[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 23, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 72560-72600]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-29735]



[[Page 72559]]

Vol. 76

Wednesday,

No. 226

November 23, 2011

Part III





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52





Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 226 / Wednesday, November 23, 2011 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52

[NRC-2008-0122]
RIN 3150-AI10


Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is amending certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in its 
regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and 
utilization facilities. The final rule adds a conforming provision in 
the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for 
new nuclear power plants. The final rule codifies certain voluntary 
protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' and 
generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed 
by Commission orders. In addition, the final rule amends other licensee 
emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive review of the 
NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The requirements enhance the ability 
of licensees in preparing to take and taking certain EP and protective 
measures in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part, 
security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 
2001; clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan 
implementation among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to 
be more effective and efficient.

DATES: This final rule is effective on December 23, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document using the following methods:
     NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine 
and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's 
PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC 
are available online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 
which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If 
you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing 
the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff 
at 1-(800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by email to 
[email protected].
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and 
supporting materials related to this final rule can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: (301) 492-
3668; email: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: (301) 415-3874, email: [email protected]; or 
Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 
(301) 415-2966, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Implementation
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XV. Backfit Analysis
XVI. Congressional Review Act

I. Background

    After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP 
programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued 
adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications 
were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim 
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026), 
dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license 
holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the U.S. This 
order required licensees to implement interim compensatory measures 
(ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and take 
actions such as:
    (1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility 
between the plans;
    (2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response 
facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations 
facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting 
emergency response;
    (3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification 
(including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees), 
activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response 
organizations (OROs);
    (4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties 
are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency 
response; and
    (5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to 
provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.
    Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted 
inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear 
power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and 
the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.
    Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the 
changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear 
Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis Adequacy in the 
Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22, 2003 (not 
publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission that the 
EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing issues. 
However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events differ from 
accident events due to the planned action to maximize damage and loss 
of life and that the EP response to such events also differed. The NRC 
staff noted several EP issues that required further action to better 
respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.
    On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP 
program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the 
Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP 
regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the 
Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B, 
``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m., 
Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White 
Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated 
December

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20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a schedule of 
activities for the completion of the comprehensive review. The NRC 
staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of Emergency 
Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/11 
Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available), 
requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for 
enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005 
(not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide 
the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance. 
The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to 
proceed with enhancements to address EP issues as described in SECY-05-
0010. As a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), 
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based 
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that 
licensees could integrate into EP programs at power reactors. Bulletin 
BL-05-02 also sought to obtain information from licensees on their 
actions taken to implement Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP 
programs to adjust to the current threat environment. Based on the 
results of the post-BL-05-02 inspections, meetings with members of the 
nuclear power industry, and licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC 
determined that licensees were implementing strategies to satisfy Order 
EA-02-026 and enhance their programs to address the changed threat 
environment.
    As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff 
conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure, 
including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of 
this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders 
through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the 
elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and 
guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public 
and other stakeholder meetings.
    On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its 
review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of 
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20, 
2006. In that paper, the NRC staff discussed the activities it had 
conducted to complete the review and provided its recommendation to 
pursue rulemaking for enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff 
explained that the comprehensive review of the EP program identified 
several areas where the implementation of EP regulations and guidance, 
recent technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events, 
drills, and exercises had revealed to the NRC areas for potential 
improvement and increased clarity for the EP program. The staff divided 
the potential enhancements into two categories: security-based EP 
issues and other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and 
assigned it a priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of 
the issue's relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC 
strategic goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.
    The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and 
analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority, 
including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In 
SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential 
enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these 
issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and 
resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that 
the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient 
means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an 
opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.
    In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission 
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and 
guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007, 
the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission. During the 
development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed the issues identified 
in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of conducting rulemaking 
and updating guidance on all issues. The staff determined that the best 
course of action was to conduct rulemaking on the 12 issues identified 
in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and to reassess the 
remaining issues at a later date. The decision to conduct rulemaking on 
the highest priority issues was made to allow a timelier rulemaking 
effort to occur and enable the staff to more completely assess the 
remaining lower priority issues.
    Due to the similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking 
plan as ``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,'' 
these issues have been partially combined in this final rule. 
Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in SRM-M060502, 
``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency Planning 
Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, 
Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, 
Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006, to 
coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop 
emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills 
and exercises will be challenging and will not precondition participant 
responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue 
regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it 
was so closely related. Bulletin BL-05-02 provided a definition of 
``hostile action'' for use in EP programs: ``An act toward an NPP 
[nuclear power plant] or its personnel that includes the use of violent 
force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the 
licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water 
using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to 
deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent 
may be included.''
    In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that would be transparent and 
open to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through 
various means during the development of this rule. The NRC discussed 
the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance at several 
conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007 NRC 
Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) and the 2008 National 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference. These meetings 
are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.
    The NRC posted draft rule language on the Federal rulemaking Web 
site, http://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited 
stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the 
draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule. The 
NRC continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open 
communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March 
5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC 
staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking 
on enhancements to EP regulations and guidance and answered 
stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8, 2008, 
meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft 
preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders'

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questions on how these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.
    On January 9, 2009, the NRC staff provided the proposed rule to the 
Commission in SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to 
Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR [Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations] part 50).'' In its SRM to SECY-09-0007, dated 
April 16, 2009, the Commission approved the publication of the proposed 
rule. The NRC published the proposed rule on the enhancements to EP 
regulations for public comment in the Federal Register on May 18, 2009 
(74 FR 23254). Because it received several requests to lengthen the 
public comment period, the NRC extended the deadline for the public 
comment period from August 3, 2009, to October 19, 2009. During the 
public comment period, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) jointly held 11 public meetings to discuss the proposed 
rule and related guidance documents. The NRC received a total of 94 
submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were 
identified.
    On December 8, 2009, NRC and FEMA staff briefed the Commission on 
the status of the EP rulemaking and comments received during the public 
comment period. In addition, a panel of external stakeholders briefed 
the Commission on their comments and views regarding the proposed rule. 
In SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed Rule: 
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, 
December 8, 2009, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint 
North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January 
13, 2010, the Commission directed the NRC staff to continue working 
with FEMA in considering comments from State and local officials, and 
other interested stakeholders, to enhance the EP regulations and 
guidance. The Commission also directed the NRC staff to address the 
impacts of the rule and to consider providing a public draft of the 
rule language and guidance documents via the NRC public Web site while 
working with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the draft 
final rule.
    On November 15, 2010, the NRC and FEMA held a public meeting to 
discuss the proposed implementation dates for the EP final rule. The 
feedback from this meeting, as well as all the previous interactions, 
informed the NRC's schedule for the implementation of the new EP 
requirements.

II. Discussion

    The final rule applies to 10 CFR part 50 licensees that are 
currently subject to the EP requirements. The final rule similarly 
applies to certain applicants for construction permits under Part 50 
with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for coping with 
emergencies (Sec.  50.34(a)(10)), operating licenses under Part 50 
(Sec.  50.34(b)(6)(v)), early site permits under Part 52 that choose to 
propose either major features of an, or a complete and integrated, 
emergency plan (Sec.  52.17(b)(2)), and combined licenses under Part 52 
(Sec.  52.79(a)(21)). A discussion of which applicants may defer 
compliance with the requirements of this final rule is provided in 
Section V of this document.
    An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating 
event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident. 
Emergency preparedness cannot affect the probability of the initiating 
event, but a high level of EP increases the probability of accident 
mitigation if the initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial 
operator actions. As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is 
not normally quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the 
level of EP could affect the outcome of an accident in that the 
accident may be mitigated by the actions of the ERO or, in the worst 
case, consequences to the public could be reduced through the effective 
use of protective actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this 
manner enhance protection of public health and safety through 
improvements in the response to unlikely initiating events that could 
lead to severe accidents without mitigative response.
    The NRC's EP requirements are based on 16 planning standards in 
Sec.  50.47(b) that apply to onsite and offsite emergency response 
plans. The planning standards apply to onsite and offsite plans 
because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC looks at the 
application (or the licensee's activities in the case of existing 
facilities), the current State and local government emergency plans, 
and FEMA's recommendation, which is based on the content of the State 
and local plans. The FEMA regulations in 44 CFR part 350 also contain 
these planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on 
the adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local 
governments to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only 
offsite (State and local government) plans. The changes to Sec.  
50.47(b) in this final rule are designed to affect the onsite plans, 
not the offsite plans. The changes have been written in a way that is 
expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA regulations.
    This final rule does not affect the findings necessary for issuance 
of a renewed nuclear power operating license under 10 CFR part 54. As 
the Commission explained in the license renewal final rule (56 FR 
64943; December 13, 1991) and again in revisions to that final rule (60 
FR 22461; May 8, 1995), the scope of license renewal is limited to 
those issues that have a specific relevance to protecting the public 
health and safety during the license renewal period (i.e., age-related 
degradation). Issues relevant to current plant operations, like 
emergency planning, fall within the purview of the current regulatory 
process and continue into the extended operation period of a license 
renewal. See also NUREG-1412, ``Foundation for the Adequacy of the 
Licensing Bases,'' dated December 1991. The Commission has affirmed 
repeatedly that ``emergency preparedness need not be reviewed again for 
license renewal,'' 71 FR 74848, 74852; December 13, 2006 (referencing 
56 FR at 64966). The Commission stated that ``[t]hrough its standards 
and required exercises, the Commission ensures that existing plans are 
adequate throughout the life of any plant even in the face of changing 
demographics and other site-related factors.'' 71 FR at 74852 (quoting 
56 FR at 64966). This basic determination is reflected in the NRC's 
regulations at Sec.  50.47(a), in which a new finding on emergency 
planning issues is not required for license renewal.
    The discussion of the amendments in this final rule is divided into 
two sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section 
II.B for non-security related EP issues. The security-related issues 
are topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in 
Order EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related 
issues are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive 
review of EP regulations and guidance.

A. Security-Related EP Issues

    The NRC is enhancing its EP regulations by incorporating changes 
that clearly address EP actions for hostile action. Some of the changes 
are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was issued to ensure 
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense 
and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026, however, the 
Commission took several additional steps to ensure

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adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense 
and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access 
Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13, 
2003); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification 
Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24514; 
May 7, 2003); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' 
issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003); the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) final rule (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007); and the Power 
Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009). 
As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission 
has determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate 
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security. 
Therefore, the EP changes in this final rule that are based on the 
requirements of Order EA-02-026 are not necessary to ensure adequate 
protection during hostile action. These amendments are considered 
enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, licensees' 
implementation of these enhancements will result in a substantial 
increase in EP and the protection of public health and safety.
1. On-Shift Staffing Analysis
    The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned 
to emergency plan implementation functions may have numerous tasks or 
multiple responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of 
their assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift 
responsibilities are addressed in Sec.  50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV.A. The former regulations did not specifically 
require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan 
implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without 
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from 
performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC regulations and 
guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some 
flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to 
emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate 
completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event. 
The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to 
problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for 
emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:
     A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the 
licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel 
(communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and 
perform numerous response actions required by the event resulted in a 
heavy workload for the shift staff.
     A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another 
plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event, 
notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating 
procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff 
contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of 
Unusual Event.
    The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise 
On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective 
implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering 
expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a 
shift technical advisor (STA) to provide engineering and accident 
assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned additional 
response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire brigade member, 
which could have resulted in overburdening the control room staff 
during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as fire 
brigade leader, which could have hindered the STA from performing the 
primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering 
expertise.
    After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated 
that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued. 
The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift 
staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results 
of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several 
observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could 
be a large workload for radiological support personnel during 
emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant 
staffing practices for performing response activities during two 
accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with 
complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation 
and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included 
the following:
     Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for 
establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.
     Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant-
specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by 
licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.
     Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed 
personnel to staff the fire brigade.
     Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and 
non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed 
operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.
     Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the 
licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.
    Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for 
regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to 
on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee 
revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and 
assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As 
previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to 
provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC 
determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in 
effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q). In 
April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the 
assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech.) as the 
interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented 
ERO responder. The HP Tech. had assigned emergency plan tasks including 
in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid. 
The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and 
assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency 
plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q).
    These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to 
explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these 
emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency 
event. Having additional duties beyond the assigned emergency plan 
implementation functions could result in on-shift responders being 
overburdened, resulting in inadequate or untimely response.
    The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff 
responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient 
number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan 
and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some 
licensees were utilizing security

[[Page 72564]]

personnel to implement the emergency plan when many of these responders 
would likely not be available due to a hostile action.
    The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One 
option was to take no action, but this alternative would not have 
subjected new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's 
requirement of an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated 
security plan and emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the 
shift staffing study referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees 
surveyed did not use a systematic process for establishing shift 
staffing levels and additional tasks, not required by regulation, were 
assigned to the licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice, if 
permitted to continue, could have resulted in operators being 
overburdened during an emergency. A second option was to allow 
licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift staffing. 
However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to reduce on-
shift staffing levels and the NRC would have expected this practice to 
continue. This could have increased the risk of over-burdening on-shift 
responders and resulted in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore, 
both of these options were considered unacceptable.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power 
plant licensees to provide a detailed analysis to show that on-shift 
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions were not 
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing 
their assigned emergency plan functions. The NRC received several 
comments on this proposal, questioning the need for this regulation and 
suggesting that the proposed rule methodology should be placed in a 
regulatory guide, NUREG, or some other guidance document. The NRC 
disagrees with these comments and believes that a regulation is 
necessary to ensure consistent licensee implementation of on-shift 
emergency response staffing that is enforceable and not merely 
guidance. Therefore, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.A, to address this issue, as discussed in Section IV of this 
document.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should enhance its regulations to be more explicit in the 
number of ERO staff necessary for response to nuclear power plant 
emergencies. Specifically, the NRC requested comments on a draft 
staffing table that provided proposed staff functions and minimum 
staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting ERO. The table was a 
modification of the guidance found in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-
1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency 
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
dated November 1980, and incorporated lessons learned from years of NRC 
EP experience. Of the comments the NRC received, some comments 
supported and some opposed the inclusion of the table into regulations. 
The NRC acknowledges that because each site is different and site 
characteristics may dictate the size of the ERO staff, requiring 
compliance with standard staffing requirements would be an unreasonable 
approach to resolving this issue. For example, the NRC has approved 
some emergency plans with additional ERO staff due to site-specific 
circumstances, such as the lack of a local fire department or hospital. 
Therefore, the NRC is not specifying a standard ERO staffing table in 
its regulations.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to 
perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can 
perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a 
timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could 
prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC 
received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this 
requirement. The NRC agrees that this requirement is not necessary for 
non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is 
generally small, which is commensurate with the need to operate the 
facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. 
The NRC reviews the staffing as part of initial reactor licensing. The 
functions of emergency staff are outlined in emergency plans and are 
tested through drills and exercises in accordance with NUREG-0849, 
``Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans 
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated October 1983. Results are 
reviewed by the NRC during routine inspections. Therefore, the NRC has 
not included this requirement in the final rule.
2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action
    Section 50.47(b)(4) stipulates that emergency plans must include a 
standard emergency classification and EAL scheme. Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.B, specifies that emergency plans shall include EALs that 
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification of 
State and local agencies, and participation of those agencies in 
emergency response. However, the former regulations did not require 
EALs for hostile action and did not address the issue of anticipatory 
response to hostile action. Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02 
addressed these issues, those improvements to the EAL requirements to 
address hostile action were only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC 
could not ensure consistent and effective implementation of these 
enhancements among existing and future licensees.
    Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least a Notification 
of Unusual Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In 
2005, the NRC issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples 
for hostile action up to the General Emergency level. Bulletin BL-05-02 
provided examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be 
implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654, 
NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action 
Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, ``Methodology for 
Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also pointed out that 
because of improvements in Federal agencies' information-sharing and 
assessment capabilities, hostile action emergency declarations can be 
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner, based on a credible threat, 
than the current method of making declarations for accidental events. 
This would enable earlier implementation of emergency response actions.
    Although all nuclear power reactor licensees have implemented both 
the credible threat EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL 
enhancements specified in BL-05-02, licensees were not required to 
maintain the enhancements identified in the bulletin. This could have 
resulted in inconsistent EAL implementation among licensees for 
response to hostile action. Also, future licensees would not have been 
required to include these enhancements in their emergency plans. This 
final rule establishes consistent EALs across the nuclear power 
industry for hostile action. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided 
enhancements to EAL schemes that would allow event declarations to be 
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner. This timeliness is of the 
utmost importance because EALs are used as criteria for determining the 
need for notification and participation of State and local agencies. 
The NRC is

[[Page 72565]]

codifying these enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile 
action by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B, as discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these 
issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by 
licensees. These options were rejected since there would have continued 
to be no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to 
incorporate EALs for hostile action in their emergency plans, nor would 
there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that the NRC had 
determined to be adequate.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should expand to non-power reactor licensees the requirement 
for power reactor licensees to have hostile action EALs. Appendix E to 
10 CFR part 50 cites Regulatory Guide (RG) 2.6, ``Emergency Planning 
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983, as the guidance for 
the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency plans. 
Regulatory Guide 2.6 endorses ANSI/ANS 15.16-1982, ``Emergency Planning 
for Research Reactors,'' as an acceptable approach to non-power reactor 
emergency plans. The newly updated ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008 includes hostile 
action EALs. The NRC has commenced the process to update RG 2.6 to 
endorse ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008. The NRC has also determined that further 
analysis and stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the 
requirements for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has 
not included a requirement in the final rule for non-power reactor 
licensees to have hostile action EALs.
3. Emergency Response Organization Augmentation and Alternative 
Facilities
    Section 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, require 
licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff within a 
short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to assist in 
mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members typically staff 
an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) that relieves the control room 
(CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff to focus on 
reactor safety. The ERO members also staff an onsite Operational 
Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage repair 
teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in close 
proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation and 
coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal point of 
information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities involved 
in the response.
    Section 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, require 
licensees to have adequate emergency facilities and equipment to 
support emergency response. However, Sec.  50.47(b)(8) and the former 
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, did not require licensees to 
identify alternative facilities to support ERO augmentation during 
hostile action. During hostile action, ERO members would likely not 
have access to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if 
it is located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless 
these events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can 
travel quickly to the site once access is allowed.
    Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of 
staffing plans at emergency response facilities during hostile action, 
assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify alternative 
facilities capable of supporting event response. These facilities would 
function as staging areas for augmentation staff until the site was 
secured, which would minimize delays in overall site response by 
permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the danger of 
hostile action. The NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the 
identification and staffing of alternative emergency response 
facilities.
    Bulletin BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite 
emergency response facilities support EP functions during hostile 
action. It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner 
that supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the 
potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that 
some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during 
hostile action until the site was secured. However, the NRC considers 
it prudent, for hostile action events outside of normal working hours, 
to fully activate ERO members to promptly staff alternative facilities, 
in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Bulletin BL-05-02 
conveyed that, even during normal working hours, licensees should 
consider deployment of onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility 
near the site during hostile action.
    To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory 
action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as 
a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue 
Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute 
Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile 
Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action had been taken, there 
would have continued to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding 
the actions necessary during hostile action for the ERO to staff an 
alternative facility. The ERO members would likely not have access to 
the site during hostile action, but timely augmentation would still be 
necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may have 
resulted in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines, 
and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using 
a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those 
developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, would not 
provide a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed 
enhancements for hostile action. The use of voluntary programs would 
not have ensured long-term continuity of the enhancements for both 
licensees and applicants. Thus, the NRC is codifying the ICM 
requirement and the enhancement examples described in BL-05-02 
concerning ERO augmentation to alternative facilities during hostile 
action in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, to maximize the 
effectiveness of the site response. These changes are discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During 
Hostile Action
    A unique challenge posed by hostile action at a nuclear power plant 
is the increased demand on local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that 
are expected to implement portions of ORO emergency plans, as well as 
respond to the plant. The former Sec.  50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to 
Part 50 did not explicitly require licensees to coordinate with OROs to 
ensure that personnel are available to carry out preplanned actions, 
such as traffic control and route alerting by LLEAs, during hostile 
action directed at the plant.
    Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency 
response as well as demonstrate that various ORO capabilities exist 
through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and OROs have 
successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years. However, 
the NRC recognized that hostile action may challenge OROs in ways 
unforeseen at the time the current regulations were developed. For 
example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned both

[[Page 72566]]

evacuation plan and armed response duties during hostile action. The 
NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-026 and 
included provisions that licensees address coordination with OROs for 
hostile action. Specifically, the order required that licensees develop 
plans, procedures, and training regarding coordination between the site 
and OROs and directed licensees to review emergency plans to ensure 
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available during hostile 
action.
    The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and 
communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure 
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during 
hostile action. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and OROs 
through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,'' 
dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based 
on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF) 
exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills 
conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005. 
In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that 
conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every 
nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource 
planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile 
action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the 
NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees 
concerning effective coordination with OROs regarding the availability 
of adequate resources to respond to hostile action at a nuclear power 
plant.
    Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to 
respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the 
licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered 
encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program; 
however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 
means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. A voluntary approach would not have ensured 
consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM requirements and 
there would have been no requirement for new licensees to incorporate 
the changes into their emergency plans.
    The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to 
explicitly include hostile action at the site as one of the types of 
emergencies that define the State, local, and Federal agencies that 
licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the 
assistance licensees expect from them. These changes are discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
5. Protection for Onsite Personnel
    The former Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 did not 
require specific emergency plan provisions to protect onsite emergency 
responders and other onsite personnel in emergencies resulting from 
hostile action at nuclear power plants. Licensees are required to 
provide radiological protection for emergency workers and the public in 
the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), including 
actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for evacuation and 
accountability of individuals, and providing for protective clothing 
and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these personnel are required by 
the site emergency plan that the licensee must follow and maintain. The 
emergency plan requires responders with specific assignments to be 
available on-shift 24 hours a day to minimize the impact of 
radiological emergencies and provide for the protection of public 
health and safety. However, in analyses performed after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff determined that a lack of 
protection for emergency responders who are expected to implement the 
emergency plan could result in the loss of those responders and thus an 
inability to effectively implement the emergency plan.
    The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site 
evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite 
emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance 
because these actions may place at risk the response personnel 
necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action. 
Bulletin BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those 
normally prescribed may be more appropriate during hostile action, 
particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as 
evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and 
accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise 
actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the 
location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures 
would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely 
and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue. 
The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying 
upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being 
implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. Taking no action 
could have resulted in the vulnerability of onsite personnel during 
hostile action. Action is necessary to ensure effective coordination to 
enable licensees to more effectively implement their pre-planned 
actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 
means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the implementation 
of voluntary actions would not have ensured that these measures would 
be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.
    The NRC is revising Appendix E by creating new Section IV.I, to 
require licensees to protect onsite personnel during hostile action and 
to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the 
reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan, as 
discussed in Section IV of this document.
6. Challenging Drills and Exercises
    A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises 
to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise 
programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance 
that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health 
and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency. 
Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance 
of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear 
plant site.
    In the unlikely event that a licensee faces hostile action, the 
response organization will encounter challenges that differ 
significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise 
programs because these programs have not included hostile action 
scenarios. The former NRC regulations addressing this issue were 
general in nature and did not explicitly require licensees to include 
hostile action scenarios in drills and exercises, nor did they directly 
allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC is amending 
its regulations to do so.
    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
conducted a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed 
threat environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains 
valid. The NRC observed licensee performance during numerous

[[Page 72567]]

hostile action EP exercises and tabletop drills as well as several 
security FOF exercises. The NRC also discussed security-based EP issues 
with licensees and Federal, State, and local EP professionals and 
advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to collect information from 
licensees on the enhancements to drill and exercise programs to address 
the hostile action contingency.
    Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that, although EP measures 
are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile 
action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO 
drills and exercises, such as:
     Extensive coordination between operations, security, and 
EP personnel;
     Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for 
activation of the ERO;
     Execution of initial response actions in a hostile 
environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);
     The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or 
aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during 
radiological emergencies;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site 
conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security 
measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities with large 
areas of the plant damaged or on fire;
     Rescue of, and medical attention to, significant numbers 
of personnel; and
     Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to 
secure access to plant areas for repairs.
    In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear power reactor licensees stated 
that they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise 
program. Program elements were captured in NEI 06-04, Rev. 1, 
``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,'' a 
guidance document developed by NEI. The NRC endorsed this document for 
use in a pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to 
Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a 
Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19, 
2008. However, implementation of these enhancements was voluntary, and 
the NRC could not require licensees to maintain these enhancements, 
absent issuance of an order or a regulation.
    The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise 
scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises 
and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed 
many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations. 
Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local 
agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that 
facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable 
and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency 
classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release. 
Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor 
accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent 
containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used 
by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as 
a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However, 
certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise 
scenarios, including the following:
     The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident 
before a release occurs;
     The release will occur after a General Emergency is 
declared;
     The release will be terminated before the exercise ends; 
and
     The exercise will escalate sequentially through the 
emergency classes.
    In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences 
that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically 
face.
    In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the 
NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as 
follows:

    The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency 
planning exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory 
responses associated with preconditioning of participants by 
incorporating a wide spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no 
release to a large release) and events, including security-based 
events. These scenarios should emphasize the expected interfaces and 
coordination between key decision-makers based on realistic 
postulated events. The staff should share experiences of 
preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.

    As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed 
to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The 
working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA 
regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios 
and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these 
regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport 
with this final rule to address preconditioning and the incorporation 
of hostile action exercise scenarios.
    The FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to 
discuss potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC 
supported these meetings to facilitate questions as they related to the 
EP rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example, 
stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development 
and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification 
levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs 
can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could 
vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more 
realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the 
different focus groups and stakeholders informed this rulemaking, new 
guidance documents associated with this rulemaking, and an update to 
the REP Program Manual.
    A regulatory change is necessary to enhance scenario content to 
include hostile action scenarios and reduce preconditioning through a 
wide spectrum of challenges. This change will improve licensee ERO 
capability to protect public health and safety under all accident 
scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward preconditioning.
    The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations, 
but rejected that option because it would not adequately address the 
concerns previously discussed. The NRC also discussed the use of 
voluntary programs and although this option could be successful, the 
NRC could not require that changes made would be permanent and 
consistent across all sites.
    The NRC is revising Appendix E, Section IV.F, to address these 
issues, as discussed in Section IV of this document.

B. Non-Security Related EP Issues

    The remaining changes are new or amended requirements that result 
in a substantial increase to public health and safety because they 
maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to effectively 
implement their emergency plans.
1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
    The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS) 
capabilities are found in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.D.3, and require licensees to establish the capability to 
promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event 
while meeting certain ANS design objectives.

[[Page 72568]]

The former regulations did not require backup power for sirens or other 
backup ANS alerting capabilities when a major portion of the primary 
alerting means is unavailable. The regulations also did not address 
backup notification capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's 
ANS is unavailable and no backup exists, then the public may not be 
promptly alerted of an event at the facility and the protective actions 
to be taken, which could affect the public's response to the event.
    An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case 
of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions 
may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear 
power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to 
provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such 
as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or 
supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives 
information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency 
alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile 
loudspeakers.
    In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major 
portion of the alert function of an ANS for short time periods for 
various reasons, such as damage to ANS components caused by severe 
weather, loss of offsite alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of 
ANS activation equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS 
hardware/software modifications. In other situations, the notification 
capability has been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert 
radios, which are used to provide both an alert signal and notification 
function).
    The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when 
ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to 
Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and 
Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 
2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System 
Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28, 
``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated 
December 22, 2006. The inability to activate some tone alert radios 
because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS 
implementation was addressed in IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert 
Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' 
dated April 2, 1996. Without the ability to warn the population, the 
effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced. 
Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of 
the primary ANS.
    Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread 
loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren based systems, 
such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern 
U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in RG 1.155, 
``Station Blackout,'' dated August 1988, although the likelihood of 
failure of the onsite AC [alternating current] power system 
coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout 
events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some 
plants.
    The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification 
systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and 
encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (House 
Appropriations Committee) Report 107-740, FEMA was directed to update 
its guidance on outdoor warning and mass notification systems and 
require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an AC 
power supply. The House Appropriations Committee also urged FEMA to 
consult with other relevant agencies and revise the national standard 
for outdoor warning and mass notification to reflect state-of-the-art 
technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the 
Commission to require backup power for the emergency notification 
system, including siren systems, for nuclear power plants located where 
there is a permanent population, as determined by the 2000 decennial 
census, in excess of 15,000,000 within a 50 mile radius of the power 
plant. Therefore, it was appropriate that the NRC also considered 
changes to its existing regulations and guidance regarding warning 
systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.
    The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this 
issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related 
guidance documents to address ANS backup means. Several NRC and FEMA 
guidance documents, such as NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated November 1985, contain detailed information on ANS 
capabilities and design review methodology. Additional information on 
ANS backup capabilities will be provided in revisions or supplements to 
these documents. As guidance, a provision for an ANS backup means would 
not be considered a requirement and its applicability to existing 
approved ANS designs would be considered optional. As noted previously 
in this discussion, FEMA was also directed to update its guidance to 
require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an 
alternating current power supply. However, guidance changes limited to 
backup power requirements for the alerting function would not address 
backup capabilities for other types of alerting devices or the ANS 
notification function. In summary, this option did not provide a 
regulatory resolution to ensure that nuclear power plant ANS designs 
include a backup method to the primary means for both alerting and 
notification, and thus the NRC considered this option to be 
unacceptable.
    Use of a voluntary approach for ANS backup means was also 
considered. Some current nuclear power plant ANS designs address one or 
more aspects of backup ANS capabilities, such as providing backup power 
in the event primary power to sirens is lost, using backup route 
alerting when sirens are inoperable, designating multiple EAS broadcast 
stations to ensure that instructional messages can be transmitted, or 
using reverse 911 systems. A voluntary approach was considered as an 
option because State and local authorities can usually compensate for 
the temporary loss of some ANS capabilities. However, allowing 
licensees or applicants to voluntarily install backup ANS capabilities 
will not ensure that both the alerting and notification functions are 
addressed, or that new sites will have warning systems designed with 
comprehensive backup ANS capabilities. Given the importance of ANS to 
alert the public of an event at a facility and the protective actions 
to be taken, and without any voluntary industry commitment that 
existing or new warning systems will have a backup means available, the 
NRC considered a voluntary approach to be inappropriate and found this 
option unacceptable.
    The NRC believes that nuclear power reactor licensees must be 
required to have backup ANS methods and therefore is amending its 
regulations to address backup capabilities for both the alert and 
notification functions. The NRC considered three alternatives for 
addressing this issue in rulemaking.
    The first alternative would have added a regulatory requirement for 
ANS backup power. The most common warning system used at U.S. nuclear

[[Page 72569]]

power plants is based on sirens that are powered directly, or 
indirectly through batteries, by an AC power source. As noted 
previously in this discussion, the loss of power is not the only 
failure mode that can impact warning systems. Causes of past ANS 
inoperability problems have included the inability to detect siren 
failures, the inability to activate sirens, the failure to test and 
maintain personal home alerting devices, the use of telephone call-
inhibiting devices, and the failure to provide and maintain 
distribution lists of tone alert radios. Thus, a regulatory requirement 
addressing only backup ANS power would not have eliminated any of these 
other failure modes. This approach would have prescribed one specific 
method as a backup means, precluding licensees (or applicants) and 
offsite officials from considering alternative methods, such as route 
alerting or newer communications technology, that may be more suitable 
for certain nuclear power plant sites. In summary, it would have 
addressed only one of several ANS failure modes (i.e., loss of AC 
power) for one alerting method (i.e., sirens). It would not have 
addressed backup methods for other types of alerting devices or any 
part of the notification process. Therefore, the NRC considered this 
approach to be unacceptable.
    The second alternative would have required that the primary ANS be 
designed so no common single failure mode for the system existed; 
therefore, a backup system would not have been needed. This approach 
would have ensured that the entire ANS was designed and built to a very 
high level of reliability. Any equipment necessary for ANS activation 
and operation (e.g., computers, radio transmitters and radio towers, 
plus the actual alerting devices and notification means) would have had 
redundant components and power sources as necessary to eliminate any 
common single failure mode, such as a widespread power outage affecting 
a siren based system. However, ensuring that all ANS common single 
failure vulnerabilities have been identified and adequately addressed 
would have been difficult. Even after extensive analysis and testing of 
a warning system, a common failure mechanism may not have become 
evident until the system was activated for an emergency event. For a 
siren based system, several additional sirens (with backup power 
capabilities) may have been needed to be installed to provide 
overlapping acoustic coverage in the event clusters of sirens fail and 
thus may have discouraged licensees at future nuclear power plant sites 
from using these systems due to the increased cost for installing 
additional sirens. This approach may not have been applicable to non-
electronic primary warning systems based on other methods, such as 
route alerting. For these reasons, the NRC considered this approach to 
be unacceptable. Rejecting this approach does not mean that the issue 
of backup power for warning systems will be left unaddressed. As 
discussed previously, the House Committee on Appropriations directed 
FEMA to require all outdoor warning systems to be operable in the 
absence of AC power.
    The third alternative was selected and revises Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.D.3, to require a backup capability should the primary means 
of public alerting and notification be unavailable. These changes are 
discussed in Section IV of this document.
2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness
    Emergency declaration is the process by which a licensee determines 
whether an off-normal plant condition warrants declaration as an 
emergency and, if so, which of the four emergency classes--Notification 
of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency--is 
to be declared. In its oversight of licensee EP programs, the NRC has 
observed several licensees whose responses in performing emergency 
declarations were inappropriately delayed. Between 2000 and 2009, the 
NRC identified 13 situations in which an emergency declaration was 
either not done or inappropriately delayed during an actual event, 
which resulted in findings and cited and non-cited violations. These 
situations may have been a result of a lack of a specific regulatory 
timeliness requirement.
    Emergency declarations are fundamental to the licensee's EP program 
in that onsite and offsite emergency response activities are 
implemented in a staged, proportional manner, based upon the level of 
the declared emergency. If an emergency declaration is delayed, the 
subsequent emergency response actions may not be timely. Emergency 
response personnel, facilities, and equipment may not be in position 
should it become necessary to implement measures to protect public 
health and safety.
    The NRC has issued generic communications to alert licensees of 
these concerns and to advise them of the NRC's expectation that 
emergency classifications \1\ are made in a prompt manner. In 1985, the 
NRC published IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, 
Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications,'' to 
alert licensees of two instances in which declarations and/or 
notifications of an actual emergency condition were significantly 
delayed and to express the NRC expectation of timely emergency 
declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it necessary to publish Emergency 
Preparedness Position-2, ``Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on 
Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions,'' to provide 
guidance to NRC staff in evaluating licensee performance in the area of 
timely classification. The NRC cited classification delays in actual 
events and exercises as the reason for issuing the guidance. The EPPOS-
2 provided the NRC expectation that the classification should be made 
promptly following indications that conditions have reached an EAL 
threshold and that 15 minutes was a reasonable goal for completing the 
classification once indications are available to the control room 
operators. The NRC based that conclusion on the belief that 15 minutes 
is a reasonable period of time for assessing and classifying an 
emergency once indications are available to cognizant personnel, and 
that a delay in classification for up to 15 minutes would have a 
minimal impact upon the overall emergency response and protection of 
the public health and safety. The NRC noted that emergency 
classification schemes have reached a level of maturity in which the 
classification of emergencies can be accomplished in a relatively short 
period of time once the abnormal condition and associated plant 
parameters are known by cognizant licensee personnel. The EPPOS-2 
stated that the 15-minute period was not to be viewed as a grace period 
in which a licensee could resolve a condition that had already exceeded 
an EAL threshold to avoid a declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Early NRC generic communications routinely used the phrase 
``emergency classification'' to denote the outcome of the process to 
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition. This document 
uses the phrase ``emergency declaration'' in place of ``emergency 
classification'' except when summarizing an earlier document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This 15-minute goal was not a regulatory requirement but rather a 
guideline for NRC staff evaluation of a licensee's performance in 
responding to an actual radiological emergency. This goal was 
subsequently incorporated as a criterion in the industry proposed and 
NRC-approved Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone performance 
indicators (PIs). Although the reported classification performance

[[Page 72570]]

during drills and exercises remains high, there have been several 
instances during actual events in which classifications were 
inappropriately delayed. Although these actual events did not warrant 
public protective measures, this may not always be the case.
    The NRC considered the following options for addressing this 
regulatory problem. The first option, take no action, was rejected 
because it would not address the regulatory problem. The second option, 
continue to rely on the industry's voluntary PI, was rejected because 
the existence of the PI has not prevented untimely classifications 
during actual emergencies. Although these occurrences were associated 
with Notification of Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed weaknesses 
could also have occurred under different circumstances in which the 
potential impact to the public could have been greater. The third 
option, issue regulatory guidance, was rejected because although 
regulatory guidance is an appropriate mechanism for identifying 
acceptable means for complying with regulatory requirements, there was 
no regulatory requirement that emergency declarations meet any 
particular timeliness criterion. The fourth option, an amendment of the 
regulations, is the best course of action to ensure that licensees are 
aware that they are responsible for completing emergency declarations 
in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency.
    The NRC also considered providing either a performance criterion or 
a capability criterion. Similar to the notification timeliness 
criterion in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which the NRC requires 
licensees to be capable of notifying responsible State and local 
governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency, 
the NRC opted to propose a capability criterion, rather than an 
inflexible performance criterion. This approach allows licensees some 
degree of flexibility during an actual radiological emergency in 
addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise when an emergency 
declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant 
operations that are more urgently needed to protect public health and 
safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did not deny 
State and local authorities the opportunity to implement actions to 
protect the public health or safety under their emergency plans and the 
cause of the delay was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to 
foresee and prevent. Based upon these considerations, the NRC is 
amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, to address this issue by 
providing a capability criterion. These changes are discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should add requirements for non-power reactor licensees to 
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes 
and promptly declare an emergency condition. The NRC received several 
comments on these issues. The NRC believes there may be a need for the 
NRC to be aware of security related events early on so that an 
assessment can be made to consider the likelihood that the event is 
part of a larger coordinated attack.
    The NRC also believes declarations for non-security related events 
should be made in a timely fashion, but not necessarily with the same 
urgency as security related events. For example, in 2008 a tornado 
damaged the building that houses a non-power reactor. Assistance from 
the NRC, which was coordinated between NRC headquarters and NRC Region 
IV, could have been deployed earlier and with more detailed information 
if the emergency information was available to the NRC earlier.
    However, the NRC has determined that further analysis and 
stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the requirements 
for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has not included 
requirements in the final rule for non-power reactor licensees to 
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes 
and promptly declare an emergency condition.
3. Emergency Operations Facility--Performance Based Approach
    Several nuclear power reactor licensees have submitted requests for 
NRC approval to combine EOFs for plants they operate within a State or 
in multiple States into a consolidated EOF. In some instances, the 
consolidated EOF is located at a substantial distance from one or more 
of the plant sites and is no longer considered a ``near-site'' 
facility, as required by former Sec. Sec.  50.47(b)(3), 50.47(d)(1), 
50.54(gg)(1)(i), and Appendix E, Sections II.H., IV.E.8., IV.E.9.c., 
and IV.E.9.d. Guidance documents, including NUREG-0696, ``Functional 
Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,'' dated February 1981, and 
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,'' 
Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,'' 
dated January 1983, that provide criteria for establishing and locating 
emergency response facilities also refer to the EOF as a near-site 
facility. However, the regulations and guidance did not explicitly 
define the term ``near-site.'' This regulatory structure resulted in 
confusion for licensees with reasonable technical bases for moving or 
consolidating EOFs that would no longer be considered ``near-site'' and 
led to requests for exceptions to NRC guidance and exemptions from NRC 
regulations to move or consolidate their EOFs.
    In addition, neither regulations nor guidance documents addressed 
the capabilities and functional requirements for a consolidated EOF, 
such as capabilities for handling simultaneous events at two or more 
sites, or having provisions for the NRC and offsite officials to 
relocate to a facility nearer the site if they desire. Thus, licensees 
have been uncertain about when they need to submit requests for 
exceptions or exemptions, which alternative approaches to existing EOF 
distance and other facility criteria may be acceptable, and what 
additional capabilities they need to address for a consolidated EOF. A 
regulatory mechanism (Sec.  50.54(q)) is already in place that allows 
licensees to make changes to their emergency plans without prior 
Commission approval when certain conditions are met. This mechanism 
could have been applied to consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria 
had been established. In the absence of clear criteria, several recent 
licensee requests to consolidate EOFs have been evaluated by the NRC 
staff and reviewed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.
    Each nuclear power plant site is required to have an EOF where the 
licensee provides overall management of its resources in response to an 
emergency and coordinates emergency response activities with Federal, 
State, local, and Tribal agencies. The original EOF siting criteria 
called for the facility to be located near the nuclear power reactor 
site and imposed a 20-mile upper limit (later modified by the 
Commission to 25 miles) for the distance between the site and the EOF. 
This upper limit was generally considered to be the maximum distance 
from the nuclear power reactor site within which face-to-face 
communications between the licensee, offsite officials, and NRC staff 
could be facilitated, and which also permitted the timely briefing and 
debriefing of personnel going to and from the site. However, advances 
in computer and communication technology after the original EOF siting 
criteria were established now allow EOF functions to be effectively 
performed independent of

[[Page 72571]]

distance from the site. Computer based systems allow plant parameter, 
meteorological data, and radiological information for multiple sites to 
be collected, analyzed, trended, and displayed in a remotely located 
facility. Data and voice communications between the EOF and other 
onsite/offsite emergency response facilities can be addressed through a 
variety of independent systems, such as microwave, telephone, internet, 
intranet, and radio, which provide a high degree of availability and 
reliability.
    Furthermore, nuclear utility consolidation has resulted in 
initiatives to standardize fleet emergency plans, use consolidated 
EOFs, and staff EOFs by designated corporate personnel. Standardized 
plans, implementing procedures, and accident assessment tools, such as 
a common dose projection model, allow emergency responders in a 
consolidated facility to effectively perform their functions for 
multiple sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site facility. 
Consolidated facilities eliminate the need to duplicate work space, 
displays, communication networks, and other capabilities for each site. 
Consolidated facilities can also be located at or near corporate 
offices where nuclear support personnel designated to fill EOF 
positions can respond more quickly.
    The Commission, in the SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company's Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating 
Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005, 
directed the NRC staff to consider resolving these issues through 
rulemaking. In that SRM, the Commission approved the proposal for a 
consolidated EOF for three nuclear power reactor sites operated by 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company at the company's corporate 
headquarters. The Commission also instructed the NRC staff to consider 
making ``the requirements for EOFs more performance based to allow 
other multi-plant licensees to consolidate their EOFs, if those 
licensees can demonstrate their emergency response strategies will 
adequately cope with an emergency at any one of the associated 
plants.''
    To address the EOF ``near-site'' and consolidation issues, the NRC 
considered maintaining EOF distance criteria as guidance only and to 
specify other EOF criteria in guidance rather than in the regulations. 
However, providing these criteria as guidance only would not have 
ensured that future applicants would follow the criteria. Thus, an EOF 
could have been located within 10 miles of a site with no backup 
facility provided, or could have been located beyond 25 miles of a site 
without providing a facility closer to a site for NRC site team and 
offsite response personnel. An EOF could have been implemented without 
meeting the performance based criteria. A licensee could have relocated 
or consolidated an existing approved facility without meeting all or 
some of the criteria and without prior Commission approval as long as 
the licensee determined that the provisions of Sec.  50.54(q) were met. 
Under these circumstances, an EOF could have been implemented that may 
not have provided all of the capabilities that the NRC believes are 
necessary for such a facility to be fully effective. Therefore, the NRC 
determined that this option would not have been appropriate.
    The NRC also considered revising the regulations (and providing 
associated performance based criteria) to allow an EOF to be located 
more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site without prior 
Commission approval. The capability of existing EOFs located more than 
25 miles from a site to function as effective emergency response 
facilities has been demonstrated in numerous exercises and several 
actual events. However, the NRC is concerned that locating an EOF 
beyond 25 miles from a site could adversely impact the ability of 
licensee and offsite responders to fulfill their responsibilities 
(e.g., due to increased response times to a remotely located facility 
or less effective communications with responders at other locations). 
The potential adverse impacts of the EOF location must be fully 
considered and addressed, including consideration of the needs of 
offsite officials who also report to the EOF. Therefore, the NRC 
determined that the option to allow licensees to locate EOFs more than 
25 miles from a site without prior Commission review and approval would 
not have been appropriate.
    In summary, the NRC is amending its regulations (and associated 
guidance) to establish performance based criteria for all EOFs based on 
requirements and conditions previously imposed by the Commission on 
these facilities. Licensees will need to obtain prior Commission 
approval and provide a facility closer to the site in situations where 
the EOF is more than 25 miles from a site. This approach will ensure 
that an EOF has the capabilities necessary to be fully effective 
regardless of its location with respect to the nuclear power plant 
site, and that provisions are in place for a facility closer to the 
site for use by NRC site teams and offsite responders. The NRC is also 
amending its regulations (and guidance) to remove the references to an 
EOF as a ``near-site'' facility and to incorporate specific EOF 
distance criteria into the regulations, as discussed in Section IV of 
this document.
    In a conforming change, the NRC is revising Sec.  52.79(a)(17) to 
clarify that combined license applications need not address the 
requirement governing TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv). 
Instead, the requirements in Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) apply. 
That section accurately reflects the need for the combined license 
application to address an EOF; by contrast Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv) 
requires only applicants for construction permits (and not combined 
licenses) to address an EOF. The NRC considered, as an alternative to 
modifying Sec.  52.79(a)(17), correcting Sec.  50.34(f)(xxv) to remove 
the language limiting the requirement to address an EOF to construction 
permit applications. The NRC decided not to adopt that approach, but 
instead have the general requirements for EP, including Appendix E, 
apply to combined license applications by virtue of Sec.  52.79(a)(21).
4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating
    The former Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E, Sections 
II.G, III, and IV, required nuclear power plant operating license 
applicants to provide evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for the public 
located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These ETEs are used in the 
planning process to identify potential challenges to efficient 
evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event of an 
accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response managers 
in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of the public. 
The former regulations did not require any review or revision of ETEs 
following the initial licensing of the plant. Although some licensees 
do revise ETEs based on updated census data, the use of ETEs in 
evacuation planning is inconsistent and generally does not affect the 
development of public protective action strategies.
    Nuclear power reactor operating license applicants are responsible 
for developing the ETE analysis for their respective sites. They submit 
the analysis to the NRC in support of their emergency plans, usually as 
a stand-alone document. Within the ETE analysis, there are multiple ETE 
values for different scenarios developed for combinations of variables 
and events under varying conditions. For example,

[[Page 72572]]

there are different ETE values based on season (summer or winter), day 
of the week (midweek or weekend), time of day (daytime or evening), and 
weather conditions (normal or adverse). Applicants include the results 
of the ETE analysis in the onsite emergency plan and in the emergency 
plan implementing procedures for protective action recommendations. The 
ETEs are also in the offsite emergency plans for the State and local 
governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
    In NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3, 
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' 
dated December 2007, the NRC presented the results of a study of its 
protective action recommendation guidance. The NRC concluded in the 
study that ETE information is important in developing public protective 
action strategies and should be used to identify enhancements to 
evacuation plans. The effectiveness of protective action recommendation 
strategies is sensitive to the ETE, and therefore, it is important to 
reduce the uncertainties associated with ETE numerical values. 
Improving the accuracy of ETE values helps licensees recommend and 
offsite officials determine the most appropriate protective action. For 
instance, in the study, the NRC determined that for some scenarios 
sheltering may be more protective than immediate evacuation if the 
evacuation time is longer than a few hours, depending on site-specific 
factors. Further, the NRC concluded that the effect of population 
change upon evacuation times should be understood by OROs and 
incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.
    To address this issue, the NRC is amending the regulations to 
require licensees to assess changes to the EPZ population. The NRC 
believed that changes in infrastructure, or addition of a large 
subdivision to the EPZ, could also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted 
with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), who are experts in emergency 
evacuations and have researched and developed several NRC studies 
related to evacuation (e.g., NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation 
Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005, NUREG/
CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency 
Evacuations,'' January 2005, and NUREG/CR-6953). Based upon their 
expert opinion, SNL confirmed that the major contributor to changes in 
ETE values is changes in population. Population changes have a direct 
correlation to the volume of vehicles on the roadway, which directly 
affects the roadway capacity. Although changes in infrastructure can 
impact roadway capacity, changes sufficient to impact the ETE by more 
than a few minutes, such as the addition of an interstate highway, take 
many years to plan and construct. Because population changes occur 
continuously, change in population is considered the more appropriate 
metric to monitor the potential effect on roadway capacity. Therefore, 
the NRC is revising the regulations to explicitly require ETE updates 
based on population changes that cause the ETE values within the 
analysis to exceed a specified threshold.
    The NRC also considered using guidance as a means to solve the 
problem of the lack of specificity in regulations directing applicants 
and licensees on the periodicity for updating ETEs. Although the 
availability of more detailed guidance would provide applicants and 
licensees with the tools to better update their ETEs, this option would 
not have provided the regulatory means for enforcing the desired 
frequency of ETE updates and consistency of ETE determinations.
    Therefore, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV, to require the periodic review and updating of 
ETEs. The NRC guidance for completing the ETE analysis and required ETE 
updates is contained in NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of 
Evacuation Time Estimate Studies.''
5. Amended Emergency Plan Change Process
    Applicants for operating licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power 
reactors, research reactors, and certain fuel facilities, and early 
site permits (as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52 for 
nuclear power plants, are required by regulation to develop emergency 
plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 and, for 
nuclear power reactor license applicants, the standards of Sec.  
50.47(b). After the facility license was issued, the holder of the 
license was required by the former Sec.  50.54(q) to follow and 
maintain in effect emergency plans that met the requirements of 
Appendix E and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b). The former Sec.  50.54(q) also provided a process under 
which a licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan 
without prior NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the 
effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as 
modified, would continue to meet applicable regulations. However, the 
NRC determined that the language of the former Sec.  50.54(q) did not 
clearly describe the requirements the NRC intended to impose on 
licensees, leading to confusion and inefficiencies in implementation.
    A licensee must follow and maintain the effectiveness of its 
emergency plan if the NRC is to continue to find, under Sec.  
50.54(s)(2)(ii), that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency. The EP regulations generally refer to the 
onsite emergency plan as a stand-alone document. However, an emergency 
plan relies upon facility capabilities, equipment, and resources that 
are typically outside of the control of the licensee's emergency 
planning organization. The NRC has identified several occurrences in 
which licensee personnel outside of the emergency planning group have 
changed the status of capabilities and resources under their cognizance 
without considering the impact on the effectiveness of the emergency 
plan or without alerting the emergency planning group.
    Several enforcement actions in the past few years have been 
associated with EALs being rendered ineffective by configuration 
changes made to instruments referenced in an EAL without the change 
being reflected in the EAL, or without a compensatory action being put 
into place. Examples include modifications to installed seismic 
instruments that eliminated the direct readout of acceleration needed 
for classifying a seismic event and changes in reactor vessel level 
criteria (in a boiling water reactor) being made without a conforming 
change being made to the EAL. In another finding, concrete barriers 
installed in a security-initiated change blocked a site access road 
required by the emergency plan to be used for site evacuation. Another 
licensee failed to provide adequate oversight on utility (external to 
the plant) personnel maintaining the site's ANS, resulting in 
degradation of that system and subsequent enforcement actions. Based on 
its experience in reviewing root cause analyses and corrective actions 
associated with inspection findings, the NRC believes that an 
underlying cause of these occurrences is often that the licensees' 
configuration control programs did not adequately consider the impact 
of configuration changes on the effectiveness of their emergency plans.
    The NRC determined that the phrase ``maintain in effect'' in the 
former Sec.  50.54(q) was not adequately clear in conveying the NRC 
expectation that an effective emergency plan also requires maintaining 
the various capabilities and resources identified and relied on in the

[[Page 72573]]

plan. The phrase ``maintain in effect,'' as applied to an emergency 
plan in Sec.  50.54(q), has two senses: The first is that the plans are 
in force; the second is that the plans can achieve the desired result 
of providing reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can 
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 
Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) to clarify that the 
regulatory intent is both senses by requiring licensees to follow and 
``maintain the effectiveness'' of their approved emergency plans.
    The former Sec.  50.54(q) also provided a process under which a 
licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan without 
prior NRC approval provided the changes did not decrease the 
effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as 
modified, continued to meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC approval 
was required for any change that decreased the effectiveness of the 
emergency plan. The NRC and licensees experienced significant 
difficulties in implementing this portion of Sec.  50.54(q) because the 
former rule language did not define what constituted a decrease in 
effectiveness of an emergency plan nor did it identify the type of 
changes that would constitute a decrease in effectiveness of the plan. 
The lack of clear evaluation criteria resulted in regulatory 
inefficiencies, such as licensees submitting for review changes that 
did not rise to the level requiring prior NRC approval and enforcement 
actions due to licensees failing to submit changes that were later 
deemed to warrant such a review. A large fraction of the enforcement 
actions in the EP Cornerstone can be attributed to these findings.
    The NRC attempted to resolve this issue through the publication of 
regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC issued EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan 
and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' to provide guidance to NRC 
inspectors regarding their review of licensees' emergency plan changes. 
In 2004, the NEI submitted two white papers proposing a definition of 
``decrease in effectiveness'' for NRC consideration. The NRC could not 
reach consensus with NEI and thus, did not endorse the NEI guidance. In 
2005, the NRC withdrew EPPOS-4 and issued RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the 
Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005, 
to (1) Clarify the meaning of ``decrease in effectiveness,'' (2) 
clarify the process for making changes to an emergency plan, and (3) 
provide some examples of changes that are not decreases in 
effectiveness. Although RIS 2005-02 provided useful guidance, the NRC 
and NEI have continued to discuss ways to improve the Sec.  50.54(q) 
change process, including the use of a regulatory framework parallel to 
that of Sec.  50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance programs, Sec.  
50.54(p)(2) for safeguards plans, and Sec.  50.59, ``Changes, Tests, 
and Experiments.''
    During the development of this rulemaking, the NRC identified a 
concern regarding the process to be used by the NRC for reviewing 
proposed emergency plan changes. The former Sec.  50.54(q) directed the 
licensee to submit such changes under the provisions of Sec.  50.4, 
which provides the procedures for making certain submissions to the 
NRC. Some confusion existed as to whether all proposed emergency plan 
changes submitted under Sec.  50.4 would result in a decrease in 
effectiveness and whether Commission review of such submissions was 
necessary. The final rule specifies that the license amendment process 
of Sec.  50.90 is to be used when submitting a proposed emergency plan 
change that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in 
effectiveness of the plan. The final rule language addresses this 
clarification. (See Section IV of this document for further 
discussion.)
    The NRC also considered other options for addressing the Sec.  
50.54(q) problems. Using a voluntary industry initiative was rejected 
because the NRC and NEI had yet to agree on the best approach to 
resolve the problems. Issuing more regulatory guidance was rejected 
because that approach had been tried but had not resolved the problems. 
The NRC determined that an amendment to the regulations, supplemented 
as necessary by regulatory guidance, is the best course of action to 
ensure that (1) The effectiveness of the emergency plans is maintained, 
(2) changes to the approved emergency plan are properly evaluated, and 
(3) any change that reduces the effectiveness of the plan is reviewed 
by the NRC prior to implementation.
    Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) to replace the 
existing language and is making conforming changes in Part 50, Appendix 
E, Section IV.B. The NRC is issuing RG 1.219, ``Guidance on Making 
Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors,'' to describe a 
method acceptable to the NRC for demonstrating compliance with the 
final rule.
6. Removal of Completed One-Time Requirements
    The NRC is eliminating several regulatory provisions that required 
holders of licenses to take certain one-time actions to improve the 
state of EP following the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. These 
actions are complete and the requirements are no longer binding on any 
current licensee. Corresponding requirements for license applicants are 
provided in Sec. Sec.  50.33 and 50.34.
    The requirements being removed are:
    (1) Section 50.54(r), which required licensees of research or test 
reactors to submit emergency plans to the NRC for approval by September 
7, 1982, and, for the facilities with an authorized power level of less 
than 2 MW thermal, by November 3, 1982. There is no longer a need for 
this provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is 
deleting this requirement and designating the section as ``reserved.''
    (2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which required nuclear power reactor 
licensees to submit State and local governmental emergency plans within 
60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective date of the rule that added 
Sec.  50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that date has elapsed. That portion 
of Sec.  50.54(s)(1) that discussed the size of the EPZs was not 
identified for deletion in the proposed rule, but after further review 
the NRC has determined that it does not need to be retained. The size 
of EPZs for nuclear power reactors is addressed in other parts of the 
NRC's regulations. Section 50.33(g), which is applicable to the content 
of new Part 50 and Part 52 applications (with complete and integrated 
emergency plans), contains the same language regarding the size of EPZs 
as found in Sec.  50.54(s)(1). Section 50.47(c)(2) also has the same 
language regarding the size of EPZs as Sec. Sec.  50.33(g) and 
50.54(s)(1). Moreover, Part 50, Appendix E, Section I, footnote 1, 
addresses the size of EPZs with language equivalent to Sec. Sec.  
50.33(g) and 50.54(s)(1). Therefore, the NRC is deleting Sec.  
50.54(s)(1) in its entirety and designating the section as 
``reserved.''
    (3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which required that nuclear power 
reactor licensee, State, and local emergency response plans be 
implemented by April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need for this 
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting 
Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section as ``reserved.''
    (4) Section 50.54(u), which required nuclear power reactor 
licensees to submit, within 60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective 
date of the rule that added Sec.  50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC plans 
for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in Sec.  50.47(b) 
and the requirements of Appendix E. There is no longer a need for this 
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting 
this requirement

[[Page 72574]]

and designating the section as ``reserved.''
    The NRC is eliminating these completed one-time requirements in the 
interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these requirements will not 
relax any currently effective regulatory requirement and will cause no 
regulatory burden on any current or future licensee or applicant.

III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule

A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings

    As part of its comprehensive assessment of the NRC's EP regulations 
and guidance and development of this rule, the NRC staff met with 
internal and external stakeholders, including FEMA management, on 
numerous occasions including the following:
    1. Meetings with NRC regional EP inspectors in January 2005 and 
January 2006;
    2. Meetings with State, local, and Tribal governments and nuclear 
power industry representatives at the NREP Conference on April 11-14, 
2005, March 27-30, 2006, and April 7-10, 2008;
    3. Public meeting with interested stakeholders on August 31 and 
September 1, 2005;
    4. Public meeting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on May 
19, 2006;
    5. Public meeting with the NEI/nuclear power industry 
representatives on July 19, 2006;
    6. Regional meetings with State and local representatives and 
nuclear power industry working groups that started in 2007;
    7. NRC Regulatory Information Conference on March 16, 2007;
    8. Public meeting with external stakeholders on March 5, 2008;
    9. Meeting with nuclear power industry representatives at the 2008 
NEI EP and Communications Forum;
    10. Public meeting with external stakeholders on July 8, 2008;
    11. Public meetings to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to 
EP regulations and related guidance documents in June 2009 held jointly 
by the NRC and FEMA (a total of 11 public meetings);
    12. Public meeting to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to 
EP regulations and related guidance documents on September 17, 2009;
    13. Commission meeting to provide an overview of comments received 
by the NRC and FEMA during the proposed rule public comment period and 
remaining milestones in the EP rulemaking process on December 8, 2009; 
and
    14. Public meeting to discuss feedback on proposed implementation 
dates for the final rule on November 15, 2010.
    The NRC also met routinely with representatives of FEMA to 
coordinate issues of mutual interest and to keep them informed of NRC 
EP activities. These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA to collaborate on 
rulemaking and guidance issues, and to ensure alignment and regulatory 
consistency. In addition, FEMA attended the NRC public meetings 
regarding the NRC's EP rulemaking, and co-hosted 11 of the public 
meetings with the NRC held after the issuance of the proposed rule.

B. Public and Stakeholder Comments Received

    At the April 11, 2005, NREP Conference, the NRC and FEMA conducted 
a workshop with stakeholders. The workshop covered a broad range of EP 
topics. Unanswered stakeholder comments and questions were recorded by 
NRC staff, and the NRC and FEMA responded to those questions and 
comments in ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items.''
    The NRC conducted a public meeting on August 31-September 1, 2005, 
to obtain input regarding EP requirements and guidance for commercial 
nuclear power plants. The first day of meetings involved a roundtable 
discussion of topics related to the review of EP regulations and 
guidance. During the second day, the NRC staff and stakeholders 
addressed the ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items'' from the April 
2005 NREP conference and other stakeholder comments and questions. The 
NRC requested comments in writing before the August 31-September 1, 
2005, meeting and also received comments at the meeting. In addition to 
comments transcribed from the 2-day public meeting, the NRC accepted 
written comment submissions until October 31, 2005.
    The NRC and FEMA responded to generic comments from the August 31-
September 1, 2005, meeting and comments received thereafter in 
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and 
October 31, 2005).'' Site-specific comments from the public meeting 
were addressed in ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments 
(Received Between August 31 and October 31, 2005).''
    The NRC also received comments on the review of the EP regulations 
and guidance for nuclear power plants at public meetings with 
stakeholders on May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The May 19, 2006, 
meeting was transcribed. The NRC staff informed the meeting 
participants that their comments would be presented to the Commission 
in a September 2006 SECY paper. These comments were provided to the 
Commission in an attachment to SECY-06-0200 and, like the stakeholder 
comments from 2005, were used to inform the staff's recommendations to 
the Commission in SECY-06-0200.
    The NRC received three comment letters that focused on the draft 
preliminary rule language posted for comment on http://www.regulations.gov on February 29, 2008. One comment letter was 
submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, one was submitted by 
NEI, and one was submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists on 
behalf of several NGOs. These comments were addressed as part of the 
development of the proposed rule.
    The proposed rule was published on May 18, 2009, and the public 
comment period closed on October 19, 2009. The NRC received a total of 
94 submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were 
identified. Some of the comments and the NRC's responses are discussed 
throughout this document. A detailed discussion of the public comments 
and the NRC's responses is contained in a separate document (see 
Section IX of this document). The NRC also received comments on issues 
that are outside the scope of this rule and on regulatory provisions 
that are not being revised in this rule. The NRC determined that these 
comments did not support changing the scope of the final rule.

C. Proposed Rule Specific Request for Comments

    In the proposed rule, the NRC requested comments on whether the NRC 
should issue regulations requiring that licensees train responders on 
and implement the Incident Command System (ICS) to improve the 
interface with OROs during an event at a nuclear power plant. Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) requires all Federal 
departments and agencies to adopt the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and use it in their individual incident management 
programs and activities, as well as in support of all emergency 
response actions taken to assist State, Tribal, and local governments. 
Although NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, 
terminology, and organizational processes that enables incident 
management, it also utilizes the ICS for command, operations, planning, 
logistics, and finance/administration functions to manage domestic 
incidents.

[[Page 72575]]

    The NIMS/ICS are also widely used by State, tribal, and local 
governments, including when these entities are engaged in emergency 
response activities with nuclear power reactor licensees. However, 
licensees are not currently required to adopt NIMS/ICS, so the 
potential exists for confusion or miscommunication between OROs who 
utilize NIMS/ICS as an incident management system and the associated 
power reactor licensees who do not use the same system. The NRC 
observed some of these coordination challenges during the nuclear power 
industry's voluntary three year EP hostile action drill program 
initiative, which was conducted in response to BL-05-02 and concluded 
in December 2009. Ideally, both OROs and licensees should use the same 
or a compatible incident management system to effectively communicate 
with each other and improve their individual and joint response 
capabilities.
    Nevertheless, the NRC recognizes that HSPD-5 does not require the 
private sector to adopt NIMS/ICS. The NRC also understands that 
requiring its nuclear power reactor licensees to implement NIMS/ICS 
would impose upon licensees a specific type of incident command 
structure stipulated by HSPD-5. Any future changes to HSPD-5 or NIMS/
ICS could require corresponding rulemaking changes by the NRC. 
Moreover, if the NRC were to compel its nuclear power reactor licensees 
to use a specific incident management program, that program still could 
be different than incident management systems adopted by OROs that 
comply with laws promulgated by other governmental organizations. Thus, 
despite the NRC's efforts to promote consistency, these potentially 
conflicting regulatory authorities could prove to be incompatible 
during ICS activities at the reactor sites. For example, the incident 
commander during the onset of a hostile action incident at a nuclear 
facility will most likely be a local law enforcement officer, whose 
authority derives from the local or State jurisdiction and not from the 
NRC.
    Section 50.47(b)(6) of the NRC's regulations states that 
``Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response 
organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.'' In this final 
rule, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to 
require licensees to include in their emergency plans the 
``[i]dentification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State, 
local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with 
emergencies, including hostile action at the site.'' Together, these 
regulations require licensees to know which OROs would respond during 
an emergency and how to communicate with those OROs. A licensee's use 
of a command structure that is compatible with the applicable OROs' 
command structure (e.g., NIMS/ICS) would enhance communication and 
coordination between OROs and licensees and facilitate the licensee's 
compliance with the Sec.  50.47(b)(6) standard and the requirements of 
Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. The NRC's regulations, as amended by this 
final rule, contain adequate requirements to ensure that licensee 
compliance with these regulations would result in effective 
communication between OROs and licensees during emergencies. Therefore, 
the NRC is not requiring that NIMS/ICS become the sole means of 
incident command management for licensees.
    Comments received by the NRC in response to other specific requests 
for comments in the proposed rule are addressed in Sections II and IV 
of this document.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

    The Commission is amending portions of Sec.  50.47, ``Emergency 
plans;'' Sec.  50.54, ``Conditions of licenses;'' Part 50, Appendix E, 
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization 
Facilities;'' and Sec.  52.79, ``Contents of applications; technical 
information in final safety analysis report.''

1. Section 50.47 Emergency Plans

    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(b)(3) to remove the reference to 
the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria 
in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a 
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for 
EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional 
requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a 
certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed 
in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
    The final rule amends Sec.  50.47(b)(10) to require licensees to 
review and update their ETEs periodically. Changes to Appendix E to 
Part 50 provide the required frequency and details of the ETE updates 
and submissions to the NRC. Although requirements for ETEs are found in 
both Sec.  50.47(b) and in Appendix E to Part 50, the level of detail 
between them differs. Section 50.47(b) establishes the EP planning 
standards that licensees must meet, whereas Appendix E sets forth more 
detailed implementation requirements. (A discussion of this issue is 
also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
    This new requirement ensures that ETEs are reviewed periodically to 
determine whether population changes have caused significant changes in 
the ETE values. The NRC review of ETE updates will ensure they are 
performed routinely, are consistent across the industry, and are 
technically sound. The NRC guidance will provide more details of NRC 
expectations for development of an adequate ETE analysis, as well as 
provide NRC reviewers with guidance on the review of ETE updates. The 
NRC expects that the updated ETEs will be shared with OROs to be 
incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.
    The NRC received several comments that suggested that the proposed 
rule language of Sec.  50.47(b)(10) be revised to accommodate changes 
to ETE update criteria. Two commenters stated that the threshold for 
ETE updates should be based on a population sensitivity study that 
would assess the effect of a population change on the ETE. Two 
commenters argued that the ETE updates should be based on changes in 
population density rather than absolute population change. The NRC 
agrees that the ETE update criteria should be changed and should be 
based on the impact that a population change has on the ETE instead of 
a percent change in population. However, the details of the revised ETE 
update criteria should be included in Appendix E to Part 50 where more 
detailed implementation requirements are found. Two commenters argued 
that the proposed rule language should be revised to eliminate the 
requirement for submission of ETEs to the NRC for review and approval. 
The NRC believes that NRC review is necessary for consistent 
implementation, but the NRC will not approve the ETE updates. See the 
discussion under Appendix E to Part 50 in this section of the document 
for further information on this topic.
    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(d)(1) to remove the reference to 
the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria 
in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a 
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for 
EOFs, specifying that these facilities will need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A

[[Page 72576]]

discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this 
document.)

2. Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses

    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) in its entirety. Section 
50.54(q)(1) defines four terms whose meanings are limited to 
application within Sec.  50.54(q) in the final rule. Section 
50.54(q)(1)(i) defines a ``change'' to the emergency plan as an action 
that results in modification or addition to, or removal from, the 
licensee's emergency plan. All such changes are subject to Sec.  
50.54(q) unless another regulatory change process is controlling. For 
example, a plant configuration change that removes a piece of equipment 
identified and relied upon in the emergency plan could also be subject 
to the requirements of Sec.  50.59 and a technical specification change 
may also be involved.
    In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(i) defined what would have 
constituted a change to the emergency plan. The NRC received comments 
that asked the NRC to remove the phrase ``resources, capabilities, and 
methods identified in the plan'' from the final rule language for this 
definition. The NRC agrees with these comments and made this change to 
the final rule to place emphasis on the content of the emergency plan. 
Although resources, capabilities, and methods are identified in the 
emergency plan, not all of these will necessarily be under the control 
of the licensee. For example, the licensee's emergency plan may 
identify the plans and capabilities of OROs. A change to an ORO plan is 
not subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process, but the modifications 
to the licensee's emergency plan to reflect that change are subject to 
the Sec.  50.54(q) change process.
    The Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(ii) definition of ``Emergency plan'' in the 
final rule encompasses any document that describes the programmatic 
methods that the licensee uses to maintain preparedness and to respond 
to emergencies, and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b). In response to a stakeholder comment on Sec.  
50.54(q)(1)(ii) in the proposed rule, the NRC has revised this 
definition in the final rule by removing the proposed reference to 
``emergency planning functions,'' and replacing it with ``methods for 
maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies.'' 
Sub-tier documents, such as emergency plan implementing procedures, are 
not ordinarily subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process because 
these procedures generally only provide instructions in performing the 
programmatic methods identified and described in the emergency plan. 
However, if a licensee were to relocate a programmatic description to 
another document, that description will remain subject to the Sec.  
50.54(q) change process. For example, if a licensee were to relocate 
the details of its emergency classification scheme from the emergency 
plan to a wall chart posted in the control room, the wall chart would 
be subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process. The definition also 
emphasizes, by incorporation, the role of the licensee's original 
emergency plan approved by the NRC in minimizing the likelihood that a 
series of incremental changes, many of which may not have been reviewed 
by the NRC, over time will constitute a reduction in effectiveness of 
the NRC approved emergency plan.
    Section 50.54(q)(1)(iii) in the final rule defines the term 
``emergency planning function'' in terms of a capability or resource 
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency. 
During the development of the EP Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP 
subject matter experts, including NRC staff and nuclear power industry 
stakeholders, with input from the public, developed a series of 
planning standard functions that are used in determining the 
significance of inspection findings. These planning standard functions 
are paraphrases of the broadly-worded Sec.  50.47(b) planning standards 
and the corresponding requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 in terms of 
the significant functions that need to be accomplished, or the 
capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of 
a licensee's emergency plan and emergency response capability. Within 
the EP Cornerstone, the significance of inspection findings depends on 
whether the planning standards can be accomplished (i.e., loss of 
planning standard function) or can be accomplished only in a degraded 
manner (i.e., degraded planning standard function). The 
characterization of a reduction in effectiveness in the final rule 
capitalizes on this earlier effort in that any degradation or loss of a 
planning standard function is deemed to constitute a reduction in 
effectiveness. The NRC is using the phrase ``emergency planning 
function'' in lieu of ``planning standard function'' as used in the ROP 
to allow the definition to be applicable to licensed facilities that 
are subject to Appendix E, but are not subject to the planning 
standards of Sec.  50.47(b). The emergency planning functions have been 
established in RG 1.219 along with examples of typical emergency plan 
changes that are expected to constitute a reduction in effectiveness 
and examples of changes that are not.
    The emergency planning functions do not replace or supplement the 
regulations upon which they were based and, as such, compliance with 
these functions is not required. They are only used to differentiate 
between changes that the licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC 
approval and those that require prior NRC approval. The NRC did not 
establish these emergency planning functions in regulations because the 
underlying regulations already exist, and the expression of the 
emergency planning functions differs between nuclear power reactors, 
non-power reactors, and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 or Part 
52. The RG 1.219 discusses these emergency planning functions for 
nuclear power reactor licensees.
    In response to the definition of ``emergency planning function'' in 
proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iii), the NRC received a stakeholder comment 
that suggested that the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b) should be 
used for determining reductions in effectiveness, in lieu of the 
proposed emergency planning functions, since compliance is based on 
meeting planning standards. The NRC disagrees with this comment. The 
Sec.  50.54(q) change process establishes a two factor test to 
establish whether the licensee has the authority to make a change 
without prior NRC approval. First, the plan as modified must continue 
to comply with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors, 
the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). Second, the licensee must 
establish that the change does not reduce the effectiveness of the 
emergency plan. These are two different prerequisites. Compliance with 
the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors, the planning 
standards of Sec.  50.47(b), satisfies the first factor, but it doesn't 
necessarily meet the second factor.
    Under Sec.  50.47(a)(1)(i), an operating license will be issued 
only if the NRC finds that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency. During the licensing process, the licensee or 
the NRC may have identified planning constraints and vulnerabilities 
that required the licensee to commit to site-specific capabilities and 
resources beyond those identified in generic regulatory guidance as 
meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and for

[[Page 72577]]

nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of Sec.  
50.47(b). After receiving its license, a licensee may have identified 
newly developed planning or response constraints, or self-identified 
weaknesses in its emergency plan, and implemented corrective actions 
beyond that identified in its emergency plan. For example, an applicant 
having a site with complex meteorological regimes or complex topography 
may have been required to establish a more advanced emergency dose 
assessment capability. Because these extensions to generic guidance 
were found to be necessary to meet the broadly worded requirements in 
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning 
standards of Sec.  50.47(b), a licensee seeking to relax these 
requirements needs to determine that the emergency plan, as modified, 
can continue to be effective. This will generally require that the 
licensee establish that the considerations that made the site-specific 
requirements necessary are no longer applicable to that site, or 
require an alternative approach that maintains the plan's 
effectiveness. Thus, simply meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and 
for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), is not 
necessarily sufficient to prevent a reduction in the plan's 
effectiveness. For these reasons, the requirements of Appendix E, and 
for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), alone 
cannot be used for determining reductions in effectiveness.
    Section 50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule defines the term 
``reduction in effectiveness'' as a change to the emergency plan that 
results in a reduction of the licensee's capability to perform an 
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency. 
The phrase ``reduction in effectiveness'' is an evaluation concept that 
is used in Sec.  50.54(q) to differentiate between changes that the 
licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC approval and those that 
require prior NRC approval. A determination that a change may result in 
a reduction in effectiveness does not imply that the licensee could no 
longer implement its plan and provide adequate measures for the 
protection of the public. The NRC may approve a proposed emergency plan 
change that the licensee determined to be a reduction in effectiveness 
if the NRC can find that the emergency plan, as modified, continues to 
meet the requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor 
licensees, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), and continues to 
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and 
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ``Radiological 
emergency'' as used in Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule means 
any condition that results in the declaration of any ECL and the 
implementation of the licensee's emergency plan. A nuclear power 
reactor licensee evaluating whether a particular emergency plan change 
constitutes a reduction in effectiveness is expected to consider the 
spectrum of accidents addressed in the planning basis described in 
NUREG-0654. In making this determination, licensees of non-power 
reactors and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 must base their 
evaluations on the planning bases for their respective facilities.
    In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) defined the term 
``reduction in effectiveness.'' The NRC received a stakeholder comment 
that suggested that the definition of ``reduction in effectiveness'' 
should establish a threshold based on a ``significant reduction'' 
rather than a reduction. The comment cited, as an example, the use of 
``more than a minimal increase'' in the Sec.  50.59 change process. The 
NRC agrees that the Sec.  50.59 change process does incorporate the 
phrase ``more than a minimal amount.'' However, this phrase is always 
used in conjunction with a numerical criterion (e.g., Sec.  
50.59(c)(2)(i) through (iv)). With few exceptions, the planning 
standards of Sec.  50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E do not 
establish numerical requirements. Other criteria in Sec.  50.59 are 
related to any change (e.g., Sec.  50.59(c)(2)(v) through (vi) and 
(viii)). The NRC has determined that any change that reduces the 
effectiveness of the licensee's capability warrants prior NRC review; 
therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comment. The licensee is 
authorized to make changes without prior approval up to the point at 
which effectiveness is reduced. This standard is reflected in the final 
rule language.
    Regulations in Parts 50 and 52 require applicants for licenses to 
develop emergency plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E, and 
for nuclear power reactors, Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable, during 
facility licensing. A holder of a license under Part 50 or a combined 
license under Part 52 after the Commission makes the finding under 
Sec.  52.103(g) is required by Sec.  50.54(q)(2) in the final rule to 
follow and maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan. The Sec.  
50.54(q)(2) references to Appendix E and Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable, 
extend the applicability of these requirements as a condition of the 
facility license. The NRC expects licensees to identify conditions and 
situations that could reduce the effectiveness of its emergency plan, 
and to take corrective and/or compensatory actions to restore and 
maintain the requisite effectiveness.
    In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(2) would have required 
licensees to follow and maintain the effectiveness of the emergency 
plan. The NRC received a stakeholder comment that stated that requiring 
a licensee to maintain an emergency plan effective under Sec.  
50.54(q)(2) is inconsistent with the NRC approving a change that 
reduces the effectiveness of the emergency plan as required by Sec.  
50.54(q)(4). Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Sec.  50.54(q) address emergency 
plan changes that are intentional on the part of the licensee, whereas 
a non-compliance with Sec.  50.54(q)(2) is generally the result of a 
licensee failure to follow the requirements of its emergency plan 
(e.g., failure to notify OROs during an actual event) or failure to 
take action to address conditions, from whatever cause, that reduce the 
effectiveness of the emergency plan (e.g., an offsite fire department 
identified and relied upon in the emergency plan is no longer available 
to come to the site, and the licensee hasn't taken timely corrective 
actions to restore the capability). The licensee's determination of a 
reduction in effectiveness is used only to determine whether the 
licensee has the authority to implement the change without prior NRC 
approval under Sec.  50.54(q)(3) or must submit for prior NRC approval 
under Sec.  50.54(q)(4). The NRC's approval of the proposed change 
establishes a new standard of effectiveness for the licensee's 
emergency plan. Accordingly, the NRC does not believe the final rule to 
be internally inconsistent.
    Section 50.54(q)(3) in the final rule grants authority to the 
holder of a license to make changes to its emergency plan without prior 
NRC approval only if an analysis demonstrates that the changes do not 
reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed, 
continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for nuclear power 
reactor licensees, Sec.  50.47(b). As such, Sec.  50.54(q)(3) provides 
for a two factor test to establish whether the licensee has the 
authority to make a change without prior NRC approval. First, the plan 
as modified must continue to comply with the requirements of Appendix 
E, and for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). 
Second, the licensee must establish that the change does not reduce the 
effectiveness of the

[[Page 72578]]

emergency plan. These are two different and independent prerequisites. 
Compliance with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors, 
the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), addresses the first factor. 
The second factor addresses whether or not the change reduces the 
effectiveness of the emergency pan. A change that satisfies the first 
factor may not satisfy the second factor and vice versa. Changes that 
do not satisfy the first factor would require the licensee to request 
an exemption from the affected requirements under Sec.  50.12. Changes 
that do not satisfy the second factor would require the licensee to 
request prior approval under Sec.  50.54(q)(4).
    The NRC expects a licensee considering a change under this section 
to perform an evaluation of the change to a level of rigor and 
thoroughness consistent with the scope of the proposed change. A 
licensee's analysis of the impact of a change on the effectiveness of 
the plan needs to consider the accidents included in the emergency 
planning basis, the licensing basis of the particular emergency plan, 
and any emergency plan elements implemented to address site-specific 
emergency response constraints (e.g., delay in staff augmentation 
associated with a remote site, commitments to State or local 
governments, existence of significant external hazards, etc.).
    Section 50.54(q)(4) in the final rule defines the process by which 
a licensee requests prior approval of a change to the emergency plan 
that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in 
effectiveness of the plan. The final rule retains the proposed 
requirement that a licensee pursuing these changes must apply for an 
amendment to its license as provided in Sec.  50.90. A proposed 
emergency plan change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan 
would expand the licensee's operating authority, and courts have found 
that Commission actions that expand licensees' authority under their 
licenses without formally amending the licenses constitute license 
amendments and should be processed through the Commission's license 
amendment procedures. (See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 
F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 651 F.2d 780 (DC Cir. 1980) 
(per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re 
Three Mile Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315 (1996)). 
Therefore, a change to a licensee's emergency plan that would expand 
the licensee's operating authority should also be processed through the 
Commission's license amendment procedures.
    In response to Sec.  50.54(q)(4) in the proposed rule, the NRC 
received several comments questioning the NRC's conclusion that 
proposed changes that would reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's 
emergency plan would expand the licensee's operating authority. The NRC 
maintains that a reduction in the effectiveness of a licensee's 
emergency plan constitutes an expansion of the licensee's operating 
authority. A licensee's emergency plan is part of the licensing basis 
for its nuclear power plant. The plan describes how the licensee will 
comply with the NRC's requirements governing EP and emergency response. 
The NRC's regulations require that the licensee have and implement an 
approved emergency plan as a condition of its operating license. A 
change to the emergency plan constituting a reduction in effectiveness 
of that plan allows the licensee to disclaim responsibility for 
performing activities and actions (or specific portions thereof) 
formerly required (or prohibited) under the superseded provisions of 
the licensee's approved emergency plan. It allows the licensee to 
perform, without fear of NRC regulatory response (e.g., an order, 
including an enforcement action), activities and actions formerly 
precluded. In this situation, the licensee would have the capability to 
operate its facility in a manner that was not previously authorized by 
the NRC. In other words, the licensee would have operating authority 
beyond what it originally had, as reflected in the approved emergency 
plan without the proposed change.
    The NRC notes that it is not simply that the emergency plan has 
``changed'' that leads to the conclusion that there is an expansion of 
operating authority. Otherwise, any change to the emergency plan, 
regardless of the effect on licensee authority to operate, would be 
deemed an expansion of operating authority for which NRC approval via a 
license amendment is required. Rather, the effect of the plan change 
(i.e., allowing the licensee to operate in a manner with respect to 
radiological health and safety that it was not allowed to do under the 
superseded provision of the emergency plan) forms the essence of the 
test of ``expanded'' operating authority.\2\ Thus, an emergency plan 
change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan would expand the 
licensee's operating authority under its license.
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    \2\ Consistent with the former Sec.  50.54(q), Sec.  50.54(q) in 
the final rule requires that only those emergency plan changes that 
reduce the effectiveness of the plan need prior NRC approval. Those 
plan changes that increase the effectiveness of the plan may expand 
the licensee's operating authority but would not require prior NRC 
approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Commission has determined that the NRC must approve 
reductions in effectiveness to ensure compliance with the requirements 
of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards 
of Sec.  50.47(b) so that the proposed changes provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency. This approval is more than a 
ministerial, non-discretionary act. The determination of the 
acceptability of the proposed reduction in effectiveness necessitates 
consideration and resolution of technical and regulatory issues. In 
some instances, the evaluation of the plan change may involve the 
balancing of competing regulatory objectives and policies. Thus, NRC 
approval of a reduction in effectiveness constitutes an exercise of 
agency discretion. For these reasons, under the NRC's legal precedents, 
NRC approval of an emergency plan change that would reduce the 
effectiveness of the plan would grant the licensee greater operating 
authority and would require a license amendment request.
    Under Sec.  50.54(q)(4), in addition to satisfying the filing 
requirements for a license amendment request in Sec. Sec.  50.90 and 
50.91, the license amendment request must include all emergency plan 
pages affected by the change, a forwarding letter identifying the 
change, the reason for the change, and the basis for concluding that 
the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the 
requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, 
the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). The NRC will review the 
amendment application to make its no significant hazards consideration 
determination and to determine if the proposed change to the emergency 
plan is a reduction in effectiveness under Sec.  50.54(q). If the 
proposed change does constitute a reduction in effectiveness, the NRC 
may issue the amendment only if it determines that the emergency plan, 
as modified, continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for 
nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), and 
that there continues to be reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency.

[[Page 72579]]

    Section 50.54(q)(5) in the final rule applies to all licensees 
subject to Sec.  50.54(q) and requires that licensees retain a record 
of all changes to the emergency plan made without prior NRC approval 
for a period of three years from the date of change. This section also 
requires the licensee to submit, as specified under Sec.  50.4, a 
report of each such change, including a summary description of its 
evaluation, within 30 days of the change being put into effect. The NRC 
expects that the record of changes will fully describe each change made 
and will include documentation of the evaluation that determined the 
change was not a reduction in effectiveness. The NRC will use this 
record of changes during inspection oversight of the licensee's 
implementation of Sec.  50.54(q)(2).
    In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(5) would have required 
licensees to submit a report of a change to the emergency plan made 
without NRC approval, 30 days after the change was made. One commenter 
requested that the 30-day period start when the ``change is 
implemented'' rather than starting when the ``change is made.'' The NRC 
agrees that clarification is necessary, but has decided to use the 
phrase ``change is put into effect,'' because it provides a more 
specific point in time. The change is put into effect when the modified 
emergency plan is available for use in the emergency response 
facilities. At that point, the change can affect the licensee's 
response to an emergency condition, whether or not all typical 
implementation activities, such as distribution of the updated 
emergency plan and ERO training, have been completed.
    Section 50.54(q)(6) in the final rule requires a licensee of a 
nuclear power reactor to retain the emergency plan and each change for 
which prior NRC approval was obtained under Sec.  50.54(q)(4) as a 
record until the Commission terminates the license.
    The NRC is removing paragraph (r) of Sec.  50.54. Section 50.54(r) 
was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402), to 
require then-existing licensees authorized to possess and/or operate a 
research or test reactor facility to submit emergency plans complying 
with Appendix E to Part 50 to the NRC for approval within one year or 
two years, as applicable, from the effective date of the rule (November 
3, 1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section 
II.B.6 of this document.)
    The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(1) of Sec.  50.54 to remove 
language addressing a one-time requirement that has now been completed. 
Section 50.54(s)(1) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 
(45 FR 55402). This provision required existing nuclear power reactor 
licensees to submit to the NRC within 60 days after the effective date 
of the rule (November 3, 1980), the radiological response plans of 
State and local governmental entities in the U.S. that are wholly or 
partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of 
State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ. 
(A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this 
document.)
    The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(2)(i) from Sec.  50.54. Section 
50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 
(45 FR 55402), as a single paragraph. The rule was amended on May 29, 
1981 (46 FR 28838), resulting in Sec.  50.54(s)(2) being split into two 
paragraphs, Sec. Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The rule 
language in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) required that the licensee, State, and 
local emergency plans for all operating power reactors be implemented 
by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E 
to Part 50. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section 
II.B.6 of this document.)
    The NRC is removing paragraph (u) from Sec.  50.54. Section 
50.54(u) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 
55402), to require then existing nuclear power reactor licensees to 
submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet the 
standards in Sec.  50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part 
50 within 60 days after the effective date of the rule (November 3, 
1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 
of this document.)
    The NRC is revising paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of Sec.  50.54 
to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains within DHS, the 
responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power plants is with FEMA. 
The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather than ``DHS'' for 
clarity of communication with stakeholders.
    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the reference 
to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides 
criteria in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance 
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach 
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional 
requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a 
certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed 
in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
3. Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities
    The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section I, 
``Introduction,'' to include a provision allowing an applicant for an 
early site permit under Part 52 that chooses to propose either major 
features of an, or a complete and integrated, emergency plan (Sec.  
52.17(b)(2)), or a combined license under Part 52 (Sec.  52.79(a)(21)) 
whose application is docketed before December 23, 2011 to choose to 
defer compliance with this rule.
    If the applicant chooses to defer compliance with this rule, and 
its early site permit or combined license is subsequently issued, then 
the permit holder or licensee shall request to amend its early site 
permit or combined license to demonstrate compliance with this rule no 
later than December 31, 2013. Furthermore, an applicant that defers 
compliance with this rule is expected to implement this rule under the 
same schedule as it would implement EP requirements in the absence of 
this rule. This means that this rule does not require any immediate 
implementation actions on the part of any applicant, but rather shall 
be implemented after receipt of a combined license, and under the 
licensee's schedule for completing EP-related requirements (e.g., 
through completion of EP-related Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 
Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)).
    The NRC intends, by allowing an applicant to defer compliance with 
this rule, to avoid unnecessary delays in making a licensing decision 
on an early site permit or a combined license already under 
consideration by the NRC, provided:
    (1) The application complies with all applicable, current (prior to 
this rulemaking) EP regulations;
    (2) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a 
combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit or combined 
license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the amended EP 
regulations in this rule; and
    (3) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a 
combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has 
approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule.
    In response to a request in the proposed rule for comments on the 
potential impacts of a final rule on combined license and early site 
permit application processes and schedules, the NRC received comments 
that the

[[Page 72580]]

NRC should not require pending combined license and early site permit 
applicants to implement the final rule changes until after the NRC 
issues the license or permit. In this final rule, the NRC is offering 
applicants the option to defer compliance with the final rule. That 
period of compliance deferral, between December 23, 2011 and December 
31, 2013, was selected specifically to apply only to those applications 
that have already been docketed and are nearing completion of the 
safety review and subsequent hearings (as applicable) prior to a 
licensing decision being made on the application. The NRC decided to 
limit the duration of that deferral as stated because future applicants 
and currently docketed applicants not nearing a licensing decision 
would have ample time to bring their applications into compliance with 
this final rule without the need to defer compliance. So that all 
combined license and early site permit applicants ultimately comply 
with the same regulations, an applicant whose application is docketed 
before December 23, 2011 that does not receive a combined license or 
early site permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined 
license or early site permit application to comply with the changes in 
this final rule no later than December 31, 2013.
    The NRC has added a new requirement in Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
I, to address the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) facility at Watts 
Bar. The TVA is in possession of a current construction permit for 
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, and is treated as a current licensee 
for purposes of satisfying the requirements of this rule. These 
requirements reflect NRC support of a licensing review approach for 
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, that employs the current licensing 
basis for Unit 1 as the reference basis for review and licensing of 
Unit 2, as stated in the SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation 
of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear 
Plant Unit 2,'' dated July 25, 2007.
    To improve clarity in the organization of the regulations, the 
final rule numbers the paragraphs of Section I.
    The NRC is amending paragraph H in Section II of Appendix E to 
remove a reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are 
provided in Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from 
a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for 
EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E. (A 
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this 
document.)
    The NRC is amending several paragraphs within Section IV of 
Appendix E to Part 50 that apply to licensees and applicants for 
licenses under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, as applicable. All 
provisions of Section IV of Appendix E to Part 50 apply to applicants 
for, and holders of, nuclear power reactor operating licenses under 
Part 50, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site 
permits under Part 52. Many of the provisions in Section IV also apply 
to Part 50 non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, for purposes of 
brevity, the initial reference to a ``licensee'' in each of the 
remaining paragraphs in this section indicates that that particular 
rule change applies to applicants for, and holders of, operating 
licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power reactors and non-power 
reactors, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site 
permits under Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise. The 
initial reference to ``nuclear power reactor licensee'' in each of the 
remaining paragraphs in this section means applicants for, and holders 
of, operating licenses for nuclear power reactors under Part 50, 
combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site permits under 
Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise.
    The NRC is amending the former first paragraph of Section IV by 
adding language to require nuclear power reactor licensees, but not 
applicants, to revise their ETEs when the U.S. Census Bureau decennial 
census data is available. The final rule requires that within 365 days 
of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent 
decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule, and 
within 365 days of the availability of subsequent decennial census 
data, these licensees must revise their ETE analyses using the 
decennial census data, and submit the analyses to the NRC under Sec.  
50.4.
    The NRC will review the ETE analyses for completeness using NUREG/
CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate 
Studies,'' the NRC guidance on ETE development issued with the final 
rule. The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of submitting 
ETE updates for NRC review and extended the time period for ETE update 
submission from 180 to 365 days after a population change triggering 
the update or the release of census data. The NRC will not approve ETE 
updates but will review them for completeness. For this reason the NRC 
is requiring licensees to submit their ETE updates at least 180 days 
before they use them to form protective action recommendations and 
provide them to offsite authorities for use in developing offsite 
protective action strategies. This will allow time for NRC review after 
which licensees may assume that the updates are adequate and available 
for use.
    The NUREG/CR-7002 guidance is an acceptable template to meet the 
requirements for ETE analysis development and nuclear power reactor 
licensees should use this guidance, or an appropriate alternative, when 
developing an ETE analysis or analysis update. The first set of 2010 
census data is expected to be available in 2011. The NRC will establish 
a schedule for review of the updated ETEs. After the licensee submits 
the ETE analysis for NRC review, these ETEs will be known as the 
licensee's ``updated'' ETEs, as opposed to the ``approved'' ETEs, which 
are the ETEs approved by the NRC when it issues a license.
    Thereafter, these licensees are required to annually review changes 
in the population of their EPZs. To complete these reviews, licensees 
will use data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which annually produces 
resident population estimates and State/local government population 
data, if available. These reviews must be conducted no more than 365 
days apart. The licensee is required to update the ETE analysis to 
reflect the impact of a population change that causes the longest ETE 
value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected 
Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs), or for the entire 10-mile 
EPZ to change by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less from the 
licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated ETE. An ERPA is defined as 
a local area within the EPZ for which emergency response information is 
provided; the EPZ is typically divided into ERPAs along geographic or 
political boundaries. The licensee is required to submit the updated 
ETE analysis to the NRC under the procedures of Sec.  50.4 within 365 
days of the availability of the population data used in the update and 
at least 180 days before using it to form protective action 
recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental 
authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required an ETE analysis 
update when the population in the EPZ or most populous ERPA increased 
or decreased by more than 10 percent from the

[[Page 72581]]

population that formed the basis for the licensee's currently approved 
ETE. Several commenters disagreed with the 10 percent population change 
criterion being the triggering event that would require licensees to 
update their ETEs. Suggested alternative thresholds included various 
population sensitivity studies that would assess the effects of 
population changes on ETE values; a 25 percent change in the ETE 
baseline rather than a 10 percent change in the EPZ population; and 
population changes resulting in a change to ETE values of 25 percent or 
30 minutes, whichever is less.
    The final rule adopts the approach of a 25 percent or 30 minute 
increase in ETE values to determine when an ETE analysis update is 
warranted. The NRC determined that basing ETE analysis updates on a 
population change alone without consideration of its impact on the ETE 
values may not have resulted in useful ETE updates. This is because a 
large population change in an area where there is an established 
infrastructure may have no impact on ETE values, whereas a small 
population change in an area with limited infrastructure may impact the 
ETE values. The proposed requirement to update an ETE analysis based on 
a standard value of a 10 percent population change would have required 
licensees to submit updated ETEs that may have had the same time 
estimates as the original document and, therefore, would provide no 
useful updated ETE information to response agencies. An approach that 
considers both population change and its impact on the ETE numerical 
values provides assurance that updated ETE analyses are submitted only 
when the ETE values are impacted. This links the update to a population 
change that has an impact on the ETE values on a site-specific basis 
rather than a generic 10 percent population change that may or may not 
impact these values.
    Therefore, nuclear power reactor licensees (but not applicants) 
will be required to provide an updated ETE analysis to the NRC within 
365 days of (1) The later of the date of the availability of the most 
recent decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule, 
(2) the availability of subsequent decennial census data, and (3) the 
availability of the population data used in the update, during the 
years between decennial censuses, when a population increase within the 
EPZ causes certain ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, 
whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated 
ETE. Licensees should perform a population sensitivity study for 
various population increases (i.e., 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 
percent increases) to determine the population value that will cause 
ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less. 
If this threshold is reached during the decennial period between 
censuses, the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the 
impact of the population increase. To establish the basis for these 
update criteria, the NRC considered the input of ETE subject matter 
experts who considered the sensitivity of ETE analysis tools, 
uncertainty of the data used in the development of ETEs, and 
discussions with OROs regarding the time necessary to mobilize 
resources to support an evacuation. The NRC determined that an ETE 
increase of 30 minutes is the smallest time value that OROs would 
consider to potentially impact a protective action decision from 
shelter-in-place to evacuate or vice versa. A review of more than 30 
current ETEs shows that most ETEs are longer than 4 hours. Therefore, 
the 30-minute increase would likely be the overriding criterion, 
although the 25-percent increase would be expected to apply primarily 
to sites with shorter ETEs. Either of these criteria would constitute a 
material change in ETE times and would provide an appropriate 
assessment of the effect of population change on the ETE on a site-
specific basis.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the licensee to 
submit an ETE update within 180 days of a population change triggering 
the update or the release of census data. The NRC received several 
stakeholder comments in opposition to the proposed 180-day requirement, 
some stating that the 180-day timeframe may be unrealistic. The NRC 
agrees that 180 days to complete ETE updates could be challenging based 
on the number of licensees and the limited number of commercial 
contractors available to complete the updates. Therefore, the NRC is 
extending the amount of time to complete ETE analysis updates from 180 
to 365 days.
    One commenter pointed out that ETEs only analyze the time required 
to evacuate areas within the EPZ. The commenter requested that the NRC 
clarify the sentence ``time required * * * for taking other protective 
actions'' because the only other protective action is to shelter in 
place and would not fall under the ETE. The NRC agrees with this 
comment and has removed the language ``and for taking other protective 
actions'' from the final rule language.
    The requirement for nuclear power reactor licensees (but not 
applicants) to evaluate a population change impact on the ETE during 
the period between decennial censuses balances the burden on licensees 
by requiring an ETE analysis update only when a population change has a 
material impact on the individual ETE values. The U.S. Census Bureau 
currently projects population growth at approximately one percent per 
year in the U.S. However, certain areas experience much greater growth. 
The population of Maricopa County, Arizona, for example, experienced 
approximately 6.4 percent growth in the two year period from 2005 to 
2007. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is located in Maricopa 
County. St. Lucie County in Florida, where the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 
is located, experienced approximately 9.7 percent population growth in 
the same period. A nuclear plant's EPZ population may not grow at the 
same rate as the corresponding county(ies) population, but a review of 
population growth would be appropriate, as discussed in Section II.B.4 
of this document.
    The updated ETEs will allow for more effective development of 
public protective action strategies and review of evacuation planning. 
Sites with little population change will be minimally impacted by the 
requirement, while those sites with a greater rate of population change 
that materially impacts ETE values will be required to perform more 
frequent updates. Licensees should also identify potential enhancements 
to improve evacuation times and discuss them with OROs. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
    The final rule also explains that a nuclear power reactor license 
applicant must use the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data, as of the 
date the applicant submits its application to the NRC, to conduct the 
ETE analysis for its application. Once an applicant obtains a combined 
license, it will need to conduct one review of any changes in the 
population of its EPZ at least 365 days before the licensee's scheduled 
fuel load. The licensee must use updated decennial census data if more 
recent decennial census data than that used in the licensee's 
application is available. If more recent decennial census data is not 
available, then the licensee must use annual resident population 
estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and State and local government 
population data, if available. The licensee must update its ETE 
analysis if a population increase within the EPZ causes certain ETE 
values to increase by 25 percent or 30

[[Page 72582]]

minutes, whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved 
or updated ETE. If the 25-percent or 30-minute threshold is reached, 
the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of the 
population increase. The licensee must perform this review and submit 
the ETE update, to the extent necessary, no later than 365 days before 
the scheduled fuel load. After beginning operations, the licensee will 
need to comply with the final rule requirements, including the 
frequency of ETE reviews and updates, like any other operating 
licensee.
    The NRC is revising the former first paragraph of Section IV to 
change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide 
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.'' In the same 
paragraph, the phrase ``onsite protective actions during hostile 
action'' is being added as one of the elements for which emergency 
plans must contain information needed to demonstrate compliance. These 
elements correspond with the description of each part of Section IV; 
the requirement for onsite protective actions during hostile action is 
being added in new Section IV.I. The NRC is also clarifying that the 
requirements for the submittal of emergency response plans apply to not 
only applicants for nuclear power reactor operating licenses under Part 
50, but also to applicants for early site permits (as applicable) and 
combined licenses under Part 52. This clarification was intended for, 
but inadvertently omitted from, a rulemaking to update Part 52 (72 FR 
49517; August 28, 2007). To improve clarity in the organization of the 
rule, the final rule separates Section IV, as amended by the final 
rule, into seven paragraphs and numbers each of the paragraphs.
    The final rule makes two editorial revisions to Appendix E to Part 
50, Section IV.A.2. One change includes the abbreviation of emergency 
response organization, ``ERO,'' in paragraph 2 of Section IV.A. The 
second revision clarifies that paragraph 2.c. should read as follows: 
``Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency 
coordinator * * *.''
    The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to include 
hostile action at the site as one of the types of emergencies that 
define the State, local, and Federal agencies that nuclear power 
reactor licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the 
assistance licensees expect from these agencies. The former regulations 
did not explicitly require the licensee to identify ORO resources for 
responding to the site during hostile action. Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.A.7, in the final rule adds this requirement to ensure that 
the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile action at 
the site are identified in the licensee's emergency plan. This 
requirement will be enforced through routine inspection and observation 
of emergency exercises. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.4 of this document.)
    In the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, would 
have been modified to add the following: ``Nuclear power plant 
licensees shall ensure that offsite response organization resources 
(e.g., local law enforcement, firefighting, medical assistance) are 
available to respond to an emergency including hostile action at the 
nuclear power plant site.'' The NRC received several comments asserting 
that the proposed rule language would give authority to the licensee 
over the OROs in order to ``ensure'' that resources would be available 
to respond to hostile action. The NRC agrees with the comments that 
determining the adequacy of ORO emergency plans is under the 
jurisdiction of FEMA and other State and local organizations, and the 
NRC did not intend to give licensees authority over OROs via this 
rulemaking. The NRC is revising the final rule by deleting the second 
sentence of Section IV.A.7, in the proposed rule, thereby clarifying 
the intent of the final rule.
    The NRC is revising Section IV.A.7 by inserting the words ``a 
description of the'' immediately before ``assistance expected from, 
appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies'' to make this provision 
read consistently with the other paragraphs in Section IV.A.
    Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, also adds the definition of 
``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or 
its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy 
equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an 
end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, 
explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver 
destructive force. This definition is based on the definition of 
``hostile action'' in BL-05-02. The NRC is excluding non-power reactors 
from the definition of ``hostile action'' at this time because a 
regulatory basis has not been developed to support the inclusion of 
non-power reactors in that definition. Further analysis and stakeholder 
interactions would be needed prior to including non-power reactors in 
the definition of ``hostile action.''
    The NRC received a stakeholder comment via FEMA stating that a 
``hostile action,'' as defined by the NRC, does not mention cyber 
attacks, which should be considered as a form of hostile action. Cyber 
attacks are addressed in licensees' cyber security plans consistent 
with Sec.  73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and communication 
systems and networks,'' and associated guidance documents. The current 
cyber security program associates cyber attacks with ``digital computer 
and communication systems and networks,'' whereas the definition of 
hostile action is an act by individuals using physical violence that 
can potentially achieve an end to harm public health and safety. Even 
though cyber attacks can be malevolent actions against NRC licensees, 
its definition maintains an association with digital or analog computer 
and communications systems, whereas hostile actions imply physical 
attacks by individuals. Therefore, the definition of ``hostile action'' 
in Section IV.A.7 was not changed as a result of this comment.
    The former Section IV.A.7 applied to non-power reactor licensees, 
and the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final 
rule. Non-power reactor licensees are still required to identify ORO 
resources that would respond to an emergency and the assistance 
licensees expect from these resources. However, because ``hostile 
action'' is defined as ``an act directed toward a nuclear power plant 
or its personnel,'' non-power reactor licensees are not required to 
identify the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile 
action at the non-power reactor site.
    The NRC is adding a new paragraph A.9 in Section IV of Appendix E 
to Part 50. This new paragraph will require nuclear power reactor 
licensees to perform a detailed analysis to show that on-shift 
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not 
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing 
their assigned emergency plan functions when needed. In the proposed 
rule, the NRC would have required licensees to ``provide'' a detailed 
analysis. However, the NRC did not intend for licensees to submit the 
detailed analysis for review or approval. Therefore, the wording in the 
final rule was changed to require licensees to have a detailed analysis 
in their emergency plans without providing it to the NRC.
    The final rule does not specify, by position or function, which 
responsibilities must be assigned, but allows nuclear power reactor 
licensees the flexibility to determine the limit of assigned 
responsibilities for effective emergency plan implementation on a site-
specific basis. This allows licensees

[[Page 72583]]

to take credit for new technologies that could potentially affect the 
number of on-shift staff that would be needed. However, licensees need 
to ensure that the duties assigned to on-shift staff are reasonable for 
one person to perform and are not so burdensome as to negatively impact 
emergency response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.1 of this document.)
    The final rule requires nuclear power reactor licensees to perform 
a detailed analysis, such as a job task analysis (JTA) or a time motion 
analysis, to demonstrate that on-shift personnel could implement the 
plan effectively without having competing responsibilities that could 
prevent them from performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The 
NRC expects the analysis to identify all the tasks that must be 
performed by available staff during an evolution such as response to an 
emergency. These licensees need to define the events that will be used 
in the detailed staffing analysis, such as postulated design basis 
accidents and the DBT, for which there must be emergency planning. The 
analysis must identify all tasks that must be completed for each 
analyzed event, and the responders responsible for the performance of 
those tasks. Licensees must then ensure that there is sufficient on-
shift staff to perform all necessary tasks until augmentation staff 
arrives to provide assistance. Enhancing the regulations to require 
licensees to ensure that multiple responsibilities assigned to on-shift 
staff will not detract from adequate emergency plan implementation will 
establish a regulatory framework that more clearly codifies the NRC's 
shift staffing expectations for effective emergency response.
    The NRC is amending Section IV.B of Appendix E to Part 50 to add a 
requirement that nuclear power reactor licensees must consider hostile 
action, which may adversely affect the plant (e.g., cause personnel 
harm and/or equipment damage), in their EAL schemes. It will also serve 
to establish consistent EALs for hostile action among existing and 
future nuclear power reactor licensees and allow the licensees to make 
hostile action-related emergency declarations based on a credible 
threat. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.2 
of this document.)
    The former Section IV.B applied to non-power reactor licensees, and 
the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final rule. 
Non-power reactor licensees are still required to have EALs to initiate 
emergency response and protective actions. However, as discussed in 
Section II.A.2 of this document, the NRC is addressing through guidance 
the issue of hostile action EALs for non-power reactor licensees. In 
addition, the definition of ``hostile action'' does not include non-
power reactors. Therefore, non-power reactor licensees are not required 
to consider hostile action in their EAL schemes at this time.
    The final rule also makes changes to Appendix E to conform to 
changes to Sec.  50.54(q), which address the issue described in Section 
II.B.5 of this document. The NRC is modifying the requirement in former 
paragraph (1) in Section IV.B of Appendix E to require each licensee to 
obtain prior NRC approval via Sec.  50.90 if the licensee is changing 
its entire EAL scheme. This provision carries forward the intent of the 
former regulation to compel licensees to obtain NRC approval before 
changing EAL schemes, and sets forth the correct process to request 
that approval. The proposed rule would have required licensees to use 
Sec.  50.4 to obtain prior NRC approval. For many of the same reasons 
provided earlier in Section IV of this document in the discussion of 
licensee use of the license amendment process to obtain prior NRC 
approval of changes to an emergency plan that would reduce the 
effectiveness of the plan under Sec.  50.54(q), the license amendment 
process is the appropriate process for licensees to use to obtain prior 
NRC approval of EAL scheme changes.
    The Commission explained in the Statement of Considerations for the 
2005 final rule concerning NRC approval of licensee changes to EALs (70 
FR 3591; January 26, 2005) the importance of prior NRC approval of a 
licensee's EAL scheme change:

    The Commission believes a licensee's proposal to convert from 
one EAL scheme (e.g., NUREG-0654-based) to another EAL scheme (e.g., 
NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI-99-01 based) * * * is of sufficient 
significance to require prior NRC review and approval. NRC review 
and approval for such major changes in EAL methodology is necessary 
to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that the final EAL 
change will provide an acceptable level of safety.

    As previously noted, courts have found that Commission actions that 
expand licensees' authority under their licenses without formally 
amending the licenses constitute license amendments and should be 
processed through the Commission's license amendment procedures. The 
Commission has determined that a licensee's EAL scheme change requires 
prior NRC approval ``to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that 
the final EAL change will provide an acceptable level of safety.'' 
These determinations require exercises of agency discretion. The staff 
must ensure that the licensee adopts each element of the generic EAL 
scheme to fit its site and facility. In addition, the licensee does not 
have the authority to change to a new scheme unless the NRC approves 
the change in advance. Under the legal precedents, NRC staff approval 
in these instances would grant the licensee authority beyond its 
current operating authority, and that approval requires a license 
amendment. This final rule clarifies that the process to request prior 
NRC approval of EAL scheme changes is the license amendment process.
    The final rule provides additional flexibility by permitting 
licensees to use EAL schemes other than those listed in Section IV.B.2 
of the proposed rule, provided that the licensee obtains prior NRC 
approval. The final rule corrects a misstatement in the proposed rule 
that the former rule required licensees to obtain prior NRC approval 
via Sec.  50.4 for changes to an EAL scheme from NUREG-0654 to one 
based solely on NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01. The final rule also 
removes the paragraph numbering in Section IV.B of the former rule. The 
former first paragraph of Section IV.B, as amended by this final rule, 
is designated as paragraph 1. As explained above, former paragraph (1) 
in Section IV.B has been replaced with the provision requiring 
licensees to obtain prior NRC approval, via a license amendment, for 
EAL scheme changes. The final rule deletes former paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of Section IV.B and replaces them with a new requirement that all 
EAL changes, other than EAL scheme changes, are required to be made 
under the amended Sec.  50.54(q) change process, as discussed earlier 
in Section IV of this document. The final rule designates the 
provisions concerning EAL scheme changes and other EAL changes as 
paragraph 2. Paragraph B.2 applies to nuclear power reactor licensees 
and non-power reactor licensees.
    The NRC is retaining the existing language of Section IV.C of 
Appendix E to Part 50, redesignating that language as paragraph C.1, 
and adding new paragraph C.2. Paragraph C.1 still applies to non-power 
reactor licensees, but paragraph C.2 does not, for the reasons provided 
in Section II.B.2 of this document. Paragraph C.2 requires that nuclear 
power reactor licensees, first, have and maintain the capability to 
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes 
after the availability of indications to plant operators that an 
emergency

[[Page 72584]]

action level has been exceeded and, second, promptly declare the 
emergency condition upon identification of the appropriate ECL. Any 
given emergency condition may result in the thresholds for two or more 
EALs being exceeded and licensees need to consider all applicable EALs 
and base the classification decision on that EAL resulting in the 
higher ECL.
    In Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph C.2 of the proposed rule, the NRC 
would have required that licensees and applicants had to promptly 
declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following a 
determination that an EAL has been exceeded. The NRC received a 
stakeholder comment that suggested that the proposed language could be 
interpreted as requiring declaration on the first identified EAL. 
Because such an interpretation was not the NRC's intent, the NRC 
reworded the proposed phrase ``following determination that an 
emergency action level has been exceeded,'' in the proposed rule to 
read ``following identification of the appropriate emergency 
classification level,'' in the final rule to clearly articulate the 
NRC's intent.
    This new requirement emphasizes the NRC's expectations regarding 
the timeliness of emergency declarations while retaining sufficient 
operational flexibility to respond to extenuating circumstances 
necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC considers the 
15-minute criterion to commence when plant instrumentation, plant 
alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that correspond 
to an EAL become available to any plant operator. As used here, ``plant 
operator'' means any member of the plant staff, who by virtue of 
training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or 
reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the 
licensee's emergency classification scheme. ``Plant operators'' may be, 
but need not be, licensed operators or members of the ERO. ``Plant 
operators'' may be located in the control room or in another emergency 
facility in which emergency declarations are performed. The phrase 
``plant operators'' does not encompass plant personnel such as 
chemists, radiation technicians, craft personnel, security personnel, 
and others whose positions require they report, rather than assess, 
abnormal conditions to the control room.
    The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification, 
and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration 
from the first availability of a plant indication or receipt of a 
report of an off-normal condition by plant operators up to and 
including the declaration of the emergency. Validation or confirmation 
of plant indications, or reports to the plant operators, is to be 
accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment. A 
small number of EAL thresholds are related to the results of analyses 
(e.g., dose assessments, chemistry sampling) that are necessary to 
ascertain whether or not a numerical EAL threshold has been exceeded, 
rather than confirming or verifying an alarm or a received report. In 
these limited cases, the 15-minute declaration period starts with the 
availability of analysis results that show the threshold to be 
exceeded; this is the time that the information is available. 
Nonetheless, the NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to 
initiate and complete these analyses with a reasonable sense of 
urgency.
    This 15-minute criterion ends as soon as the nuclear power reactor 
licensee determines that an EAL has been exceeded and the licensee 
makes the emergency declaration. The final rule requires the licensee 
to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible 
following the identification of the appropriate ECL. Because the NRC 
requires emergency declarations to be made promptly, the final rule 
states that the 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace 
period in which a licensee may attempt to restore plant conditions to 
avoid declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. If the EAL 
threshold specifies a duration (e.g., ``fire lasting for greater than 
10 minutes from detection''), the licensee is expected to assess and 
classify the event concurrently with the specified condition duration. 
The licensee is then required to promptly declare the emergency 
condition as soon as the specified duration has been exceeded because 
no further assessment is necessary to make the declaration. The 
licensee is encouraged, but not required, to declare the emergency 
condition once it has been determined that the condition cannot be 
corrected before the specified duration is exceeded.
    The final rule establishes a capability criterion, rather than an 
inflexible performance criterion, to allow nuclear power reactor 
licensees some degree of flexibility in addressing extenuating 
circumstances that may arise during an actual emergency. For example, 
an emergency declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of 
performing plant operations that are urgently needed to protect public 
health and safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did 
not deny State and local authorities the opportunity to implement 
actions to protect the public health or safety under their emergency 
plans and the cause of the delay was not reasonably within the 
licensee's ability to foresee and prevent.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have established a 15-minute 
criterion for the declaration of an emergency condition. The NRC 
received several stakeholder comments that questioned the magnitude of 
the numeric criterion. Other comments suggested a less restrictive one-
hour criterion for events classified as Notification of Unusual Events 
in light of the reduced consequences to the public of these events. In 
developing this rule, the NRC objective was to codify the 15-minute 
timeliness goal that had been the expected performance level after the 
publishing of the EPPOS-2 guidance and which had been incorporated into 
the ROP. The NRC believes that 15 minutes is an appropriate timeliness 
capability criterion based on the following rationale. The declaration 
of a General Emergency requires the nuclear power reactor licensee to 
provide a recommendation for public protective actions to State and 
local governments. These protective actions can be more effective in 
reducing the radiological consequences of the emergency on the public 
if the action is implemented in a timely manner, preferably before the 
onset of a major release of radioactive materials. The steps that need 
to be taken by offsite officials to consider the licensee's 
recommendation and to decide upon and implement an action cannot start 
until the licensee has classified and declared the emergency and 
provided the appropriate recommendation. As such, time is of the 
essence. The planning basis for emergency planning for nuclear power 
plants provided in NUREG-0654 addresses a spectrum of accidents. The 
NUREG-0654 planning basis provides that the onset of the release to the 
environment following the onset of the event may range from 0.5 hours 
to one day. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3, as amended by the 
final rule, requires the licensee to have the capability to notify the 
State and local officials within 15 minutes after declaring an 
emergency and that the alert and notification system be capable of 
alerting the public and initiating notification of the public within 
about 15 minutes. The 15-minute timeliness expectation for emergency 
declarations now being codified is consistent with these current 
regulatory requirements and the EP planning basis.
    Although the NRC recognizes that protective actions are not 
necessary at the lower ECLs and the lower ECL events have lesser 
potential

[[Page 72585]]

consequences on the public, the NRC believes that a single timeliness 
criterion for all four ECLs is necessary. The NRC notes that the ECL, 
be it a Notification of Unusual Event or a higher ECL, cannot be known 
until the classification is completed and the declaration is made. This 
argues against the use of different timeliness criteria for 
Notification of Unusual Events and higher ECLs because emergency events 
may not proceed step-wise through the four ECLs.
    Further, the actions to assess, classify, and declare an emergency, 
and the resources needed to accomplish those actions (e.g., 
``capability''), do not differ by ECL. Although there are more EAL 
thresholds to consider during a Notification of Unusual Event than 
there are at the higher ECLs, this is balanced by increasing demands on 
the on-shift staff (i.e., to perform assessments, corrective actions, 
and mitigative actions needed to address the degraded plant condition) 
associated with the higher ECLs. The conditions (such as insufficient 
staffing, procedures, and training) that reduce a nuclear power reactor 
licensee's capability for declaring a Notification of Unusual Event 
within 15 minutes have a similar effect on the licensee's capability 
for declaring higher ECLs. Also, the licensee's performance in 
declaring Notification of Unusual Events is a viable predictor of 
licensee performance at the less frequently declared higher ECLs. These 
performance deficiencies might not be identified and corrected if the 
NRC were to establish one hour for declaring Notification of Unusual 
Events and 15 minutes for the higher classification level emergencies. 
Therefore, the NRC has decided to retain the single timeliness 
criterion in the final rule for all ECLs.
    The NRC is amending Section IV.D.1 of Appendix E to remove footnote 
1. This footnote is unnecessary because the term ``EPZ'' is already 
addressed in Section I of Appendix E. This change will also make the 
numbering of footnotes sequentially consistent throughout Appendix E.
    The NRC is amending Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to require that 
the public alert and notification system required by this section 
additionally has backup methods for both the alert and notification 
functions without specifying which backup measures should be used. This 
approach allows flexibility in the selection of the method best suited 
for each nuclear power reactor site and also allows the use of newer 
technologies or other alternative methods. The availability of backup 
ANS methods enhances the public's ability to be promptly alerted of an 
event at a facility and of possible protective actions. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.1 of this document.)
    Former Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E acknowledged that, for the 
events more likely to warrant use of the alert and notification 
capability, State and local officials will have substantial time 
available to make a judgment regarding activation of the warning system 
to alert and notify the public. Accordingly, the final rule will not 
impose specific time requirements for using a backup method. The 
alerting function may involve one or more methods that are already used 
as a backup means at several sites, such as multiple, independent siren 
activation points in conjunction with siren backup power, route 
alerting, reverse call-out systems or newer technologies, such as 
intelligent notification and communication systems for notifying 
targeted populations. The notification function may involve the 
designation of multiple EAS broadcast stations or use of weather alert 
radios or newer technologies, such as advanced messaging systems. The 
NRC and FEMA are providing guidance, issued contemporaneously with this 
final rule, for determining the acceptability of the backup methods 
based on the alerting and notification capabilities of the methods 
selected, administrative provisions for implementing and maintaining 
backup methods, identification of resources to implement backup 
methods, and periodic demonstration of the backup methods. Guidance is 
also being provided to nuclear power reactor licensees and offsite 
officials regarding the need to ensure that the backup methods can 
alert and notify the public in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ, 
that the personnel and resources required to implement the backup 
methods will be available during any type of emergency (including 
hostile action), and that designated personnel know how to implement 
backup methods.
    The backup method of alerting and notification must be capable of 
providing warning signals and instructional messages to the population 
in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ when the primary ANS is 
unavailable during an emergency (i.e., the primary ANS cannot alert or 
notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population). 
The backup means may be designed so that it can be implemented using a 
phased approach in which the populations most at risk are alerted and 
notified first, followed by alerting and notification of people in less 
immediately affected areas. The backup method may have the additional 
capability of being employed only in the specific areas impacted when a 
portion of the primary ANS, such as a single siren or sirens within a 
community, fails and the extent of the affected area and population can 
be determined.
    The new requirement for a backup method applies to both the 
alerting function and notification function of the FEMA approved ANS. 
However, the NRC recognizes that some backup methods are not capable of 
meeting the timeframes that are part of the primary ANS design 
objectives. The intent of the final rule is not to have a duplicate 
primary ANS, but to have a means of backup alerting and notification in 
place so the public can be alerted in sufficient time to allow offsite 
officials to consider a range of protective actions for the public to 
take in the event of a severe accident with potential offsite 
radiological consequences. The NRC and FEMA are providing guidance to 
clarify the design objectives and other criteria for ANS backup 
methods.
    For nuclear power plant sites with no backup measures currently in 
place, backup provisions must be identified, incorporated into the 
site's ANS design, and submitted for FEMA approval as specified in 
FEMA-REP-10. For nuclear power plant sites that already have provisions 
for ANS backup means in FEMA approved ANS designs, licensees and 
offsite officials will need to confirm that the backup methods meet the 
final rule requirements and submit revised ANS designs for FEMA 
approval if changes were deemed necessary. New Section IV.D.4 in 
Appendix E to Part 50 sets forth the deadlines for these implementation 
phases. Section V of this document provides further explanation of the 
deadlines.
    Additional changes to Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 are being made to 
more clearly distinguish between the alerting and notification 
functions of the ANS (including clarification of how the 15-minute 
design objective applies to these functions), to use consistent 
terminology when referring to the officials responsible for ANS 
activation, and to update language regarding demonstration of ANS 
capabilities and correction of deficiencies. The final rule adds a 
reference to the alerting function in Section IV.D.3 to clearly 
indicate that the requirements for the primary and backup ANS apply to 
both the alerting and notification functions. The wording of the 
primary ANS design objective is revised to clarify that the 15-minute 
criterion applies to the completion of the initial alerting and start 
of the initial notification of the public. This

[[Page 72586]]

clarification was made because the NRC, consistent with the 1990 
Seabrook decision (Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook 
Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-935, 32 NRC 57, 68 (1990), has determined 
that notification of the public need not be completed within 15 minutes 
but that initiation of the notification process must begin within 15 
minutes). The phrase ``appropriate governmental authorities'' replaces 
the phrase ``State and local officials'' when referring to ANS 
activation to encompass site-specific variations in the assignment of 
the responsibility for this function according to each offsite 
emergency plan and established ANS activation protocols. This 
responsibility may be assigned to a single State or local organization, 
or to multiple organizations among various State, county, local, and 
other governmental agencies. The use of ``appropriate governmental 
authorities'' addresses all of these variations. The former Section 
IV.D.3 referred to the February 1, 1982, date for then existing nuclear 
power reactor licensees to have demonstrated ANS capabilities for their 
sites. The NRC is removing the reference to the February 1, 1982, date 
and requiring that ANS capabilities to alert the public and provide 
instructions promptly must be demonstrated before exceeding 5 percent 
rated thermal power of the first reactor at each site, consistent with 
the requirements of Sec.  50.47(d). It is also important that licensees 
promptly correct deficiencies found during initial ANS installation and 
testing, as well as deficiencies identified thereafter, as required by 
Sec.  50.54(s)(2). However, the requirement for correction of ANS 
deficiencies is clearly stated in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not 
need to be repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required licensees to 
identify and demonstrate that governmental authorities had the 
administrative and physical means for providing a backup method of 
public ANS. The NRC received several stakeholder comments that noted 
that governmental authorities are generally responsible for ANS 
activation and implementing any backup public ANS, and that the 
licensee has no control over the resources necessary to implement the 
backup capability. The NRC agrees that licensees generally secure the 
support of governmental authorities to maintain reasonable assurance 
that the offsite portions of the emergency plan can and will be 
implemented. In response to these comments, and to improve regulatory 
clarity and structure, the final rule modifies the proposed rule 
language for the backup capability to reflect this division of ANS 
responsibilities.
    Note that no changes are being made to the basic requirement in 
Sec.  50.47(b)(5) for nuclear power reactor licensees or applicants to 
ensure that the means to provide early notification and clear 
instruction (i.e., alerting and notification) to the populace in the 
plume exposure pathway EPZ have been established. It is not necessary 
to address backup methods in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) because the current 
provision establishes the overall requirement for alerting and 
notification.
    Based on a comment received on the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix 
E, Section IV.E.5 is revised to replace the reference to ``physicians'' 
with the term ``medical service providers'' because licensees typically 
make arrangements for medical services with medical service providers 
rather than individual physicians. The phrase ``and other medical 
personnel'' is deleted because it is now redundant to the reference to 
``medical service providers.'' The NRC also revised Section IV.E.5 of 
Appendix E to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological'' to 
provide consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
    The final rule redesignates the former language of Appendix E, 
Section IV.E.8 as Section IV.E.8.a; and adds new Sections IV.E.8.b, 
IV.E.8.c, IV.E.8.d, and IV.E.8.e.
    Section IV.E.8.a in the final rule removes the reference to the EOF 
as a ``near-site'' facility and adds the requirement that nuclear power 
reactor licensees must provide an OSC. In a conforming change, the 
final rule revises Sec.  52.79(a)(17) to clarify that combined license 
applications are not subject to the TMI action requirements in Sec.  
50.34(f)(2)(xxv), which address the need for an onsite TSC, an onsite 
OSC, and an EOF. Instead, the requirements governing the need for such 
facilities in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) will apply to 
combined license applications. (A discussion of this issue is also 
provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
    Section IV.E.8.b incorporates EOF distance criteria currently found 
in NRC guidance and specifies that an EOF must be located within 10 to 
25 miles of each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves 
or, if the EOF is located less than 10 miles from a nuclear power 
reactor site, then a backup facility must be provided within 10 to 25 
miles of a site. The distance between the EOF and a site will be 
determined by the straight line distance from the site's TSC to the 
EOF, which is consistent with the approach described in NUREG-0696, 
Table 2, ``Relation of EOF Location to Habitability Criteria,'' dated 
February 1981. An EOF located more than 25 miles from the site must not 
adversely impact the ability of licensee and offsite responders to 
fulfill their responsibilities, and provisions for locating NRC and 
offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site must be 
made so they can interact face-to-face with personnel going to and 
leaving the site for briefings and debriefings. During an event, NRC 
and offsite agency staff may wish to relocate from a remotely located 
EOF to another facility closer to the nuclear power plant site. 
Suitable space near the site must be available so NRC and offsite 
agency staff could coordinate their actions efficiently, communicate 
with responders in other onsite and offsite emergency response 
facilities, and interface directly with responders at the site as 
needed. This space will allow NRC site team and offsite response 
personnel, including Federal, State, and local responders, to conduct 
briefings and debriefings with emergency response personnel entering 
and leaving the site, communicate with responders at other emergency 
response facilities, maintain awareness of conditions at the site, and 
share information with other emergency response organizations via 
electronic means, such as computer links, the internet, or facsimile 
transmission.
    The proposed rule language in Section IV.E.8.b of Appendix E would 
have obviated the need for licensees to obtain approval at either the 
NRC staff or Commission level to locate an EOF or consolidate EOFs more 
than 25 miles from a site if the EOF met certain performance based 
requirements and provided for NRC site team and offsite agency 
responders closer to the site. However, offsite agencies and the NRC's 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) expressed concerns 
about forgoing the requirement for a licensee to obtain NRC approval to 
locate an EOF beyond 25 miles. The NRC believes it is important for a 
licensee or an applicant to consult with offsite agencies that send 
representatives to the EOF prior to locating or consolidating such 
facilities. This consultation is particularly important when a licensee 
or applicant intends to use an EOF located more than 25 miles from a 
site to ensure that response times to the facility would be acceptable 
to offsite responders, adequate communications with offsite

[[Page 72587]]

responders at other locations would be available, and the EOF location 
would not raise any jurisdictional concerns (e.g., when the EOF is 
located in a different State than a nuclear power plant). Therefore, 
the NRC is retaining the requirement for a licensee or applicant to 
obtain Commission approval to locate an EOF more than 25 miles from the 
nuclear power plant site(s) it serves and modified the rule language in 
Section IV.E.8.b accordingly.
    A licensee will need prior Commission approval through a license 
amendment to locate an EOF beyond the 25-mile limit. Similar to 
approving EAL scheme changes and emergency plan changes that would 
reduce the effectiveness of the plan, determining whether a licensee's 
proposed EOF meets the regulatory criteria can require an exercise of 
agency discretion. Approval in these instances would grant the licensee 
authority beyond its current operating authority, and that approval 
requires a license amendment. Consistent with previous Commission 
approvals of EOFs beyond the 25-mile limit, these license amendments 
must be approved by the Commission and not the NRC staff.
    Section IV.E.8.c in the final rule provides performance based 
criteria applicable to all EOFs. The functions that an EOF must address 
include the capability to obtain and display plant data and 
radiological information for each reactor unit or plant that the 
facility serves. In some cases, an EOF may serve units or plants 
involving more than one type of reactor technology, such as pressurized 
water reactors and boiling water reactors, or more than one design of 
the same reactor type. The EOF staff must be capable of understanding 
conditions for each type of reactor and translating technical 
information into a useful form for offsite officials and media 
relations staff. A co-located or consolidated facility must also be 
capable of supporting effective response to events at more than one 
site simultaneously, because widespread events affecting multiple sites 
can and have occurred, such as the electrical blackout in several areas 
of the northeastern U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. The 
ability to simultaneously display information for multiple plants will 
also enhance effective response to events occurring at more than one 
site.
    Section IV.E.8.d in the final rule requires nuclear power reactor 
licensees to identify an alternative facility (or facilities) that 
would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing 
hostile action, to function as staging areas for augmentation of ERO 
staff during hostile action to minimize delays in emergency response 
and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response. To accomplish 
this, the alternative facility is required to have the following 
characteristics: the capability for communication with the EOF, control 
room, and plant security; the capability to notify offsite agencies; 
and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including 
damage control team planning and preparation. These capabilities will 
ensure that the ERO is aware of conditions at the site and is prepared 
to re-enter the site when it is deemed accessible. This will enable 
rapid staffing of onsite emergency response facilities and 
implementation of mitigation actions when ERO personnel enter the 
protected area. However, alternative facilities are not required to 
reproduce the full documentation present at primary emergency response 
facilities.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power 
plant licensees and applicants under Part 50 and Part 52 to identify an 
alternative facility (or facilities) to function as staging areas for 
augmentation of ERO staff during hostile action. The NRC received 
several stakeholder comments that stated that the proposed rule was not 
consistent with the wording of Attachment 5 to BL-05-02. One commenter 
indicated that the use of the parenthetical phrase ``(or facilities)'' 
can be interpreted in two ways. If licensees use multiple locations to 
function as the alternative facility, then this phrase could mean that 
either all the locations will have the characteristics of the 
alternative facility or that these locations will collectively have 
those characteristics. To clarify this provision, the NRC changed the 
language of the final rule to explicitly state that the alternative 
facility (or facilities) must collectively have the necessary 
characteristics.
    The same commenter also stated that the proposed rule would require 
the alternative facility to have the capability to perform offsite 
notifications whereas the wording of BL-05-02 states that one of the 
alternative facility characteristics is the capability to notify 
offsite response organizations if the EOF is not performing this 
action. The commenter argued that the final rule should have the same 
wording as contained in BL-05-02. The NRC disagrees with this comment. 
The intent of BL-05-02 was to provide a backup capability to perform 
offsite notifications if the other licensee emergency response 
facilities were not available due to a hostile action. In the event of 
a hostile action, there is no guarantee that the EOF would be available 
to perform this action. Therefore, the NRC has determined that the 
capability to perform offsite notifications is a necessary 
characteristic of alternative facilities. Licensees have the option to 
use the EOF as their alternative facility if it is located outside the 
owner-controlled area and is within about 30 miles of the site. If the 
EOF is not the designated alternative facility, then the alternative 
facility must also have the capability to perform offsite 
notifications, though not necessarily with the identical equipment 
utilized in other emergency response facilities.
    The commenter also pointed out that the final rule should have the 
same wording as BL-05-02, which states that ``it is appropriate for 
alternative facilities to have general plant drawings, procedures, 
phones, and (ideally) computer links to the site.'' Another commenter 
recommended an increased implementation period for this part of the 
rule since licensee facilities do not meet the proposed requirements 
for the availability of computer links and would need to make facility 
changes under the site modification process. The NRC agrees in part 
with these comments. Bulletin BL-05-02 does direct licensees to equip 
alternative facilities as stated. However, the NRC has determined that, 
since the alternative facility (or facilities) must have the capability 
to communicate with the EOF, control room, and site security, to 
perform offsite notifications, and to conduct engineering assessment 
activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, 
licensees should have flexibility in meeting these requirements based 
on site-specific characteristics. Also, the NRC did not intend for 
licensees to perform major facility modifications or construct new 
facilities to meet the new requirement. The NRC intends for licensees 
to use existing facilities that are a safe distance from the plant. 
Therefore, the NRC will not codify the equipment that must be present 
in the alternative facility (or facilities) but rather will allow 
licensees to achieve the required capabilities of the alternative 
facility (or facilities) in the most appropriate manner for their site.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the alternative 
facility (or facilities) to collectively exhibit certain 
characteristics, one of which was ``accessibility even if the site is 
under threat of a, or during an actual, hostile action.'' The ACRS 
Plant Operations and Fire Protection Subcommittee questioned whether 
the NRC intended for this provision to require that if

[[Page 72588]]

multiple facilities are utilized as the alternative facility, then each 
of the facilities must be accessible during hostile action or the 
threat thereof. Because the purpose of this provision is to require 
nuclear power reactor licensees to have an alternative facility (or 
facilities), each of which would be accessible under the threat of a, 
or during an actual, hostile action, the NRC changed the language of 
the final rule to clarify this characteristic of the alternative 
facility (or facilities). (A discussion of this issue is also provided 
in Section II.A.3 of this document.)
    The NRC is also adding new Section IV.E.8.e to permit a nuclear 
power reactor licensee that, on the day the final rule becomes 
effective, has an existing approved EOF that does not meet the distance 
criteria for a primary or backup EOF, or does not have provisions for a 
facility closer to the site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles 
from a nuclear power reactor site, to not be subject to the 
requirements of Section IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already received 
approval from the Commission for variances from existing requirements 
(and guidance) regarding EOF locations, backup EOF facilities, or other 
EOF characteristics. The rule language was revised in the final rule to 
clarify that exceptions to the requirements of Section IV.E.8.b apply 
only to existing EOFs. If a licensee relocates its EOF or consolidates 
EOFs after the effective date of the final rule, then the requirements 
of this section will apply to the relocated or consolidated facility. 
(Also refer to the discussion of this issue in Section II.B.3 of this 
document.)
    The NRC is amending Sections IV.E.9.c and IV.E.9.d to remove 
references to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are 
provided in Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from a 
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for 
EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
    The NRC is revising paragraph F.1.a of Section IV to remove the 
word ``radiation'' because the advent of hostile action scenarios 
renders usage of the word as too limiting in describing potential 
emergencies. This change provides consistent use of the term 
``emergency plan.'' The NRC is also revising paragraph F.1.b to change 
the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide consistent use 
of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
    The final rule revises Section IV.F.2 to replace ``public 
notification system'' with ``public alert and notification system.'' In 
the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2 referred to the ANS as the ``public 
notification system'' and other sections of the rule referred to the 
ANS as the ``public alert and notification system.'' The NRC received a 
comment identifying this inconsistency. ``Public notification system'' 
has been changed in the final rule to the ``public alert and 
notification system'' for clarity and consistency with the usage 
elsewhere.
    The NRC is adding a new requirement to Section IV.F.2.a to require 
nuclear power reactor licensees to submit, for NRC review and 
verification, scenarios for full participation exercises required by 
Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. This requirement enables the NRC to 
ensure that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the new 
requirements of Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j of Appendix E, including 
hostile action and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of 
responders.
    The NRC is revising paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and F.2.a.(iii) of 
Appendix E, Section IV to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA 
remains within DHS, the responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power 
plants is with FEMA. The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather 
than ``DHS'' for clarity of communication with stakeholders. In 
addition, in the first sentence of paragraph F.2.a.(iii), the NRC is 
changing the word ``licensee'' to ``license'' to correct a 
typographical error.
    The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.b to require nuclear power 
reactor licensees to submit scenarios for their onsite biennial 
exercises under 10 CFR 50.4. This requirement enables the NRC to verify 
that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the requirements 
of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j, including hostile action 
and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of responders. 
The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of scenario reviews 
and has included language in the rule to specify that licensees must 
submit scenarios to the NRC at least 60 days before the start of the 
biennial exercise. The NRC will not approve scenarios, but will comment 
if concerns are noted. The NRC will provide any comments to the 
licensee no later than 30 days before the exercise begins. The NRC is 
also inserting the word ``subsequent'' in paragraph F.2.b of Section IV 
to distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b. 
The NRC is also adding wording in paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b to 
distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b 
regarding the type of exercises for which scenarios are to be 
submitted. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section 
II.A.6 of this document.)
    The former Section IV.F.2.b required that licensees ensure that 
adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained to address 
several principal emergency response functional areas. The NRC is 
expanding the list of principal functional areas of emergency response 
in paragraph F.2.b to include event classification, notification of 
offsite authorities, assessment of the impact of onsite and offsite 
radiological releases, and development of protective action 
recommendations. These additional functional areas are associated with 
the planning standards in Sec.  50.47(b) that have a significant impact 
on determining the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to 
protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency (i.e., 
Sec.  50.47(b)(4) regarding event classification, Sec.  50.47(b)(5) 
regarding notification of offsite authorities, Sec.  50.47(b)(9) 
regarding assessment of radiological releases, and Sec.  50.47(b)(10) 
regarding protective actions).
    Additionally, the NRC is clarifying the intent of the principal 
functional areas by replacing the term ``corrective actions'' with the 
term ``mitigative action implementation'' in Section IV.F.2.b. The term 
``corrective actions'' is generally associated with a process (e.g., 
the Corrective Action Program) to address identified plant problems. 
However, this process is not normally used during the active response 
to an emergency. ``Mitigative action implementation'' is a more 
accurate description of the principal functional area that is to be 
demonstrated in exercises and drills. This term is not the same as 
``plant system repair,'' another principal functional area, because 
``mitigative action implementation'' may involve equipment, procedures, 
and strategies developed under Sec.  50.54(hh), the use of fire truck 
pumping capacity to inject water, or some ad hoc action. ``Mitigative 
action implementation'' communicates the expectation for a much more 
rapid response process than is communicated by ``corrective actions'' 
as that term is commonly used within the commercial nuclear power 
industry.
    The NRC is amending the last sentence of Section IV.F.2.b to add 
``in all participating facilities'' after ``operating staff'' to 
clarify that the operating staff from all facilities need not 
participate in the drill. The NRC is

[[Page 72589]]

also changing ``the drills could focus on onsite training objectives'' 
to ``the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives'' 
to make the permissive intent of the regulatory language more explicit.
    The NRC is amending the third sentence of Section IV.F.2.c by 
correcting grammar without changing the substance or intent of the 
provision. The word ``and'' is being removed from the end of Section 
IV.F.2.c.(1) and (2), and a semicolon replaces the period at the end of 
Section IV.F.2.c.(3), for the same reason. The NRC is also adding 
Section IV.F.2.c.(4) and (5) to clarify requirements for nuclear power 
reactor licensees at co-located sites to conduct hostile action 
exercises. The NRC received a comment regarding this issue and modified 
the proposed rule to direct that hostile action exercises be rotated 
between the licensees. This change flows logically from the new 
requirement to conduct hostile action exercises. Specific provisions 
for the conduct of exercises at co-located sites have been previously 
promulgated to clarify requirements for ORO participation (70 FR 3591). 
This action was appropriate because the same OROs support the emergency 
plans of both licensees at a co-located site. This final rule in 
Section IV.F.2.c.(5) requires that licensees at a co-located site 
rotate participation with OROs in hostile action exercises in a manner 
similar to other exercise participation to ensure that all licensees 
participate with OROs on a periodic basis. However, Section 
IV.F.2.c.(4) requires that licensees not participating with OROs 
conduct at least the onsite portion of hostile action exercises in each 
exercise cycle in order to ensure the maintenance of key skills.
    The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.d to reflect exercise cycle 
requirements for States with respect to ingestion pathway and hostile 
action exercises. The proposed rule included a case-by-case assessment 
for scheduling of hostile action exercises in States with multiple 
nuclear power reactors. However, in public meetings stakeholders 
commented that case-by-case assessments would create regulatory 
uncertainty. The final rule addresses exercises in States with multiple 
nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZs by providing that 
States should periodically participate in full or partial participation 
hostile action exercises and should rotate State participation among 
the licensees.
    Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d of the former rule provided 
that States should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion 
of exercises at least once every six years. As explained below 
regarding changes to Section IV.F.2.j, the NRC is requiring exercise 
cycles to be eight years long. A logical extension of establishing an 
eight-year exercise cycle is to eliminate the minimum frequency element 
in Section IV.F.2.d and state that States should fully participate in 
the ingestion pathway portion of exercises every cycle.
    The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.f to add a second situation when 
remedial exercises are required. The final rule explains that remedial 
exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily 
tested during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC, in consultation 
with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective 
measures can be taken in response to an emergency or determine that key 
ERO skills had been maintained. This change demonstrates the NRC's 
intent to invoke this requirement for exercises where the scope of the 
exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate the maintenance of key ERO 
skills. In the past, some exercises have not provided such a 
demonstration due to the use of simplistic scenarios. The final rule 
change is intended to prevent this trend in the future.
    The key skills necessary to implement the emergency plan vary among 
ERO members, emergency response facilities, and licensees. In general, 
key skills include the ability to implement emergency response 
procedures specific to the duties of the ERO member. Key skills include 
specific response capabilities that may be assigned in a site-specific 
manner such as:
     Timely classification of events;
     Timely notification of offsite authorities;
     Assessment of radiological releases onsite and offsite;
     Development of protective action recommendations;
     Dissemination of information to the public via media 
channels;
     Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and 
repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions;
     Mitigative action implementation;
     Protection of workers during emergency response, including 
medical care;
     Response to operational transients while implementing the 
emergency plan; and
     Coordination with offsite response organizations.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC provided a list of key skills 
licensees' emergency responders would have needed to implement 
emergency response procedures. The NRC received a comment that argued 
that the list of skills needs to be more specific. The NRC does not 
agree with this comment because the skills listed are more specific 
than previous requirements, are elaborated upon in guidance, and in 
some cases have been defined through the EP performance indicator 
program, as described in NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance 
Indicator Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009.
    The NRC is also revising Section IV.F.2.g to require licensees to 
correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified during exercises, 
drills, or training. This change explicitly states the regulatory 
intent that licensees must formally critique performance opportunities 
that develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills in exercises, drills, 
and training, and correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified in 
a critique. The term ``performance opportunity'' is used to indicate 
actual experiential events where proficiency in key skills is 
demonstrated. Classroom training may not provide an actual performance 
enhancing experience but rather offer instruction, while tabletop 
drills and operator requalification drills may offer actual performance 
opportunities.
    The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.h in the final rule to correct 
the reference to the section of Part 50 that pertains to situations in 
which State and local governments refuse to participate in emergency 
planning activities. The reference was changed to Sec.  50.47(c)(1).
    The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.i to Appendix E to require all 
nuclear power reactor licensees to include hostile action in biennial 
evaluated exercises. The final rule also ensures that scenarios will be 
sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of 
radiological releases and events, to properly train responders to 
respond to events more realistic than those currently used in training, 
and to avoid preconditioning the responders to success with 
inappropriate anticipatory responses. Licensees are also required to 
emphasize coordination in their drills and exercises among onsite and 
offsite response organizations to strengthen the capabilities of the 
OROs to adequately respond to an emergency at the plant that requires 
offsite response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.6 of this document.)
    The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.j to Appendix E to require 
that nuclear power reactor licensees conduct exercises that provide ERO 
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills 
necessary to implement the principal emergency response

[[Page 72590]]

functional areas identified in Section IV.F.2.b. Each exercise will 
also be required to provide ERO members the opportunity to demonstrate 
key skills specific to the emergency response duties in each emergency 
response facility. During each exercise cycle, licensees will be 
required to vary the content of exercise scenarios to provide ERO 
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills 
necessary to respond to several specific scenario elements, including 
hostile action directed at the plant site; no radiological release or 
an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public 
protective actions; an initial classification of or rapid escalation to 
a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency; implementation of 
strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.  
50.54(hh)(2); and integration of offsite resources with onsite 
response. The final rule identifies the exercise cycle as eight 
calendar years, which must begin in the year of the licensee's first 
hostile action exercise. This amendment prescribes the minimum exercise 
scenario elements necessary for licensees to meet NRC expectations for 
challenging and varied scenario content in biennial exercises.
    The NRC received comments regarding the proposed requirement that 
the first exercise in the new cycle must include hostile action. In 
States with multiple nuclear power reactor sites, this would require 
several such exercises in succession, increasing the burden on State 
emergency management agencies to support these exercises and perhaps 
reducing the benefit of preparedness efforts. The implementation period 
for this provision of the final rule was modified to allow current 
licensees until December 31, 2015, to conduct a hostile action 
exercise. The final rule clarifies the expectation that States should 
fully participate in a hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015, 
and that State full participation should be rotated among licensees in 
States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway 
EPZ.
    The NRC believes that, in the current threat environment, nuclear 
power reactors may be a target for hostile action. Although such an 
attack is unlikely, EP is a defense-in-depth measure and NRC rules 
require preparedness for unlikely accidents and events. The final rule 
requires that hostile action response be integrated formally into the 
EP program through the inspection of biennial exercises performed early 
in the first exercise cycle and periodically thereafter.
    The proposed rule would have identified the exercise cycle as six 
years. The proposed rule additionally would have specified a minimum 
frequency for hostile action scenarios. However, the NRC received 
numerous comments that the cycle should be changed to eight years and 
that a minimum frequency for hostile action scenarios should be 
eliminated to allow more flexibility in meeting the new requirements as 
well as preserving the variability of scenario challenges. 
Additionally, the commenters stated that the new requirements for 
scenario content coupled with the existing requirements would degrade 
the ability to vary scenario content. The NRC agrees with these 
comments and has changed the proposed rule to establish an eight-year 
exercise cycle without a minimum frequency for hostile action 
scenarios. This change enhances the ability of licensees to vary 
exercise scenario content in line with the numerous comments received 
on this issue.
    Section IV.F.2.j in the final rule requires that nuclear power 
reactor licensees maintain a record of exercises that documents the 
contents of scenario elements used for each exercise during an exercise 
cycle to comply with the requirements of paragraph F.2.j. The 
documentation should include, but not be limited to, the following 
items for each scenario: sequence and timeline of events; extent of ERO 
participation and objectives to be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO 
demonstration of classification, notification, and development of 
protective action recommendations; expected radiological release 
conditions and demonstration of dose assessment, including dose 
projection results; and expected onsite/offsite radiological survey 
activities and results.
    In the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec.  50.54(hh) 
in the scenario elements for the exercise cycle. The NRC received one 
comment that suggested that the NRC delete the reference to Sec.  
50.54(hh) in Section IV.F.2.j and that hostile action drills be 
evaluated and incorporated into the NRC's triennial FOF drills. The NRC 
does not agree with this comment. The NRC added the use of mitigation 
equipment and procedures required by Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) and response to 
hostile action in the final rule because they are important elements of 
nuclear plant defense-in-depth. Including the use of Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) 
equipment in FOF drills would be inappropriate because the ERO, not 
security responders, would use the equipment. Additionally, the NRC has 
previously determined that combining EP and FOF drills would be 
extremely complicated due to differences in scope of the two evolutions 
and the introduction of safeguards information issues. Further, the 
exercises are easily separated and performance addressed individually 
because the response is essentially serial. The aftermath of a security 
response can be simulated effectively in EP exercises. This has been 
demonstrated during the hostile action drill pilot program.
    The NRC received a comment that proposed Section IV.F.2.j could be 
interpreted as requiring an aircraft response in every hostile action 
exercise because proposed Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec.  50.54(hh). 
Section 50.54(hh)(1) requires certain actions to be taken in response 
to an aircraft threat. Section 50.54(hh)(2) requires the development of 
strategies, procedures, and guidance for response to loss of large 
areas of the plant due to fire or explosion. The NRC intended to 
require the demonstration of strategies, procedures, and guidance 
developed under Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) as these elements could be used in 
response to many accident scenarios, as well as in the aftermath of 
hostile action, increasing the variability of scenarios. Implementation 
guidance accompanying this final rule recommends that licensees 
demonstrate their response to an aircraft threat under Sec.  
50.54(hh)(1) during an exercise cycle, but not necessarily during a 
biennial exercise. Section IV.F.2.j was clarified to require 
demonstration of Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) capabilities in a biennial exercise 
during each exercise cycle.
    The NRC is adding new Section IV.I to Appendix E that requires 
nuclear power reactor licensees to provide an expanded range of 
protective measures for onsite personnel that are appropriate for 
protection against hostile action. These measures will be site-specific 
and consider issues such as the location of workers in relation to 
potential targets, which will dictate if sheltering and/or evacuation 
are appropriate to adequately protect the workers. Also, these measures 
are prudent to protect personnel necessary to safely shut down the 
reactor and emergency responders who are necessary to implement the 
licensee's emergency plan. By specifying these measures for personnel 
designated to carry out site emergency actions, other onsite workers 
will also be protected because the onsite protective measures that were 
deemed appropriate to protect against hostile action would be provided 
via plant page announcements or at the direction of site security 
personnel to the site as a whole and would not be directed to any

[[Page 72591]]

particular group of workers. The new requirement does not direct any 
specific actions, but will allow licensees flexibility to determine the 
most effective protective measures for onsite personnel protection on a 
site-specific basis. It also will allow licensees to take advantage of 
new technologies or other innovations that can further enhance the 
protection of workers. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.5 of this document.)

V. Implementation

    This final rule becomes effective December 23, 2011. Licensees will 
be permitted to defer implementation of the final rule until June 20, 
2012, except for the following rule changes:
    (1) The new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q) (amended emergency 
plan change process). Submittal of proposed emergency plan changes for 
prior NRC approval made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the 
new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q)(4). Submittal of emergency plan 
change documentation made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the 
new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q)(5). The implementation period for 
these requirements was revised from 30 days after publication of the 
final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 90 days 
after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register based on 
comments that 30 days after publication may not be sufficient time for 
licensees to update their site programs and procedures to address the 
amended emergency plan change process requirements. The NRC believes 
that a 90-day time frame after publication is reasonable for this 
activity, and the final rule reflects this adjustment to the 
implementation schedule;
    (2) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1-7 
(evacuation time estimate updates), which each applicable licensee is 
required to implement within 365 days of the later of the date of 
availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau or December 23, 2011;
    (3) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7 
(licensee coordination with OROs), which each applicable licensee is 
required to implement no later than June 23, 2014. The implementation 
period for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication 
of the final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 30 
months after the effective date of the final rule based on comments 
that 180 days may not be sufficient time to obtain new or update 
existing arrangements involving offsite resources that support onsite 
and offsite response activities. The NRC believes that a 30-month time 
frame is more reasonable for this activity, and the final rule reflects 
this adjustment to the implementation schedule;
    (4) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9 
(on-shift staffing analysis), which each applicable licensee must 
implement no later than December 24, 2012. The implementation period 
for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication of the 
final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 365 days 
after the effective date of the final rule based on comments that 180 
days may not be sufficient time to perform the on-shift staffing 
analysis. However, licensees are expected to take interim compensatory 
measures to address any staffing shortfalls identified in the staffing 
analysis within 30 days of when the results of the staffing analysis 
are available, and then implement long-term corrective actions within 
24 months of performing the staffing analysis;
    (5) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 
(backup means for alert and notification systems). Where FEMA has 
approved a nuclear power reactor site ANS design report including the 
backup ANS capability, this rule provision must be implemented by 
December 24, 2012. Where the ANS design report does not include backup 
ANS means or is in need of revision to ensure adequate backup ANS 
capability, a revision of the ANS design report must be submitted to 
FEMA for review by June 24, 2013 and the FEMA-approved backup ANS means 
must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. However, the 
total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup ANS means shall 
not exceed June 22, 2015;
    (6) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.E.8.d (emergency response organization augmentation at alternative 
facility), which each applicable licensee is required to implement no 
later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for 
staging emergency response organization personnel at an alternative 
facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the 
EOF, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no 
later than June 20, 2012; and
    (7) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2 
(challenging drills and exercises). Each applicable licensee is 
required to conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no 
later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a 
site will begin in the calendar year of the first hostile action 
exercise. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year 
exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise 
required by Section IV.F.2.a. All of the new requirements in Section 
IV.F.2 that must be completed in an exercise cycle must be implemented 
no later than the first eight-year exercise cycle for each site. The 
remaining new requirements in Section IV.F.2 are effective on December 
23, 2011.
    Certain applicants for an early site permit under Part 52, or a 
combined license under Part 52, can defer compliance with this final 
rule. Such an applicant can defer compliance if its application 
complies with all applicable, current (prior to this rulemaking) EP 
regulations, and the applicant, if it becomes an early site permit 
holder or a combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit 
or combined license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the 
amended EP regulations in this final rule. The applicant, if it becomes 
a combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has 
approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule. 
If the applicant does not receive a combined license or early site 
permit before December 31, 2013, the applicant shall revise its 
combined license or early site permit application to comply with those 
changes no later than December 31, 2013.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC also requested input on the 
implementation schedule for each element of the proposed rule for 
current licensees. The NRC received a number of comments on the 
appropriateness of the proposed implementation schedule, including 
whether arbitrary implementation deadlines were needed or if schedules 
should be site-specific to allow licensees to budget resources and 
properly coordinate EP program changes with OROs. The NRC believes that 
a single fixed implementation schedule is warranted to avoid wide 
variations among licensees in implementing the new requirements, to 
ensure that new requirements with long lead times, such as those 
involving biennial exercises, are addressed in a timely manner, and to 
avoid potential problems for offsite agencies that support multiple 
sites.

VI. Guidance

    The NRC revised existing guidance and provided new guidance for the 
new requirements in this final rule. This guidance is intended to 
provide an acceptable method of how licensees and applicants can meet 
the requirements of the final rule. The NRC will publish

[[Page 72592]]

Federal Register notices announcing the availability of the revised and 
new guidance documents. The documents will be available at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122.

VII. Criminal Penalties

    Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), 
provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted 
violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under 
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. For the purposes of Section 
223 of the AEA, the Commission is amending 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 and 
Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 161b, 161i, and 161o of the AEA.

VIII. Agreement State Compatibility

    Under the Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement States Programs, approved by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 
and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), 
this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility is not 
required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program elements in 
this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation 
reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of this chapter. 
Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements reserved to 
the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain requirements by 
a mechanism that is consistent with the particular State's 
administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do not 
confer regulatory authority on the State.

IX. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to 
interested persons through one or more of the methods provided in the 
ADDRESSES section of this document, as indicated.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    NRC library
                           Document                                   PDR              Web            (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards and                      X   ...............     ML020510635
 Security Compensatory Measures,'' issued February 25, 2002...
SRM-M041214B- ``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program                   X   ...............     ML043550354
 Initiatives, 1 p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004,
 Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North,
 Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
 December 20, 2004............................................
Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency Preparedness and                    X   ...............     ML051990027
 Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated July 18,
 2005.........................................................
SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency                           X   ...............     ML061910707
 Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20,
 2006.........................................................
SRM to SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency                    X   ...............     ML070080411
 Preparedness Regulations and Guidance'' dated January 8, 2007
Memorandum to the Commission, ``Rulemaking Plan for                          X   ...............     ML070440148
 Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
 Guidance,'' dated April 17, 2007.............................
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of                     X   ...............     ML061810014
 Emergency Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1
 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room,
 One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to public
 attendance)'' dated June 29, 2006............................
``Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Emergency                      X                X      ML080940227
 Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,'' dated April
 3, 2008......................................................
Draft Preliminary Rule Language, Emergency Preparedness                      X                X      ML080370069
 Rulemaking, February, 2008...................................
``Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Comments on                     X                X      ML082180005
 Emergency Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,''
 dated August 6, 2008.........................................
Order EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' issued                      X   ...............     ML030060360
 January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13, 2003)...............
Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and                           X   ...............     ML030910625
 Qualification Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April
 29, 2003 (68 FR 24514; May 7, 2003)..........................
Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' issued               X   ...............     ML030740002
 April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003)....................
Federal Register Notice--Final Rule to Amend 10 CFR 73.1:                    X   ...............     ML070520692
 Design Basis Threat (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007)............
Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at Nuclear                   X   ...............    Non-Publicly
 Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991......................                                         Available
IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise On-                      X   ...............     ML031070314
 Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993..............................
IN 95-48, ``Results of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October                 X   ...............     ML031060170
 10, 1995.....................................................
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and                        X   ...............     ML040420012
 Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
 Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
 November 1980................................................
NUREG-0849, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review and                        X   ...............     ML062190191
 Evaluation of Emergency Plans for Research and Test
 Reactors,'' dated October 1983...............................
NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, ``Methodology for Development of                X   ...............     ML041120174
 Emergency Action Levels,'' dated January 1992................
NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for Development of                      X   ...............     ML073330643
 Emergency Action Level,'' dated September 2007...............
Regulatory Guide 2.6, ``Emergency Planning for Research and                  X   ...............     ML003740234
 Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983............................
Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear                   X   ...............     ML072670421
 Energy Institute Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency
 Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,' '' dated July 19,
 2006.........................................................
Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness                   X   ...............    Non-Publicly
 Issues: Post-9/11,'' dated October 18, 2004..................                                         Available

[[Page 72593]]

 
NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency                     X   ...............     ML073100460
 Response Drill,'' Rev. 1, dated October 30, 2007.............
RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear Energy                   X   ...............     ML080110116
 Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a Hostile
 Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19,
 2008.........................................................
IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to Licensees' Ability to Provide                    X   ...............     ML022380474
 Prompt Public Notification and Information During an
 Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 2002........
IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification                     X   ...............     ML050680335
 System Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005...
IN 2006-28, ``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren                   X   ...............     ML062790341
 System Signal,'' dated December 22, 2006.....................
IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When                  X   ...............     ML031060187
 Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated April 2,
 1996.........................................................
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station Blackout,'' issued                    X   ...............     ML003740034
 August 1988..................................................
FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and            ...............    www.fema.gov   ..............
 Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
 November 1985................................................
IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class,                        X   ...............     ML031180307
 Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency
 Notifications,'' dated October 15, 1985......................
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-2, ``Emergency                       X   ...............     ML023040462
 Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification
 of Emergency Conditions,'' dated August 1, 1995..............
NUREG/CR-6953 Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3,                   X   ...............     ML080360602
 Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe
 Accidents,'' dated December 2007.............................
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for                X   ...............     ML050250240
 Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005...................
NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors                      X   ...............     ML050250245
 Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' dated January 2005........
NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time                 X   ...............     ML113010515
 Estimate Studies,'' dated November 2011......................
EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure                         X   ...............     ML023040483
 Changes,'' dated November 19, 1998...........................
Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) 4,                     X   ...............     ML050800537
 ``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' dated
 November 19, 1998............................................
RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the Process for Making Emergency                   X   ...............     ML042580404
 Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005......................
``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items,'' dated August 11,                 X   ...............     ML052000263
 2005.........................................................
Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and September 1, 2005 Portion                X   ...............     ML052620366
 of the Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting.................
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31               X   ...............     ML060450376
 and October 31, 2005),'' dated February 28, 2006.............
``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments (Received                   X   ...............     ML060860401
 Between August 31 and October 31, 2005),'' dated March 31,
 2006.........................................................
Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow Up Discussions of       ...............  ...............     ML061590186
 Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness
 Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,
 held May 19, 2006............................................
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response                     X   ...............     ML051390358
 Facilities,'' dated February 1981............................
SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear Operating Company's                  X   ...............     ML050550131
 Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating Facility
 at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005.....
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,''               X   ...............     ML051390367
 Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response
 Capabilities,'' dated January 1983...........................
NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator                     X   ...............     ML092931123
 Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009......................
Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute on EP draft                   X                X      ML081690809
 preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for comments:
 NEI1-X)......................................................
Comments submitted by Union of Concerned Scientists on EP                    X                X      ML081840067
 draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for
 comments: NGO1-X)............................................
Comments submitted by PA Bureau of Radiation Protection on EP                X                X      ML081690778
 draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for
 comments: SPA1-X)............................................
EP final rule Regulatory Analysis and Backfit Analysis........               X                X      ML112971541
EP final rule Environmental Assessment........................               X                X      ML102150163
EP Paperwork Burden Analysis..................................               X                X      ML112971537
NRC comment responses for EP draft preliminary rule language..               X                X      ML091180198
Summary and Analysis of Public Comments on Proposed Rule                     X                X      ML112971546
 Language.....................................................
Summary of September 17, 2009, Meeting to Discuss the Proposed               X                X      ML092881256
 Rule on Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations
 and Related Guidance Documents (October 16, 2009)............
SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation of Construction                 X                X      ML072060688
 and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit
 2,'' dated July 25, 2007.....................................
SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to                     X                X      ML082890481
 Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),'' dated
 January 9, 2009..............................................
SRM to SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements                 X   ...............     ML091060206
 to Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),''
 dated April 16, 2009.........................................

[[Page 72594]]

 
SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed                  X   ...............     ML100130067
 Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,
 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, December 8, 2009, Commissioners'
 Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland
 (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January 13, 2010........
Information from November 15, 2010 Public Meeting to Discuss                 X                X      ML102770561
 the Proposed Implementation Dates of the Emergency
 Preparedness Final Rule......................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical 
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with 
applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any 
voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed 
Government-unique standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary 
consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified.

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment 
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
    The NRC requested public comments on any environmental justice 
considerations that may be related to this rule and no comments were 
received. The NRC also requested the views of the States on the 
environmental assessment for this rule and no comments were received.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule contains new or amended information collection 
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Approval Number 3150-0011.
    The burden to the public for these information collections is 
estimated to average 123 hours per response, including the time for 
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
information collection. Send comments on any aspect of these 
information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, 
to the Information Services Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail 
to [email protected]; and to the Desk Officer, Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office of 
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability

    The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this 
regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives considered by the Commission. Availability of the 
regulatory analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document.

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 
Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule 
affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The 
companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the 
definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 
2.810).

XV. Backfit Analysis

    As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a 
backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission finds that the 
backfits contained in the final rule, when considered in the aggregate, 
will constitute a substantial increase in EP and are justified in view 
of this increased protection of the public health and safety. 
Availability of the backfit analysis is indicated in Section IX of this 
document.

XVI. Congressional Review Act

    Under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, the NRC has determined 
that this action is not a major rule and has verified this 
determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of 
the OMB.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 52

    Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, 
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees, 
Inspection, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting 
criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Standard design, Standard design certification.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting 
the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50 and part 52.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

0
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 
68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 
234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 
2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 
206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 
5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 194 (2005). 
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 
185, 68 Stat. 955, as

[[Page 72595]]

amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 
853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).

    Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
    Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and 
Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 
(42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 
204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 
50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 
2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 
U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 
Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under 
sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).


0
2. In Sec.  50.47, revise paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10), and (d)(1) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  50.47  Emergency plans.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance 
resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local 
staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, 
and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have 
been identified.
* * * * *
    (10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume 
exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In 
developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to 
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic 
use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates 
have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update 
the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the 
choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with 
Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions 
for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have 
been developed.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite 
assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State 
and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have 
been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned 
onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *

0
3. In Sec.  50.54:
0
a. Revise paragraph (q), the introductory text of paragraph (gg)(1), 
and paragraphs (gg)(1)(i) and (gg)(2); and
0
b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), (s)(1), (s)(2)(i), and (u).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  50.54  Conditions of licenses.

* * * * *
    (q) Emergency plans.
    (1) Definitions for the purpose of this section:
    (i) Change means an action that results in modification or addition 
to, or removal from, the licensee's emergency plan. All such changes 
are subject to the provisions of this section except where the 
applicable regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a 
particular change.
    (ii) Emergency plan means the document(s), prepared and maintained 
by the licensee, that identify and describe the licensee's methods for 
maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies. An 
emergency plan includes the plan as originally approved by the NRC and 
all subsequent changes made by the licensee with, and without, prior 
NRC review and approval under paragraph (q) of this section.
    (iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource 
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, as 
set forth in the elements of section IV. of appendix E to this part 
and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b).
    (iv) Reduction in effectiveness means a change in an emergency plan 
that results in reducing the licensee's capability to perform an 
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.
    (2) A holder of a license under this part, or a combined license 
under part 52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding 
under Sec.  52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the 
effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in 
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the 
planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).
    (3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC 
approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis 
demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the 
plan and the plan, as changed, continues to meet the requirements in 
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the 
planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).
    (4) The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the 
effectiveness of the plan as defined in paragraph (q)(1)(iv) of this 
section may not be implemented without prior approval by the NRC. A 
licensee desiring to make such a change after February 21, 2012 shall 
submit an application for an amendment to its license. In addition to 
the filing requirements of Sec. Sec.  50.90 and 50.91, the request must 
include all emergency plan pages affected by that change and must be 
accompanied by a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason 
for the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's 
emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in 
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the 
planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).
    (5) The licensee shall retain a record of each change to the 
emergency plan made without prior NRC approval for a period of three 
years from the date of the change and shall submit, as specified in 
Sec.  50.4, a report of each such change made after February 21, 2012, 
including a summary of its analysis, within 30 days after the change is 
put in effect.
    (6) The nuclear power reactor licensee shall retain the emergency 
plan and each change for which prior NRC approval was obtained pursuant 
to paragraph (q)(4) of this section as a record until the Commission 
terminates the license for the nuclear power reactor.
    (r) [Reserved]
    (s)(1) [Reserved]
    (2)(i) [Reserved]
* * * * *
    (u) [Reserved]
* * * * *
    (gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 52.103, if, following the conduct of 
the exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a of appendix E to part 50 of 
this chapter, FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of 
offsite emergency preparedness, the holder of a combined license under 
10 CFR part 52 may operate at up to 5 percent of rated thermal power 
only if the Commission finds that the state of onsite emergency 
preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective 
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the 
applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in 
Sec.  50.47 and appendix E to this part. Review of the applicant's 
emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite 
aspects:
    (i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite 
assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and 
local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been 
made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the

[[Page 72596]]

planned onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *
    (2) The condition in this paragraph, regarding operation at up to 5 
percent power, ceases to apply 30 days after FEMA informs the NRC that 
the offsite deficiencies have been corrected, unless the NRC notifies 
the combined license holder before the expiration of the 30-day period 
that the Commission finds under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this 
section that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 
taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
* * * * *

0
4. In Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50:
0
a. Revise Section I;
0
b. In Section II, revise paragraph H; and
0
c. Revise Section IV.
    The revisions read as follows:

Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities

* * * * *

I. Introduction

    1. Each applicant for a construction permit is required by Sec.  
50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a 
discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each 
applicant for an operating license is required by Sec.  50.34(b) to 
include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with 
emergencies. Each applicant for a combined license under subpart C 
of part 52 of this chapter is required by Sec.  52.79 of this 
chapter to include in the application plans for coping with 
emergencies. Each applicant for an early site permit under subpart A 
of part 52 of this chapter may submit plans for coping with 
emergencies under Sec.  52.17 of this chapter.
    2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency 
plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency 
preparedness. These plans shall be described generally in the 
preliminary safety analysis report for a construction permit and 
submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an 
operating license. These plans, or major features thereof, may be 
submitted as part of the site safety analysis report for an early 
site permit.
    3. The potential radiological hazards to the public associated 
with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities 
licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve considerations 
different than those associated with nuclear power reactors. 
Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones\1\ (EPZs) for 
facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which 
compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II, 
III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 
520/1-78-016, ``Planning Basis for the Development of State and 
Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of 
Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' December 1978. The size of the 
EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to 
local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected 
by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, 
access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs 
also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled 
nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level 
less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ 
for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in 
radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 
50 miles (80 km) in radius.
    \2\ Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the 
acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in the case of an 
operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power 
operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no NRC or FEMA review, 
findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite 
emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and the capability to 
implement State and local offsite emergency plans, as defined in 
this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of such a license.
    5. Each applicant for a combined license or early site permit 
under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before 
December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with any change to emergency 
preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 23, 
2011. If that applicant chooses to defer compliance, it shall 
subsequently request to amend the combined license or early site 
permit to comply with those changes no later than December 31, 2013. 
An applicant that does not receive a combined license or early site 
permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined license 
or early site permit application to comply with those changes no 
later than December 31, 2013. Notwithstanding any Commission finding 
under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined license holder's 
facility, the combined license holder may not operate the facility 
until the NRC has approved the license amendment demonstrating 
compliance with the final rule.
    6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 
2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 50 of 
this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued 
November 23, 2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power reactor 
licensees.

II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

* * * * *
    H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include 
facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of 
seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of 
emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including 
capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological 
information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within 
the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the 
onsite technical support center and the emergency operations 
facility in assessing information, recommending protective action, 
and disseminating information to the public.
* * * * *

IV. Content of Emergency Plans

    1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not 
necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate 
compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for 
coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation 
of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency 
facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency 
preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile 
action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an 
applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this 
part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined 
license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to 
demonstrate compliance with the standards described in Sec.  
50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.
    2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also 
provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors 
and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient 
and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau 
data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the 
NRC.
    3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved 
evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the 
formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide 
the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities 
for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
    4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability 
of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop 
an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under Sec.  
50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to 
the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action 
recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental 
authorities for use in developing offsite protective action 
strategies.
    5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power 
reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population 
changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the 
previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual 
resident population estimate and State/local government population 
data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates 
so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period 
between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the 
NRC with any updated ETE analysis.
    6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent 
resident population increases such that it causes the

[[Page 72597]]

longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all 
affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-
mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, 
from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or 
updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect 
the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit 
the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under Sec.  50.4 no later than 
365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for 
updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it 
to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State 
and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite 
protective action strategies.
    7. After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of 
this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at 
least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at 
least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall 
estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most 
recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and 
State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ 
permanent resident population increases such that it causes the 
longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all 
affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-
mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is 
less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall 
update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population 
increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the 
NRC for review under Sec.  50.4 of this chapter no later than 365 
days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.

A. Organization

    The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall 
be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, 
and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency 
organization and the means for notification of such individuals in 
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be 
included:
    1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.
    2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization 
(ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
    a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the 
individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;
    b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
    c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite 
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of 
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating 
and implementing offsite emergency measures.
    3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of 
the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant 
site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
    4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of 
persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for 
making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these 
projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and 
local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.
    5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of 
other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for 
coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with 
special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees 
of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for 
emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of 
these persons shall be described.
    6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in 
support of the licensee's emergency organization.
    7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the 
assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal 
agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, 
including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, 
``hostile action'' is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear 
power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force 
to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee 
to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using 
guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to 
deliver destructive force.
    8. Identification of the State and/or local officials 
responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate 
protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.
    9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a 
detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned 
emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned 
responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their 
assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.

B. Assessment Actions

    1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and 
for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive 
materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that 
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification 
and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and 
other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to 
be used for determining when and what type of protective measures 
should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect 
health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-
plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and 
offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 
licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may 
adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency 
action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or 
licensee and state and local governmental authorities, and approved 
by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed 
with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual 
basis.
    2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action 
level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its 
license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change. 
Licensees shall follow the change process in Sec.  50.54(q) for all 
other emergency action level changes.

C. Activation of Emergency Organization

    1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the 
alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total 
emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps 
to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each 
class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels 
(based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring 
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that 
indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment 
and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for 
notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, 
but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be 
noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall 
include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site 
area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further 
discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.
    2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall 
establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and 
declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the 
availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency 
action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the 
emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of 
the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not 
construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore 
plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an 
emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not 
construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response 
actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public 
health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not 
deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement 
measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

D. Notification Procedures

    1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, 
and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these 
officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and 
for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they 
become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include 
identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of 
the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.
    2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the 
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency 
planning information, such as the methods and times required for 
public notification and the protective actions planned if an 
accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of 
radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be 
used for dissemination of information during an

[[Page 72598]]

emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate 
to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ 
appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.
    3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible 
State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after 
declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the 
appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a 
public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed 
by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial 
operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first 
reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall 
demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been 
established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the 
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective 
of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have 
the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and 
initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and 
notification capability will range from immediate alerting and 
notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State 
and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring 
urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial 
time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make 
a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and 
notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall 
additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup 
method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in 
the event the primary method of alerting and notification is 
unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions 
of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method 
shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the 
plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute 
design objective for the primary prompt public alert and 
notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert 
and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities 
will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification 
system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The 
responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification 
system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.
    4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and 
notification design report, including the backup alert and 
notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup 
alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 
must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and 
notification design report does not include a backup alert and 
notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup 
alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and 
notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by 
June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification 
means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. 
However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup 
alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.

E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment

    Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency 
facilities and equipment, including:
    1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
    2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for 
continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive 
materials to the environment;
    3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of 
onsite individuals;
    4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate 
emergency first aid treatment;
    5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to 
handle radiological emergencies onsite;
    6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured 
individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment 
facilities outside the site boundary;
    7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support 
of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside 
the site boundary;
    8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an 
emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be 
given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;
    (ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite 
operational support center;
    b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations 
facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a 
facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power 
reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles 
from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located 
between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). 
An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear 
power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency 
operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor 
site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an 
application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency 
operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power 
reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite 
responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and 
offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response 
personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. 
Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a 
nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the 
emergency operations facility must include the following:
    (1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, 
and local responders;
    (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency 
response personnel;
    (3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency 
response facilities;
    (4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and
    (5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies;
    c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's 
emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this 
section, a facility having the following capabilities:
    (1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and 
radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor 
site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility 
serves;
    (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and 
provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to 
licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a 
nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site 
that the facility serves; and
    (3) The capability to support response to events occurring 
simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the 
emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and
    d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility 
(or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under 
threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging 
area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively 
having the following characteristics: the capability for 
communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, 
and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; 
and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including 
damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite 
emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile 
action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented 
no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the 
capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at 
the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for 
communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, 
and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20, 
2012.
    e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of 
paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations 
facility approved as of December 23, 2011;
    9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; 
each system shall have a backup power source. All communication 
plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and 
alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication 
links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where 
consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these 
arrangements will include:
    a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local 
governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such 
communications shall be tested monthly.
    b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response 
organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
    c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor 
control room, the

[[Page 72599]]

onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations 
facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and 
local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams. 
Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
    d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC 
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations 
Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite 
technical support center, and the emergency operations facility. 
Such communications shall be tested monthly.

F. Training

    1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and 
exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that 
employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency 
response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and 
drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event 
of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a 
description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining 
programs to be provided to each of the following categories of 
emergency personnel:
    i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency 
organization;
    ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including 
control room shift personnel;
    iii Radiological monitoring teams;
    iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
    v. Repair and damage control teams;
    vi. First aid and rescue teams;
    vii. Medical support personnel;
    viii. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;
    ix. Security personnel.
    In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall 
be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency 
services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news 
media persons.
    2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of 
emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test 
the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and 
methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test 
the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency 
organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable 
for any exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. A full participation \4\ exercise which tests as much of the 
licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably 
achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted 
for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power 
reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec.  50.4 
at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise 
required by this paragraph 2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency 
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate 
offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel 
physically and actively take part in testing their integrated 
capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a 
commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing 
major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans 
and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other 
resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond 
to the accident scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) For an operating license issued under this part, this 
exercise must be conducted within two years before the issuance of 
the first operating license for full power (one authorizing 
operation above 5 percent of rated power) of the first reactor and 
shall include participation by each State and local government 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state within the 
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise 
is conducted more than 1 year prior to issuance of an operating 
licensee for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's 
onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before 
issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise need 
not have State or local government participation.
    (ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this 
chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the 
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full 
participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the 
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests 
the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one 
year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This 
exercise need not have State or local government participation. If 
FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite 
emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation 
exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency 
preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency, the provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply.
    (iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this 
chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the 
site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,\5\ shall be 
conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This 
exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of 
Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one 
or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness 
as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the 
Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not 
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can 
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the 
provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Partial participation when used in conjunction with 
emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means 
appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the 
exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e., 
(a) protective action decision making related to emergency action 
levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and 
local authorities and the licensee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent 
exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power 
reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec.  50.4 
at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this 
paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full 
participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this 
section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to 
ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained 
during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, 
including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the 
principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency 
response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency 
response include activities such as management and coordination of 
emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, 
notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and 
offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action 
recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant 
system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these 
drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response 
facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support 
Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not 
be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider 
accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be 
permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would 
have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than 
have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite 
exercise training objectives.
    c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially 
with full participation by each offsite authority having a role 
under the radiological response plan. Where the offsite authority 
has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one 
site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years and 
shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan 
exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have 
licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent, 
contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located 
licensees,\6\ then each licensee shall:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose 
licensed facilities are located either on the same site or on 
adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following 
emergency planning and siting elements:
    a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones;
    b. Offsite governmental authorities;
    c. Offsite emergency response organizations;
    d. Public notification system; and/or
    e. Emergency facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan;
    (2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or 
partial participation exercise;
    (3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions 
in the years between its participation in the offsite full or 
partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and 
maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities 
and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in 
emergency preparedness

[[Page 72600]]

activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period 
between exercises;
    (4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency 
plan in each exercise cycle; and
    (5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial 
participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise 
cycles.
    d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor 
emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion 
pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In 
States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure 
pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to 
site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor 
emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action 
exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in 
one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more 
than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should 
rotate this participation from site to site.
    e. Licensees shall enable any State or local government located 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the 
licensee's drills when requested by such State or local government.
    f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is 
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that 
NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance 
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event 
of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency 
Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to 
emergency response. The extent of State and local participation in 
remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate 
corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the 
plan not properly tested in the previous exercises.
    g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance 
opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must 
provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient 
areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are 
identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be 
corrected.
    h. The participation of State and local governments in an 
emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant 
has identified those governments as refusing to participate further 
in emergency planning activities, pursuant to Sec.  50.47(c)(1). In 
such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee 
and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the 
emergency planning process.
    i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide 
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result 
from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear 
power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological 
releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill 
scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite 
and offsite response organizations.
    j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by 
nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the 
ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to 
implement the principal functional areas of emergency response 
identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must 
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills 
specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, 
EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight 
calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall 
vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under 
paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO 
to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to 
the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the 
plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal 
radiological release that does not require public protective 
actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site 
Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, 
procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.  50.54(hh)(2), and 
integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee 
shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight 
year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to 
comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall 
conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later 
than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a 
site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile 
action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the 
first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the 
initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.

G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

    Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its 
implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are 
maintained up to date shall be described.

H. Recovery

    Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, 
reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could 
be resumed shall be described.

I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action

    By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range 
of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile 
action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the 
licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions 
of the licensee's emergency plan.

PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS

0
5. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 
936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 
201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005), 
secs. 147 and 149 of the Atomic Energy Act.


0
6. In Sec.  52.79, paragraph (a)(17) is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  52.79  Contents of applications; technical information in final 
safety analysis report.

    (a) * * *
    (17) The information with respect to compliance with technically 
relevant positions of the Three Mile Island requirements in Sec.  
50.34(f) of this chapter, with the exception of Sec.  50.34(f)(1)(xii), 
(f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), and (f)(3)(v);
* * * * *

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of November 2011.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-29735 Filed 11-22-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P