[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 103 (Tuesday, May 29, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31655-31676]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-12687]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2012-0116]
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant
Hazards Considerations
Background
Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act
requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue
and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or
combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission
that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from May 16 to May 29, 2012. The last biweekly
notice was published on May 15, 2012 (77 FR 28626).
ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related
to this document, which the NRC possesses and are publicly available,
by searching on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-
0116. You may submit comments by the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0116. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: [email protected].
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules,
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
Fax comments to: RADB at 301-492-3446.
For additional direction on accessing information and submitting
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0116 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may
access information related to this document, which the NRC possesses
and is publicly available, by the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0116.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. Documents may be viewed in
ADAMS by performing a search on the document date and docket number.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0116 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly
disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as entering the comment submissions into
ADAMS, and the NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information in
[[Page 31656]]
their comment submissions that they do not want to be publicly
disclosed. Your request should state that the NRC will not edit comment
submissions to remove such information before making the comment
submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions
into ADAMS.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses and Combined Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.92, this means that operation of the facility
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination; any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or
combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of
Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2.
Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309,
which is available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland
20852. The NRC regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC
Library on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to
intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing.
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing
held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including
a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139,
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
[[Page 31657]]
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID)
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer
assistance in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form,
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document
via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted
materials in their submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
For further details with respect to this license amendment
application, see the application for amendment which is available for
public inspection at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland
20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
accessible electronically through ADAMS in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC's PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209,
301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected].
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Power
Station, Unit 3, New London County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: April 2, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Millstone Power Station, Unit 3 (MPS3) Technical
Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for snubbers to
conform to the MPS3
[[Page 31658]]
Snubber Examination, Testing, and Service Life Monitoring Program Plan.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is
presented below:
Criterion 1
Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed
change involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes revise TS SR 4.7.10 to conform the TSs to
the revised snubber program. Snubber examination, testing and
service life monitoring will continue to meet the requirements of 10
CFR 50.55a(g) except where the NRC has granted specific written
relief, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), or authorized
alternatives pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3).
Snubber examination, testing and service life monitoring is not
an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly
increased.
Snubbers will continue to be demonstrated operable by
performance of a program for examination, testing and service life
monitoring in compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a or authorized
alternatives. The proposed change to TS ACTION 3.7.10 for inoperable
snubbers is administrative in nature and is required for consistency
with the proposed change to TS SR 4.7.10. Therefore, the proposed
changes do not adversely affect plant operations, design functions
or analyses that verify the capability of systems, structures, and
components to perform their design functions. The consequences of
accidents previously evaluated are not significantly increased.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 2
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed
change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve any physical alteration of
plant equipment. The proposed changes do not change the method by
which any safety-related system performs its function. As such, no
new or different types of equipment will be installed, and the basic
operation of installed equipment is unchanged. The methods governing
plant operation and testing remain consistent with current safety
analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed
change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes ensure snubber examination, testing and
service life monitoring will continue to meet the requirements of 10
CFR 50.55a(g) except where the NRC has granted specific written
relief, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), or authorized
alternatives pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). Snubbers will continue
to be demonstrated operable by performance of a program for
examination, testing and service life monitoring in compliance with
10 CFR 50.55a or authorized alternatives. The proposed change to TS
ACTION 3.7.10 for inoperable snubbers is administrative in nature
and is required for consistency with the proposed change to TS SR
4.7.10.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion
Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA
23219.
NRC Branch Chief: George A. Wilson.
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Power
Station, Unit 3, New London County, Connecticut
Date of amendment request: April 12, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
permanently revise Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.4.g, ``Steam
Generator (SG) Program,'' to exclude a portion of the steam generator
tubes below the top of the steam generator tubesheet from periodic
inspections. Inclusion of the permanent alternate repair criteria
(PARC) in TS 6.8.4.g permits deletion of the previous temporary
alternate repair criteria (TARC) for Cycle 15. In addition, this
amendment request also proposes to revise the reporting criteria in TS
6.9.1.7, ``Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report,'' to remove
reference to the previous Cycle 15 TARC, and add reporting requirements
specific to the PARC.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The previously analyzed accidents are initiated by the failure
of plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed change
that alters the steam generator inspection criteria and the steam
generator inspection reporting criteria does not have a detrimental
impact on the integrity of any plant structure, system, or component
that initiates an analyzed event. The proposed change will not alter
the operation of, or otherwise increase the failure probability of
any plant equipment that initiates an analyzed accident.
Of the applicable accidents previously evaluated, the limiting
transients with consideration to the proposed change to the steam
generator tube inspection and repair criteria are the steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) event and the feedline break (FLB)
postulated accidents.
During the SGTR event, the required structural integrity margins
of the steam generator tubes and the tube-to-tubesheet joint over
the H* distance will be maintained. Tube rupture in tubes with
cracks within the tubesheet is precluded by the constraint provided
by the tube-to-tubesheet joint. This constraint results from the
hydraulic expansion process, thermal expansion mismatch between the
tube and tubesheet, and from the differential pressure between the
primary and secondary side. Based on this design, the structural
margins against burst, as discussed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121,
``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Steam
Generator Tubes,'' (Reference 25) are maintained for both normal and
postulated accident conditions.
The proposed change has no impact on the structural or leakage
integrity of the portion of the tube outside of the tubesheet. The
proposed change maintains structural integrity of the steam
generator tubes and does not affect other systems, structures,
components, or operational features. Therefore, the proposed change
results in no significant increase in the probability of the
occurrence of a[n] SGTR accident.
At normal operating pressures, leakage from primary water stress
corrosion cracking below the proposed limited inspection depth is
limited by both the tube-to-tubesheet crevice and the limited crack
opening permitted by the tubesheet constraint. Consequently,
negligible normal operating leakage is expected from cracks within
the tubesheet region. The consequences of an SGTR event are affected
by the primary-to-secondary leakage flow during the event. However,
primary-to-secondary leakage flow through a postulated broken tube
is not affected by the proposed changes since the tubesheet enhances
the tube integrity in the region of the hydraulic expansion by
precluding tube deformation beyond its initial hydraulically
expanded outside diameter. Therefore, the proposed changes do not
result in a significant increase in the consequences of a[n] SGTR.
The consequences of a steam line break (SLB) are also not
significantly affected by
[[Page 31659]]
the proposed changes. During a[n] SLB accident, the reduction in
pressure above the tubesheet on the shell side of the steam
generator creates an axially uniformly distributed load on the
tubesheet due to the reactor coolant system pressure on the
underside of the tubesheet. The resulting bending action constrains
the tubes in the tubesheet thereby restricting primary-to-secondary
leakage below the mid-plane.
Primary-to-secondary leakage from tube degradation in the
tubesheet area during the limiting accident (i.e., a[n] SLB) is
limited by flow restrictions. These restrictions result from the
crack and tube-to-tubesheet contact pressures that provide a
restricted leakage path above the indications and also limit the
degree of potential crack face opening as compared to free span
indications.
The leakage factor of 2.49 for Millstone Power Station Unit 3
(MPS3), for a postulated SLB/FLB, has been calculated as shown in
Table RA124-2 (Revised Table 9-7) of Reference 19. Specifically, for
the condition monitoring (CM) assessment, the component of leakage
from the prior cycle from below the H* distance will be multiplied
by a factor of 2.49 and added to the total leakage from any other
source and compared to the allowable accident induced leakage limit.
For the operational assessment (OA), the difference in the leakage
between the allowable leakage and the accident induced leakage from
sources other than the tubesheet expansion region will be divided by
2.49 and compared to the observed operational leakage.
The probability of a[n] SLB is unaffected by the potential
failure of a steam generator tube as the failure of the tube is not
an initiator for a[n] SLB event. SLB leakage is limited by leakage
flow restrictions resulting from the leakage path above potential
cracks through the tube-to-tubesheet crevice. The leak rate during
postulated accident conditions (including locked rotor) has been
shown to remain within the accident analysis assumptions for all
axial and or circumferentially orientated cracks occurring 15.2
inches below the top of the tubesheet. The accident induced leak
rate limit is 1.0 gpm. The TS operational leak rate is 150 gpd (0.1
gpm) through any one steam generator. Consequently, there is
significant margin between accident leakage and allowable
operational leakage. The SLB/FLB leak rate ratio is only 2.49
resulting in significant margin between the conservatively estimated
accident leakage and the allowable accident leakage (1.0 gpm).
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change that alters the steam generator inspection
criteria and the steam generator inspection reporting criteria does
not introduce any new equipment, create new failure modes for
existing equipment, or create any new limiting single failures.
Plant operation will not be altered, and all safety functions will
continue to perform as previously assumed in accident analyses.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change that alters the steam generator inspection
criteria and the steam generator inspection reporting criteria
maintains the required structural margins of the steam generator
tubes for both normal and accident conditions. NEI [Nuclear Energy
Institute] 97-06, Revision 3, ``Steam Generator Program Guidelines''
(Reference 1) and RG 1.121, ``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam
Generator Tubes'' (Reference 25), are used as the bases in the
development of the limited tubesheet inspection depth methodology
for determining that steam generator tube integrity considerations
are maintained within acceptable limits. RG 1.121 describes a method
acceptable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for meeting GDC 14,
``Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary,'' GDC 15, ``Reactor Coolant
System Design,'' GDC 31, ``Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant
Pressure Boundary,'' and GDC 32, ``Inspection of Reactor Coolant
Pressure Boundary,'' by reducing the probability and consequences of
a[n] SGTR. RG 1.121 concludes that by determining the limiting safe
conditions for tube wall degradation the probability and
consequences of a[n] SGTR are reduced. This RG uses safety factors
on loads for tube burst that are consistent with the requirements of
Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code.
For axially oriented cracking located within the tubesheet, tube
burst is precluded due to the presence of the tubesheet. For
circumferentially oriented cracking, the H* analysis, documented in
Section 4.0 of this enclosure, defines a length of degradation free
expanded tubing that provides the necessary resistance to tube
pullout due to the pressure induced forces, with applicable safety
factors applied. Application of the limited hot and cold leg
tubesheet inspection criteria will preclude unacceptable primary-to-
secondary leakage during all plant conditions. The methodology for
determining leakage provides for large margins between calculated
and actual leakage values in the proposed limited tubesheet
inspection depth criteria.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in any margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion
Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA
23219.
NRC Branch Chief: George A. Wilson.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
Date of amendment request: September 26, 2011.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
change the Technical Specifications (TSs) to adopt NUREG-1431,
``Standard Technical Specifications [STSs]--Westinghouse [Electric
Company] Plants,'' STS 3.8.3, ``Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting
Air,'' Condition E, regarding Diesel Generator [DG] starting air
receiver pressure limits.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
A. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Implementation of the proposed amendment does not significantly
increase the probability or the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. The DGs and their associated emergency buses
function as accident mitigators. The proposed changes do not involve
a change in the operational limits or the design of the electrical
power systems (particularly the emergency power systems) or change
the function or operation of plant equipment or affect the response
of that equipment when called upon to operate.
The proposed changes to TS 3.8.3 Condition D are consistent with
STS 3.8.3 Condition E, and they still ensure the DGs' ability to
fulfill their safety-related function.
Thus, based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
B. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a change in the operational
limits or the design capabilities of the emergency electrical power
systems. The proposed changes do not change the function or
operation of plant equipment or introduce any new failure
mechanisms. The technical evaluation that supports this License
Amendment Request included a review of the DG starting air system
capability to which these changes are bounded. The proposed changes
do not introduce any new or different types of failure mechanisms;
plant equipment will continue to respond as designed and analyzed.
C. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety?
Response: No.
[[Page 31660]]
Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers to perform their design functions
during and following an accident situation. These barriers include
the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment
system. The performance of the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant
system and the containment system will not be adversely impacted by
the proposed changes since the ability of the DGs to mitigate an
analyzed accident has not been adversely impacted by the proposed
changes.
Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel,
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC
28202.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos.
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County,
Illinois
Date of amendment request: January 31, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to describe the use of
an Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) cross-tie. Specifically, this change adds
information to the UFSAR describing the design and shared operation of
cross-tie piping between the discharges of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train
A motor-driven AF pumps.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The AF system is normally in standby and a failure of the AF
system during normal operations or emergency operations cannot
initiate any of the accidents previously evaluated. The use of the
AF Train A unit cross-tie does not interface with the reactor
coolant system, containment, or engineered safeguards features in
such a way as to be a precursor or initiator for an accident
previously evaluated. The AF system is capable of performing the
safety-related functions required to mitigate the effects of design
basis accidents. Conditions which impose safety-related performance
requirements on the design of the AF system include the following:
loss of main feedwater transient, secondary system pipe breaks, loss
of all a-c power, loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and cooldown
(after expected transients, accidents, and other scenarios). For the
non-accident unit, controls ensure compliance with existing TS
conditions that ensure one train remains operable and the condition
exists for a limited time. The AF system will continue to be used in
compliance with the existing conditions in the TS. Since the AF
system is assured of performing its intended design function in
mitigating the effects of design basis accidents, the consequences
of accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be
increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Failures of the AF system cannot initiate an accident. The
proposed use of an AF Train A unit cross-tie will not interface with
the reactor coolant system, containment, or engineered safeguards
features. Failure modes and effects described in the UFSAR are not
impacted. The electrical power supplies and AF system pumps will be
maintained in design basis train alignments. Use of an AF Train A
unit cross-tie will have no impact on the range of initiating events
previously assessed. Thus, the accident analysis presented in the
UFSAR is not impacted. The change is consistent with the safety
analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is not reduced. Results of the existing
UFSAR accident analysis are not impacted, and therefore the safety
margins are not impacted. The proposed change will not reduce a
margin of safety because the non-accident unit will be operated
within existing TS conditions. For the non-accident unit, controls
ensure compliance with existing TS conditions that ensure one train
remains operable and the condition exists for a limited time. The AF
Train A unit cross-tie is not a credited flow path in design basis
or needed to meet a safety function. The AF Train A unit cross-tie
is an additional strategy made available if a total loss of
secondary heat sink should occur. The AF Train A unit cross-tie
would be initiated if the feed flow to at least one SG cannot be
verified during the event, and an appropriate SG level cannot be
maintained to regain secondary heat sink. As such, the AF Train A
unit cross-tie is an improvement in emergency procedures for a total
loss of heat sink, and this improves probabilistic risk assessment.
The proposed change, therefore, does not involve a reduction in a
margin of safety.
Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of ``no
significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Jacob I. Zimmerman.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos.
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County,
Illinois
Date of amendment request: March 22, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
modify technical specification requirements regarding steam generator
tube inspections and reporting as described in TSTF-510, Revision 2,
``Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube
Sample Selection;'' however, Exelon Generating Company (EGC) is
proposing certain variations and deviations from TSTF-510.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the Steam Generator (SG) Program to
modify the frequency of verification of SG tube integrity and SG
tube sample selection. A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event
is one of the design basis accidents that are analyzed as part of a
plant's licensing basis. The proposed SG tube inspection frequency
and sample selection criteria will continue to ensure that the SG
tubes are inspected such that the probability of a SGTR is not
increased. The consequences of a SGTR are bounded by the
conservative assumptions in the design basis accident analysis. The
[[Page 31661]]
proposed change will not cause the consequences of a SGTR to exceed
those assumptions.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the Steam Generator Program will not
introduce any adverse changes to the plant design basis or
postulated accidents resulting from potential tube degradation. The
proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs or their
method of operation. In addition, the proposed change does not
impact any other plant system or component.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The SG tubes in pressurized water reactors are an integral part
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, as such, are relied
upon to maintain the primary system's pressure and inventory. As
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the SG tubes are
unique in that they are also relied upon as a heat transfer surface
between the primary and secondary systems such that residual heat
can be removed from the primary system. In addition, the SG tubes
also isolate the radioactive fission products in the primary coolant
from the secondary system. In summary, the safety function of a SG
is maintained by ensuring the integrity of its tubes.
Steam generator tube integrity is a function of the design,
environment, and the physical condition of the tube. The proposed
change does not affect tube design or operating environment. The
proposed change will continue to require monitoring of the physical
condition of the SG tubes such that there will not be a reduction in
the margin of safety compared to the current requirements.
The proposed amendment deletes the current TS 5.5.9.c.2 and TS
5.5.9.f.2 allowance to use ABB Combustion Engineering Inc. TIG
welded sleeves as a steam generator tube repair method. There are no
ABB Combustion Engineering Inc. (Westinghouse) TIG-welded sleeves
currently installed in the Braidwood Station, Unit 2, and Byron
Station, Unit 2, SGs. EGC has been informed by the sleeve vendor
that TIG welded sleeves are no longer commercially available. As a
result of this change, there are no available SG tube repair methods
for Braidwood Station or Byron Station. The proposed amendment
deletes TS 5.5.9.f, TS 5.5.9.c.2, TS 5.5.9.c.3, and references to
tube repair and sleeves in various TS. Removing the ability for tube
repair methods is conservative; therefore, the proposed change does
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of ``no
significant hazards consideration'' is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Jacob I. Zimmerman.
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit
1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire
Date of amendment request: April 30, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to the
Seabrook Emergency Plan are associated with the initiating conditions
involving a loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the
control room. The proposed changes revise the emergency action levels
(EALs) to include radiation monitoring indications within the aggregate
of safety system indications that are considered when evaluating a loss
of safety system indications rather than separate EALs.
Basis for proposed NSHC determination: As required by 10 CFR
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of NSHC,
which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes to the Seabrook Station emergency plan do
not impact the physical function of plant structures, systems, or
components (SSCs) or the manner in which SSCs perform their design
function. The proposed changes neither adversely affect accident
initiators or precursors, nor alter design assumptions. The proposed
changes do not alter or prevent the ability of operable SSCs to
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an
initiating event within assumed acceptance limits. No operating
procedures or administrative controls that function to prevent or
mitigate accidents are affected by the proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes will not impact the accident analysis. The
changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no
new or different type of equipment will be installed), a change in
the method of plant operation, or new operator actions. The proposed
changes will not introduce failure modes that could result in a new
accident, and the change does not alter assumptions made in the
safety analysis. The proposed changes revise emergency action levels
(EAL), which establish the thresholds for placing the plant in an
emergency classification. EALs are not initiators of any accidents.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
Margin of safety is associated with confidence in the ability of
the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant
system pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the
level of radiation dose to the public. The proposed changes are
associated with the EALs and do not impact operation of the plant or
its response to transients or accidents. The changes do not affect
the Technical Specifications or the operating license. The proposed
changes do not involve a change in the method of plant operation,
and no accident analyses will be affected by the proposed changes.
Additionally, the proposed changes will not relax any criteria used
to establish safety limits and will not relax any safety system
settings. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected
by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in plant
operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The proposed
changes do not adversely affect systems that respond to safely
shutdown the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown
condition.
The revised EALs provide more appropriate and accurate criteria
for determining protective measures that should be considered within
and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The
emergency plan will continue to activate an emergency response
commensurate with the extent of degradation of plant safety.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves NSHC.
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Florida Power & Light Company,
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Meena Khanna.
[[Page 31662]]
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-
026, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Burke
County, Georgia
Date of amendment request: February 24, 2012.
Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would amend
Combined License Nos. NPF-91 and NPF-92, for VEGP Units 3 and 4,
respectively, in regard to the Technical Specifications (TS). The
proposed amendment updates the TS for operator usability that more
closely aligns with the form and content of other improved Standard
Technical Specifications NUREGs. Specifically, the changes would result
in closer alignment with the guidance of the Technical Specifications
Task Force (TSTF) Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical
Specifications, TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, and with NUREG-1431,
Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants as updated by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved generic changes.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear
Operating Company (SNC) proposes to amend the VEGP TS. Evaluations
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed changes do not
involve significant hazards considerations are provided for each
change.
However, due to the significant number of changes associated
with the upgrade effort, SNC has grouped similar changes into
categories to facilitate the significant hazards evaluations
required by 10 CFR 50.92. Generic significant hazards evaluations
are provided for the Administrative, More Restrictive, Relocation,
and Detail Removed categories. Each individual Less Restrictive
change is addressed by a specific significant hazards evaluation.
Due to the large volume of changes, obvious editorial or
administrative changes (e.g., formatting, page rolls, punctuation,
etc.) have not always received an explicit discussion, but are
considered to be addressed by the applicable generic significant
hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
Each significant change to the TS is marked-up on the
appropriate page in Enclosure 2 of its submittal and assigned a
reference number reflective of the significant hazards evaluation
type. The reference number assigned to a change is used in the
Discussion of Change (DOC) in Enclosure 1 of its submittal which
provides a detailed description (basis) for each change supporting
the applicable significant hazards evaluation in Enclosure 6 of its
submittal.
10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Administrative Changes
SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes
identified as Administrative in accordance with the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined
that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable
to each Administrative change identified in Enclosure 1 and
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and
rewording the TS. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording
process involves no technical changes to the TS. As such, these
changes are administrative in nature and do not affect initiators of
analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient
events.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes will not impose any new or different requirements, or
eliminate any existing requirements.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because
the changes have no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. These
changes are administrative in nature. Therefore, the proposed
changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for More Restrictive Changes
This generic category include changes that impose additional
requirements, decrease allowed outage times, increase the Frequency
of Surveillances, impose additional Surveillances, increase the
scope of Specifications to include additional plant equipment,
broaden the Applicability of Specifications, or provide additional
actions. These changes have been evaluated to not be detrimental to
plant safety.
Changes to the TS requirements categorized as More Restrictive
are annotated with an ``M'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2
markup of its submittal.
SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4 TS. SNC has
evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as More
Restrictive in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR
50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each More
Restrictive change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of its
submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes provide more stringent TS requirements.
These more stringent requirements do not result in operations that
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an
accident or transient event. The more restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes do impose different Technical Specification requirements.
However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the
safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The imposition of more restrictive requirements either has no
effect on or increases a margin of plant safety. As provided in the
discussion of change, each change in this category is, by
definition, providing additional restrictions to enhance plant
safety. The changes maintain
[[Page 31663]]
requirements within the safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Relocated Specifications
This generic category applies to changes that relocate entire TS
Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). A specific DOC for each
TS identified for relocation is provided in Enclosure 1. This
evaluation will be applicable to each of the changes identified with
an ``R'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2
markup of its submittal.
SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as
Relocated Specifications in accordance with the criteria set forth
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of Amendment,'' and has determined that
the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable
to each Relocated Specification identified in Enclosure 1 and
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes relocate LCOs for structures, systems,
components, or variables that do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR
50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in TS. The affected structures,
systems, components, or variables are not assumed to be initiators
of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or
transient events. The requirements and Surveillances for these
affected structures, systems, components, or variables are proposed
to be relocated from the TS to a licensee controlled document that
is controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed
changes only reduce the level of regulatory control on these
requirements. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed
changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and adequate
control of existing requirements will be maintained.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because
they have no significant effect on any safety analyses assumptions,
as indicated by the fact that the requirements do not meet the 10
CFR 50.36 criteria for retention. In addition, the relocated
requirements are moved without change, and any future changes to
these requirements will be evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
NRC prior review and approval of changes to these relocated
requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, will no longer be
required. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior
review and approval. However, the proposed changes are consistent
with 10 CFR 50.36, which allows revising the TS to relocate these
requirements and Surveillances to a licensee controlled document.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Detail Removed Changes
This generic category applies to changes that involve removing
details out of the TS. These details are either supported by
existing content in the TS Bases or the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) or a commitment is made to add them to the TS Bases or FSAR.
The removal of this information is considered to be less restrictive
because it is no longer controlled by the TS change process.
Typically, the information removed is descriptive in nature and its
removal conforms to NUREG-1431 for format and content.
A specific DOC for each detail identified for removal is
provided in Enclosure 1 of its submittal. This evaluation will be
applicable to each of the changes identified with a ``D'' in the
Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of its
submittal.
SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes
identified as Detail Removed in accordance with the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined
that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable
to each Detail Removed change identified in Enclosure 1 and
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes relocate certain details from the TS to
other documents under regulatory control. The FSAR will be
maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR part 52,
Appendix D, Section VIII. The TS Bases are subject to the change
control provisions in the Administrative Controls Chapter of the TS.
Since any changes to these documents will be evaluated, no
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a
change in the methods governing normal plant operations. The
proposed changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and
adequate control of the information will be maintained.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because
they have no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In
addition, the details to be moved from the TS to other documents are
not being changed. Since any future changes to these details will be
evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control mechanism,
no significant reduction in a margin of safety will be allowed. A
significant reduction in a margin of safety is not associated with
the elimination of the 10 CFR 50.90 requirement for NRC review and
approval of future changes to the relocated details. Not including
these details in the TS is consistent with NUREG-1431, issued by the
NRC, which allows revising the TS to relocate these requirements to
a licensee controlled document controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR
part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII, or other TS controlled or
regulation controlled documents.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Less Restrictive Changes
This category consists of technical changes which revise
existing requirements such that more restoration time is provided,
fewer compensatory measures are needed, surveillance requirements
are deleted, or less restrictive surveillance requirements are
required. This would also include requirements which are deleted
from the TS (not relocated to other documents) and other technical
changes that do not fit a generic category. These changes are
evaluated individually.
[[Page 31664]]
Technical changes to the TS requirements categorized as ``Less
Restrictive'' are identified with an ``L'' and an individual number
in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of its submittal.
SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed technical
changes identified as ``Less Restrictive'' individually in
accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has
determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant
hazards consideration.
The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below.
L01 SNC proposes to amend TS 1.0, ``Definitions,'' by deleting
the definition for Actuation Device Test. Reference to ``overlap
with the ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'' that is cited in the definition of
Actuation Logic Test is replaced with ``overlap with the actuated
device.''
Current Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.7 (``Perform
ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'') and SR 3.3.2.8 (``Perform ACTUATION DEVICE
TEST for squib valves'') are deleted from current TS 3.3.2 and Table
3.3.2-1, Function 26, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation. The
equivalent requirement (using phrasing generally consistent with
NUREG-1431) is included in individual Specifications for the
actuated devices with the same 24 month Frequency as the deleted
SRs. The impact of this reformatting is such that more appropriate,
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the
associated device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Also,
current SR 3.3.2.9 is revised to eliminate the use of the Actuation
Device Test defined term and replaced it with verification of
actuation on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves reformatting and revising the
presentation of existing surveillance requirements (with no change
in required system or device function), such that more appropriate,
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the device
fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Revised surveillance
requirement presentation and compliance with TS actions are not an
initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected.
The consequences of an accident as a result of the revised
surveillance requirements and actions are no different than the
consequences of the same accident during the existing ones. As a
result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not
affected by this change.
The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of
structures, systems, and components from performing their intended
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change reformats TS requirements such that more
appropriate, albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when
the device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. However, the
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant
as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and
equipment is not being operated in a new or different manner. There
are no setpoints, at which protective or mitigative actions are
initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such,
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While
certain actions for inoperability of actuated devices are made less
restrictive by eliminating entry into Engineered Safety Feature
Actuation System (ESFAS) Actuation and Instrumentation inoperability
actions, no action is made less restrictive than currently approved
for any associated actuated device inoperability. As such, there is
no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L02 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.6, ``Reporting
Requirements,'' to delete TS 5.6.1, ``Occupational Radiation
Exposure Report,'' and TS 5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating Reports.'' This
change results in the renumbering of TS 5.6 sections, but does not
revise technical or administrative requirements. SNC stated that the
change is consistent with NRC approved Industry/TSTF Standard
Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-369, ``Removal of
Monthly Operating Report and Occupational Radiation Exposure
Report,'' Revision 1.
SNC has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination published on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067)
as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)
for TSTF-369, Revision 1. SNC has concluded that the proposed
determination presented in the notice is applicable to VEGP Units 3
and 4 and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).
L03 SNC proposes to amend TS to eliminate the use of the defined
term ``CORE ALTERATIONS'' and incorporate changes reflected in TSTF-
471-A.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates the use of the term ``CORE
ALTERATIONS,'' all Required Actions requiring suspension of core
alterations, and reference to core alterations in a surveillance
requirement. With the exception of a fuel handling accident, core
alterations are not an initiator of any accident previously
evaluated. Those revised Specifications which protect the initial
conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension
of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This Required Action
protects the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident and,
therefore, suspension of all other core alterations is not required.
Suspension of core alterations, except fuel handling, does not
provide mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore,
eliminating the TS presentation of core alterations does not affect
the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension
of core alterations does not affect the mitigation of the accidents
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described
[[Page 31665]]
in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new failure
modes are being introduced. The change does not alter assumptions
made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. Therefore, this
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Two events are postulated to occur in the plant conditions in
which core alterations may be made: a fuel handling accident and a
boron dilution incident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel
assemblies to prevent a fuel handling accident is retained as
appropriate. As such, requiring the suspension of core alterations
is an overly broad, redundant requirement that does not increase a
margin of safety. Core alterations have no effect on a boron
dilution incident. Core components are not involved in the creation
or mitigation of a boron dilution incident and the shutdown margin
(Mode 5) and boron concentration (Mode 6) limits are based on
assuming the worst-case configuration of the core components.
Therefore, core alterations have no effect on a margin of safety
related to a boron dilution incident. Therefore, there is no
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L04 SNC proposes to amend TS, Section 1.3, ``Completion Times,''
Example 1.3-3 to eliminate the Required Action A.1 and Required
Action B.1 second Completion Times, and to replace the discussion
regarding second Completion Times with a new discussion. SNC also
proposes to delete the second Completion Times associated with
current TS 3.8.5, ``Distribution Systems--Operating,'' Required
Actions A.1, B.1, C.1, and D.1.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates certain Completion Times from the
Technical Specifications. Completion Times are not an initiator to
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences
of an accident during the revised Completion Time are no different
than the consequences of the same accident during the existing
Completion Times. As a result, the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed
change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems,
and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant
consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to delete the second Completion Time does
not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system
settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The
safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change.
The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a
configuration outside of the design basis.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L05 SNC proposes to amend TS to eliminate LCO 3.0.8.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Technical Specification actions to restore equipment to Operable
and to monitor plant parameters are not initiators to any analyzed
accident sequence. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
continues to ensure that plant equipment is capable of performing
mitigative functions assumed by the accident analysis.
The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration,
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change does not alter the requirement to
restore compliance with TS and to monitor plant parameter status for
appropriate manual actions. Operation in accordance with the
proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed events will
continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the analysis.
Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry
standards, will continue to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L06 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.2.5 to eliminate the increased
frequency of verifying core power distribution parameters when the
On-line Power Distribution Monitoring System (OPDMS) alarms are
inoperable. This change retains the normal 24-hour Frequency and
eliminates the 12-
[[Page 31666]]
hour Frequency when OPDMS alarms are inoperable.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
A TS frequency for monitoring plant parameters is not an
initiator to any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation
in accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are maintained.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative
functions assumed by the accident analysis. No additional failure
modes or mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of
previously analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of
fission product barriers, plant configuration, and operating
procedures as described in the FSAR will not be affected by this
change. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents
will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the OPDMS
alarms do not impact a margin of safety. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed
events will continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the
analysis. Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with
industry standards, will continue to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L07 SNC proposes to amend the TS 3.3.1, 3.3.4, and 3.4.5 by
replacing the TS Required Actions requiring the reactor trip
breakers (RTBs) to be opened with two Required Actions: one Required
Action states ``Initiate action to fully insert all rods,'' and the
other Required Action states ``Place the Plant Control System in a
condition incapable of rod withdrawal.'' For consistency, TS
Applicabilities associated with RTB position are also being revised.
Applicabilities including ``RTBs closed'' are revised to state
``Plant Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods
not fully inserted.'' Conversely, Applicabilities including ``RTBs
open'' are revised to state ``With Plant Control System incapable of
rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative
functions assumed by the accident analysis. However, the change
involves allowing methods of compliance other than establishing or
verifying RTB open or closed status to determine the condition of
the capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not. The method of
establishing this status is not an accident initiator nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does allow methods of compliance other than
establishing or verifying RTB open or closed status; however, RTB
open or closed status will continue to be one appropriate and viable
method of establishing and verifying applicable plant conditions.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the
plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While
certain interlocks depend on RTB open or close status, these
interlocks and the association with RTB is not revised. When those
interlocks are required, the position of RTBs will continue to
dictate the appropriate protection system response. Allowing
alternate methods of establishing or verifying the condition of the
capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not, does not
impact any safety analysis assumption or plant response to an
analyzed event.
As such, there is no functional change to the required plant
conditions, and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
L08 SNC proposes to amend the TS by deleting current TS 3.3.1,
Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Required Actions D.1.1,
D.2.1, and D.2.2 applicable to inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux
channels.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. Overly restrictive and inappropriate Required Actions
are being deleted since adequate compensatory measures already
address the potential impact on radial power monitoring and the
appropriate compensatory and mitigative actions in the event the RTS
function is degraded for the Power Range Neutron Flux function.
Additionally, the Surveillances for TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt
Ratio (QPTR),
[[Page 31667]]
address the requirements unique to loss of Power Range Neutron Flux
monitoring for QPTR. Eliminating overly restrictive and
inappropriate Required Actions does not impact an accident initiator
or impact mitigation of the consequences of any accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change eliminates overly restrictive and
inappropriate Required Actions. However, the proposed change does
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints,
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of actuated
devices are made less restrictive by eliminating a potentially
unnecessary power reduction, and actions that could not be
performed, no action is made less restrictive than currently
approved for similar channel inoperability.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L09 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip
System (RTS) Instrumentation,'' Source Range Neutron Flux Actions in
Mode 2 for one and two inoperable channels. The change allows for
placing inoperable channels in bypass and/or trip thereby allowing
continued operation.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. However, the change involves providing actions allowing
bypassing and/or tripping one or two inoperable Source Range Neutron
Flux channels. Required Actions are not an accident initiator nor
credited with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The
actions continue to assure operation consistent with the design
provisions and within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions;
however, these actions are consistent with the design provisions and
with currently approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS
actuation functions. The proposed change does not involve a physical
alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment
is being introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While the change involves less restrictive actions, these
actions are consistent with the design provisions and with currently
approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS actuation
Functions. These actions do not result in any conflict with the
assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L10 SNC proposes to amend the TS, as follows:
TS 3.1.8 ``PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions--MODE 2,'' is
revised to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for TS 3.3.1,
``Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation'';
Current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16, Reactor Trip System
Interlocks requirements are removed;
Current TS 3.3.1 Action M is deleted;
Current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18, ESFAS
Interlocks (with the exception of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18.b,
Reactor Trip, P-4) requirements are removed; and
Current TS 3.3.2 Action J is deleted.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions explicitly
retained in TS are those assumed to actuate in the safety analysis.
The associated interlocks are necessary support functions for
Operability of these TS required RTS and ESFAS functions. The
removal of explicit interlock functions does not impact the design-
required actuation function. Plant equipment remains capable of
performing preventative and mitigative functions assumed by the
accident analysis. However, the change involves removing explicit
requirements, including actions that lead to reestablishing
operability of the assumed actuation functions; implicitly these
requirements are maintained and the actions remain viable for
reestablishing operability. Since the requirements for the safety
function Operability remains unchanged, removing the explicit
presentation of detail is not an accident initiator nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of
[[Page 31668]]
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
presentation of TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions moves the
associated interlocks from explicit treatment to becoming an
implicit support system feature, the function continues to be
required as necessary to support associated TS actuation functions.
In doing so, certain actions for inoperability of interlocks are
made more restrictive by now entering actions specific to the
supported function's inoperability which have shorter Completion
Times. However those actions are consistent with those currently
approved for inoperability of that function.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L11 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation,'' to delete:
Current Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, Source Range Neutron
Flux High Setpoint, third row for that function including
Applicability set ``3\(e)\,4\(e)\,5\(e)\'' and associated references
to Required Channel, Condition, and Surveillance Requirements;
Current Table 3.3.1-1, Footnote (e); and
Current Action R.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves removing certain actions that apply
during inoperability of all four source range channels to provide
indication. However, requirements and associated Required Actions
continue to apply to source range channels in separate TS. The
Required Actions removed are not accident initiators nor involved
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The remaining
requirements and actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves removing certain actions for
inoperability of all four source range channels; however, this
change does not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the
safety analyses and licensing basis. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR.
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of all four source
range channels to indicate are removed, requirements and associated
Required Actions continue to apply to source range channels in a
separate TS. When all source range monitoring channels are
inoperable, the remaining actions continue to assure operation
within safety analysis assumptions. These actions are consistent
with the actions presented in the NUREG-1431.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L12 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety
Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Actions related
to functions that result in valve isolation actuations. Current TS
3.3.2 Actions P, Q, R, S, T, and Z, are revised to ``Declare
affected isolation valve(s) inoperable.'' Additionally, the
following current Table 3.3.2-1 Applicability Footnotes are deleted:
(e) Not applicable for valve isolation functions whose
associated flow path is isolated;
(h) Not applicable if all main steam isolation valves
(MSIVs) are closed; and
(i) Not applicable when the startup feedwater flow
paths are isolated.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The less restrictive Required Actions are acceptable
based on the fact that the new actions are the appropriate actions
for the actuated equipment. Required Actions are not an accident
initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences of an
accident. The actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved
actions for the actuated equipment.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions;
however, the actions continue to assure operation within the
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved
actions for the actuated equipment. The proposed change does not
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR.
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
change involves less restrictive actions, the actions are consistent
with approved actions for the actuated equipment. These actions do
not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the safety
analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L13 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.3, ``Post Accident
Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation,'' as follows:
Function 12 is revised from ``Passive Residual Heat
Removal (PRHR) Flow and PRHR Outlet Temperature,'' to ``Passive
Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 flow & 1
temperature,'' to ``2.''
Function 17 is revised from ``Passive Containment
Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank Level and PCS Flow,'' to ``Passive
Containment Cooling System (PCS) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 level & 1
flow,'' to ``2.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing
[[Page 31669]]
on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change reduces the number of required Function 12
and Function 17 channels from three to two. Requiring the minimum of
two redundant channels is consistent with NUREG-1431 requirements
for meeting Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 PAM redundancy requirements.
The change also relocates the details of the specific channels
designed to satisfy the PAM requirements to the associated Bases.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the
plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant operations.
PAM functions are not initiators of analyzed events and therefore
the revised requirements do not result in operations that
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed
event. The PAM function affected by this change is designed to
accommodate single failure to support post-accident monitoring. The
change reduces TS requirements on excess required channels; however,
single failure redundancy continues to be required. Thus, the
proposed change does not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of
an accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
The TS Bases will be maintained in accordance with the change
control provisions of the TS Bases Control Program described in TS
5.5.6. Because any change to the TS Bases will be evaluated, no
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In
addition, the details being moved from the current TS to the TS
Bases are not being changed. NRC prior review and approval of
changes to these relocated requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.92, will no longer be required. Future change to these details
will be evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control
mechanism. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior
review and approval; therefore, there is no significant reduction in
a margin of safety.
L14 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.5, ``Diverse Actuation
System (DAS) Manual Controls,'' Table 3.3.5-1, ``DAS Manual
Controls,'' footnote b; current TS 3.6.7, ``Passive Containment
Cooling System (PCS)--Shutdown,'' Applicability; and current TS
3.7.9, ``Fuel Storage Pool Makeup Water Sources,'' LCO Notes 1, 2,
and 3; Applicability, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.9.1 Note, SR
3.7.9.2 Note, SR 3.7.9.3 Note, and SR 3.7.9.4 Note by deleting
``calculated'' with respect to decay heat.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS
requirements for the facility by not expressly specifying the method
of determining the decay heat value. These less stringent
requirements do not result in operations that significantly increase
the probability of initiating an analyzed event, and do not alter
assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient
event. The less restrictive requirements continue to ensure process
variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained
consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses.
Eliminating the imposition of single method of determining the decay
heat value has no effect on or a margin of plant safety.
``Calculating'' the decay heat value remains a viable option. The
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and
licensing basis. As such, there is no technical change to the
requirements and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
L15 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.4.8, ``Minimum [Reactor Coolant
System] RCS Flow,'' SR 3.4.8.1 from ``Verify that at least one
[Reactor Coolant Pump] RCP is in operation at >= 10% rated speed or
equivalent,'' to ``Verify that at least one RCP is in operation with
total flow through the core >= 3,000 gpm.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The change involves revising the acceptance criteria of
an existing surveillance requirement with no change in required
system or device function. Surveillance acceptance criteria are not
accident initiators nor involved with mitigation of the consequences
of any accident. The proposed acceptance criteria ensure that the
applicable analysis input assumptions are preserved. Therefore, this
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change revises the acceptance criteria of an
existing surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints,
at which protective or mitigative actions are
[[Page 31670]]
initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such,
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the
surveillance requirement acceptance criteria is made less
restrictive by removal of design margin that accounts for minimizing
stress and wear, and increasing equipment life, and the expected
operating limit on minimum RCP speed, this margin is more
appropriately maintained in the design and in operating and
surveillance procedures.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
L16 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.4.10, ``RCS Specific
Activity,'' Actions by deleting Required Action B.1, which requires
``Perform SR 3.4.10.2,'' within 4 hours.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS actions
for the facility. However, the less restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis. The performance of SR 3.4.10.2 is not related to an
accident initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences
of an accident.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and
licensing basis. The result of performing the additional
surveillance does not provide any additional margin of safety; as
such, eliminating the Required Action for performing the additional
surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in a margin
of safety.
L17 SNC proposes to amend TS as follows:
1. Current TS 3.5.2, ``Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs)--Operating,''
Condition D is revised from ``One CMT inoperable due to presence of
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``One CMT inlet
line with noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
2. Current TS 3.5.2, Required Action D.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore CMT inlet line noncondensible
gas volume to within limit.''
3. Current TS 3.5.2, SR 3.5.2.4 is revised from ``Verify the
volume of noncondensible gases in each CMT inlet line has not caused
the high point water level to drop below the sensor,'' to ``Verify
the volume of noncondensible gases in each CMT inlet line is within
limit.''
4. Current TS 3.5.4, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat
Exchanger (PRHR HX)--Operating,'' Condition C is revised from
``Presence of noncondensible gases in the high point vent,'' to
``PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
5. Current TS 3.5.4, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line
noncondensible gas volume to within limit.''
6. Current TS 3.5.4, SR 3.5.4.3 is revised from ``Verify the
volume of noncondensible gases in the PRHR HX inlet line has not
caused the high point water level to drop below the sensor,'' to
``Verify the volume of noncondensible gases in the PRHR HX inlet
line is within limit.''
7. Current TS 3.5.5, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat
Exchanger (PRHR HX)--Shutdown, Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Intact,'' Condition C is revised from ``Presence of noncondensible
gases in the high point vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line
noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
8. Current TS 3.5.5, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line
noncondensible gas volume to within limit.''
9. Current TS 3.5.6, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage
Tank (IRWST)--Operating,'' Condition B is revised from ``One IRWST
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in
one high point vent,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub
not within limit.''
10. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in
squib valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
11. Current TS 3.5.6, Condition C is revised from ``One IRWST
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in
both high point vents,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs
not within limit.''
12. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to
within limit.''
13. Current TS 3.5.6, SR 3.5.6.3 is revised from ``Verify the
volume of noncondensible gases in each of the four IRWST injection
squib valve outlet line pipe stubs has not caused the high-point
water level to drop below the sensor,'' to ``Verify the volume of
noncondensible gases in each of the four IRWST injection squib valve
outlet line pipe stubs is within limit.''
14. Current TS 3.5.7, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage
Tank (IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 5,'' Condition B is revised from
``Required IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST
injection flow path with noncondensible gas volume in one squib
valve outlet line pipe stub not within limit.''
15. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in
squib valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
16. Current TS 3.5.7, Condition C is revised from ``Required
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible
gases in both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow
path with noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line
pipe stubs not within limit.''
17. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to
within limit.''
18. TS 3.5.8, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 6,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible
gases in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow
path with noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line
pipe stub not within limit.''
19. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases,''
[[Page 31671]]
to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib valve outlet line
pipe stub to within limit.''
20. Current TS 3.5.8, Condition C is revised from ``Required
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible
gases in both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow
path with noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line
pipe stubs not within limit.''
21. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to
within limit.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS
requirements by not expressly specifying the method of determining
or restoring the noncondensible gas volume that can adversely affect
the associated flow path; however, the requirement that
noncondensible gas volume be within limit is not changed. These less
stringent requirements do not result in operations that
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an
accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and
licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The
amended actions and surveillances continue to assure that
noncondensible gas volumes are maintained and restored to within
acceptable limits. The change maintains requirements within the
safety analyses and licensing basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L18 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.6.8, ``Containment
Penetrations,'' LCO 3.6.8.d.2 to allow the penetration flow path to
be open provided it can be closed prior to steaming into the
containment. In conjunction, current SR 3.6.8.3 as well as the
corresponding containment Isolation function required in current TS
3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3.a for Modes 5 and 6, are
removed. This removes requirements for Operable containment
isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual operator actions
to affect any required isolation prior to steaming into the
containment.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change would remove requirements for Operable
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual
operator action to effect any required isolation. The design
provisions for instrumented closure signals are unaffected. The
isolation status of the penetration flow path is not an initiator to
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences
of an accident with the valves open and capable of being closed
prior to steaming into the containment are no different than the
consequences of the same accident with the current requirements. The
valves are currently allowed to be open, provided they can be
isolated. The accident analysis assumes cooling water inventory is
not lost in the event of an accident. Thus, closing the valves prior
to steaming into the containment will ensure this assumption is met.
As a result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
are not affected by this change. The proposed change does not alter
or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs)
from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences
of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The
proposed change does not affect the source term, containment
isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating
the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Further, the proposed change does not increase the types or amounts
of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor
significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public
radiation exposures.
The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis
assumptions and resultant consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to remove requirements for Operable
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, and allowing manual
operator action to isolate the purge valve penetration flow path
prior to steaming into the containment, does not alter the manner in
which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting
conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis
acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. The proposed
change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside
of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L19 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.9.6 ``pH Adjustment,''
LCO and current SR 3.9.6.1 trisodium phosphate (TSP) requirement
from the volume requirement of 560 ft\3\ to a weight requirement of
26,460 lbs. In addition, due to this change, Condition A and
Required Action A.1 is changed to refer to ``weight'' in lieu of
``volume.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or
[[Page 31672]]
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows for a lesser volume over time
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration. While the
total weight will remain constant and sufficient to assure safety
analysis assumptions are met, the unintended requirement to maintain
volume > 560 ft\3\, even after compaction and agglomeration is made
less restrictive. The TSP is not an initiator to any accident
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an
accident with the changed TSP weight limit are no different than the
consequences of the same accident with the current TSP limit. The
accident analysis assumes a minimum of 26,460 lbs of TSP, and this
value is being maintained in the TS. The assumed pH of 7.0 will be
maintained using the proposed weight of TSP. This pH will continue
to augment the retention of elemental iodine in the containment
water, and thus reduce the iodine available to leak to the
environment. As a result, the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed change does
not alter or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing their
intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating
event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does
not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological
release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences
of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change
does not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that
may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or
cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed
change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and
resultant consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to allow for a lesser volume over time
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration, while
maintaining the total weight to assure safety analysis assumptions
are met, does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting
safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are
determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected
by this change. The proposed change will not result in plant
operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L20 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.7.2, ``Main Steam
Isolation Valves (MSIVs),'' Condition D Note to allow separate
Condition entry due to any inoperable valve covered by the LCO, not
just the MSIVs.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows a separate Condition entry for each
affected flow path. The failure of the main steam line flow path
covered by the LCO to close is not an initiator to any accident
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an
accident are not affected since the inoperability in the flow path
is addressed to assure affected flow paths are isolated as assumed
in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of an
accident previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The
proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures,
systems, and components from performing their intended function to
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant
consequences.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis
and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change to allow a separate Condition entry for each
affected flow path does not alter the manner in which safety limits,
limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation
are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not
affected by this change. The proposed change will not result in
plant operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L21 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.8.1, ``[Direct Current] DC
Sources--Operating,'' by deleting SR 3.8.1.3 Note 2.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the
accident analysis.
The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of fission
product
[[Page 31673]]
barriers, plant configuration, and operating procedures as described
in the FSAR will not be affected by this change. Therefore, the
consequences of previously analyzed accidents will not increase
because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the
operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be
performed.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L22 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.8.2, ``DC Sources--
Shutdown,'' by adding a new Condition A to address inoperable
battery chargers.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the
accident analysis.
The proposed change does not involve any changes to SSCs and
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration,
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the
Operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be
performed.
As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L23 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.5.2, ``Radioactive
Effluent Control Program,'' to state that the provisions of SR 3.0.2
and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Radioactive Effluents Control
Program surveillance frequency.
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
A TS frequency for the determination of cumulative and projected
dose contributions from radioactive effluents is not an initiator to
any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance
with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial conditions
assumed in the accident analysis are maintained. The proposed change
does not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the
plant or change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The
proposed change will not impose any new or different requirements or
introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or
malfunction mechanism.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
[[Page 31674]]
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to
the frequency of performing the monthly cumulative dose and
projected dose calculations, will have no effect on the plant
response to analyzed events and with therefore not impact a margin
of safety. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures that
the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide the
margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring
and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue
to be performed.
As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
L24 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.5.3, ``Inservice Testing
Program,'' paragraph b from ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are
applicable to the above required Frequencies for performing
inservice testing activities,'' to ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are
applicable to the above required Frequencies and other normal and
accelerated Frequencies specified as 2 years or less in the
Inservice Testing Program for performing inservice testing
activities.''
SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of
amendment,'' as discussed below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The frequency for inservice testing is not an initiator to any
accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR, nor is it associated with
any mitigative actions to reduce consequences. Operation in
accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial
conditions accident mitigative features assumed in the accident
analysis are maintained. The proposed change does not involve a
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change
will not impose any new or different requirements or introduce a new
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety
analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to certain
frequencies for performing inservice testing, does not significantly
degrade the reliability that results from performing the
Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the
recognition that the most probable result of any particular
surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with
the SRs. As such, there is no technical change to the requirements
and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety. Margin of safety is established through equipment design,
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions
are initiated. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures
that the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide
the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate
monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will
continue to be performed. As such, there is no functional change to
the requirements and therefore, there is no significant reduction in
a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)
are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. M. Stanford Blanton, Balch & Bingham
LLP, 1710 Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 35203-2015.
NRC Branch Chief: Mark E. Tonacci.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and
Combined Licenses
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility
operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no
significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a
hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal
Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) The
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint
North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland 20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the
NRC are accessible electronically through the Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS) in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the PDR's Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by
email to [email protected].
Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne
County, Mississippi
Date of application for amendment: January 23, 2012, as
supplemented by letter dated March 21, 2012.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical
Specification (TS) 3.1.7, ``Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.'' The
license amendment request (LAR)
[[Page 31675]]
reflects the enrichment of the Boron-10 (B-10) isotope in the sodium
pentaborate (SPB) solution, which is the credited neutron absorber.
Increasing the enrichment of the B-10 isotope in the SPB solution
effectively increases the available negative reactivity inserted by the
SLC system without having to increase the system's storage capacity. In
addition, changes to the SLC system increase the operating temperature
range and decrease the solution volume. TS 3.1.7 has been reformatted
so that Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2 can be deleted and replaced with
various new action conditions and surveillance requirements. These
changes to TS 3.1.7 were originally included as part of the GGNS
Extended Power Uprate (EPU) LAR dated September 8, 2010. Due to delays
in obtaining approval of the EPU LAR and the need for the SLC system
changes to support operation with the Cycle 19 core design, Entergy
Operations, Inc. (the licensee), submitted this request separately. The
change is needed to ensure appropriate shutdown margin can be
maintained during reload design for future cycles beginning with Cycle
19.
Date of issuance: May 11, 2012.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
prior to startup from the spring 2012 refueling outage.
Amendment No: 190.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-29: The amendment revised the
Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 7, 2012 (77 FR
6148). The supplemental letter dated March 21, 2012, provided
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change
the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 11, 2012.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457,
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos.
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County,
Illinois
Date of application for amendment: March 14, 2011, as supplemented
by letters dated September 2, 2011, and November 18, 2011.
Brief description of amendment: The license amendment request
changes the facility operating licenses and the Technical
Specifications (TSs) 3.4.12-1, for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
and Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed change will reflect
standard wording incorporated in NUREG-1431, Revision 3, ``Standard
Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants,'' for plants with
installed bypass test capability. The proposed change is needed to
support utilization of bypass test capability that is planned to be
installed, which will reduce the potential for unnecessary reactor
trips or safeguards actuation due to a failure or transient in a
redundant channel.
Date of issuance: March 30, 2012.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment Nos.: Braidwood Unit 1--169; Braidwood Unit 2--169; Byron
Unit 1--176 and Byron Unit 2-176.
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72. NPF-77, NPF-37, and NPF-66:
The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 16, 2011 (76 FR
50759). The September 2, 2011, and November 18, 2011, supplements
contained clarifying information and did not change the staff's initial
proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 30, 2012.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power
Station, Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois
Date of application for amendment: June 13, 2011.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies Clinton
Power Station, Unit 1 (CPS), Technical Specification (TS) Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.2, ``Reactivity Anomalies,'' through
a revision to the method for calculating core reactivity for the
purpose of performing an anomaly check. The reactivity anomaly
verification is currently determined by comparison of predicted vs.
monitored control rod density. The proposed method would compare
predicted vs. monitored keffective (keff).
Date of issuance: March 1, 2012.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days.
Amendment No.: 198.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-62: The amendment revised the
Technical Specifications and License.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 4, 2011.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2012.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1), Dauphin County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendment: October 18, 2011, supplemented
by letters dated January 20, 2012, and April 11, 2012.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment involves
administrative changes. The changes include correcting typographical
errors, making format changes, clarifying symbols and pages,
reformatting of previously deleted pages, incorporating a consistent
abbreviation of average reactor coolant temperature, deleting notes
that are no longer applicable, and replacing certain drawing figures
with versions that have a corrected title block.
Date of issuance: May 7, 2012.
Effective date: Immediately, and shall be implemented within 60
days.
Amendment No.: 278.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-50: Amendment revised the
license and the technical specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 13, 2011 (76
FR 77567).
The supplements dated January 20, 2012, and April 11, 2012,
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not
change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards
determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 7, 2012.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket No. 50-388, Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station, Unit 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendment: March 8, 2012, as supplemented
by letters dated March 23, March 29, and April 2, 2012.
Brief description of amendment: On April 19, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission issued Amendment No. 258 to Renewed Facility
Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station, Unit 2 (SSES Unit 2). Due to a typographical error, the
amendment was incorrectly numbered. The correct
[[Page 31676]]
Amendment No. is 238. This amendment was originally noticed in the
Federal Register on May 15, 2012 (77 FR 28636). All references to
Amendment No. 258 in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's letter
dated April 19, 2012, have been corrected by letter dated April 27,
2012. The amendment allows an extension of 24 hours to the Completion
Time for Condition C in the SSES Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS)
3.8.7, ``Distribution Systems-Operating,'' to allow a Unit 1 4160 V
subsystem to be de-energized and removed from service for 96 hours to
perform modifications on the bus. It also allows an extension of 24
hours to the Completion Time for Condition A in SSES Unit 2 TS 3.7.1,
``Plant Systems-RHRSW [residual heat removal service water system] and
UHS [ultimate heat sink],'' to allow the UHS spray array and spray
array bypass valves associated with applicable division RHRSW, and in
Condition B, the applicable division Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem, to be
inoperable for 96 hours during the Unit 1 4160 V bus breaker control
logic modifications.
Date of issuance: April 19, 2012.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days from the date of issuance.
Corrected Amendment No.: 238.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-22: This amendment revised the
License and Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 16, 2012 (77 FR
15814).
The supplements dated March 23, March 29, and April 2, 2012,
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not
change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated April 19, 2012, which also contains its
final no significant hazards consideration determination.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of May 2012.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2012-12687 Filed 5-25-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P