescription Respondent issued to the 
Agent, the ALJ noted that ``[t]he evidence * * * reflect[sic] some 
irregularities,'' noting that ``the final diagnosis of generalized 
anxiety disorder facially conflicts with the patient chart entry 
stating `` `[p]atient denies problems with mood disturbance. No 
problems with anxiety.' '' ALJ at 81-82. The ALJ also noted that the 
Agent's ``testimony also reflects no questioning by Mr. Gomez or 
Respondent about ongoing issues with anxiety or sleeplessness'' and 
that ``[t]he absence of any inquiry by Respondent about the medical 
basis for continuing the prescription for Xanax arguably supports a 
finding that such a prescription lacks a legitimate medical purpose, or 
is outside the usual course of professional practice.'' Id. at 82.
    However, the ALJ then concluded that the Government had failed to 
established by preponderance of the evidence that the prescription 
lacked a legitimate medical purpose or was issued outside the usual 
course of professional practice, reasoning that ``there is other 
credible evidence of record that Respondent had information available 
to him as of August 25, 2011 that would support the continued 
prescription for Xanax.'' Id. According to the ALJ, this information 
included ``Dr. Mosley's initial diagnosis of anxiety and corresponding 
prescription for two milligram Xanax over a thirty day time period,'' 
as well as a pharmacy printout showing that similar prescriptions had 
been issued by ``another physician * * * covering the time period from 
March 14, 2011 to June 10, 2011.'' ALJ at 82. In addition, the ALJ 
noted that the Agent testified that he had filled out a medical 
questionnaire on August 25, 2011, but that ``[t]he record is unclear on 
exactly what information [the Agent] provided in answering the medical 
questionnaire * * * on the issue of anxiety, sleep disturbance, or 
pain.'' Id. However, the ALJ noted that the August 25 patient file 
stated that the patient's affected daily activities included ``sleep, 
work, and physical activity.'' Id.
    Here again, Respondent did not testify and explain what he relied 
on in concluding that a prescription for Xanax was medically 
warranted,\28\ and thus the ALJ's conclusion is nothing more than 
speculation. Moreover, even assuming that Respondent relied on the 
evidence cited by the ALJ, contrary to the ALJ's understanding, none of 
it refutes the conclusion that Respondent lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional practice 
in prescribing Xanax to the Agent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ It is acknowledged that during the visit, Respondent told 
the Agent had he had ``just left [him] on everything that you were 
on down there.'' GX 22, at 9. This does not, however, establish 
anything more than that he reviewed the prescription issued by Dr. 
Mosley. As explained previously, that another physician has issued a 
prescription does not establish that that physician issued the 
prescription for a legitimate medical purpose and acted within the 
usual course of professional practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As for Dr. Mosley's purported ``initial diagnosis,'' once again the 
ALJ misstated the evidence. As found above, in the medical record Dr. 
Mosley prepared for the Agent's July 21 visit, Mosley did not document 
that the Agent had a psychiatric history even though the form included 
a place for indicating that the Agent had anxiety, nor document that 
there was a family history of mental health conditions, or make any 
other findings consistent with an anxiety diagnosis. Indeed, Dr. Mosley 
did not list anxiety as among his various diagnoses. Thus, Mosley's 
record did not support the prescription he issued and Respondent could 
not have reasonably relied on it as a basis for concluding that the 
Agent had generalized anxiety disorder.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The ALJ also stated that there is no ``evidence to support 
a finding that Respondent's reliance on records of Dr. Mosley's 
prescribing in this instance was unreasonable or unlawful.'' ALJ at 
79. However, absent from the ALJ's discussion of the note for the 
Agent's visit with Dr. Mosley is any acknowledgement that Mosley 
made no findings that the Agent had anxiety and did not include 
anxiety among his diagnoses. See id. at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As for the prescription profile which the Agent provided, as 
explained previously, that profile establishes only that another doctor 
had prescribed alprazolam (and oxycodone) to the Agent on various 
occasions. The profile, however, says nothing about whether

[[Page 57153]]

the prescriptions issued by the previous doctor were for a legitimate 
medical purpose and issued within the usual course of professional 
practice.
    As for the Respondent's purported reliance on the information in 
the August 25 progress note that the Agent's pain affected his sleep, 
the ALJ noted that the record is unclear as to what information the 
Agent provided in answering the medical questionnaire on the issues of 
anxiety [and] sleep disturbance,'' thus suggesting the possibility that 
the information the Agent provided was not consistent with what Mr. 
Gomez (who falsified two urine drug screen reports and admitted that he 
shredded the medical questionnaires pursuant to clinic policy) entered 
into the EMR. However, even if Gomez's destruction of the questionnaire 
does not support an adverse inference, the ALJ's conclusion is not 
supported by substantial evidence.
    As explained above, Respondent did not testify that he relied on 
this notation. Moreover, if Respondent was engaged in legitimate 
medical practice, one would expect that at some point he (or Gomez) 
would have inquired of the Agent as to how the pain was affecting his 
sleep. Yet there was no such inquiry of the Agent. Also, while it may 
be that a patient's sleep problems may be a symptom of generalized 
anxiety disorder, there is no evidence establishing that this alone is 
sufficient to diagnose a patient as having generalized anxiety 
disorder, especially when the doctor finds that the patient ``denies 
any problems with anxiety'' and that the patient's ``[m]ental status, 
judgment and affect are grossly intact and normal for age.'' Again, 
because Respondent failed to testify and address the basis for his 
diagnosis and offer a credible explanation for why he diagnosed the 
Agent with general anxiety disorder while finding that he ``denies any 
problems with anxiety,'' I conclude that an adverse inference is 
warranted and hold that Respondent lacked a legitimate medical purpose 
and acted outside of the usual course of professional practice when he 
prescribed Xanax to the Agent.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With respect to the oxycodone prescription issued by 
Respondent, the ALJ wrote: ``Notably, Dr. Parran's report and 
testimony neglect to make any reference to [the Agent's] report of 
mild pain on the right side during the August 25, 2011 physical 
examination, or discuss whether such a report of mild pain would be 
consistent with a patient taking pain medication in the quantities 
and strengths prescribed to SA Rice by Dr. Mosely [sic].'' ALJ at 
81. Contrary to the ALJ's statement, the Expert testified at length 
as to the appropriateness of prescribing schedule II narcotics to a 
patient who complains of only mild pain.
    For example, after the Expert noted that the UCs had generally 
complained of pain levels which ``were four or less,'' the 
Government asked if a ``reported pain level of four or less'' was 
significant in his review. Tr. 628. The Expert answered: ``A pain 
level of a four or less indicates mild pain, and a pain which is 
typically not treated with opiate analgesics, certainly not treated 
with around the clock opiate analgesics that are Schedule II.'' Id. 
at 629. Subsequently, the expert explained that ``typically, reports 
that are certainly below four are considered mild pain and pain 
which is, you know, not impactful or very impactful on patient 
function, and typically not prescribed certainly * * * high potency 
Schedule II opiate analgesics.'' Id. at 630-31. The Expert then 
explained that there are risks and benefits to prescribing opiate 
analgesics and that while the drugs can help patients improve their 
function, there is ``[t]he risk * * * that patients can and will 
develop physical dependence,'' as well as other problems such as 
endocrine changes and sedation, and that ``if a person's impairment 
of function and/or pain level is in the mild range, then the risk of 
putting a person on these kinds of medications are [sic] typically 
considered to outweigh the potential benefit.'' Id. at 631-32. 
Notably, none of this testimony was refuted or shown to be 
inconsistent through other evidence.
    Subsequently, the Expert was asked (albeit with respect to his 
review of the visit of another UC), whether Respondent's prescribing 
of alprazolam was problematic. After noting that based upon the 
information contained on the recordings there did not seem ``to be a 
diagnosis established [to] prescribe the alprazolam,'' the Expert 
further testified:
    And my concern goes beyond that, that prescribing Alprazolam on 
top of Schedule II opiate medication increases the risk of the 
Schedule II opiate medications, because Alprazolam potentiates the 
problematic side of opiate medications. It potentiates the sedation, 
the respiratory depression and the euphoria of opiate medications.
    Id. at 636. Notably, the ALJ did not offer any explanation for 
why he rejected this testimony other than his view that the Expert 
was so biased as to ``preclude[] any reliance on his opinion 
testimony,'' ALJ at 89 n. 118, except for when he did rely on it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Evidence as to Factors Two and Four

    As explained above, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ 
properly failed to give weight to the Expert's testimony, there is 
still substantial evidence that Respondent violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a) 
when he prescribed oxycodone and alprazolam to the undercover officer 
who presented as Robbie Payne. Moreover, the record contains 
substantial evidence that Respondent violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a) when he 
prescribed alprazolam to the undercover officers who presented as 
Anthony Thompson, Michael Corleone, and Eric McMillen.
    I therefore conclude that the Government has satisfied its prima 
facie burden of showing that Respondent ``has committed such acts as 
would render his registration * * * inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). See also MacKay, 664 F.3d at 819 
(Upholding Agency determination, noting that ``[i]n light of Dr. 
MacKay's misconduct relating to factors two and four, the government 
made a prima facie showing that Dr. MacKay's continued registration is 
inconsistent with the public interest. Although Dr. MacKay may have 
engaged in the legitimate practice of pain medicine for many of his 
patients, the conduct found by the Deputy Administrator with respect to 
[two patients] is sufficient to support her determination that his 
continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest.'').

Sanction

    Under Agency precedent, where, as here, the Government has made out 
a prima facie case that a registrant has committed acts which render 
his ``registration inconsistent with the public interest,'' he must 
```present[] sufficient mitigating evidence to assure the Administrator 
that [he] can be entrusted with the responsibility carried by such a 
registration.''' Samuel S. Jackson, 72 FR 23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting 
Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 21931, 21932 (1988)). ``Moreover, because `past 
performance is the best predictor of future performance,' ALRA Labs., 
Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995), this Agency has 
repeatedly held that where a registrant has committed acts inconsistent 
with the public interest, the registrant must accept responsibility for 
[his] actions and demonstrate that [he] will not engage in future 
misconduct.'' Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR at 387. As the Sixth 
Circuit has recognized, this Agency also ``properly considers'' a 
registrant's admission of fault and his candor during the investigation 
and hearing to be ``important factors'' in the public interest 
determination. See Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 483.
    More recently, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Agency's rule, 
explaining that:

    When faced with evidence that a doctor has a history of 
distributing controlled substances unlawfully, it is reasonable for 
the * * * Administrator to consider whether that doctor will change 
his or her behavior in the future. And that consideration is vital 
to whether [his] continued registration is in the public interest. 
Without Dr. MacKay's testimony, the * * * Administrator had no 
evidence that Dr. MacKay recognized the extent of his misconduct and 
was prepared to remedy his prescribing practices.

    MacKay, 664 F.3d at 820.
    So too, here, Respondent failed to testify and acknowledge his 
wrongdoing and provide evidence that he will not engage in future 
misconduct. In short, Respondent put on no evidence to rebut the 
Government's showing that his registration is inconsistent with the

[[Page 57154]]

public interest.\31\ And here, too, it is appropriate to draw an 
adverse inference from Respondent's failure to testify. See MacKay, 664 
F.3d at 820.
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    \31\ Respondent did not even put on evidence that Mr. Gomez, who 
clearly falsified the urine drug screens of two of the undercovers 
to show they were taking drugs when they were not, had been fired.
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    Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, the existence of a pending 
criminal prosecution does not preclude the Agency from drawing an 
adverse inference from Respondent's failure to testify. See id. Indeed, 
as the Tenth Circuit recognized in MacKay, ```[n]ot only is it 
permissible to conduct a civil [administrative] proceeding at the same 
time as a related criminal proceeding, even if that necessitates 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, but it is even permissible 
for the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences from the invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment in a civil [administrative] proceeding.''' Id. 
(quoting Keating, 45 F.3d at 326). See also Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 
(``[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against 
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to 
probative evidence offered against them * * * .''); Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 
483. Moreover, ``the Fifth Amendment privilege is not `a sword whereby 
a claimant asserting the privilege [is] freed from adducing proof in 
support of a burden which would otherwise have been his.''' Grider Drug 
#1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 FR 44069, 44104 (2012) (quoting United States 
v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983)).
    I therefore hold that Respondent has failed to rebut the 
Government's prima facie case. Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained 
in Gonzales, the core purpose of the Act's prescription requirement is 
to prevent the diversion of controlled substances to those who seek the 
drugs for the purpose of engaging in self-abuse or selling them to 
others. See 546 U.S. at 274 (``the prescription requirement * * * 
ensures patients use controlled substances under the supervision of a 
doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational abuse. As a 
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients who crave 
the drugs for those prohibited uses.'') (citing Moore, 423 U.S. at 135 
& 143).\32\
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    \32\ See Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR at 463 (quoting National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, Under the Counter: The 
Diversion and Abuse of Controlled Prescription Drugs in the U.S. 3 
(2005) [hereinafter, Under the Counter]). As noted in Krishna-Iyer, 
``[t]he diversion of controlled substances has become an 
increasingly grave threat to this nation's public health and safety. 
According to The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
(CASA), `[t]he number of people who admit abusing controlled 
prescription drugs increased from 7.8 million in 1992 to 15.1 
million in 2003.''' 74 FR at 463 (quoting Under the Counter, at 3). 
CASA also found that ```[a]pproximately six percent of the U.S. 
population (15.1 million people) admitted abusing controlled 
prescription drugs in 2003, 23 percent more than the combined number 
abusing cocaine (5.9 million), hallucinogens (4.0 million), 
inhalants (2.1 million) and heroin (328,000).''' Id. (quoting Under 
the Counter, at 3). Finally, CASA found that ```[b]etween 1992 and 
2003, there has been a * * * 140.5 percent increase in the self-
reported abuse of prescription opioids,'' and in the same period, 
the ``abuse of controlled prescription drugs has been growing at a 
rate twice that of marijuana abuse, five times greater than cocaine 
abuse and 60 times greater than heroin abuse.'' Id. (quoting Under 
the Counter, at 4).
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    As I have previously explained, the Agency has revoked other 
practitioners' registrations for committing as few as two acts of 
diversion, see Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR at 463 (citing Alan H. Olefsky, 57 
FR at 928-29), and the Agency can revoke based on a single act of 
intentional or knowing diversion. See MacKay, 75 FR at 49977. Because 
Respondent's misconduct in diverting controlled substances is egregious 
and he has failed to accept responsibility for his misconduct and 
demonstrate why he can be entrusted with a registration, I conclude 
that his continued registration is inconsistent with the public 
interest. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). Accordingly, I will order that 
Respondent's registration be revoked and that any pending application 
be denied.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of 
Registration FM0624139, issued to T.J. McNichol, M.D., be, and it 
hereby is, revoked. I further order that any application of T.J. 
McNichol, M.D., to renew or modify his registration, be, and it hereby 
is, denied. This Order is effectively immediately.\33\
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    \33\ For the same reasons which led me to order the immediate 
suspension of Respondent's registration, I conclude that the public 
interest necessitates that this Order be effective immediately. 21 
CFR 1316.67

    Dated: August 29, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2012-22850 Filed 9-14-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P