[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 11, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63118-63147]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-26070]



[[Page 63117]]

Vol. 76

Tuesday,

No. 196

October 11, 2011

Part VII





Department of Justice





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Drug Enforcement Administration





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Carlos Gonzalez, M.D., Decision and Order; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 196 / Tuesday, October 11, 2011 / 
Notices  

[[Page 63118]]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 11-33]


Carlos Gonzalez, M.D., Decision and Order

    On July 18, 2011, Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John J. 
Mulrooney, Jr., issued the attached recommended decision (also ALJ). 
Thereafter, the Government filed Exceptions to the ALJ's decision.\1\
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    \1\ All citations to the ALJ's decision are to the slip opinion 
as originally issued on July 18, 2011.
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    Having reviewed the entire record and the Government's Exceptions, 
I have decided to adopt the ALJ's recommended rulings, findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order except as discussed 
below.\2\ I will therefore order that Respondent's registration be 
revoked and that any pending application to renew his registration be 
denied.
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    \2\ Because it is dictum, I do not adopt the first sentence of 
the last paragraph which begins on page 56 of the slip opinion and 
continues on to the following page.
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The Government's Exceptions

    The Government's Exceptions fall within two categories. First, the 
Government takes exception to the ALJ's finding that it had not proved 
that Respondent violated Federal law (the Ryan Haight provisions) by 
issuing controlled substance prescriptions through the Internet without 
having conducted ``at least one in-person medical evaluation'' of the 
patients. Exceptions at 3; see also ALJ at 69-71. Second, the 
Government takes exception to the ALJ's declination to give weight to 
testimony it elicited regarding several hearsay statements which it 
offered to prove various material facts (including the alleged 
violations of the Ryan Haight provisions).

The Ryan Haight Violations

    With respect to its first contention, the Government points to 
various controlled substance prescriptions (typically for steroids) 
found during an inspection of a Florida pharmacy which list Respondent 
as the prescriber and the patients as residents of some fourteen States 
outside of Florida; the prescriptions are on forms bearing the 
letterhead of three separate entities, which were internet sites 
through which a person could obtain a prescription for a controlled 
substance which the pharmacy filled. Exceptions at 2; GX 37. The 
Government contends that the prescriptions by themselves constitute 
substantial evidence to support a finding that Respondent violated the 
CSA, which following the passage of the Ryan Haight Act, prohibits the 
distribution or dispensing of ``a controlled substance by means of the 
Internet without a valid prescription,'' and requires that such a 
prescription be ``issued for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual 
course of professional practice by * * * a practitioner who has 
conducted at least one in-person medical evaluation of the patient.'' 
21 U.S.C. 829(e).
    This is so, the Government argues, because none of the patients who 
received the prescriptions in GX 37 reside in Florida, and ``it is 
unlikely that [Respondent] traveled all over the country to conduct 
physical examinations with these patients'' and ``it is also highly 
unlikely that these patients traveled from all over the country to see 
[Respondent] in Florida.'' Exceptions at 3. Based on the respective 
geographic locations of Respondent and the patients, the Government 
argues that ``it is clear that these controlled substance prescriptions 
were issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and 
lacked a legitimate medical purpose because these patients were not 
examined by'' him. Id. at 4.
    Contrary to the Government's position, the prescriptions alone are 
insufficient to establish that Respondent failed to perform an in-
person medical evaluation of the patients. Notably, the Government 
provided only thirty-seven prescriptions, which were issued to twenty-
eight patients, over a period of nearly six months. Thus, this case 
bears none of the hallmarks of the assembly-line prescribing methods 
which DEA has frequently encountered in other internet prescribing 
schemes and the small number of prescriptions does not foreclose the 
possibility that the patients traveled to Florida to be evaluated by 
him.\3\ See Sun & Lake Pharmacy, Inc., 76 FR 24523 (2011); William R. 
Lockridge, 71 FR 77791 (2006). Moreover, in contrast to other internet 
cases, the Government did not introduce any evidence showing how the 
websites functioned (such as an undercover buy) and whether persons 
were able to obtain controlled substances without undergoing an in-
person examination. Nor did the Government produce any other evidence 
which might have been probative of the issue and met the Administrative 
Procedure Act's standard of reliability, see 5 U.S.C. Sec.  556(d), 
such as evidence regarding how the websites promoted their service, the 
lack of documentation of an in-person examination in patient records, 
or the lack thereof of any patient records. Thus, the prescription 
evidence alone does not create a permissible inference that Respondent 
did not physically examine the patients.
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    \3\ While there was evidence that it exceeds the bounds of 
professional practice to prescribe narcotics to a pain patient who 
had not been seen in six months without doing a new history and 
physical exam, no evidence was presented as to what constitutes a 
legitimate medical purpose for prescribing steroids and the 
standards of medical practice for prescribing them. Moreover, that 
most of the pharmacy's steroid prescriptions were mailed to the 
patients does not foreclose the possibility that the patients had 
previously been examined by Respondent.
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    The Government further argues that the ALJ erred in holding ``that 
additional evidence was needed * * * to prove that'' Respondent did not 
physically examine the internet patients because the evidence stands 
unrefuted. Exceptions at 4. In support of this contention, the 
Government also noted that Respondent was subpoenaed and invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. Id. at 4. Unclear is 
whether the Government believes that Respondent's invocation of his 
Fifth Amendment privilege entitles it to the adverse inference that he 
did not physically examine the patients.
    As for its contention that Respondent's failure to refute its 
evidence (in any manner whatsoever) entitles it to a finding that he 
did not physically examine the patients, the argument ignores that the 
Government has the burden of proof on the issue. Because its evidence 
does not create even a permissible inference that Respondent did not 
physically examine the patients, Respondent had no obligation to refute 
it.
    As for whether Respondent's refusal to testify entitles the 
Government to an adverse inference that he failed to physically examine 
the patients identified in GX 37, it is noted that the Government 
subpoenaed him to testify and obviously Respondent has knowledge of 
whether he did so. However, in neither its original nor its 
supplemental pre-hearing statement did the Government state that it 
intended to elicit testimony from him on this issue. See ALJ Exs. 5 & 
6. Moreover, at the hearing, when Respondent's counsel informed the 
tribunal that Respondent intended to assert his Fifth Amendment 
privilege, the Government did not make an offer of proof. Thus, there 
is no basis to conclude that the Government would have questioned him 
about the internet prescriptions, and thus, an adverse inference cannot 
be drawn on the issue of whether he physically examined the patients.

[[Page 63119]]

    The Government further argues that its evidence supports the 
conclusion that Respondent did not physically examine the patients 
because it also elicited the testimony of a Diversion Investigator (DI) 
that the prescriptions ``were `absolutely' the result of the Internet 
drug-based process used by'' the pharmacy. Exceptions at 4 (citing its 
Post-Hearing Br. at 29). In its Exceptions, the Government acknowledges 
that this testimony was hearsay as it was based on the unsworn 
statements made by two employees of the pharmacy which filled the 
Internet prescriptions. Exceptions at 5.
    Under DEA regulations, a party's exceptions ``shall include a 
statement of supporting reasons for such exceptions, together with 
evidence of record (including specific and complete citations of the 
pages of the transcript and exhibits) * * * relied upon.'' 21 CFR 
1316.66(a) (emphasis added). The Government's citation to its post-
hearing brief does not comply with this requirement, which DEA has 
previously applied in rejecting the exceptions filed by a respondent. 
See Paul H. Volkman, 73 FR 30630, 30640 (2008), pet. for rev. denied 
567 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2009). Because the Government did not identify 
which specific hearsay statements it believes should be given weight, 
this alone provides reason to reject the exception.\4\
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    \4\ In his decision, the ALJ noted that ``[i]t would not be 
unreasonable for the Agency to interpret the [Ryan-Haight Act] in 
such a way that a clear and convincing demonstration on the part of 
the Government that a practitioner has caused controlled substances 
prescribed and/or dispensed under his or her [registration] to be 
shipped to a remote, out-of-state location from the * * * registered 
address would result in a burden of production on the part of the 
registrant to demonstrate that an in-person physical examination had 
been conducted.'' ALJ at 71 n.109. I conclude, however, that such a 
rule is not justified given that the Government has ample means 
available to it to prove that a registrant failed to perform a 
physical examination, including by introducing the physician's 
patient records which it has the power to obtain through either 
subpoena or an administrative warrant; where such process is issued 
and no records are provided or a warrant is issued and no records 
are found, the Government would be entitled to the inference that 
the registrant failed to perform a physical exam. In addition, the 
Government can call the registrant as a witness and elicit testimony 
on the issue, and as explained above, where the registrant invokes 
his Fifth Amendment privilege, the Government would be entitled to 
an adverse inference. Finally, the Government can either call 
patients as witnesses (as it has done in several cases) or obtain 
sworn statements from them. In the event a potential witness resides 
more than 500 miles from the place of the hearing, and either the 
Government seeks to call the witness to provide live testimony or a 
respondent seeks to cross-examine the witness, the ALJ has authority 
to move the hearing so that a subpoena can be issued to compel the 
attendance of the witness and the ALJ can take such testimony 
through telephone or videoconferencing.
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The ALJ's Declination to Give Weight to Various Other Hearsay 
Statements

    In addition to the hearsay testimony related above, the Government 
also takes exception to the ALJ's failure to give weight to hearsay 
statements made by several other persons. More specifically, these 
statements included: (1) Those made by four patients of the pain clinic 
where Respondent practiced, which were related by a Task Force Officer 
(TFO) who interviewed them; (2) the statements made to the TFO by the 
co-owners of the clinic; and (3) the statements made by a former 
employee who had been fired by the pain clinic which were related by 
the DI.
    As for the first category of statements, the Government cites more 
than 100 pages of transcript and argues that the patients' statements, 
which were unsworn, were supported by the patient files; however, the 
Government does not identify the specific statements it believes should 
have been ``given substantial weight.'' Exceptions at 6. Here again, 
the Government has not complied with the Agency's regulation and 
properly presented the exception for review. Beyond that, the 
Government's contention that the Agency should give weight to these 
unsworn statements because ``there would be nothing to gain through 
cross-examination of these * * * clinic patients because [Respondent], 
in his absence left the clinic operation and the issuing of controlled 
substances prescriptions to the [clinic] staff and therefore [has] no 
idea as to what occurred with these patients,'' Exceptions at 6-7, 
ignores that one of the fundamental purposes of cross-examination is to 
show that witnesses lack credibility or an accurate recollection of the 
event. See McCormick on Evidence Sec.  19, at 47 (3d ed. 1984) (``For 
two centuries, common law judges and lawyers have regarded the 
opportunity of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of the 
accuracy and completeness of testimony.''). The APA specifically 
protects this critical right in 5 U.S.C. 556(d), which states in 
relevant part that ``[a] party is entitled * * * to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the 
facts.''
    As for the hearsay statements of the clinic's owners and the former 
employee, the ALJ cited extensive judicial authority discussing when 
hearsay statements constitute substantial evidence, including two cases 
which are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See ALJ at 37 
(citing Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2008) and 
J.A.M. Builders v. Herman, 233 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000)).\5\ As 
the ALJ explained, while hearsay evidence is admissible in 
administrative proceedings, the weight that can be given such evidence 
and whether it constitutes substantial evidence ``is an entirely 
different matter'' and is dependent upon ``the underlying reliability 
and probative value of the evidence.'' Basco, 514 F.3d at 1182 (quoting 
U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
As set forth in the ALJ's decision, the Eleventh Circuit has held that 
four factors should be considered in assessing whether hearsay 
statements are sufficiently reliable. These are: (1) Whether the 
declarant was unbiased and had no interest in the outcome of the case; 
(2) whether the opposing party could have obtained the hearsay 
information prior to the hearing and subpoenaed the declarant for 
cross-examination; (3) whether the information was inconsistent on its 
face; and (4) whether the information has been recognized by the courts 
as inherently reliable. ALJ at 37 (discussing J.A.M. Builders, 233 F.3d 
at 1354).
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    \5\ To make clear, the ALJ also relied on the principles set 
forth in these two cases in declining to give weight to the some of 
other hearsay evidence such as the statements of the four patients 
to the TFO.
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    In its Exceptions, the Government does not even acknowledge either 
J.A.M. Builders or Basco, let alone offer any argument that the ALJ 
misapplied the relevant factors. Indeed, the Government does not cite a 
single judicial authority that supports its position that unsworn 
hearsay statements can constitute substantial evidence. However, even 
if it had, DEA is bound by the precedential authority of a United 
States Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction over a subsequent 
petition for review of the Agency's final decision under 21 U.S.C. 877.
    The Government nonetheless argues that other evidence, which is 
also hearsay, corroborates the testimony at the hearing. More 
specifically, with respect to the TFO's testimony as to the statements 
made by the clinic owners in two interviews, the Government argues that 
audio recordings and supporting transcripts corroborate the TFO's 
testimony. Exceptions at 7.
    This misses the point entirely because the ALJ did not decline to 
give weight to the TFO's testimony regarding the interviews of the 
clinic owners because he found the TFO to lack credibility. To the 
contrary, the ALJ found the TFO to be credible. ALJ at 41. However, the 
ALJ

[[Page 63120]]

declined to give weight to this portion of the TFO's testimony because 
he found the statements of the clinic owners to be inherently 
unreliable based on the high likelihood that they were motivated by the 
owners' instinct for ``self-preservation'' and interest in shielding 
themselves from criminal liability; moreover, because the statements 
were not sworn, they are not the type which the courts have recognized 
``as inherently reliable.'' ALJ at 39. Thus, that the transcripts and 
audio recording corroborate the TFO's testimony does not cure the 
fundamental flaws with the underlying hearsay statements to which he 
testified.\6\
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    \6\ Here again, the Government did not identify which of the 
numerous statements made by the clinic owners it believes the ALJ 
should have given weight to. Exceptions at 7.
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    It is acknowledged that the TFO testified that the owners had 
stated ``that the physician assistants were in charge of seeing 
patients and prescribing medications, although it was possible that 
they to some degree communicated with the Respondent through computer 
equipment at times * * * for him to approve prescriptions,'' id., and 
that this is corroborated by the testimony at the hearing of the two 
UCs as to how they obtained their prescriptions. Nonetheless, this does 
not support reliance on the statement because the third J.A.M. Builders 
factor does not ask whether the hearsay statement is inconsistent with 
other evidence in the case, but only whether the hearsay statement is 
inconsistent on its face. Moreover, even if the owners' statements are 
internally consistent, and the owners could have been subpoenaed, the 
other factors still counsel against the Agency's reliance on the 
statements. Thus, the ALJ properly concluded that the statements of the 
clinic owners could not be relied upon. Id.
    For similar reasons, the ALJ properly declined to give any weight 
to a DI's testimony regarding an interview she conducted with a former 
clinic employee who had been fired. Here again, while there is no 
evidence that the employee's statement was inconsistent on its face and 
the employee likely could have been subpoenaed (although the Government 
offered no evidence as to her whereabouts, notwithstanding that it was 
the proponent of the evidence), the other factors strongly support the 
ALJ's declination to give weight to this evidence. Having been 
terminated, the employee could well have been biased (again, while the 
Government was the proponent of statement, it did not produce any 
evidence that she was unbiased), and in any event, her unsworn 
interview with the DI is not the type of hearsay statement which the 
courts have recognized is inherently reliable. See ALJ at 42.
    Accordingly, I reject the Government's various Exceptions to the 
ALJ's Recommended Decision. However, I agree with the ALJ's findings 
and legal conclusions that: (1) ``Respondent's prescribing practice 
fell well below the applicable standard in Florida regarding the 
controlled substances prescribed and dispensed to the undercover 
agents, as well as to the patients whose charts'' were reviewed by the 
Government's Expert, ALJ at 69; (2) ``Respondent employed his 
[registration] and/or allowed/enabled others to do so in a manner where 
controlled substances were prescribed and dispensed for other than a 
legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional 
practice,'' id., and thus allowed controlled substances to be 
``provided to individuals he never met,'' id. at 72;-- and (3) 
Respondent's charts include ``out-and-out falsehoods'' and ``failed to 
provide even the most basic documentation to support his prescribing 
and dispensing.'' Id.
    I therefore conclude that Respondent has committed acts which 
render his continued registration ``inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). Because Respondent has offered no 
evidence to rebut this conclusion, I adopt the ALJ's recommended Order 
and revoke his registration and deny any pending applications.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of 
Registration BG8251845, issued to Carlos Gonzalez, M.D., be, and it 
hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of 
Carlos Gonzalez, M.D., to renew or modify his registration, be, and it 
hereby is denied. This Order is effective immediately.\7\
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    \7\ For the same reasons which led me to order the Immediate 
Suspension of Respondent's Registration, I conclude that the public 
safety requires that this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR 
1316.67.

    Dated: September 29, 2011.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
    Theresa Krause, Esq., for the Government
    Michael Metz, Esq., for the Respondent

RECOMMENDED RULINGS, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

    John J. Mulrooney, II, Chief Administrative Law Judge. On February 
18, 2011, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA 
or Government), issued \1\ an Order to Show Cause and Immediate 
Suspension of Registration (OSC/ISO) immediately suspending the DEA 
Certificates of Registration (COR), Numbers BG8251845, FG1242471, and 
FG2021804, of Carlos Gonzalez, M.D. (Respondent), as a practitioner, 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec.  824(d) (2006), based on the Administrator's 
assessment of an imminent danger to the public health and safety. The 
OSC/ISO also seeks revocation of the Respondent's registrations, 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. III 2010), and 
denial of any pending applications for renewal or modification of 
registration, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f), alleging that the 
Respondent's continued enjoyment of the privileges vested in those 
registrations is inconsistent with the public interest, as that term is 
used in 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f). On March 16, 2011, the Respondent, 
through counsel, timely requested a hearing, which was conducted in 
Miami, Florida on May 17-19, 2011. The immediate suspension of the 
Respondent's COR has remained in effect throughout these proceedings.
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    \1\ The Government served the OSC/ISO upon the Respondent on 
February 23, 2011.
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    The issue ultimately to be adjudicated by the Administrator, with 
the assistance of this recommended decision, is whether the record as a 
whole establishes by substantial evidence that Respondent's 
registration with the DEA should be revoked as inconsistent with the 
public interest as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  823(f) and 
824(a)(4). The Respondent is the holder of DEA practitioner 
registration, No. BG8251845, which expires by its terms on September 
30, 2011. The Respondent surrendered two other registrations, Nos. 
FG1242471 and FG2021804, prior to requesting a hearing.
    After carefully considering the testimony elicited at the hearing, 
the admitted exhibits, the arguments of counsel,\2\ and the record as a 
whole, I

[[Page 63121]]

have set forth my recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law 
below.
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    \2\ The parties were afforded the opportunity to file post-
hearing briefs in this matter. The Government's brief was timely 
filed on June 14, 2011, but no brief was filed on behalf of the 
Respondent. The decision to forgo filing a brief has resulted in a 
record that contains no position from the Respondent on the weight 
that should be accorded the evidence admitted during the 
proceedings, beyond the arguments made at the hearing in connection 
with objections. Neither party filed any exceptions or proposed 
corrections to the transcript, notwithstanding being afforded the 
opportunity to do so.
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The Allegations

    The OSC/ISO issued by the Government alleges that during the 
approximate time period of October 2009 through September 2010, the 
Respondent ``distributed * * * oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, and alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance by 
issuing prescriptions to several undercover law enforcement officers 
for other than a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course 
of professional practice.'' ALJ Ex. 1 at 2 (internal quotation marks 
and parentheses omitted). Furthermore, the OSC/ISO alleges that 
patients at the Respondent's practice were able to procure similarly 
illegitimate prescriptions in a similarly illegitimate manner as the 
undercover officers. Id.
    Interactions with two undercover officers are alleged in the OSC/
ISO. The first undercover officer (UC1),\3\ allegedly obtained 
prescriptions for various controlled pain medications issued from the 
Respondent's registration despite the Respondent's absence from the 
office and notwithstanding the fact that he never personally examined 
him. Id. The OSC/ISO also alleges that ``a nurse practitioner who was 
represented as being a doctor'' examined UC1 cursorily in the 
Respondent's stead, despite UC1's admission to the nurse practitioner 
that he had illicitly acquired controlled substances from a friend. Id.
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    \3\ Evidence received at the hearing establishes that UC1, as 
referred to in the OSC/ISO, refers to Task Force Officer (TFO) 
William Schwartz. TFO Schwartz employed the fictitious name ``Bill 
Rix'' during his undercover office visits.
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    The OSC/ISO also alleges that upon a subsequent visit, UC1 obtained 
prescriptions for, and distributions of, controlled pain medications 
without the Respondent conducting a physical examination, reaching a 
diagnosis, or providing a justification for the increase in dosage 
units and in the face of the UC's admission that he illegally obtained 
controlled substances from another person prior to the visit. 
Furthermore, the OSC/ISO charges that on two or more subsequent 
occasions, controlled substance pain prescriptions emanated from the 
Respondent's COR to UC1, even though UC1 was not personally examined by 
anyone and during a time wherein the Respondent was purportedly absent 
from the office. Id.
    Regarding the second undercover officer (UC2),\4\ the OSC/ISO 
alleges that while the Respondent was out of the office, UC2, after a 
cursory examination performed by a physician's assistant, was 
prescribed controlled pain medications through the Respondent's COR. 
Id. According to the Government, UC2 was issued the prescriptions even 
in the face of his admission to the physician's assistant that he had 
illegally obtained controlled substances from his girlfriend. Id.
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    \4\ Evidence received at the hearing establishes that UC2, as 
referred to in the OSC/ISO, refers to Special Agent (SA) Jack 
Lunsford. SA Lunsford assumed the fictitious name ``David Hays'' 
during his undercover visits.
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    The OSC/ISO also alleges that from February 2009 through December 
2009, the Respondent allegedly procured 238,000 dosage units of 
oxycodone, and from January 2010 through June 2010, he allegedly 
obtained through purchase 259,000 dosage units of oxycodone at his 
registered location in Lake Park, Florida.\5\ Id. at 3.
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    \5\ COR No. FG1242471 is the corresponding registration with 
this address.
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    Subsequent prehearing and supplemental prehearing statements 
alleged additional facts, including (but not limited to) recordkeeping 
deficiencies and the illegal prescribing of controlled substances over 
the Internet in violation of the Ryan Haight Act.\6\ ALJ Ex. 6 at 6.
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    \6\ On October 15, 2008, the President signed into law the Ryan 
Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (Ryan Haight 
Act), Pub. L. No. 110-425, 122 Stat. 4820 (2008), which became 
effective on April 13, 2009 and is codified at 21 U.S.C. Sec.  
829(e).
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The Stipulations of Fact

    The parties, through their respective counsel, have entered into 
stipulations regarding the following matters:
    Stipulation A: The Respondent is registered with the DEA as a 
practitioner in Schedules II through V under DEA registration number 
BG8251845 at 7108 Fairway Drive, Suite 120, Palm Beach 
Gardens, Florida 33418. Respondent's DEA registration number BG8251845 
expires by its terms on September 30, 2011.
    Stipulation B: On February 23, 2011 the Respondent was personally 
served with an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of 
Registration and was simultaneously arrested on state drug-related 
felony charges. The state criminal trial is pending.
    Stipulation C: Oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance 
pursuant to 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1308.12(b)(1)(xiii) (2010).
    Stipulation D: OxyContin is a brand of oxycodone, a Schedule II 
narcotic controlled substance pursuant to 21 C.F.R. Sec.  
1308.12(b)(1)(xiii) (2010).
    Stipulation E: Roxicodone is a brand of oxycodone, a Schedule II 
narcotic controlled substance pursuant to 21 C.F.R. Sec.  
1308.12(b)(1)(xiii) (2010).
    Stipulation F: Alprazolam is a Schedule IV controlled substance 
pursuant to 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1308.14(c)(1) (2010).
    Stipulation G: Xanax is a brand of alprazolam, a Schedule IV 
controlled substance pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 1308.14(c)(1) (2010).
    Stipulation H: Vicodin is a brand of hydrocodone combination 
product, a Schedule III narcotic controlled substance pursuant to 21 
C.F.R. Sec.  1308.13(e)(1)(iv) (2010).
    Stipulation I: Soma is a brand of carisoprodol which is a non-
controlled muscle relaxant.

The Evidence

    At the hearing, the Government presented the testimony of several 
witnesses on the issue of the Respondent's medical practice, 
recordkeeping, and controlled substance prescribing practices. The 
testimony received during the Government's case-in-chief revealed that 
three undercover (UC) law enforcement officers infiltrated the North 
Palm Pain Management Clinic (NPPM) where the Respondent was employed 
and were able to obtain controlled substances issued under his COR. The 
Government also presented the testimony of an expert witness who 
reviewed the files maintained by NPPM on two of the UC officers as well 
as four charts maintained on other patients of the clinic who 
voluntarily consented to speak with law enforcement and to have their 
files examined.

UC Patient Rix

    Task Force Officer (TFO) William Schwartz, a sixteen-year veteran 
of the Sheriff's Office in Broward County, Florida, testified that he 
has served as a detective for thirteen years,\7\ been a designated DEA 
TFO since 2009, and has participated in thousands of drug diversion 
investigations.\8\ Tr. 592-93, 752. Schwartz made multiple undercover 
visits to the North Palm Pain Management Clinic (NPPM) under the 
assumed name Bill Rix (UC Patient Rix). Schwartz wore a wire, the UC

[[Page 63122]]

visits were recorded, and the recordings and transcripts were received 
into evidence.
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    \7\ Tr. 656.
    \8\ TFO Schwartz also testified that he completed the DEA 
Diversion Investigators Course in 2002 and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) School in 2007. Tr. 751-52.
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    TFO Schwartz testified that he made his first UC visit to NPPM as 
UC Patient Rix on October 21, 2009 (October 21st visit).\9\ Upon 
arrival, Rix encountered an armed security guard and Donna Palemire, 
one of two non-physician owners of NPPM. Tr. 598-99. In response to an 
inquiry from UC Patient Rix, Palemire assured him that a one-and-a-
half-year-old MRI report would be sufficient to be admitted to the 
practice for treatment,\10\ asked him to make efforts to locate past 
pharmacy profile documentation, and referred him to her husband, non-
physician NPPM co-owner Anthony Laterza, to discuss ``rejuvenation'' 
therapy. Tr. 599-600.
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    \9\ An audio recording and a corresponding transcript were 
received into evidence. Gov't Ex. 13; Tr. 596.
    \10\ According to Schwartz, Palemire told UC Patient Rix that 
she could refer him to an MRI facility if his efforts to locate his 
18-month-old MRI proved fruitless. Tr. 600; See Gov't Ex. 40 at 1 
(MRI referral).
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    The wire transcript and audio recording received in evidence 
regarding the October 21st visit are consistent with Schwartz's 
recollection. See Gov't Ex. 13. Like Schwartz's testimony, the 
transcript reflects that in seeking admittance to the clinic as a new 
pain management patient, UC Patient Rix encountered Palemire, and that 
she instructed Rix that he needed to furnish an MRI report as a 
condition precedent to begin treatment. Id. at 4. Although UC Patient 
Rix asserted that he already had a year-and-a-half-old MRI somewhere in 
his possession, Ms. Palemire advised that the dated MRI would be fine 
``for now'' but that he would need to procure a recent one. Id. 
Palemire referred UC Patient Rix to an imagining place for another MRI, 
and told him to ask for ``Rose.'' Id. at 6; see Gov't Ex. 40 at 1 (MRI 
referral). Additionally, Palemire recommended that UC Patient Rix bring 
in a pharmacy profile and copies of prescriptions that he had received 
in the past. Gov't Ex. 13 at 7. When UC Patient Rix told Palemire that 
he did not want the doctor to be put off by his history of having taken 
80 mg oxycodone, Palemire reassured UC Patient Rix that the doctor 
would not be alarmed on that account. Id. Palemire explained, ``He * * 
* I mean she [sic] doesn't have a problem with [o]xycodone, but with 
[m]ethadone she does. But, if you come on [m]ethadone, she'll probably 
give it to you, but then kind of wean you off.'' Id. UC Patient Rix 
stated that he was seeking the 30 mg dose, which inspired Palemire to 
issue a warning that while the Respondent is ``cool'' and ``awesome,'' 
that Rix should not get himself caught in a lie because the doctor 
``doesn't like it.'' \11\ Id. at 7-8. The referral to Laterza for 
rejuvenation therapy in the form of human growth hormone (HGH) \12\ and 
testosterone is also confirmed by the transcript. See id. at 5, 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Confusingly, this transcript reflects that Palemire used 
the terms ``he'' and ``she'' interchangeably.
    \12\ HGH is not a controlled substance, and under current Agency 
precedent, a consideration of its handling by the Respondent is 
irrelevant to the public interest determination that must be made in 
these proceedings. See Tony T. Bui, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49979, 49988 
(2010) (``Because it is not a controlled substance, Respondent's 
prescribings of [HGH] could not have violated the CSA's prescription 
requirement.''). Testosterone, by contrast, is an anabolic steroid 
and a Schedule III controlled substance. 21 C.F.R. Sec.  
1308.13(f)(1); see 21 U.S.C. Sec.  802 (41)(A); 21 C.F.R. Sec.  
1300.01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TFO Schwartz testified that he again presented to NPPM as Rix two 
days later on October 23, 2009 (October 23rd visit).\13\ Tr. 603. 
According to Schwartz, Ms. Palemire explained some NPPM paperwork 
procedures, accepted the fictitious lumbar/thoracic MRI and pharmacy 
profile he offered as UC Patient Rix, and instructed him to wait for 
the Respondent's assistant. Tr. 605. According to Schwartz, while 
waiting to be seen by the assistant, Laterza coached him through the 
preparation of some paperwork, and advised him to indicate as many 
health issues as he could. Tr. 605-08. Specifically, the wire 
transcript indicates that Laterza advised Rix ``to have as many 
complaints as possible.'' Gov't Ex. 14 at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ A transcript of the wire recording of the visit was 
received into evidence. Gov't Ex. 14; Tr. 604.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It was at this point that UC Patient Rix encountered a female 
identified by Laterza as ``Dr. Betsy.'' Tr. 608. Schwartz later 
ascertained that ``Dr. Betsy'' \14\ is not really a doctor at all, but 
a nurse practitioner named Betsy Sanchez. See Tr. 777. Sanchez asked 
Rix if he had ``[a]ny medical history,'' Gov't Ex. 14 at 62, checked 
his heart rate and respiration, and applied pressure with her fingers 
below his navel, Tr. 609-10; Gov't Ex. 14 at 62-63. Nurse Sanchez told 
Rix that it would not be necessary for him to remove his shirt for the 
examination. Gov't Ex. 14 at 62. Laterza then left Rix alone with Nurse 
Sanchez, explaining that his rejuvenation portion of the visit was 
complete, and that Sanchez was going to ``triage [him] for [his] 
pain.'' Id. at 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ An examination of the wire transcript reveals that Laterza 
and Palemire go to considerable lengths to refer to Nurse Sanchez as 
``Dr. Betsy,'' see Gov't Ex. 14, and Nurse Sanchez never corrects 
anyone in UC Patient Rix's presence or intimates to Rix that she is 
not a physician, Tr. 823. There is no indication in the record, 
however, that this was done at the direction of the Respondent. 
Further, during Sanchez's interaction with UC Patient Rix, she tells 
him that she is ``gonna review this with the doctor.'' Gov't Ex. 14 
at 70; Tr. 796.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sanchez asked UC Patient Rix some questions about his reasons for 
seeking pain management. Intentionally omitting any reference to 
``pain,'' Tr. 790, Rix told her that he was a stunt man, that he 
experienced some ``stiffness,'' and that as he's getting older he does 
not ``recover'' as quickly from workouts as he did when he was young, 
Gov't Ex. 14 at 65; Tr. 618. Rix also told Sanchez that his previous 
pain clinic had closed up suddenly, rendering his prior charts 
unavailable.\15\ Gov't Ex. 14 at 65, 68. In response to questioning 
from Sanchez, Rix indicated that his pain was zero out of ten with pain 
medications, and four or five without. Id. at 67; Tr. 784. In this 
interview with Sanchez, as in the paperwork he filled out, Rix asserted 
that his discomfort was focused on his neck. Tr. 613; Gov't Ex. 14 at 
69. Thus, inasmuch as the fictitious MRI \16\ he provided related only 
to the lumbar/thoracic regions of his back, no objective evidence 
related to any neck malady was ever presented by this patient. The 
forms Rix completed also represented his pain levels between zero and a 
maximum of three and restricted the complaints to his neck.\17\ Tr. 
613; Gov't Ex. 4 at 5-6. Notwithstanding Rix's written and oral 
complaints centered on his neck, and his lumbar/thoracic MRI, neither 
his neck nor his back were examined by Sanchez, Laterza, or anyone else 
during the visit. Tr. 620-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Rix, as part of his undercover ruse, described his prior 
pain clinic to Sanchez as ``the kind of place where you had fifty 
(50) people in the waiting room, five (5) doctors, and whoever the 
doctor was available [sic] was who you went to see.'' Gov't Ex. 14 
at 71. In fact, Rix told Sanchez that he was ``kinda glad they're 
closed.'' Id. By his description, UC Patient Rix unsubtly painted a 
picture of a pill mill. This description yielded no additional 
inquiry or corresponding chart note from Nurse Sanchez.
    \16\ Gov't Ex. 4 at 30.
    \17\ A copy of the NPPM patient chart prepared and maintained on 
UC Patient Rix was obtained by a signed release form and was 
received into evidence. Gov't Ex. 4; Tr. 613-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In another, intentionally-engineered anomaly,\18\ UC Patient Rix 
provided Sanchez with a physician name that conflicted with the 
information he provided on the fictitious pharmacy printout to see if 
it would generate a reaction from her. Tr. 619, 788-89; Gov't Ex. 14 at 
70. It did not. Id. Sanchez told Rix that she would review his case 
``with the doctor,'' and would ``find out[] when he's coming.'' Gov't 
Ex. 14 at 70, 72. In the waiting room, Palemire told Rix that the 
Respondent was in surgery and that Sanchez would ``call [the 
Respondent], review the chart over

[[Page 63123]]

the phone and then * * * [Rix would be] good to go.'' Id. at 72. During 
his post-exam wait, Laterza counseled him that when he meets the 
Respondent (an event that ultimately did not occur during this UC 
visit), that he should ``[l]ook, talk, walk like you're in pain [and 
that] I want to see absolute suffering in you.'' Id. at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See Tr. 762-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Approximately an hour and a half later, Sanchez informed UC Patient 
Rix that the Respondent had approved prescriptions for controlled 
substances, but in lesser amounts than Rix's (fictitious) pharmacy 
report had indicated he had been receiving in past. Id. at 100; Tr. 
622-23. Schwartz testified that he watched as Sanchez printed out 
controlled substance prescription scripts (as well as a script for 
physical therapy with no recommended or identified source for that 
modality) \19\ that bore the Respondent's printed name. Tr. 624-25. 
Schwartz also testified that he saw Sanchez write something on or near 
the prescription scripts, but was unable to tell if she was signing 
them. Id. at 625. Schwartz testified that shortly after receiving the 
signed scripts (a remarkable development in light of the Respondent's 
absence from the room where the documents were printed and handed to 
Rix), he handed them to Palemire, who stepped into a dispensing area, 
filled the prescriptions, and handed the controlled substances over. 
Tr. 626-27, 715-16, 723-24; \20\ see Gov't Ex. 38 at 1(a), 2(a); Gov't 
Ex. 39 at 4, 6-7. Schwartz left NPPM that day with the dispensed 
controlled substances and never encountered the Respondent, who he was 
told, was performing surgery. Gov't Ex. 14 at 71, 99. TFO Schwartz 
testified that during those visits to NPPM where he did not encounter 
the Respondent, the layout of the clinic and the open doors (except for 
the restroom door) gave him confidence that if the Respondent had been 
on premises, Schwartz would have seen him. Tr. 775-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Tr. 627.
    \20\ While later in his testimony TFO Schwartz misidentified 
pictures depicting a bottle of 2 mg alprazolam tablets as dispensed 
to him on December 21, 2009, the photographs clearly show a dispense 
date of October 23, 2009. Compare Tr. 724, with Gov't Ex. 38 at 
2(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Schwartz returned to NPPM as UC Patient Rix to pick up a lab 
requisition form on November 2, 2009.\21\ There was also a visit where 
Schwartz introduced another undercover officer to Laterza as part of 
the operation, and some telephone exchanges related to the logistics of 
picking up medications. Tr. 638-43; Gov't Ex. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 15; Tr. 631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UC Patient Rix finally got to meet the Respondent during the course 
of his fifth UC visit to NPPM, which occurred on November 21, 2009 
(November 21st visit).\22\ The November 21st visit started with Laterza 
opening and explaining the hormone therapy medications and enthanate (a 
Schedule III controlled substance testosterone medication) that were 
shipped to Rix in care of NPPM. Tr. 644-46. Laterza agreed to keep the 
delivered medications refrigerated while Rix was seen by the 
Respondent. Tr. 644-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 19; Tr. 644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After a short wait, the Respondent called UC Patient Rix into an 
examination room. Tr. 646-47. Schwartz testified that the Respondent 
had the Rix patient chart as the two men entered the examination room. 
Id. at 647. UC Patient Rix explained to the Respondent that he had been 
seen by ``Dr. Betsy'' and Laterza during his prior visit to NPPM, and 
that he received controlled pain medications from the former and 
controlled testosterone from the latter. Id. at 647-48. Furthermore, 
Rix informed the Respondent that ``Dr. Betsy'' had provided him with 
pain medication at a reduced level from what he had been prescribed by 
his former pain clinic. Id. Rix asked the Respondent about obtaining 
additional medication for breakthrough pain, acknowledged that he had 
run out of the pain medication that had been previously issued to him 
by ``Dr. Betsy'' at his last visit to NPPM, and confessed that he had 
procured more pain medicine ``from some people.'' Id. at 647; Gov't Ex. 
19 at 19. Rix also mentioned to the Respondent that his last pain 
clinic was frequented by ``shady people'' and closed after a Molotov 
cocktail was thrown through a clinic window. Gov't Ex. 19 at 19. 
Additionally, UC Patient Rix inquired as to whether the Respondent (his 
pain management physician) thought that two years was enough for him to 
train to compete in a triathlon. Tr. 648; Gov't Ex. 19 at 22.
    The Respondent, who had the Rix patient chart in hand, absorbed 
Rix's representation that he had received controlled substances from 
Laterza and ``Dr. Betsy'' without comment or discernible reaction. Tr. 
647-48. Likewise, he did not question Rix about which ``people'' 
supplemented his controlled substance pain medications when he ran out, 
why he had previously frequented an unsavory pain clinic, or even why 
he needed pain medication at all if he felt fit enough to commence a 
truncated triathlete training regimen. Tr. 647-49. To the contrary, the 
Respondent's reaction to the input he received from Rix was to issue a 
script (that was filled by NPPM) increasing his Roxicodone dosage by 
one additional pill a day from the level set the previous month by 
Nurse Sanchez, with the reassurance that he generally commences 
prescribing medication for breakthrough pain at the third visit. Tr. 
649, 718, 725; Gov't Ex. 19 at 20; Gov't Ex. 4 at 24; Gov't Ex. 38 at 
4(a); compare Gov't Ex. 4 at 24 (script for 150 Roxicodone 30 
mg issued November 21, 2009), with Gov't Ex. 4 at 27 (script for 
120 Roxicodone 30 mg issued October 23, 2009). During this 
November 21st visit, UC Patient Rix was not asked to fill out any 
additional questionnaires or other paperwork,\23\ he was not examined 
(or even touched) by the Respondent or anyone else at NPPM, no vital 
signs were taken, and he was never asked about side effects or pain 
issues. Tr. 649-50. There was no discussion about Rix's fictitious MRI 
and its facial inconsistencies with his paperwork (neck versus back), 
and no treatment plan, goals for treatment, risks and benefits, or 
alternative treatments found their way into the discussion. Tr. 651. In 
fact, according to Schwartz, during the entire brief encounter, the 
Respondent was writing in the Rix patient chart or typing on the 
computer, and only even made eye contact with Rix ``for a few seconds 
at most.'' Tr. 649. The November 21st UC visit clearly established that 
the Respondent knew, or should have known (in the unlikely event that 
he did not already know), that UC Patient Rix was receiving controlled 
substances at NPPM issued on scripts over his printed name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Schwartz testified that as UC Patient Rix, he was never 
asked to fill out another form after the October 23rd visit. Tr. 
649.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Schwartz returned to NPPM on December 18, 2009 (December 18th UC 
visit) \24\ and was seen by Nurse Sanchez. Tr. 661. UC Patient Rix told 
Sanchez that he had been hospitalized with the flu, lost weight, was 
working out, and only had three out of ten pain, but would like some 
breakthrough medication based on the Respondent's previous 
encouragement that breakthrough pain medication prescribing could 
commence at the third visit. Tr. 661; Gov't Ex. 24 at 8-11. When 
questioned on the issue of pain level, UC Patient Rix told Sanchez that 
``[i]t's not that it gets so bad, it's just that

[[Page 63124]]

I run out.'' Gov't Ex. 24 at 10. Rix even asked if the three of ten 
number pain assessment he provided was appropriate. Id.; Tr. 662. 
Sanchez demurred on Rix's request for breakthrough pain medication, 
emphasizing to Rix that the Respondent had just increased his dosage. 
Tr. 661-62, 800; Gov't Ex. 24 at 11. Again, this UC visit, like the 
visit before it, did not include any type of physical exam, treatment 
plan, objectives and goals discussion, medication risks and benefits 
discussion, alternative pain treatment modalities, or follow up on the 
previous script that recommended a physical therapy consult. Tr. 663-
64. At Sanchez's command, the examination room printer yielded the same 
compliment of prescription scripts for controlled substances that had 
been produced by the Respondent on the previous visit. Tr. 665; see Tr. 
719-20, 724, 727-28, 800-01; Gov't Ex. 38 at 2(a), 11(a), 12(a), 13(a); 
Gov't Ex. 39 at 22, 26. Sanchez wrote something on the prescription 
scripts, and the visit ended with controlled substance prescriptions 
being authorized and dispensed, and without the Respondent making an 
appearance.\25\ Tr. 665.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 24; Tr. 660.
    \25\ Schwartz testified that he did not know if any of the 
scripts issued to him during any of his visits to NPPM were pre-
signed. Tr. 812.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The next NPPM visit by UC Patient Rix occurred on January 11, 
2010.\26\ Tr. 666. Upon UC Patient Rix's arrival at NPPM, Palemire told 
him that the Respondent was not in the office because his wife was in 
the hospital giving birth, but that because Rix was ``an established 
patient,'' he would not need to see the Respondent to get his 
controlled substance prescriptions. Tr. 671; Gov't Ex. 26 at 6. At 
Palemire's direction, Rix left the clinic and telephoned back on two 
occasions to query when he could return. Tr. 668; Gov't Ex. 25. On the 
second call, Palemire told Rix that he could come in. Gov't Ex. 25 at 
3; Tr. 668. Palemire handed Rix two controlled substance prescription 
scripts and dispensed the medications. Tr. 671-72, 728-29; Gov't Ex. 26 
at 15; see Gov't Ex. 4 at 18; Gov't Ex. 38 at 13(a), 14(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 26; Tr. 670. An audio recording and 
transcript of a phone call to NPPM by UC Patient Rix wherein he 
attempted to negotiate an earlier refill visit date was also 
introduced into evidence. Gov't Ex. 28; Tr. 676. Rix convinced 
Palemire to advance the visit from January 16th to the 11th. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Schwartz did not return to NPPM for six months. On July 22, 2010, 
UC Patient Rix visited NPPM and told Palemire he has been away in 
California starring in films.\27\ Tr. 679. After a brief conversation, 
Palemire handed UC Patient Rix three controlled substance 
prescriptions. Tr. 680. Although Rix conversed with an individual named 
``Ted'' regarding rejuvenation therapy, he never met with any medical 
professional during this UC visit. Tr. 681. He was not asked anything 
further about his extended absence from the practice or what treatments 
and/or medications he received during the hiatus. No one asked if he 
had been taking medication during that time, or if not, how well (or 
poorly) he was able to manage his activities of daily living without 
the benefit of controlled substance medications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 31; Tr. 678.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The testimony presented by TFO Schwartz was sufficiently detailed, 
consistent, and plausible to be found fully credible. Schwartz's 
demeanor appeared forthright and candid, and although his recollection 
of the relevant events was excellent, he demonstrated a consistent 
readiness to not acknowledge elements of the case where he was in any 
way unsure (e.g., whether Nurse Sanchez was affixing a signature to 
prescription scripts in his presence).
    A patient chart maintained by the Respondent's practice on UC 
Patient Rix was received into evidence. Gov't Ex. 4. The chart 
contained what the evidence established to be a compliment of forms and 
documents that are generally common to other patient charts from the 
Respondent's practice that were also admitted into evidence. These 
forms are collected, completed, and/or executed by the patient during 
initial intake procedures. See Tr. 617. These intake documents include: 
(1) A patient sign-in sheet; (2) a patient information form (Patient 
Intake Form); (3) a consent to treat and guarantee of payment form; (4) 
a Brief Pain Inventory (Pain Inventory); (5) a Patient Medication 
Management Agreement (Pain Med Contract); (6) a Contract for Long-Term 
Use of Opioid Analgesic (Opioid Contract); (7) an advisal to patients 
regarding possible criminal consequences under state law associated 
with acts of drug-diversion-related activity and consent for the 
Respondent's practice to cooperate in law enforcement efforts 
associated with diversion; (8) an advisal to patients regarding 
possible consequences of lost medication; (9) a HIPAA \28\ notice to 
patients; and (10) a driver's license photocopy. Gov't Ex. 4 at 2-14, 
34, 36; Tr. 615-17. Additionally, the chart contained forms that were 
completed by the Respondent and/or personnel at the practice, such as a 
Patient Reassessment Opioid Analgesic 4-A's+ Chart Note (Chart Note), 
as well as progress note pages (Progress Note Form), imaging reports, 
and copies of prescription scripts. Gov't Ex. 4 at 15-33, 35; see Tr. 
17-18, 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Patient Intake Form, UC Patient Rix listed his occupation as 
an actor, described the purpose of the visit simply as ``pain,'' and he 
wrote that he heard of the Respondent's practice through a ``friend/
word of mouth.'' Id. at 3. Rix responded on the form that he was not 
involved in an auto accident. Id. Under a section labeled ``MEDICAL 
HISTORY: (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY),'' concerning a legion of listed 
medical ailments, conditions, diseases, and symptoms, Rix declined to 
identify a single malady, and responded that he had no allergies. Id.
    The Pain Inventory consists largely of questions prompting the 
Respondent to rate his pain and how it interferes with daily activities 
and quality of life on a ten-scale (with zero representing no pain and 
ten amounting to ``pain as bad as you can imagine''). Id. at 5-6. UC 
Patient Rix affirmatively indicated therein that he experienced pain on 
the same day different from ``everyday'' pain, and signaled that he 
experienced neck pain by circling the corresponding anatomical 
representation on a diagram. Id. Underneath the diagram, Rix expressed 
that his pain in the last twenty-four hours had been constant, to wit: 
he rated his pain at its least, worst, average, and at present all as a 
three. Id. Also within the last twenty-four hours, Rix marked that he 
had experienced no pain relief (zero percent) from pain treatments or 
medications, despite reporting in an adjacent area that he was 
receiving oxycodone 30 mg, oxycodone 15 mg, and Xanax for his 
discomfort. Id. The next array of seven questions inquired into the 
level of interference that the patient's pain caused with routine 
functions. Id. The scale employed also ranges from zero (does not 
interfere) to ten (completely interferes). Id. To these metrics, UC 
Patient Rix variably fixed his pain between one and three on a ten 
scale, and in another portion of the form, characterized his pain as 
``aching'' that has lasted more than a month. Id. at 6. Regarding the 
kinds of things that improve his pain or make it worse, Rix wrote in 
respectively ``medication'' and ``no medication.'' Id. At another part 
of the form, Rix declined to circle any of a large number of symptoms. 
Id.
    The fictitious reports supplied to NPPM by Schwartz are in the Rix 
chart.

[[Page 63125]]

The fictitious MRI report reflects some multilevel mild thoracic and 
lumbar spondylosis, that there is no evidence of cord injury, and that 
there was no evidence of fracture history. Id. at 31. The fictitious 
pharmacy history indicates five prescriptions for controlled substances 
filled on two occasions during non-consecutive months and prescribed by 
two different doctors.\29\ Gov't Ex. 4 at 33. A handwritten note across 
the bottom of the report reads ``South FL Pain,'' ``Moved to Pain 
Manager,'' ``Broward Co.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ This is yet another none-too-subtle reference to possible 
doctor shopping and a potential red flag of possible diversion that 
received no discernible heightened scrutiny during the visit or in 
the patient chart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the October 23rd examination, Nurse Sanchez prepared a Chart 
Note. Gov't Ex. 4 at 28-29. Under a section denoted ``Current Analgesic 
Regimen,'' Sanchez wrote oxycodone 30 mg 210, oxycodone 15 mg 
90, and Xanax 2 mg 30, with a note in the left margin 
signifying that they were all last filled in September 2009 (the month 
before this visit). Id. Under a section styled ``Analgesia (average/
best/worst pain intensity; % pain relief),'' is found ``best 0/10'' and 
``worst 4/10.'' An ``Activities of Daily Living (functional status/
relationships/mood)'' section does not list any activities of daily 
living, but does contain the phrase ``stunt man.'' Id. Zeros are 
entered in sections entitled ``Adverse Events (type/severity),'' and 
``Aberrant Drug-Related Behaviors (type/severity).'' Id. ``MRI 5/08 -> 
mild spondylosis'' are inscribed under ``Monitoring Tests/Reports 
(urine screen/pill counts/other).'' Id. at 29. UC Patient Rix's 
physical and psychological assessment does not contain any diagnoses, 
but does state that Rix is ``pleasant.'' Id. Sanchez's notes related to 
the physical examination are not entirely legible, but do include a 
notation that UC Patient Rix is 38 years old, is in no apparent 
distress, and has clear lungs. Id. Below the physical examination 
findings is a front and back body sketch, with X's drawn upon the neck 
and lower back of the posterior depiction. Id. Further below the 
sketches is a section entitled ``Action Plan (continue/adjust/
discontinue therapy),'' wherein the controlled substances that were 
ultimately prescribed to Rix that day (``Roxi 30 mg 120'' and 
``Xanax 2 mg 30'') are indicated. Id. In a space designed for 
the medical professional to enter additional comments, Sanchez wrote 
the word ``obtain.'' Id.
    The Government presented testimony and a written report from Mark 
A. Rubenstein, M.D., FAAPMR, FAAEM. Tr. 24-25; Gov't Ex. 11. Dr. 
Rubenstein, a Florida-licensed physician and academic, whose 
qualifications include a board certification in Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation with a subspecialty certificate in Pain Medicine, as 
well as extensive experience serving as a medical expert to multiple 
entities in varied litigation forums,\30\ was offered and accepted as 
an expert in the area of pain management. Tr. 21, 129; see Gov't Ex. 
10. Rubenstein testified that he was compensated at a rate of $750.00 
per hour for his testimony, $500.00 per hour for his preparation time, 
and that there was no cap fixed on the compensation arrangement. Tr. 
118.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Tr. 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Rubenstein's report and testimony set forth his professional 
evaluation of six patient charts seized from the Respondent's practice, 
including the chart maintained on UC Patient Rix. Tr. 27. As a 
preliminary matter, it is worthy of note that the format of Dr. 
Rubenstein's report was confusing and singularly unhelpful. While a 
critical objective of securing expert assistance is to aid the trier of 
fact in analyzing and processing material that can benefit from 
expertise beyond the ken of the ordinary citizen, Dr. Rubenstein's 
report is disorganized, unfocused, and written in a manner that 
bespeaks a free association narration of documents and other items 
provided to him by the Government in no particular order. A principal 
reason for the difficulty in utilizing the report undoubtedly comes 
from the manner of its genesis. Rubenstein testified that over time he 
has developed a relationship with the Florida State Attorney's Office 
wherein he would review files and provide whatever opinions he felt the 
documents warranted, with scarce guidance regarding a specific mandate. 
Tr. 28-29. Moreover, Rubenstein was asked to review a mass of paper 
wherein patient charts that were eventually properly admitted into 
evidence are interspersed with DEA investigative reports and other 
documents that were not. Tr. 35; Gov't Ex. 12. The exhibit that 
contained the documents reviewed by Dr. Rubenstein was admitted into 
evidence in these proceedings as a single exhibit (Expert Review 
Package), Tr. 28-29, for the singular purpose to enable a review over 
whether particular facets of his opinions regarding the UC operations 
were informed by properly admitted evidence, Tr. 34-35. In reviewing 
Rubenstein's report, it was often difficult to determine whether he was 
relying upon information procured from a patient chart, a UC visit 
recording, a DEA investigatory report, or even a conversation with an 
agent \31\ that was not an admitted part of the record in this case, 
and expert opinions were drafted in a manner that made it challenging 
to ascertain whether a single patient, several patients, or overall 
trends were the object of the opinion. The absence of focus that 
defines the pages that were submitted by the Government as the 
purported report of an expert severely detracted from the benefit that 
Dr. Rubenstein's expertise could have yielded. The disjointed nature of 
the report was certainly not ameliorated by Dr. Rubenstein's almost 
perpetual need to refer to it during his testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See Tr. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An example of the difficulty in the manner in which Dr. 
Rubenstein's analysis was procured, evaluated, and presented was his 
observations and conclusions on the UC Patient Rix chart regarding what 
he perceived to be a 50-second physical exam during the October 23rd UC 
visit that was limited to a pupil examination. Gov't Ex. 11 at 1. 
Nowhere in the admitted exhibits or testimony (beyond the Expert Review 
Package) is the October 23rd UC visit limited to this time period and 
scope. Thus, this opinion cannot be used here to determine whether the 
Respondent's controlled substance prescribing practices were 
unsatisfactory.
    On the UC Patient Rix chart, Rubenstein's report and his testimony 
criticized the practice at NPPM for introducing Nurse Sanchez as ``Dr. 
Betsy.'' Tr. 30. Rubenstein found this to be misleading. Id. As 
discussed elsewhere in this recommended decision, the record is not 
sufficiently developed on this point to ascertain the extent (if any) 
that this feature should impact the decision as to whether the 
revocation of the Respondent's COR is in the public interest. While 
true, as discussed above, that Rix did indicate to the Respondent that 
he had been previously seen and was issued controlled substances by 
``Dr. Betsy,'' and was not corrected on the issue of her title, it is 
not clear that this was a matter that reflected controlled substance 
prescribing at or below the standard recognized in Florida. Stated 
differently, it is not Sanchez's moniker among NPPM patients that is as 
important here as whether the Respondent was permitting her to make 
controlled substance prescription decisions under his COR number. Dr. 
Rubenstein was unambiguous on his expert opinion that the prevailing 
medical standard in Florida requires

[[Page 63126]]

that a physician must actually meet a patient prior to prescribing 
controlled substances, and must be physically present at a facility 
where controlled substances are being prescribed. Tr. 36-43. This is 
so, according to Dr. Rubenstein, even where medical professional 
``extenders'' such as nurse practitioners or physician's assistants are 
utilized to take vital signs and/or conduct portions of physical 
examinations. Tr. 41-42.
    According to Schwartz's credible testimony, he made ten visits to 
NPPM and received controlled substances on five of those. He met with 
Nurse Sanchez (not the Respondent) for the first time during the (2nd) 
October 23rd UC visit and got controlled substances; he met with the 
Respondent (for the first and only time) on the (5th) November 21st UC 
visit and got controlled substances; he met again with Nurse Sanchez on 
the (6th) December 18th UC visit and got controlled substances; he met 
only with Palemire on the (7th) January 11th visit and got controlled 
substances; and on the (10th) July 28th visit, Rix met with a non-
medical office staffer named ``Ted'' and once again got controlled 
substances. Thus, Dr. Rubenstein's professional opinion that the 
controlled substance prescribing realized under the Respondent's COR 
was done without the Respondent present and fell below the Florida 
medical standards is clearly factually supported in the current record, 
and as discussed, infra, stands unrebutted. It is likewise clear that 
(at least) as of Rix's fifth visit where he met the Respondent for the 
first and last time, the Respondent knew that Rix was a patient who was 
procuring controlled substances under his COR by meeting with Nurse 
Sanchez and Mr. Laterza. The only reasonable factual inferences that 
can be drawn are that either the Respondent was aware that Nurse 
Sanchez was prescribing under his COR, or that on the fifth visit he 
learned about that situation and voluntarily endured it for the 
subsequent visits. Accordingly, the Respondent knew or should have 
known that Nurse Sanchez and others at NPPM were authorizing controlled 
substance prescriptions under his COR. In light of the fact that no 
surprise was expressed by the Respondent to UC Patient Rix when the 
latter explained to the former that he had seen ``Dr. Betsy'' and 
Laterza for his prior visit and received controlled substances (in the 
unlikely event that these statements from Rix presented an unexpected 
anomaly or concern to the Respondent), a glance at the Rix patient 
chart that the Respondent had in his hand would have provided absolute 
clarity.
    In his testimony, Rubenstein characterized the physical exam 
performed on Rix as ``suboptimal.'' Tr. 36. In particular, Rubenstein 
noted that although ``the patient complained of neck and back stiffness 
* * * the neck and back were never palpated or even examined and * * * 
no detailed neurologic or musculoskeletal examination was performed.'' 
Id. Similarly, Rubenstein's report noted that ``no neurologic or 
musculoskeletal examination [was] performed,'' and that ``no objective 
abnormality [was] ever identified during the limited, brief and 
suboptimal physical examination.'' Gov't Ex. 11 at 2. The brevity and 
scarce content of the physical examination were credibly detailed by 
TFO Schwartz, thereby equipping this unrebutted expert opinion with a 
sufficient factual evidentiary basis in the record for reliance.
    Rubenstein's report also observed that although the chart reflected 
a prescription for physical therapy, ``there was no recommendation to a 
specific therapist, a diagnosis, a type of physical therapy, frequency, 
duration, goals, etc.'' Id. In his report, Dr. Rubenstein concluded 
that the treatment observed during the October 23rd Rix office visit

Does not represent even minimal standards to justify controlled 
substances, and there would be no basis to prescribe highly 
addictive medications such as oxycodone 30 mg in large quantities as 
well as Xanax 2 mg based on the history provided or the physical 
examination performed [and that] [t]his represents a deviation from 
the standard of care.

Id.
    Dr. Rubenstein also opined that having UC Patient Rix execute a 
pain contract, medical management agreement, and an advisal regarding 
safeguarding opioids at the outset of treatment, before a determination 
could be made by a physician that opiates were even appropriate, is a 
practice that falls below the standard of care in Florida. Tr. 43-46; 
Gov't Ex. 4 at 7-11.
    The Rix patient chart also contains progress notes \32\ pertaining 
to Rix's (5th) November 21 UC visit, the first and only time the 
Respondent was in the same room with UC Patient Rix. Gov't Ex. 4. Rix 
was seen only by the Respondent, and the handwritten progress notes are 
signed with the letter ``g.'' Id. at 26. The progress notes reflect 
marks on the form denoting inquiries regarding medication side effects 
(constipation, loss of appetite, and insomnia checked off), social 
history (single and living with spouse oxymoronically checked off), 
daily substance intake (half pack of cigarettes and no alcohol checked 
off), and physical examination (reflects examination of head, ears, 
eyes, nose, throat, and abdomen, and that Rix was pleasant and appeared 
in pain). Id. at 25. The form also indicates negative psychological 
history findings for eight mental health symptoms and ``rarely'' 
designated for three others. Id. at 26. Additionally, the form 
indicates that Rix had been ``counseled on risks/benefits of [the 
prescribed medications and] will take exactly as prescribed,'' that 
``fish oil/omega 3 was recommended [in a dosage of] 3-6 grams per 
day,'' that alcohol and soda avoidance was urged ``@ length [sic],'' 
that Rix was ``strongly advised'' to stop smoking, and responded 
negatively when asked whether he has used recreational drugs while 
taking pain medication. Id. Schwartz's credible testimony and the 
transcript of the wire he wore show that none of those areas were the 
subject of any discussion or examination during the brief encounter. 
Gov't Ex. 4 at 25-26; Gov't Ex. 18 at 17-22; Tr. 647-53. Thus, to the 
extent that the progress notes reflect these events, questions, and 
examination results, they are plainly fabricated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Although the patient name on this page is left blank, there 
is adequate, unchallenged record evidence to support a finding that 
this page was contained in the Rix patient chart provided to TFO 
Thomas by NPPM. See Gov't Ex. 4 at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the section labeled ``plan,'' six controlled and non-
controlled substances are preprinted in predetermined strengths. The 
list contains Roxi 30 mg, Roxi 15 mg, Valium 10 mg, Xanax (with a blank 
next to the strength), Mobic 7.5 mg (non-controlled), and Soma (non-
controlled with a blank next to the strength). Id. Next to each drug is 
a corresponding area with a blank field and the words ``continued as 
prescribed'' next to it. Id. Handwritten by the Respondent is a check 
next to Roxi 30 mg and an ``up'' arrow with the number 150 next to 
``continued as prescribed.'' Id. Also marked is Xanax for 2 mg. Id.
    In evaluating this November 21st UC visit, Dr. Rubenstein's report 
notes that although no physical examination was conducted on Rix during 
this visit, the office visit form has no patient name and falsely 
reflects that an examination of the patient's head and other enumerated 
body parts and organs occurred. Gov't Ex. 11 at 3. Hence, based on the 
credible testimony of TFO Schwartz and the corroborating transcript 
received into evidence, these chart notes are plainly untrue.
    The UC Patient Rix patient chart contains a progress note prepared 
in

[[Page 63127]]

connection with Schwartz's (6th) December 18th UC visit. Gov't Ex. 4 at 
22-23. Consistent with Schwartz's credible testimony that his 
procurement of controlled substances on this occasion was preceded by 
contact with Nurse Betsy Sanchez and not the Respondent, the progress 
notes are signed with the letter ``B.'' Id. at 23. Suffice it to say 
that the progress notes prepared by Nurse Sanchez during this UC visit 
are as distant from the reality of what happened as were the 
Respondent's recorded recollections of the November 21st visit. In 
short, the observations set forth in these chart notes are as phony as 
those concocted by the Respondent regarding the November 21st UC visit.
    Dr. Rubenstein's report on the December 18th UC visit notes that 
this visit also resulted in the issuance of controlled substance 
prescriptions issued under the Respondent's COR although he was nowhere 
in sight, and that this visit included neither a physical examination 
nor even the taking of vital signs. Gov't Ex. 11 at 3. These are 
factual predicates that find support in the record in Schwartz's 
credible testimony. Tr. 660-65. The absence of any examination and 
vital readings did not result in the absence of values regarding those 
aspects from appearing in the progress notes, which Rubenstein 
characterizes as ``fraud in the examination scenario.'' Gov't Ex. 11 at 
3. Rubenstein also found it remarkable that UC Patient Rix told them 
his pain was ``not bad'' so long as he has his medication and that Rix 
asked for advice about what number to volunteer on the pain scale and 
whether a three would be too low. Id. Although Patient Rix informed the 
practice that he had been in the hospital for a week, lost ten pounds, 
and had been unable to keep food down, conditions that could have 
precluded his ability to finish the medication that had been prescribed 
on the prior visit, Nurse Sanchez presented him with prescriptions for 
150 Roxicodone 30 mg and 30 Xanax 2 mg, both of which 
were dispensed by Ms. Palemire. Id. at 3-4.
    The Rix patient chart contains a progress note prepared in 
connection with the (7th) January 11 UC visit by UC Patient Rix. Gov't 
Ex. 4 at 19-20. Although, according to the credible testimony of TFO 
Schwartz, UC Patient Rix was issued controlled substances after 
consultation with only Palemire (and no medical professional), Tr. 681, 
the progress note reflects recorded observations, history, advice, and 
counseling reminiscent of previous (equally false) versions prepared in 
connection with other visits by the Respondent and Nurse Sanchez. The 
form is signed with the letter ``g.'' Gov't Ex. 4 at 20.
    The progress note documentation maintained in the chart in 
connection with the (8th) July 22nd UC visit was unnamed, incomplete, 
and unsigned. Gov't Ex. 4 at 16-17. Like the UC visit that preceded it 
by six months, the credible testimony of TFO Schwartz established that 
he encountered no medical professional during that visit, no history of 
any kind was taken, and no examination took place--the false entries on 
the form to the contrary notwithstanding. Tr. 681. The progress note 
bore no reference to the fact that Rix had not been to the practice in 
six months. Gov't Ex. 4 at 16-17.
    Regarding this final UC visit to NPPM by Rix as a pain patient\33\ 
and the lengthy hiatus that preceded it, Dr. Rubenstein testified that 
after such a long absence from the practice, that a detailed history 
and inquiry must precede a determination by the physician that 
controlled substances are an appropriate course, and that the 
documentation in the chart did not support such steps. Tr. 48-54. Not 
only did Schwartz's credible testimony and the chart note support the 
absence of such a probing inquiry, Schwartz's testimony establishes 
that the decision to prescribe controlled substance pain medication on 
the Respondent's COR was made by, or with input from only, Palemire, 
who is not a medical professional. Rubenstein opined that ``based on 
the records presented * * * there was no basis to prescribe oxycodone 
or Xanax based on the history provided or the physical examination 
performed.'' Tr. 50. Dr. Rubenstein elaborated that this was of 
particular importance in a case such as Rix presented, where the two 
medications have potentially dangerous interactions that can result in 
respiratory depression, and that a determination as to whether a 
patient has been off opioids for that period of time (and by virtue of 
that abstinence would be treated as opioid na[iuml]ve) must be made by 
a qualified practitioner. Tr. 51-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ TFO Schwartz returned two more subsequent times, on July 
23rd and July 28th, to order and pick up anabolic steroids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Addressing the controlled substance prescribing regarding UC 
Patient Rix, Dr. Rubenstein testified that the amount of controlled 
substances prescribed was inconsistent with the relatively low levels 
of pain complaints. Tr. 55. According to Rubenstein, the conflict 
between the complaints in the neck and the MRI addressing the back made 
it unclear as to what body part was even being treated for pain. Tr. 
56. Moreover, Rubenstein was troubled by the absence of any indication 
that in the face of stated back and neck complaints, no neurologic or 
musculoskeletal exam had been performed and that there was no evidence 
that UC Patient Rix's back and neck had been palpated. Tr. 56-57. Dr. 
Rubenstein testified that after reviewing the patient chart prepared on 
UC Patient Rix, it was his opinion that the care rendered to Rix at 
NPPM did not meet the standard of care required in pain management for 
the following reasons:

There was not an adequate physician/patient relationship. The 
medications were excessive given the lack of appropriate history or 
physical examination, the lack of identified pain generators and the 
lack of patient complaints or objective abnormality that would have 
correlated to the requirement or consideration of said medications. 
The medications were excessive in dose and frequency given the 
underlying problem and there were issues with who performed the 
evaluation of the patient.

Tr. 59.

UC Patient Hays

    Retired Special Agent (SA) Jack Lunsford testified that prior to 
his retirement, he had served over twenty-two years as a DEA special 
agent. Tr. 136. Lunsford testified that he made two UC visits to the 
Respondent's practice, on June 29, 2010 and July 27, 2010, 
respectively, under the assumed name David Hays (UC Patient Hays), and 
that (like TFO Schwartz's visits as Rix) both visits were recorded 
through the use of a bodywire and transcribed. Tr. 137, 139, 176.
    SA Lunsford testified that at his initial visit to NPPM, which 
occurred on June 29, 2010,\34\ he was greeted by an armed security 
guard who told him that the Respondent was not in and that he did not 
know whether the Respondent would return. Id. SA Lunsford testified 
that he lined up at the reception counter. Tr. 138-40. The attendant at 
the reception counter likewise informed UC Patient Hays that the 
Respondent was not available, but stated that a ``Dr. Derrick'' could 
see him instead.\35\ Tr. 140. He was then instructed to produce his MRI 
report and driver's license and was asked to sign a log and fill out 
paperwork while he waited for his examination. Tr. 140-41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 30; Tr. 176.
    \35\ Derrick Davis is a physician's assistant who was employed 
by NPPM. Tr. 893.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A copy of the patient chart maintained by the Respondent's office 
on UC Patient Hays reveals the same

[[Page 63128]]

compliment of standard forms present in the other patient charts 
received into evidence \36\ and has chart entries reflecting his 
initial June 29th UC visit. Gov't Ex. 8. On the Patient Intake Form, UC 
Patient Hays indicated that he was referred to the practice by his 
``friend Mark,'' and that the purpose of his visit was ``to see about 
medication.'' Id. at 2. The Pain Inventory reflects a range of pain 
from only 1-3 on a 10 scale, that he has endured this discomfort for 
``more than a month,'' that he treats his pain with rest, hot showers, 
and over-the-counter Advil and Motrin, and that remedies have provided 
him with 30% relief (from his 1-3 out of 10 pain). Id. at 4-5. Diagonal 
lines were drawn on a Pain Med Contract that was provided to Hays, 
thereby alerting the patient that it is not necessary to provide either 
his ``[g]oals for taking opioid medications'' or ``[m]edication and 
proposed duration of use.'' \37\ Id. at 6. Similar lines were pre-drawn 
on the provided Opioid Contract through areas designated for the 
patient to list ``[t]he reasons [he] has pain,'' and the specific 
opioid medications and doses prescribed. Id. at 10. Lunsford testified 
that these diagonal marks were not made by him. Tr. 143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ An exception being the addition in UC Patient Hays' medical 
file of a copy of a DEA regulation (21 C.F.R. Sec.  1306.13) 
detailing the permissible conditions for the partial filling of a 
prescription for a Schedule II substance. Gov't Ex. 8 at 13.
    \37\ SA Lunsford testified that while he was not certain when 
the diagonal lines appeared in the chart, they were not added by 
him. Tr. 143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A review of the transcript prepared in connection with the June 
29th UC visit,\38\ to which SA Lunsford's testimony largely parallels, 
reveals that UC Patient Hays never interacted with the Respondent, but 
was seen by a physician's assistant (PA) who identified himself as 
``Derrick.'' \39\ Gov't Ex. 30 at 9. When, in response to an inquiry 
from the PA, Hays informed that he ``had not really injured'' his back, 
the PA told him that he was mistaken and that his back was injured, and 
pointed to his MRI report. Id.; Tr. 164. The lumbar MRI report found 
within the UC Patient Hays chart reflects ``[s]mall disc protrusions at 
L4-5 and L5-S1 with bulging of the annulus [with] [n]o nerve root 
effacement * * * identified at either level'' and ``[r]ecommend[s] 
correlation with the clinical symptoms and neurologic exam to assess 
the significance of the * * * findings.'' Gov't Ex. 30 at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ While the foundation laid for the introduction of the 
transcript was certainly not a model for clarity, the document was 
received into evidence after SA Lunsford testified that it might 
contain some inconsistencies that did not rise to the level of 
significant, such as him saying ``Whoa'' but it appearing as ``Wow'' 
in the transcript. Tr. 169-76. Whatever typos he thought the 
transcript may possess, SA Lunsford still felt that on balance it 
was fair and accurate as to what transpired on June 29, 2010. Tr. 
171, 175. Moreover, although the tenor of Lunsford's testimony 
during the authentication evolution gave the impression that the 
transcript contained typographical errors, the substance of SA 
Lunsford's recollection of events as expressed through his credible 
testimony was substantially the same as the version depicted in the 
transcript.
    \39\ Although the office staff told UC Patient Hays that he was 
going to see ``Dr. Derrick,'' the physician's assistant made it 
clear at the outset of his interaction with Hays that he was a 
``practitioner assistant.'' Gov't Ex. 30 at 9; Tr. 149.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UC Patient Hays told the PA that he was a pressure washer by 
occupation and that his employment, as well as the mechanic work he 
performs on his motorcycles, results in his lifting heavy items. Gov't 
Ex. 30 at 10. While Hays initially told the PA that he had never been 
in a motor vehicle accident, id., he later admitted to rear-ending a 
car in a motor vehicle. Id. at 17.\40\ Regarding medication, consistent 
with his responses on the Pain Inventory, Hays told the PA that he has 
been treating his back discomfort with ``Advil and Motrin sometimes.'' 
Id. at 11; see Tr. 163. When asked pointedly whether he had tried other 
medications ``whether you got it off the street or [from] a friend,'' 
UC Patient Hays conceded that his girlfriend has given him oxycodone in 
both 30 and 15 mg strength, as well as Xanax, but that this was causing 
a problem because his girlfriend actually had a legitimate need for her 
prescribed pain medication and Hays, by his own admission, only had 
``you know, a few * * * I guess relatively minor health issues.'' Id. 
at 11-12; see Tr. 150, 153. As the discussion between patient and PA 
progressed, Hays made it clear that taking his girlfriend's medication 
has caused some relationship disharmony because she is happy ``[w]ell, 
because she's medicated [and] I haven't been so much.'' Id. Hays told 
the PA that his girlfriend ``wants us to get kind of on a even bases 
[sic].'' Gov't Ex. 30 at 12. An almost surreal exchange followed 
wherein the PA (none too discreetly) re-framed the patient's issue as 
based really in terms of the need for back pain relief, to which the 
patient finally replied ``You know, [I] haven't really thought about it 
that way but you may be right,'' and the PA ultimately announced 
``Okay. Well, let's see what we could do to make you happier and make 
you guys really connect, okay?'' Id. at 12-14; see Tr. 150. The PA 
conducted a discussion with the patient regarding potential medication 
side effects and risks of addiction. Gov't Ex. 30 at 15-16, 24; see Tr. 
151, 165. A discussion on pain level followed, wherein UC Patient Hays 
repeatedly confessed that his earthly existence has been virtually 
unknown to feeling or even observing genuine pain, and is finally 
coaxed into agreeing that without medication, his pain level is about a 
three out of ten. Gov't Ex. 30 at 17-18; see Tr. 151. When pressed on 
the issue of pain, UC Patient Hays explained to the PA that ``my back 
doesn't feel all that bad,'' that ``I mean * * * I've drove [sic] over 
here, I've been sitting around, I walked freely,'' that ``[w]hen I take 
Advil it works pretty good [and that when] I'm taking that other stuff 
* * * everything's just, you know * * * [k]inda flat.'' Gov't Ex. 30 at 
18; see Tr. 151. The PA utters an audible sigh when Hays insists 
``[w]ell, my back is really nothing to be worried about.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ As discussed, infra, the chart note prepared by the PA in 
connection with this visit reflects that Hays told him that he had 
been in a motor vehicle accident; however, UC Patient Hays denied 
experiencing a motor vehicle accident on his intake form. Compare 
Gov't Ex. 8 at 27, with Gov't Ex. 8 at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The PA, in an obvious testament to his (albeit arguably misguided) 
perseverance, conducted a physical examination where he took the 
patient's blood pressure and had him conduct multiple postural pushing 
and twisting maneuvers, none of which caused the patient to issue any 
manner of complaint. Gov't Ex. 30 at 23-24; see Tr. 150-51. 
Interestingly, the chart notes in the file that correspond to this UC 
visit reflect numerous (+) signs that correspond to illegible words, 
notwithstanding the absence of any complaint by the patient as captured 
within the transcript. Gov't Ex. 8 at 28. The PA informed UC Patient 
Hays that he intended to ``talk to the doctor,''\41\ and shortly 
thereafter, the NPPM office staff provided the patient with an 
appointment card and prescription scripts for 150 Roxicodone 
30 mg, 30 Xanax 2 mg, as well as Naprosyn (not a controlled 
substance), and a prescription script where the word ``consultation'' 
appears next to the area designated ``drug name,'' and ``see ortho and 
physical therapy'' appears in the area designated for pharmacy label 
instructions. Id. at 26; see Tr. 154. SA Lunsford testified that he 
recalled the prescriptions being signed with ``some form of initials,'' 
either something resembling a ``C'' and ``G,'' or just a lone ``G.'' 
Tr. 154; see Gov't Ex. 40 at 25-26, 28-29. According to SA Lunsford's 
testimony, the issuing physician's name on the script belonged to the 
Respondent. Id. However, no testimony was elicited from Lunsford as to

[[Page 63129]]

whether he was familiar with, or could identify, the Respondent's 
signature.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Gov't Ex. 30 at 26; Tr. 153.
    \42\ The Government sought to elicit testimony regarding 
conversations between patients that were overheard by Lunsford as he 
sat in the waiting area, but inasmuch as there was no link between 
the Respondent and any of these purported conversations, the 
testimony was excluded as irrelevant. Tr. 158-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the evaluation of this UC visit that is set forth in his report, 
Dr. Rubenstein notes that UC Patient Hays received controlled substance 
prescriptions on the June 29th UC visit, even though he received only a 
``brief exam in terms of cardiac and respirator auscultation'' by a 
physician's assistant, performed postural maneuver tests ``with full 
strength and flexibility,'' and was never seen by the Respondent. Gov't 
Ex. 11 at 5. The report notes that Patient Hays told the physician's 
assistant that over-the-counter Advil \43\ ``works pretty good'' and 
that his back ``doesn't feel all that bad [and] is really nothing to be 
worried about.'' Id. Rubenstein also found it remarkable that when 
Patient Hays stated that his back was ``not really injured,'' that the 
physician's assistant pointed to the patient chart and told him that it 
was. Id. Interestingly, the MRI report that he had provided to NPPM as 
Patient Hays was actually a report done on SA Lunsford's back. Tr. 143-
44, 217, 226. Thus, the diagnosis of a small disc protrusion reflected 
in the patient chart is actually a diagnosis for Patient Hays that is 
supported by objective medical evidence. Tr. 217-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Actually, the transcript of this interaction with the 
physician's assistant reflects that UC Patient Hays told him he had 
been treating his back with ``Advil and Motrin.'' Gov't Ex. 30 at 
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SA Lunsford's second and final foray into the Respondent's practice 
as UC Patient Hays occurred on July 27, 2010.\44\ Tr. 176. SA Lunsford 
testified to entering the clinic premises and having brief interactions 
with a uniformed security guard as well as a receptionist. He presented 
his Patient Hays driver's license, signed a sign-in sheet (the single 
paperwork evolution associated with the visit on his part), and paid an 
office visit fee. Tr. 176-77, 179-80. SA Lunsford then seated himself 
in the waiting area until called back to the reception counter about an 
hour later. Tr. 177-78. As revealed in the transcript and Lunsford's 
testimony, the interaction involved nothing more than a visit at the 
reception desk that took as much time as needed by the staff person to 
say, ``There you go,'' and Hays to reply, ``Thank you very much.'' 
Gov't Ex. 33 at 3. Hays thanked the staff person for wishing him ``a 
wonderful afternoon'' and the transaction, id., which yielded an 
identical battery of prescription scripts as the first UC visit, was 
completed \45\--but for the paperwork. The chart entry reflects a 
somewhat more elaborate account that (falsely) details UC Patient Hays' 
denial of side effects and street drug use, his pain and the appearance 
of his pain, as well as Hays' abnormal posture (spelled ``postue'' in 
the form), all recorded without an examination of any kind. Gov't Ex. 8 
at 24-25. According to Lunsford, he came and left the clinic, and 
received his controlled substance prescriptions, without suffering the 
inconvenience that might be caused by interaction with medical 
personnel of any variety. Tr. 177-78, 246. Lunsford testified that 
while he was in the waiting room awaiting the issuance of his 
prescriptions, he saw the Respondent enter the clinic and cross the 
threshold into the hormone treatment area. Tr. 178-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 33; Tr. 182.
    \45\ Gov't Ex. 8 at 23; Tr. 177-78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regrettably, the only observations in Dr. Rubenstein's report 
relative to UC Patient Hays' second UC visit relate to the nature of 
the controlled substances dispensed and the fact that no patient name 
was written on the progress note page. Gov't Ex. 11 at 5. However, in 
his testimony, Rubenstein offered his conclusion that under the 
prevailing standards in Florida, the controlled-substance prescribing 
that was undertaken with respect to Hays was not justified by the 
information presented to the prescriber. When asked what was missing 
from the chart that should have been there to support the prescribing 
evidenced in the case of UC Patient Hays, Dr. Rubenstein responded this 
way:

An adequate history and complete physical examination, with any 
other objective testing to formulate an appropriate treatment plan, 
which may or may not include medication. In this case, [SA Lunsford] 
was specifically downgrading his complaints of pain * * * telling 
the physician's assistant that his back was ``nothing to be worried 
about.'' Yet high doses of medications were being recommended that 
were not warranted based on the patient's history. So to justify 
prescriptions of the agents and any opioid agent at an initial 
visit, I would want an appropriate history or physical examination 
that would indicate that there is acute or chronic pain with an 
objective correlation that would justify such agents, and even so, 
the amounts and doses of medication would be excessive for an 
initial visit of the patient.

Tr. 65-66. Dr. Rubenstein opined that the medical care offered to UC 
Patient Hays (which, in this case was controlled substance prescribing 
and dispensing) fell below the established standards for medical care 
in Florida. Tr. 76-77.
    Viewed in a vacuum, the controlled substance prescribing conducted 
at NPPM under the authority of the Respondent's COR was effected by 
persons other than the Respondent. The evidence presents no serious 
dispute on that issue. However, the direct, credible evidence from TFO 
Schwartz that the Respondent was directly informed that UC Patient Rix 
was previously seen by, and received controlled substances from, 
Laterza and ``Dr. Betsy,'' with an in-hand patient chart confirming 
that scenario, casts the NPPM staff interactions with UC Patient Hays 
in a different light. Under the circumstances presented here, it is 
reasonable, based on the evidence of record, to conclude that the 
Respondent was well aware (or should have been) that these and other 
controlled-substance prescribing actions like these were being taken by 
various NPPM staff persons under his COR. This is particularly true 
here, where the Respondent, although called as a witness by the 
Government at the hearing, asserted the Fifth Amendment and declined to 
testify. Although the Respondent was an employee of NPPM, he was the 
master of his COR. His status as an NPPM employee in no way diminished 
his responsibility to safeguard the authority associated with his COR.

UC Patient Barbaro

    SA Joseph Annerino, an agent with two and a half years of 
experience with DEA, and with a decade of prior experience as a Chicago 
police officer, testified that he made two UC visits to the 
Respondent's practice using the name Joe Barbaro (UC Patient Barbaro), 
that he never met the Respondent or any other physician there, and yet 
received Testosterone Cypionate \46\ under the authority of the 
Respondent's COR. Tr. 261-62, 287, 311. SA Annerino testified that UC 
Patient Rix introduced him to Mr. Laterza at NPPM to effectuate the 
sale of anabolic steroids. Tr. 263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ A Schedule III controlled substance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SA Annerino testified that shortly after being introduced to Mr. 
Laterza at the first visit on November 16, 2009,\47\ Laterza provided 
quite a bit of information in response to questions he posed about 
testosterone and HGH, as well as explaining the benefits of hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT). Tr. 262, 264. The transcript of the first of 
the UC visits reflects a lengthy conversation with Laterza about

[[Page 63130]]

purported benefits of testosterone and HGH treatment and an examination 
conducted by Nurse Sanchez, who, like in the case of UC Patient Rix, 
was introduced and answered to the moniker ``Dr. Betsy.'' Gov't Ex. 17 
at 40-42; Tr. 273-74. As testified by SA Annerino, Laterza instructed 
him to complete a personal history form, upon which he declined to put 
down any physical ailments. Tr. 264-65. As a result, Laterza spent much 
of his time coaching UC Patient Barbaro on the most advantageous 
answers to questions asked in the patient information form, even to the 
point that Laterza personally changed answers provided by UC Patient 
Barbaro from ``no'' to ``yes.'' Gov't Ex. 17 at 17-19, 36-39; Tr. 265-
66, 268-69. At one point, Laterza admonished him that ``if you say no 
to everything, then the doctor is not going to know what he's 
treating.'' Gov't Ex. 17 at 37; Tr. 268. SA Annerino testified that an 
examination was conducted by Nurse Sanchez. Tr. 273; Gov't Ex. 17 at 
41. However, SA Annerino testified that none of his discussions with 
Nurse Sanchez bore upon the subject of testosterone. Tr. 274.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 17; 268.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Laterza arranged for UC Patient Barbaro to have his blood drawn at 
a lab and left a phone message for him four days later wherein he 
attempted to arrange for a time to ``go over'' Barbaro's ``labs'' with 
him. Tr. 274, 278, 282; Gov't Ex. 20 at 3. Four days after the phone 
message, on November 24, 2009, UC Patient Barbaro telephoned Laterza, 
and the latter explained the blood analysis results to the former in 
great detail, ultimately advising that ``basically, you are going to 
need some testosterone'' due to ``deficiencies'' that Laterza 
identified in the results. Gov't Ex. 21 at 4; Tr. 282-84. On December 
9, 2009, UC Patient Barbaro presented himself to the Respondent's 
practice \48\ (following a voicemail from Laterza on November 30, 2009 
to pick up his Testosterone Cypionate from the clinic, Tr. 284), and 
upon little more than stating his (fictitious) name and providing cash, 
was presented by Ms. Palemire with a box containing a vial of 
Testosterone Cypionate and a syringe, Tr. 287-88; Gov't Exs. 22-23. 
While vial of the controlled testosterone reflects that it was 
prescribed pursuant to the Respondent's COR, Tr. 304, 331-32; Gov't Ex. 
38, at 7-A, Laterza made no representations to SA Annerino that he ever 
consulted with the Respondent about UC Patient Barbaro's treatment, 
that the Respondent had actual knowledge of his treatment, or that the 
Respondent personally prescribed the controlled substances or 
authorized Laterza to issue the prescriptions,\49\ Tr. 284, 325-27, 
332. Annerino testified that although he obtained controlled steroids 
issued under the Respondent's COR, the only medical professional he 
interacted with at NPPM was Nurse Sanchez, and that the first time he 
ever laid eyes on the Respondent was at the hearing. Tr. 311, 316.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ An audio recording and corresponding transcript were 
received in evidence. Gov't Ex. 23; Tr. 294.
    \49\ SA Annerino testified that although a search warrant was 
executed at the Respondent's practice pursuant to the ``round-up'' 
for Operation Pill Nation, he was not a part of that evolution and 
therefore lacks any knowledge as to whether a patient file 
corresponding to UC Patient Barbaro was ever identified, sought, or 
recovered. Tr. 272. Dr. Rubenstein's report did not contain an 
analysis of UC Patient Barbaro's encounters with the Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although Dr. Rubenstein did not review any patient chart associated 
with the Annerino's UC visits as Barbaro, his testimony was unequivocal 
that the issuance of controlled substance prescriptions without meeting 
a patient falls below the Florida prescribing standards. Tr. 36-43. If 
the evidence of record stood, thus, with no evidence of a direct 
connection between Laterza and the Respondent, there would be little to 
recommend wrongdoing on the part of the Respondent based on the 
testimony of SA Annerino. However, the Respondent's November 21st UC 
visit and interaction with UC Patient Rix, wherein the former was 
advised by the latter that he was receiving anabolic steroids through 
exchanges with Laterza, provides ample support for the proposition that 
the Respondent knew or should have known that Laterza was consulting 
and prescribing controlled steroids armed with the Respondent's COR. 
This is particularly so on this record wherein the Respondent asserted 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to 
testify although called as a witness by the Government.

Patient Chart Reviews

    At the request of the Government, Dr. Rubenstein reviewed charts 
maintained on four of the Respondent's patients, prepared written 
comments in his report, and testified at the hearing about his 
conclusions. Each patient executed a written authorization for the 
release of their respective chart.

Chart Review: Patient SL\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Pursuant to a Protective Order issued in this case on May 
2, 2011, initials have been substituted for the names of patients. 
ALJ Ex. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Patient SL's chart reflects that he is a 35-year-old male patient 
who was treated by the Respondent from April to September of 2010. 
Gov't Ex. 5. On his Pain Inventory, which he completed and submitted on 
intake, SL signaled that he was experiencing pain in the 4-8 out of 10 
range in his lower back, right knee, and left shoulder, that he had 
been experiencing the pain for ``over a month,'' and that his treatment 
with oxycodone 30 mg and Percocet 5 mg, coupled with Xanax for sleep 
issues, has afforded him relief at a level between 70-100%. Id. at 32. 
Further, the Pain Inventory reflects that while his discomfort is 
exacerbated by running, excessive walking, and prolonged sitting, that 
medicine, rest, and therapy provide relief. Id. at 33.
    The SL patient chart maintained by NPPM contains, inter alia, 
multiple prescriptions authorized under the Respondent's COR for 
Roxicodone (30 mg) and Xanax (2 mg). Id. at 4-5, 11, 14, 23, 27. Dr. 
Rubenstein's report notes that a sign-in sheet included in the chart 
contains obviously discrepant dates, that the patient informed the 
practice that he had been referred ``by a friend,'' that no neurologic 
or musculoskeletal examinations were ever performed on him at the 
Respondent's practice, and that he traveled from a remote location to 
be treated by the Respondent without any obvious explanation for the 
commute present in the documentation. Gov't Ex. 11 at 15-16. Although 
at the hearing Dr. Rubenstein testified that there was no apparent 
reason this patient traveled a distance that Rubenstein guestimated to 
be about thirty to forty minutes\51\ to be treated at NPPM, there was 
insufficient development of this issue to have the testimony bear on 
any issue that must be decided here. If thirty to forty minutes was a 
long distance, there was no evidence presented as to what a reasonable 
distance might be, or why the distance was or should be gauged in 
determining whether revoking the Respondent's COR is in the public 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Tr. 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Rubenstein testified that the SL patient file demonstrated what 
he characterized as a ``deficit in the standard of care.'' Tr. 81. 
Specifically, Rubenstein noted that the file lacked sufficient 
documentation to substantiate the need for the controlled substances 
prescribed, that there were no records from prior physicians, and that 
no indications that alternative treatments beyond the controlled 
substances prescribed were ever discussed with the patient. Id. at 80-
81. Dr. Rubenstein summarized his conclusions in his report as follows:


[[Page 63131]]


The records of [SL] are suboptimal. They clearly do not document the 
rationale or need for high doses of Roxicodone. At no point was a 
physical exam ever documented which would have warranted the use of 
these agents. There was no examination of the right knee or left 
shoulder consistent with the MRIs. There was absolutely no 
documentation in the file which would have warranted or 
substantiated the need for these medications. No other alternatives 
for treatment of these problems were reviewed. Clearly this 
represented simply visits to dispense medications. No other records 
from other providers to document the use and need of these 
medications [was] reviewed. In summary, this represents a deficit in 
the standard of care.

Id. at 16.

Chart Review: Patient CC

    Patient CC's chart reveals that she was treated at NPPM from May to 
October of 2010, and that during that time she received multiple 
prescriptions for controlled substances, including (but not limited to) 
multiple prescriptions for Roxicodone (30 mg and 15 mg doses) and Xanax 
(2 mg). Gov't Ex. 6 at 5-7, 15-17, 40-41, 44-45, 48-49, 52-54. She 
initially presented to NPPM as an obese, 31-year-old patient with 
complaints of back and ankle pain that she rated between three and 
seven on a ten-scale. Id. at 20-23. The chart contains MRI reports for 
the ankle as well as the lumbar and thoracic areas of CC's back from 
2007. Id. at 32-34. The back MRI reports describe anomalies that are 
consistently characterized as ``mild.'' Id. at 32, 34. The ankle MRI 
report includes references to an incomplete fracture, a partial tendon 
tear, as well as a ligament tear. Id. at 33. Dr. Rubenstein testified 
that the 2007 MRI reports could be relied upon in evaluating patient 
treatment, but were not current enough to justify the prescribing of 
pain medication. Tr. 88.
    Although CC's chart shows that the controlled substance medication 
dosages were changed and titrated, there was no justification for the 
adjustments documented in the record as opined by Dr. Rubenstein. Tr. 
90-91. Moreover, Rubenstein noted that CC was prescribed OxyContin in 
an 80 mg dose, which is a dosage indicated for opioid-dependent 
patients, absent a diagnosis of cancer or other terminal illness. Tr. 
91-93. The chart has no indication that CC was diagnosed as having 
opioid dependence, a malignancy, or other terminal disease. Dr. 
Rubenstein testified that in his view, based on his review of the 
chart:

There is no basis for any of [the prescribed] medications based on 
lack of any neurologic or musculoskeletal exam abnormality. I * * * 
reviewed the imaging studies [and] noted that there were large 
quantities of multiple highly addictive medications prescribed 
without any objective abnormality other than [an] MRI from 2007 that 
had shown some mild abnormalities but no, in my opinion, nerve root 
displacement or spinal cord compression [and thus, a] [l]ack of 
objective correlation that would have been consistent with the 
patient's complaints that shepresented to [NPPM].

Tr. 86-87. This testimony was consistent with the conclusions set forth 
in Dr. Rubenstein's report. Gov't Ex. 11 at 7.

Chart Review: Patient CH

    Dr. Rubenstein also reviewed the chart maintained on Patient CH, a 
29-year-old female patient treated by the Respondent from August 2009 
until October 2010,\52\ when, according to a chart entry, she was 
discharged in a notice dated October 5, 2010 by a Dr. Randy Dean for 
``Dr. Shopping.'' Gov't Ex. 7 at 1. An intake form completed by CH 
states that the purpose of her visit is pain management, and she claims 
having the diagnoses or symptoms of fibromyalgia, depression/anxiety, 
and neck/back pain in her medical history. Id. at 34. Patient CH wrote 
that she heard about the NPPM clinic from a business card. Id. At 
intake, CH reported on the Pain Inventory that she had pain in her 
neck, front and back shoulders, lower back, and quadriceps, and rates 
her pain between seven and ten. Id. at 36. She further represented that 
only medicine and rest improve her pain, whereas ``walking, playing 
[with] kids[,] standing, [and] riding in [a] car'' all aggravate her 
pain. Id. at 37. CH adds, ``[The pain] interferes with my life in 
everyway [sic]. I can't function to do everyday jobs when I'm in pain. 
It even interferes with my relationship [with] husband & kids.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ A sign-in sheet included in the chart reflects that CH 
presented to NPPM on fifteen occasions from August 2009 through 
August 2010. Gov't Ex. 7 at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Among CH's documents provided at intake were an MRI report and two 
papers relating to prescribed controlled substances. Id. at 30-32. The 
MRI \53\ is of the lumbar spine and reports minimal impressions. Id. at 
30, 46 (``Very minimal degenerative changes in the low lumbar spine as 
described above. No fracture, no acute herniated nucleus pulposis. No 
significant facet arthritis.''). A prescription label of 56 
alprazolam 1 mg by a Dr. Findley, dated May 20, 2009, is included, as 
well as a pharmacy profile from Orange Park Drugs between March 12, 
2009 and July 9, 2009, which contains only either 120 
oxycodone 30 mg or 90 Vicodin 10/500 mg, all prescribed by a 
Dr. Fowler. Id. at 31-32. It is noted that the alprazolam prescription 
is not included in the pharmacy profile, although it was prescribed 
within the same time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ While the MRI refers to Patient CH as a ``man,'' this was 
apparently errata. Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the progress notes and prescriptions for each visit, 
little changes each time. Usually few notes are taken or boxes checked. 
Controlled substances are consistently prescribed with explanations, 
notes on medication efficacy and results, activities of daily living, 
progress, or testing protocols consistently absent. Oft times, the 
progress notes are unsigned, un-named, and abjectly unintelligible. 
See, e.g., id. at 110-11.\54\ At the initial visit on August 8, 2009, 
the unsigned chart contains a notation to drug test CH's urine at the 
next visit, although there is no documentation to suggest that this 
aspiration ever came to fruition during CH's year at the practice. See 
Gov't Ex. 7 at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ It would be difficult to imagine that any subsequent 
practitioner or reviewer would be able to discern the rationale 
employed to justify the medications prescribed that day or anything 
else that happed during that visit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The chart reflects a more or less continuous stream of controlled 
substance prescriptions issued in the Respondent's name \55\ throughout 
the year of treatment without follow up. Even should a notation appear 
to signal to follow up with the patient regarding a referral, see id. 
at 75-77 (August 2009 visit), no follow up is ever found or is 
evidenced anywhere in the chart during the months subsequent, see, 
e.g., id. at 72-74 (September 2009 visit), and instead the patient is 
supplied with prescriptions for greater amounts of controlled 
substances, see id. at 56-57, 59, 82, 92-93 (October 2009 visit with 
Roxicodone dosage increase). Furthermore, the chart reflects a pattern 
of premature visits during which controlled substances are prescribed 
every time without annotation to the medical record explaining why. 
See, e.g., id. at 75-77 (August 25, 2009 visit, 17 day cycle); id. at 
56-57, 59, 82, 92-93 (October 17, 2009 visit, 22 day cycle); id. at 12-
14 (December 7, 2009 visit, 18 day cycle).\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ CH also received controlled substances from times by a 
physician other than the Respondent. See, id. at 67 (Dr. Carlos 
Haro), 109 (same).
    \56\ For reasons not readily apparent or explained by testimony, 
the CH chart reflected another curious practice wherein the patient 
was provided split prescriptions. At CH's February 10 visit, which 
was conducted by Dr. Carlos Haro, two prescriptions were issued for 
Roxicodone 30 mg into two separate scripts, one for 50 dosage units 
and the other for 100 dosage units, but netting no difference of 
quantity from that prescribed the previous month. Compare id. at 67, 
109, with id. at 17. This method was also employed the following 
month by the Respondent on a visit occurring March 6, 2010, whereby 
he provided dual prescriptions for Roxicodone 30 mg, one for 150 
tablets and another for 75 tablets, resulting in a cumulative 
increase of 75 dosage units. Id. at 112-13. No evidence was 
developed in the record regarding the propriety of subdividing 
controlled substances prescribed by issuing multiple scripts, nor 
was comment drawn by Dr. Rubenstein in his review about the increase 
of oxycodone afforded by the Respondent through this technique.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 63132]]

    Dr. Rubenstein's report noted the absence of neurologic 
examinations and multiple occasions where prescription scripts were 
issued without any indication of a corresponding office visit. Gov't 
Ex. 11 at 12. Dr. Rubenstein provided the following assessment of the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
patient file:

Although at the initial visit an MRI study, physical therapy and EMG 
all [were] recommended[,] there was absolutely no reference anywhere 
in the records to suggest that specific referrals were given, that 
the patient completed these referrals, or even any documentation as 
to what occurred. There were no diagnostic studies listed in the 
file [and] [t]here was no neurologic exam ever performed. In 
summary, the records do not meet the standard of care to justify the 
prescriptions that were dispensed. There was no evidence of any 
objective abnormality[,] be it through diagnostic testing, physical 
examination, or even a detailed pain history that would warrant the 
medications.

Id. at 13. Similarly, when asked at the hearing if the chart reflects 
whether the standard of care was met for the prescribing of controlled 
substances in Florida, Dr. Rubenstein testified:

The records did not meet with the standard of care to justify the 
prescriptions that were dispensed. There was no evidence of any 
objective abnormality, be it through diagnostic testing, physical 
examination or detailed pain history that would warrant the 
medication.

Tr. 96.

Chart Review: Patient PL

    The patient file maintained by the Respondent on PL, a 48-year-old 
female patient who was seen by the Respondent from April to September 
2010, at which time according to a chart entry she was discharged from 
the practice for ``Dr. Shopping,'' was also reviewed by Dr. 
Rubenstein.\57\ Gov't Ex. 9 at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ This entry was signed by Dr. Randy Dean, rather than the 
Respondent. Gov't Ex. 9 at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PL's sign-in sheet indicates five visits in 2010, on April 10, May 
7, June 10, July 19, and August 16, but curiously the only minimally-
completed progress note contained in the entire chart is dated 
September 17 (a date subsequent to the final sign-in date). Gov't Ex. 9 
at 3-8, 23.
    The intake forms indicate that PL identified herself as a manager 
at a storage facility, represented that the purpose of her visit was to 
``receive pain medications,'' and stated that she was referred by 
someone with an identical name to her emergency contact person. Id. at 
9. PL indicated complaints of anxiety, neck pain, and arthritis. Id. On 
the Pain Inventory, PL drew X's on an illustration depicting pain 
running all along her shoulders and arms, down her legs, and on her 
neck. Id. at 11. On a ten-scale, PL rated her pain between six and ten. 
Id. PL wrote on the form that she had been prescribed 240 
oxycodone 30 mg, 120 oxycodone 15 mg, 90 Xanax, and 
90 Soma sometime in the last 40 days. Id. To describe the 
variety of pain she experienced, PL circled every adjective listed on 
the inventory form except for ``dull.'' Id. at 12. Medicine, rest, and 
ice all purportedly improved her pain, while lifting, standing, or even 
writing exacerbated it. Id.
    A cervical spine MRI report dated March 11, 2008 is found within 
the PL chart exhibit. Id. at 21-22. It identified mild impingement of 
the left C4 and left C5 nerve roots caused by disc herniation at C3-C4 
and C4-C5, and bone marrow edema associated with the C4 and C3 areas 
that was opined to be a secondary result of bone contusion. Id. at 22.
    As discussed, supra, scantily-completed progress notes are found 
within the chart for the September 17 visit, only. Id. at 3-4. The 
marks upon it indicate PL was observed to exhibit abnormal posture, 
appeared in pain, and had pain in her abdomen. Id. at 3. The word 
``denies'' is written near the section inquiring about recreational 
drugs. Id. Roxicodone in the 30 mg and 15 mg varieties are checked to 
be continued as described, as is Xanax 2 mg and Soma 350 mg. Id. at 4. 
The word ``Naprosyn'' is also written near the treatment plan area. Id. 
The rest of the form, in pertinent part, is left blank. See id. at 3-4. 
Prescriptions in the medical file issued on September 17 are for 
60 Naprosyn 500 mg, 180 Roxicodone 30 mg, 30 
Rocicodone 15 mg, 60 Soma 350 mg, and to see a neurologist and 
primary care physician for chronic pain, to obtain lab workups 
including liver function tests, and for medical records of an injury. 
Id. at 6-7.
    In his report, Dr. Rubenstein notes that PL's emergency contact in 
her paperwork is the same person that she indicated as the person who 
referred her to the practice to ``receive pain medications,'' that 
chart documentation did not support the controlled substance 
prescriptions issued, and that the file was bereft of any indication 
that a neurologic or musculoskeletal examination was ever performed. 
Gov't Ex. 11 at 13. Dr. Rubenstein set forth his analysis of PL's care 
as follows:

The records of [PL] are also beneath the standard of care. No 
attempt was actually made to review previous medical records. There 
was no documentation as to the need for Roxicodone at the doses 
prescribed, especially at the initial visit and all subsequent 
visits. No neurologic exam was ever documented. There was no focal 
objective deficit on exam or even any specific exam that would 
correlate with the MRI findings in the cervical spine that would 
have justified the prescriptions that were provided. No other 
[treatment] alternatives were reviewed in the file.

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis supplied). In like manner, when asked during the 
hearing whether he had an expert opinion about whether the controlled 
substance prescribing demonstrated in the PL patient chart met the 
standard of care required to be exercised in Florida, Dr. Rubenstein 
testified that:

The records were beneath the standard of care, that no attempt was 
actually made to review the previous medical records, there was no 
documentation as to the need for Roxicodone at the doses prescribed, 
especially at the initial visit and all subsequent visits, no 
neurologic exam was ever documented, there was no focal objective 
deficit on exam or even any specific exam that would have correlated 
with [the] MRI findings of the cervical spine that would have 
justified the prescriptions provided. There were no other 
alternatives that I saw in the file to medication management 
offered.

Tr. 98 (emphasis supplied). Although Dr. Rubenstein specifically bases 
at least a portion of his expert opinion regarding the PL chart review 
on the controlled substances prescribed at the initial visit and 
subsequent visits, the patient file provided by the Government and 
accepted into evidence reflects a chart note relative to only a single 
visit (September 17, 2010). Dr. Rubenstein's report reflects events 
that purportedly occurred during visits that correspond to dates 
entered into the sign-in sheet. Compare Gov't Ex. 9 at 8, with Gov't 
Ex. 11 at 13-14. Inasmuch as the copy of the PL patient chart that was 
provided by the Government does not have the information regarding 
these visits beyond the sign-in sheet, it is likely that the 
Government-provided version is incomplete, or at a minimum, at some 
variance with the chart reviewed by Dr. Rubenstein. While this is an 
admittedly disconcerting inconsistency, no conclusions will be drawn in 
this recommended decision regarding those portions of the chart not in 
evidence.

The Expert Opinion of Dr. Rubenstein

    In his report Dr. Rubenstein provided a synopsis of his overall 
evaluation of the charts from the Respondent's

[[Page 63133]]

practice that he was asked to review. According to Dr. Rubenstein, the 
reviews he conducted clearly suggest that medications are being 
prescribed and/or dispensed from North Palm Pain Management without 
objective abnormalities correlating with patient pain complaints. High 
doses of highly addicting medications in the form of Roxicodone and 
Xanax are prescribed to each individual, yet not one of the patients 
showed any objective abnormality. In fact, no new neurologic exam was 
performed on any of the patients at any of the visits, and there were 
multiple visits when the patient was not even examined. Even more 
alarming is the fact that prescriptions were dispensed from the office 
without even physician encounters or visits, and at times there was not 
even a medical paraprofessional present. There were also times when 
patients did not complain of any significant pain, yet [were] still 
provided with high doses of medications and weaning was not discussed. 
The patient specifically did not even complain of back pain, yet was 
given high doses of Roxicodone. This does not appear to meet with the 
standard of care of pain management. Clearly, these are visits designed 
to supply patients with Roxicodone, Xanax, and in one patient, Soma. 
Although physical therapy was mentioned for at least two of the 
patients, there was no formal physical therapy prescription ever 
written or even referenced. The patients that were referred to 
Neurology were never given the name of a consultant to see, nor even a 
diagnosis to consider. Gov't Ex. 11 at 7.
    Notwithstanding the disjointed organization of Dr. Rubenstein's 
written report, his arguably inordinate dependence on prior notes while 
on the witness stand, and the discrepancy noted, supra, between the 
version of Patient PL patient chart he apparently reviewed and the copy 
of the chart received in evidence at this hearing, his testimony was 
sufficiently clear, cogent, and supported by identified elements in the 
charts and admitted evidence to be relied upon in this recommended 
decision. Dr. Rubenstein highlighted consistent themes in his generally 
well-reasoned conclusions that lend credibility to the opinions he 
offered. Perhaps most significantly here, Dr. Rubenstein's expert 
opinion stands unrebutted.

TFO Thomas

    The Government also presented the testimony of TFO Robert Thomas. 
TFO Thomas testified that he has been a police officer in the City of 
Palm Beach Gardens since 1994, that he works as a field training 
officer for the city, and that he has also been cross-designated by DEA 
as a TFO since May of 2009. Tr. 837-38. TFO Thomas served as the case 
agent \58\ for the investigation of the Respondent, which began around 
September 2009. Tr. 839.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ As described by TFO Thomas through his testimony, the case 
agent is in charge of a particular case and is primarily responsible 
for initiating the investigation, directing the course of the 
investigation, and documenting its developments. Tr. 869.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TFO Thomas testified that he personally obtained the undercover 
patient files for TFO Schwartz and SA Lunsford at NPPM by presenting 
Mr. Laterza with signed Florida Department of Health (DOH) medical 
release forms and identifying himself only as a police officer at Palm 
Beach Gardens. Tr. 841. He testified that he was also responsible for 
securing the patient files for Patients CH and PL by observing them 
exiting the clinic at different times, following them to their next 
destination, and then approaching them after they stopped \59\ by 
identifying himself as a TFO for DEA inquiring whether they would 
voluntarily answer questions. Tr. 844-46. Accordingly to TFO Thomas, 
both agreed to speak to him and to execute a DOH release form so that 
he could retrieve their medical records from NPPM. Tr. 844-46. 
Similarly, TFO Thomas testified that while conducting surveillance, he 
spied Patient SL leave NPPM and caused an officer in a marked patrol 
car to conduct a traffic stop on Patient SL for extreme window tint. 
Tr. 842, 900. TFO Thomas's testimony continued that at the conclusion 
of the stop and after Patient SL was informed that he was free to 
leave, Thomas approached him as a TFO, and during this encounter SL 
agreed to answer questions and to sign a DOH release form. Id. TFO 
Thomas testified that he used the executed form to obtain a copy of 
SL's patient file from Mr. Laterza. Id. Finally, Thomas testified that 
Patient CC, who was cooperating with Assistant State Attorney Christy 
Rogers at the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office, furnished the 
prosecutor's office with a signed DOH medical release form, but TFO 
Thomas could not recall if he personally retrieved the patient file 
from NPPM or if possession of the file was the result of the fruits of 
some other agent's endeavors of the State Attorney's Office.\60\ Id. at 
842-43. Thomas also testified that CC had some outstanding criminal 
matter with the State Attorney's Office, but stated that he did not 
know the details, effectively short-circuiting any meaningful ability 
to cross-examine on that issue. Tr. 881-82, 885-86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ TFO Thomas made contact with CH at a Burger King on North 
Lake Boulevard, Tr. 844, and with PL at a nearby gas station about a 
quarter-mile from NPPM, Tr. 845-46.
    \60\ TFO Thomas later clarified on cross-examination that the 
State Attorney's Office obtained CC's patient file prior to his 
being brought into her interview. Tr. 911.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TFO Thomas presented testimony regarding an interview in which he 
participated of Patient CH. Tr. 848. The conversation was purportedly 
recorded, but neither the recording nor a transcript derived therefrom 
was offered into evidence. See id.; 902-03. TFO Thomas testified that 
Patient CH told him she had been treated at NPPM for the last twelve to 
fifteen months, yet she was only seen by the Respondent five or six 
times. Tr. 848-49. According to Thomas, Patient CH stated that she 
received prescriptions for oxycodone without ever seeing the Respondent 
or any medical professional at her last six office visits. Tr. 849. 
Still, according to TFO Thomas's testimony, she paid a $200 office 
visit fee each time and sat in the waiting room for fifteen minutes to 
an hour for her prescriptions. Id. During one of these visits, it was 
TFO Thomas's testimony that Patient CH stated that she received 
prescriptions for controlled substances after she observed the 
Respondent leave the clinic premises. Id. Furthermore, TFO Thomas 
provided testimony that during his interview of Patient CH, she 
represented that she once observed the Respondent pre-sign a fresh pack 
of blank prescription pads opened, in her view, by Ms. Palemire. Id. 
850. Patient CH purportedly described to Thomas that she watched as Ms. 
Palemire then loaded a portion of the pre-signed prescriptions into the 
printer used by the office for writing out the scripts. Id. Later in 
his testimony, TFO Thomas denied ever seeing pre-signed prescriptions 
himself. Tr. 855-56, 935.
    Hearsay evidence is admissible evidence in administrative 
proceedings. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (signed 
reports prepared by licensed physicians correctly admitted at Social 
Security disability hearing); Keller v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 227, 230 
(7th Cir. 1991) (insurance company investigative reports correctly 
admitted in Social Security disability hearing where sufficient indicia 
of reliability established); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (hearsay affidavits correctly admitted where indicia of 
reliability established). However, the weight afforded such testimony 
and, a fortiori, whether that testimony can support substantial

[[Page 63134]]

evidence is an entirely different matter. As succinctly stated by the 
Eleventh Circuit:

Although the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in 
administrative hearings, there are due process limits on the extent 
to which an adverse administrative determination may be based on 
hearsay evidence. As was held in U.S. Pipe and Foundry Company v. 
Webb, ``hearsay may constitute substantial evidence in 
administrative proceedings as long as the factors that assure the 
`underlying reliability and probative value' of the evidence are 
present.'' 595 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1979).

Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, the 
utility of hearsay evidence before an administrative tribunal is 
limited by its reliability and credibility. Divining the correct use of 
hearsay evidence requires a balancing of four factors: (1) whether the 
out-of-court declarant was not biased and had no interest in the 
outcome of the case; (2) whether the opposing party could have obtained 
the information contained in the hearsay before the hearing and could 
have subpoenaed the declarant; (3) whether the information was 
inconsistent on its face; and (4) whether the information has been 
recognized by the courts as inherently reliable. Id. at 1182; J.A.M. 
Builders v. Herman, 233 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000).
    Timely, well-reasoned objections were interposed by the 
Respondent's counsel at the time this evidence was offered. Tr. 847-48. 
Although the Respondent's counsel conceded that he made no attempt to 
subpoena any of the patients with whom TFO Thomas spoke, including 
Patient CH, Tr. 847, all other factors militate against consideration 
of the hearsay evidence elicited through Thomas pertaining to this and 
other interviews he conducted which were offered as evidence by the 
Government. Regarding possible bias, CC had an open criminal case, and 
no foundation was laid by the Government regarding the absence of bias 
from the other interviewees. The information provided could not be 
tested for consistency as the propositions contained in the interviews 
is corroborated by no other evidence of record, and there is no case 
law or other authority recognizing this variety of evidence as 
inherently reliable. Simply put, the Government, as the proponent of 
the evidence, did not lay a foundation sufficient to permit this 
tribunal to consider, with any appreciable value, the hearsay testimony 
of TFO Thomas regarding Patient CH or the other individuals he 
interviewed, absent the information being subject to the crucible of 
cross-examination. The Government opted to elicit the relevant 
information from TFO Thomas rather than to examine Patient CH directly, 
and did so at its own peril. Without more of a foundation, such as a 
way to gauge Patient CH's degree of bias or the consistency of her 
recollection, the reliability of the testimony as it stands on the 
record has not been shown to be adequate to merit gainful consideration 
for any purpose. Hence, this testimony, as helpful as it may have been 
to support the Government's investigation, cannot be used to support 
the enforcement action it seeks or to support any Agency finding or 
action that requires the benefit of substantial evidence.
    Similarly, TFO Thomas testified to participating in two meetings 
with Mr. Laterza and Ms. Palemire occurring on October 14, 2010 \61\ 
and October 20, 2010,\62\ which were also recorded by TFO Thomas and 
later transcribed. Tr. 851-53, 856-57; see Gov't Exs. 35, 36. 
Specifically regarding the Respondent's controlled substance 
prescription writing, TFO Thomas testified that Mr. Laterza and Ms. 
Palemire explained that the Respondent would come in to NPPM for close 
to nine hours per week to pre-sign blank prescriptions so that a 
physician's assistant or nurse practitioner could print and issue 
prescriptions under his signature while he was not in the office. Tr. 
854. TFO Thomas testified that he was told that the Respondent would be 
contacted to come back to the clinic if the clinic ran out of pre-
signed scripts as its throughput could be as many as one hundred 
patients per day. Tr. 854. As conveyed to him by Mr. Laterza, TFO 
Thomas testified that the physician assistants were in charge of seeing 
patients and prescribing medications, although it was possible that 
they to some degree communicated with the Respondent through computer 
equipment at times, owned by the Respondent, for him to approve 
prescriptions.\63\ Tr. 854-55, 861.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ During this interview, Laterza's attorney, Myles Malman, 
Esq., was also present. Tr. 856.
    \62\ Theodore Degel, an employee at the clinic, was an 
additional participant to this interview. Tr. 851.
    \63\ TFO Thomas acknowledged that he had never seen any blank, 
pre-signed prescriptions with the Respondent's signature. Tr. 856.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thomas's recollection was that Laterza informed him that he was 
motivated to come forward about the Respondent by an ``internal 
investigation'' conducted by NPPM's attorney at the company's own 
initiative, and that this was commenced on suspicion that the 
Respondent was self-prescribing anabolic steroids and other medications 
by proxy through his father, and defrauding the clinic of thousands of 
dollars in the process. Tr. 853, 860-61; see Gov't Ex. 35 at 16.
    This is again the type of hearsay evidence that, while not patently 
inadmissible, may not constitute substantial evidence and be afforded 
any weight, based upon an identical result yielded from a weighing of 
the J.A.M. Builders factors.\64\ Mr. Laterza as an owner of NPPM had an 
obvious interest in protecting the integrity of the clinic and 
shielding it from liability, be it civil or criminal. Regarding 
possible bias, few situations would likely invoke a more heightened 
sense of self-preservation than when Mr. Laterza is speaking to law 
enforcement and reporting on potential criminal activity occurring 
within his own business, while specifically identifying and shifting 
blame to a former employee (the Respondent). Accordingly, the self-
interest by which Mr. Laterza hoped law enforcement would rely and act 
upon his statements could not be greater, and his assertions were never 
put to the test of a meaningful cross-examination. Similarly, there is 
no corroborating information of record to test for consistency, and the 
information procured is clearly not of a nature that has been 
recognized by the courts as inherently reliable. The testimony 
regarding this interview can play no part in supporting a finding of 
substantial evidence in this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Timely, cogent, persuasive objections were interposed by 
the Respondent's counsel at the time this evidence was offered by 
the Government. Tr. 857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In an effort to generally establish the form and style in which the 
Respondent signed prescriptions, the Government elicited testimony from 
TFO Thomas that he spoke to Assistant State Attorney (ASA) Christy 
Rogers who spoke to Agent Bujnowski \65\ who spoke to the Respondent 
who allegedly confirmed that he effected his signature upon a single 
prescription by employing a

[[Page 63135]]

single letter resembling a ``G'' or ``C'' that was obtained by law 
enforcement from a pharmacy and somehow suspected to have been pre-
signed before it was issued. Tr. 861-64. In addition to speaking to ASA 
Rogers, TFO Thomas testified that he read a report drafted by Agent 
Bujnowski regarding this interaction with the Respondent. Tr. 863-64. 
The witness was not familiar with the details of the conversation 
purportedly conducted between Bujnowski and the Respondent, or even 
when it occurred. Tr. 862-63. The witness actually testified that he 
read a report (the details of which he could not remember) and spoke to 
someone who spoke to Bujnowski, who spoke to the Respondent. Tr. 864. 
This evidence was actually offered in this manner by the Government in 
support of its case. Even a highly-skilled cross-examiner, such as the 
Respondent's counsel in this case, would be at a loss to effectively 
engage such a vague, amorphous presentation of testimony. A timely, 
well-reasoned, continuing objection was interposed by the Respondent's 
counsel at the time this evidence was offered by the Government. Tr. 
861. Like other evidence of similar ilk offered by the Government in 
this case, that the testimony was not patently inadmissible at 
administrative proceedings does not answer the question of whether it 
can be used to uphold an administrative enforcement action that must be 
supported by substantial evidence, a query that must ultimately be 
answered in the negative. Because of the obvious concerns regarding the 
reliability of this testimony and the needlessly tortured and obscure 
way that it was offered, even if the J.A.M. Builders factors weighed in 
favor of admission (which they most clearly do not), no weight 
whatsoever can be assigned to this testimony insofar as it pertains to 
the way the Respondent purportedly signed prescriptions at NPPM, or 
that the Respondent gave an admission about the manner in which he 
signed prescriptions while at NPPM. To consider such evidence against 
the Respondent on this record would violate the Administrative 
Procedure Act and result in a grievous miscarriage of justice. See 5 
U.S.C. Sec.  556(d) (``A party is entitled * * * to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the 
facts.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ At another point in the proceedings, the Government 
signaled its intention to elicit information acquired by Bujnowski 
from DI McRae, who was apparently prepared to testify that she had 
obtained the information from Bujnowski through the means of a 
telephone call the day before the hearing. Tr. 565-69. That effort 
was abandoned upon the simultaneous representation that Bujnowski 
would be produced for the hearing. Tr. 569. Notwithstanding the 
Government's representation in this regard, Bujnowski was not 
produced. The Government indicated that a subpoena would be required 
to procure his testimony and was offered one on the spot, but 
declined and persevered in its efforts to present this information 
in this unfortunate manner. Tr. 828-33. During cross-examination, DI 
McRae even testified that Bujnowski located prescription scripts 
that were pre-signed by the Respondent. Tr. 587. Unfortunately, this 
testimony was not elicited from a witness with first-hand knowledge 
in a manner that could be relied upon in these proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TFO Thomas also testified that a database maintained by DEA 
reflects that two phone calls were placed to DEA by the Respondent in 
September 2010, wherein he complained that although he was no longer 
working at NPPM, individuals associated with that clinic were still 
utilizing prescriptions in his name on forged scripts. Tr. 865-66, 920-
22. Thomas testified that he placed two calls to the cellular phone 
number left by the caller, left detailed voicemails identifying himself 
as a DEA TFO, and received no call back. Tr. 867. In a peculiar irony, 
the same rationale that precludes consideration of unsubstantiated, 
unreliable hearsay offered against the Respondent precludes even 
negligible consideration of the DEA record of this phone call that 
purportedly emanated from the Respondent. That some DEA database 
contains a note entered a by an unknown DEA employee about a phone call 
that was purportedly lodged by the Respondent, offers little that can 
support or negate a finding of substantial evidence. In any event, as 
discussed in more detail, infra, the Respondent was present at the 
hearing and elected not to testify.
    Subject to the parameters set forth above regarding weight and the 
permissible uses of his elicited testimony, TFO Thomas provided 
testimony that was sufficiently detailed, plausible, and internally 
consistent to be deemed credible.

DI McRae

    Further testimony was elicited by the Government through DI 
Victoria McRae, who at the time of hearing worked at DEA as a Diversion 
Investigator for twenty-two years. Tr. 553. DI McRae is currently 
stationed at the Miami Field Division. Id. Although DI McRae provided 
some helpful foundational information regarding the admission of some 
DEA documentation,\66\ that is where the utility of her testimony for 
these proceedings began and ended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ Tr. 554-56; Gov't Exs. 1, 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DI McRae testified that she was present when a search warrant was 
executed at NPPM and that she and TFO Thomas interviewed employees of 
the clinic as part of the investigation. Tr. 556-58. According to 
McRae, she and Thomas conducted an interview of former NPPM employee 
and pharmacy technician, Crystal Laster, on November 5, 2010 at the 
Palm Beach Gardens Police Department.\67\ Tr. 556-58. According to DI 
McRae's testimony, Ms. Laster told her that she had worked at NPPM from 
April to July of 2010, had been fired,\68\ and consequently sought in 
October 2010 to report illegal activity that she had observed during 
her employment. Tr. 558-60. McRae testified that Laster told her that 
she was directed by Palemire to deduct dosage units from filled 
prescriptions to make up for shortfalls, and that it was office 
practice to flush away overages. Tr. 560. Additionally, McRae testified 
that Laster said Palemire permitted early refills, that Laster saw the 
Respondent pre-sign prescriptions, and that the Respondent was not 
always present at the clinic when patients were being seen. Tr. 560-61, 
578-79. McRae also testified that Laster told her that NPPM tolerated 
the practice of sponsoring.\69\ Tr. 562, 585.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Although DI McCrae testified that the interview was 
recorded, for reasons not readily apparent, the Government did not 
seek admission of a recording or transcript of the interview. See 
Tr. 574.
    \68\ Ms. Laster told DI McRae that she was fired by Ms. Palemire 
due to a discovered shortage of twenty oxycodone tablets. Tr. 573-
74.
    \69\ Sponsoring was explained as the process through which one 
person would pay the transportation, room and board, office visit, 
and/or medication costs for a group of patients traveling from out 
of state in exchange for a percentage of their controlled substance 
medication. Tr. 562-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the reality that the Respondent (like the 
Government) \70\ could have sought process to compel Laster's 
appearance at the hearing, all other J.A.M. Builders factors weigh 
powerfully against admission of the testimony regarding this interview. 
That she was fired from her employment by NPPM and waited several 
months to report alleged misconduct raises the specter of bias, there 
was no admissible evidence upon which to test consistency, and the 
information was not of a type that has been recognized as inherently 
reliable by the courts. While the information that was purportedly 
obtained through Laster's interview was clearly relevant, it was not 
offered through a vehicle that could ever be considered to support a 
finding of substantial evidence and must be afforded no weight in these 
proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ In view of the nature of the information purportedly held 
by Ms. Laster (pre-signed prescriptions, patients treated while the 
Respondent was not present, inventory regularities regarding 
controlled substances procured under the Respondent's COR), and the 
absence of any indication of her unavailability or unsuitability to 
process, the Government's tactical decision to present her 
information in this manner is striking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subject to the parameters set forth above regarding weight and the 
permissible uses of her elicited testimony, DI McRae provided testimony 
that was sufficiently detailed, plausible, and internally consistent to 
be deemed credible.

GS Langston

    The Government presented the testimony of Group Supervisor (GS) 
Susan Langston to support its allegation that the Respondent violated 
the Ryan

[[Page 63136]]

Haight Act. GS Langston testified that she has been the Group 
Supervisor of Diversion at the DEA Fort Lauderdale Resident Office for 
the past two years and that she has been a DI since 1996. Tr. 509.
    GS Langston testified that she came upon evidence related to this 
case while conducting an investigation into an unrelated matter. 
Specifically, Langston testified that on February 14, 2011, while 
conducting an on-site inspection of a retail pharmacy named American 
Pharmaceutical Group (American Pharmaceutical) \71\ in connection with 
that entity's application for a second COR, she came upon prescription 
scripts for controlled substances that were authorized under the 
Respondent's name and COR number. Tr. 510-12, 539. During the course of 
her inspection, GS Langston spoke to Bruce Derby and Jay Olynck, who 
respectively served as company pharmacist/pharmacy department manager 
and company accountant. Tr. 513-17. According to Langston, these 
officials of American Pharmaceutical told her that their company had a 
business arrangement with three Internet companies: Key to Life 
Therapy, HMMG Medical, and Total Rejuvenation (contract Internet 
providers). Under the business arrangement, when authorized 
prescription orders were received by American Pharmaceutical via fax 
from the contract Internet providers, the prescriptions would be filled 
and shipped out directly to the patient/customer/ultimate consumer. The 
scripts authorized by the Respondent that Langston found bore the 
indicia of the three Internet companies involved in the arrangement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ The notice of inspection (DEA Form 82) that was issued in 
connection with Langston's inspection indicates that American 
Pharmaceutical was located in Wilton Manors, Florida. Gov't Ex. 37 
at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to Langston, the American Pharmaceutical employees told 
her that the contract Internet providers would match website-solicited 
patient/customers from various locations with physicians on contract 
with them. Tr. 513-14. The patient/customer would apparently request a 
specific controlled substance, and if, after blood work and 
consultation with one of their physicians on contract, the physician 
agreed to write the prescription, that script would be sent to American 
Pharmaceutical, which would then fill the prescription and ship it out. 
Tr. 514-15. Langston testified that during her inspection, she came 
upon scripts authorized under the Respondent's name and COR number that 
also bore the indicia of the contract Internet providers. Tr. 513-17.
    Additionally, GS Langston testified that she was told that before 
American Pharmaceutical would fill prescriptions for a contract doctor, 
it required that he or she file a form certifying that a proper 
patient-doctor relationship was maintained with all patients for which 
prescriptions were transmitted. Tr. 541-44. While GS Langston looked 
through a file that American Pharmaceutical kept up containing these 
forms signed by many doctors, and based on what American Pharmaceutical 
told Langston there could/would/should have been one corresponding to 
the Respondent, Tr. 542-43, 546, GS Langston chose not to look for or 
take custody of a copy, and testified that she does not know whether 
such a form was ever executed by the Respondent, Tr. 542, 544.
    The lion's share of GS Langston's testimony was devoted to 
detailing thirty-two prescriptions for anabolic steroids that were 
filled, over the Respondent's name and CORs issued to him, by American 
Pharmaceutical and a part of the document seizure performed by 
Langston.\72\ See generally Tr. 519-33. The prescriptions were 
dispensed and shipped to patients located throughout the United States, 
over the Respondent's three registrations, for each of three contract 
Internet providers. See Tr. 519, 524, 532; Gov't Ex. 37. The 
documentation submitted into evidence demonstrates that between August 
26, 2010 and February 11, 2011, controlled substance prescriptions were 
filled through American Pharmaceutical and shipped to twenty-eight 
clients in fourteen states outside Florida.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ GS Langston admitted that while she seized all of American 
Pharmaceutical's prescription records, she did not go through all of 
them, and she had not gone through all of the prescriptions related 
to the Respondent. Tr. 511, 513, 518. GS Langston ended her 
investigation into American Pharmaceutical once it voluntarily 
surrendered its COR and ceased business, an event which was 
precipitated by the results of her inspection. Tr. 518.
    \73\ One page from the Government's exhibit does not list any 
controlled substances. Gov't Ex. 37 at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During her testimony, GS Langston acknowledged that shipping 
controlled substances is not in itself a violation of the Ryan Haight 
Act, but urged that prescribing without establishing a valid doctor-
patient relationship based upon at least one in-person examination 
is.\74\ Tr. 544. GS Langston conceded that she did not actually know 
whether any of the patients who were prescribed anabolic steroids in 
documentation supplied by the Government were seen by the Respondent or 
by another physician who was in consult with the Respondent. Tr. 547-
48. Furthermore, GS Langston testified that her assumption that the 
prescriptions were filled via the Internet process was based 
exclusively on her conversation with the American Pharmaceutical 
employees, Tr. 538, and that she neither took any steps to corroborate 
American Pharmaceutical's account of the business relationships 
involved in the Internet prescribing scheme, such as talking with 
personnel at the contract Internet providers, Tr. 517, nor did she 
verify with any of the patients the manner by which they were 
prescribed controlled substances, Tr. 548, as the focus of her 
investigation was solely on American Pharmaceutical, id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See 21 U.S.C. Sec.  829(e) (2006 & Supp. III).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The manner in which the Government's hearsay evidence on this issue 
was elicited presents a closer case regarding the appropriate weight to 
be accorded under the J.A.M. Builders factors. See 233 F.3d at 1354. 
While true that the Respondent arguably could have located and 
subpoenaed the American Pharmaceutical personnel interviewed by 
Langston, and that the information obtained is not the type 
traditionally deemed reliable by the courts, it is equally true that 
there is no obvious equation that suggests bias on the part of the 
interviewees towards the Respondent, and the scripts received into 
evidence that were obtained through a DEA inspection does add at least 
some level of corroboration to the account in view of the remote 
distances between the prescriber and patient/customer. However, it is 
not necessary to reach this issue, because, as discussed in more 
detail, infra, even if this evidence were deemed, arguendo, to be 
sufficiently reliable to support a substantial evidence finding, no 
evidence has been introduced from which it can properly be inferred 
that controlled substances were issued to the patient/customers without 
physical examinations. In fact, Langston conceded that American 
Pharmaceutical also had a walk-in aspect to its pharmacy, and that the 
admitted documents do not all even reflect that the controlled 
substances were shipped to the recipients. Tr. 536-37.
    Regarding credibility, GS Langston's testimony was sufficiently 
detailed, plausible, and consistent to be deemed credible in these 
proceedings.

DI Milan

    DI Marjorie Milan also testified on behalf of the Government. DI 
Milan testified that she is a Diversion Investigator at the Miami Field 
Division

[[Page 63137]]

for just short of twelve years.\75\ Tr. 435-36. DI Milan's 
participation of the investigation into the Respondent involved 
examining records seized on February 23, 2011 from NPPM by the West 
Palm Beach Sheriff's Office. Tr. 441. DI Milan's testimony was offered 
to identify records within the seized documents pertaining to the 
Respondent, Tr. 441-42, and to support the Government's allegation that 
the Respondent was noncompliant with his recordkeeping obligations as a 
DEA registrant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Through DI Milan's testimony, the Government offered into 
evidence voluntary surrender forms signed by the Respondent for COR 
Numbers FG1242471 and FG2021804. While the Government noticed all 
three of the Respondent's CORs in its charging document, including 
the remaining registration of BG8251845, almost all of the 
misconduct alleged by the Government occurred over COR FG1242471, 
the registration associated with the NPPM address. Notwithstanding, 
misconduct, if proven, is relevant not only to the COR connected to 
the misconduct, but for all under the public interest factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DI Milan testified to her opinion that the controlled substance 
records were deficient in that they were not ``readily retrievable'' in 
violation of 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1304.03-.04 (2011).\76\ DI Milan explained 
(without benefit of specific guidance document or instruction) \77\ 
that the term ``readily retrievable'' was the window of time that it 
takes DEA personnel to conduct an on-site inspection of a 
practitioner's premises, should DEA request at that time to review 
inventorying, dispensing, or any other applicable documents required to 
be maintained and so produced under the CSA. Tr. 442-43. To add 
generally to the confusion wrought by her testimony, Milan also 
informed that a registrant's required records may still be deemed 
``readily retrievable'' if provided within a day or two of the 
request.\78\ Tr. 443. Putting aside the relative merits of DI Milan's 
flexible definition of whether a registrant's records are ``readily 
retrievable,'' her testimony is clear on the point that the Respondent 
was never asked to retrieve anything. Tr. 444, 470-72. Milan's opinion 
that the Respondent defaulted in his responsibility to have ``readily 
retrievable'' records is based upon a sterile review of documents 
seized from NPPM at a time well after the Respondent's employment at 
that clinic was terminated. Tr. 473. The Respondent was terminated from 
his employment in September 2010, Tr. 473, but the seizure of records 
at NPPM did not take place until February 2011, Tr. 441. Milan 
testified that she was neither present during the seizure of records by 
the sheriff's office, nor was she aware of any inquiry made to the 
Respondent regarding the readily retrievable nature of what was 
recovered. Tr. 443-44. Indeed the records were taken pursuant to a 
criminal state search warrant, not an administrative inspection 
warrant, and the only time that DI Milan was in personal contact with 
the documents was while they were in custody of the sheriff's office. 
Tr. 443-45. No further testimony by DI Milan is on the record 
characterizing why or how the applicable information required to be 
kept was not retrievable in a ready fashion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ DI Milan was not able to testify as to which regulations 
required readily retrievable records, Tr. 442, and this issue 
likewise occupied no portion of the Government's brief.
    \77\ DI Milan could not identify any source for the ``readily 
retrievable'' records requirement. Tr. 442.
    \78\ On the issue of what temporal parameters define ``readily 
retrievable,'' Milan provided the following less-than-helpful 
guidance: ``Um, usually I think we give them like maybe a day or two 
for them to go ahead and provide the records to us so that we can 
review them. After that then we pretty much will, we figure if 
there's another avenue that we have to go through to be able to see 
the records.'' Tr. 443.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Aside from the merits of the celerity or accessibility of the files 
procured, DI Milan testified to required recordkeeping records that she 
noted were absent from the nine boxes of evidence held in custody by 
the sheriff's office. Tr. 475. DI Milan asserted that she specifically 
looked for inventory records or ordering records that would indicate 
amounts of controlled substances purchased. Tr. 475-76. This testimony 
(which was actually extracted from the witness on cross-examination) 
was insufficiently developed to ascertain anything concrete regarding 
whether recordkeeping was maintained in compliance with DEA regulation 
or whether those records, if they existed, would have been contained in 
the boxes seized. Moreover, while DI Milan explained why she did not 
need to look at every single page within the seizure to know the 
contents (a remarkable assertion in and of itself), she declared, ``I 
could pretty much distinguish what did not pertain to what I needed to 
look for. In other words, if it looked like it was financial records 
[sic], that was something that I wouldn't be looking at, because I was 
looking for any documentation that showed whether controlled substances 
had been ordered, and also what was being dispensed.'' Tr. 475-76. Even 
if the unreasonable proposition that records evaluated under the 
circumstances here could ever be assessed as ``readily retrievable'' or 
not was hypothetically indulged, from Milan's testimony it would be 
impossible to ascertain what, if any, documents were present or missing 
from the seized records; no one who testified has even reviewed all the 
seized records. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence from which a 
finding of deficiency founded on lack of readily retrievable records 
could be based.
    DI Milan also testified that she reviewed logbooks containing 
affixed controlled substance dispensing labels issued over the 
Respondent's COR, which she electronically scanned at the sheriff's 
office. Tr. 446-48. She then selected, without any particular process 
or method, one day in each month of February, March, April, May, and 
June in 2010 to concentrate her analysis.\79\ Tr. 446-47, 481. She also 
scanned the executed scripts corresponding to the dispensing labels 
found within the records seized.\80\ Tr. 451-53. The extent of the 
analysis conducted by DI Milan was limited to calculating the sums of 
dosage units dispensed by the Respondent for each of oxycodone 15 mg, 
oxycodone 30 mg, and alprazolam 2 mg on each of the five dates, Tr. 
456-59, as well as providing less than assertive testimony coming up 
with a minimum and maximum prescribed dosage unit range for each of the 
three drug varieties cumulatively based upon the five dates.\81\ Tr. 
459-61. The documents providing the basis of DI Milan's testimony, 
included in the proposed exhibit by the Government (Government's 
Exhibit 43), were provisionally admitted into evidence subject to the 
witness providing a foundation sufficient to support why it was 
relevant. Tr. 448-49. While the exhibit remains in evidence, the 
Government provided no contextual evidence from which any relevant 
conclusion could rationally be based other than a statement of the 
tallies themselves. The total dosage units of a single type of 
substance prescribed on a particular day, or prescribed concurrently 
with other substances, without more, speaks nothing to the propriety or 
impropriety of the practitioner's prescribing behavior and

[[Page 63138]]

adds nothing (in the absence of contextual evidence) to the equation of 
whether it is in the public interest to continue the Respondent's 
privileges as a registrant. The same holds true for the range of 
tablets prescribed at any one time. In fact, DI Milan specifically 
testified that she was suggesting nothing proper or improper about what 
was prescribed or how many patients the Respondent prescribed to on any 
given day. Tr. 481, 492. For these reasons, Government's Exhibit 43 and 
the associated testimony by DI Milan sheds no appreciable light on the 
determination as to whether the Respondent's continued registration 
would be inconsistent with the public interest and has been given no 
weight in this recommended decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ The precise dates selected were February 19, March 5, April 
1, May 28, and June 18, 2010. Tr. 450-51.
    \80\ DI Milan acknowledged that she had no idea who assembled 
the records or the significance of their organization scheme. Tr. 
454.
    \81\ While it was proffered that DI Milan would testify as to 
how many patients were seen by the Respondent on each of the 
particular days examined by DI Milan based solely on the dispensing 
labels, Tr. 449, DI Milan eventually admitted that while this figure 
was ascertainable, she did not tally it, Tr. 460-63; see Tr. 487-88, 
490-91. Later, DI Milan testified that her analysis did not suggest 
that the Respondent saw ``some exorbitant number'' of patients each 
day, all of to whom he prescribed controlled substances. Tr. 486, 
492.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SDI Wright

    The Government provided the testimony of Senior Diversion 
Investigator (SDI) Kyle Wright, Chief of DEA's Targeting and Analysis 
Section. Tr. 346. SDI Wright testified that he and his staff analyze 
data from the Automated Records and Controlled Ordering System (ARCOS), 
a database maintained by DEA pursuant to its obligations under the CSA. 
Tr. 346-47. Through ARCOS, DEA has the capacity to track the path of 
all Schedule II and Schedule III narcotic drugs \82\ throughout their 
lifecycle events in the distribution chain, from the time their raw 
form elements are imported or created, through manufacturing, 
distribution, and the dispensing to the ultimate end user, i.e. 
typically the patient. Tr. 347. SDI Wright explained that the data 
loaded into ARCOS pertains to two broad groups, those DEA registrants 
who must report controlled substance transactions to ARCOS (e.g., 
manufacturer, distributor), and those registrants on whom transactions 
are reported to ARCOS (e.g., pharmacy, dispensing practitioner).\83\ 
Tr. 348. The COR number of every party participating in an event is 
entered in connection with each transaction. Tr. 348, 358. According to 
SDI Wright, the information loaded into ARCOS is used both to monitor 
the legitimate flow of controlled substances within the closed 
regulatory system, as well as to highlight numerical anomalies that 
could reflect the potential for diversion. Tr. 349- 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ SDI Wright explained that while all Schedule II substances 
are tracked, only a subset of Schedule III controlled substances 
considered to be narcotic drugs are tracked. Tr. 420; but see 21 
C.F.R. Sec.  1304.33 (2011) (also requiring reporting on all 
Schedule I controlled substances, gamma hydroxybutyric acid 
(Schedule III), and some activities involving selected psychotropic 
substances in Schedules III and IV).
    \83\ Registrants who are ``reported on'' are also referred to as 
the ``retail side'' in contrast to the ``reporter side.'' Tr. 348. 
Some of the types of transactions that trigger a reporting 
requirement are importation, loss, destruction, and purchases/sales. 
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Through SDI Wright's testimony, the Government presented some 
absolute and comparative statistical information based upon data culled 
from ARCOS. The data related to the Respondent's COR and was relevant 
to the extent that it showed purchasing trends of Schedule II and 
Schedule III narcotics associated with the Respondent's COR. However, 
the information, in the form it was offered, did not provide any 
insight into whether the Respondent committed any activity that was 
consistent or inconsistent with his responsibilities as a 
registrant.\84\ This is not to say that statistical data could not 
support substantial evidence to revoke a registrant's COR in all cases. 
There was simply insufficient contextual evidence adduced at the 
hearing to utilize the statistics that were offered.\85\ In the absence 
of testimony or other evidence that could provide some context to the 
data, and why the numbers Wright provided demonstrated whether or to 
what extent the Respondent was exercising due care regarding his 
responsibilities as a registrant, there is no use that the impressive 
array of statistical information he provided can be put to.\86\ Beyond 
doubt, there are a host of factors that could account for why the 
Respondent's level of controlled substance prescribing should have been 
lower, higher, or was just right. A non-exhaustive list of such 
evidence might include (but not be limited to) the nature of his 
practice (pain specialist versus nephrologist),\87\ the geographical 
location (and population) of his practice, the scarcity or abundance of 
other practitioners practicing the same medical field in similar 
proximity, the number of hours per week he practiced and number of 
patients he treated during that time period, and even the socioeconomic 
status of the region. All these factors, and certainly others, could 
likely shed light on why ARCOS figures related to the numbers of 
controlled substance prescriptions that were issued and/or dispensed 
reflected well or poorly on whether the Respondent was adequately 
discharging his duties under the CSA. To the extent that reasonable 
expectations regarding the Respondent's practice or similarly-situated 
registrants could be divined, it was not presented. The Respondent's 
level of dispensing was not compared with other registrants with a 
reliable metric that could establish anything relevant about the 
numbers. Here, the most SDI Wright could offer is that the numbers 
presented could support an investigatory red flag. Tr. 384. Beyond 
question, DI Wright presented as a forthright, credible witness with a 
superior command over the subject matter of his testimony. That said, 
the data was presented in something of a contextual vacuum, and as 
such, cannot be used to reach a determination as to whether the 
continuation of the Respondent's COR is in the public interest.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ The first set of data presented by SDI Wright consisted of 
raw numbers of dosage units purchased over the Respondent's COR in 
2009 and 2010, Tr. 367-86, that, on SDI Wright's admission, did not 
suggest anything improper or illegal but that only raised an 
investigatory flag based primarily on a sharp increase from one 
quarter to a following quarter, Tr. 382-84; Gov't Ex. 41, at 1-6. 
SDI Wright's attention was also drawn to data indicating that 
variations of oxycodone 30 mg tablets were ordered much to the 
exclusion of other controlled substances. Tr. 382. Additionally, SDI 
Wright presented tables and graphs comparing the amount of oxycodone 
dosage units purchased by the Respondent to countywide, statewide, 
and nationwide practitioner ordering averages, Tr. 386-92, 395; 
Gov't Ex. 41 at 8 (calendar year 2009), 12 (calendar year 2010), and 
comparing the Respondent to two other practitioners constituting the 
top three purchasers in zip code 33404, Tr. 393-97; Gov't Ex. 41, at 
9-11 (calendar year 2009), 13-15 (calendar year 2010).
    \85\ At the hearing, the Respondent's counsel interposed timely 
(ultimately well-founded) objections to various aspects of DI 
Wright's testimony. Tr. 353, 374, 376-77, 381, 391.
    \86\ When Wright was asked if he knew whether the Respondent 
authorized the prescriptions in question, he responded in this way: 
``Okay, I'm going to answer your question precisely. I know nothing 
about his prescribing at all, because that's not what ARCOS 
tracks.'' Tr. 398.
    \87\ Tr. 406-07.
    \88\ The Government's argument that these raw numbers 
demonstrate the impact of the Respondent's poor prescribing 
practices, Gov't Br. at 26, is not persuasive on this record. The 
numbers here reflect only volume; not high volume or low volume. If 
the record revealed that controlled substances were being improperly 
dispensed through every (or even most) prescription issued or 
dispensed, the number of controlled substances being released 
without the benefit of adequate controls would arguably be relevant 
to show the impact of the Respondent's laxity. Here, beyond the 
instances demonstrated in the record where the Respondent's 
prescribing practices fell below the standard described by the 
Government's expert, there is no sensible way to extrapolate what 
percentage (if any) of the balance of the issued scripts or 
dispensed medications were disgorged from the closed regulatory 
system in an improper way. Put another way, volume of total 
prescriptions issued does not reveal anything meaningful (or even 
useable) about community impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Respondent did not testify and presented no evidence at the 
hearing.
    Other evidence required for a disposition of this issue is set 
forth in the analysis portion of this decision.

[[Page 63139]]

The Analysis

    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec.  824(a)(4) (2006), the Administrator 
\89\ is permitted to revoke a COR if persuaded that the registrant 
``has committed such acts as would render * * * registration under 
section 823 * * * inconsistent with the public interest * * *.'' The 
following factors have been provided by Congress in determining ``the 
public interest'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ This authority has been delegated pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 
Sec. Sec.  0.100(b) and 0.104 (2010).

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research 
with respect to controlled substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws 
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal or local laws relating 
to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

    21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f) (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
    ``[T]hese factors are considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert A. 
Leslie, M.D., 68 Fed. Reg. 15227, 15230 (2003). Any one or a 
combination of factors may be relied upon, and when exercising 
authority as an impartial adjudicator, the Administrator may properly 
give each factor whatever weight she deems appropriate in determining 
whether an application for a registration should be denied. Morall v. 
DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005); JLB, Inc., d/b/a Boyd 
Drugs, 53 Fed. Reg. 43945, 43947 (1988); David E. Trawick, D.D.S., 53 
Fed. Reg. 5326, 5327 (1988); see also Joy's Ideas, 70 Fed. Reg. 33195, 
33197 (2005); David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 Fed. Reg. 37507, 37508 (1993); 
Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 Fed. Reg. 16422, 16424 (1989). 
Moreover, the Administrator is ``not required to make findings as to 
all of the factors * * *.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 
2005); see also Morall, 412 F.3d at 173-74. The Administrator is not 
required to discuss consideration of each factor in equal detail, or 
even every factor in any given level of detail. Trawick v. DEA, 861 
F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988) (the Administrator's obligation to explain 
the decision rationale may be satisfied even if only minimal 
consideration is given to the relevant factors and remand is required 
only when it is unclear whether the relevant factors were considered at 
all). The balancing of the public interest factors ``is not a contest 
in which score is kept; the Agency is not required to mechanically 
count up the factors and determine how many favor the Government and 
how many favor the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses 
on protecting the public interest * * *.'' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 
Fed. Reg. 459, 462 (2009).
    In an action to revoke a registrant's DEA COR, the DEA has the 
burden of proving that the requirements for revocation are satisfied. 
21 C.F.R. Sec.  1301.44(e) (2011). Once DEA has made its prima facie 
case for revocation of the registrant's DEA Certificate of 
Registration, the burden of production then shifts to the Respondent to 
show that, given the totality of the facts and circumstances in the 
record, revoking the registrant's registration would not be 
appropriate. Morall, 412 F.3d at 174; Humphreys v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 
661 (3d Cir. 1996); Shatz v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 
(8th Cir. 1989); Thomas E. Johnston, 45 Fed. Reg. 72311, 72312 (1980). 
Further, ``to rebut the Government's prima facie case, [the Respondent] 
is required not only to accept responsibility for [the established] 
misconduct, but also to demonstrate what corrective measures [have 
been] undertaken to prevent the reoccurrence of similar acts.'' Jeri 
Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8236 (2010).
    Where the Government has sustained its burden and established that 
a registrant has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest, 
that registrant must present sufficient mitigating evidence to assure 
the Administrator that he or she can be entrusted with the 
responsibility commensurate with such a registration. Steven M. 
Abbadessa, D.O., 74 Fed. Reg. 10077, 10078, 10081 (2009); Medicine 
Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 387 (2008); Samuel S. Jackson, 
D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23848, 23853 (2007). Normal hardships to the 
practitioner and even to the surrounding community that are attendant 
upon the lack of registration are not relevant considerations. 
Abbadessa, 74 Fed. Reg. at 10078; see also Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 74 
Fed. Reg. 36751, 36757 (2009).
    The Agency's conclusion that past performance is the best predictor 
of future performance has been sustained on review in the courts, Alra 
Labs. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995), as has the Agency's 
consistent policy of strongly weighing whether a registrant who has 
committed acts inconsistent with the public interest has accepted 
responsibility and demonstrated that he or she will not engage in 
future misconduct. Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 483; Ronald Lynch, M.D., 75 Fed. 
Reg. 78745, 78749 (2010) (Respondent's attempts to minimize misconduct 
held to undermine acceptance of responsibility); George Mathew, M.D., 
75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66140, 66145, 66148 (2010); East Main Street 
Pharmacy, 75 Fed. Reg. 66149, 66165 (2010); George C. Aycock, M.D., 74 
Fed. Reg. 17529, 17543 (2009); Abbadessa, 74 Fed. Reg. at 10078; 
Krishna-Iyer, 74 Fed. Reg. at 463; Medicine Shoppe, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
387.
    While the burden of proof at this administrative hearing is a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 
91, 100-01 (1981), the Administrator's factual findings will be 
sustained on review to the extent they are supported by ``substantial 
evidence.'' Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 481. And while ``the possibility of 
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence'' does not limit 
the Administrator's ability to find facts on either side of the 
contested issues in the case, Shatz, 873 F.2d at 1092; Trawick, 861 
F.2d at 77, all ``important aspect[s] of the problem,'' such as a 
Respondent's defense or explanation that runs counter to the 
Government's evidence, must be considered. Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy v. 
DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Humphreys, 96 F.3d at 663. The 
ultimate disposition of the case must be in accordance with the weight 
of the evidence, not simply supported by enough evidence to justify, if 
the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the 
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. 
Steadman, 450 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Regarding the exercise of discretionary authority, the courts have 
recognized that gross deviations from past agency precedent must be 
adequately supported, Morall, 412 F.3d at 183, but mere unevenness in 
application does not, standing alone, render a particular discretionary 
action unwarranted. Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(citing Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188 (1973)), 
cert. denied, ---- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1033, 1033 (2009). It is well-
settled that since the Administrative Law Judge has had the opportunity 
to observe the demeanor and conduct of hearing witnesses, the factual 
findings set forth in this recommended decision are entitled to 
significant deference, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 
496 (1951), and that this recommended decision constitutes an important 
part of the record that must be considered in the Administrator's 
decision, Morall, 412 F.3d at 179. However, any recommendations set 
forth herein

[[Page 63140]]

regarding the exercise of discretion are by no means binding on the 
Administrator and do not limit the exercise of that discretion. 5 
U.S.C. Sec.  557(b) (2006); River Forest Pharmacy, Inc. v. DEA, 501 
F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1974); Attorney General's Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act 8 (1947).

Factors 1 and 3: The Recommendation of the Appropriate State Licensing 
Board or Professional Disciplinary Authority; and Conviction Record 
Under Federal or State Laws Relating to the Manufacture, Distribution, 
or Dispensing of Controlled Substances

    In this case, it is undisputed that the Respondent holds a valid 
and current state license to practice medicine in Florida. The record 
contains no evidence of a recommendation regarding the Respondent's 
medical privileges by any cognizant state licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority. However, that a state has not 
acted against a registrant's medical license is not dispositive in this 
administrative determination as to whether continuation of a 
registration is consistent with the public interest. Patrick W. 
Stodola, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20727, 20730 (2009); Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 461. It is well-established Agency precedent that a 
``state license is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
registration.'' Leslie, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15230; John H. Kennedy, M.D., 
71 Fed. Reg. 35705, 35708 (2006). Even the reinstatement of a state 
medical license does not affect the DEA's independent responsibility to 
determine whether a registration is in the public interest. Mortimer B. 
Levin, D.O., 55 Fed. Reg. 9209, 8210 (1990). The ultimate 
responsibility to determine whether a registration is consistent with 
the public interest has been delegated exclusively to the DEA, not to 
entities within state government. Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 
6580, 6590 (2007), aff'd, Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, ---- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1033 (2009). Congress vested 
authority to enforce the CSA in the Attorney General, not state 
officials. Stodola, 74 Fed. Reg. at 20375. Here, there is no evidence 
of record that the state licensing board has even considered the issue 
of a formal action against the Respondent's licensure. Thus, on these 
facts, that the record contains no evidence of a recommendation by a 
state licensing board does not weigh for or against a determination as 
to whether continuation of the Respondent's DEA certification is 
consistent with the public interest.
    Regarding the third factor (convictions relating to the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances), the 
record in this case does not contain evidence that the Respondent has 
been convicted of a crime related to the manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensing of controlled substances. DEA administrative proceedings are 
non-punitive and ``a remedial measure, based upon the public interest 
and the necessity to protect the public from those individuals who have 
misused controlled substances or their DEA COR, and who have not 
presented sufficient mitigating evidence to assure the [Administrator] 
that they can be trusted with the responsibility carried by such a 
registration.'' Jackson, 72 Fed. Reg. at 23853; Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 
Fed. Reg. 21931, 21932 (1988). Where evidence in a particular case 
reflects that the Respondent has acquired convictions relating to the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances, 
those convictions must be carefully examined and weighed in the 
adjudication of whether the issuance of a registration is in the public 
interest. 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f).
    Although the standard of proof in a criminal case is more stringent 
than the standard required at an administrative proceeding, and the 
elements of both federal and state crimes relating to controlled 
substances are not always co-extensive with conduct that is relevant to 
a determination of whether registration is within the public interest, 
evidence that a registrant has been convicted of crimes related to 
controlled substances is a factor to be evaluated in reaching a 
determination as to whether he or she should be entrusted with a DEA 
certificate. The probative value of an absence of any evidence of 
criminal prosecution is somewhat diminished by the myriad of 
considerations that are factored into a decision to initiate, pursue, 
and dispose of criminal proceedings by federal, state, and local 
prosecution authorities. See Robert L. Dougherty, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 
16823, 16833 n.13 (2011); Dewey C. Mackay, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49956, 
49973 (2010) (``[W]hile a history of criminal convictions for offenses 
involving the distribution or dispensing of controlled substances is a 
highly relevant consideration, there are any number of reasons why a 
registrant may not have been convicted of such an offense, and thus, 
the absence of such a conviction is of considerably less consequence in 
the public interest inquiry.'' (citing Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 
Fed. Reg. 459, 461 (2009); Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6593 
n.22 (2007), aff'd, Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, ---- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1033 (2009))); Ladapo O. Shyngle, 
M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 6056, 6057 n.2 (2009). Although there is information 
in the record implying that the Respondent was arrested for conduct 
connected to that which was alleged in this case,\90\ no evidence was 
offered or received which indicates whether law enforcement authorities 
are still engaged in a prosecution (or even a criminal investigation) 
of the Respondent, the current status of the charges that supported the 
arrest, or (beyond being ``drug-related'') even what the Respondent was 
arrested for or charged with. More to the point, an arrest is merely an 
untested accusation, not a conviction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ Stipulation B; Tr. 468-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, consideration of the evidence of record under the 
first and third factors neither supports the Government's argument for 
revocation nor militates against it.

Factors 2, 4, and 5: The Respondent's Experience in Dispensing 
Controlled Substances; Compliance with Applicable State, Federal, or 
Local Laws Relating to Controlled Substances; and Such Other Conduct 
Which May Threaten the Public Health and Safety

    In this case, the gravamen of the allegations in the OSC/ISO, as 
well as the factual concentration of much of the evidence presented, 
share as a principal focus the manner in which the Respondent has 
either prescribed and dispensed controlled substances under the 
authority of his COR, and/or permitted/authorized others to do so. 
Thus, it is analytically logical to consider public interest factors 
two, four, and five together. That being said, factors two, four, and 
five involve analysis of common and distinct considerations.
    Regarding Factor 2, in requiring an examination of a registrant's 
experience in handling controlled substances, Congress, in mandating a 
consideration of this element, manifested an acknowledgement that the 
qualitative manner and the quantitative volume in which a registrant 
has engaged in the dispensing of controlled substances, and how long he 
has been in the business of doing so, are significant factors to be 
evaluated in reaching a determination as to whether he should be 
entrusted with a DEA certificate. In some cases, viewing a registrant's 
actions against a backdrop of how he has performed activity within the 
scope of the

[[Page 63141]]

certificate can provide a contextual lens to assist in a fair 
adjudication of whether continued registration is in the public 
interest.
    Evidence that a practitioner may have conducted a significant level 
of sustained activity within the scope of the registration for a 
sustained period is a relevant and correct consideration which must be 
accorded due weight. However, the Agency has taken the reasonable 
position that this factor can be readily outweighed by acts held to be 
inconsistent with the public interest. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 Fed. Reg. 
at 463. Experience which occurred prior and subsequent to proven 
allegations of malfeasance may be relevant. Evidence that precedes 
proven misconduct may add support to the contention that, even 
acknowledging the gravity of a registrant's transgressions, they are 
sufficiently isolated and/or attenuated that adverse action against his 
registration is not compelled by public interest concerns. Likewise, 
evidence presented by the Government that the proven allegations are 
congruous with a consistent past pattern of poor behavior can enhance 
the Government's case.
    In a similar vein, conduct which occurs after proven allegations 
can shed light on whether a registrant has taken steps to reform and/or 
conform his or her conduct to appropriate standards. Contrariwise, a 
registrant who has persisted in incorrect behavior, or made attempts to 
circumvent Agency directives, even after being put on notice, can 
enhance the Government's case for revocation. Novelty, Inc., 73 Fed. 
Reg. 52689, 52703 (2008), aff'd, 571 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 36487, 36503 (2007); John J. 
Fotinopoulous, 72 Fed. Reg. 24602, 24606 (2007).
    In Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 Fed. Reg. at 463, DEA policy regarding 
this aspect of the public interest determination was clarified to some 
extent. The decision in that case acknowledged the reality that even a 
significant and sustained history of uneventful practice under a DEA 
certificate can be offset by proof that a registrant has committed acts 
inconsistent with the public interest. Id.; see also Jeri Hassman, 
M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8235 (2010) (acknowledging Agency precedential 
rejection of the concept that conduct which is inconsistent with the 
public interest is rendered less so by comparing it with a Respondent's 
legitimate activities which occurred in substantially higher numbers); 
Paul J. Cargine, Jr., 36 Fed. Reg. 51592, 515600 (1998) (``even though 
the patients at issue are only a small portion of Respondent's patient 
population, his prescribing of controlled substances to these 
individuals raises serious concerns regarding [his] ability to 
responsibly handle controlled substances in the future.''). In the 
context of a pharmacy registrant, Agency precedent has consistently 
held that even a significant level of legitimate dispensing cannot 
offset flagrant violations. See, e.g., Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 
Fed. Reg. 364, 386 & n.56 (2008).
    The Agency, in its administrative precedent (notwithstanding what 
might be perceived as an arguable lack of at least readily-apparent 
ambiguity employed by Congress in the language of the statute) \91\ has 
further curtailed the scope of Factor 2. The Agency's current view 
regarding Factor 2 is that while evidence of a registrant's experience 
handling controlled substances may be entitled to some weight in 
assessing whether errant practices have been reformed, it is entitled 
to no weight in cases where the Government has met its prima facie 
burden and a practitioner has failed to acknowledge wrongdoing. Cynthia 
M. Cadet, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 19450 n.3 (2011); Roni Dreszer, M.D., 76 
Fed. Reg. 19434 n.3 (2011); Michael J. Aruta, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 19420 
n.3 (2011); Jacobo Dreszer, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 19386-87 n.3 (2011). In 
this case, it is undisputed that the Respondent was issued a license to 
practice medicine in Florida. Since neither party to the litigation 
introduced any evidence regarding how the Respondent conducted himself 
as a registrant prior to the conduct alleged in the OSC/ISO, the 
quality and history of the Respondent's prior experience as a DEA 
registrant was simply not an issue in this case. However, as discussed, 
infra, other features of Factor 2 clearly do bear on a disposition of 
this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) for the two-step process 
constructed by the United States Supreme Court regarding the 
deference afforded to an agency in interpreting a statute it is 
charged to administer.
    First * * * [i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the * * * agency[ ] must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. * * * [I]f the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.''
    467 U.S. at 842-43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding Factor 4, to effectuate the dual goals of conquering drug 
abuse and controlling both legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances, ``Congress devised a closed regulatory system 
making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any 
controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.'' 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13 (2005). Consistent with the 
maintenance of that closed regulatory system, subject to limited 
exceptions not relevant here, a controlled substance may only be 
dispensed upon a prescription issued by a practitioner, and such a 
prescription is unlawful unless it is ``issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.'' 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1306.04(a). Furthermore, ``an 
order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of 
professional treatment * * * is not a prescription within the meaning 
and intent of [21 U.S.C. Sec.  829] and the person knowingly * * * 
issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations 
of the provisions of law related to controlled substances.'' Id.
    A registered practitioner is authorized to dispense,\92\ which the 
CSA defines as ``to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user 
\93\ * * * by, or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner.'' 21 
U.S.C. 802(10) (2006 & Supp. III 2010); see also Rose Mary Jacinta 
Lewis, 72 Fed. Reg. 4035, 4040 (2007). The prescription requirement is 
designed to ensure that controlled substances are used under the 
supervision of a doctor as a bulwark against the risk of addiction and 
recreational abuse. Aycock, 74 Fed. Reg. at 17541 (citing Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 
135, 142-43 (1975) (noting that evidence established that a physician 
exceeded the bounds of professional practice when he gave inadequate 
examinations or none at all, ignored the results of the tests he did 
make, and took no precautions against misuse and diversion)). The 
prescription requirement likewise stands as a proscription against 
doctors ``peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those prohibited 
uses.'' Id. The courts have sustained criminal convictions based on the 
issuing of illegitimate prescriptions where physicians conducted no 
physical examinations or sham physical examinations. United States v. 
Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 690-91 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 
1113 (2006); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 
1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f).
    \93\ ``Ultimate user'' is defined as ``a person who has lawfully 
obtained, and who possesses, a controlled substance for his own use 
or for the use of a member of his household or for an animal owned 
by him or by a member of his household.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec.  802(27).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 63142]]

Prescribing Under the Respondent's Registration

    Beyond doubt, the Government's evidence establishes that employees 
at NPPM, utilizing the authority of the Respondent's COR, were playing 
fast and loose with controlled substance prescriptions, which were 
preceded by physical examinations that could be only generously 
described as cursory, and which were conducted in a slovenly manner by 
non-physicians. The activities were unquestionably the crudest form of 
a mass-production operation aimed at making money by providing 
controlled substances without regard to medical need or legal 
requirement. That said, the evidence also establishes that the 
Respondent was not the owner of NPPM, but an employee from early 2009 
to September 2010. Tr. 588, 865, 892. The focus of a correct 
determination in this case hinges on the appropriate level of 
responsibility to be required of a DEA registrant under these facts.
    The Agency has consistently held that a DEA registrant is strictly 
liable for the misconduct of any person or entity he authorizes to act 
under his registration. Scott C. Bickman, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 17694, 
17703 (2011); Paul Volkman, 73 Fed. Reg. 30630, 30644 n.42 (2008), 
aff'd, Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 224 (6th Cir. 2009); Rose Mary 
Jacinta Lewis, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 4035, 4041 (2007). While complete 
omniscience on the part of a registrant is not the standard, the Agency 
has made it clear that it will not countenance deliberate indifference 
on the part of those who enjoy the privileges of a DEA COR. See 
Holloway Distrib., 72 Fed. Reg. 42118, 42124 (2007) (a policy of ``see 
no evil, hear no evil'' in a List I distributor context is held to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of a DEA registrant). 
Even in a criminal context regarding prescriptions illegitimately 
issued, the courts have held that a factfinder ``may consider willful 
blindness as a basis for knowledge.'' United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 
1023, 1031 (8th Cir. 2006).
    TFO Schwartz made ten visits to NPPM as UC Patient Rix, received 
controlled substances for his efforts during five, and obtained an 
unfilled prescription for controlled substances during one. Controlled 
pain medications and testosterone were provided to him under the 
Respondent's COR although he did not meet the Respondent until his 
fifth (November 21st) visit. See Tr. 646, 807. As UC Patient Rix, 
Schwartz had met with Laterza about obtaining testosterone and HRT, and 
with Nurse Sanchez about pain management, during clinic UC visits which 
occurred on October 21st and 23rd. Tr. 600-01, 608-12, 618-19. During 
the fifth (November 21st) UC visit, where he met with the Respondent 
for the first time, Patient Rix informed the Respondent (who had picked 
up the Patient Rix medical chart from the reception desk and was 
punching keys at a computer terminal during their entire interaction in 
the examination room) that he had previously met with Ms. Sanchez at 
this practice and received controlled substance pain medication, and 
that he had previously met with Laterza and received controlled 
substance testosterone from him. Tr. 647-49; Gov't Ex. 19 at 18. To 
emphasize the point, Patient Rix highlighted Ms. Sanchez's decision to 
provide a level of pain medication that was below the amount Rix had 
sought from her. Tr. 647; Gov't Ex. 19 at 18. Similarly, Rix explained 
to the Respondent that he was consulting with Laterza about HRT and 
sought advice from the Respondent about possible medication 
interactions, which the Respondent answered with assurances. Tr. 648; 
Gov't Ex. 19 at 18. Thus, there is no doubt, that based on Schwartz's 
credible testimony in this regard, that the Respondent knew or should 
have known that his COR was being used for the prescribing of 
controlled substances in the past, at times when he was or was not 
present. The Respondent's decision to blithely press on and issue 
prescriptions for controlled substances at an increased level to UC 
Patient Rix, based upon the conversation that he had with the patient 
and the chart he held in his hand, stands unexplained and 
unexplainable. Whether the Respondent knew of (or even designed) the 
controlled-substance shenanigans perpetrated by Laterza and Sanchez 
before that moment, or prescribed in spite of them and thereby ratified 
it thereafter, his actions fell markedly below the level of care 
required by one entrusted with a DEA COR. If he was so inclined, he 
could have, at a minimum, evaluated UC Patient Rix himself with a full 
and adequate physical examination. Instead, the Respondent, unfazed, 
increased UC Patient Rix's prescriptions for powerful and addictive 
controlled narcotics and endorsed their use by the patient with 
controlled steroids. Even a brief examination of the patient chart that 
the Respondent held in his hand would have allowed him to evaluate the 
discrepancies between the neck complaints expressed at the visit with 
the back complaints addressed in the MRI report provided. Further, the 
chart notes are replete with examinations and observations that can 
accurately be described as based in fantasy. It is clear that the 
Respondent prescribed dangerous and controlled substances to UC Patient 
Rix for reasons that lacked a legitimate medical purpose and were 
outside the course of professional practice in violation of 21 C.F.R. 
Sec.  1306.04(a).
    The Respondent's decision to prescribe controlled substances under 
the circumstances present at the (5th) November 21st UC visit without 
corrective action or even cursory inquiry, standing alone, is conduct 
sufficient to sustain the Government's burden to establish that the 
Respondent has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest. 
However, the Respondent's demeanor and inaction upon the direct 
communication by UC Patient Rix about how prescribing was being handled 
at NPPM under his COR stands as powerful and unrebutted evidence that 
the Respondent knew what was going on and ignored it--or worse. Thus, 
the evidence demonstrates that the Respondent either intentionally 
violated 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1306.04(a) through the agency of NPPM 
functionaries when controlled drug prescriptions were issued over his 
COR to UC Patient Rix, UC Patient Hays, and UC Patient Barbaro, or 
shirked his responsibility as a COR registrant by taking no action to 
correct the illegality. Furthermore, the evidence fully supports the 
Government's theory that the Respondent issued controlled substance 
prescriptions in a manner that fell substantially below the standards 
required of a practitioner in Florida based upon the Government's 
expert's review of the patient charts maintained on Patients SL, CH, 
CC, and PL.
    The Respondent, acting on the advice of counsel, invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. Tr. 334-35, 833-34. At a DEA 
administrative hearing, it is permissible to draw an adverse inference 
from silence, even in the face of a Fifth Amendment invocation. See 
Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States 
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (``Silence gains more probative 
weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since it is assumed 
in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely than not to 
dispute an untrue accusation.'')); Joseph Baumstarck, M.D., 74 Fed. 
Reg. 17525, 17528, n.3 (2009) (citing Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. 
Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998)). The Government's case presented 
credible evidence that the Respondent had evidence that UC Patient Rix 
had received controlled substance prescriptions under the

[[Page 63143]]

Respondent's COR before he even met him, and ratified that decision 
when Schwartz (as Patient Rix) directly told him so. His response to 
this information was to prescribe even more controlled substances at a 
higher dosage level. UC Patients Hays and Barbaro received controlled 
substances under the Respondent's COR without meeting him at all. This 
evidence was presented at the hearing, yet the Respondent presented no 
evidence in contradiction or diminishment. No competent evidence was 
received that could sustain a finding that the Respondent did not know 
of the misconduct accomplished with his COR. On the facts of this case, 
where the supported allegations are of a nature that a registrant would 
be more likely than not to dispute them if untrue, an adverse inference 
based on the Respondent's silence is appropriate. Accordingly, as an 
evidentiary matter, it should be, and will be assumed that if the 
Respondent had contrary testimony to offer, he would have presented it, 
and that the Government has established, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that controlled substances were prescribed and dispensed 
under the Respondent's COR under circumstances where he knew it was 
done, and where he should have known it was done.

Readily Retrievable Records

    Accurate and reliable records are an obvious bedrock safeguard that 
is essential to ensure the integrity of the closed regulatory system. 
Because controlled substance activity is tracked through records, it 
can only be regulated by insisting on adequate documentation. Paperwork 
anomalies that could be viewed as minor infractions in other contexts 
rarely can be considered as such in this environment. In fact, it is no 
overstatement that adequate recordkeeping is a vital component to 
regulating activity related to controlled substances. A truly closed 
system requires not only that certain records and inventories be kept 
by all those registrants who either generate or take custody of 
controlled substances in any phase of the distribution chain until they 
reach the ultimate user, but that those documents be subject to 
periodic inspection and ready retrieval for that purpose. Registrants, 
such as the Respondent, who are authorized to dispense controlled 
substances are required to keep such records and to maintain them in a 
manner that is ``readily retrievable'' upon demand of those DEA 
officials charged with conducting inspections. See 21 C.F.R. Sec.  
1304.04(g) & (f)(2) (2011); see 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1304.03 (requiring 
recordkeeping set forth in Sec.  1304.04 for dispensing physicians). 
Readily retrievable is defined in the regulations as ``records kept * * 
* in such a manner that they can be separated out from all other 
records in a reasonable time * * *.'' 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1300.01(b)(38).
    At the hearing, DI Milan testified that the West Palm Beach 
Sheriff's Office seized records on February 23, 2011 pertaining to the 
Respondent, and that she was tasked with reviewing controlled substance 
transaction records associated with the Respondent's COR. Tr. 441-42. 
DI Milan further testified that, in her view, the Respondent's records 
were not readily retrievable, in contravention to applicable federal 
regulations. Tr. 442. However, DI Milan did not specify which records 
were not readily retrievable (or what regulation required them to be 
so). Furthermore, and more fundamentally, Milan acknowledged that no 
one ever asked the Respondent to produce any records. Tr. 444. It is 
not necessary, in this case, to reach a conclusion as to the reasonable 
parameters of when records can be accessed to meet the regulatory 
requirement of being ``readily retrievable,'' because the Respondent 
was never asked to retrieve any records. On these facts, where Milan 
testified that she had not reviewed all documents seized by the West 
Palm Beach Sherriff's Office from NPPM, and never made a demand of any 
kind for the production of any records from the Respondent, and was not 
present during the execution of the state criminal search warrant 
seizing the records that she reviewed, it would be illogical to find 
that the Respondent violated the requirement to have any records, much 
less that his records were unsatisfactory because they were not readily 
retrievable. Furthermore, the records were seized from NPPM five months 
after the Respondent was separated from his employment there. Tr. 441, 
473, 865, 892. There is no evidence as to who had access to the records 
during the five months that they were out of the Respondent's control. 
Under the circumstances present in this record, it would border upon 
the surreal to sustain a finding that records that were out of the 
Respondent's control for five months, never fully inventoried by the 
Government before, during, or after seizure, or ever even requested of 
the registrant, were absent or delinquent in that they were not 
maintained in a readily retrievable manner. See, e.g., Edmund Chein, 
M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6598 (2007) (recognizing that readily 
retrievable does not mean ``instantaneously produced'' and finding no 
basis to conclude that records and inventory records were not ``readily 
retrievable'' during inspection where evidence reflected neither how 
long DEA personnel waited for records nor total time present at 
clinic).

The Respondent's Prescribing and Dispensing

    While true that the CSA authorizes the ``regulat[ion] of medical 
practice so far as it bars doctors from using their prescription-
writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and 
trafficking as conventionally understood,'' Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 266-
67, an evaluation of cognizant state standards is essential, Joseph 
Gaudio, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 10083, 10090 (2009); Kamir Garces-Mejias, 
M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 54931, 54935 (2007); United Prescription Servs., 
Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 50397, 50407 (2007). In this adjudication, the 
evaluation of the Respondent's prescribing practices must be consistent 
with the CSA's recognition of state regulation of the medical 
profession and its bar on physicians from peddling to patients who 
crave drugs for prohibited uses. The analysis must be ``tethered 
securely'' to state law and federal regulations in application of the 
public interest factors, and may not be based on a mere disagreement 
between experts as to the most efficacious way to prescribe controlled 
substances to treat chronic pain sufferers. Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 
215, 223 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272, 274).
    Under the CSA, it is fundamental that a practitioner must establish 
and maintain a bona fide doctor-patient relationship in order to act 
``in the usual course of * * * professional practice'' and to issue a 
prescription for a legitimate medical purpose.'' Dewey C. Mackay, M.D., 
75 Fed. Reg. 49956, 49973 (2010); Stodola, 74 Fed. Reg. at 20731; 
Shyngle, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6057-58 (citing Moore, 423 U.S. at 141-43). 
The CSA generally looks to state law to determine whether a bona fide 
doctor-patient relationship was established and maintained. Stodola, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 20731; Shyngle, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6058; Garces-Mejias, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 54935; United Prescription Servs., 72 Fed. Reg. at 50407.
    Under Florida law, grounds for disciplinary action or denial of 
state licensure include ``prescribing * * * any controlled substance, 
other than in the course of the physician's professional practice,'' 
and prescribing such substances ``inappropriately or in excessive or 
inappropriate quantities [as it] is [presumed to] not [be] in the best 
interest of the patient and is not in the

[[Page 63144]]

course of the physician's professional practice, without regard to his 
or her intent.'' Fla. Stat. Sec.  458.331(1)(q) (2010). Florida law 
further provides that grounds for such disciplinary action also 
include:

Failing to keep legible, as defined by department rule in 
consultation with the board, medical records that identify the 
licensed physician * * * and that justify the course of treatment of 
the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories; 
examination results; test results; records of drugs prescribed, 
dispensed, or administered; and reports of consultations and 
hospitalizations.

Id. Sec.  458.331(1)(m).\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ An additional ground recently amended to the statute is 
failing to comply with the requirements of 21 U.S.C. Sec.  821 et 
seq. (Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act). Fla. Stat. Sec.  
458.331(1)(oo)(2010). However, the alleged conduct in this matter 
precedes the effective date of the amendment, October 1, 2010.

    In exercising its rulemaking function,\95\ the Florida Board of 
Medicine (Florida Board) promulgated a regulation addressing 
``Standards for Adequacy of Medical Records'' applicable to all 
physicians. Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 64B8-9.003 (2010). That regulation 
provides, in pertinent part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Rulemaking authority regarding the practice of medicine 
within the state of Florida has been delegated to the Florida Board 
of Medicine (Florida Board). Fla. Stat. Sec.  458.309(1) (2010).

(2) A licensed physician shall maintain patient medical records in 
English, in a legible manner and with sufficient detail to clearly 
demonstrate why the course of treatment was undertaken.
(3) The medical record shall contain sufficient information to 
identify the patient, support the diagnosis, justify the treatment 
and document the course and results of treatment accurately, by 
including, at a minimum, patient histories; examination results; 
test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed or 
administered; reports of consultations and hospitalizations; and 
copies of records or reports or other documentation obtained from 
other health care practitioners at the request of the physician and 
relied upon by the physician in determining the appropriate 
treatment of the patient.
(4) All entries made into the medical records shall be accurately 
dated and timed. Late entries are permitted, but must be clearly and 
accurately noted as late entries and dated and timed accurately when 
they are entered in to the record * * *.

Id.

    With respect to defining the parameters of what constitutes 
``professional practice'' in the context of pain management 
prescribing, Florida state law provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may 
prescribe or administer any controlled substance under Schedules II-
V * * * to a person for the treatment of intractable pain,\96\ 
provided the physician does so in accordance with that level of 
care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent 
physician under similar conditions and circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Florida defines ``intractable pain'' to mean ``pain for 
which, in the generally accepted course of medical practice, the 
cause cannot be removed and otherwise treated.'' Id. Sec.  
458.326(1).

Fla. Stat. Sec.  458.326. Moreover, the Florida Board has adopted,\97\ 
albeit in modified version, the Model Policy for the Use of Controlled 
Substances for the Treatment of Pain (Model Policy), a document drafted 
by the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) to provide 
professional guidelines for the treatment of pain with controlled 
substances. The standards adopted by Florida share the key tenants of 
the Model Policy's standards for pain management prescribing, including 
the emphasis on diligent efforts by physicians to prevent drug 
diversion, prescribing based on clear documentation of unrelieved pain 
and thorough medical records, and compliance with applicable federal 
and state law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Pursuant to authority vested in the Florida Board by the 
Florida legislature specifically to promulgate rules regarding state 
standards for pain management clinical practice. Id. Sec.  
458.309(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the Model Policy, which was promulgated ``to encourage the 
legitimate medical uses of controlled substances for the treatment of 
pain while stressing the need to safeguard against abuse and 
diversion,'' Florida's regulation providing ``Standards for the Use of 
Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain'' (Florida Standards), 
Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 64B8-9.013, recognizes that ``inappropriate 
prescribing of controlled substances * * * may lead to drug diversion 
and abuse by individuals who seek them for other than legitimate 
medical use,'' id. at 9.013(d). The language employed by the regulation 
under the preamble section titled ``Pain [M]anagement [P]rinciples'' 
makes clear that the standards ``are not intended to define complete or 
best practice, but rather to communicate what the [Florida Board] 
considers to be within the boundaries of professional practice'' 
(emphasis supplied), id. at 9.013(1)(g); thus, the plain text supports 
an inference that the standards provide the minimum requirements for 
establishing conduct that comports with the professional practice of 
controlled substance-based pain management within the state. Likewise, 
the level of integral range of acceptable practice that is built into 
the regulation underscores the importance of seeking an expert 
professional opinion in reaching a correct adjudication of whether a 
registrant has met the applicable Florida standard. It is clear that in 
assessing whether the controlled substance prescribing practices of a 
Florida practitioner fall within the acceptable range of what 
constitutes within the bounds of being ``issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice,'' \98\ on the facts presented 
here,\99\ input from an expert witness was helpful in some respects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ 21 C.F.R. Sec.  1306.04(a).
    \99\ Although the Agency has acknowledged the directive from the 
federal courts that a mere disagreement between experts cannot, 
standing alone, ordinarily form the basis of an adverse action 
against a practitioner's privilege to handle control substances, 
Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 223 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales, 
546 U.S. at 272, 274), it has also stated that expert testimony is 
not mandated ``[w]here, for example, the Government produces 
evidence of undercover visits showing that a physician knowingly 
engaged in outright drug deals * * *.'' Cadet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19450 
n.3; R. Dreszer, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19434 n.3; Aruta, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
19420 n.3; J. Dreszer, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19386-87 n.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Florida Standards direct that ``[p]hysicians should be diligent 
in preventing the diversion of drugs for illegitimate purposes,'' id. 
at 9.013(1)(d), and provide that the prescribing of controlled 
substances for pain will be considered

To be for a legitimate medical purpose if based on accepted 
scientific knowledge of the treatment of pain or if based on sound 
clinical grounds. All such prescribing must be based on clear 
documentation of unrelieved pain and in compliance with applicable 
state or federal law.

Id. at 9.013(1)(e) (emphasis supplied).

    The Florida Standards further provide that the validity of 
prescribing will be judged ``based on the physician's treatment of the 
patient and on available documentation, rather than on the quantity and 
chronicity of prescribing'' (emphasis supplied). Id. at 9.013(1)(g). 
Furthermore, the Standards advise that physicians should not fear 
disciplinary action for ``prescribing * * * controlled substances * * * 
for a legitimate medical purpose and that is supported by appropriate 
documentation establishing a valid medical need and treatment plan'' 
(emphasis supplied), or ``for failing to adhere strictly to the 
provisions of these standards, if good cause is shown for such 
deviation.'' Id. at 9.013(1)(b), (f) (emphasis supplied).
    Although, as discussed above, the Florida Board instituted general 
guidance applicable to all physicians regarding medical records, it 
also promulgated a separate set of documentation requirements in the 
Florida Standards applicable

[[Page 63145]]

specifically to those physicians who prescribe controlled substances in 
the pain-management context. The Florida Standards, under the 
subheading ``Medical Records,'' state that ``[t]he physician is 
required to keep accurate and complete records'' (emphasis supplied) 
including, though not limited to:

1. The medical history and physical examination, including history 
of drug abuse or dependence, as appropriate;
2. Diagnostic, therapeutic, and laboratory results;
3. Evaluations and consultations;
4. Treatment objectives;
5. Discussion of risks and benefits;
6. Treatments;
7. Medications (including date, type, dosage, and quantity 
prescribed);
8. Instructions and agreements; and
9. Periodic reviews.

Id. at 9.013(3)(f). The same section directs that ``[r]ecords must 
remain current and be maintained in an acceptable manner and readily 
available for review.'' Id.

    The Florida Standards similarly emphasize the need for proper 
documentation in the patient evaluation context by specifying:

A complete\100\ medical history and physical examination must be 
conducted and documented in the medical record. The medical record 
should document the nature and intensity of the pain, current and 
past treatments for pain, underlying or coexisting diseases or 
conditions, the effect of the pain on physical and psychological 
function, and history of substance abuse. The medical record also 
should document the presence of one or more recognized medical 
indications for the use of a controlled substance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ The original Model Policy version of the guidelines does 
not contain a reference to the need for a complete medical history, 
instead only requiring a medical history generally. Thus, the 
Florida Board has adopted a higher standard than the measure that 
has been set in the Model Policy by the FSMB.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Id. at 9.013(3)(a).

    Furthermore, the Florida Standards require a written treatment plan 
that ``should state objectives that will be used to determine treatment 
success, such as pain relief and improved physical and psychosocial 
function, and should indicate if any further diagnostic evaluations or 
other treatments are planned.'' Id. at 9.013(3)(b). Subsequent to the 
initiation of treatment, ``the physician should adjust drug therapy to 
the individual medical needs of each patient. Other treatment 
modalities or a rehabilitation program may be necessary depending on 
the etiology of the pain and the extent to which the pain is associated 
with physical and psychosocial impairment.'' Id. (emphasis supplied).
    Another standard adopted by the Florida Board, under the subheading 
``Informed Consent and Agreement for Treatment,'' is the directive that

[T]he physician should discuss the risks and benefits of the use of 
controlled substances with the patient, persons designated by the 
patient, or with the patient's surrogate or guardian if the patient 
is incompetent. The patient should receive prescriptions from one 
physician and one pharmacy where possible. If the patient is 
determined to be at high risk for medication abuse or have a history 
of substance abuse, the physician should employ the use of a written 
agreement between physician and patient outlining patient 
responsibilities, including, but not limited to:
1. Urine/serum medication levels screening when requested;
2. Number and frequency of all prescription refills; and
3. Reasons for which drug therapy may be discontinued (i.e., 
violation of agreement).

Id. at 9.003(3)(c).

    The Florida Standards contain a further requirement to periodically 
review ``the course of pain treatment and any new information about the 
etiology of the pain.'' Id. at 9.013(3)(d). The Florida Standards 
explain the importance of periodic review in the following manner:

Continuation or modification of therapy should depend on the 
physician's evaluation of the patient's progress. If treatment goals 
are not being achieved, despite medication adjustments, the 
physician should reevaluate the appropriateness of continued 
treatment. The physician should monitor patient compliance in 
medication usage and related treatment plans.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

--------Under the subheading ``Consultation,'' the Florida Board 
promulgated the instruction that

[t]he physician should be willing to refer the patient as necessary 
for additional evaluation and treatment in order to achieve 
treatment objectives. Special attention should be given to those 
pain patients who are at risk for misusing their medications and 
those whose living arrangements pose a risk for medication misuse or 
diversion. The management of pain in patients with a history of 
substance abuse or with a comorbid psychiatric disorder requires 
extra care, monitoring, and documentation, and may require 
consultation with or referral to an expert in the management of such 
patients.

Id. at 9.013(3)(e).

    It is abundantly clear from the plain language of the Florida 
Standards that the Florida Board places critical emphasis on physician 
implementation of adequate safeguards in their practice to minimize 
diversion and the need to document the objective signs and rationale 
employed in the course of pain treatment utilizing the prescription of 
controlled substances, as well as documentation regarding risks, 
benefits, and side effects of prescribed medications. Conscientious, 
legible documentation is repeatedly emphasized as not just a 
ministerial act, but a key treatment tool and a vital indicator to 
evaluate whether the physician's prescribing practices are ``within the 
usual course of professional practice.''
    In Sergio Rodriguez, M.D., Fla. Bd. of Med., No. 2008-20504 (Jan. 
7, 2011), the Florida Board considered a case with many striking 
similarities to the case presented here. In Rodriguez, the respondent-
practitioner had repeatedly seen an undercover agent, and without the 
benefit of a physical examination, medical history, tests, or treatment 
plan, and with incomplete and incorrect documentation, prescribed 
controlled substances. The Board adopted the state Administrative Law 
Judge's conclusion that the doctor's ``relationship with [the 
undercover patient] consisted solely of his writing prescriptions for 
controlled substances [and found that the doctor] was not prescribing 
these medications in the course of his professional practice.'' Id., 
ALJ Dec. at 14.
    The Government's evidence establishes that the Respondent issued 
controlled substance prescriptions to undercover law enforcement 
personnel posing as patients and other patients at his Florida office 
beginning in October 2009 and continuing until August 2010. As 
discussed at length elsewhere in this decision, in addition to the fact 
that controlled substances were prescribed and dispensed to patients 
without the Respondent even meeting them, the physical examinations 
were either cursory or non-existent, and the histories and 
documentation were inconsistent, incomplete, for the most part abjectly 
illegible, woefully inadequate, and frequently outright false. Much 
like the evidence that sustained the criminal conviction in Moore,\101\ 
the examinations were inadequate and the patient records are devoid of 
any indication that steps were taken to safeguard against misuse and 
diversion. The uncontroverted and persuasive testimony of the 
Government's expert, Dr. Rubenstein, established, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the Respondent's prescribing practices fell well 
below the applicable standard in Florida regarding the controlled 
substances prescribed and dispensed to the undercover agents,

[[Page 63146]]

as well as to the patients whose charts he reviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ 423 U.S. at 142-43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On this record, the Government has established that the Respondent 
employed his COR and/or allowed/enabled others to do so in a manner 
where controlled substances were prescribed and dispensed for other 
than a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of 
professional practice, based on the absence of acceptable physician-
patient relationships and even minimal due care in documentation as 
those concepts are dealt with under federal and Florida state law.

Ryan Haight Act

    Under the Ryan Haight Act, it is a violation of federal law to 
``deliver[], distribute[], or dispense[]\102\ a controlled substance by 
means of the Internet without a valid prescription.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec.  
829(e). For a prescription to be valid under the meaning of this 
provision, it must have been ``issued for a legitimate medical purpose 
in the usual course of professional practice by * * * a practitioner 
who has conducted at least one in-person medical evaluation of the 
patient.\103\ Id. An in-person medical evaluation is defined as ``a 
medical evaluation that is conducted with the patient in the physical 
presence of the practitioner, without regard to whether portions of the 
evaluation are conducted by other health professionals.'' Id. at Sec.  
(2)(B)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ The statutory definition of the term ``dispense'' includes 
the prescribing and administering of controlled substances. 21 
U.S.C. Sec.  802(10).
    \103\ Provisions of the law dealing with the authorization of a 
``covering practitioner'' and ``telemedicine'' practice have no 
applicability to the facts developed at this hearing. See id. at 
Sec. Sec.  2(A)(ii), (C), 3(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Government alleged that the Respondent issued ``controlled 
substance prescriptions to patents in states other than Florida and 
that the controlled substances were being shipped into the resident 
state of these patients and that this was being accomplished in 
violation of the Ryan Haight Act and [sic] in 21 U.S.C. Sec.  829(e).'' 
ALJ Ex. 6 at 6. As it unfolded at the hearing, the Government's 
evidence sought to establish that the Respondent issued controlled 
substance prescriptions to twenty-eight out-of-state individuals in 
fourteen states without providing an in-person physical examination to 
a single one. Gov't Ex. 37. Without question, to the extent that these 
prescriptions were issued without the benefit of an in-person physical 
examination, their issuance would constitute violations of the CSA as 
amended by the Ryan Haight Act, as well as the laws of many of the 
states where they were received by the end users. Without physical 
examinations, the Respondent may well have violated state prescribing 
proscriptions in several states, including (but not limited to) 
Alabama,\104\ California,\105\ Illinois,\106\ Louisiana,\107\ 
Mississippi,\108\ and others. It is also unquestionably true that these 
controlled substance prescriptions were issued by the Respondent in a 
sufficiently high number and in a relatively brief period such that the 
evidence would be more than ample to support the adverse COR action 
sought by the Government in this matter. However, the Government's 
allegation that the Respondent prescribed controlled substances 
contrary to the Ryan Haight Act was dependent upon it establishing that 
the Respondent prescribed anabolic steroids without providing a 
physical examination and without a legitimate doctor-patient 
relationship. The only evidence tending to support that possibility was 
the shipping information of the steroids to arguably remote 
destinations outside Florida. However, evidence which may provide ample 
underpinnings to sustain a reasonable suspicion is not the same quantum 
required to support a finding of substantial evidence. Under the 
substantial evidence test, the evidence, such as the circumstantial 
evidence here, must ``do more than create a suspicion of the existence 
of the fact to be established.'' Alvin Darby, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 26993, 
26999 n.31 (2010) (quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 
306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)). Here, there is a missing link. There is no 
evidence that a single patient that received a controlled substance 
under the Respondent's COR outside the state of Florida was not 
examined by him. It is not that evidence was presented and found 
lacking; it is that no evidence was presented on the issue at all. A 
Ryan Haight violation sustained under the evidence presented would 
allow the Government to establish that no in-person physical 
examination occurred based on shipping label addresses and double 
hearsay business practice testimony from a diversion investigator who 
interviewed an individual who was an employee of a now-defunct company 
who did business with the Internet providers. In short, on the present 
record, it would be tantamount to sustaining a Ryan Haight violation 
based upon the mere fact that controlled substances were shipped to 
locations outside the registrant's home state. Unlike other similar 
cases, no documentary or reliable testimonial evidence was introduced 
regarding the nature of the Respondent's relationship with the Internet 
providers. While an adverse inference based on the Respondent's failure 
to testify is admittedly a possible evidentiary mechanism available to 
the Government on these facts, such an inference should not, on the 
present record, be utilized to establish an element upon which the 
Government presented no evidence.\109\ Thus, the record compels a 
finding that the Government did not establish a violation of the Ryan 
Haight Act.
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    \104\ Ala. Code Sec. Sec.  34-24-50(1), -51, -53, -343, -501, -
502(a) (2010); Ala. Admin. Code r. 540-x-9-.11 (2010).
    \105\ Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. Sec.  2052, 2060, 2242, 2242.1 
(West 2010); Carlos Gustavo Levy (Med. Bd. of Cal. Jan. 28, 2003) 
(citation order); Carlos Gustavo Levy (Med. Bd. of Cal. Nov. 30, 
2001) (citation order); Joan Jerzak, Drugs on the Information 
Highway, 88 Med. Bd. of Cal. Action Rep., Feb. 2004, at 4, available 
at http://www.medbd.ca.gov/licensee/internet_prescribing.html.
    \106\ 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/49, 49.5 (2010).
    \107\ La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec.  37:1262, 37:1271, 37:1290, 
40:1238.4 (2010); La. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, Statement of Position on 
Internet/Telephonic Prescribing (2000), http://www.lsbme.louisiana.gov/Statements%20of%20Position/InternetTelephonicPrescribing.pdf.
    \108\ Miss. Code Ann. Sec. Sec.  73-25-1, -25-34, -43-11 (West 
2010); 30-17 Miss. Code R. Sec.  1:21(100), (102) (LexisNexis 2010).
    \109\ Inasmuch as the Ryan Haight Act became effective on April 
13, 2009, the interpretive precedent regarding the law is 
predictably still in its nascent stages. It would not be 
unreasonable for the Agency to interpret the statute in such a way 
that a clear and convincing demonstration on the part of the 
Government that a practitioner has caused controlled substances 
prescribed and/or dispensed under his or her COR to be shipped to a 
remote, out-of-state location from the COR registered address would 
result in a burden of production on the part of the registrant to 
demonstrate that an in-person physical examination had been 
conducted. However, as of the date of this recommended decision, the 
Agency has not yet had the opportunity to evaluate the issue in this 
context.
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Factors 2, 4, and 5 Considered

    The Government's evidence under these factors, as discussed above, 
present something of a mixed bag. On the one hand, there is 
insufficient evidence to support its allegations that the Respondent 
failed to maintain required records in a readily retrievable manner, in 
violation of regulatory requirements to do so, or its allegations that 
the Respondent prescribed in violation of the Ryan Haight Act. Thus, 
the evidence introduced on these issues, like the statistical data 
elicited through the head of its ARCOS Unit, does not impact a 
consideration of Factors 2, 4, or 5 (or any other relevant 
consideration in these proceedings) in any way.
    On the other hand, the Government's evidence does establish that 
the Respondent was profoundly delinquent

[[Page 63147]]

in his responsibilities as a DEA registrant. He prescribed and 
dispensed controlled substances in the face of direct proof that others 
at NPPM were utilizing his COR to prescribe and dispense controlled 
pain medications and steroids. The evidence supports a finding that he 
knew that NPPM functionaries were busily prescribing and dispensing 
controlled substances under his COR while the enterprise compensated 
him as an employee. Under these conditions, the Respondent's salary 
appears, in many ways, to have been tantamount to the price of his 
complicity or willful ignorance. Patients were receiving dangerous and 
potentially addictive controlled substances while the Respondent was 
not present. The patient charts reviewed by the Government's expert 
demonstrated that the Respondent has been unwilling to take his 
responsibilities as a registrant regarding documented analysis related 
to the professional utilization and control of controlled substances in 
any way seriously. The patient charts maintained on the UCs contained 
out-and-out falsehoods. Most of the chart notes were illegible. The 
prescribing done by and allowed by the Respondent in the absence of 
valid physician-patient relationships, like the poor documentation in 
his charts, was done in violation of federal and state law, fell below 
the standard expected of a practitioner in the Florida, and resulted in 
the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances outside the 
course of a professional practice and for illegitimate purposes. 21 
C.F.R. Sec.  1306.04(a). Consideration of the evidence of record under 
Factors 2 and 4 militate powerfully in favor of revocation.
    The Fifth statutory factor, which plays a critical role in a 
disposition of this case given the facts presented, permits the 
Administrator to consider ``other conduct which may threaten the public 
health and safety.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec.  823(f)(5). Under current Agency 
precedent, this factor has been held to be sufficiently broad as to 
encompass ``conduct which creates a probable or possible threat * * * 
to public health and safety. Cadet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19450 n.3; R. 
Dreszer, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19434 n.3; Aruta, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19420 n.3; 
J. Dreszer, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19386-87 n.3.
    The Respondent has used his COR, and allowed it to be used, in a 
manner where controlled substances were provided to individuals he 
never met, and where he has failed to provide even the most basic 
documentation to support his prescribing and dispensing. He has acted 
in a manner that was contrary to the most bedrock obligations attendant 
upon a registrant to guard against diversion, and has committed and 
endured conduct that allowed and facilitated powerful, addictive 
controlled substances to be prescribed and distributed without the 
benefits of the basic safeguards required to ensure a closed regulatory 
system. His actions created an environment where individuals were 
receiving potentially dangerous controlled substances without regard to 
whether such substances were medically required or in the best 
interests of the patients. Simply put, the Respondent has endangered 
the public and this factor militates strongly in favor or revocation.

Recommendation

    Based on the foregoing, the evidence supports a finding that the 
Government has established that the Respondent has committed acts that 
are inconsistent with the public interest. In cases, such as the 
present case, where the Government has made out a prima facie case that 
the Respondent has committed acts that render his continued 
registration inconsistent with the public interest, Agency precedent 
has firmly placed acknowledgement of guilt and acceptance of 
responsibility as conditions precedent to merit the continued status as 
a registrant and avoid revocation. Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Ronald Lynch, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 78745, 78749 (2010) 
(Respondent's attempts to minimize misconduct held to undermine 
acceptance of responsibility); George Mathew, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 
66140, 66145, 66148 (2010); George C. Aycock, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 17529, 
17543 (2009); Steven M. Abbadessa, D.O., 74 Fed. Reg. 10077, 10078 
(2009); Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459, 463 (2009); 
Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 387 (2008). Here, the 
Respondent has not accepted responsibility for his actions, expressed 
remorse for his conduct at any level, or presented a shred of evidence 
that could reasonably support a finding that the Administrator should 
continue to entrust him with a Certificate of Registration. Under 
current Agency precedent, the evidence of record compels a 
recommendation that the Government's petition to revoke the 
Respondent's registration be sustained.
    Accordingly, the Respondent's Certificate of Registration should be 
REVOKED, and any pending renewal applications should be DENIED.

Dated: July 18, 2011.
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JOHN J. MULROONEY, II

Chief Administrative Law Judge
[FR Doc. 2011-26070 Filed 10-7-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P