At present, Oman has no nuclear research or power program; however, Oman does have the need for radioactive sources for legitimate industrial, medical, and research purposes in support of important economic and commercial development projects. Exports of radioactive sources from the United States for such purposes would be facilitated by removal of Oman from the restricted destinations list in Part 110.

The NRC staff has determined that removing Oman from the restricted destinations list is consistent with current U.S. law and policy, and will pose no unreasonable risk to the public health and safety or to the common defense and security of the United States.

Because this rule involves a foreign affairs function of the United States, the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply (5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). This rule will become effective immediately upon publication.

II. Voluntary Consensus Standards

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–113) requires that Federal Agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless, using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. This final rule does not constitute the establishment of a standard for which the use of a voluntary consensus standard would be applicable.

III. Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion

The NRC has determined that this final rule is the type of action described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(1). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for the rule.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Approval Number 3150–0036.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

V. Regulatory Analysis

Removal of Oman from the restricted destinations list in §110.29 means that exports of certain radioactive materials to Oman may qualify for the NRC general license specified in §§110.21 through 110.24. There is no alternative to amending the regulations for the export and import of nuclear equipment and materials. This final rule is expected to have no changes in the information collection burden or cost to the public.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects only companies exporting nuclear equipment and materials to Oman which do not fall within the scope of the definition of “small entities” set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601(3)), or the Size Standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).

VII. Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required for this rule, because these amendments do not include any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I.

VIII. Congressional Review Act

Under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 110

Administrative practice and procedure, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Export, Import, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR part 110.

PART 110—EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

1. The authority citations for part 110 continues to read as follows:


2. Section 110.29 is amended by removing “Oman” from the list of restricted destinations.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February 2012.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Michael F. Weber,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.

[FR Doc. 2012–4556 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 121, and 129


RIN 2120–AJ92

Security Considerations for Lavatory Oxygen Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Interim final rule; disposition of comments.

SUMMARY: On March 8, 2011, the FAA published an interim final rule, request
for comments (Amendment Nos. 21–94, 25–133, 121–354, 129–50; SFAR 111) on security considerations for lavatory oxygen systems (77 FR 12550). The interim final rule addresses a security vulnerability and is needed so the affected airplanes can continue operating until the non-compliance to airworthiness standards and operating rules is resolved. We sought public comment on the interim final rule even though it became effective upon publication. This action responds to the public comments the FAA received.

ADDRESS: You may review the public docket for this rulemaking (Docket No. FAA–2011–0186) at the Docket Management Facility in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, 20590–0001 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the public docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact Jeff Gardlin, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: (425) 227–2136; email: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov.

For legal questions concerning this action, contact Douglas Anderson, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional Counsel, ANM–7, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: (425) 227–2166; email: douglas.anderson@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA became aware of a security vulnerability with certain types of oxygen systems installed inside the lavatories of most transport category airplanes. As a result, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011–04–09, which mandated that these oxygen systems be rendered inoperative until the vulnerability could be eliminated. However, by completing the mandated actions in AD 2011–04–09, operators were no longer in compliance with the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1447, 121.329, and 121.333, and could not legally continue flight operations. AD 2011–04–09 also affects newly manufactured airplanes and airplanes undergoing other modification. The Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) is needed to address the security vulnerability and allow the affected operators to continue flight operations until the non-compliance to airworthiness standards and operating rules created by the AD is resolved.

The FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) primarily comprised of industry representatives in March 2011. The ARC’s purpose was to recommend regulatory changes and guidance that could be used to restore oxygen in affected lavatories while addressing the security vulnerability. The ARC submitted its recommendations to the FAA on August 3, 2011. The FAA is reviewing the recommendations and will initiate additional rulemaking as necessary. The recommendations will facilitate developing future rulemaking to address existing and new certifications of aircraft. As stated in SFAR 111, we envision a two- to four-year regulatory process to restore the affected oxygen systems to their full operational capability. Complete restoration includes any new regulatory changes, as well as incorporating any new oxygen system designs into airplanes currently in service.

Discussion of Comments

The FAA received comments from ten commenters: Aerox Aviation Oxygen Systems, Inc., The Boeing Company, and eight private citizens. Boeing and three citizens supported the SFAR with the overall assertion that removing chemical oxygen generators from the lavatories poses a risk to a small number of passengers compared to putting all of the passengers on the airplane at risk by keeping the chemical oxygen generators installed.

Five citizens opposed the SFAR, asserting that the safety benefit gained by removing the chemical oxygen system from lavatories to preclude the unlikely event of a terrorist attack does not outweigh the potential risk of individual passengers experiencing hypoxia in the event of a decompression. These commenters also suggested that the FAA consider other options, such as installing an alternative oxygen system in the lavatories, rather than simply removing the chemical oxygen system.

We disagree with the commenters’ assertion that the potential risk of a security breach is outweighed by the potential individual risk of hypoxia for a passenger in the lavatory during cabin decompression. We continue to believe that the approach taken by the FAA—to temporarily allow a non-compliance with existing regulations until a solution is found to the problem identified in the underlying AD—appropriately addresses risk. While there is some risk of hypoxia, the emergency descent procedures initiated by the flightcrew are the primary protection against hypoxia provided to passengers.

Pressure loss events have not resulted in a cabin pressure altitude that was instantaneously equal to the airplane altitude. Even when decompressions have occurred when the airplane is at a high altitude, such as 40,000 feet, cabin occupants have not been exposed to those altitudes because it takes time for the cabin pressure to leak from the fuselage. Flightcrews initiate an emergency descent shortly after they receive notification that the cabin pressure cannot be maintained. The airplane is already descending by the time the internal cabin pressure is equal to the airplane altitude.

We carefully considered all of the variables and determined that the risk to all of the passengers due to the security vulnerability was significantly greater than the potential individual risk of hypoxia in the event of cabin decompression. AD 2011–04–09 and SFAR 111 are only interim measures, and we are actively pursuing regulatory changes intended to restore supplemental oxygen in the affected lavatories, while considering the security issues.

We partially agree with the commenters’ suggestions to consider other rulemaking alternatives because other alternatives could be used to restore oxygen in the affected lavatories. We disagree with the commenters’ suggestions to accomplish longer-term rulemaking actions while leaving the chemical oxygen generators installed in the lavatories. The security vulnerability would remain until final corrective actions were identified and completed. Accomplishing the actions in AD 2011–04–09 eliminates the security vulnerability until additional actions can be identified and taken to restore the oxygen system with a design that would consider the security risk.

Boeing stated that in and of itself, the SFAR does not require removing or expending the contents of the chemical oxygen generators. This will likely cause confusion and is not consistent with the actions in AD 2011–04–09. Boeing recommended that the SFAR be revised to require the oxygen generators to be either removed or expended and that the wording be the same as that in the AD; we disagree. The affected chemical oxygen generators have already been removed or expended in accordance with AD 2011–04–09, and the SFAR does not supersede AD 2011–04–09. The SFAR provides interim relief...
to operators from type design requirements that the operators would have been out of compliance with once the actions mandated in AD 2011–04–09 were completed. No changes to SFAR 111 were made as a result of this comment.

Boeing also suggested that the SFAR be clarified to allow the applicant for a type certificate to receive a production certificate and an airworthiness approval for domestic operators affected by AD 2011–04–09 (14 CFR part 121 operators) or for foreign operators (14 CFR part 129) in countries where the local civil aviation authority has issued a mandatory action equivalent to AD 2011–04–09. We infer that Boeing is requesting we clarify SFAR 111 for airplanes registered outside the United States because only foreign registered airplanes could be subject to a mandatory action similar to AD 2011–04–09. We disagree because SFAR 111 does not apply to airplanes registered outside the United States. We cannot provide relief from airworthiness standards issued by civil aviation authorities in other countries. The responsible civil aviation authority must grant relief from an airworthiness standard. Furthermore, SFAR 111, paragraph (b)(2) already provides this relief for airplanes registered in the United States but operated by foreign carriers. No changes were made to the SFAR as a result of this comment.

Boeing suggested paragraph (c) of the SFAR be revised to indicate that it is the operators’ responsibility to provide flightcrew training procedures for airplanes with a disabled lavatory oxygen system. We disagree that this clarification is necessary because the SFAR does not include a requirement to revise existing flightcrew training procedures. Operators currently have the option to add or revise existing training for the cabin or flightcrew as they deem necessary. No changes were made to the SFAR as a result of this comment.

Aerox Aviation provided information pertaining to the availability of a small portable, gaseous oxygen supply and stated that such equipment could provide an emergency oxygen supply. We are familiar with the Aerox portable oxygen equipment as well as other portable oxygen equipment from other suppliers. It is possible for operators to incorporate installation of portable gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the lavatory under existing regulations. If such equipment were to be installed, it would need to be approved by the FAA in accordance with existing procedures applicable to type design changes. Neither AD 2011–04–09 nor SFAR 111 would prevent installation of portable gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the lavatory. No changes were made to the SFAR as a result of this comment.

Conclusion

After analyzing the comments submitted in response to SFAR 111, the FAA has determined that no further revisions to the SFAR are necessary at this time. The FAA determined this interim rule remains necessary because it addresses an emergency safety situation that made it imperative to immediately implement the rulemaking’s provisions. While the chemical oxygen supply is intended to provide passengers with supplemental oxygen when necessary, lavatories become privately enclosed areas when in use. Possible tampering with that chemical oxygen supply presented a security vulnerability that this rulemaking addresses. Therefore, Amendments 21–94, 25–133, 121–354, and 129–50 remain in effect.

The FAA is currently assessing the recommendations of the ARC discussed above. We are using these recommendations to develop additional rulemaking actions that will restore the affected oxygen systems to their full operational capability in existing and new certifications of affected aircraft, while eliminating the potential security threat posed by the previous systems.

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2012.

Frank P. Paskiewicz,
Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2012–4571 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket No. USCG–2012–0068]

RIN 1625–AA00

Safety Zone; Lauderdale Air Show, Atlantic Ocean, Fort Lauderdale, FL

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Temporary final rule.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is establishing a temporary safety zone on the waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale, Florida during the Lauderdale Air Show. The event is scheduled to take place on Saturday, April 28, 2012 and Sunday, April 29, 2012. The safety zone is necessary for the safety of air show participants, participant aircraft, spectators, and the general public during the event. Persons and vessels are prohibited from entering, transiting through, anchoring in, or remaining within the safety zone unless authorized by the Captain of the Port Miami or a designated representative.

DATES: This rule is effective from 11 a.m. on April 28, 2012 through 4:15 p.m. on April 29, 2012. This rule will be enforced daily from 11 a.m. until 4:15 p.m. on April 28, 2012 and April 29, 2012.

ADDRESSES: Documents indicated in this preamble as being available in the docket are part of docket USCG–2012–0068 and are available online by going to http://www.regulations.gov, inserting USCG–2012–0068 in the “Keyword” box, and then clicking “Search.” They are also available for inspection or copying at the Docket Management Facility (M–30), U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this temporary final rule, call or email Lieutenant Jennifer S. Makowski, Sector Miami Prevention Department, Coast Guard; telephone (305) 535–8724, email Jennifer.S.Makowski@uscg.mil. If you have questions on viewing the docket, call Renee V. Wright, Program Manager, Docket Operations, telephone (202) 366–9826.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Regulatory Information

The Coast Guard is issuing this temporary final rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment pursuant to authority under section 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision authorizes an agency to issue a rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because the Coast Guard did not receive necessary information regarding the event until January 17, 2012. As a result, the Coast Guard did not have sufficient time to publish an NPRM and to receive public comments prior to the event. Therefore, the Coast Guard did not delay in the effective date of this rule would be contrary to the public interest.