[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 139 (Wednesday, July 20, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43319-43324]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-18312]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-12 
National Security Complex

AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of Decision 
(ROD) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee based on information and analyses contained in the Final 
Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security 
Complex, DOE/EIS-0387 (Y-12 Final SWEIS, Y-12 SWEIS or 2011 Y-12 SWEIS) 
issued on March 4, 2011; comments on the Draft and Final Y-12 SWEIS; 
and other factors, including costs, security considerations and the 
missions of NNSA. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS analyzes the potential 
environmental impacts for ongoing and reasonably foreseeable future 
operations

[[Page 43320]]

and activities at Y-12, including alternatives for changes to site 
infrastructure and levels of operation. Five alternatives are analyzed 
in this Y-12 SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative (maintain the status 
quo); (2) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Alternative; (3) Upgrade-
in-Place Alternative; (4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative; and (5) No 
Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative. Both the Draft and the 
Y-12 Final SWEISs identified the Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
(Alternative 4) as NNSA's preferred alternative. NNSA has decided to 
select Alternative 4, to continue operation of Y-12, and to construct 
and operate one new facility--a Capability-sized UPF. A separate 
decision may be made at a later date regarding whether to construct and 
operate a Complex Command Center (CCC).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 2011 Y-
12 SWEIS or this ROD, or to receive a copy of this SWEIS or ROD, 
contact: Ms. Pam Gorman, Y-12 SWEIS Document Manager, U.S. Department 
of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Y-12 Site Office, 
P.O. Box 2050, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, (865) 576-9903. For information on 
the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact: Ms. 
Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-
54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756. Additional information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access 
to many DOE NEPA documents, including the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, are 
available on the Internet through the DOE NEPA Web site at: http://nepa.energy.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Y-12 is one of three primary installations on the DOE Oak Ridge 
Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The other installations are 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the East Tennessee Technology 
Park (formerly the Oak Ridge K-25 Site). As one of the NNSA production 
facilities, Y-12 is the primary site for enriched uranium processing 
and storage, and one of the manufacturing facilities for maintaining 
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Y-12 is unique in that it is the 
only source within the NNSA nuclear security enterprise for certain 
mission critical nuclear weapons components. Y-12 also dismantles 
weapons components, safely and securely stores and manages special 
nuclear material (SNM), supplies SNM for use in naval and research 
reactors, and dispositions surplus materials. Y-12 nuclear 
nonproliferation programs play a critical role in securing our nation 
and the world and combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
by removing, securing, and dispositioning SNM, and down-blending 
weapons-grade materials to non-weapons forms suitable for use in 
commercial reactors. Y-12 also conducts nondefense-related activities 
including: environmental monitoring, remediation, and decontamination 
and decommissioning activities of the DOE Environmental Management 
Program; managing waste materials from past and current operations; 
supporting the production of medical isotopes; and developing highly 
specialized technologies to support the capabilities of the U.S. 
industrial base.
    NNSA prepared the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS and this ROD pursuant to the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for 
implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing 
Procedures (10 CFR part 1021).
    The process for preparing the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS began on November 28, 
2005, when NNSA published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal 
Register (70 FR 71270), announcing its intent to prepare this Y-12 
SWEIS. NNSA distributed the Draft Y-12 SWEIS in October 2009. The 
public comment period for the Draft Y-12 SWEIS began on October 30, 
2009, with publication of the Environmental Protection Agency's Notice 
of Availability in the Federal Register (74 FR 56189). That notice 
invited public comment on the Draft Y-12 SWEIS through January 4, 2010. 
During the comment period, two public hearings were held in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, on November 17 and 18, 2009. At the first hearing, NNSA 
announced an extension of the comment period until January 29, 2010. 
That announcement was formalized with a notice in the Federal Register 
on December 28, 2009 (74 FR 68599). Following issuance of the Draft 
SWEIS, NNSA determined that a Haul Road was needed to support UPF 
construction. The Final SWEIS also includes information and analysis of 
a Haul Road extension corridor for the UPF, including a detailed 
Wetlands Assessment that was prepared in accordance with 10 CFR part 
1022. This Assessment is contained in Appendix G of the Final SWEIS. 
Comments received on the Haul Road and Wetlands Assessment were 
addressed in the Final SWEIS.

Alternatives Considered

    The No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) for the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS 
is the continued implementation of the 2002 ROD (67 FR 11296), which 
was based on the Final SWEIS for the Y-12 National Security Complex 
(DOE/EIS-0309), and modified by subsequent NEPA decisions. Four action 
alternatives are considered in this SWEIS in addition to the No Action 
Alternative: UPF Alternative (Alternative 2); Upgrade-in-Place 
Alternative (Alternative 3); Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
(Alternative 4); and No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
(Alternative 5). The four action alternatives differ in that: 
Alternative 2 involves a new, fully modernized manufacturing facility 
(the UPF) optimized for safety, security and efficiency; Alternative 3 
involves upgrading the existing facilities to attain the highest level 
of safety, security, and efficiency possible without constructing new 
production facilities; and both Alternatives 4 and 5 involve 
constructing a UPF that would be approximately 10 percent smaller than 
the UPF assessed for Alternative 2. Alternatives 4 and 5 would also 
result in reductions in the production capability level at Y-12 to 
support the requirements of a smaller stockpile. Alternative 4 analyzes 
a production capability level equivalent to approximately 80 
secondaries and cases per year and Alternative 5 analyzes a production 
capability level equivalent to approximately 10 secondaries and cases 
per year. The construction and operation of a CCC, which would provide 
a new Emergency Services Complex for Y-12 is analyzed for Alternatives 
2-5.

Preferred Alternative

    As discussed in Section 3.6 of the Y-12 Final SWEIS, NNSA 
identified the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4) as its 
preferred alternative in both the Draft and the Final Y-12 SWEIS.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    Considering the many environmental facets of the alternatives 
analyzed in the Y-12 Final SWEIS, and looking out over the long term, 
NNSA believes that the No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF 
Alternative (Alternative 5) would be the environmentally preferable 
alternative. Replacing older, inefficient facilities with new 
facilities that incorporate modern safety, security and efficiency 
standards, would improve Y-12's ability to protect human health and the 
environment. Modernizing and

[[Page 43321]]

replacing older facilities with more energy efficient and 
environmentally-protective facilities would minimize environmental 
impacts compared to the No Action and Upgrade in Place Alternatives. 
Under Alternative 5, NNSA would minimize the use of electricity and 
water, improve health and safety for workers and the public, streamline 
operations through consolidation, and reduce the resource consumption 
``footprint'' of Y-12. Operating at a reduced production level would 
minimize the volume of all classes of waste generated at Y-12. NNSA 
notes that the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4) would 
result in environmental benefits of a similar nature as those 
associated with Alternative 5, but to a slightly reduced extent due to 
the higher level of operations associated with Alternative 4.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    NNSA analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on: Land 
use; visual resources; site infrastructure; traffic and transportation; 
geology and soils; air quality and noise; greenhouse gases; water 
resources; wetlands; ecological resources; threatened and endangered 
species; cultural resources; socioeconomics; environmental justice; 
human health and safety; waste management; facility accidents; and 
intentional destructive acts. NNSA also evaluated the potential impacts 
of each alternative as to irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources, and the relationship between short-term uses of the 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity. In addition, NNSA evaluated the impact of potential 
accidents at Y-12 on workers and surrounding populations. These 
analyses and results are described in the Summary and chapters 4 and 5 
of the SWEIS. In a classified appendix, NNSA evaluated the potential 
impacts of intentional destructive acts that might occur at Y-12.

Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

    NNSA distributed more than 500 copies of the Y-12 Final SWEIS to 
Congressional members and committees, the State of Tennessee, local 
governments, other Federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
and individuals. Additionally, the Y-12 Final SWEIS is, available 
electronically via the Internet at http://nepa.energy.gov.
    Following publication of the Y-12 Final SWEIS in March 2011, and 
prior to issuing this ROD, NNSA received three comment documents 
related to the Y-12 Final SWEIS. Two of the three documents were 
submitted by the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (OREPA) on 
April 1, 2011 and April 4, 2011, and the third was submitted on April 
4, 2011 by the following organizations: Southwest Research and 
Information Center, Tri-Valley CAREs, Friends of the Earth, Nuclear 
Watch of New Mexico, Fernald Residents for Environmental Safety and 
Health, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, JustPeace, Cumberland Countians 
for Peace and Justice, Network for Environmental and Economic 
Responsibility, and Nukewatch. The Appendix to this ROD identifies the 
comments contained in these three documents and provides NNSA's 
responses. NNSA has concluded that none of the comments received 
necessitate further NEPA analysis.

Decision

    NNSA has decided to select the Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
(Alternative 4). Under this Alternative, NNSA will continue to operate 
Y-12 to meet the stockpile stewardship mission critical activities 
assigned to the site. NNSA will also construct and operate a 
Capability-sized UPF at Y-12 adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium 
Materials Facility (HEUMF) and consolidate its enriched uranium 
operations. This new facility is described in Section 1.4.4 of the Y-12 
Final SWEIS. NNSA will reduce the production capability level of 
facilities that support NNSA's stockpile stewardship mission to a level 
that equates to approximately 80 secondaries and cases per year 
(compared to a capability level that equates to 125 secondaries and 
cases per year for Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 and a capability level that 
equates to 10 secondaries and cases per year for Alternative 5). This 
alternative also includes continuing operations related to other NNSA 
National Security Programs, such as Nonproliferation, Global Threat 
Reduction Initiatives, and support to Naval Reactors. Under this 
alternative, activities conducted at Y-12 under non-NNSA Programs such 
as the Complementary Work/Work for Others Program, Environmental 
Management Programs, Non-defense Research and Development Program and 
Complementary Work/Technology Program would also continue. These 
programs, their missions and their major activities are described in 
Chapter 2 of the Final Y-12 SWEIS. Additionally, NNSA has decided, for 
the time being, to defer making a decision regarding the construction 
and operation of the CCC. At an appropriate time, a separate decision 
will be made regarding whether to construct and operate a CCC.

Basis for Decision

    NNSA's decisions are based on its mission responsibilities and its 
need to sustain Y-12's ability to operate in a manner that allows it to 
fulfill its existing responsibilities in an environmentally sound, 
timely, and fiscally prudent manner. National security policies require 
NNSA to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile as well as its 
core technical competencies and capabilities. Y-12's operations support 
a wide range of scientific and technological capabilities for NNSA's 
national security missions, including nonproliferation.
    The benefits of implementing the Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
include reliable, long-term, consolidated enriched uranium processing 
capability for the nuclear security enterprise with modern technologies 
and facilities; improved security posture for SNM; reduced accident 
risks; improved health and safety for workers and the public; improved 
operational efficiency; and reductions in the cost of operating and 
maintaining key site facilities. The UPF will replace multiple aging 
facilities with a modern facility that will be synergistic with the new 
HEUMF to provide a robust SNM capability and improve responsiveness, 
flexibility, and efficiency of operations.
    Significant improvements in operation and maintenance costs and 
operational efficiency can be expected from a new Capability-sized UPF. 
These improvements include plans for installing new, reliable equipment 
which is expected to, greatly reduce the need for major corrective 
maintenance (e.g., less than half of the existing casting furnaces are 
normally available because of reliability problems). In addition, 
security improvements will be an integral part of the new facility, 
reducing the number of personnel required to protect material. It is 
also expected that the inventory cycle can be greatly reduced because 
of more effective means of real-time inventory controls. A more 
efficient facility layout is expected to decrease material handling 
steps and reduce intra-plant transfers.
    With the consolidation of SNM operations, incorporation of integral 
security systems, and the 90 percent reduction of the protected area, 
the security posture will be greatly improved under the Capability-
sized UPF Alternative. The use of engineered controls to reduce 
reliance on administrative controls and personal

[[Page 43322]]

protection equipment to protect workers will improve worker health and 
safety. In addition, use of new technologies and processes may 
eliminate the need for some hazardous materials, reduce emissions, and 
minimize wastes. Cost savings and cost avoidances are expected to 
include the following:
     Savings from consolidation related to right-sizing of 
facilities/footprint, more efficient operations, and simplification of 
SNM movement;
     Operating and maintenance cost reductions of approximately 
33 percent from current operations;
     Reducing the footprint of the Perimeter Intrusion 
Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) protected area by 90 percent 
(from 150 acres to about 15 acres), which will allow better 
concentration of the protective force over a smaller area; and
     Reducing the number of workers required to access the 
protected area, which will improve the productivity of workers assigned 
to non-SNM activities that are currently located in the protected area. 
By reducing the size of the PIDAS, it is forecast that approximately 
600 fewer employees will have to enter the PIDAS. An improvement in 
efficiency of up to 20 percent in non-SNM operations, including 
environmental clean-up projects, could be realized by avoiding the 
access requirements and restrictions of the PIDAS. Projects that 
support non-SNM operations will be less expensive because of improved 
productivity.

Mitigation Measures for the Capability-sized UPF Alternative 
(Alternative 4)

    As described in the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, Y-12 operates in compliance 
with environmental laws, regulations, and policies within a framework 
of contractual requirements. Many of these contractual requirements 
mandate controls and actions intended to protect human health and the 
environment as well as limit and mitigate potential adverse 
environmental effects. Examples include the Environment, Safety, and 
Health Manual, Integrated Safety Management System, emergency plans, 
pollution prevention and waste minimization programs. NNSA and Y-12 
will continue to impose contractual requirements for actions necessary 
to comply with these or similar controls.
    Mitigation measures are included in the UPF project design and are 
integral components of the project to be implemented during the 
construction project with all necessary funding provided by the 
project. Mitigation measures specific to the UPF project include the 
wetlands and stream mitigations described in Section 4.3 of Appendix G. 
Other mitigation measures are identified in the Y-12 Final SWEIS 
(Chapter 5) and NNSA will impose all mitigation commitments associated 
with the Capability-sized UPF Alternative by including these measures 
in all appropriate contractual documents and providing oversight to 
ensure that the commitments are met. Monitoring of project activities 
will occur through NNSA oversight which ensures fulfillment of imposed 
requirements so that potential conditions adverse to quality, security, 
safety health, and environment are promptly identified and actions are 
taken to correct the conditions and prevent recurrence.

Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

Appendix to the Y-12 SWEIS ROD

    Following publication of the Final Site-Wide Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE/EIS-
0387 (Y-12 Final SWEIS or 2011 Y-12 SWEIS) in March 2011, and prior 
to issuing of this Record of Decision (ROD), the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) received three comment documents 
related to the Y-12 Final SWEIS. These comments were received 
outside of the public comment period established by NNSA for 
consideration of the SWEIS. However, NNSA endeavors to consider all 
public comments where reasonably practicable, even when not 
obligated to do so by the requirements of NEPA and the DOE and CEQ 
regulations.
    As discussed below, the comments raised in the three documents 
were largely similar to, and in many cases identical to comments 
that were submitted on the Draft Y-12 SWEIS, and to which NNSA 
responded in the Y-12 Final SWEIS. Listed below is a summary of the 
major comments contained in these three documents, along with NNSA's 
response to these comments.
    Comment 1. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS is not a site-wide EIS and 
focused almost exclusively on two proposed DOE actions--construction 
of a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the construction of a 
Complex Command Center (CCC).
    Response. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS provides a comprehensive analysis 
of the current environmental situation at Y-12, and of ongoing and 
reasonably foreseeable future operations and activities at existing 
and proposed facilities. The SWEIS includes an analysis of all 
proposed actions and reasonable alternatives ripe for analysis and 
decisionmaking. The SWEIS was prepared by NNSA in accordance with 
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations. In preparing the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, 
NNSA used current and well-documented, well-known scientific models 
and data to analyze potential environmental impacts. Consequently, 
NNSA disagrees that the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS is not a site-wide EIS.
    In addition to analyzing all current, ongoing and reasonably 
foreseeable operations and activities at Y-12 that support NNSA's 
stockpile stewardship and nonproliferation missions, the 2011 Y-12 
SWEIS includes an analysis of constructing and operating a UPF at Y-
12 in accordance with NNSA's decision to pursue such a facility in 
the ROD (73 FR 77644) for the Complex Transformation Supplemental 
PEIS (SPEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236-S4). The SWEIS includes an analysis of 
constructing and operating a CCC at Y-12 because NNSA is considering 
this facility as a replacement for existing facilities that house 
equipment and personnel for the plant shift superintendent, fire 
department, and emergency operations center. Analyzing reasonably 
foreseeable project-specific actions in a SWEIS, such as the 
construction and operation of a UPF or CCC, is appropriate. (See 
comment-response 2.F on page 3-11 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS).
    Comment 2. Because NNSA's activities are part of the ``nuclear 
security enterprise,'' NNSA needs to conduct an updated 
``nonproliferation assessment'' to reassess whether the activities 
addressed by the Y-12 Final SWEIS are still consistent with U.S. 
nonproliferation policy.
    Response. As discussed above, the Y-12 Final SWEIS was prepared 
by NNSA in accordance with the requirements of NEPA and the DOE and 
CEQ regulations. Notwithstanding the fact that this comment is 
beyond the scope of NEPA considerations for a site-wide EIS, NNSA 
believes that its activities, including those considered in the Y-12 
Final SWEIS, are fully consistent with current U.S. nuclear weapons 
policies and treaty obligations, including the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR), (U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 
Report (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/npr).
    An extensive discussion of current nonproliferation and national 
security policies is included in Section 1.5 of the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS. The NNSA's nonproliferation mission is actively supported at 
Y-12. Y-12 participates in developing and implementing domestic and 
international programs and projects aimed at reducing threats, both 
internal and external, to the United States from the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, weapons technologies, and weapons usable 
materials.
    Comment 3. The Y-12 Final SWEIS fails to fully describe and 
analyze environmental impacts of excavation, soil characterization, 
transportation or disposal associated with the UPF.
    Response. The Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an analysis of the 
impacts of the UPF construction, including soil disturbance, 
transportation, and disposal. Soil disturbance and disposal is 
addressed in Section 5.1.2 and 5.5.2. Transportation of soil is 
addressed in Section 5.4.1.2. (See comment-response 12.T.13 on page 
3-52 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS).
    Soil characterization information is contained in detail in the 
referenced Wetland and Sensitive Species Survey Report for Y-12: 
Proposed Uranium Processing Facility, November 2009, which is a 
reference for the

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Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). (See 
comment-response 12.T.20 on page 3-54 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS). Potential impacts related to excavation, soil 
characterization, transportation and disposal are also considered in 
the state Aquatic Resource Alteration Permit application. During 
project execution, characterization of soils excavated and managed 
for the UPF will be conducted as described in Section 4.0 of the 
Wetlands Assessment utilizing MARSSIM (Multi-Agency Radiation Survey 
and Site Investigation Manual) processes. (See comment-response 
12.T.23 on page 3-55 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). In 
planning for the Haul Road Extension Corridor and wetland 
development, no contaminated soil is anticipated. Walk-over 
radiological surveys have been done and sampling for site 
characterization is being performed according to MARSSIM and U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency requirements. Historical land use in 
the region is also known which lends support to NNSA's expectation 
that no contamination will be encountered on the project. 
Nevertheless, the potential exists for contaminated soils and 
possibly other media to be encountered during excavation and other 
site activities. Prior to commencing ground disturbance, NNSA would 
survey potentially affected areas to determine the extent and nature 
of any contaminated media and required remediation in accordance 
with the procedures established under the site's environmental 
restoration program and in accordance with appropriate requirements 
and agreements. As discussed in Section 5.5.2 of the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS, the potential for additional soil contamination from project 
activities would be minimized by complying with waste management 
procedures specified in DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste 
Management, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Programs.
    Comment 4. The Y-12 Final SWEIS provides inadequate analysis of 
seismic risks and steps taken to ameliorate risks.
    Response. Seismology is addressed in Sections 4.5.3 and 5.5.1 of 
the Y-12 Final SWEIS. As discussed in those sections, Y-12 lies at 
the boundary between seismic Zones 1 and 2, indicating that minor to 
moderate damage could typically be expected from an earthquake. Y-12 
is traversed by many inactive faults formed during the late 
Paleozoic Era. There is no evidence of capable faults (surface 
movement within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring 
nature within the past 500,000 years) in the immediate area of Y-12, 
as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) ``Reactor 
Site Criteria'' (10 CFR part 100). The nearest capable faults are 
approximately 300 miles west of Y-12 in the New Madrid Fault zone. 
Based on the seismic history of the area, a moderate seismic risk 
exists at Y-12. However, this should not negatively impact the 
construction and operation of facilities at Y-12. All new facilities 
and building expansions would be designed to withstand the maximum 
expected earthquake-generated ground acceleration in accordance with 
DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and accompanying safety 
guidelines. (See comment-response 12.E on page 3-33 of Volume II of 
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
    The Y-12 Final SWEIS also considers potential impacts that could 
be caused by earthquakes and other natural phenomena (see Section 
D.9). Table D.9.3-1 identifies the accidents that were considered 
for the major operations at Y-12. The accidents analyzed in detail 
for the Y-12 Final SWEIS bound any impacts that would be associated 
with earthquakes and other natural phenomena. This is due to the 
fact that the accidents analyzed in detail in the SWEIS would be 
expected to result in greater radiological releases than reasonably 
foreseeable accidents caused by natural phenomena, including seismic 
activity. (See comment-response 12.M.1 on page 3-39 of Volume II of 
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
    Comment 5. NNSA failed to provide adequate public comment 
opportunity for wetlands proposal announced after close of the Draft 
SWEIS comment period.
    Response. NNSA has never intended to proceed with the proposed 
action without public comment and compliance with applicable 
permitting processes and regulations. The need for the Haul Road 
Extension Corridor and associated potential impacts to wetlands were 
not identified until after the Draft SWEIS was released for public 
comment in October 2009. NNSA issued a separate Notice of Proposed 
Wetlands Action and Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12 
Final SWEIS) in June 2010 in compliance with 10 CFR Part 1022, and 
provided an 18 day public comment period. In addition, Y-12 has 
fully complied with the process of obtaining permits for the Haul 
Road Extension Corridor which is intended to help to identify and 
resolve environmental impact issues and/or concerns that State or 
Federal agencies may have. The permitting processes also included 
public comment periods. The public was given a 30 day comment period 
for each of the permitting processes conducted by the Tennessee 
Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE). Full, detailed project plans and design 
drawings for the proposed Haul Road Extension Corridor were also 
available through the USACE and TDEC in addition to the abridged 
summaries provided in their respective public notices. (See comment-
response 12.T.2 on page 3-47 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
    Comment 6. NNSA inappropriately declares the environmental 
impact of wetlands disruption ``not relevant'' to the SWEIS.
    Response. Following the requirements of 10 CFR part 1022, NNSA 
prepared a Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12 Final SWEIS) 
and determined that the information in the Wetlands Assessment does 
not reflect a significant impact or substantial change to the SWEIS 
and the NEPA process. The Y-12 Final SWEIS includes the potential 
impacts related to the Haul Road Extension Corridor Project. The Y-
12 Final SWEIS analyzes all reasonably foreseeable potential 
environmental impacts associated with implementation of the 
alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS. (See comment-response 12.T.9 on 
page 3-50 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
    Comment 7. The Y-12 Final SWEIS fails to provide adequate 
analysis of Alternative 6, proposed by the Oak Ridge Environmental 
Peace Alliance (OREPA) and supported by broader public, which 
provides a reasonable, unexamined alternative to those considered in 
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.
    Response. NNSA continues to believe that ``Alternative 6'' is 
not a reasonable alternative based on its determination that this 
alternative would not support current and reasonably foreseeable 
national security requirements.
    As discussed in comment-response 9.A on page 3-25 of Volume II 
of the Y-12 Final SWEIS, NNSA believes that many of the elements of 
``Alternative 6,'' proposed by OREPA, are analyzed in the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS. For example, the Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an alternative 
(Alternative 3, Upgrade in-Place) that would accomplish all required 
dismantlements (and any required assembly) in existing facilities 
that would be upgraded. As such, the SWEIS includes an alternative 
that recognizes a need for a Stockpile Stewardship mission that can 
be achieved through an upgrade in-place to existing facilities. 
While NNSA agrees that consolidating operations and upgrading in-
place could render facilities functional for at least another 
decade, during which the future of U.S. nuclear force needs could 
become more clear, NNSA notes that the recently completed Nuclear 
Posture Review specifically concludes that a UPF is a key investment 
required to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
    The SWEIS also includes an alternative that would provide the 
minimum assembly/disassembly capacity which NNSA believes would meet 
national security requirements, which ``Alternative 6'' does not 
satisfy. Under this alternative (Alternative 5--No Net Production/
Capability-sized UPF Alternative), NNSA would maintain the 
capability to conduct surveillance and produce and dismantle 
secondaries and cases. NNSA would reduce the production capability 
level to approximately 10 secondaries and cases per year, which 
would support surveillance operations and a limited Life Extension 
Program workload; however, this alternative would not support adding 
new types or increased numbers of secondaries to the stockpile.
    In response to public comments, NNSA added a discussion of 
``Alternative 6,'' proposed by OREPA, to Section 3.4 of the Y-12 
Final SWEIS. The existing analyses of the individual elements of 
``Alternative 6'' that are incorporated in the action alternatives 
provide the decisionmaker with the information required to 
incorporate any of those elements into decisions for future actions 
at Y-12.
    Comment 8. DOE's Preferred Alternative does not match the 
``purpose and need'' as closely as the less-expensive No Net 
Production Alternative.
    Response. Section 3.6 of the SWEIS discusses the rationale for 
the preferred alternative. (See comment-response 8.A on page 3-24 of 
Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.) NNSA decided that Alternative 4

[[Page 43324]]

was preferred over other alternatives because it represented the 
best capacity for meeting current and reasonably foreseeable 
national security requirements.
    Comment 9. The Y-12 Final SWEIS wrongly declares that the 
demolition/disposal of existing facilities arising from relocation 
of operations to a new UPF is ``not ripe.''
    Response. The Integrated Facility Disposition Program (IFDP) is 
DOE's program for disposing of legacy materials and facilities at 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12. The IFDP includes 
both existing excess facilities (e.g., facilities not required for 
DOE's needs or the discharge of its responsibilities) and newly 
identified excess (or soon to be excess) facilities. Under the IFDP, 
the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of approximately 188 
facilities at ORNL, 112 facilities at Y-12, and remediation of soil 
and groundwater contamination would occur over the next 30 to 40 
years. The IFDP will be conducted as a remedial action under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA). Cleanup and D&D activities conducted under CERCLA are 
reviewed through the CERCLA process, which incorporates NEPA values. 
The potential impacts of the IFDP are analyzed in the cumulative 
impacts section of the SWEIS in chapter 6 (See comment-response 12.P 
on page 3-44 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). Although IFDP 
D&D activities are expected to commence within the next three to 
five years, the major IFDP D&D activities would not take place for 
many years (e.g., most likely any D&D activities associated with the 
action alternatives in this SWEIS would not take place prior to 
approximately 2018). These major D&D activities are to be resolved 
under the provisions of CERCLA and are beyond the planning basis for 
this SWEIS (See Section 5.16 on page 5-100 of Volume I of the Y-12 
Final SWEIS). NNSA believes that the Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an 
analysis of all reasonable alternatives and all cleanup/waste 
management actions that are required to be included in a NEPA 
analysis.
    Comment 10. The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health is not 
listed as a consulting agency. They should be given an opportunity, 
and time, to comment on the Y-12 Final SWEIS before any ROD is 
issued.
    Response. During the Y-12 SWEIS process, NNSA specifically 
invited TDEC to be a cooperating agency in the preparation of the 
SWEIS and also requested that other agencies express their interest 
in being designated as a cooperating agency in the preparation of 
the Y-12 SWEIS (see 70 FR 71270, November 28, 2005). The Tennessee 
Division of Radiological Health is part of TDEC. TDEC comments on 
the Draft Y-12 SWEIS are contained on page 2-123 of Volume II of the 
Y-12 Final SWEIS.
    Comment 11. Commentors stated that an article in the Knoxville 
News-Sentinel on March 31, 2011, casts new light on the seismic 
conditions of current facilities and underscores OREPA's concerns, 
first raised in 1994 and repeatedly in the succeeding years, about 
the structural integrity of facilities at Y-12 including building 
9212. The Y-12 Final SWEIS does not include a thorough assessment of 
risks associated with ongoing operations at Y-12 in the ``No Action 
Alternative,'' and provides an inadequate evaluation in its accident 
scenarios.
    Response. The Y-12 Final SWEIS considers potential impacts that 
could be caused by earthquakes and other natural phenomena such as 
wind, rain/snow, tornadoes and lightning (see Section D.9). 
Criticality is also considered. Table D.9.3-1 identifies the 
accidents that were considered for the major operations at Y-12. As 
shown in that table, the SWEIS considered potential impacts from 
earthquakes and other natural phenomena, including wind, flood, and 
lightning. The impacts associated with accidents analyzed in detail 
for the Y-12 Final SWEIS bound any impacts that would be associated 
with earthquakes and other natural phenomena. This is due to the 
fact that the accidents analyzed in detail in the SWEIS would be 
expected to result in greater radiological releases than reasonably 
foreseeable accidents caused by natural phenomena at Y-12.
    With respect to potential accidents associated with existing/old 
facilities, as discussed in Section 5.14.1.1, the Y-12 Final SWEIS 
accident analysis process began with a review of all Y-12 
facilities, including Building 9212, with emphasis on building 
hazard classification, radionuclide inventories, including type, 
quantity, and physical form, and storage and use conditions. For 
each of these facilities, the next step was to identify the most 
current documentation describing and quantifying the risks 
associated with its operation. Current safety documentation was 
obtained for all of these facilities. From these documents, 
potential accident scenarios and source terms (release rates and 
frequencies) associated with those facilities were identified. (See 
comment-response 12.M.1 on page 3-39 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final 
SWEIS).

[FR Doc. 2011-18312 Filed 7-19-11; 8:45 am]
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