[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 169 (Thursday, August 30, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 52978-53057]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-16761]
[[Page 52977]]
Vol. 77
Thursday,
No. 169
August 30, 2012
Part IV
Department of the Treasury
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Part 3
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Federal Reserve System
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12 CFR Part 217
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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12 CFR Parts 324, 325
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Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule;
Market Risk Capital Rule; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 169 / Thursday, August 30, 2012 /
Proposed Rules
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Part 3
[Docket No. ID OCC-2012-0010]
RIN 1557-AD46
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 217
[Regulation Q; Docket No. R-1442]
RIN 7100 AD-87
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Parts 324 and 325
RIN 3064-AD97
Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital
Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule
AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
ACTION: Joint notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are
seeking comment on three notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRs) that
would revise and replace the agencies' current capital rules.
In this NPR (Advanced Approaches and Market Risk NPR) the agencies
are proposing to revise the advanced approaches risk-based capital rule
to incorporate certain aspects of ``Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems'' (Basel III)
that the agencies would apply only to advanced approach banking
organizations. This NPR also proposes other changes to the advanced
approaches rule that the agencies believe are consistent with changes
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to its
``International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards: A Revised Framework'' (Basel II), as revised by the BCBS
between 2006 and 2009, and recent consultative papers published by the
BCBS. The agencies also propose to revise the advanced approaches risk-
based capital rule to be consistent with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act). These revisions
include replacing references to credit ratings with alternative
standards of creditworthiness consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
Additionally, the OCC and FDIC are proposing that the market risk
capital rule be applicable to federal and state savings associations,
and the Board is proposing that the advanced approaches and market risk
capital rules apply to top-tier savings and loan holding companies
domiciled in the United States that meet the applicable thresholds. In
addition, this NPR would codify the market risk rule consistent with
the proposed codification of the other regulatory capital rules across
the three proposals.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before October 22, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to:
OCC: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC
is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments by
the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please use the
title ``Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-based
Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule'' to facilitate the organization
and distribution of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the
following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal--``Regulations.gov'': Go to
http://www.regulations.gov, under the ``More Search Options'' tab click
next to the ``Advanced Docket Search'' option where indicated, select
``Comptroller of the Currency'' from the agency drop-down menu, and
then click ``Submit.'' In the ``Docket ID'' column, select ``OCC-2012-
0010'' to submit or view public comments and to view supporting and
related materials for this proposed rule. The ``How to Use This Site''
link on the Regulations.gov home page provides information on using
Regulations.gov, including instructions for submitting or viewing
public comments, viewing other supporting and related materials, and
viewing the docket after the close of the comment period.
Email: [email protected].
Mail: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E
Street SW., Mail Stop 2-3, Washington, DC 20219.
Fax: (202) 874-5274.
Hand Delivery/Courier: 250 E Street SW., Mail Stop 2-3,
Washington, DC 20219.
Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and
``Docket Number OCC-2012-0010'' in your comment. In general, OCC will
enter all comments received into the docket and publish them on the
Regulations.gov Web site without change, including any business or
personal information that you provide such as name and address
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received,
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not enclose any
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure. You may review
comments and other related materials that pertain to this notice by any
of the following methods:
Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Select ``Document Type'' of ``Public
Submissions,'' in ``Enter Keyword or ID Box,'' enter Docket ID ``OCC-
2012-0010,'' and click ``Search.'' Comments will be listed under ``View
By Relevance'' tab at bottom of screen. If comments from more than one
agency are listed, the ``Agency'' column will indicate which comments
were received by the OCC.
Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect
and photocopy comments at the OCC, 250 E Street SW., Washington, DC.
For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 874-
4700. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid
government-issued photo identification and to submit to security
screening in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
Docket: You may also view or request available background
documents and project summaries using the methods described above.
Board: When submitting comments, please consider submitting your
comments by email or fax because paper mail in the Washington, DC area
and at the Board may be subject to delay. You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. [XX][XX], by any of the following methods:
Agency Web Site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Email: [email protected]. Include docket
number in the subject line of the message.
Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
[[Page 52979]]
Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20551.
All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your
comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact
information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in
paper form in Room MP-500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th and C
Street NW., Washington, DC 20551) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on
weekdays.
FDIC: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Agency Web site: http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html.
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments/Legal ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivered/Courier: The guard station at the rear of
the 550 17th Street Building (located on F Street), on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
E-mail: [email protected].
Instructions: Comments submitted must include ``FDIC'' and ``RIN
3064-D97.'' Comments received will be posted without change to http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html, including any
personal information provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OCC: Margot Schwadron, Senior Risk
Expert, (202) 874-6022, David Elkes, Risk Expert, (202) 874-3846, or
Mark Ginsberg, Risk Expert, (202) 927-4580, or Ron Shimabukuro, Senior
Counsel, Patrick Tierney, Counsel, Carl Kaminski, Senior Attorney, or
Kevin Korzeniewski, Attorney, Legislative and Regulatory Activities
Division, (202) 874-5090, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
250 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.
Board: Anna Lee Hewko, Assistant Director, Capital and Regulatory
Policy, (202) 530-6260, Thomas Boemio, Manager, Capital and Regulatory
Policy, (202) 452-2982, or Constance M. Horsley, Manager, Capital and
Regulatory Policy, (202) 452-5239, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation; or Benjamin W. McDonough, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-2036,
or April C. Snyder, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-3099, Legal Division,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets
NW., Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only,
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), (202) 263-4869.
FDIC: Bobby R. Bean, Associate Director, [email protected]; Ryan
Billingsley, Senior Policy Analyst, [email protected]; or Karl
Reitz, Senior Policy Analyst, [email protected], Capital Markets Branch,
Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 898-6888; or Mark
Handzlik, Counsel, [email protected], Michael Phillips, Counsel,
[email protected]; or Greg Feder, Counsel, [email protected], Ryan
Clougherty, Senior Attorney, [email protected]; Supervision Branch,
Legal Division, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In connection with the proposed changes to
the agencies' capital rules in this NPR, the agencies are also seeking
comment on the two related NPRs published elsewhere in today's Federal
Register. In the notice titled ``Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory
Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital
Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt Corrective
Action'' (Basel III NPR) the agencies are proposing to revise their
minimum risk-based capital requirements and criteria for regulatory
capital, as well as establish a capital conservation buffer framework,
consistent with Basel III. The Basel III NPR also includes transition
provisions for banking organizations to come into compliance with its
requirements.
In the notice titled ``Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized
Approach for Risk-weighted Assets; Market Discipline and Disclosure
Requirements'' (Standardized Approach NPR), the agencies are proposing
to revise and harmonize their rules for calculating risk-weighted
assets to enhance risk sensitivity and address weaknesses identified
over recent years, including by incorporating aspects of the
standardized framework in Basel II, and providing alternatives to
credit ratings, consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act. The
revisions include methodologies for determining risk-weighted assets
for residential mortgages, securitization exposures, and counterparty
credit risk. The Standardized Approach NPR also would introduce
disclosure requirements that would apply to top-tier banking
organizations domiciled in the United States with $50 billion or more
in total assets, including disclosures related to regulatory capital
instruments.
The proposed requirements in the Basel III NPR and Standardized
Approach NPR would apply to all banking organizations that are
currently subject to minimum capital requirements (including national
banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, state and federal
savings associations, and top-tier bank holding companies domiciled in
the United States not subject to the Board's Small Bank Holding Company
Policy Statement (12 CFR part 225, appendix C)), as well as top-tier
savings and loan holding companies domiciled in the United States
(collectively, banking organizations).
The proposals are being published in three separate NPRs to reflect
the distinct objectives of each proposal, to allow interested parties
to better understand the various aspects of the overall capital
framework, including which aspects of the rules would apply to which
banking organizations, and to help interested parties better focus
their comments on areas of particular interest.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Risk-Weighted Assets--Proposed Modifications to the Advanced
Approaches Rules
A. Counterparty Credit Risk
1. Revisions to the Recognition of Financial Collateral
2. Changes to Holding Periods and the Margin Period of Risk
3. Changes to the Internal Models Methodology (IMM)
4. Credit Valuation Adjustments
5. Cleared Transactions (Central Counterparties)
6. Stress period for Own Internal Estimates
B. Removal of Credit Ratings
C. Proposed Revisions to the Treatment of Securitization Exposures
1. Definitions
2. Operational Criteria for Recognizing Risk Transference in
Traditional Securitizations
3. Proposed Revisions to the Hierarchy of Approaches
4. Guarantees and Credit Derivatives Referencing a Securitization
Exposure
5. Due Diligence Requirements for Securitization Exposures
6. Nth-to-Default Credit Derivatives
D. Treatment of Exposures Subject to Deduction
E. Technical Amendments to the Advanced Approaches Rule
1. Eligible Guarantees and Contingent U.S. Government Guarantees
2. Calculation of Foreign Exposures for Applicability of the
Advanced Approaches--Insurance Underwriting Subsidiaries
3. Calculation of Foreign Exposures for Applicability of the
Advanced Approaches--Changes to FFIEC 009
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4. Applicability of the Rule
5. Change to the Definition of Probability of Default Related to
Seasoning
6. Cash Items in Process of Collection
7. Change to the Definition of Qualified Revolving Exposure
8. Trade-Related Letters of Credit
F. Pillar 3 Disclosures
1. Frequency and Timeliness of Disclosures
2. Enhanced Securitization Disclosure Requirements
3. Equity Holding That Are Not Covered Positions
III. Market Risk Capital Rule
IV. List of Acronyms
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
VII. Plain Language
VIII. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
I. Introduction
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are
issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR, proposal, or proposed
rule) to revise the advanced approaches risk-based capital rule
(advanced approaches rule) to incorporate certain aspects of ``Basel
III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking
systems'' (Basel III). This NPR also proposes to revise the advanced
approaches rule to incorporate other revisions to the Basel capital
framework published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) in a series of documents between 2009 and 2011 \1\ and
subsequent consultative papers. The proposal would also address
relevant provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), and incorporate certain technical
amendments to the existing requirements.\2\
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\1\ The BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities,
which was established by the central bank governors of the G-10
countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of bank
supervisory authorities and central banks from Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Documents issued by the BCBS are available through the Bank for
International Settlements Web site at http://www.bis.org. Basel III
was published in December 2010 and revised in June 2011. The text is
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.
\2\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (Dodd-
Frank Act).
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In this NPR, the Board also proposes applying the advanced
approaches rule and the market risk rule to savings and loan holding
companies, and the Board, FDIC, and OCC propose applying the market
risk capital rule to savings and loan holding companies and to state
and federal savings associations, respectively. In addition, this NPR
would codify the market risk rule in a manner similar to the other
regulatory capital rules in the three proposals. In a separate Federal
Register notice, also published today, the agencies are finalizing
changes to the market risk rule. As described in more detail below, the
agencies are proposing changes to the advanced approaches rule in a
manner consistent with the BCBS requirements, including the
requirements introduced by the BCBS in ``Enhancements to the Basel II
framework'' (2009 Enhancements) in July 2009 and in Basel III.\3\ The
main proposed revisions to the advanced approaches rule are related to
treatment of counterparty credit risk, the securitization framework,
and disclosure requirements.
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\3\ See ``Enhancements to the Basel II framework'' (July 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm.
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Consistent with Basel III, the proposal seeks to ensure that
counterparty credit risk, credit valuation adjustments (CVA), and
wrong-way risk are incorporated adequately into the agencies'
regulatory capital requirements. More specifically, the NPR would
establish a capital requirement for the market value of counterparty
credit risk; propose a more risk-sensitive approach for certain
transactions with central counterparties, including the treatment of
default fund contributions to central counterparties; and make certain
adjustments to the methodologies used to calculate counterparty credit
risk requirements. In addition, consistent with the ``2009
Enhancements,'' the agencies propose strengthening the risk-based
capital requirements for certain securitization exposures by requiring
banking organizations that are subject to the advanced approaches rule
to conduct more rigorous credit analysis of securitization exposures
and enhancing the disclosure requirements related to these exposures.
In addition to the incorporation of the BCBS standards, the
agencies are proposing changes to the advanced approaches rule in a
manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act, by removing references to,
or requirements of reliance on, credit ratings from their
regulations.\4\ Accordingly, the agencies are proposing to remove the
ratings-based approach and the internal assessment approach for
securitization exposures from the advanced approaches rule and require
advanced approaches banking organizations to use either the supervisory
formula approach (SFA) or a simplified version of the SFA when
calculating capital requirements for securitization exposures. The
agencies also are proposing to remove references to ratings from
certain defined terms under the advanced approaches rule and replace
them with alternative standards of creditworthiness. Finally, the
proposed rule contains a number of proposed technical amendments that
would clarify or adjust existing requirements under the advanced
approaches rule.
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\4\ See section 939A of Dodd-Frank Act (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).
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In addition, in today's Federal Register, the agencies are
publishing two separate notices of proposed rulemaking that are both
relevant to the calculation of capital requirements for institutions
using the advanced approaches rule. The notice titled ``Regulatory
Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum
Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and
Prompt Corrective Action'' (Basel III NPR), which is applicable to all
banking organizations, would revise the definition of capital (the
numerator of the risk-based capital ratios), establish the new minimum
ratio requirements, and make other changes to the agencies' general
risk-based capital rules related to regulatory capital. In addition,
the Basel III NPR proposes that certain elements of Basel III apply
only to institutions using the advanced approaches rule, including a
supplementary Basel III leverage ratio and a countercyclical capital
buffer. The Basel III NPR also includes transition provisions for
banking organizations to come into compliance with the requirements of
that proposed rule.
The notice titled ``Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach
for Risk-Weighted Assets; Market Discipline and Disclosure
Requirements'' (Standardized Approach NPR) would also apply to all
banking organizations. In the Standardized Approach NPR, the agencies
are proposing to revise and harmonize their rules for calculating risk-
weighted assets to enhance risk sensitivity and address weaknesses
identified over recent years, including by incorporating aspects of the
BCBS' Basel II standardized framework, changes proposed in recent
consultative papers published by the BCBS and alternatives to credit
ratings, consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act. The
revisions include methodologies for determining risk-weighted assets
for residential mortgages, securitization exposures, and
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counterparty credit risk. The Standardized Approach NPR also would
introduce disclosure requirements that would apply to top-tier banking
organizations domiciled in the United States with $50 billion or more
in total assets, including disclosures related to regulatory capital
instruments.
The requirements proposed in the Basel III NPR and Standardized
Approach NPR, as well as the market risk capital rule in this proposal,
are proposed to become the ``generally applicable'' capital
requirements for purposes of section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act because
they would be the capital requirements applied to insured depository
institutions under section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,
without regard to asset size or foreign financial exposure. Banking
organizations that are or would be subject to the advanced approaches
rule (advanced approaches banking organizations) or the market risk
rule should also review the Basel III NPR and Standardized Approach
NPR.
II. Risk-Weighted Assets--Proposed Modifications to the Advanced
Approaches
A. Counterparty Credit Risk
The recent financial crisis highlighted certain aspects of the
treatment of counterparty credit risk under the Basel II framework that
were inadequate and of banking organizations' risk management of
counterparty credit risk that were insufficient. The Basel III
revisions would address both areas of weakness by ensuring that all
material on- and off-balance sheet counterparty risks, including those
associated with derivative-related exposures, are appropriately
incorporated into banking organizations' risk-based capital ratios. In
addition, new risk management requirements in Basel III strengthen the
oversight of counterparty credit risk exposures. The agencies are
proposing the counterparty credit risk revisions in a manner generally
consistent with Basel III, modified to incorporate alternative
standards to the use of credit ratings. The discussion below highlights
these revisions.
1. Revisions to the Recognition of Financial Collateral
Eligible Financial Collateral
The exposure-at-default (EAD) adjustment approach under section 132
of the proposed rules permits a banking organization to recognize the
credit risk mitigation benefits of eligible financial collateral by
adjusting the EAD to the counterparty. Such approaches include the
collateral haircut approach, simple Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach and
the internal models methodology (IMM).
Consistent with Basel III, the agencies are proposing to modify the
definition of financial collateral so that resecuritizations would no
longer qualify as eligible financial collateral under the advanced
approaches rule. Thus, resecuritization collateral could not be used to
adjust the EAD of an exposure. The agencies believe that this treatment
is appropriate because resecuritizations have been shown to have more
market value volatility than other collateral types. During the recent
financial crisis, the market volatility of resecuritization exposures
made it difficult for resecuritizations to serve as a source of
liquidity because banking organizations were unable to sell those
positions without incurring substantial loss or to use them as
collateral for secured lending transactions.
Under the proposal, a securitization in which one or more of the
underlying exposures is a securitization position would be considered a
resecuritization. A resecuritization position under the proposal means
an on- or off-balance sheet exposure to a resecuritization, or an
exposure that directly or indirectly references a resecuritization
exposure.
Consistent with these changes excluding less liquid collateral from
the definition of financial collateral, the agencies also propose that
conforming residential mortgages no longer qualify as financial
collateral under the advanced approaches rule. As a result, under this
proposal, a banking organization would no longer be able to recognize
the credit risk mitigation benefit of such instruments through an
adjustment to EAD. In addition, also consistent with the Basel
framework, the agencies propose to exclude all debt securities that are
not investment grade from the definition of financial collateral. As
discussed in section II (B) of this preamble, the agencies are
proposing to revise the definition of ``investment grade'' for both the
advanced approaches rule and market risk capital rule.
Revised Supervisory Haircuts
As reflected in Basel III, securitization exposures have increased
levels of volatility relative to other collateral types. To address
this issue, Basel III incorporates new standardized supervisory
haircuts for securitization exposures in the EAD adjustment approach
based on the credit rating of the exposure. Consistent with section
939A of the Dodd Frank Act, the agencies are proposing an alternative
approach to assigning standard supervisory haircuts for securitization
exposures, and are also proposing to amend the standard supervisory
haircuts for other types of financial collateral to remove the
references to credit ratings.
Under the proposal, as outlined in table 1 below, the standard
supervisory market price volatility haircuts would be revised based on
the applicable risk weight of the exposure calculated under the
standardized approach. Supervisory haircuts for exposures to
sovereigns, government-sponsored entities, public sector entities,
depository institutions, foreign banks, credit unions, and corporate
issuers would be calculated based upon the risk weights for such
exposures described under section 32 of the Standardized Approach NPR.
The proposed table for the standard supervisory market price volatility
haircuts would be revised as follows:
Table 1--Standard Supervisory Market Price Volatility Haircuts \1\
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Haircut (in percents) assigned based on:
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Sovereign issuers risk weight Non-sovereign issuers risk Investment grade
Residual maturity under Sec. ------.32 \2\ weight under Sec. ------.32 securitization
------------------------------------------------------------------ exposures (in
20% or percent)
Zero% 50% 100% 20% 50% 100%
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Less than or equal to 1 year....................................... 0.5 1.0 15.0 1.0 2.0 25.0 4.0
Greater than 1 year and less than or equal to 5 years.............. 2.0 3.0 15.0 4.0 6.0 25.0 12.0
Greater than 5 years............................................... 4.0 6.0 15.0 8.0 12.0 25.0 24.0
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Main index equities (including convertible bonds) and gold..............................15.0........
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Other publicly-traded equities (including convertible bonds)............................25.0........
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Mutual funds.........................................................Highest haircut applicable to any security
in which the fund can invest.
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Cash collateral held....................................................................Zero........
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\1\ The market price volatility haircuts in Table 2 are based on a 10 business-day holding period.
\2\ Includes a foreign PSE that receives a zero percent risk weight.
The agencies are also proposing to clarify that if a banking
organization lends instruments that do not meet the definition of
financial collateral used in the Standardized Approach NPR and the
advanced approaches rule (as modified by the proposal), such as non-
investment grade corporate debt securities or resecuritization
exposures, the haircut applied to the exposure would be the same as the
haircut for equity that is publicly traded but which is not part of a
main index.
Question 1: The agencies solicit comments on the proposed changes
to the recognition of financial collateral under the advanced
approaches rule.
2. Changes to Holding Periods and the Margin Period of Risk
During the financial crisis, many financial institutions
experienced significant delays in settling or closing-out
collateralized transactions, such as repo-style transactions and
collateralized over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The assumed holding
period for collateral in the collateral haircut and simple VaR
approaches and the margin period of risk in the IMM under Basel II
proved to be inadequate for certain transactions and netting sets.\5\
It also did not reflect the difficulties and delays experienced by
institutions when settling or liquidating collateral during a period of
financial stress.
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\5\ Under the advanced approaches rule, the margin period of
risk means, with respect to a netting set subject to a collateral
agreement, the time period from the most recent exchange of
collateral with a counterparty until the next required exchange of
collateral plus the period of time required to sell and realize the
proceeds of the least liquid collateral that can be delivered under
the terms of the collateral agreement and, where applicable, the
period of time required to re-hedge the resulting market risk, upon
the default of the counterparty. See 12 CFR part 3, appendix C, and
part 167, appendix C (OCC); 12 CFR part 208, appendix F, and 12 CFR
part 225, appendix G (Board); 12 CFR part 325, appendix D, and 12
CFR part 390, subpart Z, appendix A (FDIC).
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Under Basel II, the minimum assumed holding period for collateral
and margin period of risk are five days for repo-style transactions,
and ten days for other collateralized transactions where liquid
financial collateral is posted under a daily margin maintenance
requirement. Under Basel III, a banking organization must assume a
holding period of 20 business days under the collateral haircut or
simple VaR approaches, or must assume a margin period of risk under the
IMM of 20 business days for netting sets where: (1) The number of
trades exceeds 5,000 at any time during the quarter (except if the
counterparty is a central counterparty (CCP) or the netting set
consists of cleared transactions with a clearing member); (2) one or
more trades involves illiquid collateral posted by the counterparty; or
(3) the netting set includes any OTC derivatives that cannot be easily
replaced.
For purposes of determining whether collateral is illiquid or an
OTC derivative cannot be easily replaced for these purposes, a banking
organization could, for example, assess whether, during a period of
stressed market conditions, it could obtain multiple price quotes
within two days or less for the collateral or OTC derivative that would
not move the market or represent a market discount (in the case of
collateral) or a premium (in the case of an OTC derivative).
If, over the two previous quarters, more than two margin disputes
on a netting set have occurred that lasted longer than the holding
period or margin period of risk used in the EAD calculation, then a
banking organization would use a holding period or a margin period of
risk for that netting set that is at least two times the minimum
holding period that would otherwise be used for that netting set.
Margin disputes occur when the banking organization and its
counterparty do not agree on the value of collateral or on the
eligibility of the collateral provided. In addition, such disputes also
can occur when a banking organization and its counterparty disagree on
the amount of margin that is required, which could result from
differences in the valuation of a transaction, or from errors in the
calculation of the net exposure of a portfolio (for instance, if a
transaction is incorrectly included or excluded from the portfolio).
Consistent with Basel III, the agencies propose to amend the
advanced approaches rule to incorporate these adjustments to the
holding period in the collateral haircut and simple VaR approaches, and
to the margin period of risk in the IMM that a banking organization may
use to determine its capital requirement for repo-style transactions,
OTC derivative transactions, or eligible margin loans. For cleared
transactions, which are discussed below, the agencies propose that a
banking organization not be required to adjust the holding period or
margin period of risk upward when determining the capital requirement
for its counterparty credit risk exposures to the central counterparty,
which is also consistent with Basel III.
Question 2: The agencies solicit comments on the proposed changes
to holding periods and margin periods of risk.
3. Changes to the Internal Models Methodology
During the recent financial crisis, increased volatility in the
value of derivative positions and collateral led to higher counterparty
exposures than amounts estimated by banking organizations' internal
models. To address this issue, under Basel III, when
[[Page 52983]]
using the IMM, banking organizations are required to determine their
capital requirements for counterparty credit risk using stressed
inputs. Consistent with Basel III, the agencies propose to amend the
advanced approaches rule so that the capital requirement for IMM
exposures would be equal to the larger of the capital requirement for
those exposures calculated using data from the most recent three-year
period and data from a three-year period that contains a period of
stress reflected in the credit default spreads of the banking
organization's counterparties.
Under the proposal, an IMM exposure would be defined as a repo-
style transaction, eligible margin loan, or OTC derivative for which a
banking organization calculates its EAD using the IMM. A banking
organization would be required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the banking organization's primary federal supervisor at least
quarterly that the stress period coincides with increased credit
default swap (CDS) spreads, or other credit spreads of its
counterparties and have procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of its
stress calibration. These procedures would be required to include a
process for using benchmark portfolios that are vulnerable to the same
risk factors as the banking organization's portfolio. In addition, the
primary federal supervisor could require a banking organization to
modify its stress calibration if the primary federal supervisor
believes that another calibration would better reflect the actual
historic losses of the portfolio.
Consistent with Basel III, the agencies are proposing to require a
banking organization to subject its internal models to an initial
validation and annual model review process. As part of the model review
process, the agencies propose that a banking organization would need to
have a backtesting program for its model that includes a process by
which unacceptable model performance would be identified and remedied.
In addition, the agencies propose that when a banking organization
multiplies expected positive exposure (EPE) by the default scaling
factor alpha of 1.4 when calculating EAD, the primary federal
supervisor may require the banking organization to set that alpha
higher based on the performance of the banking organization's internal
model.
The agencies also are proposing to require a banking organization
to have policies for the measurement, management, and control of
collateral, including the reuse of collateral and margin amounts, as a
condition of using the IMM. Under the proposal, a banking organization
would be required to have a comprehensive stress testing program that
captures all credit exposures to counterparties and incorporates stress
testing of principal market risk factors and the creditworthiness of
its counterparties.
Under Basel II, a banking organization was permitted to capture
within its internal model the effect on EAD of a collateral agreement
that requires receipt of collateral when the exposure to the
counterparty increases. Basel II also contained a ``shortcut'' method
to provide a banking organization whose internal model did not capture
the effects of collateral agreements with a method to recognize some
benefit from the collateral agreement. Basel III modifies that
``shortcut'' method by setting effective EPE to a counterparty as the
lesser of the following two exposure calculations: (1) The exposure
without any held or posted margining collateral, plus any collateral
posted to the counterparty independent of the daily valuation and
margining process or current exposure, or (2) an add-on that reflects
the potential increase of exposure over the margin period of risk plus
the larger of (i) the current exposure of the netting set reflecting
all collateral received or posted by the banking organization excluding
any collateral called or in dispute; or (ii) the largest net exposure
(including all collateral held or posted under the margin agreement)
that would not trigger a collateral call. The add-on would be computed
as the largest expected increase in the netting set's exposure over any
margin period of risk in the next year. The agencies propose to include
the Basel III modification of the ``shortcut'' method in this NPR.
Recognition of Wrong-way Risk
The financial crisis also highlighted the interconnectedness of
large financial institutions through an array of complex transactions.
To recognize this interconnectedness and to mitigate the risk of
contagion from the banking sector to the broader financial system and
the general economy, Basel III includes enhanced requirements for the
recognition and treatment of wrong-way risk in the IMM. The proposed
rule would define wrong-way risk as the risk that arises when an
exposure to a particular counterparty is positively correlated with the
probability of default of such counterparty itself.
The agencies are proposing enhancements to the advanced approaches
rule that would require banking organizations' risk management
procedures to identify, monitor, and control wrong-way risk throughout
the life of an exposure. These risk management procedures should
include the use of stress testing and scenario analysis. In addition,
where a banking organization has identified an IMM exposure with
specific wrong-way risk, the banking organization would be required to
treat that transaction as its own netting set. Specific wrong-way risk
is a type of wrong way risk that arises when either the counterparty
and issuer of the collateral supporting the transaction, or the
counterparty and the reference asset of the transaction, are affiliates
or are the same entity.
In addition, where a banking organization has identified an OTC
derivative transaction, repo-style transaction, or eligible margin loan
with specific wrong-way risk for which the banking organization would
otherwise apply the IMM, the banking organization would insert the
probability of default (PD) of the counterparty and a loss given
default (LGD) equal to 100 percent into the appropriate risk-based
capital formula specified in table 1 of section 131 of the proposed
rule, then multiply the output of the formula (K) by an alternative EAD
based on the transaction type, as follows:
(1) For a purchased credit derivative, EAD would be the fair value
of the underlying reference asset of the credit derivative contract;
(2) For an OTC equity derivative,\6\ EAD would be the maximum
amount that the banking organization could lose if the fair value of
the underlying reference asset decreased to zero;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Equity derivatives that are call options are not subject to
a counterparty credit risk capital requirement for specific wrong-
way risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) For an OTC bond derivative (that is, a bond option, bond
future, or any other instrument linked to a bond that gives rise to
similar counterparty credit risks), EAD would be the smaller of the
notional amount of the underlying reference asset and the maximum
amount that the banking organization could lose if the fair value of
the underlying reference asset decreased to zero; and
(4) For repo-style transactions and eligible margin loans, EAD
would be calculated using the formula in the collateral haircut
approach of section 132 and with the estimated value of the collateral
substituted for the parameter C in the equation.
Question 3: The agencies solicit comment on the appropriateness of
the proposed calculation of capital requirements for OTC equity or bond
derivatives with specific wrong-way risk. What alternatives should be
made
[[Page 52984]]
available to banking organizations in order to calculate the EAD in
such cases? What challenges would a banking organization face in
estimating the EAD for OTC derivative transactions with specific wrong-
way risk if the agencies were to permit a banking organization to use
its incremental risk model that meets the requirements of section 8 of
the market risk rule instead of the proposed alternatives?
Increased Asset Value Correlation Factor
To recognize the correlation of financial institutions'
creditworthiness attributable to similar sensitivities to common risk
factors, the agencies are proposing to incorporate the Basel III
increase in the correlation factor used in the formula provided in
table 1 of section 131 of the proposed rule for certain wholesale
exposures. Under the proposed rule, banking organizations would apply a
multiplier of 1.25 to the correlation factor for wholesale exposures to
unregulated financial institutions that generate a majority of their
revenue from financial activities, regardless of asset size. This
category would include highly leveraged entities such as hedge funds
and financial guarantors. In addition, banking organizations would
apply a multiplier of 1.25 to the correlation factor for wholesale
exposures to regulated financial institutions with consolidated assets
of greater than or equal to $100 billion.
The proposed definitions of ``financial institution'' and
``regulated financial institution'' are set forth and discussed in the
Basel III NPR.
4. Credit Valuation Adjustments
CVA is the fair value adjustment to reflect counterparty credit
risk in the valuation of an OTC derivative contract. The BCBS reviewed
the treatment of counterparty credit risk and found that roughly two-
thirds of counterparty credit risk losses during the crisis were due to
marked-to-market losses from CVA, while one-third of counterparty
credit risk losses resulted from actual defaults. Basel II addressed
counterparty credit risk as a combination of default risk and credit
migration risk. Credit migration risk accounts for market value losses
resulting from deterioration of counterparties' credit quality short of
default and is addressed in Basel II via the maturity adjustment
multiplier. However, the maturity adjustment multiplier in Basel II was
calibrated for loan portfolios and may not be suitable for addressing
CVA risk. Accordingly, Basel III requires banking organizations to
directly reflect CVA risk through an additional capital requirement.
The Basel III CVA capital requirement would reflect the CVA due to
changes of counterparties' credit spreads, assuming fixed expected
exposure (EE) profiles. Basel III provides two approaches for
calculating the CVA capital requirement: the simple approach and the
advanced CVA approach. The agencies are proposing both approaches for
calculating the CVA capital requirement (subject to certain
requirements discussed below), but without references to credit
ratings.
Only a banking organization that is subject to the market risk
capital rule and has obtained prior approval from its primary federal
supervisor to calculate both the EAD for OTC derivative contracts using
the IMM described in section 132 of the proposed rule, and the specific
risk add-on for debt positions using a specific risk model described in
section 207(b) of subpart F would be eligible to use the advanced CVA
approach. A banking organization that receives such approval would
continue to use the advanced CVA approach until it notifies its primary
federal supervisor in writing that it expects to begin calculating its
CVA capital requirement using the simple CVA approach. The notice would
include an explanation from the banking organization as to why it is
choosing to use the simple CVA approach and the date when the banking
organization would begin to calculate its CVA capital requirement using
the simple CVA approach.
Under the proposal, when calculating a CVA capital requirement, a
banking organization would be permitted to recognize the hedging
benefits of single name CDS, single name contingent CDS, index CDS
(CDSind), and any other equivalent hedging instrument that
references the counterparty directly, provided that the equivalent
hedging instrument is managed as a CVA hedge in accordance with the
banking organization's hedging policies. Consistent with Basel III,
under this NPR, a tranched or nth-to-default CDS would not qualify as a
CVA hedge. In addition, the agencies propose that any position that is
recognized as a CVA hedge would not be a covered position under the
market risk capital rule, except in the case where the banking
organization is using the advanced CVA approach, the hedge is a
CDSind, and the VaR model does not capture the basis between
the spreads of the index that is used as the hedging instrument and the
hedged counterparty exposure over various time periods, as discussed in
further detail below.
To convert the CVA capital requirement to a risk-weighted asset
amount, a banking organization would multiply its CVA capital
requirement by 12.5. Under the proposal, because the CVA capital
requirement reflects market risk, the CVA risk-weighted asset amount
would not be a component of credit risk-weighted assets and therefore
would not be subject to the 1.06 multiplier for credit risk-weighted
assets.
Simple CVA Approach
The agencies are proposing the Basel III formula for the simple CVA
approach to calculate the CVA capital requirement (KCVA),
with a modification in a manner consistent with section 939A of the
Dodd-Frank Act. A banking organization would use the formula below to
calculate its CVA capital requirement for OTC derivative transactions.
The banking organization would calculate KCVA as the square
root of the sum of the capital requirement for each of its OTC
derivative counterparties multiplied by 2.33. The simple CVA approach
is based on an analytical approximation derived from a general CVA VaR
formulation under a set of simplifying assumptions:
All credit spreads have a flat term structure;
All credit spreads at the time horizon have a lognormal
distribution;
Each single name credit spread is driven by the
combination of a single systematic factor and an idiosyncratic factor;
The correlation between any single name credit spread and
the systematic factor is equal to 0.5;
All credit indices are driven by the single systematic
factor; and
The time horizon is short (the square root of time scaling
to 1 year is applied in the end).
The approximation is based on the linearization of the dependence of
both CVA and CDS hedges on credit spreads. Given the assumptions listed
above (most notably, the single-factor assumption), CVA VaR can be
expressed using an analytical formula. The formula of the simple CVA
approach is obtained by applying certain standardizations, conservative
adjustments, and scaling to the analytical CVA VaR result.
A banking organization would calculate KCVA, where:
[[Page 52985]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.023
In Formula 1, wi refers to the weight applicable to
counterparty i assigned according to Table 2 below.\7\ In Basel III,
the BCBS assigned wi based on the external rating of the
counterparty. However, to comply with the Dodd-Frank requirement to
remove references to ratings, the agencies propose to assign
wi based on the relevant PD of the counterparty, as assigned
by the banking organization. Wind in Formula 1 refers to the
weight applicable to the CDSind based on the average weight
under Table 2 of the underlying reference names that comprise the
index.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ These weights represent the assumed values of the product of
a counterparties' current credit spread and the volatility of that
credit spread.
Table 2--Assignment of Counterparty Weight Under the Simple CVA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight Wind
Internal PD (in percent) (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.00-0.07............................................... 0.70
>0.07-0.15.............................................. 0.80
>0.15-0.40.............................................. 1.00
>0.4-2.00............................................... 2.00
>2.0--6.00.............................................. 3.00
>6.0.................................................... 10.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EADi \total\ in Formula 1 refers to the sum of the EAD
for all netting sets of OTC derivative contracts with counterparty i
calculated using the current exposure methodology described in section
132(c) of the proposed rule as adjusted by Formula 2 or the IMM
described in section 132(d) of the proposed rule. When the banking
organization calculates EAD using the IMM, EADi \total\
equals EADunstressed.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.024
Mi in Formulas 1 and 2 refers to the EAD-weighted
average of the effective maturity of each netting set with counterparty
i (where each netting set's M cannot be smaller than one).
Mihedge in Formula 1 refers to the notional
weighted average maturity of the hedge instrument. Mind in
Formula 1 equals the maturity of the CDSind or the notional
weighted average maturity of any CDSind purchased to hedge
CVA risk of counterparty i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The term ``exp'' is the exponential function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bi in Formula 1 refers to the sum of the notional
amounts of any purchased single name CDS referencing counterparty i
that is used to hedge CVA risk to counterparty i multiplied by (1-exp(-
0.05 x Mi hedge))/(0.05 x Mi
hedge). B ind in Formula 1 refers to the notional
amount of one or more CDSind purchased as protection to
hedge CVA risk for counterparty i multiplied by (1-exp(-0.05 x
Mind))/(0.05 x Mind). A banking organization
would be allowed to treat the notional amount in the index attributable
to that counterparty as a single name hedge of counterparty i
(Bi,) when calculating KCVA and subtract the
notional amount of Bi from the notional amount of the
CDSind. The banking organization would be required to then
calculate its capital requirement for the remaining notional amount of
the CDSind as a stand-alone position.
Advanced CVA Approach
Under the advanced CVA approach, a banking organization would use
the VaR model it uses to calculate specific risk under section 205(b)
of subpart F or another model that meets the quantitative requirements
of sections 205(b) and 207(b) of subpart F to calculate its CVA capital
requirement for a counterparty by modeling the impact of changes in the
counterparty's credit spreads, together with any recognized CVA hedges
on the CVA for the counterparty. A banking organization's total capital
requirement for CVA equals the sum of the CVA capital requirements for
each counterparty.
The agencies are proposing that the VaR model incorporate only
changes in the counterparty's credit spreads, not changes in other risk
factors. The banking organization would not be required to capture
jump-to-default risk in its VaR model. A banking organization would be
required to include any immaterial OTC derivative portfolios for which
it uses the current exposure methodology by using the EAD calculated
under the current exposure methodology as a constant EE in the formula
for the calculation of CVA and setting the maturity equal to the
greater of half of the longest maturity occurring in the netting set
and the notional weighted average maturity of all transactions in the
netting set.
In order for a banking organization to receive approval to use the
advanced CVA approach, under the NPR, the
[[Page 52986]]
banking organization would need to have the systems capability to
calculate the CVA capital requirement on a daily basis, but would not
be expected or required to calculate the CVA capital requirement on a
daily basis.
The CVA capital requirement under the advanced CVA approach would
be equal to the general market risk capital requirement of the CVA
exposure using the ten-business-day time horizon of the revised market
risk framework. The capital requirement would not include the
incremental risk requirement of subpart F. The agencies propose to
require a banking organization to use the Basel III formula for the
advanced CVA approach to calculate KCVA as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.025
In Formula 3:
(A) ti = the time of the i-th revaluation time bucket
starting from t0 = 0.
(B) tT = the longest contractual maturity across the OTC
derivative contracts with the counterparty.
(C) si = the CDS spread for the counterparty at tenor
ti used to calculate the CVA for the counterparty. If a
CDS spread is not available, the banking organization would use a
proxy spread based on the credit quality, industry and region of the
counterparty.
(D) LGDMKT = the loss given default of the counterparty
based on the spread of a publicly traded debt instrument of the
counterparty, or, where a publicly traded debt instrument spread is
not available, a proxy spread based on the credit quality, industry
and region of the counterparty.
(E) EEi = the sum of the expected exposures for all
netting sets with the counterparty at revaluation time ti
calculated using the IMM.
(F) Di = the risk-free discount factor at time
ti, where D0 = 1.
(G) Exp is the exponential function.
Under the proposal, if a banking organization's VaR model is not
based on full repricing, the banking organization would use either
Formula 4 or Formula 5 to calculate credit spread sensitivities. If the
VaR model is based on credit spread sensitivities for specific tenors,
the banking organization would calculate each credit spread sensitivity
according to Formula 4:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.026
If the VaR model uses credit spread sensitivities to parallel
shifts in credit spreads, the banking organization would calculate each
credit spread sensitivity according to Formula 5:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.027
\9\ For the final time bucket, i = T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 52987]]
To calculate the CVAUnstressedVAR measure in Formula 3,
a banking organization would use the EE for a counterparty calculated
using current market data to compute current exposures and would
estimate model parameters using the historical observation period
required under section 205(b)(2) of subpart F. However, if a banking
organization uses the shortcut method described in section 132(d)(5) of
the proposed rule to capture the effect of a collateral agreement when
estimating EAD using the IMM, the banking organization would calculate
the EE for the counterparty using that method and keep that EE constant
with the maturity equal to the maximum of half of the longest maturity
occurring in the netting set, and the notional weighted average
maturity of all transactions in the netting set.
To calculate the CVAStressedVAR measure in Formula 3,
the banking organization would use the EEi for a
counterparty calculated using the stress calibration of the IMM.
However, if a banking organization uses the shortcut method described
in section 132(d)(5) of the proposed rule to capture the effect of a
collateral agreement when estimating EAD using the IMM, the banking
organization would calculate the EEi for the counterparty
using that method and keep that EEi constant with the
maturity equal to the greater of half of the longest maturity occurring
in the netting set with the notional amount equal to the weighted
average maturity of all transactions in the netting set. Consistent
with Basel III, the agencies propose to require a banking organization
to calibrate the VaR model inputs to historical data from the most
severe twelve-month stress period contained within the three-year
stress period used to calculate EEi. However, the agencies
propose to retain the flexibility to require a banking organization to
use a different period of significant financial stress in the
calculation of the CVAStressedVAR measure that would better
reflect actual historic losses of the portfolio.
Under the NPR, a banking organization's VaR model would be required
to capture the basis between the spreads of the index that is used as
the hedging instrument and the hedged counterparty exposure over
various time periods, including benign and stressed environments. If
the VaR model does not capture that basis, the banking organization
would be permitted to reflect only 50 percent of the notional amount of
the CDSind hedge in the VaR model. The remaining 50 percent
of the notional amount of the CDSind hedge would be a
covered position under the market risk capital rule.
Question 4: The agencies solicit comments on the proposed CVA
capital requirements, including the simple CVA approach and the
advanced CVA approach.
5. Cleared Transactions (Central Counterparties)
CCPs help improve the safety and soundness of the derivatives and
repo-style transaction markets through the multilateral netting of
exposures, establishment and enforcement of collateral requirements,
and market transparency. Under the current advanced approaches rule,
exposures to qualifying central counterparties (QCCPs) received a zero
percent risk weight. However, when developing Basel III, the BCBS
recognized that as more derivatives and repo-style transactions move to
CCPs, the potential for systemic risk increases. To address these
concerns, the BCBS has sought comment on a specific capital requirement
for such transactions with CCPs and a more risk-sensitive approach for
determining a capital requirement for a banking organization's
contributions to the default funds of these CCPs. The BCBS also has
sought comment on a preferential capital treatment for exposures
arising from derivative and repo-style transactions with, and related
default fund contributions to, CCPs that meet the standards established
by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).\10\ The
treatment for exposures that arise from the settlement of cash
transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot (FX), and spot
commodities) with a QCCP where there is no assumption of ongoing
counterparty credit risk by the QCCP after settlement of the trade and
associated default fund contributions remains unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See CPSS, ``Recommendations for Central Counterparties,''
(November 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss64.pdf?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A banking organization that is a clearing member, a term that is
defined in the Basel III NPR as a member of, or direct participant in,
a CCP that is entitled to enter into transactions with the CCP, or a
clearing member client, proposed to be defined as a party to a cleared
transaction associated with a CCP in which a clearing member acts
either as a financial intermediary with respect to the party or
guarantees the performance of the party to the CCP, would first
calculate its trade exposure for a cleared transaction. The trade
exposure amount for a cleared transaction would be determined as
follows:
(1) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or
netting set of derivative contracts, the trade exposure amount equals:
(i) The exposure amount for the derivative contract or netting set
of derivative contracts, calculated using the methodology used to
calculate exposure amount for OTC derivative contracts under section
132(c) or 132(d) of this NPR, plus
(ii) The fair value of the collateral posted by the banking
organization and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that
is not bankruptcy remote.
(2) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction, the
trade exposure amount equals:
(i) The exposure amount for the repo-style transaction calculated
using the methodologies under sections 132(b)(2), 132(b)(3) or 132(d)
of this NPR, plus
(ii) The fair value of the collateral posted by the banking
organization and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that
is not bankruptcy remote.
When the banking organization calculates EAD under the IMM, EAD
would be calculated using the most recent three years of historical
data, that is, EADunstressed. Trade exposure would not
include any collateral held by a custodian in a manner that is
bankruptcy remote from the CCP.
Under the proposal, a clearing member banking organization would
apply a risk weight of 2 percent to its trade exposure amount with a
QCCP. The proposed definition of QCCP is discussed in the Standardized
Approach NPR preamble. A banking organization that is a clearing member
client would apply a 2 percent risk weight to the trade exposure amount
if:
(1) The collateral posted by the banking organization to the QCCP
or clearing member is subject to an arrangement that prevents any
losses to the clearing member due to the joint default or a concurrent
insolvency, liquidation, or receivership proceeding of the clearing
member and any other clearing member clients of the clearing member;
and
(2) The clearing member client has conducted sufficient legal
review to conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains sufficient
written documentation of that legal review) that in the event of a
legal challenge (including one resulting from default or a
receivership, insolvency, or liquidation proceeding) the relevant court
and administrative authorities
[[Page 52988]]
would find the arrangements to be legal, valid, binding, and
enforceable under the law of the relevant jurisdiction, provided
certain additional criteria are met.
The agencies believe that omnibus accounts (that is, accounts that
are generally established by clearing entities for non-clearing
members) in the United States would satisfy these requirements because
of the protections afforded client accounts under certain regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC).\11\ If the criteria above are not met, a
banking organization that is a clearing member client would apply a
risk weight of 4 percent to the trade exposure amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C
Section 78aaa--78lll; 17 CFR part 300; 17 CFR part 190.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member and a banking organization that is a clearing member client
would risk weight the trade exposure according to the risk weight
applicable to the CCP under the Standardized Approach NPR.
Collateral posted by a clearing member or clearing member client
banking organization that is held in a manner that is bankruptcy remote
from the CCP would not be subject to a capital requirement for
counterparty credit risk. As with all posted collateral, the banking
organization would continue to have a capital requirement for any
collateral provided to a CCP or a custodian in connection with a
cleared transaction.
Under the proposal, a cleared transaction would not include an
exposure of a banking organization that is a clearing member to its
clearing member client where the banking organization is either acting
as a financial intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction
with a CCP or where the banking organization provides a guarantee to
the CCP on the performance of the client. Such a transaction would be
treated as an OTC derivative transaction. However, the agencies
recognize that this treatment may create a disincentive for banking
organizations to act as intermediaries and provide access to CCPs for
clients. As a result, the agencies are considering approaches that
could address this disincentive while at the same time appropriately
reflect the risks of these transactions. For example, one approach
would allow banking organizations that are clearing members to adjust
the EAD calculated under section 132 downward by a certain percentage
or, for banking organizations using the IMM, to adjust the margin
period of risk. International discussions are ongoing on this issue,
and the agencies would expect to revisit the treatment of these
transactions in the event that the BCBS revises its treatment of these
transactions.
Default Fund Contribution
The agencies are proposing that, under the advanced approaches
rule, a banking organization that is a clearing member of a CCP
calculate its capital requirement for its default fund contributions at
least quarterly or more frequently upon material changes to the CCP.
Banking organizations seeking more information on the proposed risk-
based capital treatment of default fund contributions should refer to
the preamble of the Standardized Approach NPR.
Question 5: The agencies request comment on the proposed treatment
of cleared transactions. The agencies solicit comment on whether the
proposal provides an appropriately risk-sensitive treatment of a
transaction between a banking organization that is a clearing member
and its client and a clearing member's guarantee of its client's
transaction with a CCP by treating these exposures as OTC derivative
contracts. The agencies also request comment on whether the adjustment
of the exposure amount would address possible disincentives for banking
organizations that are clearing members to facilitate the clearing of
their clients' transactions. What other approaches should the agencies
consider and why?
Question 6: The agencies are seeking comment on the proposed
calculation of the risk-based capital for cleared transactions,
including the proposed risk-based capital requirements for exposures to
a QCCP. Are there specific types of exposures to certain QCCPs that
would warrant an alternative risk-based capital approach? Please
provide a detailed description of such transactions or exposures, the
mechanics of the alternative risk-based approach, and the supporting
rationale.
6. Stress Period for Own Internal Estimates
Under the collateral haircut approach in the advanced approaches
rule, banking organizations that receive prior approval from their
primary federal supervisory may calculate market price and foreign
exchange volatility using own internal estimates. To receive approval
to use such an approach, banking organizations are required to base own
internal estimates on a historical observation period of at least one
year, among other criteria. During the financial crisis, increased
volatility in the value of collateral led to higher counterparty
exposures than estimated by banking organizations. In response, the
agencies are proposing in this NPR to modify the quantitative standards
for approval by requiring banking organizations to base own internal
estimates of haircuts on a historical observation period that reflects
a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress
appropriate to the security or category of securities. As described in
the Standardized Approach NPR preamble, a banking organization would
also be required to have policies and procedures that describe how it
determines the period of significant financial stress used to calculate
the banking organization's own internal estimates, and to be able to
provide empirical support for the period used. To ensure an appropriate
level of conservativeness, in certain circumstances a primary federal
supervisor may require a banking organization to use a different period
of significant financial stress in the calculation of own internal
estimates for haircuts.
B. Removal of Credit Ratings
Consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, the agencies
are proposing a number of changes to the definitions in the advanced
approaches rule that currently reference credit ratings.\12\ These
changes are similar to alternative standards proposed in the
Standardized Approach NPR and alternative standards that already have
been implemented in the agencies' market risk capital rule. In
addition, the agencies are proposing necessary changes to the hierarchy
for risk weighting securitization exposures necessitated by the removal
of the ratings-based approach, as described further below.
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\12\ See 76 FR 79380 (Dec. 21, 2011).
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The agencies propose to use an ``investment grade'' standard that
does not rely on credit ratings as an alternative standard in a number
of requirements under the advanced approaches rule, as explained below.
Under this NPR and the Standardized Approach NPR, investment grade
would mean that the entity to which the banking organization is exposed
through a loan or security, or the reference entity with respect to a
credit derivative, has adequate capacity to meet financial commitments
for the projected life of the asset or exposure. Such an entity or
reference entity has adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if
the risk
[[Page 52989]]
of its default is low and the full and timely repayment of principal
and interest is expected.
Eligible Guarantor
Under the current advanced approaches rule, guarantors are required
to meet a number of criteria in order to be considered as eligible
guarantors under the securitization framework. For example, the entity
must have issued and outstanding an unsecured long-term debt security
without credit enhancement that has a long-term applicable external
rating in one of the three highest investment-grade rating categories.
The agencies are proposing to replace the term ``eligible
securitization guarantor'' with the term ``eligible guarantor,'' which
includes certain entities that have issued and outstanding an unsecured
debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade.
Other modifications to the definition of eligible guarantor are
discussed in subpart C of this preamble.
Eligible Double Default Guarantor
Under this proposal, the term ``eligible double default
guarantor,'' with respect to a guarantee or credit derivative obtained
by a banking organization, means:
(1) U.S.-based-entities. A depository institution, bank holding
company, savings and loan holding company, or securities broker or
dealer registered with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o et seq.), if at the time the guarantee is issued or
any time thereafter, has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt
security without credit enhancement that is investment grade.
(2) Non-U.S.-based entities. A foreign bank, or a non-U.S.-based
securities firm if the banking organization demonstrates that the
guarantor is subject to consolidated supervision and regulation
comparable to that imposed on U.S. depository institutions, or
securities broker-dealers) if at the time the guarantee is issued or
anytime thereafter, has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt
security without credit enhancement that is investment grade. Under the
proposal, insurance companies in the business of providing credit
protection would no longer be eligible double default guarantors.
Conversion Factor Matrix for OTC Derivative Contracts
Under this proposal and Standardized Approach NPR, the agencies
propose to retain the metrics used to calculate the potential future
exposure (PFE) for derivative contracts (as set forth in table 3 of the
proposed rule), and apply the proposed definition of ``investment
grade.''
Money Market Fund Approach
Previously, under the advanced approaches money market fund
approach, banking organizations were permitted to assign a 7 percent
risk weight to exposures to money market funds that were subject to SEC
rule 2a-7 and that had an applicable external rating in the highest
investment grade rating category. In this NPR, the agencies propose to
eliminate the money market fund approach. The agencies believe it is
appropriate to eliminate the preferential risk weight for money market
fund investments due to the agencies' and banking organizations'
experience with them during the recent financial crisis, in which they
demonstrated, at times, elevated credit risk. As a result of the
proposed changes, a banking organization would use one of the three
alternative approaches under section 154 of this proposal to determine
the risk weight for its exposures to a money market fund, subject to a
20 percent floor.
Modified Look-Through Approaches for Equity Exposures to Investment
Funds
Under the proposal, risk weights for equity exposures under the
simple modified look-through approach would be based on the highest
risk weight assigned according to subpart D of the Standardized
Approach NPR based on the investment limits in the fund's prospectus,
partnership agreement, or similar contract that defines the fund's
permissible investments.
Qualifying Operational Risk Mitigants
Under section 161 of the proposal, a banking organization may
adjust its estimate of operational risk exposure to reflect qualifying
operational risk mitigants. Previously, for insurance to be considered
as a qualifying operational risk mitigant, it was required to be
provided by an unaffiliated company rated in the three highest rating
categories by a nationally recognized statistical ratings organization
(NRSRO). Under the proposal, qualifying operational risk mitigants,
among other criteria, would be required to be provided by an
unaffiliated company that the banking organization deems to have strong
capacity to meet its claims payment obligations and the obligor rating
category to which the banking organization assigns the company is
assigned a PD equal to or less than 10 basis points.
Question 7: The agencies request comment on the proposed use of
alternative standards as they would relate to the definitions of
investment grade, eligible guarantor, eligible double default guarantor
under the advanced approaches rule, as well as the treatment of certain
OTC derivative contracts, operational risk mitigants, money market
mutual funds, and investment funds under the advanced approaches rule.
C. Proposed Revisions to the Treatment of Securitization Exposures
1. Definitions
Consistent with the 2009 Enhancements and as proposed in the
Standardized Approach NPR, the agencies are proposing to introduce a
new definition for resecuritization exposures and broaden the
definition of securitization. In addition, the agencies are proposing
to amend the existing definition of traditional securitization in order
to exclude certain types of investment firms from treatment under the
securitization framework.
The definition of a securitization exposure would be broadened to
include an exposure that directly or indirectly references a
securitization exposure. Specifically, a securitization exposure would
be defined as an on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet credit exposure
(including credit-enhancing representations and warranties) that arises
from a traditional securitization or synthetic securitization exposure
(including a resecuritization), or an exposure that directly or
indirectly references a securitization exposure. The agencies are
proposing to define a resecuritization exposure as (1) an on- or off-
balance sheet exposure to a resecuritization; or (2) an exposure that
directly or indirectly references a resecuritization exposure. An
exposure to an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) program would not
be a resecuritization exposure if either: the program-wide credit
enhancement does not meet the definition of a resecuritization
exposure; or the entity sponsoring the program fully supports the
commercial paper through the provision of liquidity so that the
commercial paper holders effectively are exposed to the default risk of
the sponsor instead of the underlying exposures. Resecuritization would
mean a securitization in which one or more of the underlying exposures
is a securitization exposure.
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that resecuritization
exposures, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) comprised of
asset-backed securities (ABS), generally present greater levels of risk
relative to
[[Page 52990]]
other securitization exposures due to their increased complexity and
lack of transparency and potential to concentrate systematic risk.
Accordingly, the 2009 Enhancements amended the Basel II internal
ratings-based approach in the securitization framework to require a
banking organization to assign higher risk weights to resecuritization
exposures than other, similarly-rated securitization exposures. In this
proposal, the agencies are proposing to assign risk weights under the
simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) in a manner that would
result in higher risk weights for resecuritization exposures. In
addition, the agencies are proposing to modify the definition of
financial collateral such that resecuritizations would no longer
qualify as eligible financial collateral under the advanced approaches
rule.
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
The following is an example of how to evaluate whether a
transaction involving a traditional multi-seller ABCP conduit would be
considered a resecuritization exposure under the proposed rule. In this
example, an ABCP conduit acquires securitization exposures where the
underlying assets consist of wholesale loans and no securitization
exposures. As is typically the case in multi-seller ABCP conduits, each
seller provides first-loss protection by over-collateralizing the
conduit to which it sells its loans. To ensure that the commercial
paper issued by each conduit is highly-rated, a banking organization
sponsor provides either a pool-specific liquidity facility or a
program-wide credit enhancement such as a guarantee to cover a portion
of the losses above the seller-provided protection.
The pool-specific liquidity facility generally would not be treated
as a resecuritization exposure under this proposal because the pool-
specific liquidity facility represents a tranche of a single asset pool
(that is, the applicable pool of wholesale exposures), which contains
no securitization exposures. However, a sponsor's program-wide credit
enhancement that does not cover all losses above the seller-provided
credit enhancement across the various pools generally would constitute
tranching of risk of a pool of multiple assets containing at least one
securitization exposure, and therefore would be treated as a
resecuritization exposure.
In addition, if the conduit from the example funds itself entirely
with a single class of commercial paper, then the commercial paper
generally would not be considered a resecuritization exposure if either
the program-wide credit enhancement did not meet the proposed
definition of a resecuritization exposure, or the commercial paper was
fully guaranteed by the sponsoring banking organization. When the
sponsoring banking organization fully guarantees the commercial paper,
the commercial paper holders effectively would be exposed to the
default risk of the sponsor instead of the underlying exposures, thus
ensuring that the commercial paper does not represent a tranched risk
position.
Definition of Traditional Securitization
Since issuing the advanced approaches rules in 2007, the agencies
have received feedback from banking organizations that the existing
definition of traditional securitization is inconsistent with their
risk experience and market practice. The agencies have reviewed this
definition in light of this feedback and agree with commenters that
changes to it may be appropriate. The agencies are proposing to exclude
from the definition of traditional securitization exposures to
investment funds, collective investment funds, pension funds regulated
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and their
foreign equivalents, and transactions regulated under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and their foreign equivalents, because these
entities are generally prudentially regulated and subject to strict
leverage requirements. Moreover, the agencies believe that the capital
requirements for an extension of credit to, or an equity holding in
these transactions would be more appropriately calculated under the
rules for corporate and equity exposures, and that the securitization
framework was not designed to apply to such transactions.
Accordingly, the agencies propose to amend the definition of a
traditional securitization by excluding any fund that is (1) An
investment fund, as defined under the rule, (2) a pension fund
regulated under ERISA or a foreign equivalent, or (3) a company
regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a foreign
equivalent. Under the current rule, the definition of investment fund,
which the agencies are not proposing to amend, means a company all or
substantially all of the assets of which are financial assets; and that
has no material liabilities.
Question 8: The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions
to the definition of traditional securitization.
Under the current advanced approaches rule, the definition of
eligible securitization guarantor includes, among other entities, any
entity (other than a securitization special purpose entity (SPE)) that
has issued and has outstanding an unsecured long-term debt security
without credit enhancement that has a long-term applicable external
rating in one of the three highest investment-grade rating categories,
or has a PD assigned by the banking organization that is lower than or
equal to the PD associated with a long-term external rating in the
third highest investment grade category. The agencies are proposing to
remove the existing references to ratings from the definition of an
eligible guarantor (the proposed new term for an eligible
securitization guarantor). As revised, the definition for an eligible
guarantor would include:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), a multilateral development bank, a depository
institution, a bank holding company, a savings and loan holding company
(as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1467a), a credit union, or a foreign bank; or
(2) An entity (other than an SPE):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter,
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit
enhancement that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond
insurer or re-insurer).
During the financial crisis, certain guarantors of securitization
exposures had difficulty honoring those guarantees as the financial
condition of the guarantors deteriorated at the same time as the
guaranteed exposures experienced losses. Therefore, the agencies are
proposing to add the requirement related to the correlation between the
guarantor's creditworthiness and the credit risk of the exposures it
has guaranteed to address this concern.
Question 9: The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions
to the definition of eligible securitization guarantor.
[[Page 52991]]
2. Operational Criteria for Recognizing Risk Transference in
Traditional Securitizations
Section 41 of the current advanced approaches rule includes
operational criteria for recognizing the transfer of risk. Under the
criteria, a banking organization that transfers exposures that it has
originated or purchased to a securitization SPE or other third party in
connection with a traditional securitization may exclude the exposures
from the calculation of risk-weighted assets only if certain conditions
are met. Among the criteria listed is that the transfer is considered a
sale under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
The purpose of the criterion that the transfer be considered a sale
under GAAP was to ensure that the banking organization that transferred
the exposures was not required under GAAP to consolidate the exposures
on its balance sheet. Given changes in GAAP since the rule was
published in 2007, the agencies propose to amend paragraph (a)(1) of
section 41 of the advanced approaches rule to require that the
transferred exposures are not reported on the banking organization's
balance sheet under GAAP.\13\
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\13\ For more information on the changes in GAAP related to the
transfer of exposures, see Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Topics 810 and 860.
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Question 10: The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions
to operational criteria under section 41 of the advanced approaches
rule.
3. Proposed Revisions to the Hierarchy of Approaches
Consistent with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, the agencies
are proposing to remove the advanced approaches rule's ratings-based
approach (RBA) and internal assessment approach (IAA) for
securitization exposures. Under the proposal, the hierarchy for
securitization exposures would be modified as follows:
(1) A banking organization would be required to deduct from common
equity tier 1 capital any after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a
securitization and apply a 1,250 percent risk weight to the portion of
a credit-enhancing interest-only strip (CEIO) that does not constitute
after-tax gain-on-sale.
(2) If a securitization exposure does not require deduction, a
banking organization would be required to assign a risk weight to the
securitization exposure using the supervisory formula approach (SFA).
The agencies expect banking organizations to use the SFA rather than
the SSFA in all instances where data to calculate the SFA is available.
(3) If the banking organization cannot apply the SFA because not
all the relevant qualification criteria are met, it would be allowed to
apply the SSFA. A banking organization should be able to explain and
justify (e.g., based on data availability) to its primary federal
regulator any instances in which the banking organization uses the SSFA
rather than the SFA for its securitization exposures.
If the banking organization does not apply the SSFA to the
exposure, the banking organization would be required to assign a 1,250
percent risk weight, unless the exposure qualifies for a treatment
available to certain ABCP exposures under section 44 of Standardized
Approach NPR.
The SSFA, described in detail in the Standardized Approach NPR, is
similar in construct and function to the SFA. A banking organization
would need several inputs to calculate the SSFA. The first input is the
weighted-average capital requirement under the requirements described
in Standardized Approach NPR that would be applied to the underlying
exposures if they were held directly by the banking organization. The
second and third inputs indicate the position's level of subordination
and relative size within the securitization. The fourth input is the
level of delinquencies experienced on the underlying exposures. A bank
would apply the hierarchy of approaches in section 142 of this proposed
rule to determine which approach it would apply to a securitization
exposure.
Banking organizations using the advanced approaches rule should
note that the Standardized Approach NPR would require the use of the
SSFA for certain securitizations subject to the advanced approaches
rule.
Question 11: The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions
to the hierarchy for securitization exposures under the advanced
approaches rule.
4. Guarantees and Credit Derivatives Referencing a Securitization
Exposure
The advanced approaches rule includes methods for calculating risk-
weighted assets for nth-to-default credit derivatives, including first-
to-default credit derivatives and second-or-subsequent-to-default
credit derivatives.\14\ The advanced approaches rule, however, does not
specify how to treat guarantees or non-nth-to-default credit
derivatives purchased or sold that reference a securitization exposure.
Accordingly, the agencies are proposing clarifying revisions to the
risk-based capital requirements for credit protection purchased or
provided in the form of a guarantee or derivative other than nth-to-
default credit derivatives that reference a securitization exposure.
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\14\ Nth-to-default credit derivative means a credit derivative
that provides credit protection only for the nth-defaulting
reference exposure in a group of reference exposures. See 12 CFR
part 3, appendix C, section 42(l) (OCC); 12 CFR part 208, appendix
F, and 12 CFR part 225, appendix G (Board); 12 CFR part 325,
appendix D, section 4(l), and 12 CFR part 390, subpart Z, appendix
A, section 4(l) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a guarantee or credit derivative (other than an nth-to-default
credit derivative), the proposal would require a banking organization
to determine the risk-based capital requirement for the guarantee or
credit derivative as if it directly holds the portion of the reference
exposure covered by the guarantee or credit derivative. The banking
organization would calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the
guarantee or credit derivative by applying either (1) the SFA as
provided in section 143 of the proposal to the reference exposure if
the bank and the reference exposure qualify for the SFA; or (2) the
SSFA as provided in section 144 of the proposal. If the guarantee or
credit derivative and the reference securitization exposure would not
qualify for the SFA, or the SSFA, the bank would be required to assign
a 1,250 percent risk weight to the notional amount of protection
provided under the guarantee or credit derivative.
The proposal also would modify the advanced approaches rule to
clarify how a banking organization may recognize a guarantee or credit
derivative (other than an nth-to-default credit derivative) purchased
as a credit risk mitigant for a securitization exposure held by the
banking organization. In addition, the proposal adds a provision that
would require a banking organization to use section 131 of the proposal
instead of the approach required under the hierarchy of approaches in
section 142 to calculate the risk-based capital requirements for a
credit protection purchased by a banking organization in the form of a
guarantee or credit derivative (other than an nth-to-default credit
derivative) that references a securitization exposure that a banking
organization does not hold. Credit protection purchased that references
a securitization exposure not held by a banking organization subjects
the banking organization to counterparty credit risk with respect to
the credit protection but not credit risk to the securitization
exposure.
[[Page 52992]]
Question 12: The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions
to the treatment of guarantees and credit derivatives that reference a
securitization exposure.
5. Due Diligence Requirements for Securitization Exposures
As the recent financial crisis unfolded, weaknesses in exposures
underlying securitizations became apparent and resulted in NRSROs
downgrading many securitization exposures held by banks. The agencies
found that many banking organizations relied on NRSRO ratings as a
proxy for the credit quality of securitization exposures they purchased
and held without conducting their own sufficient independent credit
analysis. As a result, some banking organizations did not have
sufficient capital to absorb the losses attributable to these
exposures. Accordingly, consistent with the 2009 Enhancements, the
agencies are proposing to implement due diligence requirements that
banking organizations would be required to use the SFA or SSFA to
determine the risk-weighted asset amount for securitization exposures
under the advanced approaches proposal. These disclosure requirements
are consistent with those required in the standardized approach, as
discussed in the Standardized Approach NPR.
Question 13: The agencies solicit comments on what, if any, are
specific challenges that are involved with meeting the proposed due
diligence requirements and for what types of securitization exposures?
How might the agencies address these challenges while ensuring that a
banking organization conducts an appropriate level of due diligence
commensurate with the risks of its exposures?
6. Nth-to-Default Credit Derivatives
The agencies propose that a banking organization that provides
credit protection through an nth-to-default derivative assign a risk
weight to the derivative using the SFA or the SSFA. In the case of
credit protection sold, a banking organization would determine its
exposure in the nth-to-default credit derivative as the largest
notional dollar amount of all the underlying exposures.
When applying the SSFA to protection provided in the form of an
nth-to-default credit derivative, the attachment point (parameter A) is
the ratio of the sum of the notional amounts of all underlying
exposures that are subordinated to the banking organization's exposure
to the total notional amount of all underlying exposures. For purposes
of applying the SFA, parameter A would be set equal to the credit
enhancement level (L) used in the SFA formula. In the case of a first-
to-default credit derivative, there are no underlying exposures that
are subordinated to the banking organization's exposure. In the case of
a second-or-subsequent-to default credit derivative, the smallest (n-1)
underlying exposure(s) are subordinated to the banking organization's
exposure.
Under the SSFA, the detachment point (parameter D) would be the sum
of the attachment point and the ratio of the notional amount of the
banking organization's exposure to the total notional amount of the
underlying exposures. Under the SFA, Parameter D would be set to equal
L plus the thickness of the tranche (T) under the SFA formula. A
banking organization that does not use the SFA or SSFA to calculate a
risk weight for an nth-to-default credit derivative would assign a risk
weight of 1,250 percent to the exposure.
For the treatment of protection purchased through an nth-to-
default, a banking organization would determine its risk-based capital
requirement for the underlying exposures as if the banking organization
had synthetically securitized the underlying exposure with the lowest
risk-based capital requirement and had obtained no credit risk mitigant
on the underlying exposures. A banking organization would calculate a
risk-based capital requirement for counterparty credit risk according
to section 132 of the proposal for a first-to-default credit derivative
that does not meet the rules of recognition for guarantees and credit
derivatives under section 134(b).
A banking organization that obtains credit protection on a group of
underlying exposures through a nth-to-default credit derivative that
meets the rules of recognition of section 134(b) of the proposal (other
than a first-to-default credit derivative) would be permitted to
recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of the derivative only if
the banking organization also has obtained credit protection on the
same underlying exposures in the form of first-through-(n-1)-to-default
credit derivatives; or if n-1 of the underlying exposures have already
defaulted. If a banking organization satisfies these requirements, the
banking organization would determine its risk-based capital requirement
for the underlying exposures as if the banking organization had only
synthetically securitized the underlying exposure with the nth lowest
risk-based capital requirement and had obtained no credit risk mitigant
on the other underlying exposures. A banking organization that does not
fulfill these requirements would calculate a risk-based capital
requirement for counterparty credit risk according to section 132 of
the proposal for a nth-to-default credit derivative that does not meet
the rules of recognition of section 134(b) of the proposal.
For a guarantee or credit derivative (other than an nth-to-default
credit derivative) provided by a banking organization that covers the
full amount or a pro rata share of a securitization exposure's
principal and interest, the banking organization would risk weight the
guarantee or credit derivative as if it holds the portion of the
reference exposure covered by the guarantee or credit derivative.
As a protection purchaser, if a banking organization chooses (and
is able) to recognize a guarantee or credit derivative (other than an
nth-to-default credit derivative) that references a securitization
exposure as a credit risk mitigant, where applicable, the banking
organization must apply section 145 of the proposal for the recognition
of credit risk mitigants. If a banking organization cannot, or chooses
not to, recognize a credit derivative that references a securitization
exposure as a credit risk mitigant under section 145, the banking
organization would determine its capital requirement only for
counterparty credit risk in accordance with section 131 of the
proposal.
Question 14: The agencies request comment on the proposed treatment
for nth-to-default credit derivatives.
D. Treatment of Exposures Subject to Deduction
Under the current advanced approaches rule, a banking organization
must deduct certain exposures from total capital, including
securitization exposures such as CEIOs, low-rated securitization
exposures, and high-risk securitization exposures subject to the SFA;
eligible credit reserves shortfall; and certain failed capital markets
transactions.\15\ Consistent with Basel III, the agencies are proposing
that the exposures noted above that are currently deducted from total
capital would instead be assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight, except
as required under
[[Page 52993]]
subpart B of the Standardized Approach NPR, and except for deductions
from total capital of insurance underwriting subsidiaries of bank
holding companies. The proposed change would reduce the differences in
the measure of tier 1 capital for risk-based capital purposes under the
advanced approaches rule as compared to the leverage capital
requirements.
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\15\ Section 42(a)(1) of the advanced approaches rule states, in
part, that a banking organization must deduct from total capital the
portion of any CEIO that does not constitute gain-on-sale. The
proposal would clarify that this provision relates to any CEIO that
does not constitute after-tax gain-on-sale; see 12 CFR part 3,
appendix C, section 11, and 12 CFR part 167, section 11 (OCC); 12
CFR part 208, appendix F, section 11, and 12 CFR part 225, appendix
G, section 11 (Board); 12 CFR part 325, appendix D, section 11, and
12 CFR part 390, subpart Z, appendix A, section 11 (FDIC).
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The agencies note that such treatment is not equivalent to a
deduction from tier 1 capital, as the effect of a 1,250 percent risk
weight would depend on an individual banking organization's current
risk-based capital ratios. Specifically, when a risk-based capital
ratio (either tier 1 or total risk-based capital) exceeds 8.0 percent,
the effect on that risk-based capital ratio of assigning an exposure a
1,250 percent risk weight would be more conservative than a deduction
from total capital. The more a risk-based capital ratio exceeds 8.0
percent, the harsher is the effect of a 1,250 percent risk weight on
risk-based capital ratios. Conversely, the effect of a 1,250 percent
risk weight would be less harsh than a deduction from total capital for
any risk-based capital ratio that is below 8.0 percent. Unlike a
deduction from total capital, however, a bank's leverage ratio would
not be affected by assigning an exposure a 1,250 percent risk weight.
The agencies are not proposing to apply a 1,250 percent risk weight
to those exposures currently deducted from tier 1 capital under the
advanced approaches rule. For example, the agencies are proposing that
gain-on-sale that is deducted from tier 1 under the advanced approaches
rule be deducted from common equity tier 1 under the proposed rule. In
this regard, the agencies also clarify that any asset deducted from
common equity tier 1, tier 1, or tier 2 capital under the advanced
approaches rule would not be included in the measure of risk-weighted
assets under the advanced approaches rule.
Question 15: The agencies request comment on the proposed 1,250
percent risk weighting approach to CEIOs, low-rated securitization
exposures, and high-risk securitization exposures subject to the SFA,
any eligible credit reserves shortfall, and certain failed capital
markets transactions.
E. Technical Amendments to the Advanced Approaches Rule
The agencies are proposing other amendments to the advanced
approaches rule that are designed to refine and clarify certain aspects
of the rule's implementation. Each of these revisions is described
below.
1. Eligible Guarantees and Contingent U.S. Government Guarantees
In order to be recognized as an eligible guarantee under the
advanced approaches rule, the guarantee, among other criteria, must be
unconditional. The agencies note that this definition would exclude
certain guarantees provided by the U.S. Government or its agencies that
would require some action on the part of the bank or some other third
party. However, based on their risk perspective, the agencies believe
that these guarantees should be recognized as eligible guarantees.
Therefore, the agencies are proposing to amend the definition of
eligible guarantee so that it explicitly includes a contingent
obligation of the U.S. Government or an agency of the U.S. Government,
the validity of which is dependent on some affirmative action on the
part of the beneficiary or a third party (for example, servicing
requirements) irrespective of whether such contingent obligation would
otherwise be considered a conditional guarantee. A corresponding
provision is included in section 36 of the Standardized Approach NPR.
2. Calculation of Foreign Exposures for Applicability of the Advanced
Approaches--Insurance Underwriting Subsidiaries
A banking organization is subject to the advanced approaches rule
if it has consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion, or
if it has total consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposures of at
least $10 billion.\16\ For bank holding companies, in particular, the
advanced approaches rule provides that the $250 billion threshold
criterion excludes assets held by an insurance underwriting subsidiary.
However, a similar provision does not exist for the $10 billion
foreign-exposure threshold criteria. Therefore, for bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies, the Board is
proposing to exclude assets held by insurance underwriting subsidiaries
from the $10 billion in total foreign exposures threshold. The Board
believes such a parallel provision would result in a more appropriate
scope of application for the advanced approaches rule.
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\16\ See 12 CFR part 3, appendix C, and 12 CFR part 167,
appendix C (OCC); 12 CFR part 208, appendix F, and 12 CFR part 225,
appendix G (Board); 12 CFR part 325, appendix D, and 12 CFR part
390, subpart Z (FDIC).
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3. Calculation of Foreign Exposures for Applicability of the Advanced
Approaches--Changes to FFIEC 009
The agencies are proposing to revise the advanced approaches rule
to comport with changes to the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) Country Exposure Report (FFIEC 009) that
occurred after the issuance of the advanced approaches rule in 2007.
Specifically, the FFIEC 009 replaced the term ``local country claims''
with the term ``foreign-office claims.'' Accordingly, the agencies have
made a similar change under section 100, the section of the advanced
approaches rule that makes the rules applicable to a banking
organization that has consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign
exposures equal to $10 billion or more. As a result, to determine total
on-balance sheet foreign exposure, a bank would sum its adjusted cross-
border claims, local country claims, and cross-border revaluation gains
calculated in accordance with FFIEC 009. Adjusted cross-border claims
would equal total cross-border claims less claims with the head office
or guarantor located in another country, plus redistributed guaranteed
amounts to the country of the head office or guarantor.
4. Applicability of the Rule
The agencies believe it would not be appropriate for banking
organizations to move in and out of the scope of the advanced
approaches rule based on fluctuating asset sizes. As a result, the
agencies are proposing to amend the advanced approaches rule to clarify
that once a banking organization is subject to the advanced approaches
rule, it would remain subject to the rule until its primary federal
supervisor determines that application of the rule would not be
appropriate in light of the banking organization's asset size, level of
complexity, risk profile, or scope of operations. In connection with
the consideration of a banking organization's level of complexity, risk
profile, and scope of operations, the agencies also may consider a
banking organization's interconnectedness and other relevant risk-
related factors.
5. Change to the Definition of Probability of Default Related to
Seasoning
The advanced approaches rule requires an upward adjustment to
estimated PD for segments of retail exposures for which seasoning
effects are material. The rationale underlying this requirement was the
seasoning pattern displayed by some types of retail
[[Page 52994]]
exposures--that is, the exposures have very low default rates in their
first year, rising default rates in the next few years, and declining
default rates for the remainder of their terms. Because of the one-year
internal ratings-based (IRB) default horizon, capital based on the very
low PDs for newly originated, or ``unseasoned,'' loans would be
insufficient to cover the elevated risk in subsequent years. The upward
seasoning adjustment to PD was designed to ensure that banking
organizations would have sufficient capital when default rates for such
segments rose predictably beginning in year two.
Since the issuance of the advanced approaches rule, the agencies
have found the seasoning provision to be problematic. First, it is
difficult to ensure consistency across institutions, given that there
is no guidance or criteria for determining when seasoning is
``material'' or what magnitude of upward adjustment to PD is
``appropriate.'' Second, the advanced approaches rule lacks flexibility
by requiring an upward PD adjustment whenever there is a significant
relationship between a segment's default rate and its age (since
origination). For example, the upward PD adjustment may be
inappropriate in cases where (1) The outstanding balance of a segment
is falling faster over time (due to defaults and prepayments) than the
default rate is rising; (2) the age (since origination) distribution of
a portfolio is stable over time; or (3) where the loans in a segment
are intended, with a high degree of certainty, to be sold or
securitized within a short time period.
Therefore, the agencies are proposing to delete the regulatory
(Pillar 1) seasoning provision and instead to treat seasoning under
Pillar 2. In addition to the difficulties in applying the advanced
approaches rule's seasoning requirements discussed above, the agencies
believe that the consideration of seasoning belongs more appropriately
in Pillar 2 First, seasoning involves the determination of minimum
required capital for a period in excess of the 12-month time horizon of
Pillar 1. It thus falls more appropriately under longer-term capital
planning and capital adequacy, which are major focal points of the
internal capital adequacy assessment process component of Pillar 2.
Second, seasoning is a major issue only where a banking organization
has a concentration of unseasoned loans. The capital treatment of loan
concentrations of all kinds is omitted from Pillar 1; however, it is
dealt with explicitly in Pillar 2.
6. Cash Items in Process of Collection
Previously under the advanced approaches rule issued in 2007, cash
items in the process of collection were not assigned a risk-based
capital treatment and, as a result, would have been subject to a 100
percent risk weight. Under the proposed rule, the agencies are revising
the advanced approaches rule to risk weight cash items in the process
of collection at 20 percent of the carrying value, as the agencies have
concluded that this treatment would be more commensurate with the risk
of these exposures. A corresponding provision is included in section 32
of the Standardized Approach NPR.
7. Change to the Definition of Qualified Revolving Exposure
The agencies are proposing to modify the definition of Qualified
Revolving Exposure (QRE) such that certain unsecured and
unconditionally cancellable exposures where a banking organization
consistently imposes in practice an upper exposure limit of $100,000
and requires payment in full every cycle will now qualify as QRE. Under
the current definition, only unsecured and unconditionally cancellable
revolving exposures with a pre-established maximum exposure amount of
$100,000 (such as credit cards) are classified as QRE. Unsecured,
unconditionally cancellable exposures that require payment in full and
have no communicated maximum exposure amount (often referred to as
``charge cards'') are instead classified as ``other retail.'' For
regulatory capital purposes, this classification is material and would
generally result in substantially higher minimum required capital to
the extent that the exposure's asset value correlation (AVC) will
differ if classified as QRE (where it is assigned an AVC of 4 percent)
or other retail (where AVC varies inversely with through-the-cycle PD
estimated at the segment level and can go as high as almost 16 percent
for very low PD segments).
The proposed definition would allow certain charge card products to
qualify as QRE. Charge card exposures may be viewed as revolving in
that there is an ability to borrow despite a requirement to pay in
full. Where a banking organization consistently imposes in practice an
upper exposure limit of $100,000 the agencies believe that charge cards
are more closely aligned from a risk perspective with credit cards than
with any type of ``other retail'' exposure and are therefore proposing
to amend the definition of QRE in order to allow such products to
qualify as QRE.
The agencies also have considered the appropriate treatment of
hybrid cards. Hybrid cards have characteristics of both charge and
credit cards. The agencies are uncertain whether it would be prudent to
allow hybrid cards to qualify as QREs at this time. Hybrid cards are a
relatively new product, and there is limited information available
about them including data on their market and risk characteristics.
Question 16: Do hybrid cards exhibit similar risk characteristics
to credit and charge cards and should the agencies allow them to
qualify as QREs? Commenters are requested to provide a detailed
explanation, as appropriate, as well as the relevant data and impact
analysis to support their positions. Such information should include
data on the number or dollar-amounts of cards issued to date,
anticipated growth rate, and performance data including default and
delinquency rates, credit score distribution of cardholders,
volatilities, or asset-value correlations.
8. Trade-Related Letters of Credit
In 2011, the BCBS revised the Basel II advanced internal ratings-
based approach to remove the one-year maturity floor for trade finance
instruments. Consistent with this revision, this proposed rule would
specify that an exposure's effective maturity must be no greater than
five years and no less than one year, except that an exposure's
effective maturity must be no less than one day if the exposure is a
trade-related letter of credit, or if the exposure has an original
maturity of less than one year and is not part of a banking
organization's ongoing financing of the obligor.
A corresponding provision is included in section 33 of the
Standardized Approach NPR.
Question 17: The agencies request comment on all the other proposed
amendments to the advanced approaches rule described in section E
(items 1 through 8), of this preamble.
F. Pillar 3 Disclosures
1. Frequency and Timeliness of Disclosures
Under the proposed rule, a banking organization is required to
provide certain qualitative and quantitative disclosures on a
quarterly, or in some cases, annual basis, and these disclosures must
be ``timely.'' In the preamble to the advanced approaches rule issued
in 2007, the agencies indicated that quarterly disclosures would be
timely if they were provided within 45 days after calendar quarter-end.
The preamble did not specify
[[Page 52995]]
expectations regarding annual disclosures. The agencies acknowledged
that timing of disclosures required under the federal banking laws may
not always coincide with the timing of disclosures under other federal
laws, including federal securities laws and their implementing
regulations by the SEC. The agencies also indicated that a banking
organization may use disclosures made pursuant to SEC, regulatory
reporting, and other disclosure requirements to help meet its public
disclosure requirements under the advanced approaches rule.
The agencies understand that the deadline for certain SEC financial
reports is more than 45 calendar days after calendar quarter-end.
Therefore, the agencies are proposing to clarify in this NPR that,
where a banking organization's fiscal year-end coincides with the end
of a calendar quarter, the requirement for timely disclosure would be
no later than the applicable reporting deadlines for regulatory reports
(for example, FR Y-9C) and financial reports (for example, SEC Forms
10-Q and 10-K). When these deadlines differ, banking organizations
would adhere to the later deadline. In cases where a banking
organization's fiscal year-end does not coincide with the end of a
calendar quarter, the agencies would consider those disclosures that
are made within 45 days as timely.
2. Enhanced Securitization Disclosure Requirements
In view of the significant contribution of securitization exposures
to the financial crisis, the agencies believe that enhanced disclosure
requirements are appropriate. Consistent with the disclosures
introduced by the 2009 Enhancements, the agencies are proposing to
amend the qualitative section for Table 11.8 disclosures
(Securitization) to include the following:
[ssquf] The nature of the risks inherent in a banking
organization's securitized assets,
[ssquf] A description of the policies that monitor changes in the
credit and market risk of a banking organization's securitization
exposures,
[ssquf] A description of a banking organization's policy regarding
the use of credit risk mitigation for securitization exposures,
[ssquf] A list of the special purpose entities a banking
organization uses to securitize exposures and the affiliated entities
that a bank manages or advises and that invest in securitization
exposures or the referenced SPEs, and
[ssquf] A summary of the banking organization's accounting policies
for securitization activities.
To the extent possible, the agencies are proposing the disclosure
requirements included in the 2009 Enhancements. However, due to the
prohibition on the use of credit ratings in the risk-based capital
rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed tables do not
include those disclosure requirements related to the use of ratings.
3. Equity Holding That Are Not Covered Positions
Section 71 of the current advanced approaches rule requires banking
organizations to include in their public disclosures a discussion of
``important policies covering the valuation of and accounting for
equity holdings in the banking book.'' Since ``banking book'' is not a
defined term under the advanced approaches rule, the agencies propose
to refer to such exposures as equity holdings that are not covered
positions.
III. Market Risk Capital Rule
In today's Federal Register, the federal banking agencies are
finalizing revisions to the agencies' market risk capital rule (the
market risk capital rule), which generally requires national banks,
state banks, and bank holding companies with significant exposure to
market risk to implement systems and procedures necessary to manage and
measure that risk and to hold a commensurate amount of capital. As
noted in the introduction of this preamble, in this NPR, the agencies
are proposing to expand the scope of the market risk capital rule to
include savings associations and savings and loan holding companies and
codify the market risk rule in a manner similar to the other regulatory
capital rules in the three proposals. In the process of incorporating
the market risk rule into the regulatory capital framework, the
agencies note that there will be some overlap among certain defined
terms. In any final rule, the agencies intend to merge definitions and
make any appropriate technical changes.
As a general matter, a banking organization subject to the market
risk capital rule will not include assets held for trading purposes
when calculating its risk-weighted assets for the purpose of the other
risk-based capital rules. Instead, the banking organization must
determine an appropriate capital requirement for such assets using the
methodologies set forth in the final market risk capital rule. The
banking organization then must multiply its market risk capital
requirement by 12.5 to determine a risk-weighted asset amount for its
market risk exposures and then add that amount to its credit risk-
weighted assets to arrive at its total risk-weighted asset amount.
As described in the preamble to the market risk capital rule, the
agencies revised their respective market risk rules to better capture
positions subject to market risk, reduce pro-cyclicality in market risk
capital requirements, enhance the rule's sensitivity to risks that were
not adequately captured under the prior regulatory measurement
methodologies, and increase transparency through enhanced disclosures.
The market risk capital rules is designed to determine capital
requirements for trading assets based on general and specific market
risk associated with these assets. General market risk is the risk of
loss in the market value of positions resulting from broad market
movements, such as changes in the general level of interest rates,
equity prices, foreign exchange rates, or commodity prices. Specific
market risk is the risk of loss from changes in the market value of a
position due to factors other than broad market movements, including
event risk (changes in market price due to unexpected events specific
to a particular obligor or position) and default risk.
The agencies' current market risk capital rules do not apply to
savings associations or savings and loan holding companies. The Board
has previously expressed its intention to assess the condition,
performance, and activities of savings and loan holding companies
(SLHCs) on a consolidated risk-based basis in a manner that is
consistent with the Board's established approach regarding bank holding
company supervision while considering any unique characteristics of
SLHCs and the requirements of the Home Owners' Loan Act.\17\ Therefore,
as noted above, the agencies are proposing in this NPR to expand the
scope of the market risk rule to savings associations and savings and
loan holding companies that meet the stated thresholds. As proposed,
the market risk capital rule would apply to any savings association or
savings and loan holding company whose trading activity (the gross sum
of its trading assets and trading liabilities) is equal to 10 percent
or more of its total assets or $1 billion or more. Under the proposed
rule, each agency would retain the authority to apply its respective
market risk rule to any entity under its jurisdiction, regardless of
whether it
[[Page 52996]]
meets the aforementioned thresholds, if the agency deems it necessary
or appropriate for safe and sound banking practices.
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\17\ See 76 FR 22663 (April, 22, 2011).
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As a general matter, savings associations and savings and loan
holding companies do not engage in trading activity to a substantial
degree. However, the agencies believe that any savings association or
savings and loan holding company whose trading activity grows to the
extent that it meets the thresholds should hold capital commensurate
with the risk of the trading activity and should have in place the
prudential risk management systems and processes required under the
market risk capital rule. Therefore, the agencies believe it would be
necessary and appropriate to expand the scope of the market risk rule
to apply to savings associations and savings and loan holding
companies.
Application of the market risk capital rule to all banking
organizations with material exposure to market risk would be
particularly important because of banking organizations' increased
exposure to traded credit products, such as credit default swaps,
asset-backed securities and other structured products, as well as other
less liquid products. In fact, many of the revisions to the final
market risk capital rule were made in response to concerns that arose
during the financial crisis when certain trading assets suffered
substantial losses, causing banking organizations holding those assets
to suffer substantial losses. For example, in addition to a market risk
capital requirement to account for general market risk, the revised
rules apply more conservative standardized specific risk capital
requirements to most securitization positions, implement an additional
incremental risk capital requirement for a banking organization that
models specific risk for one or more portfolios of debt or, if
applicable, equity positions. Additionally, to address concerns about
the appropriate treatment of traded positions that have limited price
transparency, a banking organization subject to the market risk capital
rule must have a well-defined valuation process for all covered
positions.
Question 18: The agencies request comment on the application of the
market risk rule to savings associations and savings and loan holding
companies.
IV. List of Acronyms
ABCP Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
ABS Asset-Backed Security
AVC Asset Value Correlation
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
CCP Central Counterparty
CDO Collateralized Debt Obligation
CDS Credit Default Swap
CDSind Index Credit Default Swap
CEIO Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip
CPSS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
CVA Credit Valuation Adjustment
DFA Dodd-Frank Act
DvP Delivery-versus-Payment
E Measure of Effectiveness
EAD Exposure-at-Default
EE Expected Exposure
Expected Operational Loss (EOL)
EPE Expected Positive Exposure
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
FR Federal Register
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
HVCRE High-Volatility Commercial Real Estate
IAA Internal Assessment Approach
IMA Internal Models Approach
IMM Internal Models Methodology
I/O Interest-Only
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
IRB Internal Ratings-Based
Loss Given Default (LGD)
M Effective Maturity
NGR Net-to-Gross Ratio
NPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NRSRO Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OTC Over-the-Counter
PD Probability of Default
PFE Potential Future Exposure
PvP Payment-versus-Payment
QCCP Qualifying Central Counterparty
QRE Qualified Retail Exposure
RBA Ratings-Based Approach
RVC Ratio of Value Change
SFA Supervisory Formula Approach
SSFA Simplified Supervisory Formula Approach
U.S.C. United States Code
VaR Value-at-Risk
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA) requires
an agency to provide an initial regulatory flexibility analysis with a
proposed rule or to certify that the rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (defined for
purposes of the RFA to include banks with assets less than or equal to
$175 million) and publish its certification and a short, explanatory
statement in the Federal Register along with the proposed rule.
The Board is providing an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
with respect to this NPR. The OCC and FDIC are certifying that the
proposals in this NPR will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Board
Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration,\18\
a small entity includes a depository institution or bank holding
company with total assets of $175 million or less (a small banking
organization). As of March 31, 2012 there were 373 small state member
banks. As of December 31, 2011, there were approximately 128 small
savings and loan holding companies and 2,385 small bank holding
companies.\19\
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\18\ See 13 CFR 121.201.
\19\ The December 31, 2011, data are the most recent available
data on small savings and loan holding companies and small bank
holding companies.
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As discussed previously in the Supplementary Information, the Board
is proposing to revise its capital requirements to promote safe and
sound banking practices, implement Basel III, and other aspects of the
Basel capital framework, and codify its capital requirements.
The proposals also satisfy certain requirements under the Dodd-
Frank Act by imposing new or revised minimum capital requirements on
certain depository institution holding companies.\20\ Additionally,
under section 38(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the
agencies may prescribe capital standards for depository institutions
that they regulate.\21\ In addition, among other authorities, the Board
may establish capital requirements for state member banks under the
Federal Reserve Act,\22\ for state member banks and bank holding
companies under the International Lending Supervision Act and Bank
Holding Company Act,\23\ and for savings and loan holding companies
under the Home Owners' Loan Act.\24\
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\20\ See 12 U.S.C. 5371.
\21\ See 12 U.S.C. 1831o(c)(1).
\22\ See 12 CFR 208.43.
\23\ See 12 U.S.C. 3907; 12 U.S.C. 1844.
\24\ See 12 U.S.C. 1467a(g)(1).
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The proposed requirements in this NPR generally would not apply to
small bank holding companies that are not engaged in significant
nonbanking activities, do not conduct significant off-balance sheet
activities, and do not have a material amount of debt or equity
securities outstanding that are registered with the SEC. These small
bank holding companies remain subject to the Board's Small Bank Holding
Company Policy Statement (Policy Statement).\25\
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\25\ See 12 CFR part 225, appendix C; see also 12 U.S.C.
5371(b)(5)(C). Section 171 of the Dodd-Frank provides an exemption
from its requirements for bank holding companies subject to the
Policy Statement (as in effect on May 19, 2010). Section 171 does
not provide a similar exemption for small savings and loan holding
companies and they are therefore subject to the proposed rules.
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[[Page 52997]]
The proposals in this NPR would generally not apply to other small
banking organizations. Those small banking organizations that would be
subject to the proposed modifications to the advanced approaches rules
would only be subject to those requirements because they are a
subsidiary of a large banking organization that meets the criteria for
advanced approaches. The Board expects that all such entities would
rely on the systems developed by their parent banking organizations and
would have no additional compliance costs. The Board also expects that
the parent banking organization would remedy any capital shortfalls at
such a subsidiary that would occur due to the proposals in this NPR.
The Board welcomes comment on all aspects of its analysis. A final
regulatory flexibility analysis will be conducted after consideration
of comments received during the public comment period.
OCC
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
(RFA), the regulatory flexibility analysis otherwise required under
section 604 of the RFA is not required if an agency certifies that the
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities (defined for purposes of the RFA to include
banks with assets less than or equal to $175 million) and publishes its
certification and a short, explanatory statement in the Federal
Register along with its rule.
As of March 31, 2012, there were approximately 599 small national
banks and 284 small federally chartered savings associations. The
proposed changes to OCC's minimum risk-based capital requirements
included in this NPR would impact only those small national banks and
federal savings associations that are subsidiaries of large
internationally active banking organizations that use the advanced
approaches risk-based capital rules, and those small federal savings
associations that meet the threshold criteria for application of the
market risk rule. Only six small institutions would be subject to the
advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, and no small federal
savings associations satisfy the threshold criteria for application of
the market risk rule. Therefore, the OCC does not believe that the
proposed rule will result in a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
FDIC Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
(RFA), the regulatory flexibility analysis otherwise required under
section 604 of the RFA is not required if an agency certifies that the
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities (defined for purposes of the RFA to include
banks with assets less than or equal to $175 million) and publishes its
certification and a short, explanatory statement in the Federal
Register along with its rule.
As of March 31, 2012, there were approximately 2,433 small state
nonmember banks, 115 small state savings banks, and 45 small state
savings associations (collectively, small banks and savings
associations). The proposed changes to FDIC's minimum risk-based
capital requirements included in this NPR would impact only those small
banks and savings associations that are subsidiaries of large,
internationally-active banking organizations that use the advanced
approaches risk-based capital rules, and those small state savings
associations that meet the threshold criteria for application of the
market risk rule. There are no small banks and savings associations
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, and no
small state savings associations satisfy the threshold criteria for
application of the market risk rule. Therefore, the FDIC does not
believe that the proposed rule will result in a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
Request for Comment on Proposed Information Collection
In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) of 1995, the Agencies may not conduct or sponsor, and the
respondent is not required to respond to, an information collection
unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number. The Agencies are requesting comment on a proposed
information collection.
The information collection requirements contained Subpart E of this
joint notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) have been submitted by the
OCC and FDIC to OMB for review under the PRA, under OMB Control Nos.
1557-0234 and 3064-0153. The information collection requirements
contained in Subpart F of this NPR have been submitted by the OCC and
FDIC to OMB for review under the PRA. In accordance with the PRA (44
U.S.C. 3506; 5 CFR part 1320, Appendix A.1), the Board has reviewed the
NPR under the authority delegated by OMB. The Board's OMB Control
Number for the information collection requirements contained Subpart E
of this NPR is 7100-0313 and for the information collection
requirements contained Subpart F of this NPR is 7100-0314. The
requirements in Subpart E are found in proposed sections ----.121, --
--.122, ----.123, ----.124, ----.132, ----.141, ----.142, ----.152, --
--.173. The requirements in Subpart F are found in proposed sections --
--.203, ----.204, ----.205, ----.206, ----.207, ----.208, ----.209, --
--.210, and ----.212.
The Agencies have published two other NPRs in this issue of the
Federal Register. Please see the NPRs entitled ``Regulatory Capital
Rules: Regulatory Capital, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital
Adequacy, Transition Provisions'' and ``Regulatory Capital Rules:
Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets; Market Discipline and
Disclosure Requirements.'' While the three NPRs together comprise an
integrated capital framework, the PRA burden has been divided among the
three NPRs and a PRA statement has been provided in each.
Comments are invited on:
(a) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the
proper performance of the Agencies' functions, including whether the
information has practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information
collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions
used;
(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected;
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on
respondents, including through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
(e) Estimates of capital or start up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
All comments will become a matter of public record.
Comments should be addressed to:
OCC: Communications Division, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Public Information Room, Mail stop 1-5, Attention: 1557-0234,
250 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20219. In addition, comments may be
sent by fax to 202-874-4448, or by electronic mail to
[email protected]. You can inspect and photocopy the comments
at the OCC's Public Information Room, 250 E Street SW., Washington, DC
20219. You can make an appointment to inspect the comments by calling
202-874-5043.
[[Page 52998]]
Board: You may submit comments, identified by R-1443, by any of the
following methods:
Agency Web Site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments on the http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Email: [email protected]. Include docket
number in the subject line of the message.
Fax: 202-452-3819 or 202-452-3102.
Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW,
Washington, DC 20551.
All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your
comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact
information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in
paper in Room MP-500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th and C Streets
NW.) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC: You may submit written comments, which should refer to RIN
3064-AD97 Advanced Approaches Risk-based Capital Rule (3064-0153);
Market Risk Capital Rule (NEW), by any of the following methods:
Agency Web Site: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.html. Follow the instructions for submitting comments
on the FDIC Web site.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Email: [email protected].
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments, FDIC, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard station at the rear of the
550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on business days between
7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Public Inspection: All comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose/html
including any personal information provided. Comments may be inspected
at the FDIC Public Information Center, Room 100, 801 17th Street NW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on business days.
Proposed Information Collection
Title of Information Collection: Regulatory Capital Rules (Part 3):
Advanced Approaches Risk-based Capital Rules (Basel III, Part 3).
Frequency of Response: Quarterly and annually.
Affected Public:
OCC: National banks and federally chartered savings associations.
Board: State member banks (SMBs), bank holding companies (BHCs),
and savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs).
FDIC: Insured state nonmember banks, certain subsidiaries of these
entities, and state chartered savings associations.
Estimated Burden: The burden estimates below exclude any regulatory
reporting burden associated with changes to the Consolidated Reports of
Income and Condition for banks (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041; OMB Nos. 7100-
0036, 3064-0052, 1557-0081), Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework
Regulatory Reporting Requirements (FFIEC 101; OMB Nos. 7100-0319, 3064-
0159, 1557-0239), the Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies
(FR Y-9; OMB No. 7100-0128), and the Capital Assessments and Stress
Testing information collection (FR Y-14A/Q/M; OMB No. 7100-0341). The
agencies are still considering whether to revise these information
collections or to implement a new information collection for the
regulatory reporting requirements. In either case, a separate notice
would be published for comment on the regulatory reporting
requirements.
OCC
Estimated Number of Respondents: 45.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: One-time recordkeeping, 460 hours;
ongoing recordkeeping, 176 hours; one-time disclosures, 280 hours;
ongoing disclosures, 140 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 47,520 hours.
Board
Estimated Number of Respondents: SMBs, 4; BHCs, 20; SLHCs, 13.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: One-time recordkeeping, 460 hours;
ongoing recordkeeping, 176 hours; one-time disclosures, 280 hours;
ongoing disclosures, 140 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 39,072 hours.
FDIC
Estimated Number of Respondents: 8.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: One-time recordkeeping, 460 hours;
ongoing recordkeeping, 176 hours; one-time disclosures, 280 hours;
ongoing disclosures, 140 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 8,448 hours.
Abstract
The PRA burden associated with reporting, recordkeeping, and
disclosure requirements of Subpart E that are found in proposed
sections ----.121, ----.122, ----.123, ----.124, ----.132(b)(2)(iii),
----.132(b)(3), ----.132 (d)(1), ----.132(d)(1)(iii), ----.141(b)(3),
----.142(h)(2), ----.152(c)(2), ----.173 (tables: 11.1, 11.2, 11.3,
11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.10, and 11.11) are currently accounted for under
the Agencies' existing information collections (ICs).
The PRA burden associated with recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements found in proposed sections ----.132(b)(2)(iii)(A), --
--.132(d)(2)(iv), ----.132(d)(3)(vi), ----.132(d)(3)(viii), --
--.132(d)(3)(ix), ----.132(d)(3)(x), ----.132(d)(3)(xi), --
--.141(c)(2)(i), ----.141(c)(2)(ii), ----.173 (tables: 11.4, 11.5,
11.9, and 11.12) would revise the Agencies' existing ICs and are
described below.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Recordkeeping Requirements
Under proposed section ----.132(b)(2)(iii)(A), counterparty credit
risk of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC
derivative contracts, Own internal estimates for haircuts. With the
prior written approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may calculate haircuts
(Hs and Hfx) using its own internal estimates of the volatilities of
market prices and foreign exchange rates. To receive [AGENCY] approval
to use its own internal estimates, a [BANK] must satisfy the minimum
quantitative standards outlined in this section. The agencies estimate
that respondents would take on average 80 hours (two business weeks) to
reprogram and update systems with the requirements outlined in this
section. In addition, the agencies estimate that, on a continuing
basis, respondents would take on average 16 hours annually to maintain
their internal systems.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(2)(iv), counterparty credit risk
of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative
contracts, Risk-weighted assets using IMM--Under the IMM, a [BANK] uses
an internal model to estimate the expected exposure (EE) for a netting
set and then calculates EAD based on that EE. A [BANK] must calculate
two EEs and two EADs (one stressed and one unstressed) for each netting
as outlined
[[Page 52999]]
in this section. The agencies estimate that respondents would take on
average 80 hours (two business weeks) to update their current model
with the requirements outlined in this section. In addition, the
agencies estimate that, on a continuing basis, respondents would take
on average 40 hours annually to maintain their internal model.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(3)(vi), counterparty credit risk
of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative
contracts. To obtain [AGENCY] approval to calculate the distributions
of exposures upon which the EAD calculation is based, the [BANK] must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] that it has been using
for at least one year an internal model that broadly meets the minimum
standards, with which the [BANK] must maintain compliance. The [BANK]
must have procedures to identify, monitor, and control wrong-way risk
throughout the life of an exposure. The procedures must include stress
testing and scenario analysis. The agencies estimate that respondents
would take on average 80 hours (two business weeks) to implement a
model with the requirements outlined in this section.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(3)(viii), counterparty credit
risk of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC
derivative contracts. When estimating model parameters based on a
stress period, the [BANK] must use at least three years of historical
data that include a period of stress to the credit default spreads of
the [BANK]'s counterparties. The [BANK] must review the data set and
update the data as necessary, particularly for any material changes in
its counterparties. The [BANK] must demonstrate at least quarterly that
the stress period coincides with increased CDS or other credit spreads
of the [BANK]'s counterparties. The [BANK] must have procedures to
evaluate the effectiveness of its stress calibration that include a
process for using benchmark portfolios that are vulnerable to the same
risk factors as the [BANK]'s portfolio. The [AGENCY] may require the
[BANK] to modify its stress calibration to better reflect actual
historic losses of the portfolio. The agencies estimate that
respondents would take on average 80 hours (two business weeks) to
implement procedures with the requirements outlined in this section.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(3)(ix), counterparty credit risk
of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative
contracts. A [BANK] must subject its internal model to an initial
validation and annual model review process. The model review should
consider whether the inputs and risk factors, as well as the model
outputs, are appropriate. As part of the model review process, the
[BANK] must have a backtesting program for its model that includes a
process by which unacceptable model performance will be determined and
remedied. The agencies estimate that respondents would take on average
40 hours (one business week) to implement a model with the requirements
outlined in this section. In addition, the agencies estimate that, on a
continuing basis, respondents would take on average 40 hours annually
to maintain their internal model.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(3)(x), counterparty credit risk
of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative
contracts. A [BANK] must have policies for the measurement, management
and control of collateral and margin amounts. The agencies estimate
that respondents would take on average 20 hours to implement policies
with the requirements outlined in this section.
Under proposed section ----.132(d)(3)(xi), counterparty credit risk
of repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative
contracts. A [BANK] must have a comprehensive stress testing program
that captures all credit exposures to counterparties, and incorporates
stress testing of principal market risk factors and creditworthiness of
counterparties. The agencies estimate that respondents would take on
average 40 hours (one business week) to implement a program with the
requirements outlined in this section. In addition, the agencies
estimate that, on a continuing basis, respondents would take on average
40 hours annually to maintain their program.
Under proposed sections ----.141(c)(2)(i) and (ii), operational
criteria for recognizing the transfer of risk. A [BANK] must
demonstrate its comprehensive understanding of a securitization
exposure under section 141(c)(1), for each securitization exposure by
conducting an analysis of the risk characteristics of a securitization
exposure prior to acquiring the exposure and document such analysis
within three business days after acquiring the exposure. On an on-going
basis (no less frequently than quarterly), evaluate, review, and update
as appropriate the analysis required under this section for each
securitization exposure. The agencies estimate that respondents would
take on average 40 hours (one business week) to implement a program
with the requirements outlined in this section. The agencies estimate
that, on a continuing basis, respondents would take on average 10 hours
quarterly to evaluate, review, and update the program requirements.
Disclosure Requirements
Under proposed section ----.173, disclosures by banks that are
advanced approaches banks that have successfully completed parallel
run. A [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank must make the
disclosures described in Tables 11.1 through 11.12. The [BANK] must
make these disclosures publicly available for each of the last three
years (that is, twelve quarters) or such shorter period beginning on
the effective date of this subpart E.
Under proposed table 11.4--Capital Conservation and Countercyclical
Buffers. The [BANK] must comply with the qualitative and quantitative
public disclosures outlined in this table. The agencies estimate that
respondents would take on average 80 hours (two business weeks) to
comply with the disclosure requirements outlined in this table. The
agencies estimate that, on a continuing basis, respondents would take
on average 40 hours annually comply with the disclosure requirements
outlined in this table.
Under proposed table 11.5--Credit Risk: General Disclosures. The
[BANK] must comply with the qualitative and quantitative public
disclosures outlined in this table. The agencies estimate that
respondents would take on average 80 hours (two business weeks) to
comply with the disclosure requirements outlined in this table. The
agencies estimate that, on a continuing basis, respondents would take
on average 40 hours annually to comply with the disclosure requirements
outlined in this table.
Under proposed table 11.9--Securitization. The [BANK] must comply
with the qualitative and quantitative public disclosures outlined in
this table. The agencies estimate that respondents would take on
average 60 hours to comply with the disclosure requirements outlined in
this table. The agencies estimate that, on a continuing basis,
respondents would take on average 30 hours annually comply with the
disclosure requirements outlined in this table.
Under proposed Table 11.12--Interest Rate Risk for Non-trading
Activities. The [BANK] must comply with the qualitative and
quantitative public disclosures outlined in this table. The agencies
estimate that respondents would take on average 60 hours to comply with
the disclosure
[[Page 53000]]
requirements outlined in this table. The agencies estimate that, on a
continuing basis, respondents would take on average 30 hours annually
comply with the disclosure requirements outlined in this table.
Proposed Information Collection
Title of Information Collection: Regulatory Capital Rules (Part 3):
Market Risk Capital Rule (Basel III, Part 3).
Frequency of Response: Quarterly and annually.
Affected Public:
OCC: National banks and federally chartered savings associations.
Board: Savings associations and saving and loan holding companies.
FDIC: Insured state nonmember banks, state savings associations,
and certain subsidiaries of these entities.
Estimated Burden:
OCC
Estimated Number of Respondents: 45.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: 1,964 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 99,180 hours.
Board
Estimated Number of Respondents: 30.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: 2,204 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 66,120 hours.
FDIC
Estimated Number of Respondents: 2.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: 1,964 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 3,928 hours.
Abstract:
The PRA burden associated with reporting, recordkeeping, and
disclosure requirements of Subpart F that are found in proposed
sections ----.203, ----.204, ----.205, ----.206, ----.207, ----.208, --
--.209, ----.210, and ----.212. They would enhance risk sensitivity and
introduce requirements for public disclosure of certain qualitative and
quantitative information about a savings association's or a savings and
loan holding company's market risk. The collection of information is
necessary to ensure capital adequacy according to the level of market
risk.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section ----lowbarm;----lowbarm;.203 sets forth the requirements
for applying the market risk framework. Section ----.203(a)(1) requires
clearly defined policies and procedures for determining which trading
assets and trading liabilities are trading positions, which of its
trading positions are correlation trading positions, and specifies what
must be taken into account. Section ----.203(a)(2) requires a clearly
defined trading and hedging strategy for trading positions approved by
senior management and specifies what each strategy must articulate.
Section ----.203(b)(1) requires clearly defined policies and procedures
for actively managing all covered positions and specifies the minimum
that they must require. Sections ----.203(c)(4) through ----.203(c)(10)
require the annual review of internal models and include certain
requirements that the models must meet. Section ----.203(d)(4) requires
an annual report to the board of directors on the effectiveness of
controls supporting market risk measurement systems.
Section ----.204(b) requires quarterly backtesting. Section --
--.205(a)(5) requires institutions to demonstrate to the agencies the
appropriateness of proxies used to capture risks within value-at- risk
models. Section ----.205(c) requires institutions to retain value-at-
risk and profit and loss information on sub-portfolios for two years.
Section ----.206(b)(3) requires policies and procedures for stressed
value-at-risk models and prior approvals on determining periods of
significant financial stress.
Section ----.207(b)(1) specifies what internal models for specific
risk must include and address. Section 208(a) requires prior written
approval for incremental risk. Section ----.209(a) requires prior
approval for comprehensive risk models. Section ----.209(c)(2) requires
retaining and making available the results of supervisory stress
testing on a quarterly basis. Section ----.210(f) requires
documentation quarterly for analysis of risk characteristics of each
securitization position it holds. Section ----.212 requires quarterly
quantitative disclosures, annual qualitative disclosures, and a formal
disclosure policy approved by the board of directors that addresses the
bank's approach for determining the market risk disclosures it makes.
VII. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires the Federal
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies have sought to present
the proposed rule in a simple and straightforward manner, and invite
comment on the use of plain language.
VIII. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2
U.S.C. 1532 et seq.) requires that an agency prepare a written
statement before promulgating a rule that includes a Federal mandate
that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100 million
or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. If a written
statement is required, the UMRA (2 U.S.C. 1535) also requires an agency
to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives
before promulgating a rule and from those alternatives, either select
the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative
that achieves the objectives of the rule, or provide a statement with
the rule explaining why such an option was not chosen.
This NPR would incorporate revisions to the Basel Committee's
capital framework into the banking agencies' advanced approaches risk-
based capital rules and remove references to credit ratings consistent
with section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act. This NPR would modify various
elements of the advanced approached risk-based capital rules regarding
the determination of risk-weighted assets. These changes would (1)
Modify treatment of counterparty credit risk, (2) remove references to
credit ratings, (3) modify the treatment of securitization exposures,
and (4) modify the treatment of exposures subject to deduction from
capital. The NPR also would enhance disclosure requirements, especially
with regard to securitizations, and would amend the advanced approaches
so that capital requirements using the internal models methodology take
into consideration stress in calibration data, stress testing, initial
validation, collateral management, and annual model review. The NPR
rule also would require national banks and federal savings associations
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules to
identify, monitor, and control wrong-way risk.
Finally, the NPR would expand the scope of the agencies' market
risk capital rule to savings associations that meet certain thresholds.
To estimate the impact of this NPR on national banks and federal
savings associations, the OCC estimated the amount of capital banks
will need to raise to meet the new requirements relative to the amount
of capital they
[[Page 53001]]
currently hold, as well as the compliance costs associated with
establishing the infrastructure to determine correct risk weights using
the revised methods for calculating risk-weighted assets and the
compliance costs associated with new disclosure requirements. The OCC
has determined that its proposed rule will not result in expenditures
by State, local, and Tribal governments, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more. Accordingly, the UMRA does not require that a
written statement accompany this NPR.
Text of the Proposed Common Rule [All Agencies]
The text of the proposed common rule appears below:
PART ---- CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF [BANK]S
Subpart E--Risk-Weighted Assets--Internal Ratings-Based and Advanced
Measurement Approaches
Sec.
----.100 Purpose, applicability, and principle of conservatism.
----.101 Definitions.
QUALIFICATION
----.121 Qualification process.
----.122 Qualification requirements.
----.123 Ongoing qualification.
----.124 Merger and acquisition transitional arrangements.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR GENERAL CREDIT RISK
----.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail risk-
weighted assets.
----.132 Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions,
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.
----.133 Cleared transactions.
----.134 Guarantees and credit derivatives: PD substitution and LGD
adjustment approaches.
----.135 Guarantees and credit derivatives: Double default
treatment.
----.136 Unsettled transactions.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR SECURITIZATION EXPOSURES
----.141 Operational criteria for recognizing the transfer of risk.
----.142 Risk-based capital requirement for securitization
exposures.
----.143 Supervisory formula approach (SFA).
----.144 Simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA).
----.145 Recognition of credit risk mitigants for securitization
exposures.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR EQUITY EXPOSURES
----.151 Introduction and exposure measurement.
----.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
----.153 Internal models approach (IMA).
----.154 Equity exposures to investment funds.
----.155 Equity derivative contracts.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR OPERATIONAL RISK
----.161 Qualification requirements for incorporation of operational
risk mitigants.
----.162 Mechanics of risk-weighted asset calculation.
DISCLOSURES
----.171 Purpose and scope.
----.172 Disclosure requirements.
----.173 Disclosures by certain advanced approaches [BANKS].
Subpart F--Risk-weighted Assets--Market Risk
----.201 Purpose, applicability, and reservation of authority.
----.202 Definitions.
----.203 Requirements for application of this subpart F.
----.204 Measure for market risk.
----.205 VaR-based measure.
----.206 Stressed VaR-based measure.
----.207 Specific risk.
----.208 Incremental risk.
----.209 Comprehensive risk.
----.210 Standardized measurement method for specific risk.
----.211 Simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA).
----.212 Market risk disclosures.
Subpart E--Risk Weighted Assets--Internal Ratings-Based and
Advanced Measurement Approaches
Sec. ----.100 Purpose, applicability, and principle of conservatism.
(a) Purpose. This subpart E establishes:
(1) Minimum qualifying criteria for [BANK]s using [BANK]-specific
internal risk measurement and management processes for calculating
risk-based capital requirements; and
(2) Methodologies for such [BANK]s to calculate their total risk-
weighted assets.
(b) Applicability. (1) This subpart applies to a [BANK] that:
(i) Has consolidated total assets, as reported on the most recent
year-end [Regulatory Reports] equal to $250 billion or more;
(ii) Has consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign exposure at
the most recent year-end equal to $10 billion or more (where total on-
balance sheet foreign exposure equals total cross-border claims less
claims with a head office or guarantor located in another country plus
redistributed guaranteed amounts to the country of head office or
guarantor plus local country claims on local residents plus revaluation
gains on foreign exchange and derivative products, calculated in
accordance with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure Report);
(iii) Is a subsidiary of a depository institution that uses the
advanced approaches pursuant to subpart E of 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 12
CFR part 217 (Board), or 12 CFR part 325 (FDIC) to calculate its total
risk-weighted assets;
(iv) Is a subsidiary of a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company that uses the advanced approaches pursuant to 12 CFR
part 217 to calculate its total risk-weighted assets; or
(v) Elects to use this subpart to calculate its total risk-weighted
assets.
(2) A bank that is subject to this subpart shall remain subject to
this subpart unless the [AGENCY] determines in writing that application
of this subpart is not appropriate in light of the [BANK]'s asset size,
level of complexity, risk profile, or scope of operations. In making a
determination under this paragraph, the [AGENCY] will apply notice and
response procedures in the same manner and to the same extent as the
notice and response procedures in 12 CFR 3.12 (OCC), 12 CFR 263.202
(Board), and 12 CFR 325.6(c) (FDIC).
(3) A market risk [BANK] must exclude from its calculation of risk-
weighted assets under this subpart the risk-weighted asset amounts of
all covered positions, as defined in subpart F of this part (except
foreign exchange positions that are not trading positions, over-the-
counter derivative positions, cleared transactions, and unsettled
transactions).
(c) Principle of Conservatism. Notwithstanding the requirements of
this subpart, a [BANK] may choose not to apply a provision of this
subpart to one or more exposures provided that:
(1) The [BANK] can demonstrate on an ongoing basis to the
satisfaction of the [AGENCY] that not applying the provision would, in
all circumstances, unambiguously generate a risk-based capital
requirement for each such exposure greater than that which would
otherwise be required under this subpart;
(2) The [BANK] appropriately manages the risk of each such
exposure;
(3) The [BANK] notifies the [AGENCY] in writing prior to applying
this principle to each such exposure; and
(4) The exposures to which the [BANK] applies this principle are
not, in the aggregate, material to the [BANK].
Sec. ----. 101 Definitions.
(a) Terms set forth in Sec. ----.2 and used in this subpart have
the definitions assigned thereto in Sec. ----.2.
[[Page 53002]]
(b) For the purposes of this subpart, the following terms are
defined as follows:
Advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) systems means an advanced
approaches [BANK]'s internal risk rating and segmentation system; risk
parameter quantification system; data management and maintenance
system; and control, oversight, and validation system for credit risk
of wholesale and retail exposures.
Advanced systems means an advanced approaches [BANK]'s advanced IRB
systems, operational risk management processes, operational risk data
and assessment systems, operational risk quantification systems, and,
to the extent used by the [BANK], the internal models methodology,
advanced CVA approach, double default excessive correlation detection
process, and internal models approach (IMA) for equity exposures.
Backtesting means the comparison of a [BANK]'s internal estimates
with actual outcomes during a sample period not used in model
development. In this context, backtesting is one form of out-of-sample
testing.
Benchmarking means the comparison of a [BANK]'s internal estimates
with relevant internal and external data or with estimates based on
other estimation techniques.
Bond option contract means a bond option, bond future, or any other
instrument linked to a bond that gives rise to similar counterparty
credit risk.
Business environment and internal control factors means the
indicators of a [BANK]'s operational risk profile that reflect a
current and forward-looking assessment of the [BANK]'s underlying
business risk factors and internal control environment.
Credit default swap (CDS) means a financial contract executed under
standard industry documentation that allows one party (the protection
purchaser) to transfer the credit risk of one or more exposures
(reference exposure(s)) to another party (the protection provider) for
a certain period of time.
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) means the fair value adjustment
to reflect counterparty credit risk in valuation of an OTC derivative
contract.
Default--For the purposes of calculating capital requirements under
this subpart:
(1) Retail. (i) A retail exposure of a [BANK] is in default if:
(A) The exposure is 180 days past due, in the case of a residential
mortgage exposure or revolving exposure;
(B) The exposure is 120 days past due, in the case of retail
exposures that are not residential mortgage exposures or revolving
exposures; or
(C) The [BANK] has taken a full or partial charge-off, write-down
of principal, or material negative fair value adjustment of principal
on the exposure for credit-related reasons.
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(i) of this definition, for a
retail exposure held by a non-U.S. subsidiary of the [BANK] that is
subject to an internal ratings-based approach to capital adequacy
consistent with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's
``International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards: A Revised Framework'' in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, the [BANK]
may elect to use the definition of default that is used in that
jurisdiction, provided that the [BANK] has obtained prior approval from
the [AGENCY] to use the definition of default in that jurisdiction.
(iii) A retail exposure in default remains in default until the
[BANK] has reasonable assurance of repayment and performance for all
contractual principal and interest payments on the exposure.
(2) Wholesale. (i) A [BANK]'s wholesale obligor is in default if:
(A) The [BANK] determines that the obligor is unlikely to pay its
credit obligations to the [BANK] in full, without recourse by the
[BANK] to actions such as realizing collateral (if held); or
(B) The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material
credit obligation(s) to the [BANK].\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Overdrafts are past due once the obligor has breached an
advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than the current
outstanding balance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An obligor in default remains in default until the [BANK] has
reasonable assurance of repayment and performance for all contractual
principal and interest payments on all exposures of the [BANK] to the
obligor (other than exposures that have been fully written-down or
charged-off).
Dependence means a measure of the association among operational
losses across and within units of measure.
Economic downturn conditions means, with respect to an exposure
held by the [BANK], those conditions in which the aggregate default
rates for that exposure's wholesale or retail exposure subcategory (or
subdivision of such subcategory selected by the [BANK]) in the
exposure's national jurisdiction (or subdivision of such jurisdiction
selected by the [BANK]) are significantly higher than average.
Effective maturity (M) of a wholesale exposure means:
(1) For wholesale exposures other than repo-style transactions,
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts described in
paragraph (2) or (3) of this definition:
(i) The weighted-average remaining maturity (measured in years,
whole or fractional) of the expected contractual cash flows from the
exposure, using the undiscounted amounts of the cash flows as weights;
or
(ii) The nominal remaining maturity (measured in years, whole or
fractional) of the exposure.
(2) For repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC
derivative contracts subject to a qualifying master netting agreement
for which the [BANK] does not apply the internal models approach in
section 132(d), the weighted-average remaining maturity (measured in
years, whole or fractional) of the individual transactions subject to
the qualifying master netting agreement, with the weight of each
individual transaction set equal to the notional amount of the
transaction.
(3) For repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and OTC
derivative contracts for which the [BANK] applies the internal models
approach in Sec. ----.132(d), the value determined in Sec. --
--.132(d)(4).
Effective notional amount means, for an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative, the lesser of the contractual notional
amount of the credit risk mitigant and the EAD of the hedged exposure,
multiplied by the percentage coverage of the credit risk mitigant.
Eligible double default guarantor, with respect to a guarantee or
credit derivative obtained by a [BANK], means:
(1) U.S.-based entities. A depository institution, a bank holding
company, a savings and loan holding company, or a securities broker or
dealer registered with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act, if at
the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, has issued and
outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit enhancement that
is investment grade.
(2) Non-U.S.-based entities. A foreign bank, or a non-U.S.-based
securities firm if the [BANK] demonstrates that the guarantor is
subject to consolidated supervision and regulation comparable to that
imposed on U.S. depository institutions, or securities broker-dealers)
if at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, has
issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit
enhancement that is investment grade.
[[Page 53003]]
Eligible operational risk offsets means amounts, not to exceed
expected operational loss, that:
(1) Are generated by internal business practices to absorb highly
predictable and reasonably stable operational losses, including
reserves calculated consistent with GAAP; and
(2) Are available to cover expected operational losses with a high
degree of certainty over a one-year horizon.
Eligible purchased wholesale exposure means a purchased wholesale
exposure that:
(1) The [BANK] or securitization SPE purchased from an unaffiliated
seller and did not directly or indirectly originate;
(2) Was generated on an arm's-length basis between the seller and
the obligor (intercompany accounts receivable and receivables subject
to contra-accounts between firms that buy and sell to each other do not
satisfy this criterion);
(3) Provides the [BANK] or securitization SPE with a claim on all
proceeds from the exposure or a pro rata interest in the proceeds from
the exposure;
(4) Has an M of less than one year; and
(5) When consolidated by obligor, does not represent a concentrated
exposure relative to the portfolio of purchased wholesale exposures.
Expected exposure (EE) means the expected value of the probability
distribution of non-negative credit risk exposures to a counterparty at
any specified future date before the maturity date of the longest term
transaction in the netting set. Any negative market values in the
probability distribution of market values to a counterparty at a
specified future date are set to zero to convert the probability
distribution of market values to the probability distribution of credit
risk exposures.
Expected operational loss (EOL) means the expected value of the
distribution of potential aggregate operational losses, as generated by
the [BANK]'s operational risk quantification system using a one-year
horizon.
Expected positive exposure (EPE) means the weighted average over
time of expected (non-negative) exposures to a counterparty where the
weights are the proportion of the time interval that an individual
expected exposure represents. When calculating risk-based capital
requirements, the average is taken over a one-year horizon.
Exposure at default (EAD) means:
(1) For the on-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or
segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a
repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan for which the [BANK]
determines EAD under Sec. ----.132, a cleared transaction, or default
fund contribution), EAD means the [BANK]'s carrying value (including
net accrued but unpaid interest and fees) for the exposure or segment
less any allocated transfer risk reserve for the exposure or segment.
(2) For the off-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or
segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a
repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan for which the [BANK]
determines EAD under Sec. ----.132, cleared transaction, or default
fund contribution) in the form of a loan commitment, line of credit,
trade-related letter of credit, or transaction-related contingency, EAD
means the [BANK]'s best estimate of net additions to the outstanding
amount owed the [BANK], including estimated future additional draws of
principal and accrued but unpaid interest and fees, that are likely to
occur over a one-year horizon assuming the wholesale exposure or the
retail exposures in the segment were to go into default. This estimate
of net additions must reflect what would be expected during economic
downturn conditions. For the purposes of this definition:
(i) Trade-related letters of credit are short-term, self-
liquidating instruments that are used to finance the movement of goods
and are collateralized by the underlying goods.
(ii) Transaction-related contingencies relate to a particular
transaction and include, among other things, performance bonds and
performance-based letters of credit.
(3) For the off-balance sheet component of a wholesale exposure or
segment of retail exposures (other than an OTC derivative contract, a
repo-style transaction, or eligible margin loan for which the [BANK]
determines EAD under Sec. ----.132, cleared transaction, or default
fund contribution) in the form of anything other than a loan
commitment, line of credit, trade-related letter of credit, or
transaction-related contingency, EAD means the notional amount of the
exposure or segment.
(4) EAD for OTC derivative contracts is calculated as described in
Sec. ----.132. A [BANK] also may determine EAD for repo-style
transactions and eligible margin loans as described in Sec. ----.132.
Exposure category means any of the wholesale, retail,
securitization, or equity exposure categories.
External operational loss event data means, with respect to a
[BANK], gross operational loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant
causal information for operational loss events occurring at
organizations other than the [BANK].
IMM exposure means a repo-style transaction, eligible margin loan,
or OTC derivative for which a [BANK] calculates its EAD using the
internal models methodology of Sec. ----.132(d).
Internal operational loss event data means, with respect to a
[BANK], gross operational loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant
causal information for operational loss events occurring at the [BANK].
Loss given default (LGD) means:
(1) For a wholesale exposure, the greatest of:
(i) Zero;
(ii) The [BANK]'s empirically based best estimate of the long-run
default-weighted average economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the [BANK]
would expect to incur if the obligor (or a typical obligor in the loss
severity grade assigned by the [BANK] to the exposure) were to default
within a one-year horizon over a mix of economic conditions, including
economic downturn conditions; or
(iii) The [BANK]'s empirically based best estimate of the economic
loss, per dollar of EAD, the [BANK] would expect to incur if the
obligor (or a typical obligor in the loss severity grade assigned by
the [BANK] to the exposure) were to default within a one-year horizon
during economic downturn conditions.
(2) For a segment of retail exposures, the greatest of:
(i) Zero;
(ii) The [BANK]'s empirically based best estimate of the long-run
default-weighted average economic loss, per dollar of EAD, the [BANK]
would expect to incur if the exposures in the segment were to default
within a one-year horizon over a mix of economic conditions, including
economic downturn conditions; or
(iii) The [BANK]'s empirically based best estimate of the economic
loss, per dollar of EAD, the [BANK] would expect to incur if the
exposures in the segment were to default within a one-year horizon
during economic downturn conditions.
(3) The economic loss on an exposure in the event of default is all
material credit-related losses on the exposure (including accrued but
unpaid interest or fees, losses on the sale of collateral, direct
workout costs, and an appropriate allocation of indirect workout
costs). Where positive or negative cash flows on a wholesale exposure
to a defaulted obligor or a defaulted retail exposure (including
proceeds from the sale of collateral, workout costs, additional
extensions of credit to facilitate
[[Page 53004]]
repayment of the exposure, and draw-downs of unused credit lines) occur
after the date of default, the economic loss must reflect the net
present value of cash flows as of the default date using a discount
rate appropriate to the risk of the defaulted exposure.
Obligor means the legal entity or natural person contractually
obligated on a wholesale exposure, except that a [BANK] may treat the
following exposures as having separate obligors:
(1) Exposures to the same legal entity or natural person
denominated in different currencies;
(2)(i) An income-producing real estate exposure for which all or
substantially all of the repayment of the exposure is reliant on the
cash flows of the real estate serving as collateral for the exposure;
the [BANK], in economic substance, does not have recourse to the
borrower beyond the real estate collateral; and no cross-default or
cross-acceleration clauses are in place other than clauses obtained
solely out of an abundance of caution; and
(ii) Other credit exposures to the same legal entity or natural
person; and
(3)(i) A wholesale exposure authorized under section 364 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 364) to a legal entity or natural
person who is a debtor-in-possession for purposes of Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code; and
(ii) Other credit exposures to the same legal entity or natural
person.
Operational loss means a loss (excluding insurance or tax effects)
resulting from an operational loss event. Operational loss includes all
expenses associated with an operational loss event except for
opportunity costs, forgone revenue, and costs related to risk
management and control enhancements implemented to prevent future
operational losses.
Operational loss event means an event that results in loss and is
associated with any of the following seven operational loss event type
categories:
(1) Internal fraud, which means the operational loss event type
category that comprises operational losses resulting from an act
involving at least one internal party of a type intended to defraud,
misappropriate property, or circumvent regulations, the law, or company
policy excluding diversity- and discrimination-type events.
(2) External fraud, which means the operational loss event type
category that comprises operational losses resulting from an act by a
third party of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or
circumvent the law. Retail credit card losses arising from non-
contractual, third-party-initiated fraud (for example, identity theft)
are external fraud operational losses. All other third-party-initiated
credit losses are to be treated as credit risk losses.
(3) Employment practices and workplace safety, which means the
operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses
resulting from an act inconsistent with employment, health, or safety
laws or agreements, payment of personal injury claims, or payment
arising from diversity- and discrimination-type events.
(4) Clients, products, and business practices, which means the
operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses
resulting from the nature or design of a product or from an
unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obligation to
specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability requirements).
(5) Damage to physical assets, which means the operational loss
event type category that comprises operational losses resulting from
the loss of or damage to physical assets from natural disaster or other
events.
(6) Business disruption and system failures, which means the
operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses
resulting from disruption of business or system failures.
(7) Execution, delivery, and process management, which means the
operational loss event type category that comprises operational losses
resulting from failed transaction processing or process management or
losses arising from relations with trade counterparties and vendors.
Operational risk means the risk of loss resulting from inadequate
or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external
events (including legal risk but excluding strategic and reputational
risk).
Operational risk exposure means the 99.9th percentile of the
distribution of potential aggregate operational losses, as generated by
the [BANK]'s operational risk quantification system over a one-year
horizon (and not incorporating eligible operational risk offsets or
qualifying operational risk mitigants).
Other retail exposure means an exposure (other than a
securitization exposure, an equity exposure, a residential mortgage
exposure, a pre-sold construction loan, a qualifying revolving
exposure, or the residual value portion of a lease exposure) that is
managed as part of a segment of exposures with homogeneous risk
characteristics, not on an individual-exposure basis, and is either:
(1) An exposure to an individual for non-business purposes; or
(2) An exposure to an individual or company for business purposes
if the [BANK]'s consolidated business credit exposure to the individual
or company is $1 million or less.
Probability of default (PD) means:
(1) For a wholesale exposure to a non-defaulted obligor, the
[BANK]'s empirically based best estimate of the long-run average one-
year default rate for the rating grade assigned by the [BANK] to the
obligor, capturing the average default experience for obligors in the
rating grade over a mix of economic conditions (including economic
downturn conditions) sufficient to provide a reasonable estimate of the
average one-year default rate over the economic cycle for the rating
grade.
(2) For a segment of non-defaulted retail exposures, the [BANK]'s
empirically based best estimate of the long-run average one-year
default rate for the exposures in the segment, capturing the average
default experience for exposures in the segment over a mix of economic
conditions (including economic downturn conditions) sufficient to
provide a reasonable estimate of the average one-year default rate over
the economic cycle for the segment.
(3) For a wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor or segment of
defaulted retail exposures, 100 percent.
Qualifying cross-product master netting agreement means a
qualifying master netting agreement that provides for termination and
close-out netting across multiple types of financial transactions or
qualifying master netting agreements in the event of a counterparty's
default, provided that:
(1) The underlying financial transactions are OTC derivative
contracts, eligible margin loans, or repo-style transactions; and
(2) The [BANK] obtains a written legal opinion verifying the
validity and enforceability of the agreement under applicable law of
the relevant jurisdictions if the counterparty fails to perform upon an
event of default, including upon receivership, insolvency, liquidation,
or similar proceeding.
Qualifying revolving exposure (QRE) means an exposure (other than a
securitization exposure or equity exposure) to an individual that is
managed as part of a segment of exposures with homogeneous risk
characteristics, not on an individual-exposure basis, and:
(1) Is revolving (that is, the amount outstanding fluctuates,
determined largely by the borrower's decision to
[[Page 53005]]
borrow and repay, up to a pre-established maximum amount);
(2) Is unsecured and unconditionally cancelable by the [BANK] to
the fullest extent permitted by Federal law; and
(3) Has a maximum contractual exposure amount (drawn plus undrawn)
of up to $100,000, or the [BANK] consistently imposes in practice an
upper limit of $100,000.
Retail exposure means a residential mortgage exposure, a qualifying
revolving exposure, or an other retail exposure.
Retail exposure subcategory means the residential mortgage
exposure, qualifying revolving exposure, or other retail exposure
subcategory.
Risk parameter means a variable used in determining risk-based
capital requirements for wholesale and retail exposures, specifically
probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at
default (EAD), or effective maturity (M).
Scenario analysis means a systematic process of obtaining expert
opinions from business managers and risk management experts to derive
reasoned assessments of the likelihood and loss impact of plausible
high-severity operational losses. Scenario analysis may include the
well-reasoned evaluation and use of external operational loss event
data, adjusted as appropriate to ensure relevance to a [BANK]'s
operational risk profile and control structure.
Total wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets means:
(1) The sum of:
(i) Risk-weighted assets for wholesale exposures that are not IMM
exposures, cleared transactions, or default fund contributions to non-
defaulted obligors and segments of non-defaulted retail exposures;
(ii) Risk-weighted assets for wholesale exposures to defaulted
obligors and segments of defaulted retail exposures;
(iii) Risk-weighted assets for assets not defined by an exposure
category;
(iv) Risk-weighted assets for non-material portfolios of exposures;
(v) Risk-weighted assets for IMM exposures (as determined in Sec.
----.132(d));
(vi) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions and risk-
weighted assets for default fund contributions (as determined in Sec.
----.133); and
(vii) Risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions (as
determined in Sec. ----.136); minus
(2) Any amounts deducted from capital pursuant to Sec. ----.22.
Unexpected operational loss (UOL) means the difference between the
[BANK]'s operational risk exposure and the [BANK]'s expected
operational loss.
Unit of measure means the level (for example, organizational unit
or operational loss event type) at which the [BANK]'s operational risk
quantification system generates a separate distribution of potential
operational losses.
Wholesale exposure means a credit exposure to a company, natural
person, sovereign, or governmental entity (other than a securitization
exposure, retail exposure, or equity exposure).
Wholesale exposure subcategory means the HVCRE or non-HVCRE
wholesale exposure subcategory.
QUALIFICATION
Sec. ----.121 Qualification process.
(a) Timing. (1) A [BANK] that is described in Sec. --
--.100(b)(1)(i) through (iv) must adopt a written implementation plan
no later than six months after the date the [BANK] meets a criterion in
that section. The implementation plan must incorporate an explicit
start date no later than 36 months after the date the [BANK] meets at
least one criterion under Sec. ----.100(b)(1)(i) through (iv). The
[AGENCY] may extend the start date.
(2) A [BANK] that elects to be subject to this appendix under Sec.
----.100(b)(1)(v) must adopt a written implementation plan.
(b) Implementation plan. (1) The [BANK]'s implementation plan must
address in detail how the [BANK] complies, or plans to comply, with the
qualification requirements in Sec. ----.122. The [BANK] also must
maintain a comprehensive and sound planning and governance process to
oversee the implementation efforts described in the plan. At a minimum,
the plan must:
(i) Comprehensively address the qualification requirements in Sec.
----.122 for the [BANK] and each consolidated subsidiary (U.S. and
foreign-based) of the [BANK] with respect to all portfolios and
exposures of the [BANK] and each of its consolidated subsidiaries;
(ii) Justify and support any proposed temporary or permanent
exclusion of business lines, portfolios, or exposures from the
application of the advanced approaches in this subpart (which business
lines, portfolios, and exposures must be, in the aggregate, immaterial
to the [BANK]);
(iii) Include the [BANK]'s self-assessment of:
(A) The [BANK]'s current status in meeting the qualification
requirements in Sec. ----.122; and
(B) The consistency of the [BANK]'s current practices with the
[AGENCY]'s supervisory guidance on the qualification requirements;
(iv) Based on the [BANK]'s self-assessment, identify and describe
the areas in which the [BANK] proposes to undertake additional work to
comply with the qualification requirements in Sec. ----.122 or to
improve the consistency of the [BANK]'s current practices with the
[AGENCY]'s supervisory guidance on the qualification requirements (gap
analysis);
(v) Describe what specific actions the [BANK] will take to address
the areas identified in the gap analysis required by paragraph
(b)(1)(iv) of this section;
(vi) Identify objective, measurable milestones, including delivery
dates and a date when the [BANK]'s implementation of the methodologies
described in this subpart will be fully operational;
(vii) Describe resources that have been budgeted and are available
to implement the plan; and
(viii) Receive approval of the [BANK]'s board of directors.
(2) The [BANK] must submit the implementation plan, together with a
copy of the minutes of the board of directors' approval, to the
[AGENCY] at least 60 days before the [BANK] proposes to begin its
parallel run, unless the [AGENCY] waives prior notice.
(c) Parallel run. Before determining its risk-weighted assets under
this subpart and following adoption of the implementation plan, the
[BANK] must conduct a satisfactory parallel run. A satisfactory
parallel run is a period of no less than four consecutive calendar
quarters during which the [BANK] complies with the qualification
requirements in Sec. ----.122 to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY].
During the parallel run, the [BANK] must report to the [AGENCY] on a
calendar quarterly basis its risk-based capital ratios determined in
accordance with Sec. ----.10(b)(1) through (3) and Sec. ----.(c)(1)
through (3). During this period, the [BANK]'s minimum risk-based
capital ratios are determined as set forth in subpart D of this part.
(d) Approval to calculate risk-based capital requirements under
this subpart. The [AGENCY] will notify the [BANK] of the date that the
[BANK] must begin to use this subpart for purposes of Sec. ----.10 if
the [AGENCY] determines that:
(1) The [BANK] fully complies with all the qualification
requirements in Sec. ----.122;
(2) The [BANK] has conducted a satisfactory parallel run under
paragraph (c) of this section; and
(3) The [BANK] has an adequate process to ensure ongoing compliance
with the qualification requirements in Sec. ----.122.
[[Page 53006]]
Sec. ----.122 Qualification requirements.
(a) Process and systems requirements. (1) A [BANK] must have a
rigorous process for assessing its overall capital adequacy in relation
to its risk profile and a comprehensive strategy for maintaining an
appropriate level of capital.
(2) The systems and processes used by a [BANK] for risk-based
capital purposes under this subpart must be consistent with the
[BANK]'s internal risk management processes and management information
reporting systems.
(3) Each [BANK] must have an appropriate infrastructure with risk
measurement and management processes that meet the qualification
requirements of this section and are appropriate given the [BANK]'s
size and level of complexity. Regardless of whether the systems and
models that generate the risk parameters necessary for calculating a
[BANK]'s risk-based capital requirements are located at any affiliate
of the [BANK], the [BANK] itself must ensure that the risk parameters
and reference data used to determine its risk-based capital
requirements are representative of its own credit risk and operational
risk exposures.
(b) Risk rating and segmentation systems for wholesale and retail
exposures. (1) A [BANK] must have an internal risk rating and
segmentation system that accurately and reliably differentiates among
degrees of credit risk for the [BANK]'s wholesale and retail exposures.
(2) For wholesale exposures:
(i) A [BANK] must have an internal risk rating system that
accurately and reliably assigns each obligor to a single rating grade
(reflecting the obligor's likelihood of default). A [BANK] may elect,
however, not to assign to a rating grade an obligor to whom the [BANK]
extends credit based solely on the financial strength of a guarantor,
provided that all of the [BANK]'s exposures to the obligor are fully
covered by eligible guarantees, the [BANK] applies the PD substitution
approach in Sec. ----.134(c)(1) to all exposures to that obligor, and
the [BANK] immediately assigns the obligor to a rating grade if a
guarantee can no longer be recognized under this subpart. The [BANK]'s
wholesale obligor rating system must have at least seven discrete
rating grades for non-defaulted obligors and at least one rating grade
for defaulted obligors.
(ii) Unless the [BANK] has chosen to directly assign LGD estimates
to each wholesale exposure, the [BANK] must have an internal risk
rating system that accurately and reliably assigns each wholesale
exposure to a loss severity rating grade (reflecting the [BANK]'s
estimate of the LGD of the exposure). A [BANK] employing loss severity
rating grades must have a sufficiently granular loss severity grading
system to avoid grouping together exposures with widely ranging LGDs.
(3) For retail exposures, a [BANK] must have an internal system
that groups retail exposures into the appropriate retail exposure
subcategory, groups the retail exposures in each retail exposure
subcategory into separate segments with homogeneous risk
characteristics, and assigns accurate and reliable PD and LGD estimates
for each segment on a consistent basis. The [BANK]'s system must
identify and group in separate segments by subcategories exposures
identified in Sec. ----.131(c)(2)(ii) and (iii).
(4) The [BANK]'s internal risk rating policy for wholesale
exposures must describe the [BANK]'s rating philosophy (that is, must
describe how wholesale obligor rating assignments are affected by the
[BANK]'s choice of the range of economic, business, and industry
conditions that are considered in the obligor rating process).
(5) The [BANK]'s internal risk rating system for wholesale
exposures must provide for the review and update (as appropriate) of
each obligor rating and (if applicable) each loss severity rating
whenever the [BANK] receives new material information, but no less
frequently than annually. The [BANK]'s retail exposure segmentation
system must provide for the review and update (as appropriate) of
assignments of retail exposures to segments whenever the [BANK]
receives new material information, but generally no less frequently
than quarterly.
(c) Quantification of risk parameters for wholesale and retail
exposures. (1) The [BANK] must have a comprehensive risk parameter
quantification process that produces accurate, timely, and reliable
estimates of the risk parameters for the [BANK]'s wholesale and retail
exposures.
(2) Data used to estimate the risk parameters must be relevant to
the [BANK]'s actual wholesale and retail exposures, and of sufficient
quality to support the determination of risk-based capital requirements
for the exposures.
(3) The [BANK]'s risk parameter quantification process must produce
appropriately conservative risk parameter estimates where the [BANK]
has limited relevant data, and any adjustments that are part of the
quantification process must not result in a pattern of bias toward
lower risk parameter estimates.
(4) The [BANK]'s risk parameter estimation process should not rely
on the possibility of U.S. government financial assistance, except for
the financial assistance that the U.S. government has a legally binding
commitment to provide.
(5) Where the [BANK]'s quantifications of LGD directly or
indirectly incorporate estimates of the effectiveness of its credit
risk management practices in reducing its exposure to troubled obligors
prior to default, the [BANK] must support such estimates with empirical
analysis showing that the estimates are consistent with its historical
experience in dealing with such exposures during economic downturn
conditions.
(6) PD estimates for wholesale obligors and retail segments must be
based on at least five years of default data. LGD estimates for
wholesale exposures must be based on at least seven years of loss
severity data, and LGD estimates for retail segments must be based on
at least five years of loss severity data. EAD estimates for wholesale
exposures must be based on at least seven years of exposure amount
data, and EAD estimates for retail segments must be based on at least
five years of exposure amount data.
(7) Default, loss severity, and exposure amount data must include
periods of economic downturn conditions, or the [BANK] must adjust its
estimates of risk parameters to compensate for the lack of data from
periods of economic downturn conditions.
(8) The [BANK]'s PD, LGD, and EAD estimates must be based on the
definition of default in Sec. ----.101.
(9) The [BANK] must review and update (as appropriate) its risk
parameters and its risk parameter quantification process at least
annually.
(10) The [BANK] must, at least annually, conduct a comprehensive
review and analysis of reference data to determine relevance of
reference data to the [BANK]'s exposures, quality of reference data to
support PD, LGD, and EAD estimates, and consistency of reference data
to the definition of default in Sec. ----.101.
(d) Counterparty credit risk model. A [BANK] must obtain the prior
written approval of the [AGENCY] under Sec. ----.132 to use the
internal models methodology for counterparty credit risk and the
advanced CVA approach for the CVA capital requirement.
(e) Double default treatment. A [BANK] must obtain the prior
written approval of the [AGENCY] under
[[Page 53007]]
Sec. ----.135 to use the double default treatment.
(f) Equity exposures model. A [BANK] must obtain the prior written
approval of the [AGENCY] under Sec. ----.153 to use the internal
models approach for equity exposures.
(g) Operational risk. (1) Operational risk management processes. A
[BANK] must:
(i) Have an operational risk management function that:
(A) Is independent of business line management; and
(B) Is responsible for designing, implementing, and overseeing the
[BANK]'s operational risk data and assessment systems, operational risk
quantification systems, and related processes;
(ii) Have and document a process (which must capture business
environment and internal control factors affecting the [BANK]'s
operational risk profile) to identify, measure, monitor, and control
operational risk in [BANK] products, activities, processes, and
systems; and
(iii) Report operational risk exposures, operational loss events,
and other relevant operational risk information to business unit
management, senior management, and the board of directors (or a
designated committee of the board).
(2) Operational risk data and assessment systems. A [BANK] must
have operational risk data and assessment systems that capture
operational risks to which the [BANK] is exposed. The [BANK]'s
operational risk data and assessment systems must:
(i) Be structured in a manner consistent with the [BANK]'s current
business activities, risk profile, technological processes, and risk
management processes; and
(ii) Include credible, transparent, systematic, and verifiable
processes that incorporate the following elements on an ongoing basis:
(A) Internal operational loss event data. The [BANK] must have a
systematic process for capturing and using internal operational loss
event data in its operational risk data and assessment systems.
(1) The [BANK]'s operational risk data and assessment systems must
include a historical observation period of at least five years for
internal operational loss event data (or such shorter period approved
by the [AGENCY] to address transitional situations, such as integrating
a new business line).
(2) The [BANK] must be able to map its internal operational loss
event data into the seven operational loss event type categories.
(3) The [BANK] may refrain from collecting internal operational
loss event data for individual operational losses below established
dollar threshold amounts if the [BANK] can demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the [AGENCY] that the thresholds are reasonable, do not
exclude important internal operational loss event data, and permit the
[BANK] to capture substantially all the dollar value of the [BANK]'s
operational losses.
(B) External operational loss event data. The [BANK] must have a
systematic process for determining its methodologies for incorporating
external operational loss event data into its operational risk data and
assessment systems.
(C) Scenario analysis. The [BANK] must have a systematic process
for determining its methodologies for incorporating scenario analysis
into its operational risk data and assessment systems.
(D) Business environment and internal control factors. The [BANK]
must incorporate business environment and internal control factors into
its operational risk data and assessment systems. The [BANK] must also
periodically compare the results of its prior business environment and
internal control factor assessments against its actual operational
losses incurred in the intervening period.
(3) Operational risk quantification systems. (i) The [BANK]'s
operational risk quantification systems:
(A) Must generate estimates of the [BANK]'s operational risk
exposure using its operational risk data and assessment systems;
(B) Must employ a unit of measure that is appropriate for the
[BANK]'s range of business activities and the variety of operational
loss events to which it is exposed, and that does not combine business
activities or operational loss events with demonstrably different risk
profiles within the same loss distribution;
(C) Must include a credible, transparent, systematic, and
verifiable approach for weighting each of the four elements, described
in paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section, that a [BANK] is required to
incorporate into its operational risk data and assessment systems;
(D) May use internal estimates of dependence among operational
losses across and within units of measure if the [BANK] can demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] that its process for estimating
dependence is sound, robust to a variety of scenarios, and implemented
with integrity, and allows for uncertainty surrounding the estimates.
If the [BANK] has not made such a demonstration, it must sum
operational risk exposure estimates across units of measure to
calculate its total operational risk exposure; and
(E) Must be reviewed and updated (as appropriate) whenever the
[BANK] becomes aware of information that may have a material effect on
the [BANK]'s estimate of operational risk exposure, but the review and
update must occur no less frequently than annually.
(ii) With the prior written approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may
generate an estimate of its operational risk exposure using an
alternative approach to that specified in paragraph (g)(3)(i) of this
section. A [BANK] proposing to use such an alternative operational risk
quantification system must submit a proposal to the [AGENCY]. In
determining whether to approve a [BANK]'s proposal to use an
alternative operational risk quantification system, the [AGENCY] will
consider the following principles:
(A) Use of the alternative operational risk quantification system
will be allowed only on an exception basis, considering the size,
complexity, and risk profile of the [BANK];
(B) The [BANK] must demonstrate that its estimate of its
operational risk exposure generated under the alternative operational
risk quantification system is appropriate and can be supported
empirically; and
(C) A [BANK] must not use an allocation of operational risk capital
requirements that includes entities other than depository institutions
or the benefits of diversification across entities.
(h) Data management and maintenance. (1) A [BANK] must have data
management and maintenance systems that adequately support all aspects
of its advanced systems and the timely and accurate reporting of risk-
based capital requirements.
(2) A [BANK] must retain data using an electronic format that
allows timely retrieval of data for analysis, validation, reporting,
and disclosure purposes.
(3) A [BANK] must retain sufficient data elements related to key
risk drivers to permit adequate monitoring, validation, and refinement
of its advanced systems.
(i) Control, oversight, and validation mechanisms. (1) The [BANK]'s
senior management must ensure that all components of the [BANK]'s
advanced systems function effectively and comply with the qualification
requirements in this section.
(2) The [BANK]'s board of directors (or a designated committee of
the board) must at least annually review the
[[Page 53008]]
effectiveness of, and approve, the [BANK]'s advanced systems.
(3) A [BANK] must have an effective system of controls and
oversight that:
(i) Ensures ongoing compliance with the qualification requirements
in this section;
(ii) Maintains the integrity, reliability, and accuracy of the
[BANK]'s advanced systems; and
(iii) Includes adequate governance and project management
processes.
(4) The [BANK] must validate, on an ongoing basis, its advanced
systems. The [BANK]'s validation process must be independent of the
advanced systems' development, implementation, and operation, or the
validation process must be subjected to an independent review of its
adequacy and effectiveness. Validation must include:
(i) An evaluation of the conceptual soundness of (including
developmental evidence supporting) the advanced systems;
(ii) An ongoing monitoring process that includes verification of
processes and benchmarking; and
(iii) An outcomes analysis process that includes backtesting.
(5) The [BANK] must have an internal audit function independent of
business-line management that at least annually assesses the
effectiveness of the controls supporting the [BANK]'s advanced systems
and reports its findings to the [BANK]'s board of directors (or a
committee thereof).
(6) The [BANK] must periodically stress test its advanced systems.
The stress testing must include a consideration of how economic cycles,
especially downturns, affect risk-based capital requirements (including
migration across rating grades and segments and the credit risk
mitigation benefits of double default treatment).
(j) Documentation. The [BANK] must adequately document all material
aspects of its advanced systems.
Sec. ----.123 Ongoing qualification.
(a) Changes to advanced systems. A [BANK] must meet all the
qualification requirements in Sec. ----.122 on an ongoing basis. A
[BANK] must notify the [AGENCY] when the [BANK] makes any change to an
advanced system that would result in a material change in the [BANK]'s
advanced approaches total risk-weighted asset amount for an exposure
type or when the [BANK] makes any significant change to its modeling
assumptions.
(b) Failure to comply with qualification requirements. (1) If the
[AGENCY] determines that a [BANK] that uses this subpart and that has
conducted a satisfactory parallel run fails to comply with the
qualification requirements in Sec. ----.122, the [AGENCY] will notify
the [BANK] in writing of the [BANK]'s failure to comply.
(2) The [BANK] must establish and submit a plan satisfactory to the
[AGENCY] to return to compliance with the qualification requirements.
(3) In addition, if the [AGENCY] determines that the [BANK]'s
advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets are not commensurate
with the [BANK]'s credit, market, operational, or other risks, the
[AGENCY] may require such a [BANK] to calculate its advanced approaches
total risk-weighted assets with any modifications provided by the
[AGENCY].
Sec. ----.124 Merger and acquisition transitional arrangements.
(a) Mergers and acquisitions of companies without advanced systems.
If a [BANK] merges with or acquires a company that does not calculate
its risk-based capital requirements using advanced systems, the [BANK]
may use subpart D of this part to determine the risk-weighted asset
amounts for the merged or acquired company's exposures for up to 24
months after the calendar quarter during which the merger or
acquisition consummates. The [AGENCY] may extend this transition period
for up to an additional 12 months. Within 90 days of consummating the
merger or acquisition, the [BANK] must submit to the [AGENCY] an
implementation plan for using its advanced systems for the acquired
company. During the period when subpart D applies to the merged or
acquired company, any ALLL, net of allocated transfer risk reserves
established pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 3904, associated with the merged or
acquired company's exposures may be included in the acquiring [BANK]'s
tier 2 capital up to 1.25 percent of the acquired company's risk-
weighted assets. All general allowances of the merged or acquired
company must be excluded from the [BANK]'s eligible credit reserves. In
addition, the risk-weighted assets of the merged or acquired company
are not included in the [BANK]'s credit-risk-weighted assets but are
included in total risk-weighted assets. If a [BANK] relies on this
paragraph, the [BANK] must disclose publicly the amounts of risk-
weighted assets and qualifying capital calculated under this subpart
for the acquiring [BANK] and under subpart D of this part for the
acquired company.
(b) Mergers and acquisitions of companies with advanced systems.
(1) If a [BANK] merges with or acquires a company that calculates its
risk-based capital requirements using advanced systems, the [BANK] may
use the acquired company's advanced systems to determine total risk-
weighted assets for the merged or acquired company's exposures for up
to 24 months after the calendar quarter during which the acquisition or
merger consummates. The [AGENCY] may extend this transition period for
up to an additional 12 months. Within 90 days of consummating the
merger or acquisition, the [BANK] must submit to the [AGENCY] an
implementation plan for using its advanced systems for the merged or
acquired company.
(2) If the acquiring [BANK] is not subject to the advanced
approaches in this subpart at the time of acquisition or merger, during
the period when subpart D of this part applies to the acquiring [BANK],
the ALLL associated with the exposures of the merged or acquired
company may not be directly included in tier 2 capital. Rather, any
excess eligible credit reserves associated with the merged or acquired
company's exposures may be included in the [BANK]'s tier 2 capital up
to 0.6 percent of the credit-risk-weighted assets associated with those
exposures.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR GENERAL CREDIT RISK
Sec. ----.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail
risk-weighted assets.
(a) Overview. A [BANK] must calculate its total wholesale and
retail risk-weighted asset amount in four distinct phases:
(1) Phase 1--categorization of exposures;
(2) Phase 2--assignment of wholesale obligors and exposures to
rating grades and segmentation of retail exposures;
(3) Phase 3--assignment of risk parameters to wholesale exposures
and segments of retail exposures; and
(4) Phase 4--calculation of risk-weighted asset amounts.
(b) Phase 1--Categorization. The [BANK] must determine which of its
exposures are wholesale exposures, retail exposures, securitization
exposures, or equity exposures. The [BANK] must categorize each retail
exposure as a residential mortgage exposure, a QRE, or an other retail
exposure. The [BANK] must identify which wholesale exposures are HVCRE
exposures, sovereign exposures, OTC derivative contracts, repo-style
transactions, eligible margin loans, eligible purchased wholesale
exposures, cleared transactions, default fund contributions, unsettled
transactions to which Sec. ----.136 applies, and eligible
[[Page 53009]]
guarantees or eligible credit derivatives that are used as credit risk
mitigants. The [BANK] must identify any on-balance sheet asset that
does not meet the definition of a wholesale, retail, equity, or
securitization exposure, as well as any non-material portfolio of
exposures described in paragraph (e)(4) of this section.
(c) Phase 2--Assignment of wholesale obligors and exposures to
rating grades and retail exposures to segments. (1) Assignment of
wholesale obligors and exposures to rating grades.
(i) The [BANK] must assign each obligor of a wholesale exposure to
a single obligor rating grade and must assign each wholesale exposure
to which it does not directly assign an LGD estimate to a loss severity
rating grade.
(ii) The [BANK] must identify which of its wholesale obligors are
in default.
(2) Segmentation of retail exposures. (i) The [BANK] must group the
retail exposures in each retail subcategory into segments that have
homogeneous risk characteristics.
(ii) The [BANK] must identify which of its retail exposures are in
default. The [BANK] must segment defaulted retail exposures separately
from non-defaulted retail exposures.
(iii) If the [BANK] determines the EAD for eligible margin loans
using the approach in Sec. ----.132(b), the [BANK] must identify which
of its retail exposures are eligible margin loans for which the [BANK]
uses this EAD approach and must segment such eligible margin loans
separately from other retail exposures.
(3) Eligible purchased wholesale exposures. A [BANK] may group its
eligible purchased wholesale exposures into segments that have
homogeneous risk characteristics. A [BANK] must use the wholesale
exposure formula in Table 1 of this section to determine the risk-based
capital requirement for each segment of eligible purchased wholesale
exposures.
(d) Phase 3--Assignment of risk parameters to wholesale exposures
and segments of retail exposures. (1) Quantification process. Subject
to the limitations in this paragraph (d), the [BANK] must:
(i) Associate a PD with each wholesale obligor rating grade;
(ii) Associate an LGD with each wholesale loss severity rating
grade or assign an LGD to each wholesale exposure;
(iii) Assign an EAD and M to each wholesale exposure; and
(iv) Assign a PD, LGD, and EAD to each segment of retail exposures.
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, or a
multilateral development bank, to which the [BANK] assigns a rating
grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
(3) Floor on LGD estimation. The LGD for each segment of
residential mortgage exposures (other than segments of residential
mortgage exposures for which all or substantially all of the principal
of each exposure is directly and unconditionally guaranteed by the full
faith and credit of a sovereign entity) may not be less than 10
percent.
(4) Eligible purchased wholesale exposures. A [BANK] must assign a
PD, LGD, EAD, and M to each segment of eligible purchased wholesale
exposures. If the [BANK] can estimate ECL (but not PD or LGD) for a
segment of eligible purchased wholesale exposures, the [BANK] must
assume that the LGD of the segment equals 100 percent and that the PD
of the segment equals ECL divided by EAD. The estimated ECL must be
calculated for the exposures without regard to any assumption of
recourse or guarantees from the seller or other parties.
(5) Credit risk mitigation: credit derivatives, guarantees, and
collateral. (i) A [BANK] may take into account the risk reducing
effects of eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives in
support of a wholesale exposure by applying the PD substitution or LGD
adjustment treatment to the exposure as provided in Sec. ----.134 or,
if applicable, applying double default treatment to the exposure as
provided in Sec. ----.135. A [BANK] may decide separately for each
wholesale exposure that qualifies for the double default treatment
under Sec. ----.135 whether to apply the double default treatment or
to use the PD substitution or LGD adjustment treatment without
recognizing double default effects.
(ii) A [BANK] may take into account the risk reducing effects of
guarantees and credit derivatives in support of retail exposures in a
segment when quantifying the PD and LGD of the segment.
(iii) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(6) of this section, a
[BANK] may take into account the risk reducing effects of collateral in
support of a wholesale exposure when quantifying the LGD of the
exposure, and may take into account the risk reducing effects of
collateral in support of retail exposures when quantifying the PD and
LGD of the segment.
(6) EAD for OTC derivative contracts, repo-style transactions, and
eligible margin loans. A [BANK] must calculate its EAD for an OTC
derivative contract as provided in Sec. Sec. ----.132 (c) and (d). A
[BANK] may take into account the risk-reducing effects of financial
collateral in support of a repo-style transaction or eligible margin
loan and of any collateral in support of a repo-style transaction that
is included in the [BANK]'s VaR-based measure under subpart F of this
[PART] through an adjustment to EAD as provided in Sec. Sec. --
--.132(b) and (d). A [BANK] that takes collateral into account through
such an adjustment to EAD under Sec. ----.132 may not reflect such
collateral in LGD.
(7) Effective maturity. An exposure's M must be no greater than
five years and no less than one year, except that an exposure's M must
be no less than one day if the exposure is a trade related letter of
credit, or if the exposure has an original maturity of less than one
year and is not part of a [BANK]'s ongoing financing of the obligor. An
exposure is not part of a [BANK]'s ongoing financing of the obligor if
the [BANK]:
(i) Has a legal and practical ability not to renew or roll over the
exposure in the event of credit deterioration of the obligor;
(ii) Makes an independent credit decision at the inception of the
exposure and at every renewal or roll over; and
(iii) Has no substantial commercial incentive to continue its
credit relationship with the obligor in the event of credit
deterioration of the obligor.
(8) EAD for exposures to certain central counterparties. A [BANK]
may attribute an EAD of zero to exposures that arise from the
settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange, and spot commodities) with a central counterparty
where there is no assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the
central counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated
default fund contributions.
(e) Phase 4--Calculation of risk-weighted assets. (1) Non-defaulted
exposures.
(i) A [BANK] must calculate the dollar risk-based capital
requirement for each of its wholesale exposures to a non-defaulted
obligor (except for eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives
that hedge another wholesale exposure, IMM exposures, cleared
transactions, default fund contributions, unsettled transactions,
[[Page 53010]]
and exposures to which the [BANK] applies the double default treatment
in Sec. ----.135) and segments of non-defaulted retail exposures by
inserting the assigned risk parameters for the wholesale obligor and
exposure or retail segment into the appropriate risk-based capital
formula specified in Table 1 and multiplying the output of the formula
(K) by the EAD of the exposure or segment. Alternatively, a [BANK] may
apply a 300 percent risk weight to the EAD of an eligible margin loan
if the [BANK] is not able to meet the agencies' requirements for
estimation of PD and LGD for the margin loan.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.028
(ii) The sum of all the dollar risk-based capital requirements for
each wholesale exposure to a non-defaulted obligor and segment of non-
defaulted retail exposures calculated in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this
section and in Sec. ----.135(e) equals the total dollar risk-based
capital requirement for those exposures and segments.
(iii) The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for wholesale
exposures to non-defaulted obligors and segments of non-defaulted
retail exposures equals the total dollar risk-based capital
[[Page 53011]]
requirement in paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section multiplied by 12.5.
(2) Wholesale exposures to defaulted obligors and segments of
defaulted retail exposures.
(i) The dollar risk-based capital requirement for each wholesale
exposure to a defaulted obligor equals 0.08 multiplied by the EAD of
the exposure.
(ii) The dollar risk-based capital requirement for a segment of
defaulted retail exposures equals 0.08 multiplied by the EAD of the
segment.
(iii) The sum of all the dollar risk-based capital requirements for
each wholesale exposure to a defaulted obligor calculated in paragraph
(e)(2)(i) of this section plus the dollar risk-based capital
requirements for each segment of defaulted retail exposures calculated
in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section equals the total dollar risk-
based capital requirement for those exposures and segments.
(iv) The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for wholesale
exposures to defaulted obligors and segments of defaulted retail
exposures equals the total dollar risk-based capital requirement
calculated in paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section multiplied by 12.5.
(3) Assets not included in a defined exposure category. (i) A
[BANK] may assign a risk-weighted asset amount of zero to cash owned
and held in all offices of the [BANK] or in transit and for gold
bullion held in the [BANK]'s own vaults, or held in another [BANK]'s
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
(ii) A [BANK] must assign a risk weighted asset amount equal to 20
percent of the carrying value of cash items in the process of
collection.
(iii) The risk-weighted asset amount for the residual value of a
retail lease exposure equals such residual value.
(iv) The risk-weighted asset amount for DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the [BANK] could realize through net operating loss
carrybacks equals the carrying value, netted in accordance with Sec.
----.22.
(v) The risk-weighted asset amount for MSAs, DTAs arising from
temporary timing differences that the [BANK] could not realize through
net operating loss carrybacks, and significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common
stock that are not deducted pursuant to Sec. ----.22(a)(7) equals the
amount not subject to deduction multiplied by 250 percent.
(vi) The risk-weighted asset amount for any other on-balance-sheet
asset that does not meet the definition of a wholesale, retail,
securitization, IMM, or equity exposure, cleared transaction, or
default fund contribution equals the carrying value of the asset.
(4) Non-material portfolios of exposures. The risk-weighted asset
amount of a portfolio of exposures for which the [BANK] has
demonstrated to the [AGENCY]'s satisfaction that the portfolio (when
combined with all other portfolios of exposures that the [BANK] seeks
to treat under this paragraph) is not material to the [BANK] is the sum
of the carrying values of on-balance sheet exposures plus the notional
amounts of off-balance sheet exposures in the portfolio. For purposes
of this paragraph (e)(4), the notional amount of an OTC derivative
contract that is not a credit derivative is the EAD of the derivative
as calculated in Sec. ----.132.
Sec. ----.132 Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions,
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.
(a) Methodologies for collateral recognition. (1) Instead of an LGD
estimation methodology, a [BANK] may use the following methodologies to
recognize the benefits of financial collateral in mitigating the
counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, eligible margin
loans, collateralized OTC derivative contracts and single product
netting sets of such transactions, and to recognize the benefits of any
collateral in mitigating the counterparty credit risk of repo-style
transactions that are included in a [BANK]'s VaR-based measure under
subpart F:
(i) The collateral haircut approach set forth in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section;
(ii) The internal models methodology set forth in paragraph (d) of
this section; and
(iii) For single product netting sets of repo-style transactions
and eligible margin loans, the simple VaR methodology set forth in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(2) A [BANK] may use any combination of the three methodologies for
collateral recognition; however, it must use the same methodology for
transactions in the same category.
(3) A [BANK] must use the methodology in paragraph (c) of this
section, or with prior [AGENCY] approval, the internal model
methodology in paragraph (d) of this section, to calculate EAD for an
OTC derivative contract or a set of OTC derivative contracts subject to
a qualifying master netting agreement. To estimate EAD for qualifying
cross-product master netting agreements, a [BANK] may only use the
internal models methodology in paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) A [BANK] must also use the methodology in paragraph (e) of this
section for calculating the risk-weighted asset amounts for CVA for OTC
derivatives.
(b) EAD for eligible margin loans and repo-style transactions. (1)
General. A [BANK] may recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of
financial collateral that secures an eligible margin loan, repo-style
transaction, or single-product netting set of such transactions by
factoring the collateral into its LGD estimates for the exposure.
Alternatively, a [BANK] may estimate an unsecured LGD for the exposure,
as well as for any repo-style transaction that is included in the
[BANK]'s VaR-based measure under subpart F of this part, and determine
the EAD of the exposure using:
(i) The collateral haircut approach described in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section;
(ii) For netting sets only, the simple VaR methodology described in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section; or
(iii) The internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of
this section.
(2) Collateral haircut approach. (i) EAD equation. A [BANK] may
determine EAD for an eligible margin loan, repo-style transaction, or
netting set by setting EAD equal to max {0, [([Sigma]E - [Sigma]C) +
[Sigma](ES x HS) + [Sigma](Efx x
Hfx)]{time} , where:
(A) [Sigma]E equals the value of the exposure (the sum of the
current market values of all instruments, gold, and cash the [BANK] has
lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the
counterparty under the transaction (or netting set));
(B) [Sigma]C equals the value of the collateral (the sum of the
current market values of all instruments, gold, and cash the [BANK] has
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the
counterparty under the transaction (or netting set));
(C) Es equals the absolute value of the net position in
a given instrument or in gold (where the net position in a given
instrument or in gold equals the sum of the current market values of
the instrument or gold the [BANK] has lent, sold subject to repurchase,
or posted as collateral to the counterparty minus the sum of the
current market values of that same instrument or gold the [BANK] has
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the
counterparty);
(D) Hs equals the market price volatility haircut
appropriate to the instrument or gold referenced in ES;
[[Page 53012]]
(E) Efx equals the absolute value of the net position of
instruments and cash in a currency that is different from the
settlement currency (where the net position in a given currency equals
the sum of the current market values of any instruments or cash in the
currency the [BANK] has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as
collateral to the counterparty minus the sum of the current market
values of any instruments or cash in the currency the [BANK] has
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the
counterparty); and
(F) Hfx equals the haircut appropriate to the mismatch
between the currency referenced in Efx and the settlement
currency.
(ii) Standard supervisory haircuts. (A) Under the standard
supervisory haircuts approach:
(1) A [BANK] must use the haircuts for market price volatility
(Hs) in Table 2, as adjusted in certain circumstances as
provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) and (4) of this section;
Table 2--Standard Supervisory Market Price Volatility Haircuts \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Haircut (in percents) assigned based on:
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign issuers risk weight Non-sovereign issuers risk Investment grade
Residual maturity under this section \2\ weight under this section securitization
------------------------------------------------------------------ exposures (in
20% or percent)
Zero % 50% 100% 20% 50% 100%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than or equal to 1 year....................................... 0.5 1.0 15.0 1.0 2.0 25.0 4.0
Greater than 1 year and less than or equal to 5 years.............. 2.0 3.0 15.0 4.0 6.0 25.0 12.0
Greater than 5 years............................................... 4.0 6.0 15.0 8.0 12.0 25.0 24.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Main index equities (including convertible bonds) and gold..............................15.0........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other publicly-traded equities (including convertible bonds)............................25.0........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mutual funds.........................................................Highest haircut applicable to any security
in which the fund can invest.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cash collateral held....................................................................Zero........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The market price volatility haircuts in Table 2 are based on a 10-business-day holding period.
\2\ Includes a foreign PSE that receives a zero percent risk weight.
(2) For currency mismatches, a [BANK] must use a haircut for
foreign exchange rate volatility (Hfx) of 8 percent, as
adjusted in certain circumstances as provided in paragraphs
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) and (4) of this section.
(3) For repo-style transactions, a [BANK] may multiply the
supervisory haircuts provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) and (2) of
this section by the square root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
(4) A [BANK] must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the
basis of a holding period longer than ten business days (for eligible
margin loans) or five business days (for repo-style transactions) where
the following conditions apply. If the number of trades in a netting
set exceeds 5,000 at any time during a quarter, a [BANK] must adjust
the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of
twenty business days for the following quarter (except when a [BANK] is
calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under Sec. ----.133). If a
netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral
or an OTC derivative that cannot be easily replaced, a [BANK] must
adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period
of twenty business days. If over the two previous quarters more than
two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more
than the holding period, then the [BANK] must adjust the supervisory
haircuts upward for that netting set on the basis of a holding period
that is at least two times the minimum holding period for that netting
set. A [BANK] must adjust the standard supervisory haircuts upward
using the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.029
Where,
(i) TM equals a holding period of longer than 10 business
days for eligible margin loans and derivative contracts or longer
than 5 business days for repo-style transactions;
(ii) HS equals the standard supervisory haircut; and
(iii) TS equals 10 business days for eligible margin
loans and derivative contracts or 5 business days for repo-style
transactions.
(5) If the instrument a [BANK] has lent, sold subject to
repurchase, or posted as collateral does not meet the definition of
financial collateral, the [BANK] must use a 25.0 percent haircut for
market price volatility (HS).
(iii) Own internal estimates for haircuts. With the prior written
approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may calculate haircuts
(Hs and Hfx) using its own internal estimates of
the volatilities of market prices and foreign exchange rates.
(A) To receive [AGENCY] approval to use its own internal estimates,
a [BANK] must satisfy the following minimum quantitative standards:
(1) A [BANK] must use a 99th percentile one-tailed confidence
interval.
(2) The minimum holding period for a repo-style transaction is five
business days and for an eligible margin loan is ten business days
except for transactions or netting sets for which paragraph
(b)(2)(iii)(A)(3) of this section applies. When a [BANK] calculates an
own-estimates haircut on a TN-day holding period, which is
different from the minimum holding period for the transaction type, the
applicable haircut (HM) is calculated using the following
square root of time formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.030
Where,
[[Page 53013]]
(i) TM equals 5 for repo-style transactions and 10 for
eligible margin loans;
(ii) TN equals the holding period used by the [BANK] to
derive HN; and
(iii) HN equals the haircut based on the holding period
TN.
(3) If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any
time during a quarter, a [BANK] must calculate the haircut using a
minimum holding period of twenty business days for the following
quarter (except when a [BANK] is calculating EAD for a cleared
transaction under Sec. ----.133). If a netting set contains one or
more trades involving illiquid collateral or an OTC derivative that
cannot be easily replaced, a [BANK] must calculate the haircut using a
minimum holding period of twenty business days. If over the two
previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have
occurred that lasted more than the holding period, then the [BANK] must
calculate the haircut for transactions in that netting set on the basis
of a holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding
period for that netting set.
(4) A [BANK] is required to calculate its own internal estimates
with inputs calibrated to historical data from a continuous 12-month
period that reflects a period of significant financial stress
appropriate to the security or category of securities.
(5) A [BANK] must have policies and procedures that describe how it
determines the period of significant financial stress used to calculate
the [BANK]'s own internal estimates for haircuts under this section and
must be able to provide empirical support for the period used. The
[BANK] must obtain the prior approval of the [AGENCY] for, and notify
the [AGENCY] if the [BANK] makes any material changes to, these
policies and procedures.
(6) Nothing in this section prevents the [AGENCY] from requiring a
[BANK] to use a different period of significant financial stress in the
calculation of own internal estimates for haircuts.
(7) A [BANK] must update its data sets and calculate haircuts no
less frequently than quarterly and must also reassess data sets and
haircuts whenever market prices change materially.
(B) With respect to debt securities that are investment grade, a
[BANK] may calculate haircuts for categories of securities. For a
category of securities, the [BANK] must calculate the haircut on the
basis of internal volatility estimates for securities in that category
that are representative of the securities in that category that the
[BANK] has lent, sold subject to repurchase, posted as collateral,
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral. In
determining relevant categories, the [BANK] must at a minimum take into
account:
(1) The type of issuer of the security;
(2) The credit quality of the security;
(3) The maturity of the security; and
(4) The interest rate sensitivity of the security.
(C) With respect to debt securities that are not investment grade
and equity securities, a [BANK] must calculate a separate haircut for
each individual security.
(D) Where an exposure or collateral (whether in the form of cash or
securities) is denominated in a currency that differs from the
settlement currency, the [BANK] must calculate a separate currency
mismatch haircut for its net position in each mismatched currency based
on estimated volatilities of foreign exchange rates between the
mismatched currency and the settlement currency.
(E) A [BANK]'s own estimates of market price and foreign exchange
rate volatilities may not take into account the correlations among
securities and foreign exchange rates on either the exposure or
collateral side of a transaction (or netting set) or the correlations
among securities and foreign exchange rates between the exposure and
collateral sides of the transaction (or netting set).
(3) Simple VaR methodology. With the prior written approval of the
[AGENCY], a [BANK] may estimate EAD for a netting set using a VaR model
that meets the requirements in paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section.
In such event, the [BANK] must set EAD equal to max {0, [([Sigma]E -
[Sigma]C) + PFE]{time} , where:
(i) [Sigma]E equals the value of the exposure (the sum of the
current market values of all instruments, gold, and cash the [BANK] has
lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral to the
counterparty under the netting set);
(ii) [Sigma]C equals the value of the collateral (the sum of the
current market values of all instruments, gold, and cash the [BANK] has
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the
counterparty under the netting set); and
(iii) PFE (potential future exposure) equals the [BANK]'s
empirically based best estimate of the 99th percentile, one-tailed
confidence interval for an increase in the value of ([Sigma]E-
[Sigma]C) over a five-business-day holding period for repo-style
transactions, or over a ten-business-day holding period for eligible
margin loans except for netting sets for which paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of
this section applies using a minimum one-year historical observation
period of price data representing the instruments that the [BANK] has
lent, sold subject to repurchase, posted as collateral, borrowed,
purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral. The [BANK] must
validate its VaR model by establishing and maintaining a rigorous and
regular backtesting regime.
(iv) If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any
time during a quarter, a [BANK] must use a twenty-business-day holding
period for the following quarter (except when a [BANK] is calculating
EAD for a cleared transaction under Sec. ----.133). If a netting set
contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral, a [BANK]
must use a twenty-business-day holding period. If over the two previous
quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have occurred
that lasted more than the holding period, then the [BANK] must set its
PFE for that netting set equal to an estimate over a holding period
that is at least two times the minimum holding period for that netting
set.
(c) EAD for OTC derivative contracts. (1) A [BANK] must determine
the EAD for an OTC derivative contract that is not subject to a
qualifying master netting agreement using the current exposure
methodology in paragraph (c)(5) of this section or using the internal
models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section.
(2) A [BANK] must determine the EAD for multiple OTC derivative
contracts that are subject to a qualifying master netting agreement
using the current exposure methodology in Sec. ----.132(c)(6) or using
the internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this
section.
(3) Counterparty credit risk for credit derivatives.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (c) (1) and (c)(2) of this section:
(i) A [BANK] that purchases a credit derivative that is recognized
under Sec. ----.134 or Sec. ----.135 as a credit risk mitigant for an
exposure that is not a covered position under subpart F of this part is
not required to calculate a separate counterparty credit risk capital
requirement under this section so long as the [BANK] does so
consistently for all such credit derivatives and either includes or
excludes all such credit derivatives that are subject to a master
netting agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty
credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based
capital purposes.
(ii) A [BANK] that is the protection provider in a credit
derivative must treat the credit derivative as a wholesale exposure to
the reference obligor and is not required to calculate a counterparty
[[Page 53014]]
credit risk capital requirement for the credit derivative under this
section, so long as it does so consistently for all such credit
derivatives and either includes all or excludes all such credit
derivatives that are subject to a master netting agreement from any
measure used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure to all
relevant counterparties for risk-based capital purposes (unless the
[BANK] is treating the credit derivative as a covered position under
subpart F of this part, in which case the [BANK] must calculate a
supplemental counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this
section).
(4) Counterparty credit risk for equity derivatives. A [BANK] must
treat an equity derivative contract as an equity exposure and compute a
risk-weighted asset amount for the equity derivative contract under
Sec. Sec. ----.151-----.155 (unless the [BANK] is treating the
contract as a covered position under subpart F of this part). In
addition, if the [BANK] is treating the contract as a covered position
under subpart F of this part, and under certain other circumstances
described in Sec. ----.155, the [BANK] must also calculate a risk-
based capital requirement for the counterparty credit risk of an equity
derivative contract under this section.
(5) Single OTC derivative contract. Except as modified by paragraph
(c)(7) of this section, the EAD for a single OTC derivative contract
that is not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal
to the sum of the [BANK]'s current credit exposure and potential future
credit exposure (PFE) on the derivative contract.
(i) Current credit exposure. The current credit exposure for a
single OTC derivative contract is the greater of the mark-to-market
value of the derivative contract or zero.
(ii) PFE. The PFE for a single OTC derivative contract, including
an OTC derivative contract with a negative mark-to-market value, is
calculated by multiplying the notional principal amount of the
derivative contract by the appropriate conversion factor in Table 3.
For purposes of calculating either the PFE under paragraph (c)(5) of
this section or the gross PFE under paragraph (c)(6) of this section
for exchange rate contracts and other similar contracts in which the
notional principal amount is equivalent to the cash flows, the notional
principal amount is the net receipts to each party falling due on each
value date in each currency. For any OTC derivative contract that does
not fall within one of the specified categories in Table 3, the PFE
must be calculated using the ``other'' conversion factors. A [BANK]
must use an OTC derivative contract's effective notional principal
amount (that is, its apparent or stated notional principal amount
multiplied by any multiplier in the OTC derivative contract) rather
than its apparent or stated notional principal amount in calculating
PFE. PFE of the protection provider of a credit derivative is capped at
the net present value of the amount of unpaid premiums.
Table 3--Conversion Factor Matrix for OTC Derivative Contracts \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credit (non-
Foreign Credit investment- Precious
Remaining maturity \2\ Interest exchange (investment- grade Equity metals Other
rate rate and grade reference reference (except
gold asset) \3\ asset) gold)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year or less................................... 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.10
Over one to five years............................. 0.005 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.12
Over five years.................................... 0.015 0.075 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For an OTC derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the conversion factor is multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the
derivative contract.
\2\ For an OTC derivative contract that is structured such that on specified dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that
the market value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset date. For an interest rate derivative contract
with a remaining maturity of greater than one year that meets these criteria, the minimum conversion factor is 0.005.
\3\ A [BANK] must use the column labeled ``Credit (investment-grade reference asset)'' for a credit derivative whose reference asset is an outstanding
unsecured long-term debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade. A [BANK] must use the column labeled ``Credit (non-investment-
grade reference asset)'' for all other credit derivatives.
(6) Multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying
master netting agreement. Except as modified by paragraph (c)(7) of
this section, the EAD for multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to
a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the sum of the net
current credit exposure and the adjusted sum of the PFE exposure for
all OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying master netting
agreement.
(i) Net current credit exposure. The net current credit exposure is
the greater of:
(A) The net sum of all positive and negative mark-to-market values
of the individual OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying
master netting agreement; or
(B) Zero.
(ii) Adjusted sum of the PFE. The adjusted sum of the PFE,
Anet, is calculated as Anet = (0.4 x
Agross) + (0.6 x NGR x Agross), where:
(A) Agross = the gross PFE (that is, the sum of the PFE
amounts (as determined under paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section) for
each individual derivative contract subject to the qualifying master
netting agreement); and
(B) NGR = the net to gross ratio (that is, the ratio of the net
current credit exposure to the gross current credit exposure). In
calculating the NGR, the gross current credit exposure equals the sum
of the positive current credit exposures (as determined under paragraph
(c)(6)(i) of this section) of all individual derivative contracts
subject to the qualifying master netting agreement.
(7) Collateralized OTC derivative contracts. A [BANK] may recognize
the credit risk mitigation benefits of financial collateral that
secures an OTC derivative contract or single-product netting set of OTC
derivatives by factoring the collateral into its LGD estimates for the
contract or netting set. Alternatively, a [BANK] may recognize the
credit risk mitigation benefits of financial collateral that secures
such a contract or netting set that is marked-to-market on a daily
basis and subject to a daily margin maintenance requirement by
estimating an unsecured LGD for the contract or netting set and
adjusting the EAD calculated under paragraph (c)(5) or (c)(6) of this
section using the collateral haircut approach in paragraph (b)(2) of
this section. The [BANK] must substitute the EAD calculated under
paragraph (c)(5) or (c)(6) of this section for [Sigma]E in the equation
in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section and must use a ten-business day
minimum holding period (TM = 10) unless a longer holding
[[Page 53015]]
period is required by paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(A)(3) of this section.
(d) Internal models methodology. (1) With prior written approval
from the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may use the internal models methodology in
this paragraph (d) to determine EAD for counterparty credit risk for
derivative contracts (collateralized or uncollateralized) and single-
product netting sets thereof, for eligible margin loans and single-
product netting sets thereof, and for repo-style transactions and
single-product netting sets thereof. A [BANK] that uses the internal
models methodology for a particular transaction type (derivative
contracts, eligible margin loans, or repo-style transactions) must use
the internal models methodology for all transactions of that
transaction type. A [BANK] may choose to use the internal models
methodology for one or two of these three types of exposures and not
the other types. A [BANK] may also use the internal models methodology
for derivative contracts, eligible margin loans, and repo-style
transactions subject to a qualifying cross-product netting agreement
if:
(i) The [BANK] effectively integrates the risk mitigating effects
of cross-product netting into its risk management and other information
technology systems; and
(ii) The [BANK] obtains the prior written approval of the [AGENCY].
A [BANK] that uses the internal models methodology for a transaction
type must receive approval from the [AGENCY] to cease using the
methodology for that transaction type or to make a material change to
its internal model.
(2) Risk-weighted assets using IMM. Under the IMM, a [BANK] uses an
internal model to estimate the expected exposure (EE) for a netting set
and then calculates EAD based on that EE. A [BANK] must calculate two
EEs and two EADs (one stressed and one unstressed) for each netting set
as follows:
(i) EADunstressed is calculated using an EE estimate
based on the most recent data meeting the requirements of paragraph
(d)(3)(vii) of this section.
(ii) EADstressed is calculated using an EE estimate
based on a historical period that includes a period of stress to the
credit default spreads of the [BANK]'s counterparties according to
paragraph (d)(3)(viii) of this section.
(iii) The [BANK] must use its internal model's probability
distribution for changes in the market value of a netting set that are
attributable to changes in market variables to determine EE.
(iv) Under the internal models methodology, EAD = Max (0, [alpha] x
effective EPE - CVA), or, subject to [AGENCY] approval as provided in
paragraph (d)(10) of this section, a more conservative measure of EAD.
(A) CVA equals the credit valuation adjustment that the [BANK] has
recognized in its balance sheet valuation of any OTC derivative
contracts in the netting set. For purposes of this paragraph, CVA does
not include any adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital
attributable to changes in the fair value of the [BANK]'s liabilities
that are due to changes in its own credit risk since the inception of
the transaction with the counterparty.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.031
(1) EffectiveE Etk = max (EffectiveE Etk - 1,EEtk) (that is, for
a specific date tk, effective EE is the greater of EE at
that date or the effective EE at the previous date); and
(2) tk represents the kth future time period in the
model and there are n time periods represented in the model over the
first year, and
(C) [alpha] = 1.4 except as provided in paragraph (d)(5) of this
section, or when the [AGENCY] has determined that the [BANK] must
set [alpha] higher based on the [BANK]'s specific characteristics of
counterparty credit risk or model performance.
(v) A [BANK] may include financial collateral currently posted by
the counterparty as collateral (but may not include other forms of
collateral) when calculating EE.
(vi) If a [BANK] hedges some or all of the counterparty credit risk
associated with a netting set using an eligible credit derivative, the
[BANK] may take the reduction in exposure to the counterparty into
account when estimating EE. If the [BANK] recognizes this reduction in
exposure to the counterparty in its estimate of EE, it must also use
its internal model to estimate a separate EAD for the [BANK]'s exposure
to the protection provider of the credit derivative.
(3) To obtain [AGENCY] approval to calculate the distributions of
exposures upon which the EAD calculation is based, the [BANK] must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] that it has been using
for at least one year an internal model that broadly meets the
following minimum standards, with which the [BANK] must maintain
compliance:
(i) The model must have the systems capability to estimate the
expected exposure to the counterparty on a daily basis (but is not
expected to estimate or report expected exposure on a daily basis).
(ii) The model must estimate expected exposure at enough future
dates to reflect accurately all the future cash flows of contracts in
the netting set.
(iii) The model must account for the possible non-normality of the
exposure distribution, where appropriate.
(iv) The [BANK] must measure, monitor, and control current
counterparty exposure and the exposure to the counterparty over the
whole life of all contracts in the netting set.
(v) The [BANK] must be able to measure and manage current exposures
gross and net of collateral held, where appropriate. The [BANK] must
estimate expected exposures for OTC derivative contracts both with and
without the effect of collateral agreements.
(vi) The [BANK] must have procedures to identify, monitor, and
control wrong-way risk throughout the life of an exposure. The
procedures must include stress testing and scenario analysis.
(vii) The model must use current market data to compute current
exposures. The [BANK] must estimate model parameters using historical
data from the most recent three-year period and update the data
quarterly or more frequently if market conditions warrant. The [BANK]
should consider using model parameters based on forward-looking
measures, where appropriate.
(viii) When estimating model parameters based on a stress period,
the [BANK] must use at least three years of historical data that
include a period of
[[Page 53016]]
stress to the credit default spreads of the [BANK]'s counterparties.
The [BANK] must review the data set and update the data as necessary,
particularly for any material changes in its counterparties. The [BANK]
must demonstrate at least quarterly that the stress period coincides
with increased CDS or other credit spreads of the [BANK]'s
counterparties. The [BANK] must have procedures to evaluate the
effectiveness of its stress calibration that include a process for
using benchmark portfolios that are vulnerable to the same risk factors
as the [BANK]'s portfolio. The [AGENCY] may require the [BANK] to
modify its stress calibration to better reflect actual historic losses
of the portfolio.
(ix) A [BANK] must subject its internal model to an initial
validation and annual model review process. The model review should
consider whether the inputs and risk factors, as well as the model
outputs, are appropriate. As part of the model review process, the
[BANK] must have a backtesting program for its model that includes a
process by which unacceptable model performance will be determined and
remedied.
(x) A [BANK] must have policies for the measurement, management and
control of collateral and margin amounts.
(xi) A [BANK] must have a comprehensive stress testing program that
captures all credit exposures to counterparties, and incorporates
stress testing of principal market risk factors and creditworthiness of
counterparties.
(4) Maturity. (i) If the remaining maturity of the exposure or the
longest-dated contract in the netting set is greater than one year, the
[BANK] must set M for the exposure or netting set equal to the lower of
five years or M(EPE), where:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.032
(B) dfk is the risk-free discount factor for future
time period tk; and
(C) [Delta]tk = tk-1.
(ii) If the remaining maturity of the exposure or the longest-dated
contract in the netting set is one year or less, the [BANK] must set M
for the exposure or netting set equal to one year, except as provided
in sectionSec. ----.131(d)(7).
(iii) Alternatively, a [BANK] that uses an internal model to
calculate a one-sided credit valuation adjustment may use the effective
credit duration estimated by the model as M(EPE) in place of the
formula in paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section.
(5) Collateral agreements. A [BANK] may capture the effect on EAD
of a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral when
exposure to the counterparty increases, but may not capture the effect
on EAD of a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral
when counterparty credit quality deteriorates. Two methods are
available to capture the effect of a collateral agreement:
(i) With prior written approval from the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may
include the effect of a collateral agreement within its internal model
used to calculate EAD. The [BANK] may set EAD equal to the expected
exposure at the end of the margin period of risk. The margin period of
risk means, with respect to a netting set subject to a collateral
agreement, the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral
with a counterparty until the next required exchange of collateral,
plus the period of time required to sell and realize the proceeds of
the least liquid collateral that can be delivered under the terms of
the collateral agreement and, where applicable, the period of time
required to re-hedge the resulting market risk upon the default of the
counterparty. The minimum margin period of risk is set according to
paragraph (d)(5)(iii) of this section.
(ii) A [BANK] that can model EPE without collateral agreements but
cannot achieve the higher level of modeling sophistication to model EPE
with collateral agreements can set effective EPE for a collateralized
netting set equal to the lesser of:
(A) An add-on that reflects the potential increase in exposure of
the netting set over the margin period of risk, plus the larger of:
(1) The current exposure of the netting set reflecting all
collateral held or posted by the [BANK] excluding any collateral called
or in dispute; or
(2) The largest net exposure including all collateral held or
posted under the margin agreement that would not trigger a collateral
call. For purposes of this section, the add-on is computed as the
largest expected increase in the netting set's exposure over any margin
period of risk in the next year (set in accordance with paragraph
(d)(5)(iii) of this section); or
(B) Effective EPE without a collateral agreement plus any
collateral the [BANK] posts to the counterparty that exceeds the
required margin amount.
(iii) The margin period of risk for a netting set subject to a
collateral agreement is:
(A) Five business days for repo-style transactions subject to daily
remargining and daily marking-to-market, and ten business days for
other transactions when liquid financial collateral is posted under a
daily margin maintenance requirement, or
(B) Twenty business days if the number of trades in a netting set
exceeds 5,000 at any time during the previous quarter or contains one
or more trades involving illiquid collateral or any derivative contract
that cannot be easily replaced (except if the [BANK] is calculating EAD
for a cleared transaction under Sec. ----.133). If over the two
previous quarters more than two margin disputes on a netting set have
occurred that lasted more than the margin period of risk, then the
[BANK] must use a margin period of risk for that netting set that is at
least two times the minimum margin period of risk for that netting set.
If the periodicity of the receipt of collateral is N-days, the minimum
margin period of risk is the minimum margin period of risk under this
paragraph plus N minus 1. This period should be extended to cover any
impediments to prompt re-hedging of any market risk.
(6) Own estimate of alpha. With prior written approval of the
[AGENCY], a [BANK] may calculate alpha as the ratio of economic capital
from a full simulation of counterparty exposure across counterparties
that incorporates a joint simulation of market and credit risk factors
(numerator) and economic capital based on EPE (denominator), subject to
a floor of 1.2. For purposes of this calculation, economic capital is
the unexpected losses for all counterparty credit risks measured at a
99.9 percent
[[Page 53017]]
confidence level over a one-year horizon. To receive approval, the
[BANK] must meet the following minimum standards to the satisfaction of
the [AGENCY]:
(i) The [BANK]'s own estimate of alpha must capture in the
numerator the effects of:
(A) The material sources of stochastic dependency of distributions
of market values of transactions or portfolios of transactions across
counterparties;
(B) Volatilities and correlations of market risk factors used in
the joint simulation, which must be related to the credit risk factor
used in the simulation to reflect potential increases in volatility or
correlation in an economic downturn, where appropriate; and
(C) The granularity of exposures (that is, the effect of a
concentration in the proportion of each counterparty's exposure that is
driven by a particular risk factor).
(ii) The [BANK] must assess the potential model uncertainty in its
estimates of alpha.
(iii) The [BANK] must calculate the numerator and denominator of
alpha in a consistent fashion with respect to modeling methodology,
parameter specifications, and portfolio composition.
(iv) The [BANK] must review and adjust as appropriate its estimates
of the numerator and denominator of alpha on at least a quarterly basis
and more frequently when the composition of the portfolio varies over
time.
(7) Risk-based capital requirements for transactions with specific
wrong-way risk. A [BANK] must determine if a repo-style transaction,
eligible margin loan, bond option, or equity derivative contract or
purchased credit derivative to which the [BANK] applies the internal
models methodology has specific wrong-way risk. If a transaction has
specific wrong-way risk, the [BANK] must exclude it from the model
described in 132(d)(2) and instead calculate the risk-based capital
requirement for the transaction as follows:
(i) For an equity derivative contract, by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula
specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131 using the PD of the counterparty
and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The maximum amount the [BANK] could lose on the equity
derivative.
(ii) For a purchased credit derivative by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula
specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131 using the PD of the counterparty
and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The fair value of the reference asset of the credit derivative.
(iii) For a bond option, by multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula
specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131 using the PD of the counterparty
and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The smaller of the notional amount of the underlying reference
asset and the maximum potential loss under the bond option contract.
(iv) For a repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan by
multiplying:
(A) K, calculated using the appropriate risk-based capital formula
specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131 using the PD of the counterparty
and LGD equal to 100 percent, by
(B) The EAD of the transaction determined according to the EAD
equation in Sec. ----.131(b)(2), substituting the estimated value of
the collateral assuming a default of the counterparty for the value of
the collateral in [Sigma]C of the equation.
(8) Risk-weighted asset amount for IMM exposures with specific
wrong-way risk. The aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for IMM
exposures with specific wrong-way risk is the sum of a [BANK]'s risk-
based capital requirement for purchased credit derivatives that are not
bond options with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph
(d)(7)(ii) of this section, a [BANK]'s risk-based capital requirement
for equity derivatives with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under
paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section, a [BANK]'s risk-based capital
requirement for bond options with specific wrong-way risk as calculated
under paragraph (d)(7)(iii) of this section, and a [BANK]'s risk-based
capital requirement for repo-style transactions and eligible margin
loans with specific wrong-way risk as calculated under paragraph
(d)(7)(iv) of this section, multiplied by 12.5.
(9) Risk-weighted assets for IMM exposures. (i) The [BANK] must
insert the assigned risk parameters for each counterparty and netting
set into the appropriate formula specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131
and multiply the output of the formula by the EADunstressed
of the netting set to obtain the unstressed capital requirement for
each netting set. A [BANK] that uses an advanced CVA approach that
captures migrations in credit spreads under paragraph (e)(3) of this
section must set the maturity adjustment (b) in the formula equal to
zero. The sum of the unstressed capital requirement calculated for each
netting set equals Kunstressed.
(ii) The [BANK] must insert the assigned risk parameters for each
wholesale obligor and netting set into the appropriate formula
specified in Table 1 of Sec. ----.131 and multiply the output of the
formula by the EADstressed of the netting set to obtain the
stressed capital requirement for each netting set. A [BANK] that uses
an advanced CVA approach that captures migrations in credit spreads
under paragraph (e)(3) of this section must set the maturity adjustment
(b) in the formula equal to zero. The sum of the stressed capital
requirement calculated for each netting set equals
Kstressed.
(iii) The [BANK]'s dollar risk-based capital requirement under the
internal models methodology equals the larger of Kunstressed
and Kstressed. A [BANK]'s risk-weighted assets amount for
IMM exposures is equal to the capital requirement multiplied by 12.5,
plus risk weighted assets for IMM exposures with specific wrong-way
risk in paragraph (d)(8) of this section and those in paragraph (d)(10)
of this section.
(10) Other measures of counterparty exposure. (i) With prior
written approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may set EAD equal to a
measure of counterparty credit risk exposure, such as peak EAD, that is
more conservative than an alpha of 1.4 (or higher under the terms of
paragraph (d)(7)(iv)(C) of this section) times the larger of
EPEunstressed and EPEstressed for every
counterparty whose EAD will be measured under the alternative measure
of counterparty exposure. The [BANK] must demonstrate the conservatism
of the measure of counterparty credit risk exposure used for EAD.
(A) For material portfolios of new OTC derivative products, the
[BANK] may assume that the current exposure methodology in paragraphs
(c)(5) and (c)(6) of this section meets the conservatism requirement of
this section for a period not to exceed 180 days.
(B) For immaterial portfolios of OTC derivative contracts, the
[BANK] generally may assume that the current exposure methodology in
paragraphs (c)(5) and (c)(6) of this section meets the conservatism
requirement of this section.
(ii) To calculate risk-weighted assets under this approach, the
[BANK] must insert the assigned risk parameters for each counterparty
and netting set into the appropriate formula specified in Table 1 of
Sec. ----.131, multiply the output of the formula by the EAD for the
exposure as specified above, and multiply by 12.5.
(e) Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) Risk-Weighted Assets. (1) In
[[Page 53018]]
general. With respect to its OTC derivative contracts, a [BANK] must
calculate a CVA risk-weighted asset amount for each counterparty using
the simple CVA approach described in paragraph (e)(5) of this section
or, with prior written approval of the [AGENCY], the advanced CVA
approach described in paragraph (e)(6) of this section. A [BANK] that
receives prior [AGENCY] approval to calculate its CVA risk-weighted
asset amounts for a class of counterparties using the advanced CVA
approach must continue to use that approach for that class of
counterparties until it notifies the [AGENCY] in writing that the
[BANK] expects to begin calculating its CVA risk-weighted asset amount
using the simple CVA approach. Such notice must include an explanation
of the [BANK]'s rationale and the date upon which the [BANK] will begin
to calculate its CVA risk-weighted asset amount using the simple CVA
approach.
(2) Market risk [BANK]s. Notwithstanding the prior approval
requirement in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a market risk [BANK]
may calculate its CVA risk-weighted asset amount for a counterparty
using the advanced CVA approach if the [BANK] has [AGENCY] approval to:
(i) Determine EAD for OTC derivative contracts using the internal
models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section; and
(ii) Determine its specific risk add-on for debt positions issued
by the counterparty using a specific risk model described in Sec. --
--.207(b) of subpart F of this part.
(3) Recognition of Hedges. (i) A [BANK] may recognize a single name
CDS, single name contingent CDS, any other equivalent hedging
instrument that references the counterparty directly, and index credit
default swaps (CDSind) as a CVA hedge under paragraph
(e)(5)(ii) of this section or paragraph (e)(6) of this section,
provided that the position is managed as a CVA hedge in accordance with
the [BANK]'s hedging policies.
(ii) A [BANK] shall not recognize as a CVA hedge any tranched or
nth-to-default credit derivative.
(4) Total CVA risk-weighted assets. Total CVA risk-weighted assets
is the sum of the CVA capital requirement, KCVA, calculated
for each of a [BANK]'s OTC derivative counterparties, multiplied by
12.5.
(5) Simple CVA approach. (i) Under the simple CVA approach, the CVA
capital requirement, KCVA, is calculated according to the
following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.033
(A) wi = the weight applicable to counterparty i under
Table 4;
(B) Mi = the EAD-weighted average of the effective
maturity of each netting set with counterparty i (where each netting
set's M can be no less than one year.)
(C) EADi \total\ = the sum of the EAD for all netting
sets of OTC derivative contracts with counterparty i calculated
using the current exposure methodology described in paragraph (c) of
this section or the internal models methodology described in
paragraph (d) of this section. When the [BANK] calculates EAD under
paragraph (c) of this section, such EAD may be adjusted for purposes
of calculating EADi \total\ by multiplying EAD by (1-
exp(-0.05 x Mi))/(0.05 x Mi).\2\ When the
[BANK] calculates EAD under paragraph (d) of this section,
EADi \total\ equals EADunstressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The term ``exp'' is the exponential function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(D) Mi \hedge\ = the notional weighted average maturity
of the hedge instrument.
(E) Bi = the sum of the notional amounts of any purchased
single name CDS referencing counterparty i that is used to hedge CVA
risk to counterparty i multiplied by (1-exp(-0.05 x Mi
\hedge\))/(0.05 x Mi \hedge\).
(F) Mind = the maturity of the CDSind or the
notional weighted average maturity of any CDSind
purchased to hedge CVA risk of counterparty i.
(G) B ind = the notional amount of one or more
CDSind purchased to hedge CVA risk for counterparty i
multiplied by (1-exp(-0.05 x Mind))/(0.05 x
Mind).
(H) wind = the weight applicable to the CDSind
based on the average weight of the underlying reference names that
comprise the index under Table 4.
(ii) The [BANK] may treat the notional amount of the index
attributable to a counterparty as a single name hedge of counterparty i
(Bi,) when calculating KCVA, and subtract the
notional amount of Bi from the notional amount of the
CDSind. The [BANK] must calculate its capital requirement
for the remaining notional amount of the CDSind as a stand
alone position.
Table 4--Assignment of Counterparty Weight
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight Wi (in
Internal PD (in percent) percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.00-0.07............................................... 0.70
>0.070-0.15............................................. 0.80
>0.15-0.40.............................................. 1.00
>0.40-2.00.............................................. 2.00
>2.00-6.00.............................................. 3.00
>6.00................................................... 10.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) Advanced CVA Approach. (i) A [BANK] may use the VaR model it
uses to determine specific risk under Sec. ----.207(b) or another VaR
model that meets the quantitative requirements of Sec. ----.205(b) and
Sec. ----.207(b)(1) to calculate its CVA capital requirement for a
counterparty by modeling the impact of changes in the counterparty's
credit spreads, together with any recognized CVA hedges, on the CVA for
the counterparty.
(A) The VaR model must incorporate only changes in the
counterparty's credit spreads, not changes in other risk factors. It is
not required that the VaR model capture jump-to-default risk.
(B) A [BANK] that qualifies to use the advanced CVA approach must
include in that approach any immaterial OTC derivative portfolios for
which it uses the current exposure methodology in paragraph (c) of this
section according to paragraph (e)(6)(viii) of this section.
(C) A [BANK] must have the systems capability to calculate the CVA
capital requirement for a counterparty on a daily basis (but is not
required to calculate the CVA capital requirement on a daily basis).
(ii) Under the advanced CVA approach, the CVA capital requirement,
KCVA, is calculated according to the following formulas:
[[Page 53019]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.034
Where:
(A) ti = the time of the i-th revaluation time bucket
starting from t0 = 0.
(B) tT = the longest contractual maturity across the OTC
derivative contracts with the counterparty.
(C) si = the CDS spread for the counterparty at tenor
ti used to calculate the CVA for the counterparty. If a
CDS spread is not available, the [BANK] must use a proxy spread
based on the credit quality, industry and region of the
counterparty.
(D) LGDMKT = the loss given default of the counterparty
based on the spread of a publicly-traded debt instrument of the
counterparty, or, where a publicly-traded debt instrument spread is
not available, a proxy spread based on the credit quality, industry,
and region of the counterparty.
(E) EEi = the sum of the expected exposures for all
netting sets with the counterparty at revaluation time
ti, calculated above.
(F) Di = the risk-free discount factor at time
ti, where D0 = 1.
(G) Exp is the exponential function.
(iii) A [BANK] must use the formulas in paragraph (e)(6)(iii)(A) or
(e)(6)(iii)(B) of this section to calculate credit spread sensitivities
if its VaR model is not based on full repricing.
(A) If the VaR model is based on credit spread sensitivities for
specific tenors, the [BANK] must calculate each credit spread
sensitivity according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.138
(B) If the VaR model uses credit spread sensitivities to parallel
shifts in credit spreads, the [BANK] must calculate each credit spread
sensitivity according to the following formula:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For the final time bucket, i = T.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.139
(iv) To calculate the CVAUnstressedVaR measure for
purposes of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the [BANK] must:
(A) Use the EEi calculated using the calibration of
paragraph (d)(3)(vii) of this section, except as provided in Sec. --
--.132 (e)(6)(vi), and
(B) Use the historical observation period required under Sec. --
--.205(b)(2) of subpart F.
(v) To calculate the CVAStressedVaR measure for purposes
of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the [BANK] must:
(A) Use the EEi calculated using the stress calibration
in paragraph (d)(3)(viii) of this section except as provided in Sec.
----.132(e)(6)(vi) of this section.
(B) Calibrate VaR model inputs to historical data from the most
severe twelve-month stress period contained within the three-year
stress period used to calculate EEi. The [AGENCY] may
require a [BANK] to use a different period of significant financial
stress in the calculation of the CVAStressedVaR measure.
(vi) If a [BANK] captures the effect of a collateral agreement on
EAD using the method described in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section,
for purposes of paragraph (e)(6)(ii) of this section, the [BANK] must
calculate EEi using the method in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of
this section and keep that EE constant with the maturity equal to the
maximum of:
(A) Half of the longest maturity of a transaction in the netting
set, and
(B) The notional weighted average maturity of all transactions in
the netting set.
(vii) The [BANK]'s VaR model must capture the basis between the
spreads of any CDSind that is used as the hedging instrument
and the hedged counterparty exposure over various time periods,
including benign and stressed
[[Page 53020]]
environments. If the VaR model does not capture that basis, the [BANK]
must reflect only 50 percent of the notional amount of the
CDSind hedge in the VaR model. The remaining 50 percent of
the notional amount of the CDSind hedge is a covered
position under subpart F.
(viii) If a [BANK] uses the current exposure methodology described
in paragraphs (c)(5) and (c)(6) of this section to calculate the EAD
for any immaterial portfolios of OTC derivative contracts, the [BANK]
must use that EAD as a constant EE in the formula for the calculation
of CVA with the maturity equal to the maximum of:
(A) Half of the longest maturity of a transaction in the netting
set, and
(B) The notional weighted average maturity of all transactions in
the netting set.
Sec. ----.133 Cleared transactions.
(a) General requirements. (1) A [BANK] that is a clearing member
client must use the methodologies set forth in paragraph (b) of this
section to calculate risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction.
(2) A [BANK] that is a clearing member must use the methodologies
set forth in paragraph (c) of this section to calculate its risk-
weighted assets for cleared transactions and paragraph (d) of this
section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for its default fund
contribution to a CCP.
(b) Clearing member client [BANK]s. (1) Risk-weighted assets for
cleared transactions.
(i) To determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared
transaction, a clearing member client [BANK] must multiply the trade
exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2) of this section, by the risk weight appropriate
for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph
(b)(3) of this section .
(ii) A clearing member client [BANK]'s total risk-weighted assets
for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts
for all of its cleared transactions.
(2) Trade exposure amount. (i) For a cleared transaction that is a
derivative contract or netting set of derivative contracts, trade
exposure amount equals the EAD for the derivative contract or netting
set calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for OTC
derivative contracts set forth in Sec. ----.132(c) or Sec. --
--.132(d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing
member client [BANK] and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a
manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the [BANK] calculates EAD
for the cleared transaction using the methodology in Sec. ----.132(d),
EAD equals EADunstressed.
(ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction,
trade exposure amount equals the EAD for the repo-style transaction
calculated using the methodology set forth in Sec. ----.132(b)(2),
(b)(3), or (d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the
clearing member client [BANK] and held by the CCP or a clearing member
in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the [BANK] calculates
EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec. ----.132(d), EAD equals
EADunstressed.
(3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction
with a QCCP, a clearing member client [BANK] must apply a risk weight
of:
(A) Two percent if the collateral posted by the [BANK] to the QCCP
or clearing member is subject to an arrangement that prevents any loss
to the clearing member client [BANK] due to the joint default or a
concurrent insolvency, liquidation, or receivership proceeding of the
clearing member and any other clients of the clearing member; and the
clearing member client [BANK] has conducted sufficient legal review to
conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains sufficient written
documentation of that legal review) that in the event of a legal
challenge (including one resulting from default or from liquidation,
insolvency, receivership or similar proceeding) the relevant court and
administrative authorities would find the arrangements to be legal,
valid, binding and enforceable under the law of the relevant
jurisdictions.
(B) Four percent, if the requirements of Sec. ----.132(b)(3)(i)(A)
are not met.
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client [BANK] must apply the risk weight applicable to
the CCP under Sec. ----.32.
(iii) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section,
collateral posted by a clearing member client [BANK] that is held by a
custodian in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is
not subject to a capital requirement under this section. A [BANK] must
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a
CCP, clearing member or a custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction according to Sec. ----.131.
(c) Clearing member banks. (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared
transactions. (i) To determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a
cleared transaction, a clearing member [BANK] must multiply the trade
exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance
with paragraph (c)(2) of this section by the risk weight appropriate
for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph
(c)(3) of this section.
(ii) A clearing member [BANK]'s total risk-weighted assets for
cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts for
all of its cleared transactions.
(2) Trade exposure amount. A clearing member [BANK] must calculate
its trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction as follows:
(i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract, trade
exposure amount equals the EAD calculated using the methodology used to
calculate EAD for OTC derivative contracts set forth in Sec. --
--.132(c) or Sec. ----.132(d), plus the fair value of the collateral
posted by the [BANK] and held by the CCP in a manner that is not
bankruptcy remote. When the [BANK] calculates EAD for the cleared
transaction using the methodology in Sec. ----.132(d), EAD equals
EADunstressed.
(ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction,
trade exposure amount equals the EAD calculated under sections Sec. --
--.132(b)(2), Sec. ----.132(b)(3), or Sec. ----.132(d), plus the fair
value of the collateral posted by the clearing member [BANK] and held
by the CCP in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the [BANK]
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec. ----.132(d), EAD
equals EADunstressed.
(3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction
with a QCCP, a clearing member [BANK] must apply a risk weight of 2
percent.
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member [BANK] must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP
according to Sec. ----.32 of subpart D of this part.
(iii) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section,
collateral posted by a clearing member [BANK] that is held by a
custodian in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP is not
subject to a capital requirement under this section. A [BANK] must
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a
CCP or a custodian in connection with a cleared transaction according
to Sec. ----.131.
(d) Default fund contributions. (1) General requirement. A clearing
member [BANK] must determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a
default fund contribution to a CCP at least quarterly, or more
frequently if there is a material change in the financial condition of
the CCP.
[[Page 53021]]
(2) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to
non-qualifying CCPs. A clearing member [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset
amount for default fund contributions to CCPs that are not QCCPs equals
the sum of such default fund contributions multiplied by 1,250 percent.
(3) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to
QCCPs. A clearing member [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset amount for
default fund contributions to QCCPs equals the sum of its capital
requirement, KCM for each QCCP, as calculated under this
paragraph (d)(3), multiplied by 1,250 percent.
(i) The hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP (KCCP) equals:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.040
Where:
(A) EBRMi = the EAD for each transaction cleared through
the QCCP by clearing member i, calculated using the methodology used
to calculate EAD for OTC derivative contracts set forth in Sec. --
--.132(c)(5) and Sec. ----.132.(c)(6) or the methodology used to
calculate EAD for repo-style transactions set forth in Sec. --
--.132(b)(2) for repo-style transactions, provided that:
(1) For purposes of this section, when calculating the EAD, the
[BANK] may replace the formula provided in Sec. ----.132 (c)(6)(ii)
with the following formula:
Anet = (0.3 x Agross) + (0.7 x NGR x Agross);
or
(2) If the [BANK] cannot calculate NGR, it may use a value of 0.30
until March 31, 2013; and
(3) For cleared transactions that are option derivative contracts,
the PFE set forth in Sec. ----.132(c)(5) must be adjusted by
multiplying the notional principal amount of the derivative contract
by the appropriate conversion factor in Table 3 and the absolute
value of the option's delta, that is, the ratio of the change in the
value of the derivative contract to the corresponding change in the
price of the underlying asset.
(B) VMi = any collateral posted by clearing member i to
the QCCP that it is entitled to receive from the QCCP but has not
yet received, and any collateral that the QCCP is entitled to
receive from clearing member i but has not yet received;
(C) IMi = the collateral posted as initial margin by
clearing member i to the QCCP;
(D) DFi = the funded portion of clearing member i's
default fund contribution that will be applied to reduce the QCCP's
loss upon a default by clearing member i; and
(E) RW = 20 percent, except when the [AGENCY] has determined that a
higher risk weight is more appropriate based on the specific
characteristics of the QCCP and its clearing members.
(ii) For a [BANK] that is a clearing member of a QCCP with a
default fund supported by funded commitments, KCM equals:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.041
Where:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.042
Subscripts 1 and 2 denote the clearing members with the two largest
ANet values. For purposes of this section, for cleared
transactions that are derivatives, ANet is defined using
the definition set forth in Sec. ----.132(c)(6)(ii) and for cleared
transactions that are repo-style transactions, ANet is
the EAD equation max {0, [([sum]E-[sum]C) + [sum](Es x
Hs) + [sum](Efx]{time} from Sec. ----.132(b)(2(i));
(B) N = the number of clearing members in the QCCP;
(C) DFCCP = the QCCP's own funds and other financial
resources that would be used to cover its losses before clearing
members' default fund contributions are used to cover losses;
(D) DFCM = Funded default fund contributions from all
clearing members and any other clearing member contributed financial
resources that are available to absorb mutualized QCCP losses;
(E) DF = DFCCP + DFCM (that is, the total
funded default fund contribution);
[[Page 53022]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.044
(J) c2 = 100 percent; and
(K) [mu]= 1.2;
(iii) For a [BANK] that is a clearing member of a QCCP with a
default fund supported by unfunded commitments, KCM equals:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.045
Where:
(A) DFi = the [BANK]'s unfunded commitment to the default
fund;
(B) DFCM = the total of all clearing members' unfunded
commitments to the default fund; and
(C) K*CM as defined in Sec. ----.133(d)(3)(ii).
(D) For a [BANK] that is a clearing member of a QCCP with a default
fund supported by unfunded commitments and that is unable to calculate
KCM using the methodology described above in this paragraph
(d)(3)(iii), KCM equals:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.046
Where:
(1) IMi = the [BANK]'s initial margin posted to the QCCP;
(2) IMCM = the total of initial margin posted to the
QCCP; and
(3) K*CM as defined above in this paragraph (d)(3)(iii).
(iv) Total risk-weighted assets for default fund contributions.
Total risk-weighted assets for default fund contributions is the sum of
a clearing member [BANK]'s risk-weighted assets for all of its default
fund contributions to all CCPs of which the [BANK] is a clearing
member.
Sec. ----.134 Guarantees and credit derivatives: PD substitution and
LGD adjustment approaches.
(a) Scope. (1) This section applies to wholesale exposures for
which:
(i) Credit risk is fully covered by an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative; or
(ii) Credit risk is covered on a pro rata basis (that is, on a
basis in which the [BANK] and the protection provider share losses
proportionately) by an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative.
(2) Wholesale exposures on which there is a tranching of credit
risk (reflecting at least two different levels of seniority) are
securitization exposures subject to Sec. ----.141 through Sec. --
--.145.
(3) A [BANK] may elect to recognize the credit risk mitigation
benefits of an eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative
covering an exposure described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section by
using the PD substitution approach or the LGD adjustment approach in
paragraph (c) of this section or, if the transaction qualifies, using
the double default treatment in Sec. ----.135. A [BANK]'s PD and LGD
for the hedged exposure may not be lower than the PD and LGD floors
described in Sec. ----.131(d)(2) and (d)(3).
(4) If multiple eligible guarantees or eligible credit derivatives
cover a single exposure described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section,
a [BANK] may treat the hedged exposure as multiple separate exposures
each covered by a single eligible guarantee or eligible credit
[[Page 53023]]
derivative and may calculate a separate risk-based capital requirement
for each separate exposure as described paragraph (a)(3) of this
section.
(5) If a single eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative
covers multiple hedged wholesale exposures described in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section, a [BANK] must treat each hedged exposure as
covered by a separate eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative
and must calculate a separate risk-based capital requirement for each
exposure as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(6) A [BANK] must use the same risk parameters for calculating ECL
as it uses for calculating the risk-based capital requirement for the
exposure.
(b) Rules of recognition. (1) A [BANK] may only recognize the
credit risk mitigation benefits of eligible guarantees and eligible
credit derivatives.
(2) A [BANK] may only recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits
of an eligible credit derivative to hedge an exposure that is different
from the credit derivative's reference exposure used for determining
the derivative's cash settlement value, deliverable obligation, or
occurrence of a credit event if:
(i) The reference exposure ranks pari passu (that is, equally) with
or is junior to the hedged exposure; and
(ii) The reference exposure and the hedged exposure are exposures
to the same legal entity, and legally enforceable cross-default or
cross-acceleration clauses are in place to assure payments under the
credit derivative are triggered when the obligor fails to pay under the
terms of the hedged exposure.
(c) Risk parameters for hedged exposures.
(1) PD substitution approach. (i) Full coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the EAD
of the hedged exposure, a [BANK] may recognize the guarantee or credit
derivative in determining the [BANK]'s risk-based capital requirement
for the hedged exposure by substituting the PD associated with the
rating grade of the protection provider for the PD associated with the
rating grade of the obligor in the risk-based capital formula
applicable to the guarantee or credit derivative in Table 1 of Sec. --
--.131 and using the appropriate LGD as described in paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) of this section. If the [BANK] determines that full
substitution of the protection provider's PD leads to an inappropriate
degree of risk mitigation, the [BANK] may substitute a higher PD than
that of the protection provider.
(ii) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section and P of the guarantee or credit derivative is less than the
EAD of the hedged exposure, the [BANK] must treat the hedged exposure
as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to
recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit
derivative.
(A) The [BANK] must calculate its risk-based capital requirement
for the protected exposure under Sec. ----.131, where PD is the
protection provider's PD, LGD is determined under paragraph (c)(1)(iii)
of this section, and EAD is P. If the [BANK] determines that full
substitution leads to an inappropriate degree of risk mitigation, the
[BANK] may use a higher PD than that of the protection provider.
(B) The [BANK] must calculate its risk-based capital requirement
for the unprotected exposure under Sec. ----.131, where PD is the
obligor's PD, LGD is the hedged exposure's LGD (not adjusted to reflect
the guarantee or credit derivative), and EAD is the EAD of the original
hedged exposure minus P.
(C) The treatment in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) is applicable when the
credit risk of a wholesale exposure is covered on a partial pro rata
basis or when an adjustment is made to the effective notional amount of
the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of
this section.
(iii) LGD of hedged exposures. The LGD of a hedged exposure under
the PD substitution approach is equal to:
(A) The lower of the LGD of the hedged exposure (not adjusted to
reflect the guarantee or credit derivative) and the LGD of the
guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee or credit derivative
provides the [BANK] with the option to receive immediate payout upon
triggering the protection; or
(B) The LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee
or credit derivative does not provide the [BANK] with the option to
receive immediate payout upon triggering the protection.
(2) LGD adjustment approach. (i) Full coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the EAD
of the hedged exposure, the [BANK]'s risk-based capital requirement for
the hedged exposure is the greater of:
(A) The risk-based capital requirement for the exposure as
calculated under Sec. ----.131, with the LGD of the exposure adjusted
to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative; or
(B) The risk-based capital requirement for a direct exposure to the
protection provider as calculated under Sec. ----.131, using the PD
for the protection provider, the LGD for the guarantee or credit
derivative, and an EAD equal to the EAD of the hedged exposure.
(ii) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the EAD of the hedged exposure, the [BANK] must
treat the hedged exposure as two separate exposures (protected and
unprotected) in order to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit
of the guarantee or credit derivative.
(A) The [BANK]'s risk-based capital requirement for the protected
exposure would be the greater of:
(1) The risk-based capital requirement for the protected exposure
as calculated under Sec. ----.131, with the LGD of the exposure
adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit derivative and EAD set
equal to P; or
(2) The risk-based capital requirement for a direct exposure to the
guarantor as calculated under Sec. ----.131, using the PD for the
protection provider, the LGD for the guarantee or credit derivative,
and an EAD set equal to P.
(B) The [BANK] must calculate its risk-based capital requirement
for the unprotected exposure under Sec. ----.131, where PD is the
obligor's PD, LGD is the hedged exposure's LGD (not adjusted to reflect
the guarantee or credit derivative), and EAD is the EAD of the original
hedged exposure minus P.
(3) M of hedged exposures. The M of the hedged exposure is the same
as the M of the exposure if it were unhedged.
(d) Maturity mismatch. (1) A [BANK] that recognizes an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative in determining its risk-based
capital requirement for a hedged exposure must adjust the effective
notional amount of the credit risk mitigant to reflect any maturity
mismatch between the hedged exposure and the credit risk mitigant.
(2) A maturity mismatch occurs when the residual maturity of a
credit risk mitigant is less than that of the hedged exposure(s).
(3) The residual maturity of a hedged exposure is the longest
possible remaining time before the obligor is scheduled to fulfil its
obligation on the exposure. If a credit risk mitigant has embedded
options that may reduce its term, the [BANK] (protection purchaser)
must use the shortest possible residual
[[Page 53024]]
maturity for the credit risk mitigant. If a call is at the discretion
of the protection provider, the residual maturity of the credit risk
mitigant is at the first call date. If the call is at the discretion of
the [BANK] (protection purchaser), but the terms of the arrangement at
origination of the credit risk mitigant contain a positive incentive
for the [BANK] to call the transaction before contractual maturity, the
remaining time to the first call date is the residual maturity of the
credit risk mitigant.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For example, where there is a step-up in cost in conjunction
with a call feature or where the effective cost of protection
increases over time even if credit quality remains the same or
improves, the residual maturity of the credit risk mitigant will be
the remaining time to the first call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) A credit risk mitigant with a maturity mismatch may be
recognized only if its original maturity is greater than or equal to
one year and its residual maturity is greater than three months.
(5) When a maturity mismatch exists, the [BANK] must apply the
following adjustment to the effective notional amount of the credit
risk mitigant: Pm = E x (t - 0.25)/(T - 0.25), where:
(i) Pm = effective notional amount of the credit risk
mitigant, adjusted for maturity mismatch;
(ii) E = effective notional amount of the credit risk mitigant;
(iii) t = the lesser of T or the residual maturity of the credit
risk mitigant, expressed in years; and
(iv) T = the lesser of five or the residual maturity of the
hedged exposure, expressed in years.
(e) Credit derivatives without restructuring as a credit event. If
a [BANK] recognizes an eligible credit derivative that does not include
as a credit event a restructuring of the hedged exposure involving
forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest, or fees that
results in a credit loss event (that is, a charge-off, specific
provision, or other similar debit to the profit and loss account), the
[BANK] must apply the following adjustment to the effective notional
amount of the credit derivative: Pr = Pm x 0.60,
where:
(1) Pr = effective notional amount of the credit risk
mitigant, adjusted for lack of restructuring event (and maturity
mismatch, if applicable); and
(2) Pm = effective notional amount of the credit risk
mitigant adjusted for maturity mismatch (if applicable).
(f) Currency mismatch. (1) If a [BANK] recognizes an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative that is denominated in a
currency different from that in which the hedged exposure is
denominated, the [BANK] must apply the following formula to the
effective notional amount of the guarantee or credit derivative:
Pc = Pr x (1 - HFX), where:
(i) Pc = effective notional amount of the credit risk
mitigant, adjusted for currency mismatch (and maturity mismatch and
lack of restructuring event, if applicable);
(ii) Pr = effective notional amount of the credit
risk mitigant (adjusted for maturity mismatch and lack of
restructuring event, if applicable); and
(iii) HFX = haircut appropriate for the currency
mismatch between the credit risk mitigant and the hedged exposure.
(2) A [BANK] must set HFX equal to 8 percent unless it
qualifies for the use of and uses its own internal estimates of foreign
exchange volatility based on a ten-business-day holding period and
daily marking-to-market and remargining. A [BANK] qualifies for the use
of its own internal estimates of foreign exchange volatility if it
qualifies for:
(i) The own-estimates haircuts in Sec. ----.132(b)(2)(iii);
(ii) The simple VaR methodology in Sec. ----.132(b)(3); or
(iii) The internal models methodology in Sec. ----.132(d).
(3) A [BANK] must adjust HFX calculated in paragraph
(f)(2) of this section upward if the [BANK] revalues the guarantee or
credit derivative less frequently than once every ten business days
using the square root of time formula provided in Sec. --
--.132(b)(2)(iii)(A)(2).
Sec. ----.135 Guarantees and credit derivatives: Double default
treatment.
(a) Eligibility and operational criteria for double default
treatment. A [BANK] may recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits
of a guarantee or credit derivative covering an exposure described in
Sec. ----.134(a)(1) by applying the double default treatment in this
section if all the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) The hedged exposure is fully covered or covered on a pro rata
basis by:
(i) An eligible guarantee issued by an eligible double default
guarantor; or
(ii) An eligible credit derivative that meets the requirements of
Sec. ----.134(b)(2) and that is issued by an eligible double default
guarantor.
(2) The guarantee or credit derivative is:
(i) An uncollateralized guarantee or uncollateralized credit
derivative (for example, a credit default swap) that provides
protection with respect to a single reference obligor; or
(ii) An n\th\-to-default credit derivative (subject to the
requirements of Sec. ----.142(m).
(3) The hedged exposure is a wholesale exposure (other than a
sovereign exposure).
(4) The obligor of the hedged exposure is not:
(i) An eligible double default guarantor or an affiliate of an
eligible double default guarantor; or
(ii) An affiliate of the guarantor.
(5) The [BANK] does not recognize any credit risk mitigation
benefits of the guarantee or credit derivative for the hedged exposure
other than through application of the double default treatment as
provided in this section.
(6) The [BANK] has implemented a process (which has received the
prior, written approval of the [AGENCY]) to detect excessive
correlation between the creditworthiness of the obligor of the hedged
exposure and the protection provider. If excessive correlation is
present, the [BANK] may not use the double default treatment for the
hedged exposure.
(b) Full coverage. If the transaction meets the criteria in
paragraph (a) of this section.and the protection amount (P) of the
guarantee or credit derivative is at least equal to the EAD of the
hedged exposure, the [BANK] may determine its risk-weighted asset
amount for the hedged exposure under paragraph (e) of this section.
(c) Partial coverage. If the transaction meets the criteria in
paragraph (a) of this section and the protection amount (P) of the
guarantee or credit derivative is less than the EAD of the hedged
exposure, the [BANK] must treat the hedged exposure as two separate
exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize double
default treatment on the protected portion of the exposure.
(1) For the protected exposure, the [BANK] must set EAD equal to P
and calculate its risk-weighted asset amount as provided in paragraph
(e) of this section.
(2) For the unprotected exposure, the [BANK] must set EAD equal to
the EAD of the original exposure minus P and then calculate its risk-
weighted asset amount as provided in Sec. ----.131.
(d) Mismatches. For any hedged exposure to which a [BANK] applies
double default treatment, the [BANK] must make applicable adjustments
to the protection amount as required in Sec. ----.134(d), (e), and
(f).
(e) The double default dollar risk-based capital requirement. The
dollar risk-based capital requirement for a hedged exposure to which a
[BANK] has applied double default treatment is KDD
multiplied by the EAD of the exposure. KDD is calculated
according to the following formula: KDD = Ko x
(0.15 + 160 x PDg),
[[Page 53025]]
Where:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.047
(2) PDg = PD of the protection provider.
(3) PDo = PD of the obligor of the hedged exposure.
(4) LGDg = (i) The lower of the LGD of the hedged
exposure (not adjusted to reflect the guarantee or credit
derivative) and the LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if
the guarantee or credit derivative provides the [BANK] with the
option to receive immediate payout on triggering the protection; or
(ii) The LGD of the guarantee or credit derivative, if the guarantee
or credit derivative does not provide the [BANK] with the option to
receive immediate payout on triggering the protection.
(5) [rho]os (asset value correlation of the obligor) is
calculated according to the appropriate formula for (R) provided in
Table 1 in Sec. ----.131, with PD equal to PDo.
(6) b (maturity adjustment coefficient) is calculated according to
the formula for b provided in Table 1 in Sec. ----.131, with PD
equal to the lesser of PDo and PDg.
(7) M (maturity) is the effective maturity of the guarantee or
credit derivative, which may not be less than one year or greater
than five years.
Sec. ----.136 Unsettled transactions.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) Delivery-versus-payment (DvP) transaction means a securities or
commodities transaction in which the buyer is obligated to make payment
only if the seller has made delivery of the securities or commodities
and the seller is obligated to deliver the securities or commodities
only if the buyer has made payment.
(2) Payment-versus-payment (PvP) transaction means a foreign
exchange transaction in which each counterparty is obligated to make a
final transfer of one or more currencies only if the other counterparty
has made a final transfer of one or more currencies.
(3) Normal settlement period. A transaction has a normal settlement
period if the contractual settlement period for the transaction is
equal to or less than the market standard for the instrument underlying
the transaction and equal to or less than five business days.
(4) Positive current exposure. The positive current exposure of a
[BANK] for a transaction is the difference between the transaction
value at the agreed settlement price and the current market price of
the transaction, if the difference results in a credit exposure of the
[BANK] to the counterparty.
(b) Scope. This section applies to all transactions involving
securities, foreign exchange instruments, and commodities that have a
risk of delayed settlement or delivery. This section does not apply to:
(1) Cleared transactions that are subject to daily marking-to-
market and daily receipt and payment of variation margin;
(2) Repo-style transactions, including unsettled repo-style
transactions (which are addressed in Sec. Sec. ----.131 and 132);
(3) One-way cash payments on OTC derivative contracts (which are
addressed in Sec. Sec. ----.131 and 132); or
(4) Transactions with a contractual settlement period that is
longer than the normal settlement period (which are treated as OTC
derivative contracts and addressed in Sec. Sec. ----.131 and 132).
(c) System-wide failures. In the case of a system-wide failure of a
settlement or clearing system, or a central counterparty, the [AGENCY]
may waive risk-based capital requirements for unsettled and failed
transactions until the situation is rectified.
(d) Delivery-versus-payment (DvP) and payment-versus-payment (PvP)
transactions. A [BANK] must hold risk-based capital against any DvP or
PvP transaction with a normal settlement period if the [BANK]'s
counterparty has not made delivery or payment within five business days
after the settlement date. The [BANK] must determine its risk-weighted
asset amount for such a transaction by multiplying the positive current
exposure of the transaction for the [BANK] by the appropriate risk
weight in Table 5.
Table 5--Risk Weights for Unsettled DvP and PvP Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk weight
to be applied
to positive
Number of business days after contractual settlement date current
exposure (in
percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From 5 to 15............................................. 100
From 16 to 30............................................ 625
From 31 to 45............................................ 937.5
46 or more............................................... 1,250
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Non-DvP/non-PvP (non-delivery-versus-payment/non-payment-
versus-payment) transactions. (1) A [BANK] must hold risk-based capital
against any non-DvP/non-PvP transaction with a normal settlement period
if the [BANK] has delivered cash, securities, commodities, or
currencies to its counterparty but has not received its corresponding
deliverables by the end of the same business day. The [BANK] must
continue to hold risk-based capital against the transaction until the
[BANK] has received its corresponding deliverables.
(2) From the business day after the [BANK] has made its delivery
until five business days after the counterparty delivery is due, the
[BANK] must calculate its risk-based capital requirement for the
transaction by treating the current market value of the deliverables
owed to the [BANK] as a wholesale exposure.
(i) A [BANK] may use a 45 percent LGD for the transaction rather
than estimating LGD for the transaction provided the [BANK] uses the 45
percent LGD for all transactions described in Sec. ----.135(e)(1) and
(e)(2).
(ii) A [BANK] may use a 100 percent risk weight for the transaction
provided the [BANK] uses this risk weight for all transactions
described in sections 135(e)(1) and (e)(2).
(3) If the [BANK] has not received its deliverables by the fifth
business day after the counterparty delivery was due, the [BANK] must
apply a 1,250 percent risk weight to the current market value of the
deliverables owed to the [BANK].
(f) Total risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions. Total
risk-weighted assets for unsettled transactions is the sum of the risk-
[[Page 53026]]
weighted asset amounts of all DvP, PvP, and non-DvP/non-PvP
transactions.
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR SECURITIZATION EXPOSURES
Sec. ----.141 Operational criteria for recognizing the transfer of
risk.
(a) Operational criteria for traditional securitizations. A [BANK]
that transfers exposures it has originated or purchased to a
securitization SPE or other third party in connection with a
traditional securitization may exclude the exposures from the
calculation of its risk-weighted assets only if each of the conditions
in this paragraph (a) is satisfied. A [BANK] that meets these
conditions must hold risk-based capital against any securitization
exposures it retains in connection with the securitization. A [BANK]
that fails to meet these conditions must hold risk-based capital
against the transferred exposures as if they had not been securitized
and must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any after-tax gain-
on-sale resulting from the transaction. The conditions are:
(1) The exposures are not reported on the [BANK]'s balance sheet
under GAAP;
(2) The [BANK] has transferred to third parties credit risk
associated with the underlying exposures;
(3) Any clean-up calls relating to the securitization are eligible
clean-up calls; and
(4) The securitization does not:
(i) Include one or more underlying exposures in which the borrower
is permitted to vary the drawn amount within an agreed limit under a
line of credit; and
(ii) Contain an early amortization provision.
(b) Operational criteria for synthetic securitizations. For
synthetic securitizations, a [BANK] may recognize for risk-based
capital purposes the use of a credit risk mitigant to hedge underlying
exposures only if each of the conditions in this section is satisfied.
A [BANK] that meets these conditions must hold risk-based capital
against any credit risk of the exposures it retains in connection with
the synthetic securitization. A [BANK] that fails to meet these
conditions must hold risk-based capital against the underlying
exposures as if they had not been synthetically securitized. The
conditions are:
(1) The credit risk mitigant is financial collateral, an eligible
credit derivative from an eligible guarantor or an eligible guarantee
from an eligible guarantor;
(2) The [BANK] transfers credit risk associated with the underlying
exposures to third parties, and the terms and conditions in the credit
risk mitigants employed do not include provisions that:
(i) Allow for the termination of the credit protection due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures;
(ii) Require the [BANK] to alter or replace the underlying
exposures to improve the credit quality of the pool of underlying
exposures;
(iii) Increase the [BANK]'s cost of credit protection in response
to deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures;
(iv) Increase the yield payable to parties other than the [BANK] in
response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
exposures; or
(v) Provide for increases in a retained first loss position or
credit enhancement provided by the [BANK] after the inception of the
securitization;
(3) The [BANK] obtains a well-reasoned opinion from legal counsel
that confirms the enforceability of the credit risk mitigant in all
relevant jurisdictions; and
(4) Any clean-up calls relating to the securitization are eligible
clean-up calls.
(c) Due diligence requirements for securitization exposures. (1)
Except for exposures that are deducted from common equity tier 1
capital and exposures subject to Sec. ----.142(k), if a [BANK] is
unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] a
comprehensive understanding of a feature of a securitization exposure
that would materially affect the performance of the position, the
[BANK] must assign a 1,250 percent risk weight to the securitization
exposure. The [BANK]'s analysis must be commensurate with the
complexity of the securitization exposure and the materiality of the
position in relation to capital.
(2) A [BANK] must demonstrate its comprehensive understanding of a
securitization exposure under paragraph (c)(1) of this section, for
each securitization exposure by:
(i) Conduct an analysis of the risk characteristics of a
securitization exposure prior to acquiring the exposure and document
such analysis within three business days after acquiring the exposure,
considering:
(A) Structural features of the securitization that would materially
impact the performance of the exposure, for example, the contractual
cash flow waterfall, waterfall-related triggers, credit enhancements,
liquidity enhancements, market value triggers, the performance of
organizations that service the position, and deal-specific definitions
of default;
(B) Relevant information regarding the performance of the
underlying credit exposure(s), for example, the percentage of loans 30,
60, and 90 days past due; default rates; prepayment rates; loans in
foreclosure; property types; occupancy; average credit score or other
measures of creditworthiness; average loan-to-value ratio; and industry
and geographic diversification data on the underlying exposure(s);
(C) Relevant market data of the securitization, for example, bid-
ask spreads, most recent sales price and historical price volatility,
trading volume, implied market rating, and size, depth and
concentration level of the market for the securitization; and
(D) For resecuritization exposures--
(1) Performance information on the underlying securitization
exposures, for example, the issuer name and credit quality, and the
characteristics and performance of the exposures underlying the
securitization exposures; and
(2) On an on-going basis (no less frequently than quarterly),
evaluate, review, and update as appropriate the analysis required under
this section for each securitization exposure.
Sec. ----.142 Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.
(a) Hierarchy of approaches. Except as provided elsewhere in this
section and in Sec. ----.141:
(1) A [BANK] must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any
after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a securitization and must apply a
1,250 percent risk weight to the portion of any CEIO that does not
constitute after tax gain-on-sale.
(2) If a securitization exposure does not require deduction or a
1,250 percent risk weight under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the
[BANK] must apply the supervisory formula approach in Sec. ----.143 to
the exposure if the [BANK] and the exposure qualify for the supervisory
formula approach according to Sec. ----.143(a).
(3) If a securitization exposure does not require deduction or a
1,250 percent risk weight under paragraph (a)(1) of this section and
does not qualify for the supervisory formula approach, the [BANK] may
apply the simplified supervisory formula approach under Sec. ----.144.
(4) If a securitization exposure does not require deduction or a
1,250 percent risk weight under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, does
not qualify for the supervisory formula approach, and the [BANK] does
not apply the simplified supervisory formula approach, the
[[Page 53027]]
[BANK] must apply a 1,250 percent risk weight to the exposure.
(5) If a securitization exposure is a derivative contract (other
than a credit derivative) that has a first priority claim on the cash
flows from the underlying exposures (notwithstanding amounts due under
interest rate or currency derivative contracts, fees due, or other
similar payments), with approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may choose
to set the risk-weighted asset amount of the exposure equal to the
amount of the exposure as determined in paragraph (e) of this section
rather than apply the hierarchy of approaches described in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (4) of this section.
(b) Total risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures. A
[BANK]'s total risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures is
equal to the sum of its risk-weighted assets calculated using
Sec. Sec. ----.142 through 146.
(c) Deductions. A [BANK] may calculate any deduction from common
equity tier 1 capital for a securitization exposure net of any DTLs
associated with the securitization exposure.
(d) Maximum risk-based capital requirement. Except as provided in
Sec. ----.141(c), unless one or more underlying exposures does not
meet the definition of a wholesale, retail, securitization, or equity
exposure, the total risk-based capital requirement for all
securitization exposures held by a single [BANK] associated with a
single securitization (excluding any risk-based capital requirements
that relate to the [BANK]'s gain-on-sale or CEIOs associated with the
securitization) may not exceed the sum of:
(1) The [BANK]'s total risk-based capital requirement for the
underlying exposures calculated under this subpart as if the [BANK]
directly held the underlying exposures; and
(2) The total ECL of the underlying exposures calculated under this
subpart.
(e) Amount of a securitization exposure. (1) The amount of an on-
balance sheet securitization exposure that is not a repo-style
transaction, eligible margin loan, or OTC derivative contract (other
than a credit derivative) is the [BANK]'s carrying value.
(2) The amount of an off-balance sheet securitization exposure that
is not an OTC derivative contract or cleared transaction (other than a
credit derivative) is the notional amount of the exposure. For an off-
balance-sheet securitization exposure to an ABCP program, such as an
eligible ABCP liquidity facility, the notional amount may be reduced to
the maximum potential amount that the [BANK] could be required to fund
given the ABCP program's current underlying assets (calculated without
regard to the current credit quality of those assets).
(3) The amount of a securitization exposure that is a repo-style
transaction, eligible margin loan, or OTC derivative contract or
cleared transaction (other than a credit derivative) is the EAD of the
exposure as calculated in Sec. ----.132 or Sec. ----.133.
(f) Overlapping exposures. If a [BANK] has multiple securitization
exposures that provide duplicative coverage of the underlying exposures
of a securitization (such as when a [BANK] provides a program-wide
credit enhancement and multiple pool-specific liquidity facilities to
an ABCP program), the [BANK] is not required to hold duplicative risk-
based capital against the overlapping position. Instead, the [BANK] may
assign to the overlapping securitization exposure the applicable risk-
based capital treatment that results in the highest risk-based capital
requirement.
(g) Securitizations of non-IRB exposures. Except as provided in
Sec. ----.141(c), if a [BANK] has a securitization exposure where any
underlying exposure is not a wholesale exposure, retail exposure,
securitization exposure, or equity exposure, the [BANK]:
(1) Must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any after-tax
gain-on-sale resulting from the securitization and apply a 1,250
percent risk weight to the portion of any CEIO that does not constitute
gain-on-sale, if the [BANK] is an originating [BANK];
(2) May apply the simplified supervisory formula approach in Sec.
----.144 to the exposure, if the securitization exposure does not
require deduction or a 1,250 percent risk weight under paragraph (g)(1)
of this section;
(3) Must assign a 1,250 percent risk weight to the exposure if the
securitization exposure does not require deduction or a 1,250 percent
risk weight under paragraph (g)(1) of this section, does not qualify
for the supervisory formula approach, and the [BANK] does not apply the
simplified supervisory formula approach to the exposure.
(h) Implicit support. If a [BANK] provides support to a
securitization in excess of the [BANK]'s contractual obligation to
provide credit support to the securitization (implicit support):
(1) The [BANK] must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for
underlying exposures associated with the securitization as if the
exposures had not been securitized and must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital any after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from the
securitization; and
(2) The [BANK] must disclose publicly:
(i) That it has provided implicit support to the securitization;
and
(ii) The regulatory capital impact to the [BANK] of providing such
implicit support.
(i) Eligible servicer cash advance facilities. Regardless of any
other provisions of subpart E, a [BANK] is not required to hold risk-
based capital against the undrawn portion of an eligible servicer cash
advance facility.
(j) Interest-only mortgage-backed securities. Except as provided in
Sec. ----.141(c), the risk weight for a non-credit-enhancing interest-
only mortgage-backed security may not be less than 100 percent.
(k) Small-business loans and leases on personal property
transferred with recourse. (1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this subpart E, a [BANK] that has transferred small-business loans and
leases on personal property (small-business obligations) with recourse
must include in risk-weighted assets only the contractual amount of
retained recourse if all the following conditions are met:
(i) The transaction is a sale under GAAP.
(ii) The [BANK] establishes and maintains, pursuant to GAAP, a non-
capital reserve sufficient to meet the [BANK]'s reasonably estimated
liability under the recourse arrangement.
(iii) The loans and leases are to businesses that meet the criteria
for a small-business concern established by the Small Business
Administration under section 3(a) of the Small Business Act.
(iv) The [BANK] is well capitalized, as defined in[the [AGENCY]'s
[prompt corrective action regulation]--12 CFR part 6 (for national
banks), 12 CFR part 208, subpart D (for state member banks or bank
holding companies), 12 CFR part 325, subpart B (for state nonmember
banks), and 12 CFR part 165 (for savings associations)]. For purposes
of determining whether a [BANK] is well capitalized for purposes of
this paragraph, the [BANK]'s capital ratios must be calculated without
regard to the capital treatment for transfers of small-business
obligations with recourse specified in paragraph (k)(1) of this
section.
(2) The total outstanding amount of recourse retained by a [BANK]
on transfers of small-business obligations receiving the capital
treatment specified in paragraph (k)(1) of this section cannot exceed
15 percent of the [BANK]'s total capital.
[[Page 53028]]
(3) If a [BANK] ceases to be well capitalized or exceeds the 15
percent capital limitation, the preferential capital treatment
specified in paragraph (k)(1) of this section will continue to apply to
any transfers of small-business obligations with recourse that occurred
during the time that the [BANK] was well capitalized and did not exceed
the capital limit.
(4) The risk-based capital ratios of the [BANK] must be calculated
without regard to the capital treatment for transfers of small-business
obligations with recourse specified in paragraph (k)(1) of this section
.
(l) Nth-to-default credit derivatives. (1) Protection provider. A
[BANK] must determine a risk weight using the SFA or the SSFA for an
nth-to-default credit derivative in accordance with this paragraph. In
the case of credit protection sold, a [BANK] must determine its
exposure in the nth-to-default credit derivative as the largest
notional dollar amount of all the underlying exposures
(2) For purposes of determining the risk weight for an nth-to-
default credit derivative using the SFA or the SSFA, the [BANK] must
calculate the attachment point and detachment point of its exposure as
follows:
(i) The attachment point (parameter A) is the ratio of the sum of
the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated
to the [BANK]'s exposure to the total notional amount of all underlying
exposures. For purposes of using the SFA to calculate the risk weight
for its exposure in an nth-to-default credit derivative, parameter A
must be set equal to the credit enhancement level (L) input to the SFA
formula. In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there are
no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the [BANK]'s exposure.
In the case of a second-or-subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the
smallest (n-1) risk-weighted asset amounts of the underlying
exposure(s) are subordinated to the [BANK]'s exposure.
(ii) The detachment point (parameter D) equals the sum of parameter
A plus the ratio of the notional amount of the [BANK]'s exposure in the
nth-to-default credit derivative to the total notional amount of all
underlying exposures. For purposes of using the SFA to calculate the
risk weight for its exposure in an nth-to-default credit derivative,
parameter D must be set to equal L plus the thickness of tranche T
input to the SFA formula.
(3) A [BANK] that does not use the SFA or the SSFA to determine a
risk weight for its exposure in an nth-to-default credit derivative
must assign a risk weight of 1,250 percent to the exposure.
(4) Protection purchaser. (i) First-to-default credit derivatives.
A [BANK] that obtains credit protection on a group of underlying
exposures through a first-to-default credit derivative that meets the
rules of recognition of Sec. ----.134(b) must determine its risk-based
capital requirement for the underlying exposures as if the [BANK]
synthetically securitized the underlying exposure with the lowest risk-
based capital requirement and had obtained no credit risk mitigant on
the other underlying exposures. A [BANK] must calculate a risk-based
capital requirement for counterparty credit risk according to Sec. --
--.132 for a first-to-default credit derivative that does not meet the
rules of recognition of Sec. ----.134(b).
(ii) Second-or-subsequent-to-default credit derivatives. (A) A
[BANK] that obtains credit protection on a group of underlying
exposures through a nth -to-default credit derivative that meets the
rules of recognition of Sec. ----.134(b) (other than a first-to-
default credit derivative) may recognize the credit risk mitigation
benefits of the derivative only if:
(1) The [BANK] also has obtained credit protection on the same
underlying exposures in the form of first-through-(n-1)-to-default
credit derivatives; or
(2) If n-1 of the underlying exposures have already defaulted.
(B) If a [BANK] satisfies the requirements of paragraph
(l)(3)(ii)(A) of this section, the [BANK] must determine its risk-based
capital requirement for the underlying exposures as if the bank had
only synthetically securitized the underlying exposure with the nth
lowest risk-based capital requirement and had obtained no credit risk
mitigant on the other underlying exposures.
(C) A [BANK] must calculate a risk-based capital requirement for
counterparty credit risk according to Sec. ----.132 for a nth-to-
default credit derivative that does not meet the rules of recognition
of Sec. ----.134(b).
(m) Guarantees and credit derivatives other than nth-to-default
credit derivatives. (1) Protection provider. For a guarantee or credit
derivative (other than an nth-to-default credit derivative) provided by
a [BANK] that covers the full amount or a pro rata share of a
securitization exposure's principal and interest, the [BANK] must risk
weight the guarantee or credit derivative as if it holds the portion of
the reference exposure covered by the guarantee or credit derivative.
(2) Protection purchaser. (i) If a [BANK] chooses (and is able) to
recognize a guarantee or credit derivative (other than an nth-to-
default credit derivative) that references a securitization exposure as
a credit risk mitigant, where applicable, the [BANK] must apply Sec.
----.145.
(ii) If a [BANK] cannot, or chooses not to, recognize a credit
derivative that references a securitization exposure as a credit risk
mitigant under Sec. ----.145, the [BANK] must determine its capital
requirement only for counterparty credit risk in accordance with Sec.
----.131.
Sec. ----.143 Supervisory formula approach (SFA).
(a) Eligibility requirements. A [BANK] must use the SFA to
determine its risk-weighted asset amount for a securitization exposure
if the [BANK] can calculate on an ongoing basis each of the SFA
parameters in paragraph (e) of this section.
(b) Mechanics. The risk-weighted asset amount for the
securitization exposure equals the SFA risk-based capital requirement
for the exposure multiplied by 12.5.
(c) The SFA risk-based capital requirement. (1) If KIRB
is greater than or equal to L + T, the capital requirement equals the
exposure amount.
(2) If KIRB is less than or equal to L, the exposure's
SFA risk-based capital requirement is UE multiplied by TP multiplied by
the greater of:
(i) F x T (where F is 0.016 for all securitization exposures); or
(ii) S[L + + T] - S[L].
(3) If KIRB is greater than L and less than L + T, the
[BANK] must apply a 1,250 percent risk weight to an amount equal to UE
* TP * (KIRB - L), and the exposure's SFA risk-based capital
requirement is UE multiplied by TP multiplied by the greater of:
(i) F x (T - (KIRB - L) (where F is 0.016for all other
securitization exposures); or
(ii) S[L + + T] - S[KIRB].
(d) The supervisory formula:
[[Page 53029]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.048
(11) In these expressions, [beta][Y; a, b] refers to the cumulative
beta distribution with parameters a and b evaluated at Y. In the case
where N = 1 and EWALGD = 100 percent, S[Y] in formula (1) must be
calculated with K[Y] set equal to the product of KIRB and Y,
and d set equal to 1 - KIRB.
(e) SFA parameters. (1) Amount of the underlying exposures (UE). UE
is the EAD of any underlying exposures that are wholesale and retail
exposures (including the amount of any funded spread accounts, cash
collateral accounts, and other similar funded credit enhancements) plus
the amount of any underlying exposures that are securitization
exposures (as defined in Sec. ----.142(e)) plus the adjusted carrying
value of any underlying exposures that are equity exposures (as defined
in Sec. ----.151(b)).
(2) Tranche percentage (TP). TP is the ratio of the amount of the
[BANK]'s securitization exposure to the amount of the tranche that
contains the securitization exposure.
(3) Capital requirement on underlying exposures (KIRB).
(i) KIRB is the ratio of:
(A) The sum of the risk-based capital requirements for the
underlying exposures plus the expected credit losses of the underlying
exposures (as determined under this subpart E as if the underlying
exposures were directly held by the [BANK]); to
(B) UE.
(ii) The calculation of KIRB must reflect the effects of
any credit risk mitigant applied to the underlying exposures (either to
an individual underlying exposure, to a group of underlying exposures,
or to the entire pool of underlying exposures).
(iii) All assets related to the securitization are treated as
underlying exposures, including assets in a reserve account (such as a
cash collateral account).
(4) Credit enhancement level (L). (i) L is the ratio of:
(A) The amount of all securitization exposures subordinated to the
tranche that contains the [BANK]'s securitization exposure; to
(B) UE.
(ii) A [BANK] must determine L before considering the effects of
any tranche-specific credit enhancements.
(iii) Any gain-on-sale or CEIO associated with the securitization
may not be included in L.
(iv) Any reserve account funded by accumulated cash flows from the
underlying exposures that is subordinated to the tranche that contains
the [BANK]'s securitization exposure may be included in the numerator
and denominator of L to the extent cash has accumulated in the account.
Unfunded reserve accounts (that is, reserve accounts that are to be
funded from future cash flows from the underlying exposures) may not be
included in the calculation of L.
(v) In some cases, the purchase price of receivables will reflect a
discount that provides credit enhancement (for example, first loss
protection) for all or certain tranches of the securitization.
[[Page 53030]]
When this arises, L should be calculated inclusive of this discount if
the discount provides credit enhancement for the securitization
exposure.
(5) Thickness of tranche (T). T is the ratio of:
(i) The amount of the tranche that contains the [BANK]'s
securitization exposure; to
(ii) UE.
(6) Effective number of exposures (N). (i) Unless the [BANK] elects
to use the formula provided in paragraph (f) of this section,
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.049
where EADi represents the EAD associated with the
ith instrument in the pool of underlying exposures.
(ii) Multiple exposures to one obligor must be treated as a single
underlying exposure.
(iii) In the case of a re-securitization, the [BANK] must treat
each underlying exposure as a single underlying exposure and must not
look through to the originally securitized underlying exposures.
(7) Exposure-weighted average loss given default (EWALGD). EWALGD
is calculated as:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.050
where LGDi represents the average LGD associated with all
exposures to the ith obligor. In the case of a re-
securitization, an LGD of 100 percent must be assumed for the
underlying exposures that are themselves securitization exposures.
(f) Simplified method for computing N and EWALGD. (1) If all
underlying exposures of a securitization are retail exposures, a [BANK]
may apply the SFA using the following simplifications:
(i) h = 0; and
(ii) v = 0.
(2) Under the conditions in sections 143(f)(3) and (f)(4), a [BANK]
may employ a simplified method for calculating N and EWALGD.
(3) If C1 is no more than 0.03, a [BANK] may set EWALGD
= 0.50 if none of the underlying exposures is a securitization
exposure, or may set EWALGD = 1 if one or more of the underlying
exposures is a securitization exposure, and may set N equal to the
following amount:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.051
where:
(i) Cm is the ratio of the sum of the amounts of the `m'
largest underlying exposures to UE; and
(ii) The level of m is to be selected by the [BANK].
(4) Alternatively, if only C1 is available and
C1 is no more than 0.03, the [BANK] may set EWALGD = 0.50 if
none of the underlying exposures is a securitization exposure, or may
set EWALGD = 1 if one or more of the underlying exposures is a
securitization exposure and may set N = 1/C1.
Sec. ----.144 Simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA).
(a) General requirements. To use the SSFA to determine the risk
weight for a securitization exposure, a [BANK] must have data that
enables it to assign accurately the parameters described in paragraph
(b) of this section. Data used to assign the parameters described in
paragraph (b) of this section must be the most currently available data
and no more than 91 calendar days old. A [BANK] that does not have the
appropriate data to assign the parameters described in paragraph (b) of
this section must assign a risk weight of 1,250 percent to the
exposure.
(b) SSFA parameters. To calculate the risk weight for a
securitization exposure using the SSFA, a [BANK] must have accurate
information on the five inputs to the SSFA calculation described and
defined, for purposes of this section, in paragraphs (b)(1) through
(b)(5) of this section:
(1) KG is the weighted-average (with unpaid principal
used as the weight for each exposure) total capital requirement of the
underlying exposures calculated using this subpart. KG is
expressed as a decimal value between zero and 1 (that is, an average
risk weight of 100 percent represents a value of KG equal to
.08).
(2) Parameter W is expressed as a decimal value between zero and
one. Parameter W is the ratio of the sum of the dollar amounts of any
underlying exposures within the securitized pool that meet any of the
criteria as set forth in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (vi) of this
section to the ending balance, measured in dollars, of underlying
exposures.
(i) Ninety days or more past due;
(ii) Subject to a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding;
(iii) In the process of foreclosure;
(iv) Held as real estate owned;
(v) Has contractually deferred interest payments for 90 days or
more; or
(vi) Is in default.
(3) Parameter A is the attachment point for the exposure, which
represents the threshold at which credit losses will first be allocated
to the exposure. Parameter A equals the ratio of the current dollar
amount of underlying exposures that are subordinated to the exposure of
the [BANK] to the current dollar amount of underlying exposures. Any
reserve account funded by the accumulated cash flows from the
underlying exposures that is subordinated to the [BANK]'s
securitization exposure may be included in the calculation of parameter
A to the extent that cash is present in the account. Parameter A is
expressed as a decimal value between zero and one.
(4) Parameter D is the detachment point for the exposure, which
represents the threshold at which credit losses of principal allocated
to the exposure would result in a total loss of principal. Parameter D
equals parameter A plus the ratio of the current dollar amount of the
securitization exposures that are pari passu with the exposure (that
is, have equal seniority with respect to credit risk) to the current
dollar amount of the underlying exposures. Parameter D is expressed as
a decimal value between zero and one.
(5) A supervisory calibration parameter, p, is equal to 0.5 for
securitization exposures that are not resecuritization exposures and
equal to 1.5 for resecuritization exposures.
(c) Mechanics of the SSFA. KG and W are used to
calculate KA, the augmented value of KG, which
reflects the observed credit quality of the underlying pool of
exposures. KA is defined in paragraph (d) of this section.
The values of parameters A and D, relative to KA determine
the risk weight assigned to a securitization exposure as described in
paragraph (d) of this section. The risk weight assigned to a
securitization
[[Page 53031]]
exposure, or portion of an exposure, as appropriate, is the larger of
the risk weight determined in accordance with this paragraph and
paragraph (d) of this section and a risk weight of 20 percent.
(1) When the detachment point, parameter D, for a securitization
exposure is less than or equal to KA, the exposure must be
assigned a risk weight of 1,250 percent.
(2) When the attachment point, parameter A, for a securitization
exposure is greater than or equal to KA, the [BANK] must
calculate the risk weight in accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section.
(3) When A is less than KA and D is greater than
KA, the risk weight is a weighted-average of 1,250 percent
and 1,250 percent times KSSFA calculated in accordance with
paragraph (d) of this section, but with the parameter A revised to be
set equal to KA. For the purpose of this weighted-average
calculation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.052
Sec. ----.145 Recognition of credit risk mitigants for
securitization exposures.
(a) General. An originating [BANK] that has obtained a credit risk
mitigant to hedge its securitization exposure to a synthetic or
traditional securitization that satisfies the operational criteria in
Sec. ----.141 may recognize the credit risk mitigant, but only as
provided in this section. An investing [BANK] that has obtained a
credit risk mitigant to hedge a securitization exposure may recognize
the credit risk mitigant, but only as provided in this section.
(b) Collateral. (1) Rules of recognition. A [BANK] may recognize
financial collateral in determining the [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset
amount for a securitization exposure (other than a repo-style
transaction, an eligible margin loan, or an OTC derivative contract for
which the [BANK] has reflected collateral in its determination of
exposure amount under Sec. ----.132) as follows. The [BANK]'s risk-
weighted asset amount for the collateralized securitization exposure is
equal to the risk-weighted asset amount for the securitization exposure
as calculated under the SSFA in Sec. ----.144 or under the SFA in
Sec. ----.143 multiplied by the ratio of adjusted exposure amount
(SE*) to original exposure amount (SE), where:
(i) SE* = max {0, [SE-C x (1-Hs-Hfx)]{time} ;
(ii) SE = the amount of the securitization exposure calculated
under Sec. ----.142(e);
(iii) C = the current market value of the collateral;
[[Page 53032]]
(iv) Hs = the haircut appropriate to the collateral type; and
(v) Hfx = the haircut appropriate for any currency mismatch
between the collateral and the exposure.
(2) Mixed collateral. Where the collateral is a basket of different
asset types or a basket of assets denominated in different currencies,
the haircut on the basket will be
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.053
where ai is the current market value of the asset in the
basket divided by the current market value of all assets in the
basket and Hi is the haircut applicable to that asset.
(3) Standard supervisory haircuts. Unless a [BANK] qualifies for
use of and uses own-estimates haircuts in paragraph (b)(4) of this
section:
(i) A [BANK] must use the collateral type haircuts (Hs) in Table 2;
(ii) A [BANK] must use a currency mismatch haircut (Hfx) of 8
percent if the exposure and the collateral are denominated in different
currencies;
(iii) A [BANK] must multiply the supervisory haircuts obtained in
paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section by the square root of 6.5
(which equals 2.549510); and
(iv) A [BANK] must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the
basis of a holding period longer than 65 business days where and as
appropriate to take into account the illiquidity of the collateral.
(4) Own estimates for haircuts. With the prior written approval of
the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may calculate haircuts using its own internal
estimates of market price volatility and foreign exchange volatility,
subject to Sec. ----.132(b)(2)(iii). The minimum holding period
(TM) for securitization exposures is 65 business days.
(c) Guarantees and credit derivatives. (1) Limitations on
recognition. A [BANK] may only recognize an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative provided by an eligible guarantor in
determining the [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset amount for a
securitization exposure.
(2) ECL for securitization exposures. When a [BANK] recognizes an
eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative provided by an
eligible guarantor in determining the [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset
amount for a securitization exposure, the [BANK] must also:
(i) Calculate ECL for the protected portion of the exposure using
the same risk parameters that it uses for calculating the risk-weighted
asset amount of the exposure as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section; and
(ii) Add the exposure's ECL to the [BANK]'s total ECL.
(3) Rules of recognition. A [BANK] may recognize an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative provided by an eligible
guarantor in determining the [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset amount for
the securitization exposure as follows:
(i) Full coverage. If the protection amount of the eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative equals or exceeds the amount of
the securitization exposure, the [BANK] may set the risk-weighted asset
amount for the securitization exposure equal to the risk-weighted asset
amount for a direct exposure to the eligible guarantor (as determined
in the wholesale risk weight function described in Sec. ----.131),
using the [BANK]'s PD for the guarantor, the [BANK]'s LGD for the
guarantee or credit derivative, and an EAD equal to the amount of the
securitization exposure (as determined in Sec. ----.142(e)).
(ii) Partial coverage. If the protection amount of the eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative is less than the amount of the
securitization exposure, the [BANK] may set the risk-weighted asset
amount for the securitization exposure equal to the sum of:
(A) Covered portion. The risk-weighted asset amount for a direct
exposure to the eligible guarantor (as determined in the wholesale risk
weight function described in Sec. ----.131 of this subpart), using the
[BANK]'s PD for the guarantor, the [BANK]'s LGD for the guarantee or
credit derivative, and an EAD equal to the protection amount of the
credit risk mitigant; and
(B) Uncovered portion. (1) 1.0 minus the ratio of the protection
amount of the eligible guarantee or eligible credit derivative to the
amount of the securitization exposure); multiplied by
(2) The risk-weighted asset amount for the securitization exposure
without the credit risk mitigant (as determined in Sec. Sec. ----.142
through 146).
(4) Mismatches. The [BANK] must make applicable adjustments to the
protection amount as required in Sec. ----.134(d), (e), and (f) for
any hedged securitization exposure and any more senior securitization
exposure that benefits from the hedge. In the context of a synthetic
securitization, when an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative covers multiple hedged exposures that have different
residual maturities, the [BANK] must use the longest residual maturity
of any of the hedged exposures as the residual maturity of all the
hedged exposures.
Risk-Weighted Assets for Equity Exposures
Sec. ----.151 Introduction and exposure measurement.
(a) General. To calculate its risk-weighted asset amounts for
equity exposures that are not equity exposures to investment funds, a
[BANK] may apply either the Simple Risk Weight Approach (SRWA) in Sec.
----.152 or, if it qualifies to do so, the Internal Models Approach
(IMA) in Sec. ----.153. A [BANK] must use the look-through approaches
in Sec. ----.154 to calculate its risk-weighted asset amounts for
equity exposures to investment funds.
(b) Adjusted carrying value. For purposes of this [PART], the
adjusted carrying value of an equity exposure is:
(1) For the on-balance sheet component of an equity exposure, the
[BANK]'s carrying value of the exposure; and
(2) For the off-balance sheet component of an equity exposure, the
effective notional principal amount of the exposure, the size of which
is equivalent to a hypothetical on-balance sheet position in the
underlying equity instrument that would evidence the same change in
fair value (measured in dollars) for a given small change in the price
of the underlying equity instrument, minus the adjusted carrying value
of the on-balance sheet component of the exposure as calculated in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section. For unfunded equity commitments that
are unconditional, the effective notional principal amount is the
notional amount of the commitment. For unfunded equity commitments that
are conditional, the effective notional principal amount is the
[BANK]'s best estimate of the amount that would be funded under
economic downturn conditions.
Sec. ----.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
(a) General. Under the SRWA, a [BANK]'s aggregate risk-weighted
asset amount for its equity exposures is equal to the sum of the risk-
weighted asset amounts for each of the [BANK]'s individual equity
exposures (other than equity exposures to an investment fund) as
determined in this section and the risk-weighted asset amounts for each
of the [BANK]'s individual equity exposures to an investment fund as
determined in Sec. ----.154.
(b) SRWA computation for individual equity exposures. A [BANK] must
determine the risk-weighted asset amount for an individual equity
exposure (other than an equity exposure to an investment fund) by
multiplying
[[Page 53033]]
the adjusted carrying value of the equity exposure or the effective
portion and ineffective portion of a hedge pair (as defined in
paragraph (c) of this section) by the lowest applicable risk weight in
this section.
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
to an entity whose credit exposures are exempt from the 0.03 percent PD
floor in Sec. ----.131(d)(2) is assigned a zero percent risk weight.
(2) 20 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure to
a Federal Home Loan Bank or the Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac) is assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
(3) 100 percent risk weight equity exposures. The following equity
exposures are assigned a 100 percent risk weight:
(i) Community development equity exposures. An equity exposure that
qualifies as a community development investment under section 24
(Eleventh) of the National Bank Act, excluding equity exposures to an
unconsolidated small business investment company and equity exposures
held through a consolidated small business investment company described
in section 302 of the Small Business Investment Act.
(ii) Effective portion of hedge pairs. The effective portion of a
hedge pair.
(iii) Non-significant equity exposures. Equity exposures, excluding
exposures to an investment firm that would meet the definition of a
traditional securitization were it not for the [AGENCY]'s application
of paragraph (8) of that definition in Sec. ----.2 and has greater
than immaterial leverage, to the extent that the aggregate adjusted
carrying value of the exposures does not exceed 10 percent of the
[BANK]'s total capital.
(A) To compute the aggregate adjusted carrying value of a [BANK]'s
equity exposures for purposes of this section, the [BANK] may exclude
equity exposures described in paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)(i), and
(b)(3)(ii) of this section, the equity exposure in a hedge pair with
the smaller adjusted carrying value, and a proportion of each equity
exposure to an investment fund equal to the proportion of the assets of
the investment fund that are not equity exposures or that meet the
criterion of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section. If a [BANK] does not
know the actual holdings of the investment fund, the [BANK] may
calculate the proportion of the assets of the fund that are not equity
exposures based on the terms of the prospectus, partnership agreement,
or similar contract that defines the fund's permissible investments. If
the sum of the investment limits for all exposure classes within the
fund exceeds 100 percent, the [BANK] must assume for purposes of this
section that the investment fund invests to the maximum extent possible
in equity exposures.
(B) When determining which of a [BANK]'s equity exposures qualifies
for a 100 percent risk weight under this section, a [BANK] first must
include equity exposures to unconsolidated small business investment
companies or held through consolidated small business investment
companies described in section 302 of the Small Business Investment
Act, then must include publicly-traded equity exposures (including
those held indirectly through investment funds), and then must include
non-publicly-traded equity exposures (including those held indirectly
through investment funds).
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
that are not deducted from capital pursuant to Sec. ----.22(b)(4) of
subpart B are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly-traded
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph
(b)(6) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(6) of this
section) that is not publicly-traded is assigned a 400 percent risk
weight.
(7) 600 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure to
an investment firm that:
(i) Would meet the definition of a traditional securitization were
it not for the [AGENCY]'s application of paragraph (8) of that
definition in Sec. ----.2; and
(ii) Has greater than immaterial leverage is assigned a 600 percent
risk weight.
(c) Hedge transactions. (1) Hedge pair. A hedge pair is two equity
exposures that form an effective hedge so long as each equity exposure
is publicly-traded or has a return that is primarily based on a
publicly-traded equity exposure.
(2) Effective hedge. Two equity exposures form an effective hedge
if the exposures either have the same remaining maturity or each has a
remaining maturity of at least three months; the hedge relationship is
formally documented in a prospective manner (that is, before the [BANK]
acquires at least one of the equity exposures); the documentation
specifies the measure of effectiveness (E) the [BANK] will use for the
hedge relationship throughout the life of the transaction; and the
hedge relationship has an E greater than or equal to 0.8. A [BANK] must
measure E at least quarterly and must use one of three alternative
measures of E:
(i) Under the dollar-offset method of measuring effectiveness, the
[BANK] must determine the ratio of value change (RVC). The RVC is the
ratio of the cumulative sum of the periodic changes in value of one
equity exposure to the cumulative sum of the periodic changes in the
value of the other equity exposure. If RVC is positive, the hedge is
not effective and E equals zero. If RVC is negative and greater than or
equal to -1 (that is, between zero and -1), then E equals the absolute
value of RVC. If RVC is negative and less than -1, then E equals 2 plus
RVC.
(ii) Under the variability-reduction method of measuring
effectiveness:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.054
where
(A) Xt = At - Bt;
(B) At = the value at time t of one exposure in a hedge pair; and
(C) Bt = the value at time t of the other exposure in a hedge pair.
[[Page 53034]]
(iii) Under the regression method of measuring effectiveness, E
equals the coefficient of determination of a regression in which the
change in value of one exposure in a hedge pair is the dependent
variable and the change in value of the other exposure in a hedge pair
is the independent variable. However, if the estimated regression
coefficient is positive, then the value of E is zero.
(3) The effective portion of a hedge pair is E multiplied by the
greater of the adjusted carrying values of the equity exposures forming
a hedge pair.
(4) The ineffective portion of a hedge pair is (1-E) multiplied by
the greater of the adjusted carrying values of the equity exposures
forming a hedge pair.
Sec. ----.153 Internal models approach (IMA).
(a) General. A [BANK] may calculate its risk-weighted asset amount
for equity exposures using the IMA by modeling publicly-traded and non-
publicly-traded equity exposures (in accordance with paragraph (c) of
this section) or by modeling only publicly-traded equity exposures (in
accordance with paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section).
(b) Qualifying criteria. To qualify to use the IMA to calculate
risk-weighted assets for equity exposures, a [BANK] must receive prior
written approval from the [AGENCY]. To receive such approval, the
[BANK] must demonstrate to the [AGENCY]'s satisfaction that the [BANK]
meets the following criteria:
(1) The [BANK] must have one or more models that:
(i) Assess the potential decline in value of its modeled equity
exposures;
(ii) Are commensurate with the size, complexity, and composition of
the [BANK]'s modeled equity exposures; and
(iii) Adequately capture both general market risk and idiosyncratic
risk.
(2) The [BANK]'s model must produce an estimate of potential losses
for its modeled equity exposures that is no less than the estimate of
potential losses produced by a VaR methodology employing a 99.0
percent, one-tailed confidence interval of the distribution of
quarterly returns for a benchmark portfolio of equity exposures
comparable to the [BANK]'s modeled equity exposures using a long-term
sample period.
(3) The number of risk factors and exposures in the sample and the
data period used for quantification in the [BANK]'s model and
benchmarking exercise must be sufficient to provide confidence in the
accuracy and robustness of the [BANK]'s estimates.
(4) The [BANK]'s model and benchmarking process must incorporate
data that are relevant in representing the risk profile of the [BANK]'s
modeled equity exposures, and must include data from at least one
equity market cycle containing adverse market movements relevant to the
risk profile of the [BANK]'s modeled equity exposures. In addition, the
[BANK]'s benchmarking exercise must be based on daily market prices for
the benchmark portfolio. If the [BANK]'s model uses a scenario
methodology, the [BANK] must demonstrate that the model produces a
conservative estimate of potential losses on the [BANK]'s modeled
equity exposures over a relevant long-term market cycle. If the [BANK]
employs risk factor models, the [BANK] must demonstrate through
empirical analysis the appropriateness of the risk factors used.
(5) The [BANK] must be able to demonstrate, using theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence, that any proxies used in the modeling
process are comparable to the [BANK]'s modeled equity exposures and
that the [BANK] has made appropriate adjustments for differences. The
[BANK] must derive any proxies for its modeled equity exposures and
benchmark portfolio using historical market data that are relevant to
the [BANK]'s modeled equity exposures and benchmark portfolio (or,
where not, must use appropriately adjusted data), and such proxies must
be robust estimates of the risk of the [BANK]'s modeled equity
exposures.
(c) Risk-weighted assets calculation for a [BANK] modeling
publicly-traded and non-publicly-traded equity exposures. If a [BANK]
models publicly-traded and non-publicly-traded equity exposures, the
[BANK]'s aggregate risk-weighted asset amount for its equity exposures
is equal to the sum of:
(1) The risk-weighted asset amount of each equity exposure that
qualifies for a 0 percent, 20 percent, or 100 percent risk weight under
Sec. Sec. ----.152(b)(1) through (b)(3)(i) (as determined under Sec.
----.152) and each equity exposure to an investment fund (as determined
under Sec. ----.154); and
(2) The greater of:
(i) The estimate of potential losses on the [BANK]'s equity
exposures (other than equity exposures referenced in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section) generated by the [BANK]'s internal equity exposure
model multiplied by 12.5; or
(ii) The sum of:
(A) 200 percent multiplied by the aggregate adjusted carrying value
of the [BANK]'s publicly-traded equity exposures that do not belong to
a hedge pair, do not qualify for a 0 percent, 20 percent, or 100
percent risk weight under Sec. Sec. ----.152(b)(1) through (b)(3)(i),
and are not equity exposures to an investment fund;
(B) 200 percent multiplied by the aggregate ineffective portion of
all hedge pairs; and
(C) 300 percent multiplied by the aggregate adjusted carrying value
of the [BANK]'s equity exposures that are not publicly-traded, do not
qualify for a 0 percent, 20 percent, or 100 percent risk weight under
Sec. Sec. ----.152(b)(1) through (b)(3)(i), and are not equity
exposures to an investment fund.
(d) Risk-weighted assets calculation for a [BANK] using the IMA
only for publicly-traded equity exposures. If a [BANK] models only
publicly-traded equity exposures, the [BANK]'s aggregate risk-weighted
asset amount for its equity exposures is equal to the sum of:
(1) The risk-weighted asset amount of each equity exposure that
qualifies for a 0 percent, 20 percent, or 100 percent risk weight under
Sec. Sec. ----.152(b)(1) through (b)(3)(i) (as determined under Sec.
----.152), each equity exposure that qualifies for a 400 percent risk
weight under Sec. ----.152(b)(5) or a 600 percent risk weight under
Sec. ----.152(b)(6) (as determined under Sec. ----.152), and each
equity exposure to an investment fund (as determined under Sec. --
--.154); and
(2) The greater of:
(i) The estimate of potential losses on the [BANK]'s equity
exposures (other than equity exposures referenced in paragraph (d)(1)
of this section) generated by the [BANK]'s internal equity exposure
model multiplied by 12.5; or
(ii) The sum of:
(A) 200 percent multiplied by the aggregate adjusted carrying value
of the [BANK]'s publicly-traded equity exposures that do not belong to
a hedge pair, do not qualify for a 0 percent, 20 percent, or 100
percent risk weight under Sec. Sec. ----.152(b)(1) through (b)(3)(i),
and are not equity exposures to an investment fund; and
(B) 200 percent multiplied by the aggregate ineffective portion of
all hedge pairs.
Sec. ----.154 Equity exposures to investment funds.
(a) Available approaches. (1) Unless the exposure meets the
requirements for a community development equity exposure in Sec. --
--.152(b)(3)(i), a [BANK] must determine the risk-weighted asset amount
of an equity exposure to an investment fund under the Full Look-Through
Approach in paragraph (b) of this section, the Simple Modified Look-
Through Approach in
[[Page 53035]]
paragraph (c) of this section, or the Alternative Modified Look-Through
Approach in paragraph (d) of this section.
(2) The risk-weighted asset amount of an equity exposure to an
investment fund that meets the requirements for a community development
equity exposure in Sec. ----.152(b)(3)(i) is its adjusted carrying
value.
(3) If an equity exposure to an investment fund is part of a hedge
pair and the [BANK] does not use the Full Look-Through Approach, the
[BANK] may use the ineffective portion of the hedge pair as determined
under Sec. ----.152(c) as the adjusted carrying value for the equity
exposure to the investment fund. The risk-weighted asset amount of the
effective portion of the hedge pair is equal to its adjusted carrying
value.
(b) Full Look-Through Approach. A [BANK] that is able to calculate
a risk-weighted asset amount for its proportional ownership share of
each exposure held by the investment fund (as calculated under this
subpart E as if the proportional ownership share of each exposure were
held directly by the [BANK]) may either:
(1) Set the risk-weighted asset amount of the [BANK]'s exposure to
the fund equal to the product of:
(i) The aggregate risk-weighted asset amounts of the exposures held
by the fund as if they were held directly by the [BANK]; and
(ii) The [BANK]'s proportional ownership share of the fund; or
(2) Include the [BANK]'s proportional ownership share of each
exposure held by the fund in the [BANK]'s IMA.
(c) Simple Modified Look-Through Approach. Under this approach, the
risk-weighted asset amount for a [BANK]'s equity exposure to an
investment fund equals the adjusted carrying value of the equity
exposure multiplied by the highest risk weight assigned according to
subpart D that applies to any exposure the fund is permitted to hold
under its prospectus, partnership agreement, or similar contract that
defines the fund's permissible investments (excluding derivative
contracts that are used for hedging rather than speculative purposes
and that do not constitute a material portion of the fund's exposures).
(d) Alternative Modified Look-Through Approach. Under this
approach, a [BANK] may assign the adjusted carrying value of an equity
exposure to an investment fund on a pro rata basis to different risk
weight categories assigned according to subpart D of this part based on
the investment limits in the fund's prospectus, partnership agreement,
or similar contract that defines the fund's permissible investments.
The risk-weighted asset amount for the [BANK]'s equity exposure to the
investment fund equals the sum of each portion of the adjusted carrying
value assigned to an exposure class multiplied by the applicable risk
weight. If the sum of the investment limits for all exposure types
within the fund exceeds 100 percent, the [BANK] must assume that the
fund invests to the maximum extent permitted under its investment
limits in the exposure type with the highest risk weight under subpart
D of this part, and continues to make investments in order of the
exposure type with the next highest risk weight under subpart D until
the maximum total investment level is reached. If more than one
exposure type applies to an exposure, the [BANK] must use the highest
applicable risk weight. A [BANK] may exclude derivative contracts held
by the fund that are used for hedging rather than for speculative
purposes and do not constitute a material portion of the fund's
exposures.
Sec. ----.155 Equity derivative contracts.
(a) Under the IMA, in addition to holding risk-based capital
against an equity derivative contract under this [PART], a [BANK] must
hold risk-based capital against the counterparty credit risk in the
equity derivative contract by also treating the equity derivative
contract as a wholesale exposure and computing a supplemental risk-
weighted asset amount for the contract under Sec. ----.132.
(b) Under the SRWA, a [BANK] may choose not to hold risk-based
capital against the counterparty credit risk of equity derivative
contracts, as long as it does so for all such contracts. Where the
equity derivative contracts are subject to a qualified master netting
agreement, a [BANK] using the SRWA must either include all or exclude
all of the contracts from any measure used to determine counterparty
credit risk exposure.
Risk-Weighted Assets for Operational Risk
Sec. ----.161 Qualification requirements for incorporation of
operational risk mitigants.
(a) Qualification to use operational risk mitigants. A [BANK] may
adjust its estimate of operational risk exposure to reflect qualifying
operational risk mitigants if:
(1) The [BANK]'s operational risk quantification system is able to
generate an estimate of the [BANK]'s operational risk exposure (which
does not incorporate qualifying operational risk mitigants) and an
estimate of the [BANK]'s operational risk exposure adjusted to
incorporate qualifying operational risk mitigants; and
(2) The [BANK]'s methodology for incorporating the effects of
insurance, if the [BANK] uses insurance as an operational risk
mitigant, captures through appropriate discounts to the amount of risk
mitigation:
(i) The residual term of the policy, where less than one year;
(ii) The cancellation terms of the policy, where less than one
year;
(iii) The policy's timeliness of payment;
(iv) The uncertainty of payment by the provider of the policy; and
(v) Mismatches in coverage between the policy and the hedged
operational loss event.
(b) Qualifying operational risk mitigants. Qualifying operational
risk mitigants are:
(1) Insurance that:
(i) Is provided by an unaffiliated company that the [BANK] deems to
have strong capacity to meet its claims payment obligations and the
obligor rating category to which the [BANK] assigns the company is
assigned a PD equal to or less than 10 basis points;
(ii) Has an initial term of at least one year and a residual term
of more than 90 days;
(iii) Has a minimum notice period for cancellation by the provider
of 90 days;
(iv) Has no exclusions or limitations based upon regulatory action
or for the receiver or liquidator of a failed depository institution;
and
(v) Is explicitly mapped to a potential operational loss event;
(2) Operational risk mitigants other than insurance for which the
[AGENCY] has given prior written approval. In evaluating an operational
risk mitigant other than insurance, the [AGENCY] will consider whether
the operational risk mitigant covers potential operational losses in a
manner equivalent to holding total capital.
Sec. ----.162 Mechanics of risk-weighted asset calculation.
(a) If a [BANK] does not qualify to use or does not have qualifying
operational risk mitigants, the [BANK]'s dollar risk-based capital
requirement for operational risk is its operational risk exposure minus
eligible operational risk offsets (if any).
(b) If a [BANK] qualifies to use operational risk mitigants and has
qualifying operational risk mitigants, the [BANK]'s dollar risk-based
capital requirement for operational risk is the greater of:
[[Page 53036]]
(1) The [BANK]'s operational risk exposure adjusted for qualifying
operational risk mitigants minus eligible operational risk offsets (if
any); or
(2) 0.8 multiplied by the difference between:
(i) The [BANK]'s operational risk exposure; and
(ii) Eligible operational risk offsets (if any).
(c) The [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset amount for operational risk
equals the [BANK]'s dollar risk-based capital requirement for
operational risk determined under sections 162(a) or (b) multiplied by
12.5.
Disclosures
Sec. ----.171 Purpose and scope.
Sections ----.171 through ----.173 establish public disclosure
requirements related to the capital requirements of a [BANK] that is an
advanced approaches bank.
Sec. ----.172 Disclosure requirements.
(a) A [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank must publicly
disclose each quarter its total and tier 1 risk-based capital ratios
and their components as calculated under this subpart (that is, common
equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, tier 2 capital, total
qualifying capital, and total risk-weighted assets).
(b) A [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank must comply with
paragraph (c) of this section unless it is a consolidated subsidiary of
a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, or depository
institution that is subject to these disclosure requirements or a
subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking organization that is subject to
comparable public disclosure requirements in its home jurisdiction.
(c)(1) A [BANK] described in paragraph (b) of this section and that
has successfully completed its parallel run must provide timely public
disclosures each calendar quarter of the information in the applicable
tables in Sec. ----.173. If a significant change occurs, such that the
most recent reported amounts are no longer reflective of the [BANK]'s
capital adequacy and risk profile, then a brief discussion of this
change and its likely impact must be disclosed as soon as practicable
thereafter. Qualitative disclosures that typically do not change each
quarter (for example, a general summary of the [BANK]'s risk management
objectives and policies, reporting system, and definitions) may be
disclosed annually, provided that any significant changes to these are
disclosed in the interim. Management is encouraged to provide all of
the disclosures required by this subpart in one place on the [BANK]'s
public Web site.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Alternatively, a [BANK] may provide the disclosures in more
than one place, as some of them may be included in public financial
reports (for example, in Management's Discussion and Analysis
included in SEC filings) or other regulatory reports. The [BANK]
must publicly provide a summary table that specifically indicates
where all the disclosures may be found (for example, regulatory
report schedules, page numbers in annual reports).
\6\ Such entities include securities, insurance and other
financial subsidiaries, commercial subsidiaries (where permitted),
and significant minority equity investments in insurance, financial
and commercial entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) A [BANK] described in paragraph (b) of this section must have a
formal disclosure policy approved by the board of directors that
addresses its approach for determining the disclosures it makes. The
policy must address the associated internal controls and disclosure
controls and procedures. The board of directors and senior management
are responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective internal
control structure over financial reporting, including the disclosures
required by this subpart, and must ensure that appropriate review of
the disclosures takes place. One or more senior officers of the [BANK]
must attest that the disclosures meet the requirements of this subpart.
(3) If a [BANK] described in paragraph (b) of this section believes
that disclosure of specific commercial or financial information would
prejudice seriously its position by making public information that is
either proprietary or confidential in nature, the [BANK] is not
required to disclose those specific items, but must disclose more
general information about the subject matter of the requirement,
together with the fact that, and the reason why, the specific items of
information have not been disclosed.
Sec. ----.173 Disclosures by certain advanced approaches [BANKS].
Except as provided in Sec. ----.172(b), a [BANK] that is an
advanced approaches bank must make the disclosures described in Tables
11.1 through 11.12 below. The [BANK] must make these disclosures
publicly available for each of the last three years (that is, twelve
quarters) or such shorter period beginning on the effective date of
this subpart E.
Table 11.1--Scope of Application
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The name of the top corporate entity
in the group to which subpart E of this
[PART] applies.
(b) A brief description of the
differences in the basis for
consolidating entities \6\ for
accounting and regulatory purposes, with
a description of those entities:
(1) That are fully consolidated;
(2) That are deconsolidated and
deducted from total capital;
(3) For which the total capital
requirement is deducted; and
(4) That are neither consolidated nor
deducted (for example, where the
investment in the entity is assigned
a risk weight in accordance with this
subpart).
(c) Any restrictions, or other major
impediments, on transfer of funds or
total capital within the group.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantitative disclosures..... (d) The aggregate amount of surplus
capital of insurance subsidiaries
included in the total capital of the
consolidated group.
(e) The aggregate amount by which actual
total capital is less than the minimum
total capital requirement in all
subsidiaries, with total capital
requirements and the name(s) of the
subsidiaries with such deficiencies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.2--Capital Structure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) Summary information on the terms and
conditions of the main features of all
regulatory capital instruments.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) The amount of common equity tier 1
capital, with separate disclosure of:
(1) Common stock and related surplus;
(2) Retained earnings;
(3) Common equity minority interest;
[[Page 53037]]
(4) AOCI (net of tax) and other
reserves; and
(5) Regulatory deductions and
adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital.
(c) The amount of tier 1 capital, with
separate disclosure of:
(1) Additional tier 1 capital
elements, including additional tier 1
capital instruments and tier 1
minority interest not included in
common equity tier 1 capital; and
(2) Regulatory deductions and
adjustments made to tier 1 capital.
(d) The amount of total capital, with
separate disclosure of:
(1) Tier 2 capital elements, including
tier 2 capital instruments and total
capital minority interest not
included in tier 1 capital; and
(2) Regulatory deductions and
adjustments made to total capital.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.3--Capital Adequacy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) A summary discussion of the [BANK]'s
approach to assessing the adequacy of
its capital to support current and
future activities.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) Risk-weighted assets for credit risk
from:
(1) Wholesale exposures;
(2) Residential mortgage exposures;
(3) Qualifying revolving exposures;
(4) Other retail exposures;
(5) Securitization exposures;
(6) Equity exposures:
(7) Equity exposures subject to the
simple risk weight approach; and
(8) Equity exposures subject to the
internal models approach.
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted
assets and advanced market risk-weighted
assets as calculated under subpart F of
this [PART]: \7\
(1) Standardized approach for specific
risk; and
(2) Internal models approach for
specific risk.
(d) Risk-weighted assets for operational
risk.
(e) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and
total risk-based capital ratios:
(1) For the top consolidated group;
and
(2) For each depository institution
subsidiary.
(f) Total risk-weighted assets.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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\7\ Standardized market risk-weighted assets and advanced market
risk-weighted assets as calculated under this subpart are to be
disclosed only with respect to an approach that is used by a [BANK].
Table 11.4--Capital Conservation and Countercyclical Buffers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The [BANK] must publicly disclose the
geographic breakdown of its private
sector credit exposures used in the
calculation of the countercyclical
capital buffer.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) At least quarterly, the [BANK] must
calculate and publicly disclose the
capital conservation buffer and the
countercyclical capital buffer as
described under Sec. ----.11 of
subpart B.
(c) At least quarterly, the [BANK] must
calculate and publicly disclose the
buffer retained income of the [BANK], as
described under Sec. ----.11 of
subpart B.
(d) At least quarterly, the [BANK] must
calculate and publicly disclose any
limitations it has on capital
distributions and discretionary bonus
payments resulting from the capital
conservation buffer and the
countercyclical buffer framework
described under Sec. ----.11 of
subpart B, including the maximum payout
amount for the quarter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Qualitative Disclosure Requirement
For each separate risk area described in Tables 11.5 through 11.12,
the [BANK] must describe its risk management objectives and policies,
including:
Strategies and processes;
The structure and organization of the relevant risk
management function;
The scope and nature of risk reporting and/or measurement
systems; and
Policies for hedging and/or mitigating risk and strategies
and processes for monitoring the continuing effectiveness of hedges/
mitigants.
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\8\ Table 11.5 does not cover equity exposures.
\9\ See, for example, ASC Topic 815-10 and 210-20 (formerly FASB
Interpretation Numbers 37 and 41).
\10\ Geographical areas may comprise individual countries,
groups of countries, or regions within countries. A [BANK] might
choose to define the geographical areas based on the way the
company's portfolio is geographically managed. The criteria used to
allocate the loans to geographical areas must be specified.
\11\ A [BANK] is encouraged also to provide an analysis of the
aging of past-due loans.
\12\ The portion of the general allowance that is not allocated
to a geographical area should be disclosed separately.
\13\ The reconciliation should include the following: A
description of the allowance; the opening balance of the allowance;
charge-offs taken against the allowance during the period; amounts
provided (or reversed) for estimated probable loan losses during the
period; any other adjustments (for example, exchange rate
differences, business combinations, acquisitions and disposals of
subsidiaries), including transfers between allowances; and the
closing balance of the allowance. Charge-offs and recoveries that
have been recorded directly to the income statement should be
disclosed separately.
[[Page 53038]]
Table 11.5 \8\--Credit Risk: General Disclosures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement with respect to credit risk
(excluding counterparty credit risk
disclosed in accordance with Table
11.7), including:
(1) Policy for determining past due or
delinquency status;
(2) Policy for placing loans on
nonaccrual;
(3) Policy for returning loans to
accrual status;
(4) Definition of and policy for
identifying impaired loans (for
financial accounting purposes).
(5) Description of the methodology
that the entity uses to estimate its
allowance for loan losses, including
statistical methods used where
applicable;
(6) Policy for charging-off
uncollectible amounts; and
(7) Discussion of the [BANK]'s credit
risk management policy
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) Total credit risk exposures and
average credit risk exposures, after
accounting offsets in accordance with
GAAP,\9\ without taking into account the
effects of credit risk mitigation
techniques (for example, collateral and
netting not permitted under GAAP), over
the period categorized by major types of
credit exposure. For example, [BANK]s
could use categories similar to that
used for financial statement purposes.
Such categories might include, for
instance:
(1) Loans, off-balance sheet
commitments, and other non-derivative
off-balance sheet exposures;
(2) Debt securities; and
(3) OTC derivatives.
(c) Geographic\10\ distribution of
exposures, categorized in significant
areas by major types of credit exposure.
(d) Industry or counterparty type
distribution of exposures, categorized
by major types of credit exposure.
(e) By major industry or counterparty
type:
(1) Amount of impaired loans for which
there was a related allowance under
GAAP;
(2) Amount of impaired loans for which
there was no related allowance under
GAAP;
(3) Amount of loans past due 90 days
and on nonaccrual;
(4) Amount of loans past due 90 days
and still accruing; \11\
(5) The balance in the allowance for
credit losses at the end of each
period, disaggregated on the basis of
the entity's impairment method. To
disaggregate the information required
on the basis of impairment
methodology, an entity shall
separately disclose the amounts based
on the requirements in GAAP; and
(6) Charge-offs during the period.
(f) Amount of impaired loans and, if
available, the amount of past due loans
categorized by significant geographic
areas including, if practical, the
amounts of allowances related to each
geographical area,\12\ further
categorized as required by GAAP.
(g) Reconciliation of changes in
ALLL.\13\
(h) Remaining contractual maturity
breakdown (for example, one year or
less) of the whole portfolio,
categorized by credit exposure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.6--Credit Risk: Disclosures for Portfolios Subject to IRB Risk-
Based Capital Formulas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) Explanation and review of the:
(1) Structure of internal rating
systems and relation between internal
and external ratings;
(2) Use of risk parameter estimates
other than for regulatory capital
purposes;
(3) Process for managing and
recognizing credit risk mitigation
(see Table 11.8); and
(4) Control mechanisms for the rating
system, including discussion of
independence, accountability, and
rating systems review.
(b)(1) Description of the internal
ratings process, provided separately for
the following:
(i) Wholesale category;
(ii) Retail subcategories--
(A) Residential mortgage exposures;
(B) Qualifying revolving exposures;
and
(C) Other retail exposures.
(2) For each category and subcategory
above the description should include:
(i) The types of exposure included in
the category/subcategories; and
(ii) The definitions, methods and data
for estimation and validation of PD,
LGD, and EAD, including assumptions
employed in the derivation of these
variables.\14\
Quantitative disclosures: (c)(1) For wholesale exposures, present
Risk assessment. the following information across a
sufficient number of PD grades
(including default) to allow for a
meaningful differentiation of credit
risk: \15\
(i) Total EAD; \16\
(ii) Exposure-weighted average LGD
(percentage);
(iii) Exposure-weighted average risk
weight; and
(iv) Amount of undrawn commitments and
exposure-weighted average EAD
including average drawdowns prior to
default for wholesale exposures.
(2) For each retail subcategory,
present the disclosures outlined
above across a sufficient number of
segments to allow for a meaningful
differentiation of credit risk.
Quantitative disclosures: (d) Actual losses in the preceding period
Historical results. for each category and subcategory and
how this differs from past experience. A
discussion of the factors that impacted
the loss experience in the preceding
period--for example, has the [BANK]
experienced higher than average default
rates, loss rates or EADs.
(e) [BANK]'s estimates compared against
actual outcomes over a longer
period.\17\ At a minimum, this should
include information on estimates of
losses against actual losses in the
wholesale category and each retail
subcategory over a period sufficient to
allow for a meaningful assessment of the
performance of the internal rating
processes for each category/
subcategory.\18\ Where appropriate, the
[BANK] should further decompose this to
provide analysis of PD, LGD, and EAD
outcomes against estimates provided in
the quantitative risk assessment
disclosures above.\19\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 53039]]
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\14\ This disclosure item does not require a detailed
description of the model in full--it should provide the reader with
a broad overview of the model approach, describing definitions of
the variables and methods for estimating and validating those
variables set out in the quantitative risk disclosures below. This
should be done for each of the four category/subcategories. The
[BANK] must disclose any significant differences in approach to
estimating these variables within each category/subcategories.
\15\ The PD, LGD and EAD disclosures in Table 11.6(c) should
reflect the effects of collateral, qualifying master netting
agreements, eligible guarantees and eligible credit derivatives as
defined under this part. Disclosure of each PD grade should include
the exposure-weighted average PD for each grade. Where a [BANK]
aggregates PD grades for the purposes of disclosure, this should be
a representative breakdown of the distribution of PD grades used for
regulatory capital purposes.
\16\ Outstanding loans and EAD on undrawn commitments can be
presented on a combined basis for these disclosures.
\17\ These disclosures are a way of further informing the reader
about the reliability of the information provided in the
``quantitative disclosures: risk assessment'' over the long run. The
disclosures are requirements from year-end 2010; in the meantime,
early adoption is encouraged. The phased implementation is to allow
a [BANK] sufficient time to build up a longer run of data that will
make these disclosures meaningful.
\18\ This disclosure item is not intended to be prescriptive
about the period used for this assessment. Upon implementation, it
is expected that a [BANK] would provide these disclosures for as
long a set of data as possible--for example, if a [BANK] has 10
years of data, it might choose to disclose the average default rates
for each PD grade over that 10-year period. Annual amounts need not
be disclosed.
\19\ A [BANK] must provide this further decomposition where it
will allow users greater insight into the reliability of the
estimates provided in the ``quantitative disclosures: risk
assessment.'' In particular, it must provide this information where
there are material differences between its estimates of PD, LGD or
EAD compared to actual outcomes over the long run. The [BANK] must
also provide explanations for such differences.
\20\ Net unsecured credit exposure is the credit exposure after
considering the benefits from legally enforceable netting agreements
and collateral arrangements, without taking into account haircuts
for price volatility, liquidity, etc.
\21\ This may include interest rate derivative contracts,
foreign exchange derivative contracts, equity derivative contracts,
credit derivatives, commodity or other derivative contracts,
repostyle transactions, and eligible margin loans.
Table 11.7--General Disclosure for Counterparty Credit Risk of OTC
Derivative Contracts, Repo-Style Transactions, and Eligible Margin Loans
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement with respect to OTC
derivatives, eligible margin loans, and
repo-style transactions, including:
(1) Discussion of methodology used to
assign economic capital and credit
limits for counterparty credit
exposures;
(2) Discussion of policies for
securing collateral, valuing and
managing collateral, and establishing
credit reserves;
(3) Discussion of the primary types of
collateral taken;
(4) Discussion of policies with
respect to wrong-way risk exposures;
and
(5) Discussion of the impact of the
amount of collateral the [BANK] would
have to provide if the [BANK] were to
receive a credit rating downgrade.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) Gross positive fair value of
contracts, netting benefits, netted
current credit exposure, collateral held
(including type, for example, cash,
government securities), and net
unsecured credit exposure. \20\ Also
report measures for EAD used for
regulatory capital for these
transactions, the notional value of
credit derivative hedges purchased for
counterparty credit risk protection,
and, for [BANK]s not using the internal
models methodology in Sec. ----
.132(d), the distribution of current
credit exposure by types of credit
exposure. \21\
(c) Notional amount of purchased and sold
credit derivatives, segregated between
use for the [BANK]'s own credit
portfolio and for its intermediation
activities, including the distribution
of the credit derivative products used,
categorized further by protection bought
and sold within each product group.
(d) The estimate of alpha if the [BANK]
has received supervisory approval to
estimate alpha.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.8--Credit Risk Mitigation \22\ \23\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement with respect to credit risk
mitigation, including:
(1) Policies and processes for, and an
indication of the extent to which the
[BANK] uses, on- or off-balance sheet
netting;
(2) Policies and processes for
collateral valuation and management;
(3) A description of the main types of
collateral taken by the [BANK];
(4) The main types of guarantors/
credit derivative counterparties and
their creditworthiness; and
(5) Information about (market or
credit) risk concentrations within
the mitigation taken.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) For each separately disclosed
portfolio, the total exposure (after,
where applicable, on- or off-balance
sheet netting) that is covered by
guarantees/credit derivatives.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ At a minimum, a [BANK] must provide the disclosures in
Table 11.8 in relation to credit risk mitigation that has been
recognized for the purposes of reducing capital requirements under
this subpart. Where relevant, [BANK]s are encouraged to give further
information about mitigants that have not been recognized for that
purpose.
\23\ Credit derivatives and other credit mitigation that are
treated for the purposes of this subpart as synthetic securitization
exposures should be excluded from the credit risk mitigation
disclosures (in Table 11.8) and included within those relating to
securitization (in Table 11.9).
Table 11.9--Securitization
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement with respect to
securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion
of:
(1) The [BANK]'s objectives for
securitizing assets, including the
extent to which these activities
transfer credit risk of the
underlying exposures away from the
[BANK] to other entities and
including the type of risks assumed
and retained with resecuritization
activity; \24\
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g.
liquidity risk) inherent in the
securitized assets;
[[Page 53040]]
(3) The roles played by the [BANK] in
the securitization process \25\ and
an indication of the extent of the
[BANK]'s involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor
changes in the credit and market risk
of securitization exposures including
how those processes differ for
resecuritization exposures;
(5) The [BANK]'s policy for mitigating
the credit risk retained through
securitization and resecuritization
exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches
that the [BANK] follows for its
securitization exposures including
the type of securitization exposure
to which each approach applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs
that the [BANK], as sponsor, uses to
securitize third-party exposures. The
[BANK] must indicate whether it has
exposure to these SPEs, either on- or
off- balance sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the [BANK] manages or
advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the
securitization exposures that the
[BANK] has securitized or in
securitization SPEs that the [BANK]
sponsors.\26\
(c) Summary of the [BANK]'s accounting
policies for securitization activities,
including:
(1) Whether the transactions are
treated as sales or financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions and
inputs applied in valuing retained or
purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key
assumptions and inputs from the
previous period for valuing retained
interests and impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic
securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be
securitized are valued and whether
they are recorded under subpart E of
this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing
liabilities on the balance sheet for
arrangements that could require the
[BANK] to provide financial support
for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes
to any of the quantitative information
set forth below since the last reporting
period.
Quantitative disclosures..... (e) The total outstanding exposures
securitized \27\ by the [BANK] in
securitizations that meet the
operational criteria in Sec. ----.141
(categorized into traditional/
synthetic), by underlying exposure
type,\28\ separately for securitizations
of third-party exposures for which the
bank acts only as sponsor.
(f) For exposures securitized by the
[BANK] in securitizations that meet the
operational criteria in Sec. ----.141:
(1) Amount of securitized assets that
are impaired \29\/past due
categorized by exposure type; and
(2) Losses recognized by the [BANK]
during the current period categorized
by exposure type.\30\
(g) The total amount of outstanding
exposures intended to be securitized
categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization
exposures retained or purchased
categorized by exposure type; and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization
exposures categorized by exposure
type.
(i)(1) Aggregate amount of securitization
exposures retained or purchased and the
associated capital requirements for
these exposures, categorized between
securitization and resecuritization
exposures, further categorized into a
meaningful number of risk weight bands
and by risk-based capital approach (e.g.
SA, SFA, or SSFA).
(2) Exposures that have been deducted
entirely from tier 1 capital, credit
enhancing I/Os deducted from total
capital (as described in Sec. ----
.42(a)(1), and other exposures
deducted from total capital should be
disclosed separately by exposure
type.
(j) Summary of current year's
securitization activity, including the
amount of exposures securitized (by
exposure type), and recognized gain or
loss on sale by asset type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization
exposures retained or purchased
categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk
mitigation is applied and those not
applied; and
(2) Exposures to guarantors
categorized according to guarantor
credit worthiness categories or
guarantor name.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The [BANK] must describe the structure of resecuritizations
in which it participates; this description must be provided for the
main categories of resecuritization products in which the [BANK] is
active.
\25\ For example, these roles would include originator,
investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement, sponsor,
liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\26\ For example, money market mutual funds should be listed
individually, and personal and private trusts should be noted
collectively.
\27\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures
originated by the bank, whether generated by them or purchased, and
recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party
exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization
transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the
bank's balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by the bank
from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not
retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but
need only be reported for the year of inception.
\28\ A [BANK] is required to disclose exposures regardless of
whether there is a capital charge under Pillar 1.
\29\ A [BANK] must include credit-related other than temporary
impairment (OTTI).
\30\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain
on the bank's balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of I/O strips
and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of
liabilities for probable future financial support required of the
bank with respect to securitized assets.
Table 11.10--Operational Risk
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement for operational risk.
(b) Description of the AMA, including a
discussion of relevant internal and
external factors considered in the
[BANK]'s measurement approach.
[[Page 53041]]
(c) A description of the use of insurance
for the purpose of mitigating
operational risk.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.11--Equities Not Subject to Subpart F of This Part
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement with respect to the equity
risk of equity holdings not subject to
subpart F of this part, including:
(1) Differentiation between holdings
on which capital gains are expected
and those held for other objectives,
including for relationship and
strategic reasons; and
(2) Discussion of important policies
covering the valuation of and
accounting for equity holdings not
subject to subpart F of this [PART].
This includes the accounting
methodology and valuation
methodologies used, including key
assumptions and practices affecting
valuation as well as significant
changes in these practices.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) Carrying value on the balance sheet
of equity investments, as well as the
fair value of those investments.
(c) The types and nature of investments,
including the amount that is:
(1) Publicly-traded; and
(2) Non-publicly-traded.
(d) The cumulative realized gains
(losses) arising from sales and
liquidations in the reporting period.
(e)(1) Total unrealized gains (losses)
\31\
(2) Total latent revaluation gains
(losses) \32\
(3) Any amounts of the above included
in tier 1 and/or tier 2 capital.
(f) Capital requirements categorized by
appropriate equity groupings, consistent
with the [BANK]'s methodology, as well
as the aggregate amounts and the type of
equity investments subject to any
supervisory transition regarding total
capital requirements.\33\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.12--Interest Rate Risk for Non-Trading Activities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...... (a) The general qualitative disclosure
requirement, including the nature of
interest rate risk for non-trading
activities and key assumptions,
including assumptions regarding loan
prepayments and behavior of non-maturity
deposits, and frequency of measurement
of interest rate risk for non-trading
activities.
Quantitative disclosures..... (b) The increase (decline) in earnings or
economic value (or relevant measure used
by management) for upward and downward
rate shocks according to management's
method for measuring interest rate risk
for non-trading activities, categorized
by currency (as appropriate).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Unrealized gains (losses) recognized in the balance sheet
but not through earnings.
\32\ Unrealized gains (losses) not recognized either in the
balance sheet or through earnings.
\33\ This disclosure must include a breakdown of equities that
are subject to the 0 percent, 20 percent, 100 percent, 300 percent,
400 percent, and 600 percent risk weights, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart F--Risk-Weighted Assets--Market Risk
Sec. ----.201 Purpose, applicability, and reservation of authority.
(a) Purpose. This subpart F establishes risk-based capital
requirements for [BANK]s with significant exposure to market risk,
provides methods for these [BANK]s to calculate their standardized
measure for market risk and, if applicable, advanced measure for market
risk, and establishes public disclosure requirements.
(b) Applicability. (1) This subpart applies to any [BANK] with
aggregate trading assets and trading liabilities (as reported in the
[BANK]'s most recent quarterly [regulatory report]), equal to:
(i) 10 percent or more of quarter-end total assets as reported on
the most recent quarterly [Call Report or FR Y-9C]; or
(ii) $1 billion or more.
(2) The [AGENCY] may apply this subpart to any [BANK] if the
[AGENCY] deems it necessary or appropriate because of the level of
market risk of the [BANK] or to ensure safe and sound banking
practices.
(3) The [AGENCY] may exclude a [BANK] that meets the criteria of
paragraph (b)(1) of this section from application of this subpart if
the [AGENCY] determines that the exclusion is appropriate based on the
level of market risk of the [BANK] and is consistent with safe and
sound banking practices.
(c) Reservation of authority. (1) The [AGENCY] may require a [BANK]
to hold an amount of capital greater than otherwise required under this
subpart if the [AGENCY] determines that the [BANK]'s capital
requirement for market risk as calculated under this subpart is not
commensurate with the market risk of the [BANK]'s covered positions. In
making determinations under paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(3) of this
section, the [AGENCY] will apply notice and response procedures
generally in the same manner as the notice and response procedures set
forth in [12 CFR 3.12, 12 CFR 263.202, 12 CFR 325.6(c), 12 CFR
567.3(d)].
(2) If the [AGENCY] determines that the risk-based capital
requirement calculated under this subpart by the [BANK] for one or more
covered positions or portfolios of covered positions is not
commensurate with the risks associated with those positions or
portfolios, the [AGENCY] may require the [BANK] to assign a different
risk-based capital requirement to the positions or portfolios that more
accurately reflects the risk of the positions or portfolios.
(3) The [AGENCY] may also require a [BANK] to calculate risk-based
capital requirements for specific positions or portfolios under this
subpart, or under subpart D or subpart E of this part, as appropriate,
to more accurately reflect the risks of the positions.
(4) Nothing in this subpart limits the authority of the [AGENCY]
under any other provision of law or regulation to take supervisory or
enforcement action, including action to address unsafe or unsound
practices or conditions, deficient capital levels, or violations of
law.
Sec. ----.202 Definitions.
(a) Terms set forth in Sec. ----.2 and used in this subpart have
the definitions assigned thereto in Sec. ----.2.
[[Page 53042]]
(b) For the purposes of this subpart, the following terms are
defined as follows:
Backtesting means the comparison of a [BANK]'s internal estimates
with actual outcomes during a sample period not used in model
development. For purposes of this subpart, backtesting is one form of
out-of-sample testing.
Commodity position means a position for which price risk arises
from changes in the price of a commodity.
Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, a multilateral development bank, a
depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public sector
entity, a government-sponsored entity, or a securitization.
Correlation trading position means:
(1) A securitization position for which all or substantially all of
the value of the underlying exposures is based on the credit quality of
a single company for which a two-way market exists, or on commonly
traded indices based on such exposures for which a two-way market
exists on the indices; or
(2) A position that is not a securitization position and that
hedges a position described in paragraph (1) of this definition; and
(3) A correlation trading position does not include:
(i) A resecuritization position;
(ii) A derivative of a securitization position that does not
provide a pro rata share in the proceeds of a securitization tranche;
or
(iii) A securitization position for which the underlying assets or
reference exposures are retail exposures, residential mortgage
exposures, or commercial mortgage exposures.
Covered position means the following positions:
(1) A trading asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-
balance sheet),\1\ as reported on Schedule RC-D of the Call Report or
Schedule HC-D of the FR Y-9C, that meets the following conditions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Securities subject to repurchase and lending agreements are
included as if they are still owned by the lender.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) The position is a trading position or hedges another covered
position; \2\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A position that hedges a trading position must be within the
scope of the bank's hedging strategy as described in paragraph
(a)(2) of section 203 of this subpart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The position is free of any restrictive covenants on its
tradability or the [BANK] is able to hedge the material risk elements
of the position in a two-way market;
(2) A foreign exchange or commodity position, regardless of whether
the position is a trading asset or trading liability (excluding any
structural foreign currency positions that the [BANK] chooses to
exclude with prior supervisory approval); and
(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) of this definition, a
covered position does not include:
(i) An intangible asset, including any servicing asset;
(ii) Any hedge of a trading position that the [AGENCY] determines
to be outside the scope of the [BANK]'s hedging strategy required in
paragraph (a)(2) of Sec. ----.203;
(iii) Any position that, in form or substance, acts as a liquidity
facility that provides support to asset-backed commercial paper;
(iv) A credit derivative the [BANK] recognizes as a guarantee for
risk-weighted asset amount calculation purposes under subpart D or
subpart E of this part;
(v) Any position that is recognized as a credit valuation
adjustment hedge under Sec. ----.132(e)(5) or Sec. ----.132(e)(6),
except as provided in Sec. ----.132(e)(6)(vii);
(vi) Any equity position that is not publicly traded, other than a
derivative that references a publicly traded equity;
(vii) Any position a [BANK] holds with the intent to securitize; or
(viii) Any direct real estate holding.
Debt position means a covered position that is not a securitization
position or a correlation trading position and that has a value that
reacts primarily to changes in interest rates or credit spreads.
Default by a sovereign entity has the same meaning as the term
sovereign default under Sec. ----.2.
Equity position means a covered position that is not a
securitization position or a correlation trading position and that has
a value that reacts primarily to changes in equity prices.
Event risk means the risk of loss on equity or hybrid equity
positions as a result of a financial event, such as the announcement or
occurrence of a company merger, acquisition, spin-off, or dissolution.
Foreign exchange position means a position for which price risk
arises from changes in foreign exchange rates.
General market risk means the risk of loss that could result from
broad market movements, such as changes in the general level of
interest rates, credit spreads, equity prices, foreign exchange rates,
or commodity prices.
Hedge means a position or positions that offset all, or
substantially all, of one or more material risk factors of another
position.
Idiosyncratic risk means the risk of loss in the value of a
position that arises from changes in risk factors unique to that
position.
Incremental risk means the default risk and credit migration risk
of a position. Default risk means the risk of loss on a position that
could result from the failure of an obligor to make timely payments of
principal or interest on its debt obligation, and the risk of loss that
could result from bankruptcy, insolvency, or similar proceeding. Credit
migration risk means the price risk that arises from significant
changes in the underlying credit quality of the position.
Market risk means the risk of loss on a position that could result
from movements in market prices.
Resecuritization position means a covered position that is:
(1) An on- or off-balance sheet exposure to a resecuritization; or
(2) An exposure that directly or indirectly references a
resecuritization exposure in paragraph (1) of this definition.
Securitization means a transaction in which:
(1) All or a portion of the credit risk of one or more underlying
exposures is transferred to one or more third parties;
(2) The credit risk associated with the underlying exposures has
been separated into at least two tranches that reflect different levels
of seniority;
(3) Performance of the securitization exposures depends upon the
performance of the underlying exposures;
(4) All or substantially all of the underlying exposures are
financial exposures (such as loans, commitments, credit derivatives,
guarantees, receivables, asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed
securities, other debt securities, or equity securities);
(5) For non-synthetic securitizations, the underlying exposures are
not owned by an operating company;
(6) The underlying exposures are not owned by a small business
investment company described in section 302 of the Small Business
Investment Act;
(7) The underlying exposures are not owned by a firm an investment
in which qualifies as a community development investment under section
24 (Eleventh) of the National Bank Act;
(8) The [AGENCY] may determine that a transaction in which the
underlying exposures are owned by an investment firm that exercises
substantially unfettered control over the size and composition of its
assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet
[[Page 53043]]
exposures is not a securitization based on the transaction's leverage,
risk profile, or economic substance;
(9) The [AGENCY] may deem an exposure to a transaction that meets
the definition of a securitization, notwithstanding paragraph (5), (6),
or (7) of this definition, to be a securitization based on the
transaction's leverage, risk profile, or economic substance; and
(10) The transaction is not:
(i) An investment fund;
(ii) A collective investment fund (as defined in 12 CFR 208.34
(Board), 12 CFR 9.18 (OCC), and 12 CFR 344.3 (FDIC);
(iii) A pension fund regulated under the ERISA or a foreign
equivalent thereof; or
(iv) Regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
80a-1) or a foreign equivalent thereof.
Securitization position means a covered position that is:
(1) An on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet credit exposure
(including credit-enhancing representations and warranties) that arises
from a securitization (including a resecuritization); or
(2) An exposure that directly or indirectly references a
securitization exposure described in paragraph (1) of this definition.
Sovereign debt position means a direct exposure to a sovereign
entity.
Specific risk means the risk of loss on a position that could
result from factors other than broad market movements and includes
event risk, default risk, and idiosyncratic risk.
Structural position in a foreign currency means a position that is
not a trading position and that is:
(1) Subordinated debt, equity, or minority interest in a
consolidated subsidiary that is denominated in a foreign currency;
(2) Capital assigned to foreign branches that is denominated in a
foreign currency;
(3) A position related to an unconsolidated subsidiary or another
item that is denominated in a foreign currency and that is deducted
from the [BANK]'s tier 1 or tier 2 capital; or
(4) A position designed to hedge a [BANK]'s capital ratios or
earnings against the effect on paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of this
definition of adverse exchange rate movements.
Term repo-style transaction means a repo-style transaction that has
an original maturity in excess of one business day.
Trading position means a position that is held by the [BANK] for
the purpose of short-term resale or with the intent of benefiting from
actual or expected short-term price movements, or to lock in arbitrage
profits.
Two-way market means a market where there are independent bona fide
offers to buy and sell so that a price reasonably related to the last
sales price or current bona fide competitive bid and offer quotations
can be determined within one day and settled at that price within a
relatively short timeframe conforming to trade custom.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) means the estimate of the maximum amount that
the value of one or more positions could decline due to market price or
rate movements during a fixed holding period within a stated confidence
interval.
Sec. ----.203 Requirements for application of this subpart F.
(a) Trading positions. (1) Identification of trading positions. A
[BANK] must have clearly defined policies and procedures for
determining which of its trading assets and trading liabilities are
trading positions and which of its trading positions are correlation
trading positions. These policies and procedures must take into
account:
(i) The extent to which a position, or a hedge of its material
risks, can be marked-to-market daily by reference to a two-way market;
and
(ii) Possible impairments to the liquidity of a position or its
hedge.
(2) Trading and hedging strategies. A [BANK] must have clearly
defined trading and hedging strategies for its trading positions that
are approved by senior management of the [BANK].
(i) The trading strategy must articulate the expected holding
period of, and the market risk associated with, each portfolio of
trading positions.
(ii) The hedging strategy must articulate for each portfolio of
trading positions the level of market risk the [BANK] is willing to
accept and must detail the instruments, techniques, and strategies the
[BANK] will use to hedge the risk of the portfolio.
(b) Management of covered positions. (1) Active management. A
[BANK] must have clearly defined policies and procedures for actively
managing all covered positions. At a minimum, these policies and
procedures must require:
(i) Marking positions to market or to model on a daily basis;
(ii) Daily assessment of the [BANK]'s ability to hedge position and
portfolio risks, and of the extent of market liquidity;
(iii) Establishment and daily monitoring of limits on positions by
a risk control unit independent of the trading business unit;
(iv) Daily monitoring by senior management of information described
in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iii) of this section;
(v) At least annual reassessment of established limits on positions
by senior management; and
(vi) At least annual assessments by qualified personnel of the
quality of market inputs to the valuation process, the soundness of key
assumptions, the reliability of parameter estimation in pricing models,
and the stability and accuracy of model calibration under alternative
market scenarios.
(2) Valuation of covered positions. The [BANK] must have a process
for prudent valuation of its covered positions that includes policies
and procedures on the valuation of positions, marking positions to
market or to model, independent price verification, and valuation
adjustments or reserves. The valuation process must consider, as
appropriate, unearned credit spreads, close-out costs, early
termination costs, investing and funding costs, liquidity, and model
risk.
(c) Requirements for internal models. (1) A [BANK] must obtain the
prior written approval of the [AGENCY] before using any internal model
to calculate its risk-based capital requirement under this subpart.
(2) A [BANK] must meet all of the requirements of this section on
an ongoing basis. The [BANK] must promptly notify the [AGENCY] when:
(i) The [BANK] plans to extend the use of a model that the [AGENCY]
has approved under this subpart to an additional business line or
product type;
(ii) The [BANK] makes any change to an internal model approved by
the [AGENCY] under this subpart that would result in a material change
in the [BANK]'s risk-weighted asset amount for a portfolio of covered
positions; or
(iii) The [BANK] makes any material change to its modeling
assumptions.
(3) The [AGENCY] may rescind its approval of the use of any
internal model (in whole or in part) or of the determination of the
approach under Sec. ----.209(a)(2)(ii) for a [BANK]'s modeled
correlation trading positions and determine an appropriate capital
requirement for the covered positions to which the model would apply,
if the [AGENCY] determines that the model no longer complies with this
subpart or fails to reflect accurately the risks of the [BANK]'s
covered positions.
(4) The [BANK] must periodically, but no less frequently than
annually, review its internal models in light of developments in
financial markets and modeling technologies, and enhance those models
as appropriate to ensure
[[Page 53044]]
that they continue to meet the [AGENCY]'s standards for model approval
and employ risk measurement methodologies that are most appropriate for
the [BANK]'s covered positions.
(5) The [BANK] must incorporate its internal models into its risk
management process and integrate the internal models used for
calculating its VaR-based measure into its daily risk management
process.
(6) The level of sophistication of a [BANK]'s internal models must
be commensurate with the complexity and amount of its covered
positions. A [BANK]'s internal models may use any of the generally
accepted approaches, including but not limited to variance-covariance
models, historical simulations, or Monte Carlo simulations, to measure
market risk.
(7) The [BANK]'s internal models must properly measure all the
material risks in the covered positions to which they are applied.
(8) The [BANK]'s internal models must conservatively assess the
risks arising from less liquid positions and positions with limited
price transparency under realistic market scenarios.
(9) The [BANK] must have a rigorous and well-defined process for
re-estimating, re-evaluating, and updating its internal models to
ensure continued applicability and relevance.
(10) If a [BANK] uses internal models to measure specific risk, the
internal models must also satisfy the requirements in paragraph (b)(1)
of Sec. ----.207.
(d) Control, oversight, and validation mechanisms. (1) The [BANK]
must have a risk control unit that reports directly to senior
management and is independent from the business trading units.
(2) The [BANK] must validate its internal models initially and on
an ongoing basis. The [BANK]'s validation process must be independent
of the internal models' development, implementation, and operation, or
the validation process must be subjected to an independent review of
its adequacy and effectiveness. Validation must include:
(i) An evaluation of the conceptual soundness of (including
developmental evidence supporting) the internal models;
(ii) An ongoing monitoring process that includes verification of
processes and the comparison of the [BANK]'s model outputs with
relevant internal and external data sources or estimation techniques;
and
(iii) An outcomes analysis process that includes backtesting. For
internal models used to calculate the VaR-based measure, this process
must include a comparison of the changes in the [BANK]'s portfolio
value that would have occurred were end-of-day positions to remain
unchanged (therefore, excluding fees, commissions, reserves, net
interest income, and intraday trading) with VaR-based measures during a
sample period not used in model development.
(3) The [BANK] must stress test the market risk of its covered
positions at a frequency appropriate to each portfolio, and in no case
less frequently than quarterly. The stress tests must take into account
concentration risk (including but not limited to concentrations in
single issuers, industries, sectors, or markets), illiquidity under
stressed market conditions, and risks arising from the [BANK]'s trading
activities that may not be adequately captured in its internal models.
(4) The [BANK] must have an internal audit function independent of
business-line management that at least annually assesses the
effectiveness of the controls supporting the [BANK]'s market risk
measurement systems, including the activities of the business trading
units and independent risk control unit, compliance with policies and
procedures, and calculation of the [BANK]'s measures for market risk
under this subpart. At least annually, the internal audit function must
report its findings to the [BANK]'s board of directors (or a committee
thereof).
(e) Internal assessment of capital adequacy. The [BANK] must have a
rigorous process for assessing its overall capital adequacy in relation
to its market risk. The assessment must take into account risks that
may not be captured fully in the VaR-based measure, including
concentration and liquidity risk under stressed market conditions.
(f) Documentation. The [BANK] must adequately document all material
aspects of its internal models, management and valuation of covered
positions, control, oversight, validation and review processes and
results, and internal assessment of capital adequacy.
Sec. ----.204 Measure for market risk.
(a) General requirement. (1) A [BANK] must calculate its
standardized measure for market risk by following the steps described
in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. An advanced approaches [BANK] also
must calculate an advanced measure for market risk by following the
steps in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(2) Measure for market risk. A [BANK] must calculate the
standardized measure for market risk, which equals the sum of the VaR-
based capital requirement, stressed VaR-based capital requirement,
specific risk add-ons, incremental risk capital requirement,
comprehensive risk capital requirement, and capital requirement for de
minimis exposures all as defined under this paragraph (a)(2), (except,
that the [BANK] may not use the SFA in section 210(b)(2)(vii)(B) of
this subpart for purposes of this calculation). An advanced approaches
[BANK] also must calculate the advanced measure for market risk, which
equals the sum of the VaR-based capital requirement, stressed VaR-based
capital requirement, specific risk add-ons, incremental risk capital
requirement, comprehensive risk capital requirement, and capital
requirement for de minimis exposures as defined under this paragraph
(a)(2).
(i) VaR-based capital requirement. A [BANK]'s VaR-based capital
requirement equals the greater of:
(A) The previous day's VaR-based measure as calculated under Sec.
----.205; or
(B) The average of the daily VaR-based measures as calculated under
Sec. ----.205 for each of the preceding 60 business days multiplied by
three, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Stressed VaR-based capital requirement. A [BANK]'s stressed
VaR-based capital requirement equals the greater of:
(A) The most recent stressed VaR-based measure as calculated under
Sec. ----.206; or
(B) The average of the stressed VaR-based measures as calculated
under Sec. ----.206 for each of the preceding 12 weeks multiplied by
three, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section.
(iii) Specific risk add-ons. A [BANK]'s specific risk add-ons equal
any specific risk add-ons that are required under Sec. ----.207 and
are calculated in accordance with Sec. ----.210.
(iv) Incremental risk capital requirement. A [BANK]'s incremental
risk capital requirement equals any incremental risk capital
requirement as calculated under section 208 of this subpart.
(v) Comprehensive risk capital requirement. A [BANK]'s
comprehensive risk capital requirement equals any comprehensive risk
capital requirement as calculated under section 209 of this subpart.
(vi) Capital requirement for de minimis exposures. A [BANK]'s
capital requirement for de minimis exposures equals:
[[Page 53045]]
(A) The absolute value of the market value of those de minimis
exposures that are not captured in the [BANK]'s VaR-based measure or
under paragraph (a)(2)(vi)(B) of this section; and
(B) With the prior written approval of the [AGENCY], the capital
requirement for any de minimis exposures using alternative techniques
that appropriately measure the market risk associated with those
exposures.
(b) Backtesting. A [BANK] must compare each of its most recent 250
business days' trading losses (excluding fees, commissions, reserves,
net interest income, and intraday trading) with the corresponding daily
VaR-based measures calibrated to a one-day holding period and at a one-
tail, 99.0 percent confidence level. A [BANK] must begin backtesting as
required by this paragraph no later than one year after the later of
January 1, 2013 and the date on which the [BANK] becomes subject to
this subpart. In the interim, consistent with safety and soundness
principles, a [BANK] subject to this subpart as of its effective date
should continue to follow backtesting procedures in accordance with the
[AGENCY]'s supervisory expectations.
(1) Once each quarter, the [BANK] must identify the number of
exceptions (that is, the number of business days for which the actual
daily net trading loss, if any, exceeds the corresponding daily VaR-
based measure) that have occurred over the preceding 250 business days.
(2) A [BANK] must use the multiplication factor in table 1 that
corresponds to the number of exceptions identified in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section to determine its VaR-based capital requirement for
market risk under paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section and to determine
its stressed VaR-based capital requirement for market risk under
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section until it obtains the next
quarter's backtesting results, unless the [AGENCY] notifies the [BANK]
in writing that a different adjustment or other action is appropriate.
Table 1--Multiplication Factors Based on Results of Backtesting
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiplication
Number of exceptions factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 or fewer.......................................... 3.00
5................................................... 3.40
6................................................... 3.50
7................................................... 3.65
8................................................... 3.75
9................................................... 3.85
10 or more.......................................... 4.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. ----.205 VaR-based measure.
(a) General requirement. A [BANK] must use one or more internal
models to calculate daily a VaR-based measure of the general market
risk of all covered positions. The daily VaR-based measure also may
reflect the [BANK]'s specific risk for one or more portfolios of debt
and equity positions, if the internal models meet the requirements of
paragraph (b)(1) of Sec. ----.207. The daily VaR-based measure must
also reflect the [BANK]'s specific risk for any portfolio of
correlation trading positions that is modeled under Sec. ----.209. A
[BANK] may elect to include term repo-style transactions in its VaR-
based measure, provided that the [BANK] includes all such term repo-
style transactions consistently over time.
(1) The [BANK]'s internal models for calculating its VaR-based
measure must use risk factors sufficient to measure the market risk
inherent in all covered positions. The market risk categories must
include, as appropriate, interest rate risk, credit spread risk, equity
price risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodity price risk. For
material positions in the major currencies and markets, modeling
techniques must incorporate enough segments of the yield curve--in no
case less than six--to capture differences in volatility and less than
perfect correlation of rates along the yield curve.
(2) The VaR-based measure may incorporate empirical correlations
within and across risk categories, provided the [BANK] validates and
demonstrates the reasonableness of its process for measuring
correlations. If the VaR-based measure does not incorporate empirical
correlations across risk categories, the [BANK] must add the separate
measures from its internal models used to calculate the VaR-based
measure for the appropriate market risk categories (interest rate risk,
credit spread risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange rate risk, and/
or commodity price risk) to determine its aggregate VaR-based measure.
(3) The VaR-based measure must include the risks arising from the
nonlinear price characteristics of options positions or positions with
embedded optionality and the sensitivity of the market value of the
positions to changes in the volatility of the underlying rates, prices,
or other material risk factors. A [BANK] with a large or complex
options portfolio must measure the volatility of options positions or
positions with embedded optionality by different maturities and/or
strike prices, where material.
(4) The [BANK] must be able to justify to the satisfaction of the
[AGENCY] the omission of any risk factors from the calculation of its
VaR-based measure that the [BANK] uses in its pricing models.
(5) The [BANK] must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY]
the appropriateness of any proxies used to capture the risks of the
[BANK]'s actual positions for which such proxies are used.
(b) Quantitative requirements for VaR-based measure. (1) The VaR-
based measure must be calculated on a daily basis using a one-tail,
99.0 percent confidence level, and a holding period equivalent to a 10-
business-day movement in underlying risk factors, such as rates,
spreads, and prices. To calculate VaR-based measures using a 10-
business-day holding period, the [BANK] may calculate 10-business-day
measures directly or may convert VaR-based measures using holding
periods other than 10 business days to the equivalent of a 10-business-
day holding period. A [BANK] that converts its VaR-based measure in
such a manner must be able to justify the reasonableness of its
approach to the satisfaction of the [AGENCY].
(2) The VaR-based measure must be based on a historical observation
period of at least one year. Data used to determine the VaR-based
measure must be relevant to the [BANK]'s actual exposures and of
sufficient quality to support the calculation of risk-based capital
requirements. The [BANK] must update data sets at least monthly or more
frequently as changes in market conditions or portfolio composition
warrant. For a [BANK] that uses a weighting scheme or other method for
the historical observation period, the [BANK] must either:
(i) Use an effective observation period of at least one year in
which the average time lag of the observations is at least six months;
or
(ii) Demonstrate to the [AGENCY] that its weighting scheme is more
effective than a weighting scheme with an average time lag of at least
six months representing the volatility of the [BANK]'s trading
portfolio over a full business cycle. A [BANK] using this option must
update its data more frequently than monthly and in a manner
appropriate for the type of weighting scheme.
(c) A [BANK] must divide its portfolio into a number of significant
subportfolios approved by the [AGENCY] for subportfolio backtesting
purposes. These subportfolios must be sufficient to allow the [BANK]
and the [AGENCY] to assess the adequacy of the VaR model at the risk
factor level; the [AGENCY] will evaluate the
[[Page 53046]]
appropriateness of these subportfolios relative to the value and
composition of the [BANK]'s covered positions. The [BANK] must retain
and make available to the [AGENCY] the following information for each
subportfolio for each business day over the previous two years (500
business days), with no more than a 60-day lag:
(1) A daily VaR-based measure for the subportfolio calibrated to a
one-tail, 99.0 percent confidence level;
(2) The daily profit or loss for the subportfolio (that is, the net
change in price of the positions held in the portfolio at the end of
the previous business day); and
(3) The p-value of the profit or loss on each day (that is, the
probability of observing a profit that is less than, or a loss that is
greater than, the amount reported for purposes of paragraph (c)(2) of
this section based on the model used to calculate the VaR-based measure
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section).
Sec. ----.206 Stressed VaR-based measure.
(a) General requirement. At least weekly, a [BANK] must use the
same internal model(s) used to calculate its VaR-based measure to
calculate a stressed VaR-based measure.
(b) Quantitative requirements for stressed VaR-based measure. (1) A
[BANK] must calculate a stressed VaR-based measure for its covered
positions using the same model(s) used to calculate the VaR-based
measure, subject to the same confidence level and holding period
applicable to the VaR-based measure under Sec. ----.205, but with
model inputs calibrated to historical data from a continuous 12-month
period that reflects a period of significant financial stress
appropriate to the [BANK]'s current portfolio.
(2) The stressed VaR-based measure must be calculated at least
weekly and be no less than the [BANK]'s VaR-based measure.
(3) A [BANK] must have policies and procedures that describe how it
determines the period of significant financial stress used to calculate
the [BANK]'s stressed VaR-based measure under this section and must be
able to provide empirical support for the period used. The [BANK] must
obtain the prior approval of the [AGENCY] for, and notify the [AGENCY]
if the [BANK] makes any material changes to, these policies and
procedures. The policies and procedures must address:
(i) How the [BANK] links the period of significant financial stress
used to calculate the stressed VaR-based measure to the composition and
directional bias of its current portfolio; and
(ii) The [BANK]'s process for selecting, reviewing, and updating
the period of significant financial stress used to calculate the
stressed VaR-based measure and for monitoring the appropriateness of
the period to the [BANK]'s current portfolio.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the [AGENCY] from requiring a
[BANK] to use a different period of significant financial stress in the
calculation of the stressed VaR-based measure.
Sec. ----.207 Specific risk.
(a) General requirement. A [BANK] must use one of the methods in
this section to measure the specific risk for each of its debt, equity,
and securitization positions with specific risk.
(b) Modeled specific risk. A [BANK] may use models to measure the
specific risk of covered positions as provided in paragraph (a) of
section 205 of this subpart (therefore, excluding securitization
positions that are not modeled under section 209 of this subpart). A
[BANK] must use models to measure the specific risk of correlation
trading positions that are modeled under Sec. ----.209.
(1) Requirements for specific risk modeling. (i) If a [BANK] uses
internal models to measure the specific risk of a portfolio, the
internal models must:
(A) Explain the historical price variation in the portfolio;
(B) Be responsive to changes in market conditions;
(C) Be robust to an adverse environment, including signaling rising
risk in an adverse environment; and
(D) Capture all material components of specific risk for the debt
and equity positions in the portfolio. Specifically, the internal
models must:
(1) Capture event risk and idiosyncratic risk;
(2) Capture and demonstrate sensitivity to material differences
between positions that are similar but not identical and to changes in
portfolio composition and concentrations.
(ii) If a [BANK] calculates an incremental risk measure for a
portfolio of debt or equity positions under section 208 of this
subpart, the [BANK] is not required to capture default and credit
migration risks in its internal models used to measure the specific
risk of those portfolios.
(2) Specific risk fully modeled for one or more portfolios. If the
[BANK]'s VaR-based measure captures all material aspects of specific
risk for one or more of its portfolios of debt, equity, or correlation
trading positions, the [BANK] has no specific risk add-on for those
portfolios for purposes of paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of Sec. ----.204.
(c) Specific risk not modeled. (1) If the [BANK]'s VaR-based
measure does not capture all material aspects of specific risk for a
portfolio of debt, equity, or correlation trading positions, the [BANK]
must calculate a specific-risk add-on for the portfolio under the
standardized measurement method as described in Sec. ----.210.
(2) A [BANK] must calculate a specific risk add-on under the
standardized measurement method as described in Sec. ----.210 for all
of its securitization positions that are not modeled under Sec. --
--.209.
Sec. ----.208 Incremental risk.
(a) General requirement. A [BANK] that measures the specific risk
of a portfolio of debt positions under Sec. ----.207(b) using internal
models must calculate at least weekly an incremental risk measure for
that portfolio according to the requirements in this section. The
incremental risk measure is the [BANK]'s measure of potential losses
due to incremental risk over a one-year time horizon at a one-tail,
99.9 percent confidence level, either under the assumption of a
constant level of risk, or under the assumption of constant positions.
With the prior approval of the [AGENCY], a [BANK] may choose to include
portfolios of equity positions in its incremental risk model, provided
that it consistently includes such equity positions in a manner that is
consistent with how the [BANK] internally measures and manages the
incremental risk of such positions at the portfolio level. If equity
positions are included in the model, for modeling purposes default is
considered to have occurred upon the default of any debt of the issuer
of the equity position. A [BANK] may not include correlation trading
positions or securitization positions in its incremental risk measure.
(b) Requirements for incremental risk modeling. For purposes of
calculating the incremental risk measure, the incremental risk model
must:
(1) Measure incremental risk over a one-year time horizon and at a
one-tail, 99.9 percent confidence level, either under the assumption of
a constant level of risk, or under the assumption of constant
positions.
(i) A constant level of risk assumption means that the [BANK]
rebalances, or rolls over, its trading positions at the beginning of
each liquidity horizon over the one-year horizon in a manner that
maintains the [BANK]'s initial risk level. The [BANK] must determine
the
[[Page 53047]]
frequency of rebalancing in a manner consistent with the liquidity
horizons of the positions in the portfolio. The liquidity horizon of a
position or set of positions is the time required for a [BANK] to
reduce its exposure to, or hedge all of its material risks of, the
position(s) in a stressed market. The liquidity horizon for a position
or set of positions may not be less than the shorter of three months or
the contractual maturity of the position.
(ii) A constant position assumption means that the [BANK] maintains
the same set of positions throughout the one-year horizon. If a [BANK]
uses this assumption, it must do so consistently across all portfolios.
(iii) A [BANK]'s selection of a constant position or a constant
risk assumption must be consistent between the [BANK]'s incremental
risk model and its comprehensive risk model described in section 209 of
this subpart, if applicable.
(iv) A [BANK]'s treatment of liquidity horizons must be consistent
between the [BANK]'s incremental risk model and its comprehensive risk
model described in section 209, if applicable.
(2) Recognize the impact of correlations between default and
migration events among obligors.
(3) Reflect the effect of issuer and market concentrations, as well
as concentrations that can arise within and across product classes
during stressed conditions.
(4) Reflect netting only of long and short positions that reference
the same financial instrument.
(5) Reflect any material mismatch between a position and its hedge.
(6) Recognize the effect that liquidity horizons have on dynamic
hedging strategies. In such cases, a [BANK] must:
(i) Choose to model the rebalancing of the hedge consistently over
the relevant set of trading positions;
(ii) Demonstrate that the inclusion of rebalancing results in a
more appropriate risk measurement;
(iii) Demonstrate that the market for the hedge is sufficiently
liquid to permit rebalancing during periods of stress; and
(iv) Capture in the incremental risk model any residual risks
arising from such hedging strategies.
(7) Reflect the nonlinear impact of options and other positions
with material nonlinear behavior with respect to default and migration
changes.
(8) Maintain consistency with the [BANK]'s internal risk management
methodologies for identifying, measuring, and managing risk.
(c) Calculation of incremental risk capital requirement. The
incremental risk capital requirement is the greater of:
(1) The average of the incremental risk measures over the previous
12 weeks; or
(2) The most recent incremental risk measure.
Sec. ----.209 Comprehensive risk.
(a) General requirement. (1) Subject to the prior approval of the
[AGENCY], a [BANK] may use the method in this section to measure
comprehensive risk, that is, all price risk, for one or more portfolios
of correlation trading positions.
(2) A [BANK] that measures the price risk of a portfolio of
correlation trading positions using internal models must calculate at
least weekly a comprehensive risk measure that captures all price risk
according to the requirements of this section. The comprehensive risk
measure is either:
(i) The sum of:
(A) The [BANK]'s modeled measure of all price risk determined
according to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this section; and
(B) A surcharge for the [BANK]'s modeled correlation trading
positions equal to the total specific risk add-on for such positions as
calculated under section 210 of this subpart multiplied by 8.0 percent;
or
(ii) With approval of the [AGENCY] and provided the [BANK] has met
the requirements of this section for a period of at least one year and
can demonstrate the effectiveness of the model through the results of
ongoing model validation efforts including robust benchmarking, the
greater of:
(A) The [BANK]'s modeled measure of all price risk determined
according to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this section; or
(B) The total specific risk add-on that would apply to the bank's
modeled correlation trading positions as calculated under section 210
of this subpart multiplied by 8.0 percent.
(b) Requirements for modeling all price risk. If a [BANK] uses an
internal model to measure the price risk of a portfolio of correlation
trading positions:
(1) The internal model must measure comprehensive risk over a one-
year time horizon at a one-tail, 99.9 percent confidence level, either
under the assumption of a constant level of risk, or under the
assumption of constant positions.
(2) The model must capture all material price risk, including but
not limited to the following:
(i) The risks associated with the contractual structure of cash
flows of the position, its issuer, and its underlying exposures;
(ii) Credit spread risk, including nonlinear price risks;
(iii) The volatility of implied correlations, including nonlinear
price risks such as the cross-effect between spreads and correlations;
(iv) Basis risk;
(v) Recovery rate volatility as it relates to the propensity for
recovery rates to affect tranche prices; and
(vi) To the extent the comprehensive risk measure incorporates the
benefits of dynamic hedging, the static nature of the hedge over the
liquidity horizon must be recognized. In such cases, a [BANK] must:
(A) Choose to model the rebalancing of the hedge consistently over
the relevant set of trading positions;
(B) Demonstrate that the inclusion of rebalancing results in a more
appropriate risk measurement;
(C) Demonstrate that the market for the hedge is sufficiently
liquid to permit rebalancing during periods of stress; and
(D) Capture in the comprehensive risk model any residual risks
arising from such hedging strategies;
(3) The [BANK] must use market data that are relevant in
representing the risk profile of the [BANK]'s correlation trading
positions in order to ensure that the [BANK] fully captures the
material risks of the correlation trading positions in its
comprehensive risk measure in accordance with this section; and
(4) The [BANK] must be able to demonstrate that its model is an
appropriate representation of comprehensive risk in light of the
historical price variation of its correlation trading positions.
(c) Requirements for stress testing. (1) A [BANK] must at least
weekly apply specific, supervisory stress scenarios to its portfolio of
correlation trading positions that capture changes in:
(i) Default rates;
(ii) Recovery rates;
(iii) Credit spreads;
(iv) Correlations of underlying exposures; and
(v) Correlations of a correlation trading position and its hedge.
(2) Other requirements. (i) A [BANK] must retain and make available
to the [AGENCY] the results of the supervisory stress testing,
including comparisons with the capital requirements generated by the
[BANK]'s comprehensive risk model.
(ii) A [BANK] must report to the [AGENCY] promptly any instances
where the stress tests indicate any material deficiencies in the
comprehensive risk model.
[[Page 53048]]
(d) Calculation of comprehensive risk capital requirement. The
comprehensive risk capital requirement is the greater of:
(1) The average of the comprehensive risk measures over the
previous 12 weeks; or
(2) The most recent comprehensive risk measure.
Sec. ----.210 Standardized measurement method for specific risk.
(a) General requirement. A [BANK] must calculate a total specific
risk add-on for each portfolio of debt and equity positions for which
the [BANK]'s VaR-based measure does not capture all material aspects of
specific risk and for all securitization positions that are not modeled
under Sec. ----.209. A [BANK] must calculate each specific risk add-on
in accordance with the requirements of this section. Notwithstanding
any other definition or requirement in this appendix, a position that
would have qualified as a debt position or an equity position but for
the fact that it qualifies as a correlation trading position under
paragraph (2) of the definition of correlation trading position in
Sec. ----.2, shall be considered a debt position or an equity
position, respectively, for purposes of this section 210 of this
subpart.
(1) The specific risk add-on for an individual debt or
securitization position that represents sold credit protection is
capped at the notional amount of the credit derivative contract. The
specific risk add-on for an individual debt or securitization position
that represents purchased credit protection is capped at the current
market value of the transaction plus the absolute value of the present
value of all remaining payments to the protection seller under the
transaction. This sum is equal to the value of the protection leg of
the transaction.
(2) For debt, equity, or securitization positions that are
derivatives with linear payoffs, a [BANK] must assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to the market value of the effective notional amount
of the underlying instrument or index portfolio, except for a
securitization position for which the [BANK] directly calculates a
specific risk add-on using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this
section. A swap must be included as an effective notional position in
the underlying instrument or portfolio, with the receiving side treated
as a long position and the paying side treated as a short position. For
debt, equity, or securitization positions that are derivatives with
nonlinear payoffs, a [BANK] must risk weight the market value of the
effective notional amount of the underlying instrument or portfolio
multiplied by the derivative's delta.
(3) For debt, equity, or securitization positions, a [BANK] may net
long and short positions (including derivatives) in identical issues or
identical indices. A [BANK] may also net positions in depositary
receipts against an opposite position in an identical equity in
different markets, provided that the [BANK] includes the costs of
conversion.
(4) A set of transactions consisting of either a debt position and
its credit derivative hedge or a securitization position and its credit
derivative hedge has a specific risk add-on of zero if:
(i) The debt or securitization position is fully hedged by a total
return swap (or similar instrument where there is a matching of swap
payments and changes in market value of the debt or securitization
position);
(ii) There is an exact match between the reference obligation of
the swap and the debt or securitization position;
(iii) There is an exact match between the currency of the swap and
the debt or securitization position; and
(iv) There is either an exact match between the maturity date of
the swap and the maturity date of the debt or securitization position;
or, in cases where a total return swap references a portfolio of
positions with different maturity dates, the total return swap maturity
date must match the maturity date of the underlying asset in that
portfolio that has the latest maturity date.
(5) The specific risk add-on for a set of transactions consisting
of either a debt position and its credit derivative hedge or a
securitization position and its credit derivative hedge that does not
meet the criteria of paragraph (a)(4) of this section is equal to 20.0
percent of the capital requirement for the side of the transaction with
the higher specific risk add-on when:
(i) The credit risk of the position is fully hedged by a credit
default swap or similar instrument;
(ii) There is an exact match between the reference obligation of
the credit derivative hedge and the debt or securitization position;
(iii) There is an exact match between the currency of the credit
derivative hedge and the debt or securitization position; and
(iv) There is either an exact match between the maturity date of
the credit derivative hedge and the maturity date of the debt or
securitization position; or, in the case where the credit derivative
hedge has a standard maturity date:
(A) The maturity date of the credit derivative hedge is within 30
business days of the maturity date of the debt or securitization
position; or
(B) For purchased credit protection, the maturity date of the
credit derivative hedge is later than the maturity date of the debt or
securitization position, but is no later than the standard maturity
date for that instrument that immediately follows the maturity date of
the debt or securitization position. The maturity date of the credit
derivative hedge may not exceed the maturity date of the debt or
securitization position by more than 90 calendar days.
(6) The specific risk add-on for a set of transactions consisting
of either a debt position and its credit derivative hedge or a
securitization position and its credit derivative hedge that does not
meet the criteria of either paragraph (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this section,
but in which all or substantially all of the price risk has been
hedged, is equal to the specific risk add-on for the side of the
transaction with the higher specific risk add-on.
(b) Debt and securitization positions. (1) The total specific risk
add-on for a portfolio of debt or securitization positions is the sum
of the specific risk add-ons for individual debt or securitization
positions, as computed under this section. To determine the specific
risk add-on for individual debt or securitization positions, a [BANK]
must multiply the absolute value of the current market value of each
net long or net short debt or securitization position in the portfolio
by the appropriate specific risk-weighting factor as set forth in
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(vii) of this section.
(2) For the purpose of this section, the appropriate specific risk-
weighting factors include: (i) Sovereign debt positions. (A) In
general. A [BANK] must assign a specific risk-weighting factor to a
sovereign debt position based on the CRC applicable to the sovereign
entity and, as applicable, the remaining contractual maturity of the
position, in accordance with table 2 of this section. Sovereign debt
positions that are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States are treated as having a CRC of 0.
[[Page 53049]]
Table 2--Specific Risk-weighting Factors for Sovereign Debt Positions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific risk-weighting factor Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign CRC.................................. 0-1 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------
2-3 Remaining contractual maturity is 0.25
6 months or less.
--------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity is 1.0
greater than 6 and up to and
including 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity 1.6
exceeds 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------
4-6 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------
7 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No CRC....................................................... 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Default by the Sovereign Entity.............................. 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section, a
[BANK] may assign to a sovereign debt position a specific risk-
weighting factor that is lower than the applicable specific risk-
weighting factor in table 2 if:
(1) The position is denominated in the sovereign entity's currency;
(2) The [BANK] has at least an equivalent amount of liabilities in
that currency; and
(3) The sovereign entity allows banks under its jurisdiction to
assign the lower specific risk-weighting factor to the same exposures
to the sovereign entity.
(C) A [BANK] must assign a 12.0 percent specific risk-weighting
factor to a sovereign debt position immediately upon determination a
default has occurred; or if a default has occurred within the previous
five years.
(D) A [BANK] must assign an 8.0 percent specific risk-weighting
factor to a sovereign debt position if the sovereign entity does not
have a CRC assigned to it, unless the sovereign debt position must be
assigned a higher specific risk-weighting factor under paragraph
(b)(2)(i)(C) of this section.
(ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank
debt positions. A [BANK] may assign a 0.0 percent specific risk-
weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure to the Bank for
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, or an MDB.
(iii) GSE debt positions. A [BANK] must assign a 1.6 percent
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure
to a GSE. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a [BANK] must assign an 8.0
percent specific risk-weighting factor to preferred stock issued by a
GSE.
(iv) Depository institution, foreign bank, and credit union debt
positions. (A) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(B) of this
section, a [BANK] must assign a specific risk-weighting factor to a
debt position that is an exposure to a depository institution, a
foreign bank, or a credit union using the specific risk-weighting
factor that corresponds to that entity's home country and, as
applicable, the remaining contractual maturity of the position, in
accordance with table 3 of this section.
Table 3--Specific Risk-weighting Factors for Depository Institutions, Foreign Bank, and Credit Union Debt
Pensions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific risk-weighting factor Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity of 0.25
6 months or less.
--------------------------------------------------
Sovereign CRC.................................. 0-2 Remaining contractual maturity of 1.0
greater than 6 and up to and
including 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity 1.6
exceeds 24 months.
----------------------------------------------------------------
3 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------
4-7 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No CRC....................................................... 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Default by the Sovereign Entity.............................. 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) A [BANK] must assign a specific risk-weighting factor of 8.0
percent to a debt position that is an exposure to a depository
institution or a foreign bank that is includable in the depository
institution's or foreign bank's regulatory capital and that is not
subject to deduction as a reciprocal holding under Sec. ----.22.
(C) A [BANK] must assign a 12.0 percent specific risk-weighting
factor to a debt position that is an exposure to a foreign bank
immediately upon determination that a default by the foreign bank's
home country has occurred or if a default by the foreign bank's home
country has occurred within the previous five years.
(v) PSE debt positions. (A) Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(2)(v)(B) of this section, a [BANK] must assign a
[[Page 53050]]
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure
to a PSE based on the specific risk-weighting factor that corresponds
to the PSE's home country and to the position's categorization as a
general obligation or revenue obligation and, as applicable, the
remaining contractual maturity of the position, as set forth in tables
4 and 5 of this section.
(B) A [BANK] may assign a lower specific risk-weighting factor than
would otherwise apply under tables 4 and 5 of this section to a debt
position that is an exposure to a foreign PSE if:
(1) The PSE's home country allows banks under its jurisdiction to
assign a lower specific risk-weighting factor to such position; and
(2) The specific risk-weighting factor is not lower than the risk
weight that corresponds to the PSE's home country in accordance with
tables 4 and 5 of this section.
(C) A [BANK] must assign a 12.0 percent specific risk-weighting
factor to a PSE debt position immediately upon determination that a
default by the PSE's home country has occurred or if a default by the
PSE's home country has occurred within the previous five years.
Table 4--Specific Risk-weighting Factors for PSE General Obligation Debt Positions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General obligations specific risk- Percent
weighting factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign CRC.............................. 0-2 Remaining contractual maturity of 6 0.25
months or less.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity of 1.0
greater than 6 and up to and
including 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity 1.6
exceeds 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
3 8.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
4-7 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No CFR 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Default by the Sovereign Entity 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5--Specific Risk-weighting Factors for PSE Revenue Obligation Debt Positions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revenue obligation specific risk- Percent
weighting factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign CRC.............................. 0-1 Remaining contractual maturity of 6 0.25
months or less.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity of 1.0
greater than 6 and up to and
including 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Remaining contractual maturity 1.6
exceeds 24 months.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
2-3 8.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
4-7 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No CFR 8.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Default by the Sovereign Entity 12.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(vi) Corporate debt positions. Except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (b)(2)(vi)(B) of this section, a [BANK] must assign a
specific risk-weighting factor to a corporate debt position in
accordance with the investment grade methodology in paragraph
(b)(2)(vi)(A) of this section.
(A) Investment grade methodology. (1) For corporate debt positions
that are exposures to entities that have issued and outstanding
publicly traded instruments, a [BANK] must assign a specific risk-
weighting factor based on the category and remaining contractual
maturity of the position, in accordance with table 6. For purposes of
this paragraph (b)(2)(vi)(A)(1), the [BANK] must determine whether the
position is in the investment grade or not investment grade category.
Table 6--Specific Risk-weighting Factors for Corporate Debt Positions
Under the Investment Grade Methodology
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific risk-
Category Remaining contractual weighting factor
maturity (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investment Grade.............. 6 months or less...... 0.50
Greater than 6 and up 2.00
to and including 24
months.
Greater than 24 months 4.00
Non-investment Grade.......... ...................... 12.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 53051]]
(2) A [BANK] must assign an 8.0 percent specific risk-weighting
factor for corporate debt positions that are exposures to entities that
do not have publicly traded instruments outstanding.
(B) Limitations. (1) A [BANK] must assign a specific risk-weighting
factor of at least 8.0 percent to an interest-only mortgage-backed
security that is not a securitization position.
(2) A [BANK] shall not assign a corporate debt position a specific
risk-weighting factor that is lower than the specific risk-weighting
factor that corresponds to the CRC of the issuer's home country in
table 2 of this section.
(vii) Securitization positions. (A) General requirements. (1) A
[BANK] that is not an advanced approaches bank must assign a specific
risk-weighting factor to a securitization position using either the
simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section (and Sec. ----.211) or assign a
specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
(2) A [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank must calculate a
specific risk add-on for a securitization position in accordance with
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section if the [BANK] and the
securitization position each qualifies to use the SFA in Sec. --
--.143. A [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank with a
securitization position that does not qualify for the SFA under
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section may assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to the securitization position using the SSFA in
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section or assign a
specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
(3) A [BANK] must treat a short securitization position as if it is
a long securitization position solely for calculation purposes when
using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section or the SSFA
in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section.
(B) SFA. To calculate the specific risk add-on for a securitization
position using the SFA, a [BANK] that is an advanced approaches bank
must set the specific risk add-on for the position equal to the risk-
based capital requirement as calculated under Sec. ----.143.
(C) SSFA. To use the SSFA to determine the specific risk-weighting
factor for a securitization position, a [BANK] must calculate the
specific risk-weighting factor in accordance with Sec. ----.211.
(D) Nth-to-default credit derivatives. A [BANK] must determine a
specific risk add-on using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this
section, or assign a specific risk-weighting factor using the SSFA in
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section to an nth-to-default credit
derivative in accordance with this paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(D), regardless
of whether the [BANK] is a net protection buyer or net protection
seller. A [BANK] must determine its position in the nth-to-default
credit derivative as the largest notional dollar amount of all the
underlying exposures.
(1) For purposes of determining the specific risk add-on using the
SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section or the specific risk-
weighting factor for an nth-to-default credit derivative using the SSFA
in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section the [BANK] must calculate
the attachment point and detachment point of its position as follows:
(i) The attachment point (parameter A) is the ratio of the sum of
the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated
to the [BANK]'s position to the total notional amount of all underlying
exposures. For purposes of using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of
this section to calculate the specific add-on for its position in an
nth-to-default credit derivative, parameter A must be set equal to the
credit enhancement level (L) input to the SFA formula in section 143 of
this subpart. In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative,
there are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the [BANK]'s
position. In the case of a second-or-subsequent-to-default credit
derivative, the smallest (n-1) notional amounts of the underlying
exposure(s) are subordinated to the [BANK]'s position.
(ii) The detachment point (parameter D) equals the sum of parameter
A plus the ratio of the notional amount of the [BANK]'s position in the
nth-to-default credit derivative to the total notional amount of all
underlying exposures. For purposes of using the SFA in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section to calculate the specific risk add-on
for its position in an nth-to-default credit derivative, parameter D
must be set to equal the L input plus the thickness of tranche T input
to the SFA formula in Sec. ----.143 of this subpart.
(2) A [BANK] that does not use the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B)
of this section to determine a specific risk-add on, or the SSFA in
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section to determine a specific risk-
weighting factor for its position in an nth-to-default credit
derivative must assign a specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent
to the position.
(c) Modeled correlation trading positions. For purposes of
calculating the comprehensive risk measure for modeled correlation
trading positions under either paragraph (a)(2)(i) or (a)(2)(ii) of
Sec. ----.209, the total specific risk add-on is the greater of:
(1) The sum of the [BANK]'s specific risk add-ons for each net long
correlation trading position calculated under this section; or
(2) The sum of the [BANK]'s specific risk add-ons for each net
short correlation trading position calculated under this section.
(d) Non-modeled securitization positions. For securitization
positions that are not correlation trading positions and for
securitizations that are correlation trading positions not modeled
under Sec. ----.209, the total specific risk add-on is the greater of:
(1) The sum of the [BANK]'s specific risk add-ons for each net long
securitization position calculated under this section; or
(2) The sum of the [BANK]'s specific risk add-ons for each net
short securitization position calculated under this section.
(e) Equity positions. The total specific risk add-on for a
portfolio of equity positions is the sum of the specific risk add-ons
of the individual equity positions, as computed under this section. To
determine the specific risk add-on of individual equity positions, a
[BANK] must multiply the absolute value of the current market value of
each net long or net short equity position by the appropriate specific
risk-weighting factor as determined under this paragraph:
(1) The [BANK] must multiply the absolute value of the current
market value of each net long or net short equity position by a
specific risk-weighting factor of 8.0 percent. For equity positions
that are index contracts comprising a well-diversified portfolio of
equity instruments, the absolute value of the current market value of
each net long or net short position is multiplied by a specific risk-
weighting factor of 2.0 percent.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A portfolio is well-diversified if it contains a large
number of individual equity positions, with no single position
representing a substantial portion of the portfolio's total market
value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) For equity positions arising from the following futures-related
arbitrage strategies, a [BANK] may apply a 2.0 percent specific risk-
weighting factor to one side (long or short) of each position with the
opposite side exempt from an additional capital requirement:
(i) Long and short positions in exactly the same index at different
dates or in different market centers; or
[[Page 53052]]
(ii) Long and short positions in index contracts at the same date
in different, but similar indices.
(3) For futures contracts on main indices that are matched by
offsetting positions in a basket of stocks comprising the index, a
[BANK] may apply a 2.0 percent specific risk-weighting factor to the
futures and stock basket positions (long and short), provided that such
trades are deliberately entered into and separately controlled, and
that the basket of stocks is comprised of stocks representing at least
90.0 percent of the capitalization of the index. A main index refers to
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, the FTSE All-World Index, and any
other index for which the [BANK] can demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the [AGENCY] that the equities represented in the index have liquidity,
depth of market, and size of bid-ask spreads comparable to equities in
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index and FTSE All-World Index.
(f) Due diligence requirements. (1) A [BANK] must demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the [AGENCY] a comprehensive understanding of the
features of a securitization position that would materially affect the
performance of the position by conducting and documenting the analysis
set forth in paragraph (f)(2) of this section. The [BANK]'s analysis
must be commensurate with the complexity of the securitization position
and the materiality of the position in relation to capital.
(2) A [BANK] must demonstrate its comprehensive understanding for
each securitization position by:
(i) Conduct an analysis of the risk characteristics of a
securitization position prior to acquiring the position and document
such analysis within three business days after acquiring position,
considering:
(A) Structural features of the securitization that would materially
impact the performance of the position, for example, the contractual
cash flow waterfall, waterfall-related triggers, credit enhancements,
liquidity enhancements, market value triggers, the performance of
organizations that service the position, and deal-specific definitions
of default;
(B) Relevant information regarding the performance of the
underlying credit exposure(s), for example, the percentage of loans 30,
60, and 90 days past due; default rates; prepayment rates; loans in
foreclosure; property types; occupancy; average credit score or other
measures of creditworthiness; average loan-to-value ratio; and industry
and geographic diversification data on the underlying exposure(s);
(C) Relevant market data of the securitization, for example, bid-
ask spreads, most recent sales price and historical price volatility,
trading volume, implied market rating, and size, depth and
concentration level of the market for the securitization; and
(D) For resecuritization positions, performance information on the
underlying securitization exposures, for example, the issuer name and
credit quality, and the characteristics and performance of the
exposures underlying the securitization exposures; and
(ii) On an on-going basis (no less frequently than quarterly),
evaluating, reviewing, and updating as appropriate the analysis
required under paragraph (f)(1) of this section for each securitization
position.
Sec. 211 Simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA).
(a) General requirements. To use the SSFA to determine the specific
risk-weighting factor for a securitization position, a [BANK] must have
data that enables it to assign accurately the parameters described in
paragraph (b) of this section. Data used to assign the parameters
described in paragraph (b) of this section must be the most currently
available data and no more than 91 calendar days old. A [BANK] that
does not have the appropriate data to assign the parameters described
in paragraph (b) of this section must assign a specific risk-weighting
factor of 100 percent to the position.
(b) SSFA parameters. To calculate the specific risk-weighting
factor for a securitization position using the SSFA, a [BANK] must have
accurate information on the five inputs to the SSFA calculation
described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section.
(1) KG is the weighted-average (with unpaid principal
used as the weight for each exposure) total capital requirement of the
underlying exposures calculated using subpart D. KG is
expressed as a decimal value between zero and 1 (that is, an average
risk weight of 100 percent represents a value of KG equal to
.08).
(2) Parameter W is expressed as a decimal value between zero and
one. Parameter W is the ratio of the sum of the dollar amounts of any
underlying exposures within the securitized pool that meet any of the
criteria are set forth in paragraphs (i) through (vi) of this paragraph
(b)(2) to the ending balance, measured in dollars, of underlying
exposures:
(i) Ninety days or more past due;
(ii) Subject to a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding;
(iii) In the process of foreclosure;
(iv) Held as real estate owned;
(v) Has contractually deferred interest payments for 90 days or
more; or
(vi) Is in default.
(3) Parameter A is the attachment point for the position, which
represents the threshold at which credit losses will first be allocated
to the position. Parameter A equals the ratio of the current dollar
amount of underlying exposures that are subordinated to the position of
the [BANK] to the current dollar amount of underlying exposures. Any
reserve account funded by the accumulated cash flows from the
underlying exposures that is subordinated to the position that contains
the [BANK]'s securitization exposure may be included in the calculation
of parameter A to the extent that cash is present in the account.
Parameter A is expressed as a decimal value between zero and one.
(4) Parameter D is the detachment point for the position, which
represents the threshold at which credit losses of principal allocated
to the position would result in a total loss of principal. Parameter D
equals parameter A plus the ratio of the current dollar amount of the
securitization positions that are pari passu with the position (that
is, have equal seniority with respect to credit risk) to the current
dollar amount of the underlying exposures. Parameter D is expressed as
a decimal value between zero and one.
(5) A supervisory calibration parameter, p, is equal to 0.5 for
securitization positions that are not resecuritization positions and
equal to 1.5 for resecuritization positions.
(c) Mechanics of the SSFA. KG and W are used to
calculate KA, the augmented value of KG, which
reflects the observed credit quality of the underlying pool of
exposures. KA is defined in paragraph (d) of this section.
The values of parameters A and D, relative to KA determine
the specific risk-weighting factor assigned to a position as described
in this paragraph and paragraph (d) of this section. The specific risk-
weighting factor assigned to a securitization position, or portion of a
position, as appropriate, is the larger of the specific risk-weighting
factor determined in accordance with this paragraph and paragraph (d)
of this section and a specific risk-weighting factor of 1.6 percent.
(1) When the detachment point, parameter D, for a securitization
position is less than or equal to KA, the position must be
assigned a specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent.
(2) When the attachment point, parameter A, for a securitization
[[Page 53053]]
position is greater than or equal to KA, the [BANK] must
calculate the specific risk-weighting factor in accordance with
paragraph (d) of this section.
(3) When A is less than KA and D is greater than
KA, the specific risk-weighting factor is a weighted-average
of 1.00 and KSSFA calculated under paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and
(c)(3)(ii) of this section, but with the parameter A revised to be set
equal to KA. For the purpose of this calculation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU12.055
Sec. ----.212 Market risk disclosures.
(a) Scope. A [BANK] must comply with this section unless it is a
consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company or a depository
institution that is subject to these requirements or of a non-U.S.
banking organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction. A [BANK] must make quantitative
disclosures publicly each calendar quarter. If a significant change
occurs, such that the most recent reporting amounts are no longer
reflective of the [BANK]'s capital adequacy and risk profile, then a
brief discussion of this change and its likely impact must be provided
as soon as practicable thereafter. Qualitative disclosures that
typically do not change each quarter may be disclosed annually,
provided any significant changes are disclosed in the interim. If a
[BANK] believes that disclosure of specific commercial or financial
information would prejudice seriously its position by making public
certain information that is either proprietary or confidential in
nature, the [BANK] is not required to disclose these specific items,
but must disclose more general information about the subject matter of
the requirement, together with the fact that, and the reason why, the
specific items of information have not been disclosed.
(b) Disclosure policy. The [BANK] must have a formal disclosure
policy approved by the board of directors that addresses the [BANK]'s
approach for determining its market risk disclosures. The policy must
address the associated internal controls and disclosure controls and
procedures. The board of directors and senior management must ensure
that appropriate verification of the disclosures takes place and that
effective internal controls and
[[Page 53054]]
disclosure controls and procedures are maintained. One or more senior
officers of the [BANK] must attest that the disclosures meet the
requirements of this subpart, and the board of directors and senior
management are responsible for establishing and maintaining an
effective internal control structure over financial reporting,
including the disclosures required by this section.
(c) Quantitative disclosures. (1) For each material portfolio of
covered positions, the [BANK] must disclose publicly the following
information at least quarterly:
(i) The high, low, and mean VaR-based measures over the reporting
period and the VaR-based measure at period-end;
(ii) The high, low, and mean stressed VaR-based measures over the
reporting period and the stressed VaR-based measure at period-end;
(iii) The high, low, and mean incremental risk capital requirements
over the reporting period and the incremental risk capital requirement
at period-end;
(iv) The high, low, and mean comprehensive risk capital
requirements over the reporting period and the comprehensive risk
capital requirement at period-end, with the period-end requirement
broken down into appropriate risk classifications (for example, default
risk, migration risk, correlation risk);
(v) Separate measures for interest rate risk, credit spread risk,
equity price risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodity price risk used
to calculate the VaR-based measure; and
(vi) A comparison of VaR-based estimates with actual gains or
losses experienced by the [BANK], with an analysis of important
outliers.
(2) In addition, the [BANK] must disclose publicly the following
information at least quarterly:
(i) The aggregate amount of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet
securitization positions by exposure type; and
(ii) The aggregate amount of correlation trading positions.
(d) Qualitative disclosures. For each material portfolio of covered
positions, the [BANK] must disclose publicly the following information
at least annually, or more frequently in the event of material changes
for each portfolio:
(1) The composition of material portfolios of covered positions;
(2) The [BANK]'s valuation policies, procedures, and methodologies
for covered positions including, for securitization positions, the
methods and key assumptions used for valuing such positions, any
significant changes since the last reporting period, and the impact of
such change;
(3) The characteristics of the internal models used for purposes of
this subpart. For the incremental risk capital requirement and the
comprehensive risk capital requirement, this must include:
(i) The approach used by the [BANK] to determine liquidity
horizons;
(ii) The methodologies used to achieve a capital assessment that is
consistent with the required soundness standard; and
(iii) The specific approaches used in the validation of these
models;
(4) A description of the approaches used for validating and
evaluating the accuracy of internal models and modeling processes for
purposes of this subpart;
(5) For each market risk category (that is, interest rate risk,
credit spread risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange risk, and
commodity price risk), a description of the stress tests applied to the
positions subject to the factor;
(6) The results of the comparison of the [BANK]'s internal
estimates for purposes of this subpart with actual outcomes during a
sample period not used in model development;
(7) The soundness standard on which the [BANK]'s internal capital
adequacy assessment under this subpart is based, including a
description of the methodologies used to achieve a capital adequacy
assessment that is consistent with the soundness standard;
(8) A description of the [BANK]'s processes for monitoring changes
in the credit and market risk of securitization positions, including
how those processes differ for resecuritization positions; and
(9) A description of the [BANK]'s policy governing the use of
credit risk mitigation to mitigate the risks of securitization and
resecuritization positions.
End of Common Rule
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 3
Administrative practices and procedure, Capital, National banks,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Risk.
12 CFR Part 217
Banks, banking, Federal Reserve System, Holding companies,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
12 CFR Part 325
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, banking, Capital
Adequacy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Savings
associations, State non-member banks.
Adoption of Proposed Common Rule
The adoption of the proposed common rules by the agencies, as
modified by agency-specific text, is set forth below:
Department of the Treasury
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Chapter I
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency proposes to further amend part 3 of chapter
I of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be
amended elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register under Docket ID
OCC-2012-0008 and OCC-2012-0009, as follows:
PART 3--MINIMUM CAPITAL RATIOS; ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818,
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907 and 3909, and
5412(b)(2)(B).
2. Designate the text set forth at the end of the common preamble
as part 3, subparts E and F.
3. Newly designated subparts E and F of part 3 are amended as set
forth below:
i. Remove ``[AGENCY]'' and add ``OCC'' in its place, wherever it
appears;
ii. Remove ``[BANK]'' and add ``national bank or Federal savings
association'' in its place, wherever it appears;
iii. Remove ``[BANKS]'' and ``[BANK]s'' and add ``national banks
and Federal savings associations'' in their places, wherever they
appear;
iv. Remove ``[BANK]'s'' and add ``national bank's and Federal
savings association's'' in its place, wherever it appears;
v. Remove ``[PART]'' and add ``Part 3'' in its place, wherever it
appears; and
vi. Remove ``[Regulatory Reports]'' and add ``Call Report'' in its
place, wherever it appears; and
vii. Remove ``[regulatory report]'' and add ``Call Reports'' in its
place, wherever it appears.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
12 CFR Chapter II
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, part 217 of
chapter II of title 12 of the Code of Federal
[[Page 53055]]
Regulations are proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS
1. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a,
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 3904, 3906-
3909, 4808, 5365, 5371.
Subpart E--Risk-Weighted Assets--Internal Ratings-Based and
Advanced Measurement Approaches
Subpart F--Risk-weighted Assets--Market Risk
2. Designate the text set forth at the end of the common preamble
as part 217, subparts E and F.
3. Part 217 is amended as set forth below:
a. Remove ``[AGENCY]'' and add ``Board'' in its place wherever it
appears.
b. Remove ``[BANK]'' and add ``Board-regulated institution'' in its
place wherever it appears.
c. Remove ``[PART]'' and add ``part'' in its place wherever it
appears.
d. Remove ``[Regulatory Reports]'' and add in its place
``Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report), for a
state member bank, or Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank
Holding Companies (FR Y-9C), for a bank holding company or savings and
loan holding company, as applicable'' the first time it appears; and
e. Remove ``[regulatory report]'' and add in its place ``Call
Report, for a state member bank or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company
or savings and loan holding company, as applicable''.
4. In Sec. 217.100, revise paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.100 Purpose, Applicability, and Principle of Conservatism.
* * * * *
(b) Applicability. (1) This subpart applies to:
(i) A top-tier bank holding company or savings and loan holding
company domiciled in the United States that:
(A) Is not a consolidated subsidiary of another bank holding
company or savings and loan holding company that uses 12 CFR part 217,
subpart E, to calculate its risk-based capital requirements; and
(B) That:
(1) Has total consolidated assets (excluding assets held by an
insurance underwriting subsidiary), as defined on schedule HC-K of the
FR Y-9C, equal to $250 billion or more;
(2) Has consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign exposure at the
most recent year-end equal to $10 billion (excluding exposures held by
an insurance underwriting subsidiary). Total on-balance sheet foreign
exposure equals total cross-border claims less claims with head office
or guarantor located in another country plus redistributed guaranteed
amounts to the country of head office or guarantor plus local country
claims on local residents plus revaluation gains on foreign exchange
and derivative products, calculated in accordance with the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure
Report); or
(3) Has a subsidiary depository institution that is required, or
has elected, to use 12 CFR part 3, subpart E (OCC), 12 CFR part 217,
subpart E (Board), or 12 CFR part 325, subpart E (FDIC) to calculate
its risk-based capital requirements;
(ii) A state member bank that:
(A) Has total consolidated assets, as reported on the most recent
year-end Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call Report),
equal to $250 billion or more;
(B) Has consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign exposure at the
most recent year-endequal to $10 billion or more (where total on-
balance sheet foreign exposure equals total cross-border claims less
claims with head office or guarantor located in another country plus
redistributed guaranteed amounts to the country of head office or
guarantor plus local country claims on local residents plus revaluation
gains on foreign exchange and derivative products, calculated in
accordance with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) 009 Country Exposure Report);
(C) Is a subsidiary of a depository institution that uses 12 CFR
part 3, subpart E (OCC), 12 CFR part 217, subpart E (Board), or 12 CFR
part 325, subpart E (FDIC) to calculate its risk-based capital
requirements; or
(D) Is a subsidiary of a bank holding company that uses 12 CFR part
217, subpart E, to calculate its risk-based capital requirements; and
(iii) Any Board-regulated institution that elects to use this
subpart to calculate its risk-based capital requirements.
* * * * *
5. In Sec. 217.121, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
* * * * *
Sec. 217.121 Qualification process.
(a) Timing. (1) A Board-regulated institution that is described in
Sec. 217.100(b)(1)(i) and (ii) must adopt a written implementation
plan no later than six months after the date the Board-regulated
institution meets a criterion in that section. The implementation plan
must incorporate an explicit start date no later than 36 months after
the date the Board-regulated institution meets at least one criterion
under Sec. 217.100(b)(1)(i) and (ii). The Board may extend the start
date.
(2) A Board-regulated institution that elects to be subject to this
subpart under Sec. 217.101(b)(1)(iii) must adopt a written
implementation plan.
* * * * *
6. In Sec. 217.122(g), revise paragraph (g)(3)(ii) to read as
follows:
Sec. ----.122 Qualification requirements.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii)(A) With the prior written approval of the Board, a state
member bank may generate an estimate of its operational risk exposure
using an alternative approach to that specified in paragraph (g)(3)(i)
of this section. A state member bank proposing to use such an
alternative operational risk quantification system must submit a
proposal to the Board. In determining whether to approve a state member
bank's proposal to use an alternative operational risk quantification
system, the Board will consider the following principles:
(A) Use of the alternative operational risk quantification system
will be allowed only on an exception basis, considering the size,
complexity, and risk profile of the state member bank;
(B) The state member bank must demonstrate that its estimate of its
operational risk exposure generated under the alternative operational
risk quantification system is appropriate and can be supported
empirically; and
(C) A state member bank must not use an allocation of operational
risk capital requirements that includes entities other than depository
institutions or the benefits of diversification across entities.
* * * * *
7. In Sec. 217.131, revise paragraph (b) and paragraphs (e)(3)(i)
and (ii), and add a new paragraph (e)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail
risk-weighted assets.
* * * * *
[[Page 53056]]
(b) Phase 1--Categorization. The Board-regulated institution must
determine which of its exposures are wholesale exposures, retail
exposures, securitization exposures, or equity exposures. The Board-
regulated institution must categorize each retail exposure as a
residential mortgage exposure, a QRE, or an other retail exposure. The
Board-regulated institution must identify which wholesale exposures are
HVCRE exposures, sovereign exposures, OTC derivative contracts, repo-
style transactions, eligible margin loans, eligible purchased wholesale
exposures, cleared transactions, default fund contributions, and
unsettled transactions to which Sec. 217.136 applies, and eligible
guarantees or eligible credit derivatives that are used as credit risk
mitigants. The Board-regulated institution must identify any on-balance
sheet asset that does not meet the definition of a wholesale, retail,
equity, or securitization exposure, any non-material portfolio of
exposures described in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, and for bank
holding companies and savings and loan holding companies, any on-
balance sheet asset that is held in a non-guaranteed separate account.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(3) * * *
(i) A bank holding company or savings and loan holding company may
assign a risk-weighted asset amount of zero to cash owned and held in
all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in transit; and
for gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository institution's own
vaults, or held in another depository institution's vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by
gold bullion liabilities.
(ii) A state member bank may assign a risk-weighted asset amount to
cash owned and held in all offices of the state member bank or in
transit and for gold bullion held in the state member bank's own
vaults, or held in another depository institution's vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by
gold bullion liabilities.
* * * * *
(5) Assets held in non-guaranteed separate accounts. The risk-
weighted asset amount for an on-balance sheet asset that is held in a
non-guaranteed separate account is zero percent of the carrying value
of the asset.
8. In Sec. 217.142, revise paragraph (k)(1)(iv) to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.142 Risk-based capital requirement for securitization
exposures.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(1) * * *
(iv) * * *
(A) In the case of a state member bank, the bank is well
capitalized, as defined in 12 CFR 208.43. For purposes of determining
whether a state member bank is well capitalized for purposes of this
paragraph, the state member bank's capital ratios must be calculated
without regard to the capital treatment for transfers of small-business
obligations with recourse specified in paragraph (k)(1) of this
section.
(B) In the case of a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company, the bank holding company or savings and loan holding
company is well capitalized, as defined in 12 CFR 225.2. For purposes
of determining whether a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company is well capitalized for purposes of this paragraph, the
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company's capital
ratios must be calculated without regard to the capital treatment for
transfers of small-business obligations with recourse specified in
paragraph (k)(1) of this section.
* * * * *
9. In Sec. 217.152, revise paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(i) Community development equity exposures. (A) For state member
banks and bank holding companies, an equity exposure that qualifies as
a community development investment under 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
excluding equity exposures to an unconsolidated small business
investment company and equity exposures held through a consolidated
small business investment company described in section 302 of the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 682).
(B) For savings and loan holding companies, an equity exposure that
is designed primarily to promote community welfare, including the
welfare of low- and moderate-income communities or families, such as by
providing services or employment, and excluding equity exposures to an
unconsolidated small business investment company and equity exposures
held through a small business investment company described in section
302 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 682).
* * * * *
10. In Sec. 217.201, revise paragraph (b)(1) introductory text to
read as follows:
Sec. 271.201 Purpose, Applicability, and Reservation of Authority.
(b) Applicability. (1) This subpart applies to any Board-regulated
institution with aggregate trading assets and trading liabilities (as
reported in the Board-regulated institution's most recent quarterly
Call Report, for a state member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding
company or savings and loan holding company, as applicable, any savings
and loan holding company that does not file the FR Y-9C should follow
the instructions to the FR Y-9C), equal to:
* * * * *
11. In Sec. 217.202, amend paragraph (b) by revising paragraph (1)
of the definition of ``Covered position'' to read as follows:
Sec. ----.202 Definitions.
* * * * *
Covered position means the following positions:
(1) A trading asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-
balance sheet),\1\ as reported on Schedule RC-D of the Call Report or
Schedule HC-D of the FR Y-9C (any savings and loan holding companies
that do not file the FR Y-9C should follow the instructions to the FR
Y-9C)), that meets the following conditions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Securities subject to repurchase and lending agreements are
included as if they are still owned by the lender.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
12 CFR Chapter III
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the common preamble, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation proposes to amend part 324 of chapter III
of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 324--CAPITAL ADEQUACY
1. The authority citation for part 324 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b),
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819 (Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n),
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102-233,
105 Stat. 1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160,
2233 (12
[[Page 53057]]
U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386, as amended
by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub.
L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).
2. Subparts E and F are added as set forth at the end of the common
preamble.
3. Subparts E and F are amended as set forth below:
a. Remove ``[AGENCY]'' and add ``FDIC'' in its place, wherever it
appears;
b. Remove ``[Agency]'' and add ``FDIC'' in its place, wherever it
appears;
c. Remove ``[12 CFR 3.12, 12 CFR 263.202, 12 CFR 325.6(c), 12 CFR
567.3(d)]'' and add ``12 CFR 325.6'' in its place, wherever it appears;
d. Remove ``[BANK]'' and add ``bank or state savings association''
in its place, wherever it appears in the phrases ``A [BANK]'', ``a
[BANK]'', ``The [BANK]'', or ``the [BANK]'';
e. Remove ``[BANK]'' and add ``bank and state savings association''
in its place, wherever it appears in the phrases ``Each [BANK]'' or
``each [BANK]'';
f. Remove ``[BANKS]'' and ``[BANK]s'' and add ``banks and state
savings associations'' in their place, wherever they appear;
g. Remove ``[PART]'' and add ``Part 324'' in its place, wherever it
appears;
h. Remove ``[Regulatory Reports]'' and add ``Consolidated Report of
Condition and Income (Call Report)'' in its place;
i. Remove ``of 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 12 CFR part 208 (Board), or 12
CFR part 325 (FDIC)'' and add ``of 12 CFR part 324'' in its place,
wherever it appears;
j. Remove ``[prompt corrective action regulation]'' and add
``Subpart H of this part'' in its place, wherever it appears;
k. Remove ``banking organization'' and add ``bank and/or state
savings associations, as''
l. Remove ``[Regulatory Reports]'' and add ``Consolidated Report of
Condition and Income (Call Report)'' in its place; and
m. Remove ``[regulatory report]'' and add ``Call Report'' in its
place wherever it appears; and
PART 325--CAPITAL MAINTENANCE
4. The authority citation for part 325 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b),
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819 (Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n),
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; Pub. L. 102-233, 105 Stat.
1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2233 (12
U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386, as amended
by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note).
Appendix D to Part 325--[Removed and reserved]
5. Appendix D to part 325 is removed and reserved.
Dated: June 11, 2012.
Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, July 3, 2012.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 12th day of June, 2012.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-16761 Filed 8-10-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P