Bulitlon 747–5A2A203, dated August 31, 2006; or Revision 1, dated August 9, 2007; and that have hi-lok bolts and collars at all of the Group B fastener locations: Except as provided by paragraph (m) of this AD, at the applicable time in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009, do the initial inspection and related investigative and corrective actions in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009, except as required by paragraph (n) of this AD. Repeat the inspection at the applicable interval in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009.

Replacement of Hi-Lok Group B Fasteners

(j) For airplanes that were inspected in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, dated August 31, 2006, and that have hi-lok bolts and collars at all of the Group B fastener locations: Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, replace all hi-lok Group B fasteners in accordance with Part 6 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009. Repeat the inspection required by Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009, at the applicable interval specified in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009.

Exceptions to Service Bulletin

(k) Where Step 3 of Part 7 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 1, dated August 9, 2007; or Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009; provides the option to support the engine weight instead of removing the engine, this AD does not allow that option. This AD requires that the engine be removed before performing the inspections required by paragraph (h) of this AD.

(l) Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 1, dated August 9, 2007, specifies a compliance time after the date of that service bulletin, this AD requires compliance within the specified compliance time after October 9, 2007 (the effective date of this AD).

(m) Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009, specifies a compliance time after the date of Revision 1 or Revision 2 of that service bulletin, this AD requires compliance within the specified compliance time after the effective date of this AD.

(n) Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 1, dated August 9, 2007; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009; specifies to contact Boeing for appropriate action, this AD requires, before further flight, repair of the discrepancy or replacement of the discrepant part using a method approved in accordance with the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization or in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (p) of this AD.

Credit for Actions Previously Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Service Information

(o) Actions performed before the effective date of this AD, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–53A2203, Revision 1, dated August 9, 2007, are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding actions specified in paragraphs (h), (i), and (j) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(p)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Ken Paolotti, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–1205, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6434; fax (425) 917–6590. Or, e-mail information to AM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD, if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airlines Organization Designation Authorization which has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(4) AMOCs approved previously in accordance with AD 2007–19–19, Amendment 9–15210, are approved as AMOCs for the corresponding provisions of this AD.

Related Information

(q) For more information about this AD, contact Ken Paolotti, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–1205, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6434; fax (425) 917–6590.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(r) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–5A2A203, Revision 2, dated July 9, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 767, MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

(4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at an NARA facility, call 202–741–6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 22, 2011.

Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2011–1117 Filed 3–9–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP Airplanes; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 748 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from our review of continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * *

Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an airflow trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have indicated that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.

This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab.
hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: This AD becomes effective March 25, 2011.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of March 25, 2011.

We must receive comments on this AD by April 25, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2010–0035, dated March 4, 2010 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Early in the life of the ATP (circa 1989), a report was received that a control surface hinge pin had migrated out of position, causing a rubbing contact. BAE Systems responded by issuing SB ATP–27–11, describing a one-time inspection of the hinge pins, which was classified mandatory by UK CAA AD 006–06–89. Both SB and AD were subsequently cancelled in 1990. The HS.748 and the ATP secondary controls are similar in these areas, although no action was taken on the HS.748 fleet at that time.

Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause it rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have concluded that, after reinstalling the pins after maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.

This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires the [detailed] inspection of aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins [for length and end pinching] and, depending on findings, the necessary corrective actions.

Corrective actions include cutting the hinge pin to specified size, and pinching the piano hinge ends sufficient to prevent the piano hinge pin from migrating from the piano hinge. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information
BAE Systems [Operations] Limited has issued Service Bulletin ATP–27–090, dated April 14, 2009; and Service Bulletin HS748–27–136, dated April 14, 2009. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

There are no products of this type currently registered in the United States. However, this rule is necessary to ensure that the described unsafe condition is addressed if any of these products are placed on the U.S. Register in the future.

Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a Note within the AD.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date
Since there are currently no domestic operators of this product, notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are unnecessary.

Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2011–0150; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–100–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
   Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2011–05–10 BAE Systems (Operations)


Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 25, 2011.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP airplanes and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 748 series 2A and series 2B airplanes; certificated in any category.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight Controls.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

* * * * *

Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a rubbing flap on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have concluded that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.

This condition (non-pinched hinge pin ends), if not detected and corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab hinge pin-out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

Compliance

(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Inspection and Corrective Action

(g) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD: Do a detailed inspection of the aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins to determine that each piano hinge pin is 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) shorter than the piano hinge at each end; and that the piano hinge ends have been pinched sufficiently to prevent the piano hinge migrating from the piano hinge, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP–27–090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748–27–136, dated April 14, 2009, as applicable.

(1) If any piano hinge pin is not 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) shorter than the piano hinge at each end, before further flight, cut to size, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP–27–090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748–27–136, dated April 14, 2009; as applicable; to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact BAE Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information Department, Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292 6
Airplanes

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Saab AB, Saab Aerosystems Model SAAB 2000 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Corrosion has been found on the rear spar upper cap of the horizontal stabilizer of SAAB 2000 aeroplanes. The affected areas are adjacent to the inboard elevator hinge where the electrical wiring harnesses are located and wired through the lightening holes. The upper spar cap is a primary structural element and is important to the structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer.

Corrosion damage in these areas, if not detected and corrected, can result in a starting point for future crack propagation, which would impair the integrity of the horizontal stabilizer upper spar cap structure.

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective April 14, 2011.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of April 14, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on December 14, 2010 (75 FR 77796). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Corrosion has been found on the rear spar upper cap of the horizontal stabilizer of SAAB 2000 aeroplanes. The affected areas are adjacent to the inboard elevator hinge where the electrical wiring harnesses are located and wired through the lightening holes. The upper spar cap is a primary structural element and is important to the structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer.

Corrosion damage in these areas, if not detected and corrected, can result in a starting point for future crack propagation, which would impair the integrity of the horizontal stabilizer upper spar cap structure.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a detailed visual inspection (DVI) of the LH and RH horizontal stabilizer rear spar adjacent to the inboard elevator hinge and the harnesses installed in the adjacent areas, installation of convoluted tubing on the harness, and corrective actions depending on findings.

The corrective actions include installing convoluted tubing on the harness, applying corrosion prevention compound to the inspected area, making sure clearance exists between the spar cap and the harnesses/convoluted tube, and contacting Saab for repair instructions and doing the repair. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a Note within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect 8 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 2 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be $1,360 or $170 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on