[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 11, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21815-21819]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-8669]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2012-0089; Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52-028; License Nos. NPF-93 and
NPF-94; EA-12-063]
South Carolina Electric And Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear
Station Units 2 and 3); Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensee identified in this Order holds licenses issued by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) authorizing
operation and construction of nuclear power plants in accordance with
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, ``Licenses, Certifications, and
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.''
II
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large
tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height, that
inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The
earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across
northeastern Japan and significantly affected the infrastructure and
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan.
When the earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3
were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine
refueling and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was
offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the
three operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was
lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDGs)
started at all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical
power to critical systems at each unit. The facility response to the
earthquake appears to have been normal.
Approximately 40 minutes following the earthquake and shutdown of
the operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site,
followed by additional waves. The tsunami caused extensive damage to
site facilities and resulted in a complete loss of all ac electrical
power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout. In
addition, all direct current electrical power was lost early in the
event on Units 1 and 2 and after some period of time at the other
units. Unit 6 retained the function of one air-cooled EDG. Despite
their actions, the operators lost the ability to cool the fuel in the
Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about
70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in
damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of cooling
capabilities.
The Unit 4 spent fuel pool contained the highest heat load of the
six units with the full core present in the spent fuel pool and the
refueling gates installed. However, because Unit 4 had been shut down
for more than 3 months, the heat load was low relative to that present
in spent fuel pools immediately following shutdown for reactor
refueling. Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the
Units 3 and 4 control room focused their efforts on stabilizing the
Unit 3 reactor. During the event, concern grew that the spent fuel was
overheating, causing a high-temperature reaction of steam and zirconium
fuel cladding generating hydrogen gas. This concern persisted primarily
due to a lack of readily available and reliable information on water
levels in the spent fuel pools. Helicopter water drops, water cannons,
and cement delivery vehicles with articulating booms were used to
refill the pools, which diverted resources and attention from other
efforts. Subsequent analysis determined that the water level in the
Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not drop below the top of the stored fuel
and no significant fuel damage occurred. The lack of information on the
condition of the spent fuel pools contributed to a poor understanding
of possible radiation releases and adversely impacted effective
prioritization of emergency response actions by decision makers.
Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant,
the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the
Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a
systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes
and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to
these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a
result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of
recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,''
dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were modified by the NRC
staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the
NRC staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions
To Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated
September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended
Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated
October 3, 2011.
As directed by the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)
for SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations
within the context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and
considered the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to
implement the recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137
established the NRC staff's prioritization of the recommendations based
upon the potential safety enhancements.
Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities
allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United States.
Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do
not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the
NRC's assessment of new insights from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi
leads the NRC staff to conclude that additional requirements must be
imposed on Licensees and CP holders to increase the capability of
nuclear power plants to mitigate beyond-design-basis external events.
These additional requirements represent a substantial increase in the
protection of public health and safety. The Commission has decided to
administratively exempt this Order from applicable provisions of the
Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109, and the issue finality requirements in 10
CFR 52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Paragraph VIII.
Additional details on an acceptable approach for complying with
this Order will be contained in final interim staff guidance (ISG)
scheduled to be issued by the NRC in August 2012. This guidance will
include a template to be used for the plan that will be submitted in
accordance with Section IV, Condition C.1 below.
III
Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and
safety
[[Page 21816]]
and assurance of the common defense and security are the fundamental
NRC regulatory objectives. Compliance with NRC requirements plays a
critical role in giving the NRC confidence that Licensees and CP
holders are maintaining an adequate level of public health and safety
and common defense and security. While compliance with NRC requirements
presumptively ensures adequate protection, new information may reveal
that additional requirements are warranted. In such situations, the
Commission may act in accordance with its statutory authority under
Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require
Licensees and CP holders to take action in order to protect health and
safety and common defense and security.
To protect public health and safety from the inadvertent release of
radioactive materials, the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy includes
multiple layers of protection: (1) Prevention of accidents by virtue of
the design, construction, and operation of the plant; (2) mitigation
features to prevent radioactive releases should an accident occur; and
(3) emergency preparedness programs that include measures such as
sheltering and evacuation. The defense-in-depth strategy also provides
for multiple physical barriers to contain the radioactive materials in
the event of an accident. The barriers are the fuel cladding, the
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment. These defense-
in-depth features are embodied in the existing regulatory requirements
and thereby provide adequate protection of public health and safety.
In the case of spent fuel pools, compliance with existing
regulations and guidance presumptively provides reasonable assurance of
the safe storage of spent fuel. In particular, Appendix A, ``General
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50
establishes the general design criteria (GDC) for nuclear power plants.
All currently operating reactors were licensed to the GDC or meet the
intent of the GDC. The GDC provide the design features of the spent
fuel storage and handling systems and the protection of these systems
from natural phenomena and operational events. The accidents considered
during licensing of U.S. nuclear power plants typically include failure
of the forced cooling system and loss of spent fuel pool inventory at a
specified rate within the capacity of the makeup water system. Further,
spent fuel pools at U.S. nuclear power plants rely on maintenance of an
adequate inventory of water under accident conditions to provide
containment, as well as the cooling and shielding safety functions.
During the events in Fukushima, responders were without reliable
instrumentation to determine water level in the spent fuel pool. This
caused concerns that the pool may have boiled dry, resulting in fuel
damage.\1\ Fukushima demonstrated the confusion and misapplication of
resources that can result from beyond-design-basis external events when
adequate instrumentation is not available.
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\1\ See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 11-005,
``Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station,'' Revision 0, issued November 2011, p. 36.
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The spent fuel pool level instrumentation at U.S. nuclear power
plants is typically narrow range and, therefore, only capable of
monitoring normal and slightly off-normal conditions. Although the
likelihood of a catastrophic event affecting nuclear power plants and
the associated spent fuel pools in the United States remains very low,
beyond-design-basis external events could challenge the ability of
existing instrumentation to provide emergency responders with reliable
information on the condition of spent fuel pools. Reliable and
available indication is essential to ensure plant personnel can
effectively prioritize emergency actions.
The Commission has determined that the spent fuel pool
instrumentation required by this Order represents a significant
enhancement to the protection of public health and safety and is an
appropriate response to the insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident. While this consideration is qualitative in nature, the
Commission has long taken the position that the determination as to
whether proposed backfits represent a substantial safety improvement
may be qualitative in nature. Staff Requirements Memorandum, SECY-93-
086, ``Backfit Considerations'' (June 30, 1993), pp. 1-2. However the
Commission does not, at this time, have sufficient information to
complete a full backfit analysis of the spent fuel pool instrumentation
that would be required by this Order. The NRC is analyzing the insights
gained from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on an accelerated timeline.
Additionally, the NRC has considered the Congressional intent that the
agency act expeditiously on Tier 1 recommendations.
The Commission has recognized, in exceptional circumstances, that
some proposed rules may not meet the requirements specified in the
Backfit Rule but nevertheless should be adopted by the NRC. Hence, the
Commission advised the NRC staff that it would consider, on a case-by-
case basis, whether a proposed regulatory action should be adopted as
an ``exception'' to the Backfit Rule. This Order represents such a
case. Therefore, the Commission has decided to administratively exempt
this Order from the Backfit Rule and the issue finality requirements in
10 CFR 52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, paragraph VIII for several
reasons.
The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident was unprecedented in terms of
initiating cause and the particular failure sequence. In addition, our
review of this event has highlighted the benefits that can be derived
from the availability of more diverse instrumentation. Consistent with
the final Aircraft Impact Assessment Rule, 10 CFR 50.150, 74 FR 28112
(June 12, 2009), the Commission's decision to administratively exempt
this Order from compliance with the Backfit Rule is a highly
exceptional action limited to the insights associated with the
extraordinary underlying circumstances of the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident and the NRC's lessons learned. Furthermore, the extensive
stakeholder engagement and broad endorsement for timely action support
the Commission's judgment that immediate action to commence
implementation of the spent fuel monitoring requirements is warranted
at this time. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that
the public health, safety, and interest require that this Order be made
immediately effective.
Based upon the considerations set forth above, the Commission has
determined that the Licensee must have a reliable means of remotely
monitoring wide-range spent fuel pool levels to support effective
prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions in the event of
a beyond-design-basis external event. These new requirements provide a
greater capability, consistent with the overall defense-in-depth
philosophy, and therefore greater assurance of protection of public
health and safety from the challenges posed by beyond-design-basis
external events to power reactors. Accordingly, the Commission
concludes that combined licenses (COLs) NPF-93 and NPF-94 shall be
modified to include the requirements identified in Attachment 1 to this
Order.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations
in 10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, It is hereby ordered,
effective immediately,
[[Page 21817]]
That COLS NPF-93 AND NPF-94 are modified as follows:
A. 1. The Licensee shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the
requirements described in Attachment 1 to this Order except to the
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license.
The Licensee shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in
Attachment 1 to the Order and shall complete full implementation prior
to initial fuel load.
B. 1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission (1) if it is unable to comply with
any of the requirements described in Attachment 1, (2) if compliance
with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any
Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
2. If the Licensee considers that implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachment 1 to this Order would adversely
impact safe and secure operation of the facility, it must notify the
Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse
impact, the basis for its determination that the requirement has an
adverse impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives
specified in the Attachment 1 requirement in question, or a schedule
for modifying the facility to address the adverse condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to
Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required
in Condition B.1.
C. 1. The Licensee shall, within one (1) year after issuance of the
final ISG, submit to the Commission for review an overall integrated
plan, including a description of how compliance with the requirements
described in Attachment 1 will be achieved.
2. The Licensee shall provide an initial status report sixty (60)
days after the issuance of the final ISG, and at six (6)-month
intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as
required in Condition C.1, which delineates progress made in
implementing the requirements of this Order.
3. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when full compliance
with the requirements described in Attachment 1 is achieved.
The Licensee's responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3,
above, shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR
52.3, as applicable.
The Director, Office of New Reactors may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee
of good cause.
V
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration
will be given to extending the time to answer or to request a hearing.
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of New
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and
include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order.
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee, or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee,
or any other person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition
to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139,
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by
telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification
(ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not listed on the web site, but
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer
assistance in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users will be required to install a web browser plug-in from the NRC's
Web site. Further information on the web-based submission form,
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on
the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions
[[Page 21818]]
should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC
guidance available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the
time the documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To
be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing
system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document
and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that
provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General
Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need
not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore,
applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative)
must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing
request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access
to the document via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-(866) 672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier,
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at
http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted
materials in their submission.
If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 30th day of March 2012.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael R. Johnson,
Director, Office of New Reactors.
Attachment 1--Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Level
Instrumentation at Combined License Holder Reactor Sites
Attachment 2 to the March 12, 2012, Order Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (available at the
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under
ADAMS accession number ML12054A679) for Part 50 Licensees, requires
reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage
pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water
level conditions by trained personnel: (1) Level that is adequate to
support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level
that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a
person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level
where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water
addition should no longer be deferred.
The design bases of V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 address many of these
attributes of spent fuel pool level instrumentation. The NRC staff
reviewed these design features prior to issuance of the combined
licenses for these facilities and certification of the AP1000 design
referenced therein. The AP1000 certified design largely addresses the
requirements in Attachment 2 of the March 12, 2012 Order by providing
two safety-related spent fuel pool level instrument channels. The
instruments measure the level from the top of the spent fuel pool to
the top of the fuel racks to address the range requirements listed
above. The safety-related classification provides for the following
additional design features:
Seismic and environmental qualification of the
instruments.
Independent power supplies.
Electrical isolation and physical separation between
instrument channels.
Display in the control room as part of the post-accident
monitoring instrumentation.
Routine calibration and testing.
As such, this Order requires V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 to address
the following requirements that were not specified in the certified
design.
1. The spent fuel pool level instrumentation shall include the
following design features:
1.1 Arrangement: The spent fuel pool level instrument channels
shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of
the level indication function against missiles that may result from
damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may
be provided by locating the safety-related instruments to maintain
instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to
utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses
and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.
1.2 Qualification: The level instrument channels shall be reliable
at
[[Page 21819]]
temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent
fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period.
1.3 Power supplies: Instrumentation channels shall provide for
power connections from sources independent of the plant alternating
current (ac) and direct current (dc) power distribution systems, such
as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Power supply designs
should provide for quick and accessible connection of sources
independent of the plant ac and dc power distribution systems. Onsite
generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries
used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to
maintain the level indication function until offsite resource
availability is reasonably assured.
1.4 Accuracy: The instrument shall maintain its designed accuracy
following a power interruption or change in power source without
recalibration.
1.5 Display: The display shall provide on-demand or continuous
indication of spent fuel pool water level.
2. The spent fuel pool instrumentation shall be maintained
available and reliable through appropriate development and
implementation of a training program. Personnel shall be trained in the
use and the provision of alternate power to the safety-related level
instrument channels.
[FR Doc. 2012-8669 Filed 4-10-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P