[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 82 (Friday, April 27, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 25088-25097]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9749]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 4

[PS Docket No. 11-82; FCC 12-22]


Extension of the Commission's Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to 
Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and 
Broadband Internet Service Providers

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission extends the outage reporting 
requirements of the Commission's rules to interconnected Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers and defers action with 
respect to reporting of outages of broadband Internet services. In 
addition, the NPRM for The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the 
Commission's Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to Interconnected Voice 
Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and Broadband Internet Service 
Providers proposal included reporting of both outages based on the 
complete loss of service and those where, while service is technically 
available, technical conditions effectively prevent communication. The 
rule adopted applies only to outages resulting from complete loss of 
service and only to interconnected VoIP services. Collecting this data 
will help the Commission help ensure the Nation's 9-1-1 systems are as 
reliable and resilient as possible and also allow the Commission to 
monitor compliance with the statutory 9-1-1 obligations of 
interconnected VoIP service providers.

DATES: The rules in this document contain information collection 
requirements that have not been approved by OMB. The Federal 
Communications Commission will publish a document in the Federal 
Register announcing the effective date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory Intoccia, Special Counsel, 
Cybersecurity and Communications Reliability Division, Public Safety 
and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1470 or 
[email protected] (email). For additional information concerning 
the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements 
contained in this document, contact Judith Boley-Herman, (202) 418-0214 
or [email protected] (email).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order in PS Docket No. 11-82, FCC 12-22, released to the public on 
February 21, 2012, and NPRM released in Federal Register in Vol. 76, 
No. 111, June 9, 2011; and correction Vol. 76, No. 121, June 23, 2011. 
The full text of the document is available for public inspection during 
regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 
12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0221/FCC-12-22A1.pdf.

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

    Document FCC 11-184 seeks comment on potential new information 
collection requirements. If the Commission adopts any new information 
collection requirement, the Commission will publish another notice in 
the Federal Register inviting the public to comment on the 
requirements, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 
Public Law 104-13 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520). In addition, pursuant to the 
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, the Commission seeks 
comment on how it might ``further reduce the information collection 
burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''

Synopsis

I. Introduction

    1. Consumers are increasingly using interconnected VoIP services in 
lieu of traditional telephone service. Interconnected VoIP services 
allow a wireline or wireless user generally to receive calls from and 
make calls to the legacy public telephone network, including calls to 
9-1-1. As of the end of 2010, 31 percent of U.S. residential telephone 
subscriptions were provided by interconnected VoIP providers, an 
increase of 21 percent from the previous year. The public's increased 
reliance on interconnected VoIP services is also reflected in 9-1-1 
usage trends; approximately 31 percent of residential wireline 9-1-1 
calls are made using VoIP service. The availability and resilience of 
our communications infrastructure, specifically 9-1-1, directly impacts 
public safety and the ability of our first responders to fulfill their 
critical mission. The most effective way to maintain emergency 
preparedness is to work continuously to minimize the incidence of 
routine outages.
    2. The Commission's public safety mission is one of its core 
functions. In 2008, Congress affirmed the Commission's efforts to 
accomplish this mission by codifying the requirement for interconnected 
VoIP providers to provide 9-1-1 services. Also, Presidential Directives 
and Executive Orders and related documents charge the Commission with 
ensuring the resilience and reliability of the Nation's commercial and 
public safety communications infrastructure. The Commission also has 
the responsibility to ensure continuous operations and reconstitution 
of critical communications and services, and plays an active role in 
Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF2), the communications branch of the 
National Response Framework, which guides the Nation's conduct during 
an all-hazards response. Executive Order 12472, which establishes the 
National Communications System, the functions of which include 
coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and 
emergency preparedness communications for the Federal government, also 
requires Commission participation.
    3. There is cause to be concerned about the ability of 
interconnected VoIP subscribers to reach emergency services when they 
need them. In the past several years, a series of significant VoIP 
outages has increased our concern about the availability of 9-1-1 over 
VoIP service. Unlike other outages of voice service, VoIP outages are 
not reported to the Commission because the current outage reporting 
requirements apply only to traditional voice and paging communications 
services over wireline, wireless, cable, and satellite, but not to 
outages affecting interconnected VoIP services. Without detailed 
information about these outages, the Commission is unable to know 
whether and how well providers are meeting their statutory obligation 
to provide 9-1-1 and Enhanced 9-1-1 (E9-1-1) service.
    4. Seeking to ensure the availability of 9-1-1 service, this Report 
and Order: Extends the Commission's mandatory

[[Page 25089]]

outage reporting rules to facilities-based and non-facilities-based 
interconnected VoIP service providers; applies the current Part 4 
definition of an outage to outages of interconnected VoIP service, 
covering the complete loss of service and/or connectivity to customers; 
and requires that these providers submit electronically a notification 
to the Commission of the affected 9-1-1 facility as the provider's 
contact person for communications outages at that facility. Requiring 
interconnected VoIP service providers to report even significant 
outages imposes a burden on them, but the cost to these providers of 
implementing the rules adopted herein is justified by the overwhelming 
public benefit of a reliable 9-1-1 system.

II. Background

    5. To perform our statutory and administrative duties effectively, 
the Commission needs timely, accurate information about the Nation's 
communications infrastructure. Since 1992, the Commission has required 
wireline providers to report major disruptions to their communications 
services. In 2004, the Commission extended reporting requirements to 
providers of wireless (including paging), cable, and satellite 
communications. Reports are submitted online via the Commission's 
Network Outage Reporting System (NORS). The Commission uses outage 
information submitted pursuant to Part 4 of the rules to carry out its 
statutory mission to promote ``safety of life and property.'' 
Specifically, Commission staff analyzes NORS data to spot statistically 
meaningful outage trends, then works either with an individual 
providers or through industry groups, as appropriate, to identify the 
cause of outages and best practices that would reduce the incidence of 
such outages. As a result of reporting and our subsequent analysis, 
measureable reliability improvements have been achieved, and reporting 
has led to improvements in communications infrastructure and services 
and emergency readiness.
    6. For example, wireline outages spiked in 2008, decreasing the 
reliability of 9-1-1 services. Systematic analysis of monthly wireline 
outages and subsequent work helped to understand the root causes of 
this trend, and resulting in improved industry practices that reduced 
the estimated number of lost wireline 9-1-1 calls by 40 percent.
    7. Before the adoption of this rule, interconnected VoIP services 
were not covered by the Commission's outage reporting rules, which 
meant that the Commission had little knowledge of the reliability of 
these services, including with respect to 9-1-1, and could not include 
these services in the process of continual evaluation and improvement. 
Yet, the Communications Act and Commission rules impose 9-1-1-related 
obligations on interconnected VoIP service providers. Outages of 
interconnected VoIP service negatively affect the ability of 
interconnected VoIP service providers to meet basic and enhanced 9-1-1 
service obligations.
    8. To remedy this situation, on May 12, 2011, we adopted an NPRM 
proposing to extend outage reporting obligations under Part 4 of the 
rules to interconnected VoIP services for both complete service outages 
and situations where, though service is technically available, 
performance conditions prevent communication. In the NPRM, we also 
proposed to apply the Part 4 outage reporting rules to both broadband 
access and broadband backbone Internet services for both complete and 
technical performance outages. In this Report and Order, we extend Part 
4 reporting obligations to interconnected VoIP services with respect to 
complete service outages, and defer action on technical performance 
outages. We also defer action on all outage reporting of broadband 
Internet services.

III. Need for Collecting Outage Information

A. Need for the Requirement

    9. We conclude that significant outages of interconnected VoIP 
service should be reported to the Commission. In the NPRM, we proposed 
to extend the Part 4 outage reporting requirements to both facilities- 
and non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP services. The Commission 
recognized that monitoring and analysis of outages is needed in light 
of increasing evidence that major VoIP service outages are occurring 
and given that such outages may disable 9-1-1 and other service 
capabilities.
    10. Comments. Most industry commenters argue that the Commission 
does not need to collect interconnected VoIP service outage information 
because service providers have market incentives to ensure that their 
systems are reliable. Some industry commenters argue that the 
interconnected VoIP information is unnecessary because broadband 
network technologies are designed to reroute traffic to avoid loss of 
service and/or connectivity, and thus, an outage of a facility for 
interconnected VoIP service may have no effect on the ability to 
continue to send or receive the related traffic. Some industry 
commenters argue that the burdens of extending the Part 4 requirements 
outweigh the benefits or are otherwise not justified. State government 
and commenters from critically important industry sectors, however, 
indicate that this additional outage information is needed to protect 
the public.
    11. Discussion. Outage reporting is the most effective and least 
burdensome way to ensure that interconnected VoIP providers are meeting 
their statutory obligation to provide 9-1-1. Without such reporting, we 
will continue to have extremely limited visibility into the reliability 
of access to 9-1-1 emergency services. Since the institution of the 
Part 4 rules in 2004, we have reviewed and analyzed outage data on both 
an individual provider and an aggregated basis. We regularly 
collaborate with providers to identify the causes of outages, develop 
and apply best practices to address the causes of outages.
    12. The Commission is uniquely positioned to piece together an 
overall picture of aggregated network performance because of the 
ability to collect and analyze outage data provided by communications 
providers that would otherwise be disinclined to share sensitive outage 
data. The Commission's ability to look at information received from 
different providers allows us to assess large-scale outages when they 
occur, thereby increasing the opportunities for federal assistance in 
dealing with the immediate problem. Analysis of NORS data has served as 
a uniquely effective precipitating force for improving network 
reliability, and thus the reliability of 9-1-1 services. This happens 
via a number of mechanisms:
    13. First, the Commission regularly provides the Network 
Reliability Steering Committee (NRSC) with aggregated outage data 
across all entities subject to Part 4 of the rules and draws attention 
to those categories of outages showing a statistically significant 
trend upward in the number of outages. Depending on the type of outage, 
the Commission may request that the NRSC create a team to recommend 
procedures, best practices and, in some cases, equipment design 
alterations to address the underlying issue. For example, following 
this process, in one six-month period in the 2008-2009 time frame, the 
Commission worked with the NRSC to reverse the trend in an increase in 
wireline outages, and consequently there was a more than 40-percent 
reduction in the estimated lost 9-1-1 calls due to wireline outages.
    14. Second, using outage reporting data and coordinating with 
providers, the Commission has been able to spot

[[Page 25090]]

upward trends in the number of outages filed by particular providers. 
In these cases, the Commission contacts the provider and works with it 
to identify causes and solutions. Consequently, some service providers 
have implemented large-scale improvements to their networks, reducing 
outages and increasing resiliency of the communications infrastructure 
and availability of the public safety services that rely on the 
communications infrastructure.
    15. Third, the Commission staff can identify industrywide issues 
through NORS analysis. In 2010, Commission staff discerned from outage 
reports that a significant number of outages associated with delivery 
of 9-1-1 services were being caused by a relatively small number of 
factors, each of which could be addressed by applying known best 
practices, and a Public Notice was released identifying these 
particular practices and urging communications providers to implement 
them widely in their networks.
    16. Fourth, the Commission can leverage outage data to assist in 
emergency responses. For example, during emergency situations, the 
Commission can provide ``Notification'' data in NORS to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, where it is used to support the 
emergency response.
    17. In these ways, the Commission's intervention has resulted in 
tangible improvements to the communications reliability necessary to 
support 9-1-1 service. No single provider has the data to spot trends 
across industry and lead efforts to address reliability problems. 
Therefore, we disagree with commenters that argue that market 
incentives eliminate the need for network outage reporting. In 
addition, we are not persuaded that outage reporting is unnecessary 
because broadband technologies reliably reroute traffic, particularly 
in light of the rise in the incidence of significant VoIP outages. 
Observers in critical infrastructure industries and in government, 
domestically and abroad, are becoming increasingly aware of the need to 
track reliability data obtained from services relying on broadband 
technologies to help ensure the reliability of emergency services and 
critical communications.
    18. Further, reporting outage data is the most efficient means for 
the Commission to ensure that interconnected VoIP service providers are 
complying with their statutory obligation to provide 9-1-1 service, and 
to obtain critical information needed to monitor the reliability and 
availability of VoIP 9-1-1/E9-1-1 services. Both the Act and the 
Commission's rules mandate that interconnected VoIP service providers 
provide 9-1-1 and E9-1-1 service. The rules we adopt today will provide 
the Commission with a mechanism in place to monitor whether these 
providers are complying with this basic obligation. Requiring 
interconnected VoIP service providers to promptly file reports when 
they experience outages that meet certain thresholds appears vastly 
superior, for example, to a complaint-driven process; the latter would 
likely be ineffective in enabling the Commission to detect and resolve 
quickly.

B. Mandatory or Voluntary Requirement

    19. We conclude that reporting significant outages of 
interconnected VoIP service should be mandatory, as was proposed in the 
NPRM. Mandatory reporting would permit the Commission to obtain a 
comprehensive, nationwide view of significant outages and assess and 
address their impact on 9-1-1 and other services, while voluntary 
reporting would likely create substantial gaps in data that would 
thwart efforts to monitor compliance with statutory obligations and to 
analyze and facilitate improvement of the Nation's 9-1-1 system.
    20. Comments. Some commenters suggest that, if the Commission 
extends its outage reporting rules, then reporting should be entirely 
voluntary; some argue that existing voluntary efforts by providers and 
their ongoing involvement in public-private coordination efforts to 
share information and promulgate best practices are sufficient to 
minimize risks to the communications infrastructure. Several industry 
parties argue that any reporting process should be voluntary and 
modeled after the voluntary Disaster Information Reporting System 
(DIRS).
    21. Discussion. Our experience has been that competitive friction 
frequently makes service providers reluctant to voluntarily disclose 
detailed information about their own service outages. There was a 
history of several years of unsuccessful voluntary outage reporting 
trials conducted by groups working under the auspices of Network 
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC). Those trials showed 
that provider participation was spotty, and the quality of information 
obtained was very poor. Based on this experience, the existing Part 4 
reporting system was adopted as a mandatory reporting scheme to ensure 
timely, complete and accurate reporting. The record in this proceeding 
provides us with no reason to believe that long-term, voluntary 
reporting would fare any better this time around. This reluctance would 
inhibit the development of a highly reliable, nationwide 9-1-1 service, 
because it inhibits the kinds of information sharing and analysis 
described above. Moreover, even if VoIP providers were not reluctant to 
share this information, an individual provider would have insufficient 
incentive to share such data, because some of the benefits would accrue 
to other providers. As we explained earlier, the outage information 
shared by one provider has led to the development of industry best 
practices that have benefited all providers nationwide. Given the 
significant increase in VoIP usage, the risks of a less vigilant 
approach in this context are becoming indefensible.
    22. We are also not persuaded that any new outage reporting process 
should apply the voluntary DIRS model. DIRS is a reporting system for 
use during large-scale disasters. DIRS is rarely activated, and the 
urgent events that lead to its activation tend to motivate 
communications providers to cooperate. Outage reporting, on the other 
hand, is designed to enable the Commission to identify key network 
failures quickly to facilitate restoration and, over time, to create a 
consistent body of data to permit analysis of trends. Moreover, apart 
from the outage reports themselves, the Commission may otherwise be 
unaware of the underlying cause of the outage, such as an internal 
network failure, whereas outages reported under DIRS are generally 
widely known and created by an external event.
    23. The Commission's poor experience with voluntary outage 
reporting is not unique. The New York Public Service Commission, for 
example, comments that--based on its experience--voluntary reporting 
does not ensure that providers ``will provide timely, accurate outage 
information.'' Likewise, the Japanese government finds it necessary to 
require mandatory outage reporting from broadband communications 
providers, including high-quality VoIP service.
    24. As we observed, the Commission attempted a voluntary outage 
reporting trial without success before adoption of the Part 4 rules. 
The record in this proceeding provides us no reason to believe that 
long-term, voluntary reporting would fare any better this time around. 
We believe a mandatory reporting requirement best meets the needs of 
the Commission to ensure the statutory mandate that interconnected VoIP 
service providers deliver reliable 9-1-1 service.
    25. In short, given the long-term upward trend in VoIP subscription 
and

[[Page 25091]]

use, the growing dependence on VoIP for 9-1-1 communications, our prior 
experience with voluntary reporting, and the statutory mandate that 
VoIP providers provide 9-1-1, we adopt mandatory outage reporting of 
interconnected VoIP service. To the extent that interconnected VoIP 
service providers have affiliated and/or non-affiliated entities that 
maintain or provide communications networks or services used by the 
provider in offering such communications, these obligations apply to 
them as well.
    26. The rules adopted modify significantly the proposal in the 
NPRM, in part in response to providers' concerns regarding the costs 
and burdens. In the NPRM, we proposed to extend Part 4 to broadband 
Internet in addition to interconnected VoIP services. In addition, we 
proposed to require reporting of both loss of service/connectivity as 
well as situations where, though service is technically being provided, 
packet loss, latency or jitter were experienced at a level that 
effectively prevented communication. We are not acting at this time on 
the extension of Part 4 rules to broadband Internet service providers 
or to outages based on performance degradation, both of which were 
sharply opposed by industry in part based on the expected costs. The 
rules we adopt to extend outage reporting to interconnected VoIP 
services received broad support in the record, and no commenter has 
argued that this type of reporting would be unduly burdensome. The 
reporting obligation we impose will allow us to fulfill our own 
obligations and to adequately monitor providers' compliance with 
statutory 9-1-1 obligations.
    27. The record in this proceeding reflects that the additional 
costs of compliance with our data collection requirement would be minor 
and significantly outweighed by the benefits. We require the reporting 
only of significant outages where customers lose service and/or 
connectivity and, therefore, the ability to access 9-1-1 services. 
Given providers' incentives to satisfy their customers, it is 
reasonable to conclude that every such provider is already tracking 
this sort of information. The configuration of VoIP service should 
already make this information available. For example, the Network 
Management System (NMS) of interconnected VoIP providers is able to 
auto-poll or execute a manual poll of a portion or all of its VoIP-
enabled devices to see if they have connectivity. Thus, interconnected 
VoIP service providers have the ability to monitor their end-user 
devices to determine if connectivity to those devices has been lost. 
The record shows that the costs involved in determining whether 
customers are completely out of service do not impose an undue burden. 
A wide array of commenters submit that the type of outage reporting 
requirement we are adopting today is either reasonable, not unduly 
burdensome, or could be applied so as not to be unduly burdensome. Even 
small providers do not assess our outage reporting requirement to be a 
burden. This Report and Order limits outage reporting to a complete 
loss of interconnected service, an approach that achieves Commission 
purposes but is sensitive to costs.
    28. As interconnected VoIP service providers are driven by business 
reasons to monitor for service outages, it follows that tracking such 
information under our rules should not be unduly burdensome. It is 
significant that not one commenter has stated that it would have to 
install any additional equipment into its network to detect when a 
large number of VoIP customers are out of service. We find that 
mandatory reporting of significant outages is minimally intrusive and 
fully justified by the benefits of ensuring compliance with statutory 
9-1-1 statutory obligations and benefits to public safety through 
robust 9-1-1 communications that we expect to result from our analysis 
and use of the reports.
    29. Because service providers already have business reasons to 
routinely collect outage information, the costs of compliance with a 
reporting requirement are essentially those of identifying reportable 
outages, then electronically reformatting and uploading that 
information into NORS. Many of the interconnected VoIP customers are 
served by providers that already have years of experience filing outage 
reports in NORS with respect to other services. Industry-wide, the 
total operating cost for reporting on interconnected VoIP outages and 
administering outage reporting programs likely is less than $1 million 
in the first year and less than $500,000 per year thereafter for all 
the providers who will report.
    30. In arriving at our decision, we considered feasible 
alternatives. We evaluated the cost effectiveness of our adopted 
approach against a less stringent option as well as several more 
stringent options. We also considered other mechanisms, such as 
certification. Our approach captures most of the expected benefits 
while avoiding the much larger costs associated with more intrusive 
options. Even a modest improvement in the reliability of 9-1-1 services 
potentially represents lives saved. Based on the record, our analysis 
concluded the net benefits will be greater with the approach we are 
adopting. With respect to the less stringent option, our adopted 
approach provides all the benefits of increased reliability at a 
nominal cost estimated to be less than $1 million industrywide. With 
respect to the more stringent option, our approach captures most of the 
expected benefits while avoiding the much larger costs associated with 
those options.
    31. While some commenters urge a period of transition before any 
mandatory outage reporting requirements go into effect, we find any 
significant delay unjustified in light of the fact that providers 
already monitor this type of activity in the ordinary course of their 
business and that the costs of electronically reporting related outages 
will not be substantial. Also, the vast majority of interconnected VoIP 
services are provided by an entity that also provides legacy services 
and, therefore, has years of experience filing in NORS. Finally, as our 
ultimate approach is much more circumscribed than the one proposed in 
the NPRM, implementing the required reporting will be far less 
complicated. However, to ensure that NORS updates are completed to 
receive these new reports and that PSHSB has an opportunity to present 
the updates to reporting providers and resolve questions, the mandatory 
reporting requirement will become effective after data collection 
approval from the Office of Management and Budget, and we will publish 
in the Federal Register an announcement of a date certain that the 
mandatory reporting requirement will become effective.

C. Legal Authority To Require the Outage Reporting

    32. In the NPRM, we requested comment on the Commission's legal 
authority to extend the Part 4 outage reporting rules to interconnected 
VoIP service providers. We conclude that the Commission has sufficient 
legal authority to require the reporting of outages of interconnected 
VoIP service.
    33. Comments. Some commenters originally expressed harsh opposition 
to the requirements proposed in the NPRM. Several industry commenters 
argue that the Commission lacks authority to take the actions proposed 
in the NPRM with regard to interconnected VoIP. Others argue that the 
Commission's authority is either unclear or questionable. Several 
parties maintain that the link between the obligation to ensure 9-1-1 
compliance by VoIP service providers and the

[[Page 25092]]

imposition of outage reporting requirements on them is too tenuous to 
support any assertion of direct or ancillary jurisdiction. Others 
suggest, however, that the Commission has some authority, or even that 
our authority here is ``unambiguous.'' In more recent ex parte filings, 
some providers focus their legal objections on NPRM proposals that we 
do not adopt.
    34. Discussion. We focus our analysis here on our authority to 
impose outage reporting requirements on interconnected VoIP. We are not 
persuaded by arguments that the Commission lacks authority to extend 
our outage reporting requirements to interconnected VoIP service. 
Consistent with our mission in section 1 to ``promote[e] safety of life 
and property,'' section 615a-1 of the Communications Act clearly 
imposes a ``duty'' on ``each IP-enabled voice service [interconnected 
VoIP] provider to provide 9-1-1 service and enhanced 9-1-1 service to 
its subscribers in accordance with the requirements of the Federal 
Communications Commission.'' Further, section 615a-1(c) generally 
directs the Commission to issue regulations implementing the statute. 
Section 615a-1(c) thus grants the Commission authority to require 
network outage reporting with respect to interconnected VoIP services 
as provided herein. In addition, the Communications Act grants the 
Commission broad authority to take necessary steps to implement the 
Act's mandates, and thus provides concurrent sources of authority for 
our actions to require network outage reporting. Sections 4(i) and 
303(r) generally authorize the Commission to take any actions ``as may 
be necessary'' to ensure that interconnected VoIP providers fulfill 
their statutory 9-1-1 and E9-1-1 duties in section 615a-1. Network 
outage reporting for interconnected VoIP providers is one of the less 
intrusive means by which the Commission may monitor compliance with the 
statutory obligation to provide 9-1-1 and E9-1-1 service and identify 
and work to eliminate barriers to that compliance. Section 403 
authorizes the Commission to launch inquiries to resolve compliance 
matters and other questions regarding the provisions of the 
Communications Act. With regard to affiliates of common carriers--the 
subscribers of which represent an increasing share of all residential 
interconnected VoIP subscribers, currently over ten percent--the 
Commission also is authorized to impose outage reporting requirements 
under section 218, which grants the Commission broad investigatory 
powers to inquire into the management of the business, which would 
include VoIP service providers that are affiliates of common carriers 
subject to the Act. Finally, section 4(o) directs the Commission to 
study of all phases of a problem for the purpose of effective 
communications in connection with safety of life or property. We do 
just that when we collect and examine outage reports. Hence, the 
Commission is on solid ground to adopt the subject reporting rules.
    35. We disagree with commenter assessments of the relationship 
between Section 615a-1 and our authority. AT&T, for instance, argues 
that section 615a-1 is not an express grant of authority to the 
Commission to order the regulation of VoIP service providers, but 
rather the Commission's role under that provision is to ``pave the 
way'' for VoIP service providers to provide 9-1-1 and E9-1-1 service by 
adopting regulations applicable to the owners and controllers of 9-1-1 
facilities, who are ILECs, CLECs, and third-party providers, to make 
that possible. AT&T points to the context of the enactment of section 
615a-1 as indicative of the limited nature of its scope.
    36. AT&T's arguments are inconsistent with the express terms of the 
statute, which covers VoIP service providers and plainly is not limited 
to the owners and controllers of trunks and routers. Among the 
Commission rules that section 615a-1 codified are rules directly 
applicable to VoIP service providers. These rules impose detailed 
obligations on the manner in which interconnected VoIP providers 
provide E9-1-1. Further, AT&T's arguments are inconsistent with the 
Commission's previous views on the scope of section 615a-1. Following 
enactment of the NET 911 Improvement Act, the Commission in 
implementing section 615a-1 adopted rules in the NET 911 Report and 
Order, which requires interconnected VoIP service providers to comply 
with all applicable industry network security standards to the same 
extent as traditional telecommunications carriers when accessing 
capabilities traditionally used by carriers. This standard is 
comprehensive and not limited to network security standards that are 
ostensibly E9-1-1-related.
    37. With respect to CTIA's concern about technological neutrality 
expressed in section 615a-1(e)(1) limitation, nothing in this Report 
and Order violates that limitation. The outage reporting requirement 
and threshold in this Report and Order do not favor or disfavor any 
particular technology. To the contrary, our action arguably corrects an 
imbalance that existed by requiring some providers of voice and 9-1-1 
service to report outages, but not others.
    38. The Commission has ancillary authority to ensure both that 
interconnected VoIP providers fulfill their duty to provide 9-1-1 
services and to address major obstacles to their doing so, such as 
failures in underlying communications networks. For example, CTIA 
argues that ``the proposed rules sweep too broadly to be linked to the 
expressly delegated responsibility to provide 9-1-1 services, and 
Verizon argues that the Commission has provided no explanation 
regarding how its proposed requirements would result in ensuring that 
VoIP providers meet their statutory duty to provide 9-1-1 service. The 
relationship between network reliability and reliable 9-1-1 service is 
clear: without reliable network operations, there can be no reliable 9-
1-1 service. As explained throughout the decision, reporting 
obligations act as a critical element to enable the Commission to 
identify and evaluate lapses in the provision of 9-1-1 service in order 
to enable providers to meet their obligations under the statute. 
Indeed, as a general matter, the Commission regularly imposes reporting 
requirements on its regulatees to ensure compliance with statutory and 
regulatory obligations. The imposition of such reporting requirements 
in this instance is appropriate not only to enable the Commission to 
ensure that providers are complying with their legal obligations, but 
also to enhance the reliability of such service industry-wide.

D. Outage Metrics and Thresholds

    39. Facilities-Based vs. Non-Facilities-Based Interconnected VoIP 
Services. We conclude that the outage reporting requirements should 
apply to both facilities- and non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP 
services. Given that interconnected VoIP services increasingly are now 
viewed by consumers as a substitute for traditional telephone service, 
in the NPRM, we proposed to extend our outage reporting rules to both 
facilities-based and non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP service 
providers.
    40. Comments. Several commenters agree that, if the Commission 
adopts rules extending outage reporting to interconnected VoIP 
services, the rules should apply equally to both facilities-based and 
non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP services. For example, NASUCA 
and the New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel take this position as both 
types of VoIP services are already subject to 9-1-1 service 
obligations. Some commenters argue

[[Page 25093]]

against inclusion of non-facilities-based, interconnected VoIP 
services, saying that non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP service 
providers have no visibility into other providers' networks.
    41. Discussion. We adopt our proposal to extend the outage 
reporting rules to both facilities-based and non-facilities-based 
interconnected VoIP service providers because both types of providers 
are subject to the same statutory and regulatory duties to provide E9-
1-1, and subscribers of non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP 
services should benefit from our work with industry to ensure robust 
access to emergency services just as subscribers of facilities-based 
interconnected VoIP and traditional services do.
    42. Accounting for technical differences between facilities-based 
and non-facilities based interconnected VoIP service providers, we 
require non-facilities-based VoIP service providers to report service 
outages that involve facilities that they own, operate, lease, or 
otherwise utilize. Non-facilities-based VoIP providers must report 
service outages that meet the threshold to the extent that they have 
access to information on service outages affecting their customers. As 
both facilities- and non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP providers 
are able to use NMS to determine the connectivity of their end-devices, 
we expect that they will be able to report on the loss of service and/
or connectivity to their customers' terminals. The non-facilities VoIP 
providers may not be able to tell where connectivity has failed if the 
failure has occurred in another provider's network, but it can tell 
that its call management cannot reach the end-user devices, and thus, 
an outage has occurred that affects its customers. They should be able 
to report significant outages where their call management systems have 
lost connectivity to their customers' end-user devices. Also, even 
where broadband networks provide facilities-based VoIP service, there 
will still be a number of end-users that will use a non-facilities-
based interconnected VoIP service instead of the broadband service 
associated with the facilities-based interconnected VoIP service 
provider. Thus, the Commission would not know the true loss of voice 
service to end-users, as it is actually facilities-based plus non-
facilities-based outages that should be counted. Thus, we will require 
both facilities-based and non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP to 
report service outages.
    43. Definition of Outage. We conclude that the current Part 4 
definition of ``outage'' should apply also to outages of interconnected 
VoIP service. Currently under Part 4 of our rules, an ``outage'' is 
defined to include ``a significant degradation in the ability of an end 
user to establish and maintain a channel of communication as a result 
of failure or degradation in the performance of a communications 
provider's network.'' Our current rules tailor the definition of a 
reportable significant degradation to communications over cable, 
telephony carrier tandem, satellite, SS7, wireless, or wireline 
facilities. Broadband networks operate differently than legacy 
networks, so the impact of outages is likely to be different. This 
difference does not appear to require a different definition of outage 
for reporting purposes, so in the NPRM, the Commission proposed to 
apply the existing definition of outage to interconnected VoIP, 
tailored to the characteristics of the broadband technologies. In the 
NPRM, the Commission also proposed a broad standard of a ``loss of 
generally-useful availability and connectivity'' to represent the 
degradation in the performance of a communication provider's network 
and sought comment on packet loss, round-trip latency, and jitter as 
appropriate metrics to trigger the outage reporting.
    44. Comments. Many commenting parties support applying the current 
Part 4 definition of an ``outage'' to interconnected VoIP service 
providers. Other parties raise concerns with the definition of 
``outage.'' CTIA is concerned about a regulatory scheme for VoIP 
service that would treat perceived or actual performance degradation as 
a reportable outage. MegaPath states that the current outage definition 
is overly broad and fails to take into account the unique 
characteristics of the broadband network.
    45. Several commenting parties do not support the concept of ``loss 
of generally-useful availability or connectivity'' in differentiating 
among outages. MetroPCS argues that a broad standard of ``loss of 
generally-useful availability and connectivity'' exacerbates the 
problem of precisely associating an outage with underlying network 
conditions. Vonage argues that the measures proposed in the NPRM--
packet loss, latency, and jitter--do not relate to actual outages, but 
are instead measures of call quality. Vonage further argues that the 
collection of such quality of service information simply will not 
indicate when a VoIP customer loses the ability to make an emergency 
call.
    47. Discussion. We apply to interconnected VoIP services the 
current Part 4 definition of an ``outage'' as ``a significant 
degradation in the ability of an end user to establish and maintain a 
channel of communications as a result of failure or degradation in the 
performance of a communications provider's network.'' Yet, the 
triggering criteria for a reportable ``outage'' for interconnected VoIP 
outage reporting purposes that we adopt today excludes the concept of a 
``loss of generally-useful availability and connectivity'' proposed in 
the NPRM based on performance degradations. We defer a decision on that 
issue. For the purposes of the rules we adopt today, a ``significant 
degradation'' resulting in ``the complete loss of service or 
connectivity to customers'' is a reportable outage if it meets the 
reporting criteria and thresholds.
    47. We are persuaded by arguments that the proposed reporting of an 
interconnected VoIP outage be based on the ``the complete loss of 
service or connectivity to customers.'' We agree with the rationale 
that triggering the reporting of an interconnected VoIP outage based on 
the loss of a user's ability to make or receive a call, as opposed to 
the loss of generally-useful availability and connectivity, as measured 
by packet loss, latency, and jitter standards, would avoid the need to 
revise packet loss, latency, and jitter standards as providers continue 
to improve performance.
    48. Furthermore, we accept that determining what constitutes a 
``loss of generally-useful availability and connectivity'' in a 
broadband environment is considerably more complicated than in the 
legacy network context. In the environment in which interconnected VoIP 
service operates, voice is a real-time application that utilizes 
broadband connectivity and is more sensitive to network impairments 
than non-real-time applications such as email. Although we believe 
performance degradations affect the ability of facilities-based and 
non-facilities-based interconnected VoIP service providers to establish 
and maintain 9-1-1 calls, adopting bright-line reporting criteria 
reduces the burden on the providers while, we expect, delivering to us 
the information we need.
    49. Reporting Thresholds. We conclude that the outage reporting 
thresholds for interconnected VoIP service outages should be similar to 
the existing Part 4 outage reporting thresholds. Based on how 
interconnected VoIP service is typically configured and provided, the 
NPRM proposed that a significant degradation of interconnected VoIP 
service exists and must be reported when an interconnected VoIP service 
provider has experienced an outage or service degradation for at least 
30 minutes: on

[[Page 25094]]

any major facility that it owns, operates, leases, or otherwise 
utilizes; potentially affecting generally useful availability and 
connectivity of at least 900,000 user minutes; or otherwise potentially 
affecting special offices, or special facilities, including 9-1-1 
PSAPs. The rule we adopt requires reporting of outages where there is a 
complete loss of service. We defer action on the issue of reporting 
outages for performance degradation that involves less than a total 
loss of service.
    50. Comments. NASUCA comments that it is plausible that industry 
would be tracking significant performance degradation in order to 
compete effectively in relevant markets, but most industry commenters 
oppose the adoption of any performance degradation metric as a 
triggering mechanism for a reportable outage. The parties argue the 
reporting of outages should be based on actual loss of service rather 
than performance degradation measurements that were proposed in the 
NPRM. Other parties argue that requiring outage reports based on 
quality of service measurements would greatly increase regulatory 
compliance burdens and expand the obligations of interconnected VoIP 
service providers beyond those that apply to providers of circuit-
switched telephony under the current Part 4 Rules.
    51. With respect to reporting outages or service degradation as a 
result of a major facility failure, Verizon states that it deploys many 
of these elements in a redundant, diverse manner such that an outage on 
a given network element may have no impact on a subscriber's ability to 
establish and maintain a channel of communications.
    52. Discussion. We adopt outage reporting thresholds for 
interconnected VoIP service outages similar to the existing Part 4 
wireline and wireless communications service outage reporting 
thresholds. We apply to interconnected VoIP service providers the 
obligation to report when they have experienced, on any facilities that 
they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an outage of at least 
30 minutes duration: (1) That potentially affects at least 900,000 
users; (2) that potentially affects any special offices and facilities 
(in accordance with paragraphs (a)-(d) of section 4.5); or (3) that 
potentially affects a 9-1-1 special facility (as defined in (e) of 
section 4.5), in which case they also shall notify, as soon as possible 
by telephone or other electronic means, any official who has been 
designated by the management of the affected 9-1-1 facility as the 
provider's contact person for communications outages at that facility, 
and they shall convey to that person all available information that may 
be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating the 
effects of the outage on callers to that facility.
    53. We defer action at this time on the performance degradation 
reporting metrics and thresholds proposed in the NPRM. Based on the 
record, we believe that the simpler rules we adopt today will provide a 
clear view into E9-1-1 compliance as well as advance the goals we have 
laid out above with regard to working with industry to improve 
performance. The rules we adopt today are more consistent with the 
rules we apply to other providers under the existing rules. Therefore, 
we will not at this time require reporting based on packet loss, 
latency, or jitter. Instead, we will require the reporting of an 
interconnected VoIP outage based on the complete loss of service or 
connectivity.
    54. With respect to reporting outages due to major facility 
failures, after carefully studying the record, we will not at this time 
adopt the proposal in the NPRM to require outage reporting when an 
interconnected VoIP service experiences a major facility failure. We 
believe the rules, as adopted, sufficiently account for major facility 
failures that result in reportable outages meeting the thresholds 
defined. We recognize a major facility failure, depending on how the 
interconnected VoIP service provider has engineered those major 
facilities, may not necessarily result in a reportable outage meeting 
the thresholds, and we, therefore, do not require, at this time, the 
reporting of outages on this basis.
    55. Reporting Process for Outages of Interconnected VoIP Service. 
We conclude that the reporting process for significant outages of 
interconnected VoIP service should differ in certain respects from the 
proposal in the NPRM. We extend the time frame for notification of an 
outage and reduce and the number of required submissions. The NPRM 
proposed to follow the current Part 4 reporting process for 
interconnected VoIP service providers. Under the current rules, 
providers are required to notify the Commission with very basic 
information within two hours of discovering a reportable outage, file 
an initial report within 72 hours, and file a final report within 30 
days that provides detail on the outage. The Final Communications 
Outage Report must contain all potentially significant information 
known about the outage after a good faith effort has been made to 
obtain it. The current NORS process provides an electronic reporting 
template to facilitate outage reporting by those currently subject to 
our Part 4 rules. In the NPRM, we proposed to follow the same reporting 
process.
    56. Comments. The majority of parties commenting on this issue 
focused on the burden of filing multiple reports, and filing those 
reports while simultaneously seeking to resolve the network outage. 
Although state government commenters generally support the proposed 
deadlines, industry commenters argue that the proposed deadlines would 
be too restrictive. Opposition to the proposed reporting timeframes 
centers on several arguments: reporting requires critical personnel to 
spend time reporting instead of fixing the underlying problem; the 
complexity of the network makes it too difficult to report within two 
hours; and, to develop best practices, the only report needed is a 30-
day final report.
    57. Discussion. We are persuaded by commenters' arguments to adopt 
a reporting process similar to NORS, but lengthen the notification 
interval to allow more time for interconnected VoIP service providers 
to work the outage problem as opposed to reporting on the outage. We 
agree with MetroPCS' rationale for lengthening the initial notification 
in that ``this change is particularly important since data networks 
operate differently than voice networks, and the cause of some 
degradations of service may not be as clearly identifiable, which can 
lead to inaccurate reporting, or over-reporting, under strict time 
constraints.'' Therefore, with respect to outages that meet the 
reporting threshold, a notification will be due within 24 hours of 
discovering that an outage is reportable and a final report within 30 
days.
    58. Verizon's suggested two-reporting system, in which a provider 
would file a notification within four hours and a final report within 
thirty days, makes more sense to us in situations that could have the 
potential to have a significant negative impact on the 9-1-1 
infrastructure. A two-tier report system would still provide a measure 
of ``situational awareness'' to allow the Commission to become involved 
in significant outages early should it choose to do so. Final reports 
would still give the Commission the opportunity to obtain the full 
details within the same timeframe as it does so today. Yet, eliminating 
the initial report would reduce the providers' workloads, and if 
implemented in conjunction with a four-hour window for the 
notification, would likely still provide the Commission with valuable 
information at the outset of the outage.

[[Page 25095]]

    59. We do not, however, adopt the 24-hour interval with respect to 
outages that may have a significant negative impact on the 9-1-1 
infrastructure. For these outages, we adopt Verizon's suggested two-
tier reporting structure and require notification for outages that may 
have a significant negative impact on the 9-1-1 infrastructure within 
four hours and a final report within 30 days. This provides a measure 
of ``situational awareness'' to allow the Commission to become involved 
in significant outages early should it choose to do so. Final reports 
would still give the Commission the opportunity to obtain the full 
details within the same timeframe as it does so today. Yet, eliminating 
the initial report would reduce providers' workloads considerably 
without harming the Commission's ability to react in the short term or 
facilitate the development and application of best practices in the 
long term.
    60. Accordingly, the Commission will require all interconnected 
VoIP service providers to submit electronically a Notification to the 
Commission within four hours of discovering that they have experienced 
on any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, 
an outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 9-
1-1 special facility. In such situations, they also must notify, as 
soon as possible by telephone or other electronic means, any official 
who has been designated by the management of the affected 9-1-1 
facility as the provider's contact person for communications outages at 
that facility, and the provider must convey to that person all 
available information that may be useful to the management of the 
affected facility in mitigating the effects of the outage on efforts to 
communicate with that facility. Such timing of the Notification targets 
conditions in which the 9-1-1 infrastructure is most likely to 
experience a negative impact, and balancing costs and burdens.
    61. Interconnected VoIP service providers that experience a 
reportable outage that does not affect a 9-1-1 special facility must 
submit electronically a Notification to the Commission within twenty-
four hours of discovering such an outage. This timing recognizes that 
these outages are less likely to impact the 9-1-1 infrastructure 
negatively, though the ability of users to make individual 9-1-1 calls 
may nonetheless be impaired. This distinction also balances different 
potential benefits with costs and burdens.
    62. Regardless of which of the two above conditions prompts the 
Notification, not later than 30 days after discovering the outage, the 
provider must submit electronically a Final Communications Outage 
Report to the Commission. We adopt a very similar level of specificity 
in reporting content and the same electronic reporting processing as is 
required by NORS.
    63. The process we adopt for reporting significant outages of 
interconnected VoIP service reduces the burden on providers from that 
proposed in the NPRM. Reducing the number of reports from three to two 
and extending the time frame for reporting will provide the Commission 
with the information it needs while reducing the reporting burden on 
the providers. It is likely that most interconnected VoIP service 
providers currently collect information on significant outages in the 
ordinary course of their business in order to serve their customers 
effectively. We conclude that the reporting burden is minimal and well-
justified by the benefits to 9-1-1 reliability.

E. Part 4 Rules and Voice Service--New Wireless Spectrum Bands

    64. We clarify that Part 4 of the rules currently covers all 
providers of Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) voice (and paging) 
service regardless in which spectrum band the service is provided and 
that the process that applies to reporting outages of these services 
should be the process in the current Part 4 rules. In 2004, when the 
Commission extended in its outage reporting requirements beyond 
wireline providers in its 2004 Part 4 Order to include wireless 
providers, the Commission enumerated several types of licensees 
providing wireless service that would be covered by the Part 4 outage 
reporting obligations. Since that time, licensing in additional 
spectrum bands, e.g., Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) and 700 MHz 
licensing, has become available for wireless services. Our 2004 Part 4 
Order suggests that the Commission intended to extend the scope of 
outage reporting to include all non-wireline providers, including new 
technologies developed after the adoption of the decision which 
established the existing outage reporting rules. In the NPRM, we sought 
comment on whether we should amend Section 4.3(f) to clarify and 
reflect this meaning.
    65. Comments. MetroPCS argues that competition and innovation are 
best served by not extending the current outage reporting rules to new 
spectrum bands or technologies. It, however, recognizes that if the 
Commission were to adopt MetroPCS's recommendation to not extend the 
current Part 4 rules to licensees in the AWS and 700 MHz spectrum 
bands, an unlevel wireless service provider playing field may result. 
The WCS Coalition also argues that AWS, 700 MHz, WCS and other 
similarly situated licensees should be exempt from new Part 4 outage 
reporting requirements until such time as they are required to meet 
their initial performance or substantial service obligations under 
their service-specific rules.
    66. Discussion. We believe that the existing rules apply to 
wireless service providers including CMRS communications providers that 
use cellular architecture and CMRS paging providers. That includes AWS 
and 700 MHz, as well as Personal Communications Service (PCS), 
Broadband Radio Service (BRS) that elect common carrier service, 
Educational Broadband Service (EBS) that elect common carrier service, 
and Wireless Communications Service (WCS) wireless service providers, 
inter alia, operating as CMRS communications providers that use 
cellular architecture or as CMRS paging providers, are subject to the 
outage reporting obligation. We also believe that our 2004 Part 4 Order 
establishing the existing outage reporting rules extended the scope of 
outage reporting to include all non-wireline providers, including new 
technologies developed after adoption of our 2004 Part 4 Order. To 
eliminate any potential for confusion, we amend the rule by eliminating 
specific examples of services. This elimination will avoid any 
potential for confusion as to the rule's scope as new spectrum bands 
are authorized and/or reallocated.
    67. We are not persuaded by commenters' arguments that AWS and 700 
MHz services should be exempt from outage reporting requirements. To 
provide an exemption for AWS and 700 MHz would lead to an unlevel 
playing field among competing mobile service providers. These newer 
wireless technologies are forming the core of major deployments where 
an outage could impact an increasingly large number of users.
    68. Reporting Process. We conclude that the reporting process as 
reflected in the existing reporting structure in NORS should be the 
same for AWS and 700 MHz wireless service providers as for the other 
wireless service providers. Since we have clarified that section 4.3(f) 
should be read broadly to include such services as AWS and 700 MHz as 
among those wireless service providers covered by the Part 4 reporting 
obligations, the technical requirements for making the reports used for 
these other wireless service providers should also apply to AWS and 700 
MHz service

[[Page 25096]]

providers. We see no reason that would warrant different treatment.

IV. Sharing of Information and Confidentiality

    69. We will apply the same confidential treatment and restricted 
information sharing to reports of interconnected VoIP service outages 
as currently apply to outage reports of services already subject to 
Part 4 of the rules. The NPRM proposed to treat outage reports filed 
with respect to interconnected VoIP service as presumptively 
confidential, the same manner outage reporting data is currently 
treated under Part 4. The NPRM also sought comment on making aggregated 
information across companies public, and whether the Commission should 
share this new outage information with other Federal agencies on a 
presumptively confidential basis.
    70. Comments. Most commenters addressing the issue support treating 
reported information as presumptively confidential. ATIS, AT&T, 
CenturyLink, and New York PSC support the Commission's sharing of 
information with other Federal agencies. AT&T, CenturyLink, ATIS, and 
WISPA do not oppose the public disclosure of aggregated outage 
information provided the individual service provider data will not be 
identified. Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) opposes the 
public disclosure of the aggregated information, arguing that the 
Commission has acknowledged that ``disclosure of outage reporting 
information to the public could present an unacceptable risk of more 
effective terrorist activity.''
    71. Discussion. We direct that individual outage reports of 
interconnected VoIP service providers also be treated on a 
presumptively confidential basis, that sharing of such reports with 
other Federal agencies, as needed, be conducted on the same basis, and 
that aggregated information across providers may be publicly reported. 
The Commission makes existing outage reports available to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to the authority of DHS 
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Sharing confidential materials 
with other Federal agencies is governed by Section 0.442 of the 
Commission's rules, which provides that the Commission may share with 
other Federal agencies materials received under a request for 
confidential treatment or that are presumptively confidential, and the 
confidentiality of the records travels with the records. The approach 
here is identical to the one we took with regard to outage reports from 
traditional providers subject to the existing Part 4 rules; we are 
aware of no problems resulting from the current approach.

V. Voluntary Dialogue on Internet Service Outage Issues

    72. The NPRM addressed whether the Commission should extend its 
outage reporting requirements to significant outages of broadband 
Internet service, and if so, what outage metrics and thresholds should 
apply. The technical issues involved in identifying and reporting such 
outages require further study. The record in this proceeding shows a 
willingness by broadband Internet service providers to participate in a 
voluntary process to improve the Commission's understanding of the 
underlying technical issues associated with broadband Internet service 
outages to assist public safety and first responders.

VI. Conclusion

    73. We adopt outage reporting requirements for interconnected VoIP 
service providers and conclude that this action will best serve the 
public interest by enabling the Commission to obtain the necessary 
information regarding services disruptions in an efficient and 
expeditious manner. This action addresses the need for information on 
service disruptions that could affect homeland security, public health 
and safety, including the reliability of the Nation's 9-1-1 system. 
This action takes into account the associated costs and burdens, the 
trend in greater VoIP service usage and its potential impact on the 
Nation's 9-1-1 infrastructure, and the increasing importance of IP 
networks.

VII. Procedural Matters

A. Accessible Formats

    74. To request materials in accessible formats for people with 
disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), 
send an email to [email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    75. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, see 5 
U.S.C. 604, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA) of the possible significant economic impact on small 
entities of the policies and rules addressed in this document. The FRFA 
is set forth in Appendix B of the document.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    76. The Report and Order contains new information collection 
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 
Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the 
general public, and other interested parties are invited to comment on 
the new information collection requirements contained in this 
proceeding.
    77. We note that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506 (c)(4), we 
previously sought specific comment on how the Commission might further 
reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns 
with fewer than 25 employees. We have described impacts that might 
affect small businesses, which includes most businesses with fewer than 
25 employees, in the FRFA in Appendix B, infra.

D. Congressional Review Act

    78. The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order in a 
report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA), see 5 U.S.C. 
801(a)(1)(A).

E. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    79. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
included in the NPRM in PS Docket No. 11-82. The Commission sought 
written comment on the proposals in this docket, including comment on 
the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to 
the RFA.

VIII. Ordering Clauses

    80. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i)-
(k), 4(o), 218, 219, 230, 256, 301, 302(a), 303(f), 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 403, 615a-1, 621(b)(3), 621(d), and 1302(a), and 1302(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i)-(k), 
154(o), 218, 219, 230, 256, 301, 302(a), 303(f), 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 403, 615a-1, 621(b)(3), 621(d), 1302(a), and 1302(b) and 
Section 1704 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1998, 44 U.S.C. 3504, this Report and Order in PS 
Docket No. 11-82 is adopted and that Part 4 of the Commission's Rules, 
47 CFR part 4 is amended as set forth in Appendix C.
    81. It is further ordered that the rules in this document contain 
information collection requirements that have not

[[Page 25097]]

been approved by OMB. The Federal Communications Commission will 
publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the effective 
date.
    82. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4

    Communications common carriers, Communications equipment.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 4 as follows:

PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority for part 4 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, 
155, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).


0
2. Section 4.3 is amended by revising paragraph (f) and redesignating 
paragraph (h) as paragraph (i) and adding new paragraph (h) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  4.3  Communications providers covered by the requirements of this 
part.

* * * * *
    (f) Wireless service providers include Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service communications providers that use cellular architecture and 
CMRS paging providers. See Sec.  20.9 of this chapter for the 
definition of Commercial Mobile Radio Service. Also included are 
affiliated and non-affiliated entities that maintain or provide 
communications networks or services used by the provider in offering 
such communications.
* * * * *
    (h) Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers 
are providers of interconnected VoIP service. See Sec.  9.3 of this 
chapter for the definition of interconnected VoIP service. Such 
providers may be facilities-based or non-facilities-based. Also 
included are affiliated and non-affiliated entities that maintain or 
provide communications networks or services used by the provider in 
offering such communications.
* * * * *

0
3. Section 4.7 is amended by revising paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) as 
follows:


Sec.  4.7  Definitions of metrics used to determine the general outage-
reporting threshold criteria.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) Assigned telephone number minutes (as defined in paragraph (c) 
of this section), for telephony, including non-mobile interconnected 
VoIP telephony, and for those paging networks in which each individual 
user is assigned a telephone number;
    (2) The mathematical result of multiplying the duration of an 
outage, expressed in minutes, by the number of end users potentially 
affected by the outage, for all other forms of communications. For 
wireless service providers and interconnected VoIP service providers to 
mobile users, the number of potentially affected users should be 
determined by multiplying the simultaneous call capacity of the 
affected equipment by a concentration ratio of 8.
* * * * *

0
4. Section 4.9 is amended by adding paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec.  4.9  Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.

* * * * *
    (g) Interconnected VoIP Service Providers. (1) All interconnected 
VoIP service providers shall submit electronically a Notification to 
the Commission:
    (i) Within 240 minutes of discovering that they have experienced on 
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an 
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 9-1-1 
special facility (as defined in (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they 
also shall notify, as soon as possible by telephone or other electronic 
means, any official who has been designated by the management of the 
affected 9-1-1 facility as the provider's contact person for 
communications outages at that facility, and the provider shall convey 
to that person all available information that may be useful to the 
management of the affected facility in mitigating the effects of the 
outage on efforts to communicate with that facility; or
    (ii) Within 24 hours of discovering that they have experienced on 
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an 
outage of at least 30 minutes duration:
    (A) That potentially affects at least 900,000 user minutes of 
interconnected VoIP service and results in complete loss of service; or
    (B) That potentially affects any special offices and facilities (in 
accordance with paragraphs Sec.  4.5(a) through (d)).
    (2) Not later than thirty days after discovering the outage, the 
provider shall submit electronically a Final Communications Outage 
Report to the Commission. The Notification and Final reports shall 
comply with all of the requirements of Sec.  4.11.

[FR Doc. 2012-9749 Filed 4-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P