

• *Fax comments to:* RADB at 301–492–3446.

For additional direction on accessing information and submitting comments, see “Accessing Information and Submitting Comments” in the **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION** section of this document.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. William Holston, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–8573; email: *William.Holston@nrc.gov*.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments**

*A. Accessing Information*

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2012–0055 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access information related to this document by the following methods:

• *Federal Rulemaking Web Site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC–2012–0055.

• *NRC’s Interim Staff Guidance Web Site:* The LR–ISG documents are also available online under the “License Renewal” heading at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/#int>.

• *NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select “ADAMS Public Documents” and then select “Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.” For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to [pdr.resource@nrc.gov](mailto:pdr.resource@nrc.gov). The draft LR–ISG–2011–03 is available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML11244A058. The GALL Report and SRP–LR are available in ADAMS under Accession Nos. ML103490041 and ML103490036, respectively.

• *NRC’s PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

*B. Submitting Comments*

Please include Docket ID NRC–2012–0055 in the subject line of your comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make your comment submission available to the public in this docket.

The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information in

comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at <http://www.regulations.gov> as well as entering the comment submissions into ADAMS, and the NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.

If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information in their comment submissions that they do not want to be publicly disclosed. Your request should state that the NRC will not edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

**II. Background**

On March 9, 2012 (77 FR 14446), the NRC requested public comments on draft LR–ISG–2011–03. Comments were to be submitted by April 9, 2012. By letter dated March 27, 2012, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested the comment period be closed on April 20, 2012. The NRC staff is granting NEI’s request. The NRC staff believes that granting the request to close the comment period on April 20, 2012, will allow stakeholders a chance to better prepare their responses to LR–ISG–2011–03.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of April 2012.

**Melanie A. Galloway,**

*Acting Director, Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 2012–8670 Filed 4–10–12; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 7590–01–P**

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Power Upgrades; Notice of Meeting**

The ACRS Subcommittee on Power Upgrades will hold a meeting on April 26, 2012, Room T–2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance, with the exception of portions that may be closed to protect information that is proprietary pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(c)(4).

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

**Thursday, April 26, 2012–8:30 a.m. Until 5 p.m.**

The Subcommittee will review the Safety Evaluation (SER) associated with the St. Lucie 1 extended power uprate application. The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC staff, the licensee, Florida Power and Light Company, and other interested persons regarding this matter. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Full Committee.

Members of the public desiring to provide oral statements and/or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Mr. Weidong Wang (Telephone 301–415–6279 or Email: [Weidong.Wang@nrc.gov](mailto:Weidong.Wang@nrc.gov)) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty minutes before the meeting. In addition, one electronic copy of each presentation should be emailed to the DFO one day before the meeting. If an electronic copy cannot be provided within this timeframe, presenters should provide the DFO with a CD containing each presentation at least thirty minutes before the meeting. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting that are open to the public. Detailed procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the **Federal Register** on October 17, 2011, (76 FR 64127–64128).

Detailed meeting agendas and meeting transcripts are available on the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs>. Information regarding topics to be discussed, changes to the agenda, whether the meeting has been canceled or rescheduled, and the time allotted to present oral statements can be obtained from the Web site cited above or by contacting the identified DFO. Moreover, in view of the possibility that the schedule for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, persons planning to attend should check with these references if such rescheduling would result in a major inconvenience.

If attending this meeting, please enter through the One White Flint North building, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. After registering with security, please contact Mr. Theron

Brown (240-888-9835) to be escorted to the meeting room.

Dated: March 26, 2012.

**Antonio Dias,**

*Technical Advisor, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.*

[FR Doc. 2012-8666 Filed 4-10-12; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 7590-01-P**

## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**[NRC-2012-0089; Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52-028; License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94; EA-12-063]**

### **South Carolina Electric And Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3); Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective Immediately)**

#### **I**

The Licensee identified in this Order holds licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) authorizing operation and construction of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants."

#### **II**

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height, that inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across northeastern Japan and significantly affected the infrastructure and industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan.

When the earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine refueling and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the three operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDGs) started at all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical power to critical systems at each unit. The facility response to the earthquake appears to have been normal.

Approximately 40 minutes following the earthquake and shutdown of the

operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site, followed by additional waves. The tsunami caused extensive damage to site facilities and resulted in a complete loss of all ac electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout. In addition, all direct current electrical power was lost early in the event on Units 1 and 2 and after some period of time at the other units. Unit 6 retained the function of one air-cooled EDG. Despite their actions, the operators lost the ability to cool the fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of cooling capabilities.

The Unit 4 spent fuel pool contained the highest heat load of the six units with the full core present in the spent fuel pool and the refueling gates installed. However, because Unit 4 had been shut down for more than 3 months, the heat load was low relative to that present in spent fuel pools immediately following shutdown for reactor refueling. Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the Units 3 and 4 control room focused their efforts on stabilizing the Unit 3 reactor. During the event, concern grew that the spent fuel was overheating, causing a high-temperature reaction of steam and zirconium fuel cladding generating hydrogen gas. This concern persisted primarily due to a lack of readily available and reliable information on water levels in the spent fuel pools. Helicopter water drops, water cannons, and cement delivery vehicles with articulating booms were used to refill the pools, which diverted resources and attention from other efforts. Subsequent analysis determined that the water level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not drop below the top of the stored fuel and no significant fuel damage occurred. The lack of information on the condition of the spent fuel pools contributed to a poor understanding of possible radiation releases and adversely impacted effective prioritization of emergency response actions by decision makers.

Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this

review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, "Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan," dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were modified by the NRC staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the NRC staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report," dated September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned," dated October 3, 2011.

As directed by the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and considered the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the NRC staff's prioritization of the recommendations based upon the potential safety enhancements.

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United States. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the NRC's assessment of new insights from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi leads the NRC staff to conclude that additional requirements must be imposed on Licensees and CP holders to increase the capability of nuclear power plants to mitigate beyond-design-basis external events. These additional requirements represent a substantial increase in the protection of public health and safety. The Commission has decided to administratively exempt this Order from applicable provisions of the Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109, and the issue finality requirements in 10 CFR 52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Paragraph VIII.

Additional details on an acceptable approach for complying with this Order will be contained in final interim staff guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued by the NRC in August 2012. This guidance will include a template to be used for the plan that will be submitted in accordance with Section IV, Condition C.1 below.

#### **III**

Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety