[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 97 (Friday, May 18, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29721-29726]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-12035]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-66984; File No. SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Amex LLC; Notice of Filing of 
Proposed Rule Change Amending Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 
904 To Eliminate Position Limits for Options on the SPDR[supreg] S&P 
500[supreg] Exchange-Traded Fund Which List and Trade Under the Symbol 
SPY

May 14, 2012.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given 
that, on May 2, 2012, NYSE Amex LLC (the ``Exchange'' or ``NYSE Amex'') 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the ``Commission'') 
the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which 
Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing 
this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from 
interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex Options 
Rule 904 to eliminate position limits for options on the SPDR[supreg] 
S&P 500[supreg] exchange-traded fund (``SPY ETF''),\3\ which list and 
trade under the symbol SPY. The text of the proposed rule change is 
available at the Exchange, the Commission's Public Reference Room, and 
www.nyse.com.
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    \3\ ``SPDR[supreg],'' ``Standard & Poor's[supreg],'' 
``S&P[supreg],'' ``S&P 500[supreg],'' and ``Standard & Poor's 500'' 
are registered trademarks of Standard & Poor's Financial Services 
LLC. The SPY ETF represents ownership in the SPDR S&P 500 Trust, a 
unit investment trust that generally corresponds to the price and 
yield performance of the SPDR S&P 500 Index.
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II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization 
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the 
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the 
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at 
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared 
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most 
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The purpose of the proposal is to amend Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex 
Options Rule 904 to eliminate position limits for SPY options.

Background

    Position limits serve as a regulatory tool designed to address 
potential manipulative schemes and adverse market impact surrounding 
the use of options. The Exchange understands that the Commission, when 
considering the appropriate level at which to set option position and 
exercise limits, has considered the concern that the limits be 
sufficient to prevent investors from disrupting the market in the 
security underlying the option.\4\ This consideration has been balanced 
by the concern that the limits ``not be established at levels that are 
so low as to discourage participation in the options market by 
institutions and other investors with substantial hedging needs or to 
prevent specialists and market-makers from adequately meeting their 
obligations to maintain a fair and orderly market.'' \5\
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    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40969 (January 22, 
1999), 64 FR 4911, 4912-4913 (February 1, 1999) (SR-CBOE-98-23) 
(citing H.R. No. IFC-3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 189-91 (Comm. Print 
1978)).
    \5\ Id. at 4913.
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    SPY options are currently the most actively traded option class in 
terms of average daily volume (``ADV'').\6\ The Exchange believes that, 
despite the popularity of SPY options as evidenced by their significant 
volume, the current position limits on SPY options could be a deterrent 
to the optimal use of this product as a hedging tool. The Exchange 
further believes that position limits on SPY options may inhibit the 
ability of certain large market participants, such as mutual funds and 
other institutional

[[Page 29722]]

investors with substantial hedging needs, to utilize SPY options and 
gain meaningful exposure to the hedging function they provide.
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    \6\ SPY ADV was 2,156,482 contracts in April 2012. ADV for the 
same period for the next four most actively traded options was: 
Apple Inc. (option symbol AAPL)--1,074,351; S&P 500 Index (option 
symbol SPX)--656,250; PowerShares QQQ Trust\SM\, Series 1 (option 
symbol QQQ)--573,790; and iShares[supreg] Russell 2000[supreg] Index 
Fund (option symbol IWM)--550,316.
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    The Exchange believes that current experience with the trading of 
SPY options, as well as the Exchange's surveillance capabilities, has 
made it appropriate to consider other, less prophylactic alternatives 
to regulating SPY options, while still seeking to ensure that large 
positions in SPY options will not unduly disrupt the options or 
underlying cash markets. Accordingly, the Exchange proposes to 
eliminate the position limits on SPY options--currently 900,000 
contracts on the same side of the market.\7\ In proposing the 
elimination of position limits on SPY options, the Exchange has 
considered several factors, including (1) the availability of 
economically equivalent products and their respective position limits, 
(2) the liquidity of the option and the underlying security, (3) the 
market capitalization of the underlying security and the related index, 
(4) the reporting of large positions and requirements surrounding 
margin, and (5) the potential for market on close volatility.
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    \7\ See Commentary .07 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 904. See also 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64966 (July 26, 2011), 76 FR 
45899 (August 1, 2011) (SR-NYSEAmex-2011-50).
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Economically Equivalent Products

    The Exchange has considered the existence of economically 
equivalent or similar products, and their respective position limits, 
if any, in assessing the appropriateness of proposing an elimination of 
position limits for SPY options.
    For example, AM-settled options on the S&P 500 Index, which list 
and trade exclusively on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (``CBOE'') 
under the symbol SPX, are currently not subject to position limits.\8\ 
Moreover, SPX options are 10 times the size of SPY options, so that a 
position of only 90,000 SPX options is the equivalent of a position of 
900,000 SPY options, which is the current position limit for SPY 
options.\9\
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    \8\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44994 (October 26, 
2001), 66 FR 55722 (November 2, 2001) (SR-CBOE-2001-22). Position 
limits were also eliminated for options on the S&P 100 Index (option 
symbol OEX) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (option symbol 
DJX).
    \9\ The Exchange notes that the reduced-value option on the S&P 
500 Index (option symbol XSP) is the equivalent size of SPY options 
and, similar to SPX options, is not subject to position limits. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 56350 (September 4, 2007), 72 FR 
51878 (September 11, 2007) (SR-CBOE-2007-79).
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    Similarly, the C2 Options Exchange (``C2'') has recently introduced 
a PM-settled S&P 500 cash settled contract (``SPXPM''), which also is 
not subject to position limits.\10\ This contract, unlike the existing 
SPX contract, is cash-settled based on the closing value of the S&P 500 
Index. In this respect, SPXPM is very much like SPY options in that it 
is settled at the close, albeit into cash as opposed to shares of the 
underlying like SPY options.
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    \10\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65256 (September 2, 
2011), 76 FR 55969 (September 9, 2011) (SR-C2-2011-008) (``SPXPM 
Approval'').
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    The Exchange believes that, because SPX, SPXPM, and SPY options are 
ultimately derivative of the same benchmark--the S&P 500 Index--they 
should be treated equally from a position limit perspective. As a 
practical matter, investors utilize SPX, SPXPM, and SPY options and 
their respective underlying instruments and futures to gain exposure to 
the same benchmark index: The S&P 500. Further, because the creation 
and redemption process for the underlying SPY ETF allows large 
investors to transfer positions from a basket of stocks comprising the 
S&P 500 index to an equivalent number of ETF shares (and the reverse) 
with relative ease, there is no reason to disadvantage options 
overlying the one versus the other. The Exchange believes that this 
view is supported by the recent expansion of various exemptions from 
position limits, such as the Delta-Based Equity Hedge Exemption \11\ 
for positions of a member, member organization or non-member affiliate 
that are delta neutral, which allows SPY option positions to be delta-
hedged by positions in SPX options. Given that SPX options are not 
subject to position limits, a member or member organization (or non-
member affiliate thereof) could theoretically establish a position in 
SPY options far in excess of the current 900,000 contract limit, 
provided that the position is hedged with SPX options. The Exchange 
believes that this situation accurately reflects the economic 
equivalence of SPX and SPY options, supporting the Exchange's proposal 
to further acknowledge this equivalence by eliminating position limits 
in SPY options.
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    \11\ See Commentary .10 to NYSE Amex Options Rule 904.
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    The Exchange also believes that Commission findings in approving 
the SPXPM options further support treating SPY options in the same 
manner as SPX and SPXPM options for purposes of position limits. In 
particular, the Commission noted in approving SPXPM options that ``C2's 
proposal will offer investors another investment option through which 
they could obtain and hedge exposure to the S&P 500 stocks,'' and that 
``C2's proposal will provide investors with the ability to trade an 
option on the S&P 500 index in an all-electronic market, which may 
better meet the needs of investors who may prefer to trade 
electronically.'' \12\ The Commission also noted that ``C2's proposal 
will provide investors with added flexibility through an additional 
product that may be better tailored to meet their particular 
investment, hedging, and trading needs.'' \13\ The Exchange believes 
that these Commission findings apply equally to SPY options. In this 
respect, SPY options with no position limit will (1) offer investors 
another investment option through which they could obtain and hedge 
significant levels of exposure to the S&P 500 stocks, (2) be available 
to trade on the Exchange (and presumably all other U.S. options 
exchanges) electronically, and (3) provide investors with added 
flexibility through an additional product that may be better tailored 
to meet their particular investment, hedging, and trading needs, 
because, among other things, they are PM-settled.
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    \12\ See SPXPM Approval at 55975.
    \13\ Id.
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    The Exchange notes that, with respect to competition amongst 
economically equivalent products, a 2005 paper by Hans Dutt and 
Lawrence Harris that set forth a model to determine appropriate 
position limits for cash-settled index derivatives observed that 
``markets and their regulators should take a closer look at the 
underlying economic rationale for the levels at which they currently 
set their position limits to ensure that the limits adequately protect 
markets from manipulation and that inconsistent position limits do not 
produce competitive advantages and disadvantages among contracts.'' 
\14\ On this point, the Exchange believes that if no position limits 
have been found to be warranted on both SPX and SPXPM options, then 
such treatment should be extended to SPY options so that inconsistent 
position limits do not produce competitive advantages and disadvantages 
among contracts.
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    \14\ The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 25, no. 10, 945-965, 
949 (2005) (``Position Limits for Cash-Settled Derivative 
Contracts,'' by Hans R. Dutt and Lawrence E. Harris) (``Dutt-Harris 
Paper''). In the paper, the authors examined existing position 
limits to determine whether they were consistent with the model the 
authors developed, and found that the results indicated that 
existing limits were not correlated with the limits suggested by 
their model.
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    In addition, the Exchange notes that the Dutt-Harris Paper focuses 
its attention on the concerns relating to manipulation of cash-settled 
derivatives, stating that ``[a]lthough

[[Page 29723]]

several scholars have argued that cash settlement may increase the risk 
of market manipulation, until recently, the theoretical problems 
arising from potential cash settlement manipulation has been considered 
minor, as evidenced by the lack of academic interest in this area.'' 
\15\ The paper further noted that ``[t]he reason for this may arise 
from the fact that most exchange-traded derivative index contracts that 
are cash settled are broad-based, and each of the underlying components 
typically possesses ample liquidity,'' and that ``manipulation of the 
underlying components would likely be extremely costly to the would-be 
manipulator.'' \16\ This suggests that whatever manipulation risk does 
exist in a cash-settled, broad-based product such as SPXPM, the 
corresponding manipulation risk in a physically-settled, but equally 
broad-based product such as SPY, is likely to be equally low, if not 
lower.
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    \15\ Id. at 946.
    \16\ Id.
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    Similarly, the Exchange notes that in the Dutt-Harris Paper the 
authors observed that the lack of scholarly interest in the cash-
settlement manipulation problem may have been ``due to the fact that, 
until recently, most U.S. exchange-traded cash-settled derivative 
contracts were based on broad indices of very liquid stocks,'' and that 
``[m]anipulation of such instruments require very large trades that are 
costly to make and easy to detect through conventional surveillance.'' 
\17\ This observation applies equally to SPY options, which are based 
on a broad index of very liquid stocks and can easily be created by 
submitting a position in the underlying securities. Moreover, it 
provides additional support for the Exchange's view that the enhanced 
reporting and surveillance for SPY options discussed below adequately 
address concerns about manipulation.\18\
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    \17\ Id. at 948.
    \18\ The authors of the Dutt-Harris Paper further posited that 
``position limits need only apply during the period when cash 
settlement takes place.'' Id. at 964. The Exchange notes that no 
such period exists with respect to SPY options, which are physically 
settled.
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Liquidity in the Option and the Underlying Security

    The Exchange has also considered the liquidity of SPY options and 
the underlying SPY ETF in assessing the appropriateness of proposing an 
elimination of position limits for SPY options.
    In approving the elimination of position and exercise limits on SPX 
options, the Commission noted that the deep, liquid markets for the 
securities underlying the S&P 500 Index reduced concerns regarding 
market manipulation or disruption in the underlying markets.\19\ The 
Commission further noted that removing position limits for SPX options 
could also bring additional depth and liquidity, in terms of both 
volume and open interest, without increasing concerns regarding 
intermarket manipulations or disruptions of the options or the 
underlying securities.\20\ The Exchange similarly believes that this 
would be the case if position limits for SPY options were eliminated.
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    \19\ See supra note 4 at 4913.
    \20\ Id.
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    In this regard, both the SPY ETF and SPY options similarly exhibit 
deep, liquid markets. However, SPY options are not as active as SPX 
options when adjusted for the difference in their notional size.\21\ As 
described below, the Exchange believes that this is partly due to the 
existence of position limits for SPY options. The table below compares 
the ADV in both SPX and SPY options, and includes an ``implied SPY 
volume'' figure that reflects theoretical SPY ADV without the 
constraint of position limits:
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    \21\ SPX options have a notional value 10 times greater than SPY 
options (i.e., one SPX contract equals 10 SPY contracts).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Implied SPY
           Date range               Trade days    SPX option ADV  SPY option ADV    Implied SPY     option ADV
                                                                                    option ADV       shortfall
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Jan 1, 2011 to Dec 31, 2011.....             252       1,567,535       5,789,511      15,675,353       9,885,842
Jan 1,2012 to Apr 19, 2012......              75       1,343,735       4,525,709      13,437,353       8,911,644
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    The Exchange believes that certain factors may result in SPX 
options--adjusted for their larger notional size--currently trading 
with greater volume than SPY options.\22\ In this regard, the Exchange 
believes that, based on input from various market participants, the 
existence of position limits in SPY options is reason in itself to 
instead utilize SPX options. Anecdotally, market participants perceive 
value in avoiding the regulatory risk of exceeding the SPY option 
position limit by instead using SPX options for their hedging needs. 
The Exchange also believes that, while exemptions are available with 
respect to position limits for SPY options, such exemptions, and the 
regulatory burden attendant therewith, may dissuade investors from 
using SPY options when they can instead use an SPX option without the 
need for such an exemption. Because SPY and SPX options are 
economically equivalent products, an investor deciding between the two 
would generally trade the product with the least barriers or 
requirements to engage in such activity. In this respect, SPX options 
are currently the easier product to trade.
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    \22\ The Exchange notes that the ``Implied SPY Option ADV 
Shortfall'' has narrowed over time and at an accelerated rate, which 
the Exchange believes is a direct result of the implementation of 
the Delta-Based Equity Hedge Exemption that allows SPY options to be 
hedged via SPX options.
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    As a further comparison, the following table sets forth certain 
data for both the SPY ETF and the combined volume for the component 
securities upon which the S&P 500 Index is based:

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                                 S&P 500 Index       S&P 500 Index
                                  underlying      underlying component                    SPY ETF average daily
          Date range             component ADV    average daily value      SPY ETF ADV         value traded
                                     \23\                traded
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Jan. 1, 2011 to Dec. 31, 2011.   3,289,595,675       $4,149,726,217,456     218,227,747          $27,297,097,993
Jan. 1, 2012 to Apr. 19, 2012.   2,851,457,600        3,860,704,307,080     145,164,527           19,684,577,239
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[[Page 29724]]

    This data shows that there is tremendous liquidity in both SPY ETF 
shares and the component securities upon which the S&P 500 Index is 
based. While the ADV for the components underlying the S&P 500 Index is 
greater than the ADV for the SPY ETF, the Exchange believes that SPY 
ETF volume has been, is currently and will likely continue to be within 
a range that the Commission has previously determined to be a deep, 
liquid market.\24\
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    \23\ The data considers the aggregate volume for all component 
stocks of the S&P 500 Index.
    \24\ See supra note 4 at n. 13. The ADV for the components of 
the indexes underlying the options for which position limits were 
eliminated were 94.77 million shares (DJX), 244.3 million shares 
(OEX), and 757.5 million shares (SPX).
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Market Capitalization of the Underlying Security and the Related Index

    The Exchange has also considered the market capitalization of the 
SPY ETF and the S&P 500 Index in assessing the appropriateness of 
proposing an elimination of position limits for SPY options.
    The Exchange understands that the Commission similarly considered 
the market capitalization of the underlying index when it approved the 
elimination of position limits in SPX options. Accordingly, the 
Exchange believes that the capitalization of and the deep, liquid 
markets for the underlying SPY ETF reduces concerns regarding market 
manipulation or disruption in the underlying market. The table below 
shows the market capitalization of the SPY ETF and the S&P 500 Index:

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                                                                 Average S&P 500 Index   Average SPY ETF  market
                          Date range                                   market cap                  cap
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Jan. 1, 2011 to Dec. 31, 2011.................................      $11,818,270,341,270          $89,533,777,897
Jan. 1, 2012 to Apr. 19, 2012.................................       12,547,946,920,000           99,752,986,022
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    This data shows the enormous capitalization of both the SPY ETF and 
the component securities upon which the S&P 500 Index is based. While 
the capitalization for the components underlying the S&P 500 Index is 
greater than that for the SPY ETF, the Exchange believes that the SPY 
ETF capitalization has nonetheless been, is currently and will likely 
continue to be at a level consistent with that which the Commission has 
previously determined to be enormously capitalized.\25\
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    \25\ See supra note 9 at 51879. Specifically, the market 
capitalization of the component securities of the Russell 2000 Index 
(``RUT'') of $1.73 trillion was determined to be enormously 
capitalized.
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    The Exchange notes that the theoretical limit on one's ability to 
hedge both SPX and SPY options is the full market capitalization of the 
S&P 500 Index itself. This similarly contributes to the Exchange's 
determination that it is appropriate for position limits on SPY options 
to be eliminated.

Large Position Reporting and Margin Requirements

    The Exchange has also considered the reporting of large option 
positions and related margin requirements in assessing the 
appropriateness of proposing an elimination of position limits for SPY 
options.
    The Exchange notes that the Large Option Position Reporting 
(``LOPR'') requirement in NYSE Amex Options Rule 906 would continue to 
apply. Rule 906 requires members and member organizations to file a 
report with the Exchange with respect to each account in which the 
member or member organization has an interest; each account of a 
partner, officer, director, trustee or employee of such member 
organization; and each customer account that has established an 
aggregate position (whether long or short) that meets certain 
determined thresholds (e.g., 200 or more option contracts if the 
underlying security is a stock or Exchange-Traded Fund Share). Rule 906 
also permits the Exchange to impose a higher margin requirement upon 
the account of a member or member organization when it determines that 
the account maintains an under-hedged position.
    Monitoring accounts maintaining large positions provides the 
Exchange with the information necessary to determine whether to impose 
additional margin and/or whether to assess capital charges upon a 
member organization carrying the account. In addition, the Commission's 
net capital rule, Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Act''),\26\ imposes a capital charge on members to the extent of 
any margin deficiency resulting from the higher margin requirement, 
which should serve as an additional form of protection.
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    \26\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
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    In approving SPXPM, the Commission addressed concerns about the 
lack of a position limit by noting that CBOE will rely on its enhanced 
surveillance requirements and procedures for SPX options to monitor 
trading activity in SPXPM options.\27\ Similarly, the Exchange notes 
that certain option products are currently traded on the Exchange 
without position limits (e.g., the NASDAQ[supreg] 100 Index option 
(option symbol NDX) and the Russell 2000[supreg] Index option (option 
symbol RUT)), and believes that the reporting, surveillance and 
monitoring mechanisms in place for these products are effective and 
could easily accommodate SPY options if position limits thereon are 
eliminated.
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    \27\ See SPXPM Approval at 55972.
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Market on Close Volatility

    The Exchange has also considered the potential for resulting or 
increased market on close volatility in assessing the appropriateness 
of proposing an elimination of position limits for SPY options.
    SPY options are American-style, physically settled options that can 
be exercised at any time and settle into shares of the underlying SPY 
ETF. A key characteristic of the SPY ETF is that the number of shares 
outstanding is limited only by the number of shares available in the 
component securities of the S&P 500 Index, which can be used to create 
additional SPY ETF shares as needed. This in-kind creation and 
redemption mechanism has proven to be quite robust, as evidenced by the 
SPY ETF's close tracking of its benchmark index and the relatively 
small premiums or discounts to Net Asset Value (``NAV'') that it has 
historically exhibited.\28\ Additionally, the ability to hedge with SPX 
options against the stocks underlying the S&P 500 is limited to the 
shares outstanding for those stocks--the same limit that applies to 
hedging with SPY options. Accordingly, the Exchange believes that the 
risk of distortions to the market resulting from the elimination of 
position limits in SPY options is no greater than the risk presented by 
SPX options not being subject to position limits.
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    \28\ See SPDR[supreg] S&P 500[supreg] ETF Trust, Annual Report 
(September 30, 2011), available at https://www.spdrs.com/library-content/public/SPY%20Annual%20Report%2009.30.11.pdf.
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    As a physically-settled option, SPY options can be easily hedged 
via long or short positions in SPY ETF shares, which, as noted above, 
can be easily

[[Page 29725]]

created or redeemed as needed. With a physically-settled contract such 
as SPY options, once a hedge in the form of a long or short position is 
obtained, that hedge can only be lost if the underlying security 
becomes hard to borrow and the short position is bought in.\29\ The 
Exchange believes that this ability to hedge with shares of the SPY ETF 
is very important, and reduces the likelihood of market on close 
volatility in the component securities underlying the S&P 500 Index 
(i.e., a market participant can remain fully hedged through expiration 
via shares of the SPY ETF), which should also be the case if position 
limits for SPY options are eliminated. At the same time, the Exchange 
believes that the elimination of position limits for SPY options would 
not increase market volatility or facilitate the ability to manipulate 
the market. The Exchange believes that any potential concern regarding 
volatility at the closing that could result from an elimination in the 
position limits for SPY options is further alleviated by the current 
trading environment, including that there are markets for individual 
securities on more than one exchange, via unlisted trading privileges, 
that there is wide dispersion of trading across multiple exchanges, and 
that exchange procedures and systems are designed to facilitate orderly 
closings, even when there is volatility.\30\
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    \29\ As noted, the in-kind creation and redemption process 
allows for short term imbalances in supply and demand to be resolved 
readily, which in turn reduces the likelihood of getting ``bought 
in'' on a short position in SPY. Since the implementation of 
Regulation SHO, SPY has never been on the threshold security list, 
which further evidences the efficacy of the in-kind creation and 
redemption process in resolving imbalances in supply and demand.
    \30\ See, e.g., Rule 123C--NYSE AMEX Equities (The Closing 
Procedures).
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Implementation

    In addition to Commission approval, the implementation of this 
proposed rule change will be contingent on other factors, including the 
completion of any changes that may be necessary to the Exchange's 
regulatory and surveillance program. The Exchange will announce the 
implementation of the elimination of position limits on SPY options 
through a notice to ATP holders after any Commission approval of this 
proposed rule change.
2. Statutory Basis
    The proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b) \31\ of 
the Act, in general, and furthers the objectives of Section 
6(b)(5),\32\ in particular, in that it is designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and 
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination 
with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in securities, to 
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open 
market and a national market system and, in general, to protect 
investors and the public interest. The Exchange believes that the 
proposed rule change would be beneficial to market participants, 
including market makers, institutional investors and retail investors, 
by permitting them to establish greater positions when pursuing their 
investment goals and needs. The Exchange also believes that 
economically equivalent products should be treated in an equivalent 
manner so as to avoid regulatory arbitrage, especially with respect to 
position limits. Treating SPY and SPX options differently by virtue of 
imposing different position limits is inconsistent with the notion of 
promoting just and equitable principles of trade and removing 
impediments to perfect the mechanisms of a free and open market. At the 
same time, the Exchange believes that the elimination of position 
limits for SPY options would not increase market volatility or 
facilitate the ability to manipulate the market.
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    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \32\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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B.Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the 
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) by order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEAmex-2012-29 and should 
be submitted on or before June 8, 2012.


[[Page 29726]]


    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\33\
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    \33\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-12035 Filed 5-17-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P