[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 23, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 72560-72600]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-29735]
[[Page 72559]]
Vol. 76
Wednesday,
No. 226
November 23, 2011
Part III
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 226 / Wednesday, November 23, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 72560]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
[NRC-2008-0122]
RIN 3150-AI10
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is amending certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in its
regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and
utilization facilities. The final rule adds a conforming provision in
the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for
new nuclear power plants. The final rule codifies certain voluntary
protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' and
generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed
by Commission orders. In addition, the final rule amends other licensee
emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive review of the
NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The requirements enhance the ability
of licensees in preparing to take and taking certain EP and protective
measures in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part,
security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11,
2001; clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan
implementation among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to
be more effective and efficient.
DATES: This final rule is effective on December 23, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine
and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's
PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC
are available online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If
you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing
the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff
at 1-(800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by email to
[email protected].
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and
supporting materials related to this final rule can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: (301) 492-
3668; email: [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: (301) 415-3874, email: [email protected]; or
Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone:
(301) 415-2966, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Implementation
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XV. Backfit Analysis
XVI. Congressional Review Act
I. Background
After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP
programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued
adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications
were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026),
dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license
holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the U.S. This
order required licensees to implement interim compensatory measures
(ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and take
actions such as:
(1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility
between the plans;
(2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response
facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations
facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting
emergency response;
(3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification
(including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees),
activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response
organizations (OROs);
(4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties
are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency
response; and
(5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to
provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.
Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted
inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear
power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and
the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.
Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the
changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear
Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis Adequacy in the
Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22, 2003 (not
publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission that the
EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing issues.
However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events differ from
accident events due to the planned action to maximize damage and loss
of life and that the EP response to such events also differed. The NRC
staff noted several EP issues that required further action to better
respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.
On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP
program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the
Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP
regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the
Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B,
``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m.,
Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White
Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
December
[[Page 72561]]
20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a schedule of
activities for the completion of the comprehensive review. The NRC
staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of Emergency
Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/11
Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available),
requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for
enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11,
2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005
(not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide
the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance.
The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to
proceed with enhancements to address EP issues as described in SECY-05-
0010. As a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02),
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that
licensees could integrate into EP programs at power reactors. Bulletin
BL-05-02 also sought to obtain information from licensees on their
actions taken to implement Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP
programs to adjust to the current threat environment. Based on the
results of the post-BL-05-02 inspections, meetings with members of the
nuclear power industry, and licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC
determined that licensees were implementing strategies to satisfy Order
EA-02-026 and enhance their programs to address the changed threat
environment.
As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff
conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure,
including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of
this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders
through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the
elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and
guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public
and other stakeholder meetings.
On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its
review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20,
2006. In that paper, the NRC staff discussed the activities it had
conducted to complete the review and provided its recommendation to
pursue rulemaking for enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff
explained that the comprehensive review of the EP program identified
several areas where the implementation of EP regulations and guidance,
recent technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events,
drills, and exercises had revealed to the NRC areas for potential
improvement and increased clarity for the EP program. The staff divided
the potential enhancements into two categories: security-based EP
issues and other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and
assigned it a priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of
the issue's relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC
strategic goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.
The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and
analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority,
including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In
SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential
enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these
issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and
resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that
the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient
means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an
opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.
In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and
guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007,
the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission. During the
development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed the issues identified
in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of conducting rulemaking
and updating guidance on all issues. The staff determined that the best
course of action was to conduct rulemaking on the 12 issues identified
in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and to reassess the
remaining issues at a later date. The decision to conduct rulemaking on
the highest priority issues was made to allow a timelier rulemaking
effort to occur and enable the staff to more completely assess the
remaining lower priority issues.
Due to the similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking
plan as ``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,''
these issues have been partially combined in this final rule.
Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in SRM-M060502,
``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency Planning
Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006,
Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville,
Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006, to
coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop
emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills
and exercises will be challenging and will not precondition participant
responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue
regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it
was so closely related. Bulletin BL-05-02 provided a definition of
``hostile action'' for use in EP programs: ``An act toward an NPP
[nuclear power plant] or its personnel that includes the use of violent
force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the
licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water
using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to
deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent
may be included.''
In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that would be transparent and
open to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through
various means during the development of this rule. The NRC discussed
the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance at several
conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007 NRC
Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) and the 2008 National
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference. These meetings
are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.
The NRC posted draft rule language on the Federal rulemaking Web
site, http://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited
stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the
draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule. The
NRC continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open
communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March
5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC
staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking
on enhancements to EP regulations and guidance and answered
stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8, 2008,
meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft
preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders'
[[Page 72562]]
questions on how these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.
On January 9, 2009, the NRC staff provided the proposed rule to the
Commission in SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to
Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR [Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations] part 50).'' In its SRM to SECY-09-0007, dated
April 16, 2009, the Commission approved the publication of the proposed
rule. The NRC published the proposed rule on the enhancements to EP
regulations for public comment in the Federal Register on May 18, 2009
(74 FR 23254). Because it received several requests to lengthen the
public comment period, the NRC extended the deadline for the public
comment period from August 3, 2009, to October 19, 2009. During the
public comment period, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) jointly held 11 public meetings to discuss the proposed
rule and related guidance documents. The NRC received a total of 94
submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were
identified.
On December 8, 2009, NRC and FEMA staff briefed the Commission on
the status of the EP rulemaking and comments received during the public
comment period. In addition, a panel of external stakeholders briefed
the Commission on their comments and views regarding the proposed rule.
In SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed Rule:
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, 9:30 a.m., Tuesday,
December 8, 2009, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint
North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January
13, 2010, the Commission directed the NRC staff to continue working
with FEMA in considering comments from State and local officials, and
other interested stakeholders, to enhance the EP regulations and
guidance. The Commission also directed the NRC staff to address the
impacts of the rule and to consider providing a public draft of the
rule language and guidance documents via the NRC public Web site while
working with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the draft
final rule.
On November 15, 2010, the NRC and FEMA held a public meeting to
discuss the proposed implementation dates for the EP final rule. The
feedback from this meeting, as well as all the previous interactions,
informed the NRC's schedule for the implementation of the new EP
requirements.
II. Discussion
The final rule applies to 10 CFR part 50 licensees that are
currently subject to the EP requirements. The final rule similarly
applies to certain applicants for construction permits under Part 50
with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for coping with
emergencies (Sec. 50.34(a)(10)), operating licenses under Part 50
(Sec. 50.34(b)(6)(v)), early site permits under Part 52 that choose to
propose either major features of an, or a complete and integrated,
emergency plan (Sec. 52.17(b)(2)), and combined licenses under Part 52
(Sec. 52.79(a)(21)). A discussion of which applicants may defer
compliance with the requirements of this final rule is provided in
Section V of this document.
An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating
event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident.
Emergency preparedness cannot affect the probability of the initiating
event, but a high level of EP increases the probability of accident
mitigation if the initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial
operator actions. As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is
not normally quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the
level of EP could affect the outcome of an accident in that the
accident may be mitigated by the actions of the ERO or, in the worst
case, consequences to the public could be reduced through the effective
use of protective actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this
manner enhance protection of public health and safety through
improvements in the response to unlikely initiating events that could
lead to severe accidents without mitigative response.
The NRC's EP requirements are based on 16 planning standards in
Sec. 50.47(b) that apply to onsite and offsite emergency response
plans. The planning standards apply to onsite and offsite plans
because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC looks at the
application (or the licensee's activities in the case of existing
facilities), the current State and local government emergency plans,
and FEMA's recommendation, which is based on the content of the State
and local plans. The FEMA regulations in 44 CFR part 350 also contain
these planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on
the adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local
governments to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only
offsite (State and local government) plans. The changes to Sec.
50.47(b) in this final rule are designed to affect the onsite plans,
not the offsite plans. The changes have been written in a way that is
expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA regulations.
This final rule does not affect the findings necessary for issuance
of a renewed nuclear power operating license under 10 CFR part 54. As
the Commission explained in the license renewal final rule (56 FR
64943; December 13, 1991) and again in revisions to that final rule (60
FR 22461; May 8, 1995), the scope of license renewal is limited to
those issues that have a specific relevance to protecting the public
health and safety during the license renewal period (i.e., age-related
degradation). Issues relevant to current plant operations, like
emergency planning, fall within the purview of the current regulatory
process and continue into the extended operation period of a license
renewal. See also NUREG-1412, ``Foundation for the Adequacy of the
Licensing Bases,'' dated December 1991. The Commission has affirmed
repeatedly that ``emergency preparedness need not be reviewed again for
license renewal,'' 71 FR 74848, 74852; December 13, 2006 (referencing
56 FR at 64966). The Commission stated that ``[t]hrough its standards
and required exercises, the Commission ensures that existing plans are
adequate throughout the life of any plant even in the face of changing
demographics and other site-related factors.'' 71 FR at 74852 (quoting
56 FR at 64966). This basic determination is reflected in the NRC's
regulations at Sec. 50.47(a), in which a new finding on emergency
planning issues is not required for license renewal.
The discussion of the amendments in this final rule is divided into
two sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section
II.B for non-security related EP issues. The security-related issues
are topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in
Order EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related
issues are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive
review of EP regulations and guidance.
A. Security-Related EP Issues
The NRC is enhancing its EP regulations by incorporating changes
that clearly address EP actions for hostile action. Some of the changes
are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was issued to ensure
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense
and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026, however, the
Commission took several additional steps to ensure
[[Page 72563]]
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense
and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access
Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13,
2003); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification
Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24514;
May 7, 2003); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,''
issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003); the Design Basis
Threat (DBT) final rule (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007); and the Power
Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009).
As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission
has determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.
Therefore, the EP changes in this final rule that are based on the
requirements of Order EA-02-026 are not necessary to ensure adequate
protection during hostile action. These amendments are considered
enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, licensees'
implementation of these enhancements will result in a substantial
increase in EP and the protection of public health and safety.
1. On-Shift Staffing Analysis
The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned
to emergency plan implementation functions may have numerous tasks or
multiple responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of
their assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift
responsibilities are addressed in Sec. 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV.A. The former regulations did not specifically
require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan
implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from
performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC regulations and
guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some
flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to
emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate
completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event.
The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to
problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for
emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:
A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the
licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel
(communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and
perform numerous response actions required by the event resulted in a
heavy workload for the shift staff.
A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another
plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event,
notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating
procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff
contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of
Unusual Event.
The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise
On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective
implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering
expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a
shift technical advisor (STA) to provide engineering and accident
assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned additional
response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire brigade member,
which could have resulted in overburdening the control room staff
during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as fire
brigade leader, which could have hindered the STA from performing the
primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering
expertise.
After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated
that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued.
The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift
staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results
of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several
observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could
be a large workload for radiological support personnel during
emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant
staffing practices for performing response activities during two
accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with
complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation
and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included
the following:
Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for
establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.
Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant-
specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by
licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.
Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed
personnel to staff the fire brigade.
Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and
non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed
operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.
Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the
licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.
Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for
regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to
on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee
revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and
assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As
previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to
provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC
determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate
reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in
effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec. 50.54(q). In
April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the
assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech.) as the
interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented
ERO responder. The HP Tech. had assigned emergency plan tasks including
in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid.
The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate
assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and
assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency
plan in violation of Sec. 50.54(q).
These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to
explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these
emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency
event. Having additional duties beyond the assigned emergency plan
implementation functions could result in on-shift responders being
overburdened, resulting in inadequate or untimely response.
The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff
responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient
number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan
and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some
licensees were utilizing security
[[Page 72564]]
personnel to implement the emergency plan when many of these responders
would likely not be available due to a hostile action.
The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One
option was to take no action, but this alternative would not have
subjected new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's
requirement of an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated
security plan and emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the
shift staffing study referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees
surveyed did not use a systematic process for establishing shift
staffing levels and additional tasks, not required by regulation, were
assigned to the licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice, if
permitted to continue, could have resulted in operators being
overburdened during an emergency. A second option was to allow
licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift staffing.
However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to reduce on-
shift staffing levels and the NRC would have expected this practice to
continue. This could have increased the risk of over-burdening on-shift
responders and resulted in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore,
both of these options were considered unacceptable.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power
plant licensees to provide a detailed analysis to show that on-shift
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions were not
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing
their assigned emergency plan functions. The NRC received several
comments on this proposal, questioning the need for this regulation and
suggesting that the proposed rule methodology should be placed in a
regulatory guide, NUREG, or some other guidance document. The NRC
disagrees with these comments and believes that a regulation is
necessary to ensure consistent licensee implementation of on-shift
emergency response staffing that is enforceable and not merely
guidance. Therefore, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.A, to address this issue, as discussed in Section IV of this
document.
In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether
the NRC should enhance its regulations to be more explicit in the
number of ERO staff necessary for response to nuclear power plant
emergencies. Specifically, the NRC requested comments on a draft
staffing table that provided proposed staff functions and minimum
staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting ERO. The table was a
modification of the guidance found in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-
1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated November 1980, and incorporated lessons learned from years of NRC
EP experience. Of the comments the NRC received, some comments
supported and some opposed the inclusion of the table into regulations.
The NRC acknowledges that because each site is different and site
characteristics may dictate the size of the ERO staff, requiring
compliance with standard staffing requirements would be an unreasonable
approach to resolving this issue. For example, the NRC has approved
some emergency plans with additional ERO staff due to site-specific
circumstances, such as the lack of a local fire department or hospital.
Therefore, the NRC is not specifying a standard ERO staffing table in
its regulations.
In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether
the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to
perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can
perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a
timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could
prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC
received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this
requirement. The NRC agrees that this requirement is not necessary for
non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is
generally small, which is commensurate with the need to operate the
facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety.
The NRC reviews the staffing as part of initial reactor licensing. The
functions of emergency staff are outlined in emergency plans and are
tested through drills and exercises in accordance with NUREG-0849,
``Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated October 1983. Results are
reviewed by the NRC during routine inspections. Therefore, the NRC has
not included this requirement in the final rule.
2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action
Section 50.47(b)(4) stipulates that emergency plans must include a
standard emergency classification and EAL scheme. Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.B, specifies that emergency plans shall include EALs that
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification of
State and local agencies, and participation of those agencies in
emergency response. However, the former regulations did not require
EALs for hostile action and did not address the issue of anticipatory
response to hostile action. Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02
addressed these issues, those improvements to the EAL requirements to
address hostile action were only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC
could not ensure consistent and effective implementation of these
enhancements among existing and future licensees.
Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least a Notification
of Unusual Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In
2005, the NRC issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples
for hostile action up to the General Emergency level. Bulletin BL-05-02
provided examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be
implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654,
NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action
Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, ``Methodology for
Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also pointed out that
because of improvements in Federal agencies' information-sharing and
assessment capabilities, hostile action emergency declarations can be
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner, based on a credible threat,
than the current method of making declarations for accidental events.
This would enable earlier implementation of emergency response actions.
Although all nuclear power reactor licensees have implemented both
the credible threat EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL
enhancements specified in BL-05-02, licensees were not required to
maintain the enhancements identified in the bulletin. This could have
resulted in inconsistent EAL implementation among licensees for
response to hostile action. Also, future licensees would not have been
required to include these enhancements in their emergency plans. This
final rule establishes consistent EALs across the nuclear power
industry for hostile action. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided
enhancements to EAL schemes that would allow event declarations to be
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner. This timeliness is of the
utmost importance because EALs are used as criteria for determining the
need for notification and participation of State and local agencies.
The NRC is
[[Page 72565]]
codifying these enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile
action by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B, as discussed in
Section IV of this document.
The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these
issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by
licensees. These options were rejected since there would have continued
to be no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to
incorporate EALs for hostile action in their emergency plans, nor would
there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that the NRC had
determined to be adequate.
In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether
the NRC should expand to non-power reactor licensees the requirement
for power reactor licensees to have hostile action EALs. Appendix E to
10 CFR part 50 cites Regulatory Guide (RG) 2.6, ``Emergency Planning
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983, as the guidance for
the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency plans.
Regulatory Guide 2.6 endorses ANSI/ANS 15.16-1982, ``Emergency Planning
for Research Reactors,'' as an acceptable approach to non-power reactor
emergency plans. The newly updated ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008 includes hostile
action EALs. The NRC has commenced the process to update RG 2.6 to
endorse ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008. The NRC has also determined that further
analysis and stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the
requirements for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has
not included a requirement in the final rule for non-power reactor
licensees to have hostile action EALs.
3. Emergency Response Organization Augmentation and Alternative
Facilities
Section 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, require
licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff within a
short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to assist in
mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members typically staff
an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) that relieves the control room
(CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff to focus on
reactor safety. The ERO members also staff an onsite Operational
Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage repair
teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in close
proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation and
coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal point of
information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities involved
in the response.
Section 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, require
licensees to have adequate emergency facilities and equipment to
support emergency response. However, Sec. 50.47(b)(8) and the former
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, did not require licensees to
identify alternative facilities to support ERO augmentation during
hostile action. During hostile action, ERO members would likely not
have access to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if
it is located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless
these events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can
travel quickly to the site once access is allowed.
Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of
staffing plans at emergency response facilities during hostile action,
assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify alternative
facilities capable of supporting event response. These facilities would
function as staging areas for augmentation staff until the site was
secured, which would minimize delays in overall site response by
permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the danger of
hostile action. The NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of
the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the
identification and staffing of alternative emergency response
facilities.
Bulletin BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite
emergency response facilities support EP functions during hostile
action. It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner
that supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the
potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that
some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during
hostile action until the site was secured. However, the NRC considers
it prudent, for hostile action events outside of normal working hours,
to fully activate ERO members to promptly staff alternative facilities,
in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Bulletin BL-05-02
conveyed that, even during normal working hours, licensees should
consider deployment of onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility
near the site during hostile action.
To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory
action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as
a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue
Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute
Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile
Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action had been taken, there
would have continued to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding
the actions necessary during hostile action for the ERO to staff an
alternative facility. The ERO members would likely not have access to
the site during hostile action, but timely augmentation would still be
necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may have
resulted in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines,
and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using
a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those
developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, would not
provide a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed
enhancements for hostile action. The use of voluntary programs would
not have ensured long-term continuity of the enhancements for both
licensees and applicants. Thus, the NRC is codifying the ICM
requirement and the enhancement examples described in BL-05-02
concerning ERO augmentation to alternative facilities during hostile
action in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, to maximize the
effectiveness of the site response. These changes are discussed in
Section IV of this document.
4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During
Hostile Action
A unique challenge posed by hostile action at a nuclear power plant
is the increased demand on local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that
are expected to implement portions of ORO emergency plans, as well as
respond to the plant. The former Sec. 50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to
Part 50 did not explicitly require licensees to coordinate with OROs to
ensure that personnel are available to carry out preplanned actions,
such as traffic control and route alerting by LLEAs, during hostile
action directed at the plant.
Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency
response as well as demonstrate that various ORO capabilities exist
through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and OROs have
successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years. However,
the NRC recognized that hostile action may challenge OROs in ways
unforeseen at the time the current regulations were developed. For
example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned both
[[Page 72566]]
evacuation plan and armed response duties during hostile action. The
NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-026 and
included provisions that licensees address coordination with OROs for
hostile action. Specifically, the order required that licensees develop
plans, procedures, and training regarding coordination between the site
and OROs and directed licensees to review emergency plans to ensure
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available during hostile
action.
The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and
communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during
hostile action. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and OROs
through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,''
dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based
on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF)
exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills
conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005.
In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that
conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every
nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource
planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile
action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the
NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees
concerning effective coordination with OROs regarding the availability
of adequate resources to respond to hostile action at a nuclear power
plant.
Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to
respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the
licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered
encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program;
however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved
means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11,
2001, threat environment. A voluntary approach would not have ensured
consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM requirements and
there would have been no requirement for new licensees to incorporate
the changes into their emergency plans.
The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to
explicitly include hostile action at the site as one of the types of
emergencies that define the State, local, and Federal agencies that
licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the
assistance licensees expect from them. These changes are discussed in
Section IV of this document.
5. Protection for Onsite Personnel
The former Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 did not
require specific emergency plan provisions to protect onsite emergency
responders and other onsite personnel in emergencies resulting from
hostile action at nuclear power plants. Licensees are required to
provide radiological protection for emergency workers and the public in
the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), including
actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for evacuation and
accountability of individuals, and providing for protective clothing
and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these personnel are required by
the site emergency plan that the licensee must follow and maintain. The
emergency plan requires responders with specific assignments to be
available on-shift 24 hours a day to minimize the impact of
radiological emergencies and provide for the protection of public
health and safety. However, in analyses performed after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff determined that a lack of
protection for emergency responders who are expected to implement the
emergency plan could result in the loss of those responders and thus an
inability to effectively implement the emergency plan.
The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site
evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite
emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance
because these actions may place at risk the response personnel
necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action.
Bulletin BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those
normally prescribed may be more appropriate during hostile action,
particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as
evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and
accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise
actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the
location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures
would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely
and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.
The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue.
The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying
upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being
implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. Taking no action
could have resulted in the vulnerability of onsite personnel during
hostile action. Action is necessary to ensure effective coordination to
enable licensees to more effectively implement their pre-planned
actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved
means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the implementation
of voluntary actions would not have ensured that these measures would
be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.
The NRC is revising Appendix E by creating new Section IV.I, to
require licensees to protect onsite personnel during hostile action and
to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the
reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan, as
discussed in Section IV of this document.
6. Challenging Drills and Exercises
A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises
to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise
programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance
that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health
and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency.
Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance
of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear
plant site.
In the unlikely event that a licensee faces hostile action, the
response organization will encounter challenges that differ
significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise
programs because these programs have not included hostile action
scenarios. The former NRC regulations addressing this issue were
general in nature and did not explicitly require licensees to include
hostile action scenarios in drills and exercises, nor did they directly
allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC is amending
its regulations to do so.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed
threat environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains
valid. The NRC observed licensee performance during numerous
[[Page 72567]]
hostile action EP exercises and tabletop drills as well as several
security FOF exercises. The NRC also discussed security-based EP issues
with licensees and Federal, State, and local EP professionals and
advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to collect information from
licensees on the enhancements to drill and exercise programs to address
the hostile action contingency.
Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that, although EP measures
are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile
action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO
drills and exercises, such as:
Extensive coordination between operations, security, and
EP personnel;
Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for
activation of the ERO;
Execution of initial response actions in a hostile
environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);
The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or
aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during
radiological emergencies;
Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site
conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security
measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;
Conduct of operations and repair activities with large
areas of the plant damaged or on fire;
Rescue of, and medical attention to, significant numbers
of personnel; and
Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to
secure access to plant areas for repairs.
In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear power reactor licensees stated
that they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise
program. Program elements were captured in NEI 06-04, Rev. 1,
``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,'' a
guidance document developed by NEI. The NRC endorsed this document for
use in a pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to
Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a
Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19,
2008. However, implementation of these enhancements was voluntary, and
the NRC could not require licensees to maintain these enhancements,
absent issuance of an order or a regulation.
The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise
scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises
and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed
many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations.
Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local
agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that
facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable
and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency
classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release.
Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor
accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent
containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used
by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as
a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However,
certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise
scenarios, including the following:
The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident
before a release occurs;
The release will occur after a General Emergency is
declared;
The release will be terminated before the exercise ends;
and
The exercise will escalate sequentially through the
emergency classes.
In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences
that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically
face.
In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the
NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as
follows:
The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency
planning exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory
responses associated with preconditioning of participants by
incorporating a wide spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no
release to a large release) and events, including security-based
events. These scenarios should emphasize the expected interfaces and
coordination between key decision-makers based on realistic
postulated events. The staff should share experiences of
preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.
As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed
to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The
working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA
regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios
and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these
regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport
with this final rule to address preconditioning and the incorporation
of hostile action exercise scenarios.
The FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to
discuss potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC
supported these meetings to facilitate questions as they related to the
EP rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example,
stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development
and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification
levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs
can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could
vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more
realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the
different focus groups and stakeholders informed this rulemaking, new
guidance documents associated with this rulemaking, and an update to
the REP Program Manual.
A regulatory change is necessary to enhance scenario content to
include hostile action scenarios and reduce preconditioning through a
wide spectrum of challenges. This change will improve licensee ERO
capability to protect public health and safety under all accident
scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward preconditioning.
The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations,
but rejected that option because it would not adequately address the
concerns previously discussed. The NRC also discussed the use of
voluntary programs and although this option could be successful, the
NRC could not require that changes made would be permanent and
consistent across all sites.
The NRC is revising Appendix E, Section IV.F, to address these
issues, as discussed in Section IV of this document.
B. Non-Security Related EP Issues
The remaining changes are new or amended requirements that result
in a substantial increase to public health and safety because they
maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to effectively
implement their emergency plans.
1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS)
capabilities are found in Sec. 50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3, and require licensees to establish the capability to
promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event
while meeting certain ANS design objectives.
[[Page 72568]]
The former regulations did not require backup power for sirens or other
backup ANS alerting capabilities when a major portion of the primary
alerting means is unavailable. The regulations also did not address
backup notification capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's
ANS is unavailable and no backup exists, then the public may not be
promptly alerted of an event at the facility and the protective actions
to be taken, which could affect the public's response to the event.
An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case
of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions
may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear
power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to
provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such
as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or
supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives
information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency
alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile
loudspeakers.
In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major
portion of the alert function of an ANS for short time periods for
various reasons, such as damage to ANS components caused by severe
weather, loss of offsite alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of
ANS activation equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS
hardware/software modifications. In other situations, the notification
capability has been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert
radios, which are used to provide both an alert signal and notification
function).
The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when
ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to
Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and
Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26,
2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System
Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28,
``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated
December 22, 2006. The inability to activate some tone alert radios
because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS
implementation was addressed in IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert
Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,''
dated April 2, 1996. Without the ability to warn the population, the
effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced.
Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of
the primary ANS.
Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread
loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren based systems,
such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern
U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in RG 1.155,
``Station Blackout,'' dated August 1988, although the likelihood of
failure of the onsite AC [alternating current] power system
coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout
events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some
plants.
The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification
systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and
encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (House
Appropriations Committee) Report 107-740, FEMA was directed to update
its guidance on outdoor warning and mass notification systems and
require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an AC
power supply. The House Appropriations Committee also urged FEMA to
consult with other relevant agencies and revise the national standard
for outdoor warning and mass notification to reflect state-of-the-art
technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the
Commission to require backup power for the emergency notification
system, including siren systems, for nuclear power plants located where
there is a permanent population, as determined by the 2000 decennial
census, in excess of 15,000,000 within a 50 mile radius of the power
plant. Therefore, it was appropriate that the NRC also considered
changes to its existing regulations and guidance regarding warning
systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.
The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this
issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related
guidance documents to address ANS backup means. Several NRC and FEMA
guidance documents, such as NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated November 1985, contain detailed information on ANS
capabilities and design review methodology. Additional information on
ANS backup capabilities will be provided in revisions or supplements to
these documents. As guidance, a provision for an ANS backup means would
not be considered a requirement and its applicability to existing
approved ANS designs would be considered optional. As noted previously
in this discussion, FEMA was also directed to update its guidance to
require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an
alternating current power supply. However, guidance changes limited to
backup power requirements for the alerting function would not address
backup capabilities for other types of alerting devices or the ANS
notification function. In summary, this option did not provide a
regulatory resolution to ensure that nuclear power plant ANS designs
include a backup method to the primary means for both alerting and
notification, and thus the NRC considered this option to be
unacceptable.
Use of a voluntary approach for ANS backup means was also
considered. Some current nuclear power plant ANS designs address one or
more aspects of backup ANS capabilities, such as providing backup power
in the event primary power to sirens is lost, using backup route
alerting when sirens are inoperable, designating multiple EAS broadcast
stations to ensure that instructional messages can be transmitted, or
using reverse 911 systems. A voluntary approach was considered as an
option because State and local authorities can usually compensate for
the temporary loss of some ANS capabilities. However, allowing
licensees or applicants to voluntarily install backup ANS capabilities
will not ensure that both the alerting and notification functions are
addressed, or that new sites will have warning systems designed with
comprehensive backup ANS capabilities. Given the importance of ANS to
alert the public of an event at a facility and the protective actions
to be taken, and without any voluntary industry commitment that
existing or new warning systems will have a backup means available, the
NRC considered a voluntary approach to be inappropriate and found this
option unacceptable.
The NRC believes that nuclear power reactor licensees must be
required to have backup ANS methods and therefore is amending its
regulations to address backup capabilities for both the alert and
notification functions. The NRC considered three alternatives for
addressing this issue in rulemaking.
The first alternative would have added a regulatory requirement for
ANS backup power. The most common warning system used at U.S. nuclear
[[Page 72569]]
power plants is based on sirens that are powered directly, or
indirectly through batteries, by an AC power source. As noted
previously in this discussion, the loss of power is not the only
failure mode that can impact warning systems. Causes of past ANS
inoperability problems have included the inability to detect siren
failures, the inability to activate sirens, the failure to test and
maintain personal home alerting devices, the use of telephone call-
inhibiting devices, and the failure to provide and maintain
distribution lists of tone alert radios. Thus, a regulatory requirement
addressing only backup ANS power would not have eliminated any of these
other failure modes. This approach would have prescribed one specific
method as a backup means, precluding licensees (or applicants) and
offsite officials from considering alternative methods, such as route
alerting or newer communications technology, that may be more suitable
for certain nuclear power plant sites. In summary, it would have
addressed only one of several ANS failure modes (i.e., loss of AC
power) for one alerting method (i.e., sirens). It would not have
addressed backup methods for other types of alerting devices or any
part of the notification process. Therefore, the NRC considered this
approach to be unacceptable.
The second alternative would have required that the primary ANS be
designed so no common single failure mode for the system existed;
therefore, a backup system would not have been needed. This approach
would have ensured that the entire ANS was designed and built to a very
high level of reliability. Any equipment necessary for ANS activation
and operation (e.g., computers, radio transmitters and radio towers,
plus the actual alerting devices and notification means) would have had
redundant components and power sources as necessary to eliminate any
common single failure mode, such as a widespread power outage affecting
a siren based system. However, ensuring that all ANS common single
failure vulnerabilities have been identified and adequately addressed
would have been difficult. Even after extensive analysis and testing of
a warning system, a common failure mechanism may not have become
evident until the system was activated for an emergency event. For a
siren based system, several additional sirens (with backup power
capabilities) may have been needed to be installed to provide
overlapping acoustic coverage in the event clusters of sirens fail and
thus may have discouraged licensees at future nuclear power plant sites
from using these systems due to the increased cost for installing
additional sirens. This approach may not have been applicable to non-
electronic primary warning systems based on other methods, such as
route alerting. For these reasons, the NRC considered this approach to
be unacceptable. Rejecting this approach does not mean that the issue
of backup power for warning systems will be left unaddressed. As
discussed previously, the House Committee on Appropriations directed
FEMA to require all outdoor warning systems to be operable in the
absence of AC power.
The third alternative was selected and revises Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3, to require a backup capability should the primary means
of public alerting and notification be unavailable. These changes are
discussed in Section IV of this document.
2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness
Emergency declaration is the process by which a licensee determines
whether an off-normal plant condition warrants declaration as an
emergency and, if so, which of the four emergency classes--Notification
of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency--is
to be declared. In its oversight of licensee EP programs, the NRC has
observed several licensees whose responses in performing emergency
declarations were inappropriately delayed. Between 2000 and 2009, the
NRC identified 13 situations in which an emergency declaration was
either not done or inappropriately delayed during an actual event,
which resulted in findings and cited and non-cited violations. These
situations may have been a result of a lack of a specific regulatory
timeliness requirement.
Emergency declarations are fundamental to the licensee's EP program
in that onsite and offsite emergency response activities are
implemented in a staged, proportional manner, based upon the level of
the declared emergency. If an emergency declaration is delayed, the
subsequent emergency response actions may not be timely. Emergency
response personnel, facilities, and equipment may not be in position
should it become necessary to implement measures to protect public
health and safety.
The NRC has issued generic communications to alert licensees of
these concerns and to advise them of the NRC's expectation that
emergency classifications \1\ are made in a prompt manner. In 1985, the
NRC published IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class,
Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications,'' to
alert licensees of two instances in which declarations and/or
notifications of an actual emergency condition were significantly
delayed and to express the NRC expectation of timely emergency
declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it necessary to publish Emergency
Preparedness Position-2, ``Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on
Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions,'' to provide
guidance to NRC staff in evaluating licensee performance in the area of
timely classification. The NRC cited classification delays in actual
events and exercises as the reason for issuing the guidance. The EPPOS-
2 provided the NRC expectation that the classification should be made
promptly following indications that conditions have reached an EAL
threshold and that 15 minutes was a reasonable goal for completing the
classification once indications are available to the control room
operators. The NRC based that conclusion on the belief that 15 minutes
is a reasonable period of time for assessing and classifying an
emergency once indications are available to cognizant personnel, and
that a delay in classification for up to 15 minutes would have a
minimal impact upon the overall emergency response and protection of
the public health and safety. The NRC noted that emergency
classification schemes have reached a level of maturity in which the
classification of emergencies can be accomplished in a relatively short
period of time once the abnormal condition and associated plant
parameters are known by cognizant licensee personnel. The EPPOS-2
stated that the 15-minute period was not to be viewed as a grace period
in which a licensee could resolve a condition that had already exceeded
an EAL threshold to avoid a declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Early NRC generic communications routinely used the phrase
``emergency classification'' to denote the outcome of the process to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition. This document
uses the phrase ``emergency declaration'' in place of ``emergency
classification'' except when summarizing an earlier document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This 15-minute goal was not a regulatory requirement but rather a
guideline for NRC staff evaluation of a licensee's performance in
responding to an actual radiological emergency. This goal was
subsequently incorporated as a criterion in the industry proposed and
NRC-approved Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone performance
indicators (PIs). Although the reported classification performance
[[Page 72570]]
during drills and exercises remains high, there have been several
instances during actual events in which classifications were
inappropriately delayed. Although these actual events did not warrant
public protective measures, this may not always be the case.
The NRC considered the following options for addressing this
regulatory problem. The first option, take no action, was rejected
because it would not address the regulatory problem. The second option,
continue to rely on the industry's voluntary PI, was rejected because
the existence of the PI has not prevented untimely classifications
during actual emergencies. Although these occurrences were associated
with Notification of Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed weaknesses
could also have occurred under different circumstances in which the
potential impact to the public could have been greater. The third
option, issue regulatory guidance, was rejected because although
regulatory guidance is an appropriate mechanism for identifying
acceptable means for complying with regulatory requirements, there was
no regulatory requirement that emergency declarations meet any
particular timeliness criterion. The fourth option, an amendment of the
regulations, is the best course of action to ensure that licensees are
aware that they are responsible for completing emergency declarations
in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency.
The NRC also considered providing either a performance criterion or
a capability criterion. Similar to the notification timeliness
criterion in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which the NRC requires
licensees to be capable of notifying responsible State and local
governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency,
the NRC opted to propose a capability criterion, rather than an
inflexible performance criterion. This approach allows licensees some
degree of flexibility during an actual radiological emergency in
addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise when an emergency
declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant
operations that are more urgently needed to protect public health and
safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did not deny
State and local authorities the opportunity to implement actions to
protect the public health or safety under their emergency plans and the
cause of the delay was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to
foresee and prevent. Based upon these considerations, the NRC is
amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, to address this issue by
providing a capability criterion. These changes are discussed in
Section IV of this document.
In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether
the NRC should add requirements for non-power reactor licensees to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes
and promptly declare an emergency condition. The NRC received several
comments on these issues. The NRC believes there may be a need for the
NRC to be aware of security related events early on so that an
assessment can be made to consider the likelihood that the event is
part of a larger coordinated attack.
The NRC also believes declarations for non-security related events
should be made in a timely fashion, but not necessarily with the same
urgency as security related events. For example, in 2008 a tornado
damaged the building that houses a non-power reactor. Assistance from
the NRC, which was coordinated between NRC headquarters and NRC Region
IV, could have been deployed earlier and with more detailed information
if the emergency information was available to the NRC earlier.
However, the NRC has determined that further analysis and
stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the requirements
for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has not included
requirements in the final rule for non-power reactor licensees to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes
and promptly declare an emergency condition.
3. Emergency Operations Facility--Performance Based Approach
Several nuclear power reactor licensees have submitted requests for
NRC approval to combine EOFs for plants they operate within a State or
in multiple States into a consolidated EOF. In some instances, the
consolidated EOF is located at a substantial distance from one or more
of the plant sites and is no longer considered a ``near-site''
facility, as required by former Sec. Sec. 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(d)(1),
50.54(gg)(1)(i), and Appendix E, Sections II.H., IV.E.8., IV.E.9.c.,
and IV.E.9.d. Guidance documents, including NUREG-0696, ``Functional
Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,'' dated February 1981, and
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,''
Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,''
dated January 1983, that provide criteria for establishing and locating
emergency response facilities also refer to the EOF as a near-site
facility. However, the regulations and guidance did not explicitly
define the term ``near-site.'' This regulatory structure resulted in
confusion for licensees with reasonable technical bases for moving or
consolidating EOFs that would no longer be considered ``near-site'' and
led to requests for exceptions to NRC guidance and exemptions from NRC
regulations to move or consolidate their EOFs.
In addition, neither regulations nor guidance documents addressed
the capabilities and functional requirements for a consolidated EOF,
such as capabilities for handling simultaneous events at two or more
sites, or having provisions for the NRC and offsite officials to
relocate to a facility nearer the site if they desire. Thus, licensees
have been uncertain about when they need to submit requests for
exceptions or exemptions, which alternative approaches to existing EOF
distance and other facility criteria may be acceptable, and what
additional capabilities they need to address for a consolidated EOF. A
regulatory mechanism (Sec. 50.54(q)) is already in place that allows
licensees to make changes to their emergency plans without prior
Commission approval when certain conditions are met. This mechanism
could have been applied to consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria
had been established. In the absence of clear criteria, several recent
licensee requests to consolidate EOFs have been evaluated by the NRC
staff and reviewed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.
Each nuclear power plant site is required to have an EOF where the
licensee provides overall management of its resources in response to an
emergency and coordinates emergency response activities with Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies. The original EOF siting criteria
called for the facility to be located near the nuclear power reactor
site and imposed a 20-mile upper limit (later modified by the
Commission to 25 miles) for the distance between the site and the EOF.
This upper limit was generally considered to be the maximum distance
from the nuclear power reactor site within which face-to-face
communications between the licensee, offsite officials, and NRC staff
could be facilitated, and which also permitted the timely briefing and
debriefing of personnel going to and from the site. However, advances
in computer and communication technology after the original EOF siting
criteria were established now allow EOF functions to be effectively
performed independent of
[[Page 72571]]
distance from the site. Computer based systems allow plant parameter,
meteorological data, and radiological information for multiple sites to
be collected, analyzed, trended, and displayed in a remotely located
facility. Data and voice communications between the EOF and other
onsite/offsite emergency response facilities can be addressed through a
variety of independent systems, such as microwave, telephone, internet,
intranet, and radio, which provide a high degree of availability and
reliability.
Furthermore, nuclear utility consolidation has resulted in
initiatives to standardize fleet emergency plans, use consolidated
EOFs, and staff EOFs by designated corporate personnel. Standardized
plans, implementing procedures, and accident assessment tools, such as
a common dose projection model, allow emergency responders in a
consolidated facility to effectively perform their functions for
multiple sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site facility.
Consolidated facilities eliminate the need to duplicate work space,
displays, communication networks, and other capabilities for each site.
Consolidated facilities can also be located at or near corporate
offices where nuclear support personnel designated to fill EOF
positions can respond more quickly.
The Commission, in the SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear
Operating Company's Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating
Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005,
directed the NRC staff to consider resolving these issues through
rulemaking. In that SRM, the Commission approved the proposal for a
consolidated EOF for three nuclear power reactor sites operated by
Southern Nuclear Operating Company at the company's corporate
headquarters. The Commission also instructed the NRC staff to consider
making ``the requirements for EOFs more performance based to allow
other multi-plant licensees to consolidate their EOFs, if those
licensees can demonstrate their emergency response strategies will
adequately cope with an emergency at any one of the associated
plants.''
To address the EOF ``near-site'' and consolidation issues, the NRC
considered maintaining EOF distance criteria as guidance only and to
specify other EOF criteria in guidance rather than in the regulations.
However, providing these criteria as guidance only would not have
ensured that future applicants would follow the criteria. Thus, an EOF
could have been located within 10 miles of a site with no backup
facility provided, or could have been located beyond 25 miles of a site
without providing a facility closer to a site for NRC site team and
offsite response personnel. An EOF could have been implemented without
meeting the performance based criteria. A licensee could have relocated
or consolidated an existing approved facility without meeting all or
some of the criteria and without prior Commission approval as long as
the licensee determined that the provisions of Sec. 50.54(q) were met.
Under these circumstances, an EOF could have been implemented that may
not have provided all of the capabilities that the NRC believes are
necessary for such a facility to be fully effective. Therefore, the NRC
determined that this option would not have been appropriate.
The NRC also considered revising the regulations (and providing
associated performance based criteria) to allow an EOF to be located
more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site without prior
Commission approval. The capability of existing EOFs located more than
25 miles from a site to function as effective emergency response
facilities has been demonstrated in numerous exercises and several
actual events. However, the NRC is concerned that locating an EOF
beyond 25 miles from a site could adversely impact the ability of
licensee and offsite responders to fulfill their responsibilities
(e.g., due to increased response times to a remotely located facility
or less effective communications with responders at other locations).
The potential adverse impacts of the EOF location must be fully
considered and addressed, including consideration of the needs of
offsite officials who also report to the EOF. Therefore, the NRC
determined that the option to allow licensees to locate EOFs more than
25 miles from a site without prior Commission review and approval would
not have been appropriate.
In summary, the NRC is amending its regulations (and associated
guidance) to establish performance based criteria for all EOFs based on
requirements and conditions previously imposed by the Commission on
these facilities. Licensees will need to obtain prior Commission
approval and provide a facility closer to the site in situations where
the EOF is more than 25 miles from a site. This approach will ensure
that an EOF has the capabilities necessary to be fully effective
regardless of its location with respect to the nuclear power plant
site, and that provisions are in place for a facility closer to the
site for use by NRC site teams and offsite responders. The NRC is also
amending its regulations (and guidance) to remove the references to an
EOF as a ``near-site'' facility and to incorporate specific EOF
distance criteria into the regulations, as discussed in Section IV of
this document.
In a conforming change, the NRC is revising Sec. 52.79(a)(17) to
clarify that combined license applications need not address the
requirement governing TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in Sec. 50.34(f)(2)(xxv).
Instead, the requirements in Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) apply.
That section accurately reflects the need for the combined license
application to address an EOF; by contrast Sec. 50.34(f)(2)(xxv)
requires only applicants for construction permits (and not combined
licenses) to address an EOF. The NRC considered, as an alternative to
modifying Sec. 52.79(a)(17), correcting Sec. 50.34(f)(xxv) to remove
the language limiting the requirement to address an EOF to construction
permit applications. The NRC decided not to adopt that approach, but
instead have the general requirements for EP, including Appendix E,
apply to combined license applications by virtue of Sec. 52.79(a)(21).
4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating
The former Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E, Sections
II.G, III, and IV, required nuclear power plant operating license
applicants to provide evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for the public
located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These ETEs are used in the
planning process to identify potential challenges to efficient
evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event of an
accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response managers
in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of the public.
The former regulations did not require any review or revision of ETEs
following the initial licensing of the plant. Although some licensees
do revise ETEs based on updated census data, the use of ETEs in
evacuation planning is inconsistent and generally does not affect the
development of public protective action strategies.
Nuclear power reactor operating license applicants are responsible
for developing the ETE analysis for their respective sites. They submit
the analysis to the NRC in support of their emergency plans, usually as
a stand-alone document. Within the ETE analysis, there are multiple ETE
values for different scenarios developed for combinations of variables
and events under varying conditions. For example,
[[Page 72572]]
there are different ETE values based on season (summer or winter), day
of the week (midweek or weekend), time of day (daytime or evening), and
weather conditions (normal or adverse). Applicants include the results
of the ETE analysis in the onsite emergency plan and in the emergency
plan implementing procedures for protective action recommendations. The
ETEs are also in the offsite emergency plans for the State and local
governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
In NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3,
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,''
dated December 2007, the NRC presented the results of a study of its
protective action recommendation guidance. The NRC concluded in the
study that ETE information is important in developing public protective
action strategies and should be used to identify enhancements to
evacuation plans. The effectiveness of protective action recommendation
strategies is sensitive to the ETE, and therefore, it is important to
reduce the uncertainties associated with ETE numerical values.
Improving the accuracy of ETE values helps licensees recommend and
offsite officials determine the most appropriate protective action. For
instance, in the study, the NRC determined that for some scenarios
sheltering may be more protective than immediate evacuation if the
evacuation time is longer than a few hours, depending on site-specific
factors. Further, the NRC concluded that the effect of population
change upon evacuation times should be understood by OROs and
incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.
To address this issue, the NRC is amending the regulations to
require licensees to assess changes to the EPZ population. The NRC
believed that changes in infrastructure, or addition of a large
subdivision to the EPZ, could also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted
with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), who are experts in emergency
evacuations and have researched and developed several NRC studies
related to evacuation (e.g., NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation
Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005, NUREG/
CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency
Evacuations,'' January 2005, and NUREG/CR-6953). Based upon their
expert opinion, SNL confirmed that the major contributor to changes in
ETE values is changes in population. Population changes have a direct
correlation to the volume of vehicles on the roadway, which directly
affects the roadway capacity. Although changes in infrastructure can
impact roadway capacity, changes sufficient to impact the ETE by more
than a few minutes, such as the addition of an interstate highway, take
many years to plan and construct. Because population changes occur
continuously, change in population is considered the more appropriate
metric to monitor the potential effect on roadway capacity. Therefore,
the NRC is revising the regulations to explicitly require ETE updates
based on population changes that cause the ETE values within the
analysis to exceed a specified threshold.
The NRC also considered using guidance as a means to solve the
problem of the lack of specificity in regulations directing applicants
and licensees on the periodicity for updating ETEs. Although the
availability of more detailed guidance would provide applicants and
licensees with the tools to better update their ETEs, this option would
not have provided the regulatory means for enforcing the desired
frequency of ETE updates and consistency of ETE determinations.
Therefore, the NRC is amending Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, to require the periodic review and updating of
ETEs. The NRC guidance for completing the ETE analysis and required ETE
updates is contained in NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of
Evacuation Time Estimate Studies.''
5. Amended Emergency Plan Change Process
Applicants for operating licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power
reactors, research reactors, and certain fuel facilities, and early
site permits (as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52 for
nuclear power plants, are required by regulation to develop emergency
plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 and, for
nuclear power reactor license applicants, the standards of Sec.
50.47(b). After the facility license was issued, the holder of the
license was required by the former Sec. 50.54(q) to follow and
maintain in effect emergency plans that met the requirements of
Appendix E and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the standards of
Sec. 50.47(b). The former Sec. 50.54(q) also provided a process under
which a licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan
without prior NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the
effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as
modified, would continue to meet applicable regulations. However, the
NRC determined that the language of the former Sec. 50.54(q) did not
clearly describe the requirements the NRC intended to impose on
licensees, leading to confusion and inefficiencies in implementation.
A licensee must follow and maintain the effectiveness of its
emergency plan if the NRC is to continue to find, under Sec.
50.54(s)(2)(ii), that there is reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency. The EP regulations generally refer to the
onsite emergency plan as a stand-alone document. However, an emergency
plan relies upon facility capabilities, equipment, and resources that
are typically outside of the control of the licensee's emergency
planning organization. The NRC has identified several occurrences in
which licensee personnel outside of the emergency planning group have
changed the status of capabilities and resources under their cognizance
without considering the impact on the effectiveness of the emergency
plan or without alerting the emergency planning group.
Several enforcement actions in the past few years have been
associated with EALs being rendered ineffective by configuration
changes made to instruments referenced in an EAL without the change
being reflected in the EAL, or without a compensatory action being put
into place. Examples include modifications to installed seismic
instruments that eliminated the direct readout of acceleration needed
for classifying a seismic event and changes in reactor vessel level
criteria (in a boiling water reactor) being made without a conforming
change being made to the EAL. In another finding, concrete barriers
installed in a security-initiated change blocked a site access road
required by the emergency plan to be used for site evacuation. Another
licensee failed to provide adequate oversight on utility (external to
the plant) personnel maintaining the site's ANS, resulting in
degradation of that system and subsequent enforcement actions. Based on
its experience in reviewing root cause analyses and corrective actions
associated with inspection findings, the NRC believes that an
underlying cause of these occurrences is often that the licensees'
configuration control programs did not adequately consider the impact
of configuration changes on the effectiveness of their emergency plans.
The NRC determined that the phrase ``maintain in effect'' in the
former Sec. 50.54(q) was not adequately clear in conveying the NRC
expectation that an effective emergency plan also requires maintaining
the various capabilities and resources identified and relied on in the
[[Page 72573]]
plan. The phrase ``maintain in effect,'' as applied to an emergency
plan in Sec. 50.54(q), has two senses: The first is that the plans are
in force; the second is that the plans can achieve the desired result
of providing reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec. 50.54(q) to clarify that the
regulatory intent is both senses by requiring licensees to follow and
``maintain the effectiveness'' of their approved emergency plans.
The former Sec. 50.54(q) also provided a process under which a
licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan without
prior NRC approval provided the changes did not decrease the
effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as
modified, continued to meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC approval
was required for any change that decreased the effectiveness of the
emergency plan. The NRC and licensees experienced significant
difficulties in implementing this portion of Sec. 50.54(q) because the
former rule language did not define what constituted a decrease in
effectiveness of an emergency plan nor did it identify the type of
changes that would constitute a decrease in effectiveness of the plan.
The lack of clear evaluation criteria resulted in regulatory
inefficiencies, such as licensees submitting for review changes that
did not rise to the level requiring prior NRC approval and enforcement
actions due to licensees failing to submit changes that were later
deemed to warrant such a review. A large fraction of the enforcement
actions in the EP Cornerstone can be attributed to these findings.
The NRC attempted to resolve this issue through the publication of
regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC issued EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan
and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' to provide guidance to NRC
inspectors regarding their review of licensees' emergency plan changes.
In 2004, the NEI submitted two white papers proposing a definition of
``decrease in effectiveness'' for NRC consideration. The NRC could not
reach consensus with NEI and thus, did not endorse the NEI guidance. In
2005, the NRC withdrew EPPOS-4 and issued RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the
Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005,
to (1) Clarify the meaning of ``decrease in effectiveness,'' (2)
clarify the process for making changes to an emergency plan, and (3)
provide some examples of changes that are not decreases in
effectiveness. Although RIS 2005-02 provided useful guidance, the NRC
and NEI have continued to discuss ways to improve the Sec. 50.54(q)
change process, including the use of a regulatory framework parallel to
that of Sec. 50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance programs, Sec.
50.54(p)(2) for safeguards plans, and Sec. 50.59, ``Changes, Tests,
and Experiments.''
During the development of this rulemaking, the NRC identified a
concern regarding the process to be used by the NRC for reviewing
proposed emergency plan changes. The former Sec. 50.54(q) directed the
licensee to submit such changes under the provisions of Sec. 50.4,
which provides the procedures for making certain submissions to the
NRC. Some confusion existed as to whether all proposed emergency plan
changes submitted under Sec. 50.4 would result in a decrease in
effectiveness and whether Commission review of such submissions was
necessary. The final rule specifies that the license amendment process
of Sec. 50.90 is to be used when submitting a proposed emergency plan
change that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in
effectiveness of the plan. The final rule language addresses this
clarification. (See Section IV of this document for further
discussion.)
The NRC also considered other options for addressing the Sec.
50.54(q) problems. Using a voluntary industry initiative was rejected
because the NRC and NEI had yet to agree on the best approach to
resolve the problems. Issuing more regulatory guidance was rejected
because that approach had been tried but had not resolved the problems.
The NRC determined that an amendment to the regulations, supplemented
as necessary by regulatory guidance, is the best course of action to
ensure that (1) The effectiveness of the emergency plans is maintained,
(2) changes to the approved emergency plan are properly evaluated, and
(3) any change that reduces the effectiveness of the plan is reviewed
by the NRC prior to implementation.
Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec. 50.54(q) to replace the
existing language and is making conforming changes in Part 50, Appendix
E, Section IV.B. The NRC is issuing RG 1.219, ``Guidance on Making
Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors,'' to describe a
method acceptable to the NRC for demonstrating compliance with the
final rule.
6. Removal of Completed One-Time Requirements
The NRC is eliminating several regulatory provisions that required
holders of licenses to take certain one-time actions to improve the
state of EP following the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. These
actions are complete and the requirements are no longer binding on any
current licensee. Corresponding requirements for license applicants are
provided in Sec. Sec. 50.33 and 50.34.
The requirements being removed are:
(1) Section 50.54(r), which required licensees of research or test
reactors to submit emergency plans to the NRC for approval by September
7, 1982, and, for the facilities with an authorized power level of less
than 2 MW thermal, by November 3, 1982. There is no longer a need for
this provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is
deleting this requirement and designating the section as ``reserved.''
(2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which required nuclear power reactor
licensees to submit State and local governmental emergency plans within
60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective date of the rule that added
Sec. 50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that date has elapsed. That portion
of Sec. 50.54(s)(1) that discussed the size of the EPZs was not
identified for deletion in the proposed rule, but after further review
the NRC has determined that it does not need to be retained. The size
of EPZs for nuclear power reactors is addressed in other parts of the
NRC's regulations. Section 50.33(g), which is applicable to the content
of new Part 50 and Part 52 applications (with complete and integrated
emergency plans), contains the same language regarding the size of EPZs
as found in Sec. 50.54(s)(1). Section 50.47(c)(2) also has the same
language regarding the size of EPZs as Sec. Sec. 50.33(g) and
50.54(s)(1). Moreover, Part 50, Appendix E, Section I, footnote 1,
addresses the size of EPZs with language equivalent to Sec. Sec.
50.33(g) and 50.54(s)(1). Therefore, the NRC is deleting Sec.
50.54(s)(1) in its entirety and designating the section as
``reserved.''
(3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which required that nuclear power
reactor licensee, State, and local emergency response plans be
implemented by April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need for this
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting
Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section as ``reserved.''
(4) Section 50.54(u), which required nuclear power reactor
licensees to submit, within 60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective
date of the rule that added Sec. 50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC plans
for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in Sec. 50.47(b)
and the requirements of Appendix E. There is no longer a need for this
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting
this requirement
[[Page 72574]]
and designating the section as ``reserved.''
The NRC is eliminating these completed one-time requirements in the
interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these requirements will not
relax any currently effective regulatory requirement and will cause no
regulatory burden on any current or future licensee or applicant.
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule
A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings
As part of its comprehensive assessment of the NRC's EP regulations
and guidance and development of this rule, the NRC staff met with
internal and external stakeholders, including FEMA management, on
numerous occasions including the following:
1. Meetings with NRC regional EP inspectors in January 2005 and
January 2006;
2. Meetings with State, local, and Tribal governments and nuclear
power industry representatives at the NREP Conference on April 11-14,
2005, March 27-30, 2006, and April 7-10, 2008;
3. Public meeting with interested stakeholders on August 31 and
September 1, 2005;
4. Public meeting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on May
19, 2006;
5. Public meeting with the NEI/nuclear power industry
representatives on July 19, 2006;
6. Regional meetings with State and local representatives and
nuclear power industry working groups that started in 2007;
7. NRC Regulatory Information Conference on March 16, 2007;
8. Public meeting with external stakeholders on March 5, 2008;
9. Meeting with nuclear power industry representatives at the 2008
NEI EP and Communications Forum;
10. Public meeting with external stakeholders on July 8, 2008;
11. Public meetings to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to
EP regulations and related guidance documents in June 2009 held jointly
by the NRC and FEMA (a total of 11 public meetings);
12. Public meeting to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to
EP regulations and related guidance documents on September 17, 2009;
13. Commission meeting to provide an overview of comments received
by the NRC and FEMA during the proposed rule public comment period and
remaining milestones in the EP rulemaking process on December 8, 2009;
and
14. Public meeting to discuss feedback on proposed implementation
dates for the final rule on November 15, 2010.
The NRC also met routinely with representatives of FEMA to
coordinate issues of mutual interest and to keep them informed of NRC
EP activities. These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA to collaborate on
rulemaking and guidance issues, and to ensure alignment and regulatory
consistency. In addition, FEMA attended the NRC public meetings
regarding the NRC's EP rulemaking, and co-hosted 11 of the public
meetings with the NRC held after the issuance of the proposed rule.
B. Public and Stakeholder Comments Received
At the April 11, 2005, NREP Conference, the NRC and FEMA conducted
a workshop with stakeholders. The workshop covered a broad range of EP
topics. Unanswered stakeholder comments and questions were recorded by
NRC staff, and the NRC and FEMA responded to those questions and
comments in ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items.''
The NRC conducted a public meeting on August 31-September 1, 2005,
to obtain input regarding EP requirements and guidance for commercial
nuclear power plants. The first day of meetings involved a roundtable
discussion of topics related to the review of EP regulations and
guidance. During the second day, the NRC staff and stakeholders
addressed the ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items'' from the April
2005 NREP conference and other stakeholder comments and questions. The
NRC requested comments in writing before the August 31-September 1,
2005, meeting and also received comments at the meeting. In addition to
comments transcribed from the 2-day public meeting, the NRC accepted
written comment submissions until October 31, 2005.
The NRC and FEMA responded to generic comments from the August 31-
September 1, 2005, meeting and comments received thereafter in
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and
October 31, 2005).'' Site-specific comments from the public meeting
were addressed in ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments
(Received Between August 31 and October 31, 2005).''
The NRC also received comments on the review of the EP regulations
and guidance for nuclear power plants at public meetings with
stakeholders on May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The May 19, 2006,
meeting was transcribed. The NRC staff informed the meeting
participants that their comments would be presented to the Commission
in a September 2006 SECY paper. These comments were provided to the
Commission in an attachment to SECY-06-0200 and, like the stakeholder
comments from 2005, were used to inform the staff's recommendations to
the Commission in SECY-06-0200.
The NRC received three comment letters that focused on the draft
preliminary rule language posted for comment on http://www.regulations.gov on February 29, 2008. One comment letter was
submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, one was submitted by
NEI, and one was submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists on
behalf of several NGOs. These comments were addressed as part of the
development of the proposed rule.
The proposed rule was published on May 18, 2009, and the public
comment period closed on October 19, 2009. The NRC received a total of
94 submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were
identified. Some of the comments and the NRC's responses are discussed
throughout this document. A detailed discussion of the public comments
and the NRC's responses is contained in a separate document (see
Section IX of this document). The NRC also received comments on issues
that are outside the scope of this rule and on regulatory provisions
that are not being revised in this rule. The NRC determined that these
comments did not support changing the scope of the final rule.
C. Proposed Rule Specific Request for Comments
In the proposed rule, the NRC requested comments on whether the NRC
should issue regulations requiring that licensees train responders on
and implement the Incident Command System (ICS) to improve the
interface with OROs during an event at a nuclear power plant. Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) requires all Federal
departments and agencies to adopt the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and use it in their individual incident management
programs and activities, as well as in support of all emergency
response actions taken to assist State, Tribal, and local governments.
Although NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles,
terminology, and organizational processes that enables incident
management, it also utilizes the ICS for command, operations, planning,
logistics, and finance/administration functions to manage domestic
incidents.
[[Page 72575]]
The NIMS/ICS are also widely used by State, tribal, and local
governments, including when these entities are engaged in emergency
response activities with nuclear power reactor licensees. However,
licensees are not currently required to adopt NIMS/ICS, so the
potential exists for confusion or miscommunication between OROs who
utilize NIMS/ICS as an incident management system and the associated
power reactor licensees who do not use the same system. The NRC
observed some of these coordination challenges during the nuclear power
industry's voluntary three year EP hostile action drill program
initiative, which was conducted in response to BL-05-02 and concluded
in December 2009. Ideally, both OROs and licensees should use the same
or a compatible incident management system to effectively communicate
with each other and improve their individual and joint response
capabilities.
Nevertheless, the NRC recognizes that HSPD-5 does not require the
private sector to adopt NIMS/ICS. The NRC also understands that
requiring its nuclear power reactor licensees to implement NIMS/ICS
would impose upon licensees a specific type of incident command
structure stipulated by HSPD-5. Any future changes to HSPD-5 or NIMS/
ICS could require corresponding rulemaking changes by the NRC.
Moreover, if the NRC were to compel its nuclear power reactor licensees
to use a specific incident management program, that program still could
be different than incident management systems adopted by OROs that
comply with laws promulgated by other governmental organizations. Thus,
despite the NRC's efforts to promote consistency, these potentially
conflicting regulatory authorities could prove to be incompatible
during ICS activities at the reactor sites. For example, the incident
commander during the onset of a hostile action incident at a nuclear
facility will most likely be a local law enforcement officer, whose
authority derives from the local or State jurisdiction and not from the
NRC.
Section 50.47(b)(6) of the NRC's regulations states that
``Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response
organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.'' In this final
rule, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to
require licensees to include in their emergency plans the
``[i]dentification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State,
local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with
emergencies, including hostile action at the site.'' Together, these
regulations require licensees to know which OROs would respond during
an emergency and how to communicate with those OROs. A licensee's use
of a command structure that is compatible with the applicable OROs'
command structure (e.g., NIMS/ICS) would enhance communication and
coordination between OROs and licensees and facilitate the licensee's
compliance with the Sec. 50.47(b)(6) standard and the requirements of
Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. The NRC's regulations, as amended by this
final rule, contain adequate requirements to ensure that licensee
compliance with these regulations would result in effective
communication between OROs and licensees during emergencies. Therefore,
the NRC is not requiring that NIMS/ICS become the sole means of
incident command management for licensees.
Comments received by the NRC in response to other specific requests
for comments in the proposed rule are addressed in Sections II and IV
of this document.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
The Commission is amending portions of Sec. 50.47, ``Emergency
plans;'' Sec. 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses;'' Part 50, Appendix E,
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization
Facilities;'' and Sec. 52.79, ``Contents of applications; technical
information in final safety analysis report.''
1. Section 50.47 Emergency Plans
The NRC is amending Sec. 50.47(b)(3) to remove the reference to
the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria
in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for
EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional
requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a
certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed
in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
The final rule amends Sec. 50.47(b)(10) to require licensees to
review and update their ETEs periodically. Changes to Appendix E to
Part 50 provide the required frequency and details of the ETE updates
and submissions to the NRC. Although requirements for ETEs are found in
both Sec. 50.47(b) and in Appendix E to Part 50, the level of detail
between them differs. Section 50.47(b) establishes the EP planning
standards that licensees must meet, whereas Appendix E sets forth more
detailed implementation requirements. (A discussion of this issue is
also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
This new requirement ensures that ETEs are reviewed periodically to
determine whether population changes have caused significant changes in
the ETE values. The NRC review of ETE updates will ensure they are
performed routinely, are consistent across the industry, and are
technically sound. The NRC guidance will provide more details of NRC
expectations for development of an adequate ETE analysis, as well as
provide NRC reviewers with guidance on the review of ETE updates. The
NRC expects that the updated ETEs will be shared with OROs to be
incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.
The NRC received several comments that suggested that the proposed
rule language of Sec. 50.47(b)(10) be revised to accommodate changes
to ETE update criteria. Two commenters stated that the threshold for
ETE updates should be based on a population sensitivity study that
would assess the effect of a population change on the ETE. Two
commenters argued that the ETE updates should be based on changes in
population density rather than absolute population change. The NRC
agrees that the ETE update criteria should be changed and should be
based on the impact that a population change has on the ETE instead of
a percent change in population. However, the details of the revised ETE
update criteria should be included in Appendix E to Part 50 where more
detailed implementation requirements are found. Two commenters argued
that the proposed rule language should be revised to eliminate the
requirement for submission of ETEs to the NRC for review and approval.
The NRC believes that NRC review is necessary for consistent
implementation, but the NRC will not approve the ETE updates. See the
discussion under Appendix E to Part 50 in this section of the document
for further information on this topic.
The NRC is amending Sec. 50.47(d)(1) to remove the reference to
the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria
in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for
EOFs, specifying that these facilities will need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A
[[Page 72576]]
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this
document.)
2. Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses
The NRC is amending Sec. 50.54(q) in its entirety. Section
50.54(q)(1) defines four terms whose meanings are limited to
application within Sec. 50.54(q) in the final rule. Section
50.54(q)(1)(i) defines a ``change'' to the emergency plan as an action
that results in modification or addition to, or removal from, the
licensee's emergency plan. All such changes are subject to Sec.
50.54(q) unless another regulatory change process is controlling. For
example, a plant configuration change that removes a piece of equipment
identified and relied upon in the emergency plan could also be subject
to the requirements of Sec. 50.59 and a technical specification change
may also be involved.
In the proposed rule, Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(i) defined what would have
constituted a change to the emergency plan. The NRC received comments
that asked the NRC to remove the phrase ``resources, capabilities, and
methods identified in the plan'' from the final rule language for this
definition. The NRC agrees with these comments and made this change to
the final rule to place emphasis on the content of the emergency plan.
Although resources, capabilities, and methods are identified in the
emergency plan, not all of these will necessarily be under the control
of the licensee. For example, the licensee's emergency plan may
identify the plans and capabilities of OROs. A change to an ORO plan is
not subject to the Sec. 50.54(q) change process, but the modifications
to the licensee's emergency plan to reflect that change are subject to
the Sec. 50.54(q) change process.
The Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(ii) definition of ``Emergency plan'' in the
final rule encompasses any document that describes the programmatic
methods that the licensee uses to maintain preparedness and to respond
to emergencies, and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b). In response to a stakeholder comment on Sec.
50.54(q)(1)(ii) in the proposed rule, the NRC has revised this
definition in the final rule by removing the proposed reference to
``emergency planning functions,'' and replacing it with ``methods for
maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies.''
Sub-tier documents, such as emergency plan implementing procedures, are
not ordinarily subject to the Sec. 50.54(q) change process because
these procedures generally only provide instructions in performing the
programmatic methods identified and described in the emergency plan.
However, if a licensee were to relocate a programmatic description to
another document, that description will remain subject to the Sec.
50.54(q) change process. For example, if a licensee were to relocate
the details of its emergency classification scheme from the emergency
plan to a wall chart posted in the control room, the wall chart would
be subject to the Sec. 50.54(q) change process. The definition also
emphasizes, by incorporation, the role of the licensee's original
emergency plan approved by the NRC in minimizing the likelihood that a
series of incremental changes, many of which may not have been reviewed
by the NRC, over time will constitute a reduction in effectiveness of
the NRC approved emergency plan.
Section 50.54(q)(1)(iii) in the final rule defines the term
``emergency planning function'' in terms of a capability or resource
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency.
During the development of the EP Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP
subject matter experts, including NRC staff and nuclear power industry
stakeholders, with input from the public, developed a series of
planning standard functions that are used in determining the
significance of inspection findings. These planning standard functions
are paraphrases of the broadly-worded Sec. 50.47(b) planning standards
and the corresponding requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 in terms of
the significant functions that need to be accomplished, or the
capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of
a licensee's emergency plan and emergency response capability. Within
the EP Cornerstone, the significance of inspection findings depends on
whether the planning standards can be accomplished (i.e., loss of
planning standard function) or can be accomplished only in a degraded
manner (i.e., degraded planning standard function). The
characterization of a reduction in effectiveness in the final rule
capitalizes on this earlier effort in that any degradation or loss of a
planning standard function is deemed to constitute a reduction in
effectiveness. The NRC is using the phrase ``emergency planning
function'' in lieu of ``planning standard function'' as used in the ROP
to allow the definition to be applicable to licensed facilities that
are subject to Appendix E, but are not subject to the planning
standards of Sec. 50.47(b). The emergency planning functions have been
established in RG 1.219 along with examples of typical emergency plan
changes that are expected to constitute a reduction in effectiveness
and examples of changes that are not.
The emergency planning functions do not replace or supplement the
regulations upon which they were based and, as such, compliance with
these functions is not required. They are only used to differentiate
between changes that the licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC
approval and those that require prior NRC approval. The NRC did not
establish these emergency planning functions in regulations because the
underlying regulations already exist, and the expression of the
emergency planning functions differs between nuclear power reactors,
non-power reactors, and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 or Part
52. The RG 1.219 discusses these emergency planning functions for
nuclear power reactor licensees.
In response to the definition of ``emergency planning function'' in
proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iii), the NRC received a stakeholder comment
that suggested that the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b) should be
used for determining reductions in effectiveness, in lieu of the
proposed emergency planning functions, since compliance is based on
meeting planning standards. The NRC disagrees with this comment. The
Sec. 50.54(q) change process establishes a two factor test to
establish whether the licensee has the authority to make a change
without prior NRC approval. First, the plan as modified must continue
to comply with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors,
the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b). Second, the licensee must
establish that the change does not reduce the effectiveness of the
emergency plan. These are two different prerequisites. Compliance with
the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors, the planning
standards of Sec. 50.47(b), satisfies the first factor, but it doesn't
necessarily meet the second factor.
Under Sec. 50.47(a)(1)(i), an operating license will be issued
only if the NRC finds that there is reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency. During the licensing process, the licensee or
the NRC may have identified planning constraints and vulnerabilities
that required the licensee to commit to site-specific capabilities and
resources beyond those identified in generic regulatory guidance as
meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and for
[[Page 72577]]
nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b). After receiving its license, a licensee may have identified
newly developed planning or response constraints, or self-identified
weaknesses in its emergency plan, and implemented corrective actions
beyond that identified in its emergency plan. For example, an applicant
having a site with complex meteorological regimes or complex topography
may have been required to establish a more advanced emergency dose
assessment capability. Because these extensions to generic guidance
were found to be necessary to meet the broadly worded requirements in
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning
standards of Sec. 50.47(b), a licensee seeking to relax these
requirements needs to determine that the emergency plan, as modified,
can continue to be effective. This will generally require that the
licensee establish that the considerations that made the site-specific
requirements necessary are no longer applicable to that site, or
require an alternative approach that maintains the plan's
effectiveness. Thus, simply meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and
for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), is not
necessarily sufficient to prevent a reduction in the plan's
effectiveness. For these reasons, the requirements of Appendix E, and
for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), alone
cannot be used for determining reductions in effectiveness.
Section 50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule defines the term
``reduction in effectiveness'' as a change to the emergency plan that
results in a reduction of the licensee's capability to perform an
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.
The phrase ``reduction in effectiveness'' is an evaluation concept that
is used in Sec. 50.54(q) to differentiate between changes that the
licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC approval and those that
require prior NRC approval. A determination that a change may result in
a reduction in effectiveness does not imply that the licensee could no
longer implement its plan and provide adequate measures for the
protection of the public. The NRC may approve a proposed emergency plan
change that the licensee determined to be a reduction in effectiveness
if the NRC can find that the emergency plan, as modified, continues to
meet the requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor
licensees, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), and continues to
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ``Radiological
emergency'' as used in Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule means
any condition that results in the declaration of any ECL and the
implementation of the licensee's emergency plan. A nuclear power
reactor licensee evaluating whether a particular emergency plan change
constitutes a reduction in effectiveness is expected to consider the
spectrum of accidents addressed in the planning basis described in
NUREG-0654. In making this determination, licensees of non-power
reactors and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 must base their
evaluations on the planning bases for their respective facilities.
In the proposed rule, Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iv) defined the term
``reduction in effectiveness.'' The NRC received a stakeholder comment
that suggested that the definition of ``reduction in effectiveness''
should establish a threshold based on a ``significant reduction''
rather than a reduction. The comment cited, as an example, the use of
``more than a minimal increase'' in the Sec. 50.59 change process. The
NRC agrees that the Sec. 50.59 change process does incorporate the
phrase ``more than a minimal amount.'' However, this phrase is always
used in conjunction with a numerical criterion (e.g., Sec.
50.59(c)(2)(i) through (iv)). With few exceptions, the planning
standards of Sec. 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E do not
establish numerical requirements. Other criteria in Sec. 50.59 are
related to any change (e.g., Sec. 50.59(c)(2)(v) through (vi) and
(viii)). The NRC has determined that any change that reduces the
effectiveness of the licensee's capability warrants prior NRC review;
therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comment. The licensee is
authorized to make changes without prior approval up to the point at
which effectiveness is reduced. This standard is reflected in the final
rule language.
Regulations in Parts 50 and 52 require applicants for licenses to
develop emergency plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E, and
for nuclear power reactors, Sec. 50.47(b), as applicable, during
facility licensing. A holder of a license under Part 50 or a combined
license under Part 52 after the Commission makes the finding under
Sec. 52.103(g) is required by Sec. 50.54(q)(2) in the final rule to
follow and maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan. The Sec.
50.54(q)(2) references to Appendix E and Sec. 50.47(b), as applicable,
extend the applicability of these requirements as a condition of the
facility license. The NRC expects licensees to identify conditions and
situations that could reduce the effectiveness of its emergency plan,
and to take corrective and/or compensatory actions to restore and
maintain the requisite effectiveness.
In the proposed rule, Sec. 50.54(q)(2) would have required
licensees to follow and maintain the effectiveness of the emergency
plan. The NRC received a stakeholder comment that stated that requiring
a licensee to maintain an emergency plan effective under Sec.
50.54(q)(2) is inconsistent with the NRC approving a change that
reduces the effectiveness of the emergency plan as required by Sec.
50.54(q)(4). Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Sec. 50.54(q) address emergency
plan changes that are intentional on the part of the licensee, whereas
a non-compliance with Sec. 50.54(q)(2) is generally the result of a
licensee failure to follow the requirements of its emergency plan
(e.g., failure to notify OROs during an actual event) or failure to
take action to address conditions, from whatever cause, that reduce the
effectiveness of the emergency plan (e.g., an offsite fire department
identified and relied upon in the emergency plan is no longer available
to come to the site, and the licensee hasn't taken timely corrective
actions to restore the capability). The licensee's determination of a
reduction in effectiveness is used only to determine whether the
licensee has the authority to implement the change without prior NRC
approval under Sec. 50.54(q)(3) or must submit for prior NRC approval
under Sec. 50.54(q)(4). The NRC's approval of the proposed change
establishes a new standard of effectiveness for the licensee's
emergency plan. Accordingly, the NRC does not believe the final rule to
be internally inconsistent.
Section 50.54(q)(3) in the final rule grants authority to the
holder of a license to make changes to its emergency plan without prior
NRC approval only if an analysis demonstrates that the changes do not
reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed,
continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for nuclear power
reactor licensees, Sec. 50.47(b). As such, Sec. 50.54(q)(3) provides
for a two factor test to establish whether the licensee has the
authority to make a change without prior NRC approval. First, the plan
as modified must continue to comply with the requirements of Appendix
E, and for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b).
Second, the licensee must establish that the change does not reduce the
effectiveness of the
[[Page 72578]]
emergency plan. These are two different and independent prerequisites.
Compliance with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors,
the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), addresses the first factor.
The second factor addresses whether or not the change reduces the
effectiveness of the emergency pan. A change that satisfies the first
factor may not satisfy the second factor and vice versa. Changes that
do not satisfy the first factor would require the licensee to request
an exemption from the affected requirements under Sec. 50.12. Changes
that do not satisfy the second factor would require the licensee to
request prior approval under Sec. 50.54(q)(4).
The NRC expects a licensee considering a change under this section
to perform an evaluation of the change to a level of rigor and
thoroughness consistent with the scope of the proposed change. A
licensee's analysis of the impact of a change on the effectiveness of
the plan needs to consider the accidents included in the emergency
planning basis, the licensing basis of the particular emergency plan,
and any emergency plan elements implemented to address site-specific
emergency response constraints (e.g., delay in staff augmentation
associated with a remote site, commitments to State or local
governments, existence of significant external hazards, etc.).
Section 50.54(q)(4) in the final rule defines the process by which
a licensee requests prior approval of a change to the emergency plan
that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in
effectiveness of the plan. The final rule retains the proposed
requirement that a licensee pursuing these changes must apply for an
amendment to its license as provided in Sec. 50.90. A proposed
emergency plan change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan
would expand the licensee's operating authority, and courts have found
that Commission actions that expand licensees' authority under their
licenses without formally amending the licenses constitute license
amendments and should be processed through the Commission's license
amendment procedures. (See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59
F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 651 F.2d 780 (DC Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re
Three Mile Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315 (1996)).
Therefore, a change to a licensee's emergency plan that would expand
the licensee's operating authority should also be processed through the
Commission's license amendment procedures.
In response to Sec. 50.54(q)(4) in the proposed rule, the NRC
received several comments questioning the NRC's conclusion that
proposed changes that would reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's
emergency plan would expand the licensee's operating authority. The NRC
maintains that a reduction in the effectiveness of a licensee's
emergency plan constitutes an expansion of the licensee's operating
authority. A licensee's emergency plan is part of the licensing basis
for its nuclear power plant. The plan describes how the licensee will
comply with the NRC's requirements governing EP and emergency response.
The NRC's regulations require that the licensee have and implement an
approved emergency plan as a condition of its operating license. A
change to the emergency plan constituting a reduction in effectiveness
of that plan allows the licensee to disclaim responsibility for
performing activities and actions (or specific portions thereof)
formerly required (or prohibited) under the superseded provisions of
the licensee's approved emergency plan. It allows the licensee to
perform, without fear of NRC regulatory response (e.g., an order,
including an enforcement action), activities and actions formerly
precluded. In this situation, the licensee would have the capability to
operate its facility in a manner that was not previously authorized by
the NRC. In other words, the licensee would have operating authority
beyond what it originally had, as reflected in the approved emergency
plan without the proposed change.
The NRC notes that it is not simply that the emergency plan has
``changed'' that leads to the conclusion that there is an expansion of
operating authority. Otherwise, any change to the emergency plan,
regardless of the effect on licensee authority to operate, would be
deemed an expansion of operating authority for which NRC approval via a
license amendment is required. Rather, the effect of the plan change
(i.e., allowing the licensee to operate in a manner with respect to
radiological health and safety that it was not allowed to do under the
superseded provision of the emergency plan) forms the essence of the
test of ``expanded'' operating authority.\2\ Thus, an emergency plan
change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan would expand the
licensee's operating authority under its license.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Consistent with the former Sec. 50.54(q), Sec. 50.54(q) in
the final rule requires that only those emergency plan changes that
reduce the effectiveness of the plan need prior NRC approval. Those
plan changes that increase the effectiveness of the plan may expand
the licensee's operating authority but would not require prior NRC
approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the Commission has determined that the NRC must approve
reductions in effectiveness to ensure compliance with the requirements
of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards
of Sec. 50.47(b) so that the proposed changes provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency. This approval is more than a
ministerial, non-discretionary act. The determination of the
acceptability of the proposed reduction in effectiveness necessitates
consideration and resolution of technical and regulatory issues. In
some instances, the evaluation of the plan change may involve the
balancing of competing regulatory objectives and policies. Thus, NRC
approval of a reduction in effectiveness constitutes an exercise of
agency discretion. For these reasons, under the NRC's legal precedents,
NRC approval of an emergency plan change that would reduce the
effectiveness of the plan would grant the licensee greater operating
authority and would require a license amendment request.
Under Sec. 50.54(q)(4), in addition to satisfying the filing
requirements for a license amendment request in Sec. Sec. 50.90 and
50.91, the license amendment request must include all emergency plan
pages affected by the change, a forwarding letter identifying the
change, the reason for the change, and the basis for concluding that
the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the
requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees,
the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b). The NRC will review the
amendment application to make its no significant hazards consideration
determination and to determine if the proposed change to the emergency
plan is a reduction in effectiveness under Sec. 50.54(q). If the
proposed change does constitute a reduction in effectiveness, the NRC
may issue the amendment only if it determines that the emergency plan,
as modified, continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for
nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), and
that there continues to be reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency.
[[Page 72579]]
Section 50.54(q)(5) in the final rule applies to all licensees
subject to Sec. 50.54(q) and requires that licensees retain a record
of all changes to the emergency plan made without prior NRC approval
for a period of three years from the date of change. This section also
requires the licensee to submit, as specified under Sec. 50.4, a
report of each such change, including a summary description of its
evaluation, within 30 days of the change being put into effect. The NRC
expects that the record of changes will fully describe each change made
and will include documentation of the evaluation that determined the
change was not a reduction in effectiveness. The NRC will use this
record of changes during inspection oversight of the licensee's
implementation of Sec. 50.54(q)(2).
In the proposed rule, Sec. 50.54(q)(5) would have required
licensees to submit a report of a change to the emergency plan made
without NRC approval, 30 days after the change was made. One commenter
requested that the 30-day period start when the ``change is
implemented'' rather than starting when the ``change is made.'' The NRC
agrees that clarification is necessary, but has decided to use the
phrase ``change is put into effect,'' because it provides a more
specific point in time. The change is put into effect when the modified
emergency plan is available for use in the emergency response
facilities. At that point, the change can affect the licensee's
response to an emergency condition, whether or not all typical
implementation activities, such as distribution of the updated
emergency plan and ERO training, have been completed.
Section 50.54(q)(6) in the final rule requires a licensee of a
nuclear power reactor to retain the emergency plan and each change for
which prior NRC approval was obtained under Sec. 50.54(q)(4) as a
record until the Commission terminates the license.
The NRC is removing paragraph (r) of Sec. 50.54. Section 50.54(r)
was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402), to
require then-existing licensees authorized to possess and/or operate a
research or test reactor facility to submit emergency plans complying
with Appendix E to Part 50 to the NRC for approval within one year or
two years, as applicable, from the effective date of the rule (November
3, 1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section
II.B.6 of this document.)
The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(1) of Sec. 50.54 to remove
language addressing a one-time requirement that has now been completed.
Section 50.54(s)(1) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980
(45 FR 55402). This provision required existing nuclear power reactor
licensees to submit to the NRC within 60 days after the effective date
of the rule (November 3, 1980), the radiological response plans of
State and local governmental entities in the U.S. that are wholly or
partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of
State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ.
(A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this
document.)
The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(2)(i) from Sec. 50.54. Section
50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a final rule on August 19, 1980
(45 FR 55402), as a single paragraph. The rule was amended on May 29,
1981 (46 FR 28838), resulting in Sec. 50.54(s)(2) being split into two
paragraphs, Sec. Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The rule
language in Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(i) required that the licensee, State, and
local emergency plans for all operating power reactors be implemented
by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E
to Part 50. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section
II.B.6 of this document.)
The NRC is removing paragraph (u) from Sec. 50.54. Section
50.54(u) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR
55402), to require then existing nuclear power reactor licensees to
submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet the
standards in Sec. 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part
50 within 60 days after the effective date of the rule (November 3,
1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6
of this document.)
The NRC is revising paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of Sec. 50.54
to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains within DHS, the
responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power plants is with FEMA.
The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather than ``DHS'' for
clarity of communication with stakeholders.
The NRC is amending Sec. 50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the reference
to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides
criteria in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional
requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a
certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed
in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
3. Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section I,
``Introduction,'' to include a provision allowing an applicant for an
early site permit under Part 52 that chooses to propose either major
features of an, or a complete and integrated, emergency plan (Sec.
52.17(b)(2)), or a combined license under Part 52 (Sec. 52.79(a)(21))
whose application is docketed before December 23, 2011 to choose to
defer compliance with this rule.
If the applicant chooses to defer compliance with this rule, and
its early site permit or combined license is subsequently issued, then
the permit holder or licensee shall request to amend its early site
permit or combined license to demonstrate compliance with this rule no
later than December 31, 2013. Furthermore, an applicant that defers
compliance with this rule is expected to implement this rule under the
same schedule as it would implement EP requirements in the absence of
this rule. This means that this rule does not require any immediate
implementation actions on the part of any applicant, but rather shall
be implemented after receipt of a combined license, and under the
licensee's schedule for completing EP-related requirements (e.g.,
through completion of EP-related Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and
Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)).
The NRC intends, by allowing an applicant to defer compliance with
this rule, to avoid unnecessary delays in making a licensing decision
on an early site permit or a combined license already under
consideration by the NRC, provided:
(1) The application complies with all applicable, current (prior to
this rulemaking) EP regulations;
(2) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a
combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit or combined
license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the amended EP
regulations in this rule; and
(3) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a
combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has
approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule.
In response to a request in the proposed rule for comments on the
potential impacts of a final rule on combined license and early site
permit application processes and schedules, the NRC received comments
that the
[[Page 72580]]
NRC should not require pending combined license and early site permit
applicants to implement the final rule changes until after the NRC
issues the license or permit. In this final rule, the NRC is offering
applicants the option to defer compliance with the final rule. That
period of compliance deferral, between December 23, 2011 and December
31, 2013, was selected specifically to apply only to those applications
that have already been docketed and are nearing completion of the
safety review and subsequent hearings (as applicable) prior to a
licensing decision being made on the application. The NRC decided to
limit the duration of that deferral as stated because future applicants
and currently docketed applicants not nearing a licensing decision
would have ample time to bring their applications into compliance with
this final rule without the need to defer compliance. So that all
combined license and early site permit applicants ultimately comply
with the same regulations, an applicant whose application is docketed
before December 23, 2011 that does not receive a combined license or
early site permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined
license or early site permit application to comply with the changes in
this final rule no later than December 31, 2013.
The NRC has added a new requirement in Part 50, Appendix E, Section
I, to address the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) facility at Watts
Bar. The TVA is in possession of a current construction permit for
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, and is treated as a current licensee
for purposes of satisfying the requirements of this rule. These
requirements reflect NRC support of a licensing review approach for
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, that employs the current licensing
basis for Unit 1 as the reference basis for review and licensing of
Unit 2, as stated in the SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation
of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear
Plant Unit 2,'' dated July 25, 2007.
To improve clarity in the organization of the regulations, the
final rule numbers the paragraphs of Section I.
The NRC is amending paragraph H in Section II of Appendix E to
remove a reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are
provided in Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from
a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for
EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E. (A
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this
document.)
The NRC is amending several paragraphs within Section IV of
Appendix E to Part 50 that apply to licensees and applicants for
licenses under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, as applicable. All
provisions of Section IV of Appendix E to Part 50 apply to applicants
for, and holders of, nuclear power reactor operating licenses under
Part 50, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site
permits under Part 52. Many of the provisions in Section IV also apply
to Part 50 non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, for purposes of
brevity, the initial reference to a ``licensee'' in each of the
remaining paragraphs in this section indicates that that particular
rule change applies to applicants for, and holders of, operating
licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power reactors and non-power
reactors, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site
permits under Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise. The
initial reference to ``nuclear power reactor licensee'' in each of the
remaining paragraphs in this section means applicants for, and holders
of, operating licenses for nuclear power reactors under Part 50,
combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site permits under
Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise.
The NRC is amending the former first paragraph of Section IV by
adding language to require nuclear power reactor licensees, but not
applicants, to revise their ETEs when the U.S. Census Bureau decennial
census data is available. The final rule requires that within 365 days
of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent
decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule, and
within 365 days of the availability of subsequent decennial census
data, these licensees must revise their ETE analyses using the
decennial census data, and submit the analyses to the NRC under Sec.
50.4.
The NRC will review the ETE analyses for completeness using NUREG/
CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate
Studies,'' the NRC guidance on ETE development issued with the final
rule. The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of submitting
ETE updates for NRC review and extended the time period for ETE update
submission from 180 to 365 days after a population change triggering
the update or the release of census data. The NRC will not approve ETE
updates but will review them for completeness. For this reason the NRC
is requiring licensees to submit their ETE updates at least 180 days
before they use them to form protective action recommendations and
provide them to offsite authorities for use in developing offsite
protective action strategies. This will allow time for NRC review after
which licensees may assume that the updates are adequate and available
for use.
The NUREG/CR-7002 guidance is an acceptable template to meet the
requirements for ETE analysis development and nuclear power reactor
licensees should use this guidance, or an appropriate alternative, when
developing an ETE analysis or analysis update. The first set of 2010
census data is expected to be available in 2011. The NRC will establish
a schedule for review of the updated ETEs. After the licensee submits
the ETE analysis for NRC review, these ETEs will be known as the
licensee's ``updated'' ETEs, as opposed to the ``approved'' ETEs, which
are the ETEs approved by the NRC when it issues a license.
Thereafter, these licensees are required to annually review changes
in the population of their EPZs. To complete these reviews, licensees
will use data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which annually produces
resident population estimates and State/local government population
data, if available. These reviews must be conducted no more than 365
days apart. The licensee is required to update the ETE analysis to
reflect the impact of a population change that causes the longest ETE
value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected
Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs), or for the entire 10-mile
EPZ to change by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less from the
licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated ETE. An ERPA is defined as
a local area within the EPZ for which emergency response information is
provided; the EPZ is typically divided into ERPAs along geographic or
political boundaries. The licensee is required to submit the updated
ETE analysis to the NRC under the procedures of Sec. 50.4 within 365
days of the availability of the population data used in the update and
at least 180 days before using it to form protective action
recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental
authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required an ETE analysis
update when the population in the EPZ or most populous ERPA increased
or decreased by more than 10 percent from the
[[Page 72581]]
population that formed the basis for the licensee's currently approved
ETE. Several commenters disagreed with the 10 percent population change
criterion being the triggering event that would require licensees to
update their ETEs. Suggested alternative thresholds included various
population sensitivity studies that would assess the effects of
population changes on ETE values; a 25 percent change in the ETE
baseline rather than a 10 percent change in the EPZ population; and
population changes resulting in a change to ETE values of 25 percent or
30 minutes, whichever is less.
The final rule adopts the approach of a 25 percent or 30 minute
increase in ETE values to determine when an ETE analysis update is
warranted. The NRC determined that basing ETE analysis updates on a
population change alone without consideration of its impact on the ETE
values may not have resulted in useful ETE updates. This is because a
large population change in an area where there is an established
infrastructure may have no impact on ETE values, whereas a small
population change in an area with limited infrastructure may impact the
ETE values. The proposed requirement to update an ETE analysis based on
a standard value of a 10 percent population change would have required
licensees to submit updated ETEs that may have had the same time
estimates as the original document and, therefore, would provide no
useful updated ETE information to response agencies. An approach that
considers both population change and its impact on the ETE numerical
values provides assurance that updated ETE analyses are submitted only
when the ETE values are impacted. This links the update to a population
change that has an impact on the ETE values on a site-specific basis
rather than a generic 10 percent population change that may or may not
impact these values.
Therefore, nuclear power reactor licensees (but not applicants)
will be required to provide an updated ETE analysis to the NRC within
365 days of (1) The later of the date of the availability of the most
recent decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule,
(2) the availability of subsequent decennial census data, and (3) the
availability of the population data used in the update, during the
years between decennial censuses, when a population increase within the
EPZ causes certain ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes,
whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated
ETE. Licensees should perform a population sensitivity study for
various population increases (i.e., 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30
percent increases) to determine the population value that will cause
ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less.
If this threshold is reached during the decennial period between
censuses, the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the
impact of the population increase. To establish the basis for these
update criteria, the NRC considered the input of ETE subject matter
experts who considered the sensitivity of ETE analysis tools,
uncertainty of the data used in the development of ETEs, and
discussions with OROs regarding the time necessary to mobilize
resources to support an evacuation. The NRC determined that an ETE
increase of 30 minutes is the smallest time value that OROs would
consider to potentially impact a protective action decision from
shelter-in-place to evacuate or vice versa. A review of more than 30
current ETEs shows that most ETEs are longer than 4 hours. Therefore,
the 30-minute increase would likely be the overriding criterion,
although the 25-percent increase would be expected to apply primarily
to sites with shorter ETEs. Either of these criteria would constitute a
material change in ETE times and would provide an appropriate
assessment of the effect of population change on the ETE on a site-
specific basis.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the licensee to
submit an ETE update within 180 days of a population change triggering
the update or the release of census data. The NRC received several
stakeholder comments in opposition to the proposed 180-day requirement,
some stating that the 180-day timeframe may be unrealistic. The NRC
agrees that 180 days to complete ETE updates could be challenging based
on the number of licensees and the limited number of commercial
contractors available to complete the updates. Therefore, the NRC is
extending the amount of time to complete ETE analysis updates from 180
to 365 days.
One commenter pointed out that ETEs only analyze the time required
to evacuate areas within the EPZ. The commenter requested that the NRC
clarify the sentence ``time required * * * for taking other protective
actions'' because the only other protective action is to shelter in
place and would not fall under the ETE. The NRC agrees with this
comment and has removed the language ``and for taking other protective
actions'' from the final rule language.
The requirement for nuclear power reactor licensees (but not
applicants) to evaluate a population change impact on the ETE during
the period between decennial censuses balances the burden on licensees
by requiring an ETE analysis update only when a population change has a
material impact on the individual ETE values. The U.S. Census Bureau
currently projects population growth at approximately one percent per
year in the U.S. However, certain areas experience much greater growth.
The population of Maricopa County, Arizona, for example, experienced
approximately 6.4 percent growth in the two year period from 2005 to
2007. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is located in Maricopa
County. St. Lucie County in Florida, where the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
is located, experienced approximately 9.7 percent population growth in
the same period. A nuclear plant's EPZ population may not grow at the
same rate as the corresponding county(ies) population, but a review of
population growth would be appropriate, as discussed in Section II.B.4
of this document.
The updated ETEs will allow for more effective development of
public protective action strategies and review of evacuation planning.
Sites with little population change will be minimally impacted by the
requirement, while those sites with a greater rate of population change
that materially impacts ETE values will be required to perform more
frequent updates. Licensees should also identify potential enhancements
to improve evacuation times and discuss them with OROs. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
The final rule also explains that a nuclear power reactor license
applicant must use the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data, as of the
date the applicant submits its application to the NRC, to conduct the
ETE analysis for its application. Once an applicant obtains a combined
license, it will need to conduct one review of any changes in the
population of its EPZ at least 365 days before the licensee's scheduled
fuel load. The licensee must use updated decennial census data if more
recent decennial census data than that used in the licensee's
application is available. If more recent decennial census data is not
available, then the licensee must use annual resident population
estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and State and local government
population data, if available. The licensee must update its ETE
analysis if a population increase within the EPZ causes certain ETE
values to increase by 25 percent or 30
[[Page 72582]]
minutes, whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved
or updated ETE. If the 25-percent or 30-minute threshold is reached,
the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of the
population increase. The licensee must perform this review and submit
the ETE update, to the extent necessary, no later than 365 days before
the scheduled fuel load. After beginning operations, the licensee will
need to comply with the final rule requirements, including the
frequency of ETE reviews and updates, like any other operating
licensee.
The NRC is revising the former first paragraph of Section IV to
change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.'' In the same
paragraph, the phrase ``onsite protective actions during hostile
action'' is being added as one of the elements for which emergency
plans must contain information needed to demonstrate compliance. These
elements correspond with the description of each part of Section IV;
the requirement for onsite protective actions during hostile action is
being added in new Section IV.I. The NRC is also clarifying that the
requirements for the submittal of emergency response plans apply to not
only applicants for nuclear power reactor operating licenses under Part
50, but also to applicants for early site permits (as applicable) and
combined licenses under Part 52. This clarification was intended for,
but inadvertently omitted from, a rulemaking to update Part 52 (72 FR
49517; August 28, 2007). To improve clarity in the organization of the
rule, the final rule separates Section IV, as amended by the final
rule, into seven paragraphs and numbers each of the paragraphs.
The final rule makes two editorial revisions to Appendix E to Part
50, Section IV.A.2. One change includes the abbreviation of emergency
response organization, ``ERO,'' in paragraph 2 of Section IV.A. The
second revision clarifies that paragraph 2.c. should read as follows:
``Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency
coordinator * * *.''
The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to include
hostile action at the site as one of the types of emergencies that
define the State, local, and Federal agencies that nuclear power
reactor licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the
assistance licensees expect from these agencies. The former regulations
did not explicitly require the licensee to identify ORO resources for
responding to the site during hostile action. Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.A.7, in the final rule adds this requirement to ensure that
the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile action at
the site are identified in the licensee's emergency plan. This
requirement will be enforced through routine inspection and observation
of emergency exercises. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.4 of this document.)
In the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, would
have been modified to add the following: ``Nuclear power plant
licensees shall ensure that offsite response organization resources
(e.g., local law enforcement, firefighting, medical assistance) are
available to respond to an emergency including hostile action at the
nuclear power plant site.'' The NRC received several comments asserting
that the proposed rule language would give authority to the licensee
over the OROs in order to ``ensure'' that resources would be available
to respond to hostile action. The NRC agrees with the comments that
determining the adequacy of ORO emergency plans is under the
jurisdiction of FEMA and other State and local organizations, and the
NRC did not intend to give licensees authority over OROs via this
rulemaking. The NRC is revising the final rule by deleting the second
sentence of Section IV.A.7, in the proposed rule, thereby clarifying
the intent of the final rule.
The NRC is revising Section IV.A.7 by inserting the words ``a
description of the'' immediately before ``assistance expected from,
appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies'' to make this provision
read consistently with the other paragraphs in Section IV.A.
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, also adds the definition of
``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or
its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy
equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an
end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns,
explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver
destructive force. This definition is based on the definition of
``hostile action'' in BL-05-02. The NRC is excluding non-power reactors
from the definition of ``hostile action'' at this time because a
regulatory basis has not been developed to support the inclusion of
non-power reactors in that definition. Further analysis and stakeholder
interactions would be needed prior to including non-power reactors in
the definition of ``hostile action.''
The NRC received a stakeholder comment via FEMA stating that a
``hostile action,'' as defined by the NRC, does not mention cyber
attacks, which should be considered as a form of hostile action. Cyber
attacks are addressed in licensees' cyber security plans consistent
with Sec. 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and communication
systems and networks,'' and associated guidance documents. The current
cyber security program associates cyber attacks with ``digital computer
and communication systems and networks,'' whereas the definition of
hostile action is an act by individuals using physical violence that
can potentially achieve an end to harm public health and safety. Even
though cyber attacks can be malevolent actions against NRC licensees,
its definition maintains an association with digital or analog computer
and communications systems, whereas hostile actions imply physical
attacks by individuals. Therefore, the definition of ``hostile action''
in Section IV.A.7 was not changed as a result of this comment.
The former Section IV.A.7 applied to non-power reactor licensees,
and the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final
rule. Non-power reactor licensees are still required to identify ORO
resources that would respond to an emergency and the assistance
licensees expect from these resources. However, because ``hostile
action'' is defined as ``an act directed toward a nuclear power plant
or its personnel,'' non-power reactor licensees are not required to
identify the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile
action at the non-power reactor site.
The NRC is adding a new paragraph A.9 in Section IV of Appendix E
to Part 50. This new paragraph will require nuclear power reactor
licensees to perform a detailed analysis to show that on-shift
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing
their assigned emergency plan functions when needed. In the proposed
rule, the NRC would have required licensees to ``provide'' a detailed
analysis. However, the NRC did not intend for licensees to submit the
detailed analysis for review or approval. Therefore, the wording in the
final rule was changed to require licensees to have a detailed analysis
in their emergency plans without providing it to the NRC.
The final rule does not specify, by position or function, which
responsibilities must be assigned, but allows nuclear power reactor
licensees the flexibility to determine the limit of assigned
responsibilities for effective emergency plan implementation on a site-
specific basis. This allows licensees
[[Page 72583]]
to take credit for new technologies that could potentially affect the
number of on-shift staff that would be needed. However, licensees need
to ensure that the duties assigned to on-shift staff are reasonable for
one person to perform and are not so burdensome as to negatively impact
emergency response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.1 of this document.)
The final rule requires nuclear power reactor licensees to perform
a detailed analysis, such as a job task analysis (JTA) or a time motion
analysis, to demonstrate that on-shift personnel could implement the
plan effectively without having competing responsibilities that could
prevent them from performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The
NRC expects the analysis to identify all the tasks that must be
performed by available staff during an evolution such as response to an
emergency. These licensees need to define the events that will be used
in the detailed staffing analysis, such as postulated design basis
accidents and the DBT, for which there must be emergency planning. The
analysis must identify all tasks that must be completed for each
analyzed event, and the responders responsible for the performance of
those tasks. Licensees must then ensure that there is sufficient on-
shift staff to perform all necessary tasks until augmentation staff
arrives to provide assistance. Enhancing the regulations to require
licensees to ensure that multiple responsibilities assigned to on-shift
staff will not detract from adequate emergency plan implementation will
establish a regulatory framework that more clearly codifies the NRC's
shift staffing expectations for effective emergency response.
The NRC is amending Section IV.B of Appendix E to Part 50 to add a
requirement that nuclear power reactor licensees must consider hostile
action, which may adversely affect the plant (e.g., cause personnel
harm and/or equipment damage), in their EAL schemes. It will also serve
to establish consistent EALs for hostile action among existing and
future nuclear power reactor licensees and allow the licensees to make
hostile action-related emergency declarations based on a credible
threat. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.2
of this document.)
The former Section IV.B applied to non-power reactor licensees, and
the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final rule.
Non-power reactor licensees are still required to have EALs to initiate
emergency response and protective actions. However, as discussed in
Section II.A.2 of this document, the NRC is addressing through guidance
the issue of hostile action EALs for non-power reactor licensees. In
addition, the definition of ``hostile action'' does not include non-
power reactors. Therefore, non-power reactor licensees are not required
to consider hostile action in their EAL schemes at this time.
The final rule also makes changes to Appendix E to conform to
changes to Sec. 50.54(q), which address the issue described in Section
II.B.5 of this document. The NRC is modifying the requirement in former
paragraph (1) in Section IV.B of Appendix E to require each licensee to
obtain prior NRC approval via Sec. 50.90 if the licensee is changing
its entire EAL scheme. This provision carries forward the intent of the
former regulation to compel licensees to obtain NRC approval before
changing EAL schemes, and sets forth the correct process to request
that approval. The proposed rule would have required licensees to use
Sec. 50.4 to obtain prior NRC approval. For many of the same reasons
provided earlier in Section IV of this document in the discussion of
licensee use of the license amendment process to obtain prior NRC
approval of changes to an emergency plan that would reduce the
effectiveness of the plan under Sec. 50.54(q), the license amendment
process is the appropriate process for licensees to use to obtain prior
NRC approval of EAL scheme changes.
The Commission explained in the Statement of Considerations for the
2005 final rule concerning NRC approval of licensee changes to EALs (70
FR 3591; January 26, 2005) the importance of prior NRC approval of a
licensee's EAL scheme change:
The Commission believes a licensee's proposal to convert from
one EAL scheme (e.g., NUREG-0654-based) to another EAL scheme (e.g.,
NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI-99-01 based) * * * is of sufficient
significance to require prior NRC review and approval. NRC review
and approval for such major changes in EAL methodology is necessary
to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that the final EAL
change will provide an acceptable level of safety.
As previously noted, courts have found that Commission actions that
expand licensees' authority under their licenses without formally
amending the licenses constitute license amendments and should be
processed through the Commission's license amendment procedures. The
Commission has determined that a licensee's EAL scheme change requires
prior NRC approval ``to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that
the final EAL change will provide an acceptable level of safety.''
These determinations require exercises of agency discretion. The staff
must ensure that the licensee adopts each element of the generic EAL
scheme to fit its site and facility. In addition, the licensee does not
have the authority to change to a new scheme unless the NRC approves
the change in advance. Under the legal precedents, NRC staff approval
in these instances would grant the licensee authority beyond its
current operating authority, and that approval requires a license
amendment. This final rule clarifies that the process to request prior
NRC approval of EAL scheme changes is the license amendment process.
The final rule provides additional flexibility by permitting
licensees to use EAL schemes other than those listed in Section IV.B.2
of the proposed rule, provided that the licensee obtains prior NRC
approval. The final rule corrects a misstatement in the proposed rule
that the former rule required licensees to obtain prior NRC approval
via Sec. 50.4 for changes to an EAL scheme from NUREG-0654 to one
based solely on NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01. The final rule also
removes the paragraph numbering in Section IV.B of the former rule. The
former first paragraph of Section IV.B, as amended by this final rule,
is designated as paragraph 1. As explained above, former paragraph (1)
in Section IV.B has been replaced with the provision requiring
licensees to obtain prior NRC approval, via a license amendment, for
EAL scheme changes. The final rule deletes former paragraphs (2) and
(3) of Section IV.B and replaces them with a new requirement that all
EAL changes, other than EAL scheme changes, are required to be made
under the amended Sec. 50.54(q) change process, as discussed earlier
in Section IV of this document. The final rule designates the
provisions concerning EAL scheme changes and other EAL changes as
paragraph 2. Paragraph B.2 applies to nuclear power reactor licensees
and non-power reactor licensees.
The NRC is retaining the existing language of Section IV.C of
Appendix E to Part 50, redesignating that language as paragraph C.1,
and adding new paragraph C.2. Paragraph C.1 still applies to non-power
reactor licensees, but paragraph C.2 does not, for the reasons provided
in Section II.B.2 of this document. Paragraph C.2 requires that nuclear
power reactor licensees, first, have and maintain the capability to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes
after the availability of indications to plant operators that an
emergency
[[Page 72584]]
action level has been exceeded and, second, promptly declare the
emergency condition upon identification of the appropriate ECL. Any
given emergency condition may result in the thresholds for two or more
EALs being exceeded and licensees need to consider all applicable EALs
and base the classification decision on that EAL resulting in the
higher ECL.
In Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph C.2 of the proposed rule, the NRC
would have required that licensees and applicants had to promptly
declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following a
determination that an EAL has been exceeded. The NRC received a
stakeholder comment that suggested that the proposed language could be
interpreted as requiring declaration on the first identified EAL.
Because such an interpretation was not the NRC's intent, the NRC
reworded the proposed phrase ``following determination that an
emergency action level has been exceeded,'' in the proposed rule to
read ``following identification of the appropriate emergency
classification level,'' in the final rule to clearly articulate the
NRC's intent.
This new requirement emphasizes the NRC's expectations regarding
the timeliness of emergency declarations while retaining sufficient
operational flexibility to respond to extenuating circumstances
necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC considers the
15-minute criterion to commence when plant instrumentation, plant
alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that correspond
to an EAL become available to any plant operator. As used here, ``plant
operator'' means any member of the plant staff, who by virtue of
training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or
reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the
licensee's emergency classification scheme. ``Plant operators'' may be,
but need not be, licensed operators or members of the ERO. ``Plant
operators'' may be located in the control room or in another emergency
facility in which emergency declarations are performed. The phrase
``plant operators'' does not encompass plant personnel such as
chemists, radiation technicians, craft personnel, security personnel,
and others whose positions require they report, rather than assess,
abnormal conditions to the control room.
The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification,
and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration
from the first availability of a plant indication or receipt of a
report of an off-normal condition by plant operators up to and
including the declaration of the emergency. Validation or confirmation
of plant indications, or reports to the plant operators, is to be
accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment. A
small number of EAL thresholds are related to the results of analyses
(e.g., dose assessments, chemistry sampling) that are necessary to
ascertain whether or not a numerical EAL threshold has been exceeded,
rather than confirming or verifying an alarm or a received report. In
these limited cases, the 15-minute declaration period starts with the
availability of analysis results that show the threshold to be
exceeded; this is the time that the information is available.
Nonetheless, the NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to
initiate and complete these analyses with a reasonable sense of
urgency.
This 15-minute criterion ends as soon as the nuclear power reactor
licensee determines that an EAL has been exceeded and the licensee
makes the emergency declaration. The final rule requires the licensee
to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible
following the identification of the appropriate ECL. Because the NRC
requires emergency declarations to be made promptly, the final rule
states that the 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace
period in which a licensee may attempt to restore plant conditions to
avoid declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. If the EAL
threshold specifies a duration (e.g., ``fire lasting for greater than
10 minutes from detection''), the licensee is expected to assess and
classify the event concurrently with the specified condition duration.
The licensee is then required to promptly declare the emergency
condition as soon as the specified duration has been exceeded because
no further assessment is necessary to make the declaration. The
licensee is encouraged, but not required, to declare the emergency
condition once it has been determined that the condition cannot be
corrected before the specified duration is exceeded.
The final rule establishes a capability criterion, rather than an
inflexible performance criterion, to allow nuclear power reactor
licensees some degree of flexibility in addressing extenuating
circumstances that may arise during an actual emergency. For example,
an emergency declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of
performing plant operations that are urgently needed to protect public
health and safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did
not deny State and local authorities the opportunity to implement
actions to protect the public health or safety under their emergency
plans and the cause of the delay was not reasonably within the
licensee's ability to foresee and prevent.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have established a 15-minute
criterion for the declaration of an emergency condition. The NRC
received several stakeholder comments that questioned the magnitude of
the numeric criterion. Other comments suggested a less restrictive one-
hour criterion for events classified as Notification of Unusual Events
in light of the reduced consequences to the public of these events. In
developing this rule, the NRC objective was to codify the 15-minute
timeliness goal that had been the expected performance level after the
publishing of the EPPOS-2 guidance and which had been incorporated into
the ROP. The NRC believes that 15 minutes is an appropriate timeliness
capability criterion based on the following rationale. The declaration
of a General Emergency requires the nuclear power reactor licensee to
provide a recommendation for public protective actions to State and
local governments. These protective actions can be more effective in
reducing the radiological consequences of the emergency on the public
if the action is implemented in a timely manner, preferably before the
onset of a major release of radioactive materials. The steps that need
to be taken by offsite officials to consider the licensee's
recommendation and to decide upon and implement an action cannot start
until the licensee has classified and declared the emergency and
provided the appropriate recommendation. As such, time is of the
essence. The planning basis for emergency planning for nuclear power
plants provided in NUREG-0654 addresses a spectrum of accidents. The
NUREG-0654 planning basis provides that the onset of the release to the
environment following the onset of the event may range from 0.5 hours
to one day. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3, as amended by the
final rule, requires the licensee to have the capability to notify the
State and local officials within 15 minutes after declaring an
emergency and that the alert and notification system be capable of
alerting the public and initiating notification of the public within
about 15 minutes. The 15-minute timeliness expectation for emergency
declarations now being codified is consistent with these current
regulatory requirements and the EP planning basis.
Although the NRC recognizes that protective actions are not
necessary at the lower ECLs and the lower ECL events have lesser
potential
[[Page 72585]]
consequences on the public, the NRC believes that a single timeliness
criterion for all four ECLs is necessary. The NRC notes that the ECL,
be it a Notification of Unusual Event or a higher ECL, cannot be known
until the classification is completed and the declaration is made. This
argues against the use of different timeliness criteria for
Notification of Unusual Events and higher ECLs because emergency events
may not proceed step-wise through the four ECLs.
Further, the actions to assess, classify, and declare an emergency,
and the resources needed to accomplish those actions (e.g.,
``capability''), do not differ by ECL. Although there are more EAL
thresholds to consider during a Notification of Unusual Event than
there are at the higher ECLs, this is balanced by increasing demands on
the on-shift staff (i.e., to perform assessments, corrective actions,
and mitigative actions needed to address the degraded plant condition)
associated with the higher ECLs. The conditions (such as insufficient
staffing, procedures, and training) that reduce a nuclear power reactor
licensee's capability for declaring a Notification of Unusual Event
within 15 minutes have a similar effect on the licensee's capability
for declaring higher ECLs. Also, the licensee's performance in
declaring Notification of Unusual Events is a viable predictor of
licensee performance at the less frequently declared higher ECLs. These
performance deficiencies might not be identified and corrected if the
NRC were to establish one hour for declaring Notification of Unusual
Events and 15 minutes for the higher classification level emergencies.
Therefore, the NRC has decided to retain the single timeliness
criterion in the final rule for all ECLs.
The NRC is amending Section IV.D.1 of Appendix E to remove footnote
1. This footnote is unnecessary because the term ``EPZ'' is already
addressed in Section I of Appendix E. This change will also make the
numbering of footnotes sequentially consistent throughout Appendix E.
The NRC is amending Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to require that
the public alert and notification system required by this section
additionally has backup methods for both the alert and notification
functions without specifying which backup measures should be used. This
approach allows flexibility in the selection of the method best suited
for each nuclear power reactor site and also allows the use of newer
technologies or other alternative methods. The availability of backup
ANS methods enhances the public's ability to be promptly alerted of an
event at a facility and of possible protective actions. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.1 of this document.)
Former Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E acknowledged that, for the
events more likely to warrant use of the alert and notification
capability, State and local officials will have substantial time
available to make a judgment regarding activation of the warning system
to alert and notify the public. Accordingly, the final rule will not
impose specific time requirements for using a backup method. The
alerting function may involve one or more methods that are already used
as a backup means at several sites, such as multiple, independent siren
activation points in conjunction with siren backup power, route
alerting, reverse call-out systems or newer technologies, such as
intelligent notification and communication systems for notifying
targeted populations. The notification function may involve the
designation of multiple EAS broadcast stations or use of weather alert
radios or newer technologies, such as advanced messaging systems. The
NRC and FEMA are providing guidance, issued contemporaneously with this
final rule, for determining the acceptability of the backup methods
based on the alerting and notification capabilities of the methods
selected, administrative provisions for implementing and maintaining
backup methods, identification of resources to implement backup
methods, and periodic demonstration of the backup methods. Guidance is
also being provided to nuclear power reactor licensees and offsite
officials regarding the need to ensure that the backup methods can
alert and notify the public in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ,
that the personnel and resources required to implement the backup
methods will be available during any type of emergency (including
hostile action), and that designated personnel know how to implement
backup methods.
The backup method of alerting and notification must be capable of
providing warning signals and instructional messages to the population
in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ when the primary ANS is
unavailable during an emergency (i.e., the primary ANS cannot alert or
notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population).
The backup means may be designed so that it can be implemented using a
phased approach in which the populations most at risk are alerted and
notified first, followed by alerting and notification of people in less
immediately affected areas. The backup method may have the additional
capability of being employed only in the specific areas impacted when a
portion of the primary ANS, such as a single siren or sirens within a
community, fails and the extent of the affected area and population can
be determined.
The new requirement for a backup method applies to both the
alerting function and notification function of the FEMA approved ANS.
However, the NRC recognizes that some backup methods are not capable of
meeting the timeframes that are part of the primary ANS design
objectives. The intent of the final rule is not to have a duplicate
primary ANS, but to have a means of backup alerting and notification in
place so the public can be alerted in sufficient time to allow offsite
officials to consider a range of protective actions for the public to
take in the event of a severe accident with potential offsite
radiological consequences. The NRC and FEMA are providing guidance to
clarify the design objectives and other criteria for ANS backup
methods.
For nuclear power plant sites with no backup measures currently in
place, backup provisions must be identified, incorporated into the
site's ANS design, and submitted for FEMA approval as specified in
FEMA-REP-10. For nuclear power plant sites that already have provisions
for ANS backup means in FEMA approved ANS designs, licensees and
offsite officials will need to confirm that the backup methods meet the
final rule requirements and submit revised ANS designs for FEMA
approval if changes were deemed necessary. New Section IV.D.4 in
Appendix E to Part 50 sets forth the deadlines for these implementation
phases. Section V of this document provides further explanation of the
deadlines.
Additional changes to Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 are being made to
more clearly distinguish between the alerting and notification
functions of the ANS (including clarification of how the 15-minute
design objective applies to these functions), to use consistent
terminology when referring to the officials responsible for ANS
activation, and to update language regarding demonstration of ANS
capabilities and correction of deficiencies. The final rule adds a
reference to the alerting function in Section IV.D.3 to clearly
indicate that the requirements for the primary and backup ANS apply to
both the alerting and notification functions. The wording of the
primary ANS design objective is revised to clarify that the 15-minute
criterion applies to the completion of the initial alerting and start
of the initial notification of the public. This
[[Page 72586]]
clarification was made because the NRC, consistent with the 1990
Seabrook decision (Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook
Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-935, 32 NRC 57, 68 (1990), has determined
that notification of the public need not be completed within 15 minutes
but that initiation of the notification process must begin within 15
minutes). The phrase ``appropriate governmental authorities'' replaces
the phrase ``State and local officials'' when referring to ANS
activation to encompass site-specific variations in the assignment of
the responsibility for this function according to each offsite
emergency plan and established ANS activation protocols. This
responsibility may be assigned to a single State or local organization,
or to multiple organizations among various State, county, local, and
other governmental agencies. The use of ``appropriate governmental
authorities'' addresses all of these variations. The former Section
IV.D.3 referred to the February 1, 1982, date for then existing nuclear
power reactor licensees to have demonstrated ANS capabilities for their
sites. The NRC is removing the reference to the February 1, 1982, date
and requiring that ANS capabilities to alert the public and provide
instructions promptly must be demonstrated before exceeding 5 percent
rated thermal power of the first reactor at each site, consistent with
the requirements of Sec. 50.47(d). It is also important that licensees
promptly correct deficiencies found during initial ANS installation and
testing, as well as deficiencies identified thereafter, as required by
Sec. 50.54(s)(2). However, the requirement for correction of ANS
deficiencies is clearly stated in Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not
need to be repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required licensees to
identify and demonstrate that governmental authorities had the
administrative and physical means for providing a backup method of
public ANS. The NRC received several stakeholder comments that noted
that governmental authorities are generally responsible for ANS
activation and implementing any backup public ANS, and that the
licensee has no control over the resources necessary to implement the
backup capability. The NRC agrees that licensees generally secure the
support of governmental authorities to maintain reasonable assurance
that the offsite portions of the emergency plan can and will be
implemented. In response to these comments, and to improve regulatory
clarity and structure, the final rule modifies the proposed rule
language for the backup capability to reflect this division of ANS
responsibilities.
Note that no changes are being made to the basic requirement in
Sec. 50.47(b)(5) for nuclear power reactor licensees or applicants to
ensure that the means to provide early notification and clear
instruction (i.e., alerting and notification) to the populace in the
plume exposure pathway EPZ have been established. It is not necessary
to address backup methods in Sec. 50.47(b)(5) because the current
provision establishes the overall requirement for alerting and
notification.
Based on a comment received on the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix
E, Section IV.E.5 is revised to replace the reference to ``physicians''
with the term ``medical service providers'' because licensees typically
make arrangements for medical services with medical service providers
rather than individual physicians. The phrase ``and other medical
personnel'' is deleted because it is now redundant to the reference to
``medical service providers.'' The NRC also revised Section IV.E.5 of
Appendix E to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological'' to
provide consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
The final rule redesignates the former language of Appendix E,
Section IV.E.8 as Section IV.E.8.a; and adds new Sections IV.E.8.b,
IV.E.8.c, IV.E.8.d, and IV.E.8.e.
Section IV.E.8.a in the final rule removes the reference to the EOF
as a ``near-site'' facility and adds the requirement that nuclear power
reactor licensees must provide an OSC. In a conforming change, the
final rule revises Sec. 52.79(a)(17) to clarify that combined license
applications are not subject to the TMI action requirements in Sec.
50.34(f)(2)(xxv), which address the need for an onsite TSC, an onsite
OSC, and an EOF. Instead, the requirements governing the need for such
facilities in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) will apply to
combined license applications. (A discussion of this issue is also
provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
Section IV.E.8.b incorporates EOF distance criteria currently found
in NRC guidance and specifies that an EOF must be located within 10 to
25 miles of each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves
or, if the EOF is located less than 10 miles from a nuclear power
reactor site, then a backup facility must be provided within 10 to 25
miles of a site. The distance between the EOF and a site will be
determined by the straight line distance from the site's TSC to the
EOF, which is consistent with the approach described in NUREG-0696,
Table 2, ``Relation of EOF Location to Habitability Criteria,'' dated
February 1981. An EOF located more than 25 miles from the site must not
adversely impact the ability of licensee and offsite responders to
fulfill their responsibilities, and provisions for locating NRC and
offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site must be
made so they can interact face-to-face with personnel going to and
leaving the site for briefings and debriefings. During an event, NRC
and offsite agency staff may wish to relocate from a remotely located
EOF to another facility closer to the nuclear power plant site.
Suitable space near the site must be available so NRC and offsite
agency staff could coordinate their actions efficiently, communicate
with responders in other onsite and offsite emergency response
facilities, and interface directly with responders at the site as
needed. This space will allow NRC site team and offsite response
personnel, including Federal, State, and local responders, to conduct
briefings and debriefings with emergency response personnel entering
and leaving the site, communicate with responders at other emergency
response facilities, maintain awareness of conditions at the site, and
share information with other emergency response organizations via
electronic means, such as computer links, the internet, or facsimile
transmission.
The proposed rule language in Section IV.E.8.b of Appendix E would
have obviated the need for licensees to obtain approval at either the
NRC staff or Commission level to locate an EOF or consolidate EOFs more
than 25 miles from a site if the EOF met certain performance based
requirements and provided for NRC site team and offsite agency
responders closer to the site. However, offsite agencies and the NRC's
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) expressed concerns
about forgoing the requirement for a licensee to obtain NRC approval to
locate an EOF beyond 25 miles. The NRC believes it is important for a
licensee or an applicant to consult with offsite agencies that send
representatives to the EOF prior to locating or consolidating such
facilities. This consultation is particularly important when a licensee
or applicant intends to use an EOF located more than 25 miles from a
site to ensure that response times to the facility would be acceptable
to offsite responders, adequate communications with offsite
[[Page 72587]]
responders at other locations would be available, and the EOF location
would not raise any jurisdictional concerns (e.g., when the EOF is
located in a different State than a nuclear power plant). Therefore,
the NRC is retaining the requirement for a licensee or applicant to
obtain Commission approval to locate an EOF more than 25 miles from the
nuclear power plant site(s) it serves and modified the rule language in
Section IV.E.8.b accordingly.
A licensee will need prior Commission approval through a license
amendment to locate an EOF beyond the 25-mile limit. Similar to
approving EAL scheme changes and emergency plan changes that would
reduce the effectiveness of the plan, determining whether a licensee's
proposed EOF meets the regulatory criteria can require an exercise of
agency discretion. Approval in these instances would grant the licensee
authority beyond its current operating authority, and that approval
requires a license amendment. Consistent with previous Commission
approvals of EOFs beyond the 25-mile limit, these license amendments
must be approved by the Commission and not the NRC staff.
Section IV.E.8.c in the final rule provides performance based
criteria applicable to all EOFs. The functions that an EOF must address
include the capability to obtain and display plant data and
radiological information for each reactor unit or plant that the
facility serves. In some cases, an EOF may serve units or plants
involving more than one type of reactor technology, such as pressurized
water reactors and boiling water reactors, or more than one design of
the same reactor type. The EOF staff must be capable of understanding
conditions for each type of reactor and translating technical
information into a useful form for offsite officials and media
relations staff. A co-located or consolidated facility must also be
capable of supporting effective response to events at more than one
site simultaneously, because widespread events affecting multiple sites
can and have occurred, such as the electrical blackout in several areas
of the northeastern U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. The
ability to simultaneously display information for multiple plants will
also enhance effective response to events occurring at more than one
site.
Section IV.E.8.d in the final rule requires nuclear power reactor
licensees to identify an alternative facility (or facilities) that
would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing
hostile action, to function as staging areas for augmentation of ERO
staff during hostile action to minimize delays in emergency response
and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response. To accomplish
this, the alternative facility is required to have the following
characteristics: the capability for communication with the EOF, control
room, and plant security; the capability to notify offsite agencies;
and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including
damage control team planning and preparation. These capabilities will
ensure that the ERO is aware of conditions at the site and is prepared
to re-enter the site when it is deemed accessible. This will enable
rapid staffing of onsite emergency response facilities and
implementation of mitigation actions when ERO personnel enter the
protected area. However, alternative facilities are not required to
reproduce the full documentation present at primary emergency response
facilities.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power
plant licensees and applicants under Part 50 and Part 52 to identify an
alternative facility (or facilities) to function as staging areas for
augmentation of ERO staff during hostile action. The NRC received
several stakeholder comments that stated that the proposed rule was not
consistent with the wording of Attachment 5 to BL-05-02. One commenter
indicated that the use of the parenthetical phrase ``(or facilities)''
can be interpreted in two ways. If licensees use multiple locations to
function as the alternative facility, then this phrase could mean that
either all the locations will have the characteristics of the
alternative facility or that these locations will collectively have
those characteristics. To clarify this provision, the NRC changed the
language of the final rule to explicitly state that the alternative
facility (or facilities) must collectively have the necessary
characteristics.
The same commenter also stated that the proposed rule would require
the alternative facility to have the capability to perform offsite
notifications whereas the wording of BL-05-02 states that one of the
alternative facility characteristics is the capability to notify
offsite response organizations if the EOF is not performing this
action. The commenter argued that the final rule should have the same
wording as contained in BL-05-02. The NRC disagrees with this comment.
The intent of BL-05-02 was to provide a backup capability to perform
offsite notifications if the other licensee emergency response
facilities were not available due to a hostile action. In the event of
a hostile action, there is no guarantee that the EOF would be available
to perform this action. Therefore, the NRC has determined that the
capability to perform offsite notifications is a necessary
characteristic of alternative facilities. Licensees have the option to
use the EOF as their alternative facility if it is located outside the
owner-controlled area and is within about 30 miles of the site. If the
EOF is not the designated alternative facility, then the alternative
facility must also have the capability to perform offsite
notifications, though not necessarily with the identical equipment
utilized in other emergency response facilities.
The commenter also pointed out that the final rule should have the
same wording as BL-05-02, which states that ``it is appropriate for
alternative facilities to have general plant drawings, procedures,
phones, and (ideally) computer links to the site.'' Another commenter
recommended an increased implementation period for this part of the
rule since licensee facilities do not meet the proposed requirements
for the availability of computer links and would need to make facility
changes under the site modification process. The NRC agrees in part
with these comments. Bulletin BL-05-02 does direct licensees to equip
alternative facilities as stated. However, the NRC has determined that,
since the alternative facility (or facilities) must have the capability
to communicate with the EOF, control room, and site security, to
perform offsite notifications, and to conduct engineering assessment
activities, including damage control team planning and preparation,
licensees should have flexibility in meeting these requirements based
on site-specific characteristics. Also, the NRC did not intend for
licensees to perform major facility modifications or construct new
facilities to meet the new requirement. The NRC intends for licensees
to use existing facilities that are a safe distance from the plant.
Therefore, the NRC will not codify the equipment that must be present
in the alternative facility (or facilities) but rather will allow
licensees to achieve the required capabilities of the alternative
facility (or facilities) in the most appropriate manner for their site.
In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the alternative
facility (or facilities) to collectively exhibit certain
characteristics, one of which was ``accessibility even if the site is
under threat of a, or during an actual, hostile action.'' The ACRS
Plant Operations and Fire Protection Subcommittee questioned whether
the NRC intended for this provision to require that if
[[Page 72588]]
multiple facilities are utilized as the alternative facility, then each
of the facilities must be accessible during hostile action or the
threat thereof. Because the purpose of this provision is to require
nuclear power reactor licensees to have an alternative facility (or
facilities), each of which would be accessible under the threat of a,
or during an actual, hostile action, the NRC changed the language of
the final rule to clarify this characteristic of the alternative
facility (or facilities). (A discussion of this issue is also provided
in Section II.A.3 of this document.)
The NRC is also adding new Section IV.E.8.e to permit a nuclear
power reactor licensee that, on the day the final rule becomes
effective, has an existing approved EOF that does not meet the distance
criteria for a primary or backup EOF, or does not have provisions for a
facility closer to the site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles
from a nuclear power reactor site, to not be subject to the
requirements of Section IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already received
approval from the Commission for variances from existing requirements
(and guidance) regarding EOF locations, backup EOF facilities, or other
EOF characteristics. The rule language was revised in the final rule to
clarify that exceptions to the requirements of Section IV.E.8.b apply
only to existing EOFs. If a licensee relocates its EOF or consolidates
EOFs after the effective date of the final rule, then the requirements
of this section will apply to the relocated or consolidated facility.
(Also refer to the discussion of this issue in Section II.B.3 of this
document.)
The NRC is amending Sections IV.E.9.c and IV.E.9.d to remove
references to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are
provided in Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from a
nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for
EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
The NRC is revising paragraph F.1.a of Section IV to remove the
word ``radiation'' because the advent of hostile action scenarios
renders usage of the word as too limiting in describing potential
emergencies. This change provides consistent use of the term
``emergency plan.'' The NRC is also revising paragraph F.1.b to change
the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide consistent use
of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
The final rule revises Section IV.F.2 to replace ``public
notification system'' with ``public alert and notification system.'' In
the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2 referred to the ANS as the ``public
notification system'' and other sections of the rule referred to the
ANS as the ``public alert and notification system.'' The NRC received a
comment identifying this inconsistency. ``Public notification system''
has been changed in the final rule to the ``public alert and
notification system'' for clarity and consistency with the usage
elsewhere.
The NRC is adding a new requirement to Section IV.F.2.a to require
nuclear power reactor licensees to submit, for NRC review and
verification, scenarios for full participation exercises required by
Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. This requirement enables the NRC to
ensure that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the new
requirements of Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j of Appendix E, including
hostile action and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of
responders.
The NRC is revising paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and F.2.a.(iii) of
Appendix E, Section IV to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA
remains within DHS, the responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power
plants is with FEMA. The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather
than ``DHS'' for clarity of communication with stakeholders. In
addition, in the first sentence of paragraph F.2.a.(iii), the NRC is
changing the word ``licensee'' to ``license'' to correct a
typographical error.
The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.b to require nuclear power
reactor licensees to submit scenarios for their onsite biennial
exercises under 10 CFR 50.4. This requirement enables the NRC to verify
that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the requirements
of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j, including hostile action
and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of responders.
The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of scenario reviews
and has included language in the rule to specify that licensees must
submit scenarios to the NRC at least 60 days before the start of the
biennial exercise. The NRC will not approve scenarios, but will comment
if concerns are noted. The NRC will provide any comments to the
licensee no later than 30 days before the exercise begins. The NRC is
also inserting the word ``subsequent'' in paragraph F.2.b of Section IV
to distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b.
The NRC is also adding wording in paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b to
distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b
regarding the type of exercises for which scenarios are to be
submitted. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section
II.A.6 of this document.)
The former Section IV.F.2.b required that licensees ensure that
adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained to address
several principal emergency response functional areas. The NRC is
expanding the list of principal functional areas of emergency response
in paragraph F.2.b to include event classification, notification of
offsite authorities, assessment of the impact of onsite and offsite
radiological releases, and development of protective action
recommendations. These additional functional areas are associated with
the planning standards in Sec. 50.47(b) that have a significant impact
on determining the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to
protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency (i.e.,
Sec. 50.47(b)(4) regarding event classification, Sec. 50.47(b)(5)
regarding notification of offsite authorities, Sec. 50.47(b)(9)
regarding assessment of radiological releases, and Sec. 50.47(b)(10)
regarding protective actions).
Additionally, the NRC is clarifying the intent of the principal
functional areas by replacing the term ``corrective actions'' with the
term ``mitigative action implementation'' in Section IV.F.2.b. The term
``corrective actions'' is generally associated with a process (e.g.,
the Corrective Action Program) to address identified plant problems.
However, this process is not normally used during the active response
to an emergency. ``Mitigative action implementation'' is a more
accurate description of the principal functional area that is to be
demonstrated in exercises and drills. This term is not the same as
``plant system repair,'' another principal functional area, because
``mitigative action implementation'' may involve equipment, procedures,
and strategies developed under Sec. 50.54(hh), the use of fire truck
pumping capacity to inject water, or some ad hoc action. ``Mitigative
action implementation'' communicates the expectation for a much more
rapid response process than is communicated by ``corrective actions''
as that term is commonly used within the commercial nuclear power
industry.
The NRC is amending the last sentence of Section IV.F.2.b to add
``in all participating facilities'' after ``operating staff'' to
clarify that the operating staff from all facilities need not
participate in the drill. The NRC is
[[Page 72589]]
also changing ``the drills could focus on onsite training objectives''
to ``the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives''
to make the permissive intent of the regulatory language more explicit.
The NRC is amending the third sentence of Section IV.F.2.c by
correcting grammar without changing the substance or intent of the
provision. The word ``and'' is being removed from the end of Section
IV.F.2.c.(1) and (2), and a semicolon replaces the period at the end of
Section IV.F.2.c.(3), for the same reason. The NRC is also adding
Section IV.F.2.c.(4) and (5) to clarify requirements for nuclear power
reactor licensees at co-located sites to conduct hostile action
exercises. The NRC received a comment regarding this issue and modified
the proposed rule to direct that hostile action exercises be rotated
between the licensees. This change flows logically from the new
requirement to conduct hostile action exercises. Specific provisions
for the conduct of exercises at co-located sites have been previously
promulgated to clarify requirements for ORO participation (70 FR 3591).
This action was appropriate because the same OROs support the emergency
plans of both licensees at a co-located site. This final rule in
Section IV.F.2.c.(5) requires that licensees at a co-located site
rotate participation with OROs in hostile action exercises in a manner
similar to other exercise participation to ensure that all licensees
participate with OROs on a periodic basis. However, Section
IV.F.2.c.(4) requires that licensees not participating with OROs
conduct at least the onsite portion of hostile action exercises in each
exercise cycle in order to ensure the maintenance of key skills.
The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.d to reflect exercise cycle
requirements for States with respect to ingestion pathway and hostile
action exercises. The proposed rule included a case-by-case assessment
for scheduling of hostile action exercises in States with multiple
nuclear power reactors. However, in public meetings stakeholders
commented that case-by-case assessments would create regulatory
uncertainty. The final rule addresses exercises in States with multiple
nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZs by providing that
States should periodically participate in full or partial participation
hostile action exercises and should rotate State participation among
the licensees.
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d of the former rule provided
that States should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion
of exercises at least once every six years. As explained below
regarding changes to Section IV.F.2.j, the NRC is requiring exercise
cycles to be eight years long. A logical extension of establishing an
eight-year exercise cycle is to eliminate the minimum frequency element
in Section IV.F.2.d and state that States should fully participate in
the ingestion pathway portion of exercises every cycle.
The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.f to add a second situation when
remedial exercises are required. The final rule explains that remedial
exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily
tested during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC, in consultation
with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can be taken in response to an emergency or determine that key
ERO skills had been maintained. This change demonstrates the NRC's
intent to invoke this requirement for exercises where the scope of the
exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate the maintenance of key ERO
skills. In the past, some exercises have not provided such a
demonstration due to the use of simplistic scenarios. The final rule
change is intended to prevent this trend in the future.
The key skills necessary to implement the emergency plan vary among
ERO members, emergency response facilities, and licensees. In general,
key skills include the ability to implement emergency response
procedures specific to the duties of the ERO member. Key skills include
specific response capabilities that may be assigned in a site-specific
manner such as:
Timely classification of events;
Timely notification of offsite authorities;
Assessment of radiological releases onsite and offsite;
Development of protective action recommendations;
Dissemination of information to the public via media
channels;
Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and
repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions;
Mitigative action implementation;
Protection of workers during emergency response, including
medical care;
Response to operational transients while implementing the
emergency plan; and
Coordination with offsite response organizations.
In the proposed rule, the NRC provided a list of key skills
licensees' emergency responders would have needed to implement
emergency response procedures. The NRC received a comment that argued
that the list of skills needs to be more specific. The NRC does not
agree with this comment because the skills listed are more specific
than previous requirements, are elaborated upon in guidance, and in
some cases have been defined through the EP performance indicator
program, as described in NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009.
The NRC is also revising Section IV.F.2.g to require licensees to
correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified during exercises,
drills, or training. This change explicitly states the regulatory
intent that licensees must formally critique performance opportunities
that develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills in exercises, drills,
and training, and correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified in
a critique. The term ``performance opportunity'' is used to indicate
actual experiential events where proficiency in key skills is
demonstrated. Classroom training may not provide an actual performance
enhancing experience but rather offer instruction, while tabletop
drills and operator requalification drills may offer actual performance
opportunities.
The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.h in the final rule to correct
the reference to the section of Part 50 that pertains to situations in
which State and local governments refuse to participate in emergency
planning activities. The reference was changed to Sec. 50.47(c)(1).
The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.i to Appendix E to require all
nuclear power reactor licensees to include hostile action in biennial
evaluated exercises. The final rule also ensures that scenarios will be
sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of
radiological releases and events, to properly train responders to
respond to events more realistic than those currently used in training,
and to avoid preconditioning the responders to success with
inappropriate anticipatory responses. Licensees are also required to
emphasize coordination in their drills and exercises among onsite and
offsite response organizations to strengthen the capabilities of the
OROs to adequately respond to an emergency at the plant that requires
offsite response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.6 of this document.)
The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.j to Appendix E to require
that nuclear power reactor licensees conduct exercises that provide ERO
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills
necessary to implement the principal emergency response
[[Page 72590]]
functional areas identified in Section IV.F.2.b. Each exercise will
also be required to provide ERO members the opportunity to demonstrate
key skills specific to the emergency response duties in each emergency
response facility. During each exercise cycle, licensees will be
required to vary the content of exercise scenarios to provide ERO
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills
necessary to respond to several specific scenario elements, including
hostile action directed at the plant site; no radiological release or
an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public
protective actions; an initial classification of or rapid escalation to
a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency; implementation of
strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.
50.54(hh)(2); and integration of offsite resources with onsite
response. The final rule identifies the exercise cycle as eight
calendar years, which must begin in the year of the licensee's first
hostile action exercise. This amendment prescribes the minimum exercise
scenario elements necessary for licensees to meet NRC expectations for
challenging and varied scenario content in biennial exercises.
The NRC received comments regarding the proposed requirement that
the first exercise in the new cycle must include hostile action. In
States with multiple nuclear power reactor sites, this would require
several such exercises in succession, increasing the burden on State
emergency management agencies to support these exercises and perhaps
reducing the benefit of preparedness efforts. The implementation period
for this provision of the final rule was modified to allow current
licensees until December 31, 2015, to conduct a hostile action
exercise. The final rule clarifies the expectation that States should
fully participate in a hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015,
and that State full participation should be rotated among licensees in
States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway
EPZ.
The NRC believes that, in the current threat environment, nuclear
power reactors may be a target for hostile action. Although such an
attack is unlikely, EP is a defense-in-depth measure and NRC rules
require preparedness for unlikely accidents and events. The final rule
requires that hostile action response be integrated formally into the
EP program through the inspection of biennial exercises performed early
in the first exercise cycle and periodically thereafter.
The proposed rule would have identified the exercise cycle as six
years. The proposed rule additionally would have specified a minimum
frequency for hostile action scenarios. However, the NRC received
numerous comments that the cycle should be changed to eight years and
that a minimum frequency for hostile action scenarios should be
eliminated to allow more flexibility in meeting the new requirements as
well as preserving the variability of scenario challenges.
Additionally, the commenters stated that the new requirements for
scenario content coupled with the existing requirements would degrade
the ability to vary scenario content. The NRC agrees with these
comments and has changed the proposed rule to establish an eight-year
exercise cycle without a minimum frequency for hostile action
scenarios. This change enhances the ability of licensees to vary
exercise scenario content in line with the numerous comments received
on this issue.
Section IV.F.2.j in the final rule requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees maintain a record of exercises that documents the
contents of scenario elements used for each exercise during an exercise
cycle to comply with the requirements of paragraph F.2.j. The
documentation should include, but not be limited to, the following
items for each scenario: sequence and timeline of events; extent of ERO
participation and objectives to be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO
demonstration of classification, notification, and development of
protective action recommendations; expected radiological release
conditions and demonstration of dose assessment, including dose
projection results; and expected onsite/offsite radiological survey
activities and results.
In the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec. 50.54(hh)
in the scenario elements for the exercise cycle. The NRC received one
comment that suggested that the NRC delete the reference to Sec.
50.54(hh) in Section IV.F.2.j and that hostile action drills be
evaluated and incorporated into the NRC's triennial FOF drills. The NRC
does not agree with this comment. The NRC added the use of mitigation
equipment and procedures required by Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) and response to
hostile action in the final rule because they are important elements of
nuclear plant defense-in-depth. Including the use of Sec. 50.54(hh)(2)
equipment in FOF drills would be inappropriate because the ERO, not
security responders, would use the equipment. Additionally, the NRC has
previously determined that combining EP and FOF drills would be
extremely complicated due to differences in scope of the two evolutions
and the introduction of safeguards information issues. Further, the
exercises are easily separated and performance addressed individually
because the response is essentially serial. The aftermath of a security
response can be simulated effectively in EP exercises. This has been
demonstrated during the hostile action drill pilot program.
The NRC received a comment that proposed Section IV.F.2.j could be
interpreted as requiring an aircraft response in every hostile action
exercise because proposed Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec. 50.54(hh).
Section 50.54(hh)(1) requires certain actions to be taken in response
to an aircraft threat. Section 50.54(hh)(2) requires the development of
strategies, procedures, and guidance for response to loss of large
areas of the plant due to fire or explosion. The NRC intended to
require the demonstration of strategies, procedures, and guidance
developed under Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) as these elements could be used in
response to many accident scenarios, as well as in the aftermath of
hostile action, increasing the variability of scenarios. Implementation
guidance accompanying this final rule recommends that licensees
demonstrate their response to an aircraft threat under Sec.
50.54(hh)(1) during an exercise cycle, but not necessarily during a
biennial exercise. Section IV.F.2.j was clarified to require
demonstration of Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) capabilities in a biennial exercise
during each exercise cycle.
The NRC is adding new Section IV.I to Appendix E that requires
nuclear power reactor licensees to provide an expanded range of
protective measures for onsite personnel that are appropriate for
protection against hostile action. These measures will be site-specific
and consider issues such as the location of workers in relation to
potential targets, which will dictate if sheltering and/or evacuation
are appropriate to adequately protect the workers. Also, these measures
are prudent to protect personnel necessary to safely shut down the
reactor and emergency responders who are necessary to implement the
licensee's emergency plan. By specifying these measures for personnel
designated to carry out site emergency actions, other onsite workers
will also be protected because the onsite protective measures that were
deemed appropriate to protect against hostile action would be provided
via plant page announcements or at the direction of site security
personnel to the site as a whole and would not be directed to any
[[Page 72591]]
particular group of workers. The new requirement does not direct any
specific actions, but will allow licensees flexibility to determine the
most effective protective measures for onsite personnel protection on a
site-specific basis. It also will allow licensees to take advantage of
new technologies or other innovations that can further enhance the
protection of workers. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.5 of this document.)
V. Implementation
This final rule becomes effective December 23, 2011. Licensees will
be permitted to defer implementation of the final rule until June 20,
2012, except for the following rule changes:
(1) The new requirements under Sec. 50.54(q) (amended emergency
plan change process). Submittal of proposed emergency plan changes for
prior NRC approval made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the
new requirements under Sec. 50.54(q)(4). Submittal of emergency plan
change documentation made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the
new requirements under Sec. 50.54(q)(5). The implementation period for
these requirements was revised from 30 days after publication of the
final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 90 days
after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register based on
comments that 30 days after publication may not be sufficient time for
licensees to update their site programs and procedures to address the
amended emergency plan change process requirements. The NRC believes
that a 90-day time frame after publication is reasonable for this
activity, and the final rule reflects this adjustment to the
implementation schedule;
(2) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1-7
(evacuation time estimate updates), which each applicable licensee is
required to implement within 365 days of the later of the date of
availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S.
Census Bureau or December 23, 2011;
(3) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7
(licensee coordination with OROs), which each applicable licensee is
required to implement no later than June 23, 2014. The implementation
period for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication
of the final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 30
months after the effective date of the final rule based on comments
that 180 days may not be sufficient time to obtain new or update
existing arrangements involving offsite resources that support onsite
and offsite response activities. The NRC believes that a 30-month time
frame is more reasonable for this activity, and the final rule reflects
this adjustment to the implementation schedule;
(4) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9
(on-shift staffing analysis), which each applicable licensee must
implement no later than December 24, 2012. The implementation period
for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication of the
final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 365 days
after the effective date of the final rule based on comments that 180
days may not be sufficient time to perform the on-shift staffing
analysis. However, licensees are expected to take interim compensatory
measures to address any staffing shortfalls identified in the staffing
analysis within 30 days of when the results of the staffing analysis
are available, and then implement long-term corrective actions within
24 months of performing the staffing analysis;
(5) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3
(backup means for alert and notification systems). Where FEMA has
approved a nuclear power reactor site ANS design report including the
backup ANS capability, this rule provision must be implemented by
December 24, 2012. Where the ANS design report does not include backup
ANS means or is in need of revision to ensure adequate backup ANS
capability, a revision of the ANS design report must be submitted to
FEMA for review by June 24, 2013 and the FEMA-approved backup ANS means
must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. However, the
total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup ANS means shall
not exceed June 22, 2015;
(6) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.E.8.d (emergency response organization augmentation at alternative
facility), which each applicable licensee is required to implement no
later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for
staging emergency response organization personnel at an alternative
facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the
EOF, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no
later than June 20, 2012; and
(7) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2
(challenging drills and exercises). Each applicable licensee is
required to conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no
later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a
site will begin in the calendar year of the first hostile action
exercise. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year
exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise
required by Section IV.F.2.a. All of the new requirements in Section
IV.F.2 that must be completed in an exercise cycle must be implemented
no later than the first eight-year exercise cycle for each site. The
remaining new requirements in Section IV.F.2 are effective on December
23, 2011.
Certain applicants for an early site permit under Part 52, or a
combined license under Part 52, can defer compliance with this final
rule. Such an applicant can defer compliance if its application
complies with all applicable, current (prior to this rulemaking) EP
regulations, and the applicant, if it becomes an early site permit
holder or a combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit
or combined license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the
amended EP regulations in this final rule. The applicant, if it becomes
a combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has
approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule.
If the applicant does not receive a combined license or early site
permit before December 31, 2013, the applicant shall revise its
combined license or early site permit application to comply with those
changes no later than December 31, 2013.
In the proposed rule, the NRC also requested input on the
implementation schedule for each element of the proposed rule for
current licensees. The NRC received a number of comments on the
appropriateness of the proposed implementation schedule, including
whether arbitrary implementation deadlines were needed or if schedules
should be site-specific to allow licensees to budget resources and
properly coordinate EP program changes with OROs. The NRC believes that
a single fixed implementation schedule is warranted to avoid wide
variations among licensees in implementing the new requirements, to
ensure that new requirements with long lead times, such as those
involving biennial exercises, are addressed in a timely manner, and to
avoid potential problems for offsite agencies that support multiple
sites.
VI. Guidance
The NRC revised existing guidance and provided new guidance for the
new requirements in this final rule. This guidance is intended to
provide an acceptable method of how licensees and applicants can meet
the requirements of the final rule. The NRC will publish
[[Page 72592]]
Federal Register notices announcing the availability of the revised and
new guidance documents. The documents will be available at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122.
VII. Criminal Penalties
Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),
provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted
violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. For the purposes of Section
223 of the AEA, the Commission is amending 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 and
Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 161b, 161i, and 161o of the AEA.
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs, approved by the Commission on June 20, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997),
this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility is not
required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program elements in
this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation
reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of this chapter.
Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements reserved to
the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain requirements by
a mechanism that is consistent with the particular State's
administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do not
confer regulatory authority on the State.
IX. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the documents identified below available to
interested persons through one or more of the methods provided in the
ADDRESSES section of this document, as indicated.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC library
Document PDR Web (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards and X ............... ML020510635
Security Compensatory Measures,'' issued February 25, 2002...
SRM-M041214B- ``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program X ............... ML043550354
Initiatives, 1 p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004,
Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North,
Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
December 20, 2004............................................
Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency Preparedness and X ............... ML051990027
Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated July 18,
2005.........................................................
SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency X ............... ML061910707
Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20,
2006.........................................................
SRM to SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency X ............... ML070080411
Preparedness Regulations and Guidance'' dated January 8, 2007
Memorandum to the Commission, ``Rulemaking Plan for X ............... ML070440148
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
Guidance,'' dated April 17, 2007.............................
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of X ............... ML061810014
Emergency Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1
p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room,
One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to public
attendance)'' dated June 29, 2006............................
``Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Emergency X X ML080940227
Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,'' dated April
3, 2008......................................................
Draft Preliminary Rule Language, Emergency Preparedness X X ML080370069
Rulemaking, February, 2008...................................
``Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Comments on X X ML082180005
Emergency Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,''
dated August 6, 2008.........................................
Order EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' issued X ............... ML030060360
January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13, 2003)...............
Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and X ............... ML030910625
Qualification Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April
29, 2003 (68 FR 24514; May 7, 2003)..........................
Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' issued X ............... ML030740002
April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003)....................
Federal Register Notice--Final Rule to Amend 10 CFR 73.1: X ............... ML070520692
Design Basis Threat (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007)............
Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at Nuclear X ............... Non-Publicly
Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991...................... Available
IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise On- X ............... ML031070314
Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993..............................
IN 95-48, ``Results of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October X ............... ML031060170
10, 1995.....................................................
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and X ............... ML040420012
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
November 1980................................................
NUREG-0849, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review and X ............... ML062190191
Evaluation of Emergency Plans for Research and Test
Reactors,'' dated October 1983...............................
NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, ``Methodology for Development of X ............... ML041120174
Emergency Action Levels,'' dated January 1992................
NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for Development of X ............... ML073330643
Emergency Action Level,'' dated September 2007...............
Regulatory Guide 2.6, ``Emergency Planning for Research and X ............... ML003740234
Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983............................
Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear X ............... ML072670421
Energy Institute Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency
Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,' '' dated July 19,
2006.........................................................
Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness X ............... Non-Publicly
Issues: Post-9/11,'' dated October 18, 2004.................. Available
[[Page 72593]]
NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency X ............... ML073100460
Response Drill,'' Rev. 1, dated October 30, 2007.............
RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear Energy X ............... ML080110116
Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a Hostile
Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19,
2008.........................................................
IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to Licensees' Ability to Provide X ............... ML022380474
Prompt Public Notification and Information During an
Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 2002........
IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification X ............... ML050680335
System Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005...
IN 2006-28, ``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren X ............... ML062790341
System Signal,'' dated December 22, 2006.....................
IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When X ............... ML031060187
Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated April 2,
1996.........................................................
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station Blackout,'' issued X ............... ML003740034
August 1988..................................................
FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and ............... www.fema.gov ..............
Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
November 1985................................................
IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, X ............... ML031180307
Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency
Notifications,'' dated October 15, 1985......................
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-2, ``Emergency X ............... ML023040462
Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification
of Emergency Conditions,'' dated August 1, 1995..............
NUREG/CR-6953 Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3, X ............... ML080360602
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe
Accidents,'' dated December 2007.............................
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for X ............... ML050250240
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005...................
NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors X ............... ML050250245
Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' dated January 2005........
NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time X ............... ML113010515
Estimate Studies,'' dated November 2011......................
EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure X ............... ML023040483
Changes,'' dated November 19, 1998...........................
Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) 4, X ............... ML050800537
``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' dated
November 19, 1998............................................
RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the Process for Making Emergency X ............... ML042580404
Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005......................
``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items,'' dated August 11, X ............... ML052000263
2005.........................................................
Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and September 1, 2005 Portion X ............... ML052620366
of the Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting.................
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 X ............... ML060450376
and October 31, 2005),'' dated February 28, 2006.............
``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments (Received X ............... ML060860401
Between August 31 and October 31, 2005),'' dated March 31,
2006.........................................................
Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow Up Discussions of ............... ............... ML061590186
Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness
Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,
held May 19, 2006............................................
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response X ............... ML051390358
Facilities,'' dated February 1981............................
SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear Operating Company's X ............... ML050550131
Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating Facility
at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005.....
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,'' X ............... ML051390367
Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response
Capabilities,'' dated January 1983...........................
NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator X ............... ML092931123
Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009......................
Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute on EP draft X X ML081690809
preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for comments:
NEI1-X)......................................................
Comments submitted by Union of Concerned Scientists on EP X X ML081840067
draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for
comments: NGO1-X)............................................
Comments submitted by PA Bureau of Radiation Protection on EP X X ML081690778
draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for
comments: SPA1-X)............................................
EP final rule Regulatory Analysis and Backfit Analysis........ X X ML112971541
EP final rule Environmental Assessment........................ X X ML102150163
EP Paperwork Burden Analysis.................................. X X ML112971537
NRC comment responses for EP draft preliminary rule language.. X X ML091180198
Summary and Analysis of Public Comments on Proposed Rule X X ML112971546
Language.....................................................
Summary of September 17, 2009, Meeting to Discuss the Proposed X X ML092881256
Rule on Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations
and Related Guidance Documents (October 16, 2009)............
SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation of Construction X X ML072060688
and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit
2,'' dated July 25, 2007.....................................
SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to X X ML082890481
Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),'' dated
January 9, 2009..............................................
SRM to SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements X ............... ML091060206
to Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),''
dated April 16, 2009.........................................
[[Page 72594]]
SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed X ............... ML100130067
Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,
9:30 a.m., Tuesday, December 8, 2009, Commissioners'
Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland
(Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January 13, 2010........
Information from November 15, 2010 Public Meeting to Discuss X X ML102770561
the Proposed Implementation Dates of the Emergency
Preparedness Final Rule......................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with
applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any
voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed
Government-unique standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary
consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified.
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
The NRC requested public comments on any environmental justice
considerations that may be related to this rule and no comments were
received. The NRC also requested the views of the States on the
environmental assessment for this rule and no comments were received.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Approval Number 3150-0011.
The burden to the public for these information collections is
estimated to average 123 hours per response, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
information collection. Send comments on any aspect of these
information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden,
to the Information Services Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail
to [email protected]; and to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office of
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this
regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the
alternatives considered by the Commission. Availability of the
regulatory analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document.
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the
Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule
affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The
companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the
definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR
2.810).
XV. Backfit Analysis
As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a
backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission finds that the
backfits contained in the final rule, when considered in the aggregate,
will constitute a substantial increase in EP and are justified in view
of this increased protection of the public health and safety.
Availability of the backfit analysis is indicated in Section IX of this
document.
XVI. Congressional Review Act
Under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, the NRC has determined
that this action is not a major rule and has verified this
determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of
the OMB.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees,
Inspection, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting
criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Standard design, Standard design certification.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50 and part 52.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
0
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189,
68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec.
234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,
2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202,
206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842,
5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 194 (2005).
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101,
185, 68 Stat. 955, as
[[Page 72595]]
amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat.
853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec.
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and
Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853
(42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec.
204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and
50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.
2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42
U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68
Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under
sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
0
2. In Sec. 50.47, revise paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10), and (d)(1) to
read as follows:
Sec. 50.47 Emergency plans.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance
resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local
staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made,
and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have
been identified.
* * * * *
(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume
exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In
developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic
use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates
have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update
the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the
choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with
Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions
for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have
been developed.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite
assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State
and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have
been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *
0
3. In Sec. 50.54:
0
a. Revise paragraph (q), the introductory text of paragraph (gg)(1),
and paragraphs (gg)(1)(i) and (gg)(2); and
0
b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), (s)(1), (s)(2)(i), and (u).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(q) Emergency plans.
(1) Definitions for the purpose of this section:
(i) Change means an action that results in modification or addition
to, or removal from, the licensee's emergency plan. All such changes
are subject to the provisions of this section except where the
applicable regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a
particular change.
(ii) Emergency plan means the document(s), prepared and maintained
by the licensee, that identify and describe the licensee's methods for
maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies. An
emergency plan includes the plan as originally approved by the NRC and
all subsequent changes made by the licensee with, and without, prior
NRC review and approval under paragraph (q) of this section.
(iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, as
set forth in the elements of section IV. of appendix E to this part
and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b).
(iv) Reduction in effectiveness means a change in an emergency plan
that results in reducing the licensee's capability to perform an
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.
(2) A holder of a license under this part, or a combined license
under part 52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding
under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the
effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the
planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b).
(3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC
approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis
demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the
plan and the plan, as changed, continues to meet the requirements in
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the
planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b).
(4) The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the
effectiveness of the plan as defined in paragraph (q)(1)(iv) of this
section may not be implemented without prior approval by the NRC. A
licensee desiring to make such a change after February 21, 2012 shall
submit an application for an amendment to its license. In addition to
the filing requirements of Sec. Sec. 50.90 and 50.91, the request must
include all emergency plan pages affected by that change and must be
accompanied by a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason
for the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's
emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in
appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the
planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b).
(5) The licensee shall retain a record of each change to the
emergency plan made without prior NRC approval for a period of three
years from the date of the change and shall submit, as specified in
Sec. 50.4, a report of each such change made after February 21, 2012,
including a summary of its analysis, within 30 days after the change is
put in effect.
(6) The nuclear power reactor licensee shall retain the emergency
plan and each change for which prior NRC approval was obtained pursuant
to paragraph (q)(4) of this section as a record until the Commission
terminates the license for the nuclear power reactor.
(r) [Reserved]
(s)(1) [Reserved]
(2)(i) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(u) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 52.103, if, following the conduct of
the exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a of appendix E to part 50 of
this chapter, FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of
offsite emergency preparedness, the holder of a combined license under
10 CFR part 52 may operate at up to 5 percent of rated thermal power
only if the Commission finds that the state of onsite emergency
preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the
applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in
Sec. 50.47 and appendix E to this part. Review of the applicant's
emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite
aspects:
(i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite
assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and
local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been
made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the
[[Page 72596]]
planned onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *
(2) The condition in this paragraph, regarding operation at up to 5
percent power, ceases to apply 30 days after FEMA informs the NRC that
the offsite deficiencies have been corrected, unless the NRC notifies
the combined license holder before the expiration of the 30-day period
that the Commission finds under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this
section that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
* * * * *
0
4. In Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50:
0
a. Revise Section I;
0
b. In Section II, revise paragraph H; and
0
c. Revise Section IV.
The revisions read as follows:
Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
* * * * *
I. Introduction
1. Each applicant for a construction permit is required by Sec.
50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a
discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each
applicant for an operating license is required by Sec. 50.34(b) to
include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with
emergencies. Each applicant for a combined license under subpart C
of part 52 of this chapter is required by Sec. 52.79 of this
chapter to include in the application plans for coping with
emergencies. Each applicant for an early site permit under subpart A
of part 52 of this chapter may submit plans for coping with
emergencies under Sec. 52.17 of this chapter.
2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency
plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency
preparedness. These plans shall be described generally in the
preliminary safety analysis report for a construction permit and
submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an
operating license. These plans, or major features thereof, may be
submitted as part of the site safety analysis report for an early
site permit.
3. The potential radiological hazards to the public associated
with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities
licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve considerations
different than those associated with nuclear power reactors.
Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones\1\ (EPZs) for
facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which
compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II,
III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined on a
case-by-case basis.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA
520/1-78-016, ``Planning Basis for the Development of State and
Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of
Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' December 1978. The size of the
EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to
local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected
by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics,
access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs
also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled
nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level
less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ
for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in
radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about
50 miles (80 km) in radius.
\2\ Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the
acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in the case of an
operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power
operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no NRC or FEMA review,
findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite
emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and the capability to
implement State and local offsite emergency plans, as defined in
this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of such a license.
5. Each applicant for a combined license or early site permit
under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before
December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with any change to emergency
preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 23,
2011. If that applicant chooses to defer compliance, it shall
subsequently request to amend the combined license or early site
permit to comply with those changes no later than December 31, 2013.
An applicant that does not receive a combined license or early site
permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined license
or early site permit application to comply with those changes no
later than December 31, 2013. Notwithstanding any Commission finding
under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined license holder's
facility, the combined license holder may not operate the facility
until the NRC has approved the license amendment demonstrating
compliance with the final rule.
6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit
2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 50 of
this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued
November 23, 2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power reactor
licensees.
II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
* * * * *
H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include
facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of
seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of
emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including
capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological
information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within
the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the
onsite technical support center and the emergency operations
facility in assessing information, recommending protective action,
and disseminating information to the public.
* * * * *
IV. Content of Emergency Plans
1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not
necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate
compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for
coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation
of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency
facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency
preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile
action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an
applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this
part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined
license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to
demonstrate compliance with the standards described in Sec.
50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.
2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also
provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors
and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient
and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau
data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the
NRC.
3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved
evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the
formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide
the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities
for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.
4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability
of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau
or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop
an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under Sec.
50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to
the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action
recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental
authorities for use in developing offsite protective action
strategies.
5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power
reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population
changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the
previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual
resident population estimate and State/local government population
data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates
so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period
between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the
NRC with any updated ETE analysis.
6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent
resident population increases such that it causes the
[[Page 72597]]
longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all
affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-
mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less,
from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or
updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect
the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit
the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under Sec. 50.4 no later than
365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for
updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it
to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State
and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite
protective action strategies.
7. After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of
this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at
least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at
least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall
estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most
recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and
State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ
permanent resident population increases such that it causes the
longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all
affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-
mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is
less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall
update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population
increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the
NRC for review under Sec. 50.4 of this chapter no later than 365
days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.
A. Organization
The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall
be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities,
and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency
organization and the means for notification of such individuals in
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be
included:
1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.
2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization
(ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the
individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;
b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating
and implementing offsite emergency measures.
3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of
the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant
site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of
persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for
making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these
projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and
local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.
5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of
other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for
coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with
special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees
of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for
emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of
these persons shall be described.
6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in
support of the licensee's emergency organization.
7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the
assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal
agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies,
including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix,
``hostile action'' is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear
power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force
to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee
to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using
guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to
deliver destructive force.
8. Identification of the State and/or local officials
responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate
protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.
9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a
detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned
emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned
responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their
assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.
B. Assessment Actions
1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and
for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive
materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification
and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and
other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to
be used for determining when and what type of protective measures
should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect
health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-
plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and
offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor
licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may
adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency
action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or
licensee and state and local governmental authorities, and approved
by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed
with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual
basis.
2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action
level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its
license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change.
Licensees shall follow the change process in Sec. 50.54(q) for all
other emergency action level changes.
C. Activation of Emergency Organization
1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the
alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total
emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps
to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each
class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels
(based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that
indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment
and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for
notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence,
but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be
noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall
include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site
area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further
discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.
2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall
establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and
declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the
availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency
action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the
emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of
the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not
construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore
plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an
emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not
construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response
actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public
health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not
deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement
measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.
D. Notification Procedures
1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State,
and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these
officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and
for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they
become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include
identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of
the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.
2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency
planning information, such as the methods and times required for
public notification and the protective actions planned if an
accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of
radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be
used for dissemination of information during an
[[Page 72598]]
emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate
to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ
appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.
3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible
State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after
declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the
appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a
public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed
by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial
operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first
reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall
demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been
established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective
of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have
the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and
initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and
notification capability will range from immediate alerting and
notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State
and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring
urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial
time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make
a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and
notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall
additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup
method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in
the event the primary method of alerting and notification is
unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions
of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method
shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute
design objective for the primary prompt public alert and
notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert
and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities
will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification
system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The
responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification
system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.
4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and
notification design report, including the backup alert and
notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup
alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3
must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and
notification design report does not include a backup alert and
notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup
alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and
notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by
June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification
means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval.
However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup
alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency
facilities and equipment, including:
1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for
continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive
materials to the environment;
3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of
onsite individuals;
4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate
emergency first aid treatment;
5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to
handle radiological emergencies onsite;
6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured
individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment
facilities outside the site boundary;
7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support
of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside
the site boundary;
8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an
emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be
given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;
(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite
operational support center;
b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations
facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a
facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power
reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles
from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located
between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s).
An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear
power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency
operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor
site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an
application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency
operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power
reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite
responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and
offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response
personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site.
Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a
nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the
emergency operations facility must include the following:
(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State,
and local responders;
(2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency
response personnel;
(3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency
response facilities;
(4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and
(5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies;
c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's
emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this
section, a facility having the following capabilities:
(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and
radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor
site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility
serves;
(2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and
provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to
licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a
nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site
that the facility serves; and
(3) The capability to support response to events occurring
simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the
emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and
d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility
(or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under
threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging
area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively
having the following characteristics: the capability for
communication with the emergency operations facility, control room,
and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications;
and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including
damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite
emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile
action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented
no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the
capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at
the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for
communications with the emergency operations facility, control room,
and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20,
2012.
e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of
paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations
facility approved as of December 23, 2011;
9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system;
each system shall have a backup power source. All communication
plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and
alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication
links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where
consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these
arrangements will include:
a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local
governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such
communications shall be tested monthly.
b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response
organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor
control room, the
[[Page 72599]]
onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations
facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and
local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams.
Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations
Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite
technical support center, and the emergency operations facility.
Such communications shall be tested monthly.
F. Training
1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and
exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that
employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency
response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and
drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event
of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a
description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining
programs to be provided to each of the following categories of
emergency personnel:
i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency
organization;
ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including
control room shift personnel;
iii Radiological monitoring teams;
iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
v. Repair and damage control teams;
vi. First aid and rescue teams;
vii. Medical support personnel;
viii. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;
ix. Security personnel.
In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall
be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency
services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news
media persons.
2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of
emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test
the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and
methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test
the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency
organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable
for any exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. A full participation \4\ exercise which tests as much of the
licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably
achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted
for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power
reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec. 50.4
at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise
required by this paragraph 2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate
offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel
physically and actively take part in testing their integrated
capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a
commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing
major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans
and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other
resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond
to the accident scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) For an operating license issued under this part, this
exercise must be conducted within two years before the issuance of
the first operating license for full power (one authorizing
operation above 5 percent of rated power) of the first reactor and
shall include participation by each State and local government
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state within the
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise
is conducted more than 1 year prior to issuance of an operating
licensee for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's
onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before
issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise need
not have State or local government participation.
(ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this
chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full
participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests
the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one
year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This
exercise need not have State or local government participation. If
FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite
emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation
exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency
preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency, the provisions of Sec. 50.54(gg) apply.
(iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this
chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the
site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,\5\ shall be
conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This
exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of
Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one
or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness
as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the
Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the
provisions of Sec. 50.54(gg) apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Partial participation when used in conjunction with
emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means
appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the
exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e.,
(a) protective action decision making related to emergency action
levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and
local authorities and the licensee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent
exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power
reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec. 50.4
at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this
paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full
participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this
section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to
ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained
during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills,
including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the
principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency
response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency
response include activities such as management and coordination of
emergency response, accident assessment, event classification,
notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and
offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action
recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant
system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these
drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response
facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support
Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not
be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider
accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be
permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would
have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than
have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite
exercise training objectives.
c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially
with full participation by each offsite authority having a role
under the radiological response plan. Where the offsite authority
has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one
site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years and
shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan
exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have
licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent,
contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located
licensees,\6\ then each licensee shall:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose
licensed facilities are located either on the same site or on
adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following
emergency planning and siting elements:
a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones;
b. Offsite governmental authorities;
c. Offsite emergency response organizations;
d. Public notification system; and/or
e. Emergency facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan;
(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or
partial participation exercise;
(3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions
in the years between its participation in the offsite full or
partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and
maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities
and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in
emergency preparedness
[[Page 72600]]
activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period
between exercises;
(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency
plan in each exercise cycle; and
(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial
participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise
cycles.
d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor
emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion
pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In
States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure
pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to
site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor
emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action
exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in
one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more
than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should
rotate this participation from site to site.
e. Licensees shall enable any State or local government located
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the
licensee's drills when requested by such State or local government.
f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that
NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event
of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency
Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to
emergency response. The extent of State and local participation in
remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate
corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the
plan not properly tested in the previous exercises.
g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance
opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must
provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient
areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are
identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be
corrected.
h. The participation of State and local governments in an
emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant
has identified those governments as refusing to participate further
in emergency planning activities, pursuant to Sec. 50.47(c)(1). In
such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee
and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the
emergency planning process.
i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result
from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear
power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological
releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill
scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite
and offsite response organizations.
j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by
nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the
ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to
implement the principal functional areas of emergency response
identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills
specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC,
EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight
calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall
vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under
paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO
to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to
the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the
plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal
radiological release that does not require public protective
actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site
Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies,
procedures, and guidance developed under Sec. 50.54(hh)(2), and
integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee
shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight
year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to
comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall
conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later
than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a
site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile
action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the
first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the
initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.
G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its
implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are
maintained up to date shall be described.
H. Recovery
Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident,
reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could
be resumed shall be described.
I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action
By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range
of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile
action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the
licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions
of the licensee's emergency plan.
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
0
5. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat.
936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs.
201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note);
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005),
secs. 147 and 149 of the Atomic Energy Act.
0
6. In Sec. 52.79, paragraph (a)(17) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 52.79 Contents of applications; technical information in final
safety analysis report.
(a) * * *
(17) The information with respect to compliance with technically
relevant positions of the Three Mile Island requirements in Sec.
50.34(f) of this chapter, with the exception of Sec. 50.34(f)(1)(xii),
(f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), and (f)(3)(v);
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of November 2011.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-29735 Filed 11-22-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P