[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 120 (Thursday, June 21, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37446-37456]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-15172]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2012-0128]
Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences; Fiscal Year 2011;
Dissemination of Information
Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-
438) defines an abnormal occurrence (AO) as an unscheduled incident or
event that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines to
be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety. The
Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-68)
requires that AOs be
[[Page 37447]]
reported to Congress annually. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, 24 events
that occurred at facilities licensed by the NRC and/or Agreement States
were determined to be AOs.
This report describes five events at NRC-licensed facilities. The
first event involved radiation exposure to an embryo/fetus, and the
second was an event of high safety significance at a commercial nuclear
power plant. The other three events occurred at NRC-regulated medical
institutions and are medical events as defined in Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 35. The report also describes 19
events at Agreement State-licensed facilities. Agreement States are the
37 States that currently have entered into formal agreements with the
NRC pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to regulate
certain quantities of AEA-licensed material at facilities located
within their borders. The first Agreement State-licensee event involved
radiation exposure to an embryo/fetus, the second event involved an
exposure to the extremities of a radiographer, and the third event
involved a stolen radiography camera. The other 16 Agreement State-
licensee events were medical events as defined in 10 CFR part 35 and
occurred at medical institutions. As required by Section 208, the
discussion for each event includes the date and place, the nature and
probable consequences, the cause or causes, and the actions taken to
prevent recurrence. Each event is also being described in NUREG-0090,
Vol. 34, ``Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences: Fiscal Year
2011.'' This report is available electronically at the NRC's Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/ staff/.
Three major categories of events are reported in this document--I.
For All Licensees, II. For Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Licensees,
and III. Events at Facilities Other Than Nuclear Power Plants and All
Transportation Events. The full report, which is available on the NRC's
Web site, provides the specific criteria for determining when an event
is an AO. It also discusses ``Other Events of Interest,'' which does
not meet the AO criteria but has been determined by the Commission to
be included in the report. The event identification number begins with
``AS'' for Agreement State AO events and ``NRC'' for NRC AO events.
I. For All Licensees
A. Human Exposure to Radiation From Licensed Material
During this reporting period, one event at an NRC-regulated
facility and three events at Agreement State-licensed facilities were
significant enough to be reported as AOs. Although two of these events
occurred at medical facilities, they involved unintended exposures to
individuals who were not patients. Therefore, these events belong under
the Criteria I.A, ``For All Licensees,'' category as opposed to the
Criteria III.C, ``For Medical Licensees,'' category.
NRC11-01 Human Exposure to Radiation at Portsmouth Naval Medical Center
in Portsmouth, Virginia
Date and Place--January 12, 2011, Portsmouth, Virginia.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The U.S. Department of the Navy
(the licensee) reported that a female patient at the Naval Medical
Center in Portsmouth, Virginia (NMCP), received 3,630 MBq (98 mCi) of
iodine-131 for thyroid ablation therapy. On the day of the treatment
the patient informed NMCP staff that she was not pregnant and NMCP
staff administered a pregnancy test as a routine precaution. The
pregnancy test yielded a negative result. Based on the negative
pregnancy test results and the patient's interview responses, NMCP
staff administered iodine-131 to the patient.
On January 27, 2011, the patient became aware that she was pregnant
and informed the physician who had administered the treatment. An
obstetrician estimated that conception had occurred somewhere around
January 7-10, 2011, and that a pregnancy test administered on January
12, 2011, would not have been sensitive enough to produce a positive
result. The NMCP estimated the dose to the embryo to be 21.3 cGy (21.3
rem) and notified the Naval Radiation Safety Committee that the patient
may have been pregnant before the therapy. The NMCP staff estimated a
slight increased risk of early pregnancy failure and this was discussed
with the patient. The NMCP staff subsequently refined the dose estimate
to 24.7 cGy (24.7 rem). The NRC contracted with a medical consultant
who estimated a fetal/embryo dose of 27 cGy (27 rem) and stated that
embryonic tissue capable of concentrating iodine-131 is not formed
until 10 to 12 weeks of gestation; therefore, the tissue had not yet
formed at the time of the treatment. The medical consultant concluded
that there was a low possibility of carcinogenesis or malformations.
Cause(s)--The cause of this event was the close proximity of
conception, which resulted in a negative pregnancy test result, to the
administration of the iodine-131.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The NMCP revised the initial consultation procedures for
the prescribing physician to stress the importance of discussing with
the patient the need for sexual abstinence at least 10 days before
therapeutic dose administration.
NRC--The NRC conducted an inspection on February 2, 2011, through
June 2, 2011, and there were no violations of the NRC's requirements
associated with this event.
AS11-01 Human Exposure to Radiation at Montefiore Medical Center in New
York City, New York
Date and Place--September 22, 2006 (reported on April 27, 2011),
New York City, New York.
Nature and Probable Consequences--Montefiore Medical Center (the
licensee) reported that a female patient received 3,519 MBq (95 mCi) of
iodine-131 for thyroid ablation therapy. Before the treatment, the
licensee interviewed the patient and ascertained that she was not
pregnant. The licensee's staff administered a pregnancy test as a
routine precaution. The pregnancy test yielded a negative result. Based
on the negative pregnancy test results and the patient's interview
responses, the licensee administered iodine-131 to the patient.
On December 22, 2006, the patient returned to the licensee for a
followup visit. Following that visit, the nuclear medicine department
staff was informed by another section of the medical center that the
patient was pregnant. The licensee confirmed the pregnancy with the
patient's obstetrician/gynecologist. The ultrasound performed by the
patient's obstetrician/gynecologist revealed that the patient was
approximately 2-3 weeks pregnant at the time of the iodine-131
treatment. The licensee estimated that the fetus received about 25 cGy
(25 rem) of radiation exposure and stated that embryonic tissue capable
of concentrating iodine-131 is not formed until 10 to 12 weeks of
gestation; therefore, this tissue had not yet fully formed at the time
of the treatment. The patient was advised to see a genetic specialist
to discuss the possible consequences to the fetus from this exposure.
Although the licensee claimed that it had originally reported the event
to the New York City Office of Radiological Health in 2006, the
[[Page 37448]]
office had no record of the report. The New York City Office of
Radiological Health identified the missing report in April 2011, and
subsequently notified the NRC on June 15, 2011.
Cause(s)--The cause of this event was the close proximity of
conception to the iodine-131 treatment and a false negative result on a
pregnancy test done before the administration of the treatment.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee's corrective actions included additions to
its Safety Precaution Form stressing the necessity of sexual abstinence
before the treatment and recommending that patients also take
precautions to avoid getting pregnant for 6 months after the treatment.
State--The New York City Office of Radiological Health conducted an
inspection on June 16, 2011, and determined that the licensee had
followed acceptable protocols before the administration of iodine-131.
Consequently no civil penalties or enforcement action for this event
are warranted.
AS11-02 Human Exposure to Radiation at Caribbean Inspection & NDT
Services, Inc., in Port Lavaca, Texas
Date and Place--September 12, 2011, Port Lavaca, Texas.
Nature and Probable Consequences--Caribbean Inspection & NDT
Services Inc. (the licensee) reported that a radiographer trainee
received an overexposure to his right hand and was seeking medical
attention. The radiographer trainee stated that on September 12, 2011,
while conducting radiography operations in the field, he removed a
radiography camera guide tube from the Amersham 660 D radiography
camera. The radiographer trainee stated that he noticed the 2.7 TBq (73
Ci) iridium-192 source was not fully retracted and protruding from the
camera about 2 inches. The radiographer trainee stated that he may have
brushed the source with his hand when he removed the guide tube.
On September 19, 2011, the radiographer trainee presented himself
to a Houston, Texas hospital with observable deterministic effects,
which included blistering of the thumb, index and middle fingers. These
types of effects correspond to an exposure range of 20-40 Sv (2000 to
4000 rem) to the extremities. His doctors initially conferred with the
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site in Oak Ridge, TN
regarding his medical treatment. The trainee is continuing his
treatment at the Houston, Texas hospital as an out-patient. The
licensee stated that the results of the trainee's dosimeter indicated
that he received 14.1 mSv (1.41 rem) whole body exposure based on the
film badge he was wearing at the time of the event.
Cause(s)--The State of Texas is currently investigating the cause
of this event.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine
the exact nature and cause of this event. Pending the results of this
investigation the licensee will determine corrective action and inform
the State of the circumstances of the event and the corrective actions.
State--Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Control
Program is currently investigating this incident, which includes
collecting information from the physicians, the licensee, and the
individuals involved in the event. Pending the results of this
investigation and the depositions performed through the General
Counsel, the Texas Department of State Health Services will determine
the probable causes of the event and review the licensee's corrective
actions and consider what, if any, civil penalties and enforcement
actions to pursue.
AS11-03 Stolen Radiography Camera at Acuren Inspection, Inc., in La
Porte, Texas
Date and Place--July 19, 2011, La Porte, Texas.
Nature and Probable Consequences--Acuren Inspections Inc. (the
licensee) reported the theft of a radiography camera containing 1.25
GBq (33.7 Ci) of iridium-192. On July 19, 2011, the licensee discovered
that their radiography truck had been broken into, and the radiography
camera, associated equipment, and portable generator had been stolen.
The alarm system on the truck was then tested and determined to be
operational; however, the alarm had not been set at the time of the
theft. Attempts to locate the camera included the use of portable
radiation detection equipment on vehicles, Austin Police Department/6
Civil Support Team helicopter flyovers of the area, and a U.S.
Department of Energy fly-over survey between the cities of Austin and
San Antonio, using a fixed wing plane.
It should be noted that at the time this event was reported to the
NRC, the radioactive material in the camera was at a level considered
to be risk-significant. However, as of October 1, 2011, the radioactive
material had decayed to a level considered to not be risk-significant.
The radioactive source has not been recovered at the time of this
report.
Cause(s)--Licensee failure to use the vehicle alarm system.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee conducted a company-wide review of the
incident with all employees, inspected all their trucks to verify the
alarm systems were operating, and required all employees to view a
video that showed the proper way to lock and secure radioactive
material.
State--The Texas Department of State Health Services conducted an
inspection on July 21, 2011, and determined that the radiographer had
failed to activate the alarm system on the truck containing the
radiography camera. The licensee and the radiographers involved were
cited for the violation.
II. Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Licensees
During this reporting period, one event at a commercial nuclear
power plant in the United States was significant enough to be reported
as an AO.
NRC11-02 Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Event at Browns Ferry Nuclear
Plant, Unit 1, in Athens, Alabama
Date and Place--October 23, 2010, Athens, Alabama.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) (the licensee) reported a commercial nuclear power plant event at
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, a boiling-water reactor designed by
General Electric. On October 23, 2010, during a refueling outage, it
was discovered that a residual heat removal (RHR) low pressure coolant
injection (LPCI) flow control valve failed while the licensee was
attempting to establish shutdown cooling. The flow control portion of
the valve, called the disc, was found stuck in the seat of the valve.
The disc had become separated from the valve stem and could no longer
be controlled by the valve motor operator. The RHR system is primarily
used for LPCI during accident conditions and for cooling while the
reactor is shut down. As a result of the flow control valve failure,
Loop II of the RHR system could not have performed its safe shutdown
functions and was declared inoperable. The licensee promptly placed the
other loop of the RHR system (Loop I) into service and, as a result,
the failure of the flow control valve did not involve an actual safety
consequence or impact the health and safety of the public.
[[Page 37449]]
However, the NRC reviewed this event under its significance
determination process and determined that the licensee's history with
regards to this valve performance issue represented a finding of high
safety significance (red finding). The basis for this finding was that
the flow control valve's failure (condition) caused a weakness in the
licensee's fire mitigation strategy, resulting in a significant
increase in the core damage frequency. The licensee's fire mitigation
strategy limits the availability of alternative sources of reactor
coolant inventory makeup and both loops of LPCI could potentially be
unavailable in some accident scenarios. Automatic valve function was
lost, as well as the ability of plant operators to manually use this
loop of the RHR system.
The public was never actually endangered because no event requiring
use of the RHR system occurred. However, the RHR system is counted on
for core cooling during certain accident scenarios, and the flow
control valve failure left it inoperable, which could have led to core
damage had an accident involving a series of unlikely events occurred.
The NRC determined that this event did not represent an immediate
safety concern, because the licensee staff had, as part of its
immediate corrective actions, implemented repairs and modifications in
accordance with design requirements that returned the flow control
valve to an operational condition (the red finding was for licensee
performance deficiencies resulting in a past inoperability).
Cause(s)--The immediate cause for this condition was separation of
the valve disc from the stem/skirt, with the disc wedged into the seat
in the closed position. The licensee determined that part of the root
cause was a valve manufacturing defect that resulted in undersized disc
skirt threads at the disc connection to the valve stem. In addition,
the NRC identified several other performance deficiencies on the part
of the licensee. Specifically, the NRC determined that the licensee's
failure to establish adequate programs to ensure that motor-operated
valves continue to be capable of performing their design-basis safety
functions was a performance deficiency. The NRC also concluded that TVA
should have foreseen the results of not including these valves within
the scope of the program described in Generic Letter 89-10, ``Safety-
Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,'' dated June 28,
1989, and should have corrected the problem. This failure to
effectively maintain and inspect these valves within the program
contributed to the performance deficiency. The licensee's corrective
action program and root cause evaluation also did not appear to address
the broader issues associated with programs to ensure the continued
capability of motor-operated valves to perform their design-basis
safety function.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The TVA reported this condition under 10 CFR 50.73,
``Licensee Event Reporting System,'' and under 10 CFR part 21,
``Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance Process.'' In addition, TVA
has presented corrective actions related to the flow control valve
failure and corrective actions that are planned to address long-term
fire strategies at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station. The flow
control valve was repaired promptly, and inspections were performed on
all similar valves for Units 1, 2, and 3 to verify their functional
capability. The TVA informed the NRC of plans to reduce operator manual
actions; implement procedural changes related to fire strategy; install
modifications as a result of its review of National Fire Protection
Association Standard 805, ``Performance-Based Standard for Fire
Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,'' and
continue to reduce fire risk at the station.
NRC--The NRC assessed the performance of Browns Ferry Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1, to be in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone
Column of the NRC's Action Matrix beginning in the fourth quarter of
Calendar Year 2010. This finding resulted in increased NRC oversight at
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, including a supplemental inspection
to evaluate safety, organizational, and programmatic issues at the
plant. The NRC staff initiated the supplemental inspection at the
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station beginning on September 12, 2011.
This inspection is being conducted in accordance with inspection
procedures, and will include extensive reviews of programs and
processes not inspected as part of the NRC's baseline inspection
program. The inspection will also include an assessment of the Browns
Ferry Nuclear Power Station's safety culture. Part 1 of this
supplemental inspection was completed and an inspection report was
issued on November 17, 2011 (available at Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113210602). The results
of this inspection will be combined with the results from Parts 2 and 3
of the Browns Ferry Inspection Procedure 95003 (available at ADAMS
Accession No. ML102020551), and will assist the NRC in determining the
breadth and depth of safety, organizational, and programmatic issues at
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station. The NRC will report on the final
supplemental inspection results as part of the FY 2012 AO report to
Congress.
III. Events at Facilities Other Than Nuclear Power Plants and All
Transportation Events
C. Medical Licensees
During this reporting period, three events at NRC-licensed or NRC-
regulated facilities and 16 events at Agreement State-licensed
facilities were significant enough to be reported as AOs.
AS11-04 Medical Event at Western Pennsylvania Hospital in Allegheny,
Pennsylvania
Date and Place--February 23, 2009, Allegheny, Pennsylvania.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Western Pennsylvania Hospital
(the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with a
high-dose-rate (HDR) mammosite treatment for breast cancer; the
treatment consisted of 184.2 GBq (4.9 Ci) of iridium-192. The patient
was prescribed to receive 34 Gy (3,400 rad) in 10 fractionated doses,
but instead, received a dose of 50 Gy (5,000 rad) to the skin tissue
around the catheter entry point (wrong treatment site). The patient's
physicist notified the patient and the referring physician of this
event.
Before starting the treatment on February 23, 2009, the medical
staff performed a check to verify the catheter length and treatment
calculations. In addition, the treatment procedure required daily CT
scans to verify the treatment site. On February 27, 2009, a different
therapy physicist identified a potential error in the patient's chart
and contacted the patient's physicist. On March 3, 2009, the patient's
physicist checked the other therapy physicist's findings and discovered
there had been a 3 cm error in the placement of the source during
treatment. This incorrect distance resulted in the intended site
receiving only 30 percent of the intended dose and the skin tissue
receiving the full dose. The patient received followup care for
erythema of the skin tissue and the licensee concluded that this
medical event would not have a significant medical effect on the
patient.
[[Page 37450]]
Cause(s)--The medical event was caused by human error in the
placement of the source during treatment.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee revised all mammosite policies and
procedures to strengthen the accuracy of measurement, planning,
treatment, and quality control. Specifically, the licensee modified the
mammosite worksheet to add the expected catheter length beside the
block where the measured catheter length is recorded, and required that
the catheter measurement wire be kept in place during CT simulation
following catheter measurement.
State--The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
investigated the incident on March 18, 2009, and determined that the
licensee's corrective actions were adequate. No enforcement action was
taken and the State forwarded the final update of the event to the NRC
on November 14, 2011.
AS11-05 Medical Event at the University of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Date and Place--January 21, 2010, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University of Pennsylvania
(the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with a
brachytherapy seed implant procedure to treat prostate cancer. The
patient was prescribed to receive a total dose of 145 Gy (14,500 rad)
to the prostate using 65 iodine-125 seeds. Instead, the seeds were
inadvertently placed outside the intended treatment site (wrong
treatment site). The patient received an approximate dose of 161 Gy
(16,100 rad) to the penile bulb (glans) (wrong treatment site). The
patient and referring physician were informed of this event.
On January 21, 2010, the iodine-125 seeds were implanted in the
patient's prostate using real time dosimetry under ultrasonic guidance.
The written directive called for a therapeutic radiation dose of 145 Gy
(14,500 rad) to the prostate volume, plus 5 mm of margin. On February
23, 2010, the patient returned for a 30 day post implant CT scan, which
revealed that the implanted seeds were ``in an appropriate pattern,''
but outside the intended target volume, which resulted in unintended
dose to the penile bulb (glans). The licensee concluded that the
medical event would not have a significant medical effect on the
patient.
Cause(s)--The medical event is presumed to have been caused by
misuse of a new ultrasound unit.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee's Radiation Oncology Department suspended
all prostate brachytherapy treatments pending an additional quality
assurance review. Upon completion of the quality assurance review, the
licensee modified its prostate brachytherapy treatment procedures. As
of January 2012, the licensee has not yet resumed prostate
brachytherapy treatments after implementation of these modified
procedures.
State--The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
investigated the incident on April 15, 2010, and determined that the
licensee's corrective actions were adequate. No enforcement action was
taken and the State forwarded the final update of the event to the NRC
on November 14, 2011.
AS11-06 Medical Event at University Community Hospital in Tampa,
Florida
Date and Place--February 14, 2010, Tampa, Florida.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University Community Hospital
(the licensee) reported that two patients were prescribed single-
channel HDR brachytherapy treatments of 34 Gy (3,400 rad). An actual
average dose of 17 Gy (1,700 rad) to the first patient, and 26 Gy
(2,600 rad) to the second patient, were delivered to the target area of
the breast, and some parts of the planned volume received greater than
700 percent (first patient) and 220 percent (second patient) of the
prescribed dose. In addition, other areas of the breast not in the
target region received up to 136 Gy (13,600 rad) in the first patient
and 75 Gy (7,500 rad) in the second patient. The maximum skin dose was
calculated to be 42.5 Gy (4,250 rad) to the first patient and 75 Gy
(7,500 rad) to the second patient. The patients and their referring
physicians were informed of the events.
On February 14, 2010, the licensee noted that the source within the
mammosite catheter was erroneously positioned approximately 2 to 2.5 cm
away from the tumor. This was the result of the operator entering the
wrong dwell position into the planning system. The licensee concluded
that no significant adverse health effects to the patients are
expected.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical events was human error involving
entering the wrong position of the reference end of the catheter into
the planning system.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--Corrective actions included implementing various quality
assurance steps to ensure that the correct treatment calculations and
data are used for future treatments. Additional procedural guidance
will be created with detailed instructions.
State--The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control initiated an
inspection on February 18, 2010. The State completed the inspection on
March 1, 2010, and determined that the licensee's corrective actions
were adequate. No enforcement action was taken and the State forwarded
the final update of the event to the NRC on February 1, 2011.
AS11-07 Medical Event at Coral Springs Clinic in Coral Springs, Florida
Date and Place--March 11, 2010, Coral Springs, Florida.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Coral Springs Clinic (the
licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with an HDR
brachytherapy treatment for basal cell carcinoma of the ear. The
patient was prescribed 14 fractionated doses of 2.5 Gy (250 rad) to the
ear, but instead, the patient received 22.5 Gy (2,250 rad) on the
second fractionated treatment dose. The patient and referring physician
were informed of this event.
While starting the treatment the radiation therapist accidentally
pushed the incorrect button on the HDR device, which was the ``auto
radiography'' button rather than the ``treatment'' button on the
machine control console. This resulted in the patient receiving
approximately 9 times the intended dose for that fraction of the
treatment. Further treatments were canceled. The patient and doctor
were notified of the incident. The licensee concluded that no
significant health effects to the patient are expected as a result of
this incorrect dose.
Cause(s)--The medical event was caused by human error in that the
radiation therapist failed to push the correct button on the HDR
device.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee immediately disabled the autoradiograph
function on the HDR and other similar devices. The licensee modified
its procedures to include the use of an independent mechanical timer
and provided additional training to its entire clinical staff.
State--The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control initiated an
inspection on April 27, 2010, and determined that the licensee's
corrective actions were adequate. No enforcement action was taken and
the State forwarded the final update of the event to the NRC on October
10, 2011.
[[Page 37451]]
AS11-08 Medical Event at Rhode Island Hospital in Providence, Rhode
Island
Date and Place--April 23, 2010, Providence, Rhode Island.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Rhode Island Hospital (the
licensee) reported that a medical event occurred during a thyroid
diagnostic uptake scan. The patient was prescribed to receive 7.4 MBq
(200 [micro]Ci) of iodine-123, but was administered 148 MBq (4 mCi) of
iodine-131. The administration resulted in a dose of approximately
3,108 cGy (3,108 rad) to the patient's thyroid, rather than the
estimated 7 cGy (7 rad) that would have resulted from the iodine-123
administration. The patient and referring physician were informed of
this event.
The patient's physician handed the patient a written prescription
for the iodine-123 scan, but the physician's office faxed an incorrect
order to the hospital for an iodine-131 scan. On April 23, 2010, the
patient presented the correct written prescription slip, for the
iodine-123, to the licensee's admitting receptionist. The receptionist
refused the written prescription, because she thought the hospital
already had the correct prescription in its records. The patient was
administered the iodine-131, and the whole body scan was performed. The
nuclear medicine technologist noticed something was wrong based on the
scan results. The impact of this event on the patient was not reported
by the licensee.
Cause(s)--The cause of this medical event was human error and
failure of the licensee staff to follow existing written procedures and
protocols.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee reviewed existing written protocols and
training procedures used for the nuclear medicine technologists. The
licensee's corrective actions included modifying the procedures and
conducting refresher training for the nuclear medicine technologists.
In addition, the licensee developed a thyroid interview and patient
assessment history sheet and now requires a pathology report for all
thyroid cancer patients before iodine-131 doses are administered.
State--The Rhode Island Department of Health, Radiation Control
Program, conducted an investigation of this medical event on April 30
through May 20, 2010, and issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to the
licensee. The Rhode Island Department of Health also issued a
regulatory citation regarding the licensee's failure to follow
established procedures and forwarded the final update of the event to
the NRC in September 2011.
AS11-09 Medical Event at Lovelace Medical Clinic in Albuquerque, New
Mexico
Date and Place--May 4, 2010, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Lovelace Medical Clinic (the
licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with an HDR
brachytherapy treatment for endometrial carcinoma; the treatment
consisted of 129.7 GBq (3.5 Ci) of iridium-192. The patient was
prescribed to receive a total dose of 21 Gy (2,100 rad) in three
fractionated doses to the vaginal cuff, but instead, the skin tissue on
the patient's thigh received 30.6 Gy (3,060 rad). The patient and
referring physician were informed of this event.
On May 4, 2010, the patient received the third fractionated dose of
7 Gy (700 rad) and, 1 week later, noticed the appearance of two
somewhat painful dark spots on the skin of her thigh. On May 18, 2010,
the patient notified the licensee of the appearance of the spots on her
skin and was examined by the prescribing physician the next day. The
prescribing physician did not diagnose the spots as radiation erythema
at this time, but asked the patient to return for a followup
examination approximately a week later. On May 26, 2010, the physician
identified two circular areas with a diameter of approximately 1 cm,
which were determined to be radiation erythema. The average skin dose
to the patient's thigh was calculated to be 30.6 Gy (3,060 rad) and the
thigh dose at a depth of 2.5 cm was calculated to be 4.08 Gy (408 rad).
The licensee concluded that no long-term medical effects are expected
for the patient.
Cause(s)--The medical event was caused by either improper placement
or workers inadvertently moving the catheter while adjusting the
patient for better alignment with the treatment device.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee revised its procedures to ensure that the
catheter is correctly positioned before the start of the treatment. In
addition, the licensee required staff training to address the procedure
updates.
State--The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau is conducting a
long-term investigation of the event and the licensee's corrective
actions and is still considering what, if any, enforcement actions to
pursue.
AS11-10 Medical Event at Lancaster General Hospital in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania
Date and Place--June 3, 2010, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Lancaster General Hospital
(the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with
an HDR brachytherapy treatment for ovarian cancer; the treatment
consisted of 310.8 GBq (8.4 Ci) iridium-192. The patient was prescribed
to receive 7.2 Gy (720 rad) in five fractionated doses, but instead
during one of the fractionated treatments received a dose of 19 Gy
(1,900 rad) to the small bowel (wrong treatment site). The patient and
referring physician were informed of this event.
On June 15, 2010, before starting the second treatment, the medical
staff noted that an incorrect target area had been previously entered
into the HDR device for the first treatment on June 3, 2010. The
medical staff noted that the intended treatment area in the written
directive differed from the actual area treated by approximately 3 cm.
This error in treatment area resulted in a dose of 19 Gy (1,900 rad) to
the small bowel. The licensee concluded that the medical event would
not have a significant medical effect on the patient.
Cause(s)--The medical event was caused by human error in that the
licensee entered the incorrect target area into the HDR device.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee implemented corrective measures including
procedure modifications to discontinue using the part of the HDR
software that allows for treatment offsets to occur.
State--The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
investigated the incident on June 21, 2010, and determined that the
licensee's corrective actions were adequate. No enforcement action was
taken and the State forwarded the final update of the event to the NRC
on November 14, 2011.
AS11-11 Medical Event at the Greater Baltimore Medical Center in
Baltimore, Maryland
Date and Place--July 9, 2010, Baltimore, Maryland.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Greater Baltimore Medical
Center (the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated
with a manual brachytherapy treatment for cervical cancer. The patient
was prescribed to receive 35 Gy (3,500 rad) to the cervix over the
course of 73 hours using 1.635 GBq (44.2 mCi) of cesium-137. While the
sources were being
[[Page 37452]]
inserted into the patient, one of the cesium-137 sources fell out of
the Fletcher-Suit applicator and into the patient's hospital gown.
Consequently, the skin tissue on the patient's buttocks received a dose
of 10.5 Gy (1,050 rad) from the errant source. The patient and
referring physician were informed of this event.
Sometime after the sources had been inserted into the patient, the
patient removed the hospital gown, folded it, placed it with the trash,
and donned a clean gown. On July 9, 2010, the oncologist and medical
physicist removed the sources from the patient and discovered that one
of the six sources was missing. The oncologist and radiation safety
officer subsequently located the source wrapped in the soiled hospital
gown in a bag designated for radioactive waste. The source was
retrieved and transported back to the Radiation Oncology Department's
source storage room. The licensee noticed no erythema of the patient's
skin and concluded that no clinically significant side effects would be
expected from the radiation exposure to the skin.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was the failure of the
source attachment to the applicator, coupled with failure of the
licensee to establish appropriate procedures to prevent the occurrence
of the medical event.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee plans to discontinue the use of the
Fletcher-Suit applicator used during this treatment and exclusively use
the Fletcher-Suit-Delclos applicator. The licensee also plans to revise
procedures for brachytherapy applicators and provide improved training
to the staff.
State--The Maryland Department of the Environment, Radiological
Health Program conducted an investigation on July 27, 2010, and August
18, 2010. On October 18, 2010, the Department issued a letter and NOV
to the licensee and forwarded the final update of the event to the NRC
in July 2011.
NRC11-03 Medical Event at the G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery VA Medical Center
in Jackson, Mississippi
Date and Place--August 4, 2008 (reported on September 8, 2010),
Jackson, Mississippi.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (the licensee) reported that a medical event involving prostate
cancer brachytherapy seed implants occurred at the G.V. (Sonny)
Montgomery VA Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi. The patient was
prescribed to receive a total dose of 145 Gy (14,500 rad) to the
prostate using 104 iodine-125 seeds. However, the seed placement
resulted in an approximate dose of 233 Gy (23,300 rad) to the patient's
rectum (wrong treatment site). The patient and referring physician were
informed of this event.
In September 2010, the medical center staff completed a followup
comprehensive external review and reanalysis of posttreatment dose
parameters for all prostate seed implants performed at the G.V. (Sonny)
Montgomery VA Medical Center for the period between February 2005 and
August 2008. Upon an evaluation of the updated dose information
generated by external review, medical center staff, working with the
National Health Physics Program, discovered this event. No adverse
effect to the patient is expected from the implant procedure, and the
licensee continues to monitor the progress of the patient.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was an anatomical anomaly
of the patient. The patient had an unusually thin tissue layer between
the prostate gland and rectum, which resulted in a small area of the
rectum receiving a higher than expected dose.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, working with the
National Health Physics Program and the medical center's staff,
performed an initial review of all prostate brachytherapy seed implant
procedures for the period between February 2005 and August 2008. The
initial review of this program resulted in the suspension of and
eventual termination of the medical center's prostate brachytherapy
implant program in August 2009. The followup comprehensive external
review and reanalysis of the program identified this event, which the
medical center reported to the licensee and the NRC.
NRC--In August 2010, the NRC issued an NOV and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalties to the licensee, based on the results of the initial
evaluation and analysis of several events associated with the
licensee's prostate brachytherapy implant program. The licensee was
cited for failure to have adequate written procedures and failure to
verify that the administered doses were in accordance with written
directives. The NRC has not taken any additional actions based on the
identification of this event.
NRC11-04 Medical Event at Community Hospitals of Indiana in
Indianapolis, Indiana
Date and Place--October 6, 2010, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Community Hospitals of
Indiana (the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred
associated with an HDR brachytherapy treatment for breast cancer; the
treatment consisted of 340.4 GBq (9.2 Ci) of iridium-192. The patient
was prescribed to receive a total dose of 34 Gy (3,400 rad) in 10
fractionated doses to the postsurgical cavity in the left breast
following excision of a cancerous tumor (treatment site). It was
determined that the first eight treatment fractions resulted in a
portion of the treatment site receiving a dose of 266 Gy (26,600 rad).
In addition, a portion of the patient's skin on the left breast and the
chest muscle tissue (tissue other than the treatment site) received
doses of 105 Gy (10,500 rad) and 1,002 Gy (100,200 rad), respectively.
The patient and referring physician were informed of this event.
On October 6, 2010, following the eighth fractionated treatment
dose, an error was discovered in the treatment plan by the medical
physicist who remembered that he had not changed a default entry in the
treatment planning system. This error caused the source placement to be
flipped 180 degrees along the applicator's long axis which resulted in
a portion of the treatment site at the tip end of the applicator
receiving less than the prescribed dose, and a portion of the treatment
site at the connector end of the applicator receiving more than the
prescribed dose. The licensee concluded that no long-term medical
effects are expected for the patient. The NRC contracted with a medical
consultant who determined that the overall impact to the patient is
minimal.
Cause(s)--The medical event was caused by human error in that the
medical physicist failed to change a default entry in the treatment
planning system as required by the licensee's procedure.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee revised its written directive form to remind
staff to change the default entry in the treatment planning system as
applicable, added a step to its procedure for multicatheter HDR breast
treatments to verify that the default was changed as applicable, and
trained its staff on the revised written directive form. In addition,
the licensee evaluated all of the other HDR breast treatments that
[[Page 37453]]
were conducted in 2010 to verify that the applicators were accurately
reconstructed in the treatment planning computer.
NRC--The NRC conducted a reactive inspection on October 18-20,
2010, with continued in-office review through January 18, 2011, and
issued two NOVs to the licensee on March 1, 2011, and April 20, 2011,
respectively.
AS11-12 Medical Event at Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Cleveland, Ohio
Date and Place--October 26, 2010, Cleveland, Ohio.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
(the licensee) reported, to the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) that a
medical event occurred associated with a radioembolization
brachytherapy treatment for liver cancer; the treatment consisted of
3.96 GBq (107 mCi) of yttrium-90. A postprocedure scan of the patient
identified significant undesired activity in the duodenum (wrong
treatment site). The licensee estimated that approximately 0.37 GBq (10
mCi) of activity was present in the duodenum, with a dose to the
duodenum of approximately 90 Gy (9,000 rad). The patient and physician
were informed of this event.
Approximately 3 weeks before the therapy, the patient was scanned
for extra hepatic shunting by injecting technetium-99m into the hepatic
artery. No shunting to the duodenum was identified during this
procedure. On October 26, 2010, the interventional radiologist
correctly inserted the catheter into the patient and its placement was
confirmed by a second interventional radiologist. During the
radioembolization treatment, the patient complained of pain, which
resulted in the medical staff performing a postprocedure SPECT/CT scan
of the patient. The SPECT/CT scan identified undesired yttrium-90
activity in the duodenum. The patient was hospitalized for observation
and possible intervention as a result of the dose to the duodenum. Some
ulceration of the duodenum bulb was observed, but no evidence of
perforation or bleeding was detected. The licensee is continuing to
monitor the patient for health effects from the radiation exposure.
Cause(s)--The licensee reported that the cause of the medical event
was that some collateral blood vessels became dominant and blood was
shunted through them to the duodenum, allowing movement of the yttrium-
90 microspheres. Although the licensee has not seen this relatively
uncommon occurrence in the past 3 years, it has been noted in other
treatment cases.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee modified its radioembolization therapy
procedure to include posttreatment imaging of yttrium-90 distribution.
This will allow the licensee to respond appropriately in the event of a
recurrence. The licensee's rate of occurrence is approximately 10 times
less than is reported in medical literature; therefore, no specific
action to prevent a reoccurrence is proposed.
State--On November 3, 2010, The ODH performed an onsite
investigation of the event. The ODH reviewed and approved the
licensee's corrective actions and took no enforcement action.
AS11-13 Medical Event at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago,
Illinois
Date and Place--November 23, 2010, Chicago, Illinois.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Rush University Medical
Center (the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated
with a brachytherapy seed implant procedure to treat prostate cancer.
The patient was prescribed to receive a total dose of 145 Gy (14,500
rad) to the prostate using 102 iodine-125 seeds. Instead, the seeds
were placed 4-5 cm inferior of the treatment plan (wrong treatment
site). The patient received an approximate dose of 273.5 Gy (27,350
rad), 112 Gy (11, 200 rad), and 183 Gy (18,300 rad) to the urethra,
perineum, and penile bulb (glans), respectively. The patient and
referring physician were informed of this event.
During the treatment, the iodine-125 seeds were manually inserted
into the prostate needle template via ultrasound imaging. Visualization
of the seed placement in the postimplantation scan was problematic for
the licensee's staff; however, the staff's initial estimate of seed
placement was that the seeds may have been inferior to the ideal
placement, but still in an acceptable location. An additional
posttreatment scan at the 4-week posttreatment mark indicated that the
seeds were placed 4-5 cm inferior to the planned treatment site. The
licensee surmised that the geometry of the template against the
patient's perineum shifted during the procedure, and pulled away from
the patient, perhaps due to leg movement or coughing. This placement
resulted in an elevated dose to the patient's urethra, perineum, and
penile bulb (glans). The licensee concluded that there were no observed
medical effects to the patient, and no long-term significant
complications are expected.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was the engorgement of the
prostate gland and surrounding tissue, which made the visualization and
placement of the seeds difficult during the implantation procedure.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee has indicated that these procedures will now
be conducted only where fluoroscopic imaging can be performed to
provide better ``real time'' imaging of seed placement, in addition to
transrectal ultrasound. Needle unloading procedures have been modified,
and ultrasound equipment quality assurance tests have been added before
each procedure.
State--The Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) conducted an
onsite investigation. The IEMA reviewed the event and other similar
treatment procedures at the facility and determined that this event was
an isolated incident. The IEMA approved the licensee's corrective
actions, and issued no citations or enforcement actions at the
conclusion of the investigation.
AS11-14 Medical Event at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center in Dallas, Texas
Date and Place--July 30, 2010, and September 16, 2010 (reported on
February 15, 2011), Dallas, Texas.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center (the licensee) reported the occurrence of a
medical event to two young adult patients prescribed colloidal
phosphorus-32 (ranging from 7.4 MBq (0.2 mCi) to 92.5 MBq (2.5 mCi) of
activity) for treatment of cranial cysts. The patients were prescribed
to receive a total dose of 300 Gy (30,000 rad) and 200 Gy (20,000 rad)
respectively, but instead the patients received an approximate dose of
565 Gy (56,500 rad) and 506 Gy (50,600 rad) to the cysts. These dosages
were 88 and 153 percent greater than the prescribed dosages. The
patients and referring physicians were informed of these events.
On February 15, 2011, the licensee discovered that two young adult
patients were administered doses of phosphorus-32 greater than 50
percent of the prescribed doses. The incidents were discovered when the
authorized user noticed an area of inflammation surrounding the cysts
and along the track of the drainage catheter. The authorized user
discussed these findings with the staff medical physicist who reviewed
the colloidal phosphorus-32 doses supplied by the nuclear pharmacy. The
licensee determined that
[[Page 37454]]
for both cases, the labels had the correct total activity, but the
incorrect volume and activity per unit volume. Therefore, the doses
were incorrectly labeled, and the concentration was approximately 60
percent higher than indicated on the labels. The licensee subsequently
calculated the doses to the target and surrounding tissues and does not
expect any patient impact or unfavorable outcomes as a result of these
events.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was that the two colloidal
phosphorus-32 prescriptions provided by the vendor's nuclear pharmacy
were incorrectly diluted and labeled. In addition, the licensee did not
perform a verification assay of the doses before their administration.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--To prevent recurrence, the licensee will obtain future
doses that have been calibrated to a National Institute of Standards
and Technology traceable standard. The licensee also will perform a
verification assay at its facility and will assess the dose volume for
calculating the specific activity.
State--On March 1, 2011, the Texas Department of State Health
Services conducted an inspection and reviewed the causes and the
licensee's corrective actions. The licensee was cited for a violation
for failing to perform a direct measurement of the dosage taken from a
bulk quantity for medical purposes.
NRC11-05 Medical Event at the University of Michigan Hospital in Ann
Arbor, Michigan
Date and Place--March 9, 2011, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University of Michigan
Hospital (the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred
associated with a radioembolization brachytherapy treatment of liver
cancer; the treatment consisted of 2.24 GBq (60.5 mCi) of yttrium-90.
The patient was prescribed to receive a total dose of 74.4 Gy (7,440
rad) to the left lobe of the liver, but instead, the patient received
an approximate dose of 159.4 Gy (15,940 rad). This dosage was in excess
of 100 percent of the prescribed dosage to the patient. The patient and
referring physician were informed of this event.
On March 9, 2011, before the treatment, the licensee's medical
physicist calculated the activity needed for the dose to the left lobe
of the liver. The medical physicist's calculations used the liver
segment volumes for the right lobe and medial segment combined, instead
of the much smaller left lobe. As a result of the volume calculation
error, the dose to the left lobe of the liver was 159.4 Gy (15,940
rad), which was in excess of 100 percent of the prescribed dose. The
licensee concluded that the elevated radiation dose to the patient's
liver will not result in permanent medical damage or loss of function.
The NRC contracted with a medical consultant who concluded that the
administered dose is unlikely to result in any significant adverse
effects.
Cause(s)--The NRC determined that the root cause of the medical
event was a lack of communication between licensee personnel which
resulted in an inaccurate written directive and subsequent medical
event.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee modified procedures by adding reviews of
treatment plans to ensure that written directives properly reflect the
treatment plan.
NRC--The NRC conducted an inspection on March 15 and 16, 2011, and
reviewed the licensee's corrective actions. On January 6, 2012, NRC
issued an NOV for failure to possess adequate procedures resulting in
the medical event.
AS11-15 Medical Event at Abbott Northwestern Hospital in Minneapolis,
Minnesota
Date and Place--March 17, 2011, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Abbott Northwestern Hospital
(the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with a
radioembolization brachytherapy treatment of liver cancer; the
treatment consisted of 1.11 GBq (29.97 mCi) of yttrium-90. The patient
was prescribed to receive a total dose of 30.8 Gy (3,080 rad) to the
liver, but instead, the patient received an approximate dose of 46.1 Gy
(4,610 rad). This delivered dosage was about 150 percent of the
prescribed dosage to the patient. The patient and referring physician
were informed of this event.
On March 18, 2011, after reviewing the treatment procedure from the
previous day, the licensee's radiation oncologist discovered that the
dose delivered to the patient's liver was actually 150 percent of the
prescribed dose. For further clarification, the radiation oncologist
brought this error to the attention of the lead medical physicist
responsible for the patient's treatment delivery. Upon investigation,
it was deduced that the medical physicist had not read the patient's
therapy written directive prescription correctly, resulting in a higher
than intended dosage being administered to the patient's liver. The
licensee's radiation oncologist and interventional radiologist
concluded that this elevated dose would slightly increase the patient's
risk of radiation-induced liver disease.
Cause(s)--The medical event is believed to have been caused by
human error in failing to correctly read the therapy written directive
prescription.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee implemented corrective measures, including
increasing the font and highlighting in a different color the final
dose on the written directive. In addition, the final dose is now
transferred automatically rather than manually to the spreadsheet
workbook used to draw up the dose. Also, procedures now require a
second individual to verify that the correct prescribed activity has
been transferred to the worksheet used for drawing up the dose.
State--The Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) conducted an
investigation on April 5, 2011. During the investigation, MDH met with
the radiation safety officer, the medical physicist and both radiation
oncologists involved with the incident, and several members of the
licensee administrative team. In addition, MDH reviewed the corrective
actions implemented by the licensee. The MDH did not issue any
violations or penalties associated with the event; however, MDH will
evaluate the licensee's corrective actions at its next inspection.
AS11-16 Medical Event at the University of California, Los Angeles in
Los Angeles, California
Date and Place--April 4, 2011, Los Angeles, California.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) (the licensee) reported the occurrence of a medical
event associated with a brachytherapy seed implant procedure to treat
prostate cancer. The patient was prescribed a dose of 144 Gy (14,400
rad) to the prostate using 101 iodine-125 seeds. Instead, the iodine-
125 seeds were implanted inferior to the target volume (wrong treatment
site), resulting in a dose to this tissue of 144 Gy (14,400 rad). The
patient and referring physician were informed of this event.
On May 3, 2011, the patient returned to the UCLA Department of
Radiation Oncology for a routine postimplant CT scan to verify seed
placement and final dosimetry endpoints. The routine postimplant CT
scan indicated that of the 101 total seeds implanted, approximately 72
seeds had been placed inferior to the target volume. As a result
[[Page 37455]]
of the seed misplacements, approximately 31 cm\3\ of normal tissue
inferior to the prostate received at least 144 Gy (14,400 rad) instead
of the prostate tissue receiving that dose. Rectal and bladder doses
were not significantly impacted by the seed misplacements and remained
within typical doses for prostate implants. The licensee concluded that
there was no harm to the patient from doses to the nontargeted tissue.
Cause(s)--The licensee reported that the cause of the medical event
was movement of the prostate gland during the implantation procedure,
coupled with insufficient ultrasound images needed to identify the
movement of the prostate gland during the procedure.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--The licensee temporarily placed the permanent prostate
seed implantation program on hold pending a review of the procedures.
Upon completion of the review the licensee changed the implant
procedure to require the verification of the base prostate plane and
needle placement using both axial and sagittal plane ultrasound views.
The licensee also did an internal investigation to determine if any
similar incidents of seed misplacements had occurred in the past and
reported that postimplant CT had been performed for at least the
previous 5 to 6 years without the detection of any significant seed
misplacement events.
State--The California Radiation Control Program investigated the
event and issued violations for failing to have adequate prostate seed
implantation procedures, failing to report the medical event within 24
hours of discovery, failing to provide a written report with all of the
required information for the medical event within 15 days, and failing
to have procedures and to adequately train staff and authorized users
for reporting of medical events.
AS11-17 Medical Event at St. Vincent Hospital in Green Bay, Wisconsin
Date and Place--May 15, 2011, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The St. Vincent Hospital (the
licensee) reported that a medical event occurred associated with HDR
brachytherapy treatment for breast cancer; the treatment consisted of
318.2 GBq (8.6 Ci) of iridium-192. The patient was prescribed to
receive a total dose of 34 Gy (3,400 rad) over 10 fractionated
treatments. Instead, the patient received 8.84 Gy (884 rad) to the
tumor site and a dose of 67.5 Gy (6,750 rad) to unintended skin tissue.
The patient and referring physician were informed of this event.
On June 6, 2011, the licensee determined that the applicator
catheter lengths measured using the check ruler were incorrect during
the breast cancer treatment. The licensee ascertained that the
incorrect measurement was the result of the wire being caught at the
apex of the curved catheter, approximately 4.5 cm from of the end of
the catheter. Members of the licensee's staff assumed that this
measured length was accurate because they were not aware of the nominal
catheter length. The Wisconsin Department of Health Services verified
that the nominal catheter length was not provided in the manufacturer's
written procedure, and the manufacturer determined that the check wire
used by the licensee met all design specifications. The licensee
concluded that there were no observed significant adverse effects to
the patient, and no long-term significant complications are expected.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was human error in the
failure to identify that the check wire was not inserted to the end of
the catheter's lumen and failure to identify an incorrect measurement
length.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--Corrective actions include obtaining a new measurement
wire that has the same flexible tip as the HDR dummy wire. The
treatment protocol was changed to incorporate the manufacturer's
expected applicator treatment distances. In addition, the licensee
developed a new policy and procedure, which emphasizes the due
diligence required by the staff before the first clinical use of new
HDR treatment applicators and guide tubes.
State--Based on its investigation conducted on June 14, 2011, the
Wisconsin Department of Health Services cited the licensee for failure
to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to ensure that
each administration is performed according to the provisions of the
written directive.
AS11-18 Medical Event at the University of Wisconsin--Madison in
Madison, Wisconsin
Date and Place--July 7, 2011, Madison, Wisconsin.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The University of Wisconsin--
Madison (the licensee) reported that a medical event occurred
associated with radioembolization brachytherapy treatment for liver
cancer; the treatment consisted of 1.05 GBq (28.4 mCi) of yttrium-90.
The patient was prescribed to receive a total dose of 120 Gy (12,000
rad) to the left lobe of the liver, but instead, the patient received
an approximate dose of 41.8 Gy (4,180 rad) to the right lobe of the
liver (wrong treatment site). The patient and referring physician were
informed of this event.
On July 7, 2011, the patient was scheduled for treatment for
multinodular hepatocellular carcinoma to the left lobe of the liver.
The dosimetry for yttrium-90 radioembolization brachytherapy treatment
was based on the volume (mass) of the left lobe. The written directive
specified the treatment of the left lobe of the liver; however, the
right lobe of the liver was treated in error. The licensee concluded
that the dose received was not medically significant to the patient.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was human error in not
correctly following the treatment plan as documented on the written
directive. The interventional radiologist forgot that he had changed
the initial target of the procedure after the dose had been ordered and
did not communicate that change to the rest of the staff.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--Corrective actions include a series of checks developed
to occur in the interventional radiology room before an administration.
Checks include a verbal confirmation between the interventional
radiologist and the medical physicist and confirmation of the patient
name, target area, dose, and route of administration. This checklist is
also compared to the written directive.
State--The Wisconsin Department of Health Services conducted a
reactive inspection on August 12, 2011, and did not issue any
violations to the licensee.
AS11-19 Medical Event at the Swedish American Hospital in Rockford,
Illinois
Date and Place--September 13, 2011, Rockford, Illinois.
Nature and Probable Consequences--The Swedish American Hospital
(the licensee) reported a medical event involving brachytherapy seed
implant treatment for prostate cancer. The patient was prescribed a
dose of 145 Gy (14,500 rad) to the prostate using 71 iodine-125 seeds.
Instead, 68 of the iodine-125 seeds were implanted in the large bowel,
the small bowel, and the bladder. The licensee calculated that the dose
to the prostate was less than 1 Gy (100 rad), but the unintended dose
to the large bowel was 10.2 Gy (1,020 rad). The patient and referring
physician were informed of this event.
[[Page 37456]]
On September 15, 2011, postimplant imaging of the patient revealed
that only three seeds were properly located in the prostate (target
site), indicating a dose significantly less than the prescribed amount
in the written directive. Postimplant imaging also revealed that seven
seeds were in the bladder; these seeds were immediately removed.
Additional postoperative imaging indicated that a number of seeds had
been placed in the bowel wall, bladder wall, and the lumen of the
bowel. On October 3, 2011, surgery was performed to remove misplaced
seeds. All but four seeds were removed from the patient. With the
removal of the seeds that the licensee was able to remove, the licensee
concluded that the medical event would not have a significant effect on
the patient.
Cause(s)--The cause of the medical event was a deviation from
protocol by not having a medical physicist present during the procedure
and not using fluoroscopy during needle placement.
Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence
Licensee--Corrective actions include emphasizing strict adherence
to prostate brachytherapy protocols.
State--The IEMA conducted an investigation on September 26, 2011,
and verified the root cause of the event as reported by the licensee.
The IEMA issued an NOV to the licensee regarding this failure to
implement appropriate procedures.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of June, 2012.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2012-15172 Filed 6-20-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P