[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 241 (Thursday, December 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78734-78745]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-31640]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 06-63]


R & M Sales Company, Inc.; Revocation of Registration

    On June 1, 2006, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA, or ``the 
Government''), issued an Order to Show Cause to R & M Sales Company, 
Inc. (Respondent), of Blountville, Tennessee. The Show Cause Order 
proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of 
Registration, 004413RAY, which authorizes it to distribute List I 
chemicals, as well as the denial of any pending application to renew 
its registration, on the ground that Respondent's continued 
registration is ``inconsistent with the public interest.'' OTSC at 1 
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(h) & 824(a)(4)).
    More specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that during an 
inspection for its initial registration, Respondent received copies of 
DEA notices and cites to the Code of Federal Regulations pertinent to 
listed chemical distributors. Id. Relatedly, the Order alleged that 
``Mr. Mitchell was further advised by DEA personnel on proper record-
keeping procedures for a DEA registrant, including, but not limited to, 
the requirement of maintaining records of the destruction of out of 
date listed chemical products.'' Id.
    Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that many of Respondent's 
customers are convenience stores, gas stations and small independent 
grocers located in the Cumberland Plateau area of Tennessee, which is 
known for its problem with illicit methamphetamine production, and that 
Respondent distributes pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products in both 
tablet and gel-capsule form, which are precursor chemicals used in the 
illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. at 2-3.
    The Show Cause Order further alleged that on June 8 and 9, 2005, 
DEA Investigators (DIs) conducted an inspection of Respondent, during 
which they performed an accountability audit of its handling of two 
ephedrine products, MaxBrand 25 mg. ephedrine tablets (48-count 
bottles) and Ephedrine Multi-Action 25 mg. (also 48-count bottles), 
which revealed a shortage of each product. Id. at 3-4. The Order thus 
alleged that Respondent ``failed to maintain complete and accurate 
records of a regulated transaction as required by 21 CFR 1310.06(a).'' 
Id. at 4. The Order also alleged that Respondent ``stores List I 
chemical products in its delivery trucks and/or trailers * * * 
creat[ing] the potential for the diversion of List I chemicals.'' Id. 
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(h)(1) and 21 CFR 1309.71).
    Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that based on its June 2005 
inspection, DEA ``developed additional information regarding 
[Respondent's] sale of large quantities of ephedrine to various 
convenience stores and related establishments,'' and that these ``sales 
were vastly in excess of the amounts of this over-the-counter product 
needed to meet the medical and scientific needs of the community.'' Id. 
The Order also alleged that Respondent engaged in 35 regulated 
transactions with seven different customers in which it distributed 24-
count, 36-count, and 48-count bottles of ephedrine products, ``knowing 
or having reason to believe that its product would be used in the 
illicit manufacture of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
841(d)(2).'' \1\ Id., at 4-6. In addition, the Order alleged that 
Respondent failed ``to provide notification of `suspicious' activity 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1)(A) and 21 CFR 1310.05(a)(1) with 
respect to'' these 35 transactions. Id. Finally, the Order alleged that 
DEA ``conducted [a] customer verification'' at the Fast Stop Covington, 
a convenience store located in Covington, Virginia, during which the 
owner informed a DI ``that he purchased one case (144 bottles) of 
ephedrine products from [Respondent] every two to four weeks''; the 
Order then alleged that these purchases were ``far in excess of 
legitimate demand for these products.'' Id. at 6.
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    \1\ The correct statutory citation is actually 21 U.S.C. 
841(c)(2).
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    On June 26, 2006, Respondent requested a hearing in the matter. ALJ 
Ex. 2. The matter was assigned to a DEA Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
who conducted a hearing in Arlington, Virginia on May 15 and 16, 2007. 
During the hearing, both parties called witnesses to testify and 
introduced documentary evidence. Following the hearing, both parties 
submitted briefs containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and argument.
    On February 13, 2009, the ALJ issued her recommended decision 
(ALJ), which concluded that Respondent's continued registration would 
be inconsistent with the public interest. With respect to factor one--
the maintenance of effective controls against diversion--the ALJ found 
that Respondent violated 21 CFR 1309.71(b) by storing listed chemicals 
in trucks away from its premises, that it sold ``excessive quantities 
of listed chemicals to some customers and failed to report suspicious 
order[s] for these chemicals to DEA,'' and that it ``failed to 
ascertain whether [its] customers purchased listed chemicals from other 
distributors.'' Id. at 36. She therefore concluded that ``Respondent 
does not maintain adequate controls against the diversion of the listed 
chemicals it sells,'' and that ``this factor weighs in favor of a 
finding that Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent 
with the public interest.'' Id.
    With respect to factor two--Respondent's compliance with applicable 
Federal, State and local law--the ALJ concluded that Respondent's 
storage of chemicals away from its premises and its failure to report 
suspicious transactions constituted violations of Federal law and DEA 
regulations. Id. She also found that Respondent had failed to provide 
prior notification to DEA of mail shipments of listed chemical 
products, in violation of 21 CFR 1310.03(c), and that, having ``sold 
excessive quantities of listed chemicals,'' Respondent further violated 
21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2) in that it ``should have known that some of those 
chemicals were likely to be diverted to the illicit manufacture of the 
controlled substance methamphetamine.'' Id. at 36-37. The ALJ thus 
concluded that this factor supported a finding that

[[Page 78735]]

Respondent's continued registration was inconsistent with the public 
interest. Id. at 37.
    Finding that neither Mr. Mitchell (Respondent's owner), nor any of 
its employees had ever been convicted of a crime related to controlled 
substances or listed chemicals (factor three), the ALJ concluded that 
this factor ``weigh[ed] in favor of a finding that Respondent's 
continued registration would not be inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. As to factor four--Respondent's past experience in the 
distribution of listed chemicals--the ALJ referenced Respondent's 
inadequate controls against diversion and its violations of applicable 
Federal law and found that ``this factor weigh[ed] in favor of a 
finding that Respondent's continued registration would not be 
consistent with the public interest.'' Id.
    As to the fifth factor--such other factors as are relevant to and 
consistent with public health and safety--the ALJ found that ``it is 
likely that chemicals purchased in Virginia are used to make 
methamphetamine in Tennessee'' and that ``methamphetamine can be 
produced from liquid-filled dosage form products as well as the sol[i]d 
form products.'' Id. at 37-38. The ALJ thus reasoned that this factor 
also supported the conclusion that Respondent's continued registration 
would be inconsistent with the public interest. Id. at 38.
    Based on her consideration of all the factors, the ALJ found ``that 
a preponderance of the evidence * * * demonstrates that Respondent's 
continued registration would not be consistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. The ALJ thus recommended that Respondent's registration 
be revoked and that all pending applications for renewal or 
modification be denied. Id.
    Neither party filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. Thereafter, 
the record was forwarded to me for final agency action.
    Having reviewed the record as a whole, I hereby issue this Decision 
and Final Order. I adopt the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law except as explained herein. I further find that Respondent violated 
Federal law by knowingly selling drug paraphernalia. I further concur 
with the ALJ's ultimate conclusion that Respondent's continued 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest and adopt 
her recommendation that its registration be revoked and that any 
pending applications be denied. I make the following findings.

Findings

Methamphetamine and List I Chemicals

    Both pseudoephedrine and ephedrine have therapeutic uses and are 
lawfully marketed as non-prescription (OTC) drug products under the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. GX 4, at 3. Pseudoephedrine is 
approved for marketing as a decongestant; ephedrine (in combination 
with guaifenesin) is approved for marketing as a bronchodilator.\2\ Id. 
at 3-4. Both pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are, however, regulated as 
list I chemicals under the Controlled Substances Act because they are 
precursor chemicals that are easily extracted from OTC products and 
used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, a schedule II 
controlled substance.\3\ Id.; see GX 4, at 7 (noting that 
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine can be converted into methamphetamine in 
a simple one-step reaction which can be accomplished with little or no 
chemistry expertise).
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    \2\ In July 2005, the FDA proposed to remove combination 
ephedrine-guaifenesin products from its over-the-counter (OTC) drug 
monograph and to declare them not safe and effective for OTC use. 
See 70 FR 40232 (2005). This rulemaking remains pending.
    \3\ In 1988, Congress amended the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) by enacting the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA), 
which subjected bulk ephedrine to regulation. GX 5, at 7. Shortly 
thereafter, law enforcement authorities encountered ephedrine 
tablets instead of bulk ephedrine at illicit methamphetamine 
laboratories. Id. In 1993, the CSA was again amended by the Domestic 
Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993 (DCDCA), which regulated 
single-entity ephedrine products and required distributors of these 
products to register. Id. Illicit methamphetamine manufacturers then 
switched from single-entity ephedrine products to OTC combination 
products containing ephedrine. Id. at 8. The DCDCA also led to the 
large-scale diversion of pseudoephedrine tablets to the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. In response, Congress enacted 
the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 (CMCA), which 
expanded regulatory control of lawfully marketed drug products 
containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and phenylpropanolamine. Id. 
at 8-9.
     More recently, in 2006, Congress passed the Combat 
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA). GX 3, at 5. Under the 
CMEA, effective April 8, 2006, all tablet-form drug products 
containing pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and/or phenylpropanolamine 
were required to be sold at retail in blister packs. Id. Also 
effective April 8, 2006, the law imposed a daily transaction limit 
of 3.6 grams of base product per person, per day, and a sales limit 
of 9 grams of base product in a 30-day period. Id. As of September 
30, 2006, these products must be placed behind the counter, and 
purchasers must show identification and sign a logbook. Id.
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    Methamphetamine ``is a powerful and addictive central nervous 
system stimulant.'' \4\ T. Young Associates, Inc., 71 FR 60567 (2006). 
Methamphetamine abuse has destroyed numerous lives and families and 
ravaged communities. See Rick's Picks, L.L.C., 72 FR 18275, 18276 
(2007). Moreover, because of the nature of the chemicals used to make 
methamphetamine, its illicit manufacture poses a significant 
environmental hazard, as it generates toxic chemical by-products. Tr. 
17-18. Not only do the by-products cause damage when discarded into 
waterways and public lands, the presence of chemical fumes during 
methamphetamine production creates a potential for fires and 
explosions. Id. at 18-19. Such illicit methamphetamine laboratories may 
be of the ``mom and pop type,'' and be found in motels, homes, or 
trunks of automobiles; the toxic fumes they emit also create a health 
hazard for children who are exposed to them. Id.
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    \4\ According to data compiled by the Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN), between 1993 and 1999, medical examiners throughout the 
country reported 4,593 methamphetamine related deaths. GX 4, at 9.
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    As evidenced by the number of law enforcement seizures of illicit 
meth. labs, the State of Tennessee, which is where Respondent is 
located, has had a particularly high incidence of illicit 
methamphetamine manufacturing. More specifically, in 2003, Tennessee 
ranked seventh out of 47 reporting states, with 983 seizures. GX 3, at 
4. In 2004, Tennessee ranked second of 48 reporting states, with 1,432 
seizures. Id.
    While following the passage of the Meth-Free Tennessee Act of 2005 
\5\ (which became effective May 1, 2005), the number of illicit lab 
seizures declined, Id. at 4-5; between January 1 and July 31, 2006, 
Tennessee still had 249 illicit methamphetamine laboratory seizures 
according to the statistics maintained by DEA's El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC).\6\ Tr. 32-33; GX 23. Moreover, according to data 
compiled by the National Clandestine Laboratory Database of which I 
take official notice, during 2008, law enforcement authorities reported 
553 clandestine meth. lab incidents in Tennessee. U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Maps of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/map_lab_seizures.html/

[[Page 78736]]

(visited October 6, 2009).\7\ The data also show that in 2008, 
Kentucky, another State where Respondent distributes List I chemicals, 
had 416 lab incidents, an increase from 294 the year before. Id. While 
the majority of seized methamphetamine laboratories utilized tablet-
form pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products, DEA scientific studies 
indicate that liquid and gel-cap formulations of these precursors can 
easily produce methamphetamine when the appropriate reagents or 
solvents are used. GX 23, at 8.
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    \5\ The law limits the sale of tablet-form products containing 
pseudoephedrine or ephedrine to pharmacists and licensed pharmacy 
technicians. Id. at 5. In addition, all purchasers must be over 18 
years of age, present photo identification, and sign a logbook. Id. 
While the law limits the sale of the tablet forms of list I 
chemicals, Tr. 90, it exempts gel capsules and liquid preparations. 
Tenn. Code Ann. Sec.  39-17-431(b)(3).
    \6\ By contrast, a Government witness acknowledged that the 
number of seizures in Virginia is considerably lower than the number 
in Tennessee. Tr. 33.
    \7\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency 
``may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding-
even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney 
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. 
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance with the APA and 
DEA's regulations, Respondent is ``entitled on timely request, to an 
opportunity to show to the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21 
CFR 1316.59(e). Respondent can dispute the facts of which I take 
official notice by filing a properly supported motion for 
reconsideration within twenty days of service of this Order, which 
shall begin on the date it is mailed.
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Respondent's Business

    Respondent is a wholesale distributor of various products including 
list I chemicals to convenience stores and gas stations located in 
rural Appalachia in the States of Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina. Tr. 353-54. Respondent was founded in 
1972 by Mr. Joe Allen Mitchell, and was incorporated in 1990. Id. at 
352-53. Mr. Mitchell is Respondent's President; the firm also employs 
two route salesmen and an office manager.\8\ Id. at 306 & 358.
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    \8\ Neither Mr. Mitchell, nor any of Respondent's employees, has 
been convicted of a criminal offense. Tr. 357-59. Mr. Mitchell 
further testified that he has never had reason to believe that any 
current or former employees have diverted list I chemical products. 
Id.
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    Respondent first obtained a DEA registration in July 1999, and 
currently holds Certificate of Registration, 004413RAY, which 
authorizes it to distribute list I chemicals. GX 1. While the 
certificate indicates that the registration expired on April 30, 2006, 
on March 16, 2006, Respondent submitted a renewal application. GX 2. 
Therefore, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and DEA 
regulations, I find that Respondent's registration has remained in 
effect pending the issuance of this Final Order. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c); 
21 CFR 1309.45.

The DEA Inspections

    On June 29, 1999, a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) visited 
Respondent to conduct a pre-registration investigation.\9\ GX 25. 
During the inspection, the DI provided Respondent with several 
informational notices issued by DEA including a red notice; this notice 
explains, inter alia, that combination ephedrine and pseudoephedrine 
products are being used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine 
and directs registrants to report ``suspicious orders'' to their local 
DEA office.\10\ GX 16, at 1; Tr. 78-81; GX 25, at 1-2.\11\
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    \9\ Respondent did not undergo another inspection until June 
2005. Tr. 82-84.
    \10\ The other notices included a green notice which informed 
Mr. Mitchell that chemicals such as red and white phosphorus are 
being used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, and a 
yellow notice, which informed him about the increasing theft of 
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products. See GX 16, at 2-3.
    \11\ According to the DI who testified at the hearing, when he 
conducted his close-out interview for the June 2005 inspection, Mr. 
Mitchell indicated that he had never received the colored notices. 
Tr. 130.
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    In an affidavit, the DI who conducted the 1999 inspection testified 
that he also provided Mr. Mitchell with ``copies of the Code of Federal 
Regulation (CFR) cites relative to chemical distributors.'' GX 25, at 
1. The DI further stated that he ``informed Mr. Mitchell that any 
suspicious orders and thefts or losses must be reported to the DEA in 
accordance with 21 CFR 1310.05'' and advised him as to ``the threshold 
requirements and * * * the recordkeeping requirements pursuant to 21 
CFR 1310.05 including reports of theft and loss, suspicious orders, and 
destruction of damaged or out of date merchandise.'' Id. at 2.
    In his testimony, Mr. Mitchell stated that he could not recall ever 
having been ``apprised or informed of [the] requirement to report 
suspicious orders'' and that he had thought that any amount ``over the 
threshold limit would be suspicious.'' Tr. 385-86. Mr. Mitchell also 
testified that he was ``not really'' aware that list I chemicals were 
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine or that cigarette lighter 
fluid was also used in the process. Id. at 376.\12\ In any event, 
because the requirement to report suspicious orders is set forth in 
both Federal law and DEA regulations, see 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1); 21 CFR 
1310.05(a); whether Mr. Mitchell was specifically notified of the 
requirement (either in conversation with the DI or by being provided 
with the red notice) is immaterial.\13\ See Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. 
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (``Just as everyone is charged with 
knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided 
that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register 
gives legal notice of their contents.'') (citation omitted); United 
States v. International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562 (1971) 
(``The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies 
whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published 
regulation.'').
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    \12\ Mr. Mitchell further testified that he took ``the attitude 
that I have no control on what the retail public does with the 
product.'' Tr. 404. This testimony suggests that he was aware of the 
illicit uses of ephedrine products. Moreover, short of burying one's 
head in the sand, it is hard to imagine how anyone engaged in the 
distribution of these products (especially in Tennessee, given the 
scope of the State's meth. problem) could be unaware that they are 
subject to diversion into the illicit manufacture of 
methamphetamine.
    \13\ There is no dispute that DEA inspected Respondent on June 
29, 1999. See GX 25; RX 33.
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    Some time after the 1999 inspection, Respondent received a 
facsimile of a DEA memo, ``Guidelines Regarding the Submission of 
Reports,'' which contained a table of ``Threshold Quantities'' for 
various formulations of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and 
phenylpropanolamine products. RX 30, at 1, 5; Tr. 369. Mr. Mitchell 
testified that ``[t]o me it was the Bible. It showed what the threshold 
limits are. This is the information that I went by.'' Tr. 369. 
According to Mr. Mitchell, he ``calculated the number of products that 
[he] could sell, and [he] instructed [his] salespeople these are [the] 
limits.'' Id.
    DEA did not visit Respondent again until June 8-9, 2005, when two 
DIs went to Respondent, met Mr. Mitchell and presented him with a 
Notice of Inspection, which he signed indicating his consent to the 
inspection. Tr. 84; GX 6, at 2. The DIs inspected Respondent's security 
arrangements, reviewed its procedures for handling list I products, 
examined its recordkeeping, and audited two list I products it 
distributed.
    According to one of the DIs, Respondent is located within a ``good-
sized building,'' which is surrounded by a chain-link fence with a 
gate. Tr. 178. The building includes an area in the front where novelty 
items are displayed, a warehouse in the rear, and offices. Id. at 86-
87. The building is protected by an alarm system, which the DIs tested 
and found to be in working order. Id. at 123; GX 17. Moreover, 
Respondent's enclosed yard area is lit with spotlights at night. Tr. 
360, 363; RX 29.
    Inside the warehouse, the DIs found that Respondent stored list I 
chemical products in a caged area; the cage was, however, constructed 
of chicken wire and could be easily compromised. Tr. 176. The DIs also 
found that Respondent stored list I chemicals overnight in its delivery 
trucks, which are parked within the chain-link perimeter. Id. at

[[Page 78737]]

124. The DI testified that he cited Respondent for a violation of DEA 
regulations, because the trailer and delivery vehicles are ``mobile, 
and they could easily be broken into.'' Id. Mr. Mitchell testified, 
however, that he was willing to change Respondent's practice and have 
the trucks parked inside the warehouse at night upon their return. Id. 
at 364.
    At the hearing, Mr. Mitchell acknowledged that it is Respondent's 
practice to store list I chemical products overnight on the delivery 
trucks on nights when the driver-salesmen are staying in hotels along 
their routes. Id. at 397. In Respondent's twenty-day business cycle, 
one driver-salesman stays overnight on his route approximately two 
nights; the other driver-salesman stays overnight on his route 
approximately three nights. Id. Mr. Mitchell did not express any 
willingness to change this practice.
    As noted above, during the inspection, the DIs reviewed 
Respondent's recordkeeping and conducted an audit of two products: Max 
Brand 25 mg. ephedrine 48-count bottles \14\ and Ephedrine Multi-Action 
25 mg. ephedrine 48-count bottles. Tr. 105; GX 9. The audit found 
shortages of 109 bottles of Max Brand and 275 bottles of Ephedrine 
Multi-Action; these figures amounted to 1.44% and 2.19% of the total 
quantity of each product handled during the audit period. GX 9; Tr. 
108. According to one of the DIs, the shortage could have resulted from 
recordkeeping errors such as unrecorded sales, from diversion, or from 
loss. Id. at 108-09. The DI testified, however, that he did not 
consider the shortages significant in terms of Respondent's total 
sales. Id. at 201.
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    \14\ Max Brand product has been found at seized methamphetamine 
laboratories. Tr. 105, 380.
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    During an interview, Mr. Mitchell stated that his list I chemical 
products were ``fast movers'' and that Respondent's customer base for 
the products consisted primarily of convenience stores and gas stations 
located in eastern Tennessee, Virginia, Kentucky, West Virginia, and 
both North and South Carolina.\15\ Id. at 90. Mr. Mitchell further 
stated that seventy-five percent (75%) of Respondent's customers sell 
list I products, and that thirty-five percent (35%) of Respondent's 
``overall business'' is attributable to list I products. Id. at 89-90. 
Mr. Mitchell estimated that at the time of the hearing, Respondent had 
approximately 200 customers for all of its products and that its gross 
profit \16\ from ephedrine sales was $200,000 annually.\17\ Id. at 426, 
428.
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    \15\ Approximately sixty-five percent (65%) of Respondent's list 
I chemical business is conducted in Virginia, and about thirty 
percent (30%) occurs in Tennessee, often along the border with 
Virginia. Tr. 350-51, 354.
    \16\ Gross profit is the mark-up minus distribution expenses 
such as commissions, warehouse electricity, and the water bill, etc. 
Tr. 429-30.
    \17\ At the time of the hearing, Respondent did not carry 
pseudoephedrine products. Tr. 428.
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    During the inspection, the DIs also found that Respondent used 
either the U.S. Postal Service or some other common carrier to make 
deliveries of list I products. Id. at 90-91. According to a spreadsheet 
which Mr. Mitchell gave the DIs, between July 20, 2004, and May 25, 
2005, there were thirty-four instances in which Respondent shipped list 
I products containing pseudoephedrine in this manner; the shipments 
were sent to three stores and involved such products as Tylenol Sinus, 
Advil Cold and Sinus, NyQuil, Dayquil, and Benadryl. GX 22; 21 U.S.C. 
802(34)(K).
    According to the DI, under Federal law and DEA regulations, 
Respondent was required to file monthly reports with the Agency for 
each of these transactions. Tr. 194; see 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(3); 21 CFR 
1310.03(c). However, DEA never received any such reports from 
Respondent. Id. at 194.
    Also during the inspection, a DI received a handwritten document 
from Respondent's office manager detailing the destruction of list I 
chemical products by Respondent. Tr. 121; GX 14. According to this 
document, Respondent burned twelve bottles of Multi-Action (60-count) 
in March 2005 and 12 bottles of Mini-Thin (60-count) in January 2005. 
GX 14. The document, which was dated and signed by Respondent's Office 
Manager, states that while Respondent had ``destroyed [out-of-date] 
merchandise in the past,'' ``the count would not be any greater than 
what is listed above'' for the March and January 2005 destructions of 
merchandise.\18\ Id.
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    \18\ The Office Manager testified that she had made the notation 
regarding the additional amounts that were destroyed apparently 
because there had been additional destructions but there were no 
records documenting them. Tr. 439-40; 446-48 The Office Manager 
further maintained that this statement was not accurate and that she 
made the statement because the DIs had told her that ``they needed 
something.'' Id. at 445. In its brief, the Government does not cite 
to any provision of the CSA or DEA regulations which specifically 
require that the destruction of products be reported to the Agency.
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    According to the DI, Respondent was required to give notification 
``prior to the destruction,'' but did not do so. Tr. 121. Mr. Mitchell 
testified that he had been unaware of the requirement that DEA be 
notified of the destruction of list I chemical products. Id. at 365. He 
also testified that he never contacted DEA with questions about the 
destruction of list I chemical products. Id. at 392.
    The DI further testified that during the inspections, he found 
various instances of sales that he considered suspicious. Tr. 154. His 
office subsequently compiled a record of these suspicious sales, which 
was based on the quantity of product sold. Id. at 155; GX 24.
    As found above, the DI who performed Respondent's pre-registration 
inspection had discussed the necessity of reporting suspicious 
transactions with Mr. Mitchell. Tr. 162. This DI did not, however, 
testify at the hearing, and the DI who performed the 2005 inspection 
did not know how, or if, that DI had defined ``suspicious orders.'' Id.
    On cross-examination, the DI further testified that, while 
``[t]here is no document'' specifying the criteria for determining 
whether an order is suspicious,\19\ during the pre-registration 
investigation, the DI ``explain[ed] the criteria.'' Id. at 161; see 
also id. at 169. According to the DI, such criteria would include the 
location of a customer, a sudden increase in a store's purchasing 
patterns, and a store's sales in comparison to ``other stores in the 
geographic area.'' \20\ Id. at 157-58. The DI further explained that 
even if Respondent did not know the population in an area where one of 
its customers is located, ``if you look at their sales in general'' and 
``most of the sales are'' for twelve bottles, ``and then you got some 
that are 100, 300, 300, 900, that sticks out to me.'' Id. at 160-61; 
see also GX 21 (Respondent's DEA Log of distributions).
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    \19\ DEA has, however, published criteria in the Chemical 
Handlers Manual, as well as the Report of the Attorney General's 
Suspicious Order Task Force. Although the Chemical Handlers Manual 
was withdrawn because it is currently undergoing revisions to 
reflect changes in Federal law, the Manual was in effect at the time 
of the events at issue here. In addition, DEA has published its 
```Know Your Customer' Policy,'' and the identification criteria 
developed by the Suspicious Orders Task Force on its website. See 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/chem_prog/susp.htm.
    \20\ The DI testified that ``any businessman is going to know 
their competition and who they're selling to. They're going to know 
what people want. For instance, Mr. Mitchell even told me himself 
that these were fast movers and that he needed to carry these 
products because if he didn't carry these products that other people 
would sell those products for him if he didn't sell them.'' Tr. 158. 
The DI also testified that ``the firm if they're selling in that 
area, they're going to be there every few weeks. They're going to 
know the area a lot more than I would as an investigator.'' Id. at 
160. The Government did not, however, introduce any evidence about 
comparable sales by Respondent's competitors.
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    I agree with the DI that a store's location, its sales in 
comparison to other stores, and an increase in its purchasing patterns 
are relevant (but not the exclusive) criteria which a distributor

[[Page 78738]]

must consider in evaluating whether an order is suspicious. However, I 
reject the DI's testimony that a distributor can be charged with 
knowledge of the sales levels of list I products at those stores which 
are not its customers. Moreover, I reject the DIs testimony that most 
of Respondent's sales were for twelve bottles, noting that the exhibit 
which he referred to in giving this testimony is obviously 
incomplete.\21\
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    \21\ To further explain, both Mr. Mitchell's testimony and 
Respondent's records establish that the company had far more list 1 
customers than GX 21 indicates. Moreover, at the bottom of each page 
of the exhibit, there is a notation indicating the page number. See 
GX 21. For example, the first page of the exhibit indicates that it 
covers January 2004, and the bottom of the page includes the 
notation: ``Page 4 of 5.'' Id. at 1. Yet the next page of the 
exhibit indicates that it covers February 2004, and includes the 
notation: ``Page 1 of 5.'' Id. at 2. The next two pages are for 
March 2004; the pages include the notations: ``Page 1 of 5'' and 
``Page 2 of 5,'' respectively. Id. at 3-4. This pattern is repeated 
throughout the exhibit, which includes no more than two pages for 
any one month. See generally GX 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The ALJ further noted that ``Respondent did not controvert [the 
DI's] testimony that most if its customers purchased twelve or twenty-
four bottles per month.'' ALJ at 35. The ALJ ignored, however, that 
Respondent introduce several exhibits showing its sales of various 
products to its customers. Moreover, my review of this data suggests 
that Respondent's sales were considerably greater than twelve to 
twenty- four bottles per month.
    At the hearing, Mr. Mitchell also claimed that he was unaware of 
these criteria and that no one had told him that he required to monitor 
his sales and report suspicious orders. Id. at 372. While Mr. Mitchell 
testified that he was obliged to know how to identify a suspicious 
order, he nonetheless insisted that DEA was responsible for giving him 
information on suspicious orders. Id. at 394. Mr. Mitchell admitted, 
however, that he had never requested this information from DEA.\22\ Id. 
at 392, 394.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Mr. Mitchell maintained that he had on several occasions 
refused to sell to people who had come to his warehouse seeking to 
``buy ephedrine and ephedrine only.'' Tr. 433.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Mitchell testified that he thought that only those transactions 
which exceeded the threshold amounts as indicated on the fax he 
received (RX 30, at 3) were suspicious orders. Tr. 386. The DI 
testified, however, that while the threshold amounts for sales to 
retail establishments trigger reporting requirements, they are not 
related to the determination of whether a given sale should be 
considered suspicious. Id. at 168. In answer to the question, ``[i]s 
there a relationship between these threshold amounts and what you term 
suspicious sales?,'' the DI testified:

    No, because of the extreme number of variables. You couldn't put 
a number on suspicious sales in black and white because each 
geographical area would be different. If DEA said if you sell over 
1,000 that's suspicious, well, 1,000 in northern Virginia is quite 
different from 1,000 being sold in Eastern Tennessee because there's 
a larger customer base.
Id. at 168-69.
    The DI concluded that in thirty-five instances, Respondent's 
monthly sales constituted suspicious orders based solely on the 
quantities; he also testified that these sales should have been 
reported to DEA but were not. Id. at 154-55. The Government submitted 
into evidence its compilation of the sales (GX 24), which shows the 
following sales by store and number of bottles:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Number
                                                                   of
                                                                 bottles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Chevron Food Mart, Hazard, Kentucky
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2004..................................................       324
February 2004.................................................       144
March 2004....................................................       252
April 2004....................................................       432
May 2004......................................................       288
June 2004.....................................................       156
August 2004...................................................       228
September 2004................................................       216
October 2004..................................................       288
November 2004.................................................       240
December 2004.................................................       240
January 2005..................................................       216
February 2005.................................................       216
March 2005....................................................       396
April 2005....................................................       216
May 2005......................................................       180
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Fast Stop, Covington, Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 2004................................................       168
October 2004..................................................        60
February 2005.................................................       156
March 2005....................................................       144
April 2005....................................................       156
May 2005......................................................       144
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Fast Mart Appomattox, Appomattox, Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 2004................................................        84
October 2004..................................................       144
December 2004.................................................       144
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Holiday Chevron, Marion, Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2005..................................................       468
February 2005.................................................       708
March 2005....................................................       948
April 2005....................................................       900
May 2005......................................................       984
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Garner Mountain Food Market, Isom, Kentucky
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 2005......................................................       108
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Glade Spring Chevron, Glade Spring, Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2005....................................................       168
May 2005......................................................        60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Hillbilly Market, Bristol, Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2005....................................................       324
May 2005......................................................      144
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GX 24.

    Notably, this compilation provides no information as to the number 
of tablets in each bottle, the strength of the ephedrine in each 
tablet, and the chemical composition of the ephedrine (hcl or sulfate). 
Mr. Mitchell admitted, however, that Respondent's sales in March, April 
and May of 2005 to the Holiday Chevron in Marion, Virginia, exceeded 
the threshold amount of 1000 grams, which was then in effect, and which 
made the distributions a regulated transaction under Federal law.\23\ 
Tr. 372-73; see 21 CFR 1310.04(f) (2004 & 2005). Mr. Mitchell further 
testified that the salesman who handled the Holiday Chevron's account 
had told him that the store's owner ``had two locations, and he 
sometimes moved product from one place to the other.'' Tr. 380-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Following the enactment of the Combat Methamphetamine 
Epidemic Act of 2005, the thresholds for combination ephedrine 
products were eliminated. Accordingly, all transactions involving 
ephedrine, ``regardless of size, are subject to recordkeeping and 
reporting requirement as set forth in 21 CFR part 1310.'' 21 CFR 
1310.04(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, according to Respondent's compilation of its sales to 
the Holiday Chevron, it sold even greater quantities of ephedrine 
products to the store in the months of August (1272 bottles totaling 
54,864 tablets), October (1284 totaling 55,440 tablets), and November 
2005 (1248 totaling 55,872 tablets). See RX 39, at 4-6. Each of these 
transactions exceeded the 1,000 gram threshold and yet none of them 
were reported to the Agency.
    The Government also relied on Respondent's DEA Log (GX 21), as 
support for its contention that it had engaged in excessive sales. See 
Tr. 143. Beyond the fact that the log is incomplete, the Government did 
not use this data to calculate an average monthly sale of ephedrine 
products per store or the statistical probability that any sale was 
excessive.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Apparently based on these transactions, the Government also 
alleged that Respondent's ``sales were vastly in excess of the 
amounts of this * * * product needed to meet'' legitimate medical 
needs. Show Cause Order at 4. The Government did not, however, 
introduce any studies to support this contention. Instead, the 
Government apparently relies on findings made in other cases which 
were based on expert testimony. See Gov. Br. at 22-23. However, in 
Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52693-94 (2008), I noted 
that there were serious flaws in the methodology used by the 
Government's expert in determining the level of sales which is 
consistent with legitimate demand. I thus make no findings on the 
issue.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 78739]]

    As to the Holiday Chevron in Marion, Virginia, Mr. Mitchell 
testified that he still sold listed chemical product to it and that the 
store was visited twice a month. Tr. 413. He also testified that he 
knew the store had purchased listed chemicals from another distributor 
in the past, but maintained that he did not know if the store was still 
doing so. Id.
    Mr. Mitchell also admitted that he had not inquired as to whether 
several of the stores identified in GX 24 were obtaining listed 
chemicals from other distributors. Tr. 422 (Hillbilly Market); id. at 
424 (Holiday Chevron). He then admitted that he knew that the Hillbilly 
Market, the Fast Mart, and again the Holiday Chevron, had had accounts 
with other distributors, and yet Respondent had continued to sell to 
them. Id. at 422-25. He also admitted that his route salesmen had 
``been told of other stores that receive this product by mail in large 
quantities.'' Id. at 409.
    More generally, Mr. Mitchell stated that he did not think that his 
salesmen would, in soliciting a new customer, ask the customer whether 
they were purchasing listed chemical products from another distributor. 
Id. at 430-31. He also acknowledged that a customer's purchasing of 
list I chemicals from another distributor had never affected 
Respondent's decision to sell to that customer and that Respondent 
would continue to sell to it. Id. at 408. According to the DI, a 
retailer's having multiple distributors for list I chemical products 
was typical for sales in the illicit market. Id. at 139.
    After the on-site inspection, the DIs visited two of the stores to 
which Respondent distributed list I products (David's Market in 
Bristol, Tennessee, and the Fast Stop in Covington, Virginia) to verify 
that they were customers. Tr. 134. The manager at David's Market, Ms. 
A.O., provided copies of receipts which matched Respondent's sales 
records. Id. at 135. According to the DI, Ms. A.O. indicated that the 
list I chemical products sold quickly and, because she saw bad things 
happening in the market's parking lot, she believed people were buying 
the products for the ``wrong reason.'' Id. at 135-36. As to the parking 
lot, Ms. A.O. stated that she had found what looked like a syringe and 
that she witnessed what she believed to be drug dealing taking place 
there. Id. at 136. According to Ms. A.O., David's Market also received 
list I chemical products from another distributor. Id. at 138-39.
    At the Fast Stop, the owner indicated initially that he received 
list I chemical products every two to four weeks. Tr. 141. 
Subsequently, however, the owner told another DI that he only ordered 
such products every six to nine weeks. Id.
    During the June 2005 investigation, the testifying DI asked Mr. 
Mitchell whether he had ever considered giving up the list I chemical 
products business, given its relationship to the illicit manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Id. at 131. Mr. Mitchell responded that ``he was doing 
a pretty good business selling these products and was not interested in 
giving up the DEA registration at that time.'' \25\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Mr. Mitchell testified that, although the Meth-Free 
Tennessee Act reduced his sales of ephedrine, even soft-gel 
formulations of List I chemical products were ``fast movers.'' Tr. 
388-89, 418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, during the June 2005 inspection, the DI observed that 
Respondent was selling ``Love Roses,'' a product which is ``a small 
glass cylinder that contains a plastic rose inside it,'' which is three 
to four inches in length and which has a removable cork at the ends. 
Tr. 118. The DI testified that this product is ``commonly used'' as a 
crack pipe, that it does not have a legitimate purpose, and that it is 
drug paraphernalia.\26\ Id. at 191.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The DI maintained that the product does not have a 
legitimate purpose. Tr. 191. When asked by Respondent's counsel if 
he had ``ever give[n] a loved one a rose?,'' the DI answered: ``Not 
a plastic rose that's three inches tall in a plastic vial for $ 1 
from the convenience store.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DI further testified that he told Mr. Mitchell what the product 
was used for and that Mr. Mitchell found this information surprising. 
Id. at 192. While Mr. Mitchell testified that he was unaware that Love 
Roses were used as drug paraphernalia until the 2005 inspection, id. at 
375; he admitted that Respondent was still selling the product as of 
the date of the hearing. Id. at 390.
    On cross-examination, Mr. Mitchell testified that he did not know 
why the pill forms of ephedrine were ``moving as fast as they were.'' 
Id. at 403. When asked whether he had ``ever pause[d] to think that 
these products could be'' resold ``to the illicit market?''; Mr. 
Mitchell answered: ``You know I guess I've taken the attitude that I 
have no control on what the retail public does with the [list I 
chemical] product.'' Id. at 404.

Discussion

    Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act provides that a 
registration to distribute a list I chemical ``may be suspended or 
revoked * * * upon a finding that the registrant * * * has committed 
such acts as would render [its] registration under section 823 of this 
title inconsistent with the public interest as determined under such 
section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). Moreover, under section 303(h), ``[t]he 
Attorney General shall register any applicant to distribute a list I 
chemical unless the Attorney General determines that registration of 
the applicant is inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 
823(h). In making the public interest determination, Congress directed 
that the following factors be considered:

    (1) Maintenance by the [registrant] of effective controls 
against diversion of the listed chemicals into other than legitimate 
channels;
    (2) Compliance by the [registrant] with applicable Federal, 
State, or local law;
    (3) Any prior conviction record of the [registrant] under 
Federal or State laws relating to controlled substances or to 
chemicals controlled under Federal or State law;
    (4) Any past experience of the [registrant] in the manufacture 
and distribution of chemicals; and
    (5) Such other factors as are relevant to and consistent with 
the public health and safety.

Id. Sec.  823(h).
    ``These factors may be considered in the disjunctive.'' Joy's 
Ideas, 70 FR 33195, 33197 (2005). I ``may rely on any one or a 
combination of factors and may give each factor the weight [I] deem[] 
appropriate'' in determining whether to revoke an existing registration 
or to deny an application to renew a registration. Robert A. Leslie, 68 
FR 15227, 15230 (2003). Moreover, I am ``not required to make findings 
as to all of the factors.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 
2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
    In this matter I have considered all of the statutory factors. 
While I find that several of the allegations are not proved, I conclude 
that the record as a whole establishes that Respondent does not 
maintain effective controls against diversion (factor one) and that 
Respondent violated both the CSA's requirement to report suspicious 
orders and its prohibitions against the knowing sale of drug 
paraphernalia (factor two). While I have also considered Respondent's 
(and its employees') lack of criminal convictions, and its experience 
in distributing chemicals,\27\ I

[[Page 78740]]

nonetheless conclude that factors one and two make out a prima facie 
case that Respondent's continued registration ``is inconsistent with 
the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h). I further conclude that 
Respondent has not adequately addressed the violations of law and the 
deficiencies identified in its diversion controls, and that therefore, 
it has not rebutted the Government's prima facie case. Accordingly, 
Respondent's registration will be revoked and its pending application 
to renew its registration will be denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ I acknowledge that Respondent has been registered since 
1999. However, as explained below, because the record establishes 
that Respondent has violated several provisions of Federal law and 
does not maintain effective controls against diversion, I conclude 
that it is not necessary to make findings under this factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Factor One--Maintenance of Effective Controls Against Diversion

    Under DEA precedent and regulations, this factor encompasses a 
variety of considerations. See Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 
52698 (2008). These include, inter alia, the adequacy of the 
registrant's/applicant's security arrangements, the adequacy of its 
recordkeeping and reporting, and its distribution practices. Id. 
Moreover, a distributor must exercise a high degree of care in 
monitoring its customer's purchases. See Sunny Wholesale, Inc., 73 FR 
57655, 57663 (2008). In evaluating a registrant's security controls and 
procedures, DEA regulations direct that the Agency consider numerous 
factors including ``[t]he adequacy of the registrant's or applicant's 
systems for monitoring the receipt, distribution, and disposition of 
List I chemicals in its operations.'' 21 CFR 1309.71(b)(8).
    In its brief, the Government does not contend that Respondent's 
physical security arrangements at its registered location are 
inadequate. See Gov. Br. at 22-24. While I note the DI's testimony that 
the cage in which the products are stored in its warehouse could be 
easily breached, I further note that Respondent's facility is protected 
by an alarm system and its perimeter is surrounded by a chain link 
fence. I thus agree with the ALJ that Respondent provides adequate 
physical security for those products which are kept inside the 
warehouse.
    The record, however, also establishes that Respondent has a 
practice of storing list I products on its delivery trucks overnight 
(which do not appear to have alarms), both on the night before a 
salesman leaves on his route, as well as on those nights when a 
salesman stays in a hotel. DEA has previously held that this practice 
does not provide adequate security for list I products. As I have 
previously explained, when products are left overnight on trucks, a 
thief does not have to spend time offloading the products, but can 
steal the entire vehicle with its cargo, and do so in a manner of 
seconds. See Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52698 (2008), 
pet. for review denied, 571 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2009); McBride 
Marketing, 71 FR 35710, 35711 (2006).
    During the inspection, the DIs further found that Respondent had 
shortages of 109 bottles of Max Brand and 275 bottles of Ephedrine 
Multi-Action. While the DI testified that he did not consider the 
shortages to be significant in terms of Respondent's total sales of the 
products,\28\ it is still a factor to be considered in assessing the 
adequacy of its controls against diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ It is also noted that the audit involved only two products 
and covered only a five-month period. See GX 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Relatedly, the record establishes that Respondent destroyed 
products on at least two occasions. GX 14. While Respondent was not 
required to report the destructions to DEA under Federal law or Agency 
regulations, it did not make a contemporaneous record of either 
destruction. Id. Given the frailties of human memory, the creation of a 
contemporaneous record is essential to maintaining an accurate 
accounting of the products that were destroyed.
    The ALJ further found that Respondent does not maintain effective 
controls against diversion because some of its customers purchase list 
I products from other distributors and Respondent's personnel do not 
ask its customers whether they are purchasing from other distributors. 
ALJ at 36. While a customer can seek out another supplier for a 
legitimate business reason (i.e., because it offers a lower price), 
when the store is actively buying from multiple distributors, the 
distributor has an obligation to determine whether the quantities it is 
obtaining are excessive in relation to what the distributor knows about 
typical purchasing patterns of stores serving similar markets, and if 
so, not sell to the store. Mr. Mitchell's failure to instruct his 
salesmen to make these inquiries of his customers, as well as his 
admission that he continued to sell to several stores even though he 
knew that they were purchasing listed chemical products ``by mail in 
large quantities'' from other distributors, Tr. 409, provides further 
support for a finding that Respondent does not maintain effective 
controls against diversion. See Holloway Distributing, 72 FR 42118, 
42124 (2007) (``[A] registrant has an affirmative duty to protect 
against diversion by knowing its customers and the nature of their list 
I chemical sales * * *. A registrant cannot avoid the requirements of 
Federal law by instructing its sales force to ask no questions of its 
customers and thereby be deliberately ignorant of diversion.'').
    I thus conclude that Respondent does not maintain effective 
controls against diversion. This finding provides reason alone to 
conclude that Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with 
the public interest.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ In its post-hearing brief, the Government argued that I 
should apply the ``market analysis performed by a DEA expert in the 
field regarding the `normal expected sales range' of listed chemical 
products by `non-traditional retailers.''' Gov't Br. at 22 (citing 
Holloway Distributing, 72 FR at 42123). Conceding that ``the 
Government did not present a market study in these proceedings,'' 
the Government nonetheless argued that I apply the ``findings of 
marketing expert Jonathan Robbin who found that `* * * the expected 
sales range for combination ephedrine products at a convenience 
store is `between $0 and $25, with an average of $12.58 per 
month.''' Id. at 23 (citing Planet Trading, Inc. d/b/a United 
Wholesale Distributors, Inc., 72 FR 11055, 11056 (2007)). However, 
in Novelty Distributors, I found that the methodology for 
determining the normal expected sales range for convenience stores' 
marketing of ephedrine products was unreliable. 73 FR at 52693-94. 
Accordingly, I reject the Government's argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Factor Two--Respondent's Compliance With Applicable Laws

    At the hearing, the Government put on evidence suggesting four 
different ways in which Respondent violated Federal law.\30\ More 
specifically, the Government alleged that: (1) It was required to 
report the transactions which it shipped by mail, (2) it failed to 
report suspicious transactions, (3) it sold drug paraphernalia, and (4) 
it knowingly or intentionally distributed ephedrine having reasonable 
cause to believe the product would be used in the illicit manufacture 
of methamphetamine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ As discussed under factor one, the Government also elicited 
testimony from an Investigator to the effect that Respondent was 
required to report the destruction of List I products. In its brief, 
the Government does not cite this testimony as evidence relevant to 
any of the public interest factors. See Gov. Br. 22-29. More 
importantly, a destruction of a listed chemical does not fall within 
any of the circumstances which trigger the obligation to report to 
the Agency under Federal law or DEA regulations. See 21 U.S.C. 
830(b); 21 CFR 1310.05(a). As explained above, a destruction should, 
however, be documented in the registrant's records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In her decision, the ALJ concluded that Respondent violated Federal 
law by failing to report suspicious transactions,\31\ by failing to 
file monthly

[[Page 78741]]

reports of transactions which were shipped by mail, and by knowingly 
distributing listed chemicals when it had reasonable cause to believe 
the products would be diverted. ALJ at 36-37. The ALJ did not, however, 
address whether Respondent violated Federal law by selling drug 
paraphernalia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ While the ALJ cited Respondent's failure to report 
suspicious transactions under both factors one and two, her 
reasoning was provided under factor one. See ALJ at 35-37. Because 
this requirement is directly imposed by statute, I discuss it under 
factor two. However, whether the requirement is discussed under 
factor one or two is not significant as what matters is the extent 
of the violations, if any.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Respondent's Failure To Report Mail-Order Transactions

    As found above, on thirty-four occasions between July 20, 2004, and 
May 25, 2005, Respondent shipped list I products containing 
pseudoephedrine to three stores using either the mail or some other 
common carrier. GX 22. Moreover, it is undisputed that Respondent did 
not file reports for any of the shipments. Based on these findings, the 
ALJ concluded that Respondent violated DEA regulations, reasoning that 
``21 CFR 1310.03(c) at relevant times required handlers of listed 
chemicals to file monthly reports of transactions by mail.'' ALJ at 36-
37.
    The CSA specifically requires that:

[e]ach regulated person who engages in a transaction with a 
nonregulated person * * * which--

    (i) involves ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine 
(including drug products containing these chemicals); and
    (ii) uses or attempts to use the Postal Service or any private 
or commercial carrier;

    shall, on a monthly basis, submit a report of each such 
transaction conducted during the previous month to the Attorney 
General in such form, containing such data, and at such times as the 
Attorney General shall establish by regulation.

21 U.S.C. 830(b)(3)(B); see also 21 CFR 1310.03(c) (``Each regulated 
person who engages in a transaction with a nonregulated person * * * 
that involves ephedrine [or] pseudoephedrine * * * including drug 
products containing these chemicals, and uses or attempts to use the 
Postal Service or any private or commercial carrier must file monthly 
reports of each such transaction * * * .'').\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Unless otherwise noted in this discussion, all citations 
and quotations to the U.S. Code and DEA regulations are to the 
statute and regulations that were in effect at the time of the 
conduct at issue and as they were then numbered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CSA further defines ``[t]he term `regulated person' '' to mean 
in relevant part, ``a person who manufactures, distributes, imports, or 
exports a listed chemical.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(38). Moreover, the Act 
defines ``[t]he term `distribute' '' to mean ``to deliver (other than 
by administering or dispensing) * * * a listed chemical.'' 21 U.S.C. 
802(11).
    Respondent is thus clearly a ``regulated person'' under the Act and 
subject to the mail order reporting provision. However, as the text of 
the mail order reporting provision makes clear, the reporting 
requirement does not apply to all mail order transactions which a 
regulated person engages in, but rather, only those it engages in 
``with a nonregulated person,'' 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(3)(B), a term which 
neither Congress nor the Agency have defined. See generally 21 U.S.C. 
802; 21 CFR 1300.02. The critical question therefore is whether a 
retail store is a ``nonregulated person'' under this provision.
    Neither the Government in its brief, nor the ALJ in her decision, 
even acknowledge the statutory text, let alone address this issue. See 
generally Gov. Br. at 22-29; ALJ at 36-37. Moreover, there are numerous 
reasons that support the conclusion that retail stores were--even prior 
to the enactment of the CMEA--regulated persons under the Act.
    The first reason is that a retail store which sells listed 
chemicals engages in distribution as that term is defined by the Act--
it delivers (other than by administering or dispensing) a chemical to a 
customer. See 21 U.S.C. 802(11). Relatedly, Congress defined the term 
``retail distributor'' to ``mean a grocery store, general merchandise 
store, drug store, or other entity or person whose activities as a 
distributor relating to pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine products 
are limited almost exclusively to sales for personal use * * * either 
directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct 
sales.'' \33\ Id. section 802(46)(A); see also 21 CFR 1300.02(b)(29). 
It is thus clear that under the Act, retail sales constitute 
distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ While this version does not list ephedrine, the statute was 
subsequently amended to include this chemical. See 21 U.S.C. 
802(49)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, while DEA has exempted from registration list I retail 
distributors ``whose activities * * * are limited to the distribution 
of below-threshold quantities of a pseudoephedrine * * * or combination 
ephedrine product * * * in a single transaction to an individual for 
legitimate medical use,'' 21 CFR 1309.24(e), DEA regulations further 
provided that ``[a]ny person exempted from the registration requirement 
under this section shall comply with the security requirements set 
forth in Sec.  1309.71-1309.73 of this part and the record-keeping and 
reporting requirement set forth under parts 1310 and 1313 of this 
chapter.'' Id. Sec.  1309.24(k). A retail distributor was thus (and 
remains) subject to Agency regulations and cannot be deemed to be a 
``nonregulated person'' under 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(3)(B).
    This conclusion finds further support in the exceptions which 
Congress created to the reporting requirement. See id. section 
830(b)(3)(D). Among these is the exception for ``[d]istributions of 
drug products by retail distributors that may not include face-to-face 
transactions to the extent that such distributions are consistent with 
the activities authorized for a retail distributor as specified in 
section 802(46).'' Id. section 830(b)(3)(D)(ii). Because the reporting 
requirement only applies to regulated persons, there would be no need 
to exempt retail distributors if they were nonregulated persons. 
Accordingly, I am compelled to reject the ALJ's conclusion that 
Respondent violated Federal law when it failed to report the mail order 
transactions.

Respondent's Failure To Report Suspicious Transactions

    The Government argued, and the ALJ concluded, that Respondent 
violated Federal law and DEA regulations by failing to report 
suspicious transactions. More specifically, the ALJ apparently found 
that Respondent violated Federal law by failing to report each of the 
thirty-five transactions identified in Government Exhibit 24. See ALJ 
at 35-36. She further rejected Respondent's contention that this 
requirement only applies to sales which exceed the threshold amount. 
Id. at 36; see also Gov. Br. at 23 (asserting that DEA has rejected the 
defense that a registrant is not required to report suspicious 
transactions which are below the threshold).
    Adopting the Government's reasoning, the ALJ explained that:

    First, * * * a sale of an over-the-threshold amount of listed 
chemical is subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and 
may or may not be a suspicious transaction. Likewise, a sale of a 
quantity less than the threshold amount may nonetheless be 
suspicious. Second, and more importantly, an order from a small 
retailer for hundreds of bottles of a product that is regulated 
precisely because it can be used for illicit purposes should 
immediately cause the distributor of that product concern as to why 
his customer is ordering such quantities.

ALJ at 35-36.
    Here again, neither the ALJ in her decision, nor the Government in 
its brief, even acknowledge the text of the relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. 
830(b)(1). See id. at 35-37. The statute provides in pertinent part:

    (1) Each regulated person shall report to the Attorney General, 
in such form and manner as the Attorney General shall prescribe by 
regulation--

[[Page 78742]]

    (A) any regulated transaction involving an extraordinary 
quantity of a listed chemical, an uncommon method of payment or 
delivery, or any other circumstance that the regulated person 
believes may indicate that the listed chemical will be used in 
violation of this subchapter.

21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). See also 21 CFR 1310.05(a)(1) 
(``Each regulated person shall report to the Special Agent in Charge of 
the DEA Divisional Office for the area in which the regulated person 
making the report is located, as follows: * * * Any regulated 
transaction involving an extraordinary quantity of a listed chemical, 
an uncommon method of payment or delivery, or any other circumstance 
that the regulated person believes may indicate that the listed 
chemical will be used in violation of this part.'').
    Notably, Congress did not require that any transaction ``involving 
an extraordinary quantity of a listed chemical'' (or involving the 
other two circumstances set forth in this paragraph) be reported by a 
regulated person. 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1)(A). Rather, it required the 
reporting only of a ``regulated transaction involving an extraordinary 
quantity of a listed chemical,'' or a regulated transaction involving 
the other two circumstances. Id. (emphasis added)
    Moreover, Congress defined ``[t]he term `regulated transaction' '' 
to mean ``a distribution, receipt, [or] sale * * * of, a listed 
chemical, or if the Attorney General establishes a threshold amount for 
a specific listed chemical, a threshold amount, including a cumulative 
threshold amount for multiple transactions * * * of a listed 
chemical[.]'' Id. Sec.  802(39)(A). With respect to the combination 
ephedrine products at issue here, DEA regulations in effect at the time 
of the transactions set a threshold of 1000 grams ``within a calendar 
month'' for distributions between Respondent and a retail store 
customer.\34\ 21 CFR 1310.04(f) & (f)(ii) (2004) & (2005). Accordingly, 
only those cumulative transactions which met the 1000 gram threshold 
within a given calendar month constituted regulated transactions for 
the purpose of the requirement to report a suspicious order under 21 
U.S.C. 830(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Under the regulation, whether the threshold had been 
reached (and a regulated transaction had occurred) was based on 
``the cumulative amount for multiple transactions within a calendar 
month.'' 21 CFR 1310.04(f). The thresholds were eliminated by the 
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005. See USA Patriot 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 
section 712(b), 120 Stat. 192, 264 (2006). For all transactions 
occurring after the effective date of the legislation, ``the size of 
the transaction is not a factor in determining whether the 
transaction meets the definition of a regulated transaction * * *. 
All such transactions, regardless of size, are subject to 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements as set forth in * * * part 
[1310] and notification provisions as set forth in part 1313 * * 
*.'' 21 CFR 1310.04(g).
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    As noted above, the ALJ held that all of the transactions 
identified by the Government in its exhibit 24 were suspicious orders 
which Respondent was required to report. The ALJ's holding was based 
entirely on policy considerations and was not grounded in the relevant 
statutory texts. While these policy considerations are undoubtedly 
valid, they cannot trump the clear and unambiguous text of the statute. 
As the Supreme Court has explained: ``When a court reviews an agency's 
construction of the statute it administers * * * [i]f the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.'' Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984). In short, on this issue, Congress made the policy 
determination when it limited the reporting requirement to those 
transactions which met the definition of a ``regulated transaction.''
    Mr. Mitchell admitted, however, that the sales his firm made in 
March, April and May 2005 to the Holiday Chevron in Marion, Virginia 
exceeded the threshold.\35\ The record establishes that these sales 
were for 948, 900, and 984 bottles in the respective months. In 
addition, Respondent's evidence further showed that it sold even 
greater quantities, and which exceeded the threshold, in August (1272 
bottles), October (1284 bottles), and November (1248 bottles) of 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ In light of Mr. Mitchell's admission, I deem waived any 
argument that the sales did not exceed the 1000 gram threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to Respondent's brief, ``[a]ny sales above the[] 
`threshold' quantities * * * [Mr.] Mitchell considered `suspicious' and 
any quantity less than the computed `threshold' [Mr.] Mitchell did not 
consider suspicious.'' Resp. Br. at 4 (proposed findings of fact at 
]8). Notwithstanding Mr. Mitchell's acknowledgement that sales above 
threshold were suspicious, he did not report any of the six sales to 
DEA.
    Moreover, while I reject the ALJ's finding that most of 
Respondent's customers were purchasing only twelve to twenty-four 
bottles, I conclude that these six sales ``involved [an] extraordinary 
quantity'' based on both the absolute amount of each sale and that the 
sales were approximately double to nearly triple what Respondent had 
sold to this store in a previous month (468 bottles). Any responsible 
person would have recognized that these sales were suspicious and Mr. 
Mitchell admitted that they were.\36\ Accordingly, these sales involved 
an ``extraordinary quantity'' and were subject to reporting under 
section 830(b)(1)(A).\37\ I therefore hold that Respondent violated 
Federal law and DEA regulations by failing to report these sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ In her discussion of Respondent's obligation to report 
suspicious orders, the ALJ explained that ``Respondent did not 
controvert [the DI's] testimony that most of its customers purchased 
twelve or twenty-four bottles per month.'' ALJ at 35. A review of 
Respondent's evidence suggests that its average monthly sale was 
considerably more. Respondent did not, however, provide any 
statistical analysis to show what its average sale was.
    \37\ I note Respondent's evidence that the owner of the Holiday 
Chevron was purportedly buying for two stores. See RX 53. This 
contention is legally irrelevant as the transactions occurred with a 
single person. Significantly, while Congress exempted ``a domestic 
lawful distribution in the usual course of business between agents 
or employees of a single regulated person'' from the definition of a 
regulation transaction, it did not exempt the distribution to that 
regulated person. 21 U.S.C. 802(39)(A) & (A)(i). Indeed, were such 
transactions exempt from reporting, the purpose of the statute would 
be seriously undermined.
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Alleged Violations of 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2)

    The Government also alleged that Respondent violated 21 U.S.C. 
841(c)(2),\38\ because ``Respondent had `reasonable cause to believe' 
that the large quantities of ephedrine products it sold to Fast Stop 
Covington, Chevron Food Mart[,] * * * [and] Holiday Chevron * * * would 
be used to manufacture methamphetamine.'' Gov. Br. at 26. The 
Government further argues that it ``is not required to prove that the 
products were actually used to manufacture methamphetamine,'' and that 
there is no quantity threshold which exempts a merchant from criminal 
liability under the statute. Id. (citing cases). The ALJ agreed with 
the Government and found that Respondent violated 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2) 
because it sold ``excessive quantities of listed chemicals'' and ``it 
should have known that some of those chemicals were likely to be 
diverted to the illicit manufacture of * * * methamphetamine.'' ALJ at 
37.
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    \38\ This provision makes it a felony for ``[a]ny person who 
knowingly or intentionally * * * possesses or distributes a listed 
chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the 
listed chemical will be used to manufacture a control substance 
except as authorized by'' the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Government is correct that it need not show that the ephedrine 
Respondent distributed was actually used to manufacture methamphetamine 
and that the then-existing threshold that triggered reporting 
requirements did not

[[Page 78743]]

create a safe harbor which allowed a registrant to distribute a listed 
chemical product in disregard for the ultimate disposition of those 
products. Holloway Distributing, 72 FR 42118, 42124 (2007) (collecting 
cases); see also United States v. Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 
2006) (`` `[t]here is no quantity threshold exempting a merchant from 
criminal liability under section 841(c)(2).' '').
    The Government ignores, however, that to establish a violation of 
this provision it must show that Respondent (or its principal) knew 
facts that provided ``reasonable cause to believe'' that the ephedrine 
it distributed would be used to illicitly manufacture methamphetamine. 
Holloway, 72 FR at 42124. As one court of appeals has explained, the 
Government must show that Respondent ``knew, or knew facts that would 
have made a reasonable person aware, that the [ephedrine] would be used 
to make methamphetamine.'' United States v. Kaur, 362 F.3d 1155, 1158 
(9th Cir. 2004).
    In support of her conclusion that Respondent was selling excessive 
quantities, the ALJ cited the DI's testimony that Respondent was 
selling only twelve to twenty-four bottles a month to most of its 
customers (Tr. 143). The DI's testimony was based on his review of an 
exhibit (GX 21), which purports to be a record of Respondent's monthly 
sales to each customer. The record is, however, clearly incomplete and 
was missing data (for every month no less) for most of Respondent's 
customers. While it is unclear why this record is incomplete, what is 
clear is that this evidence is not reliable and does not satisfy the 
substantial evidence test. See 5 U.S.C. 556(d) (``A sanction may not be 
imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole 
record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in 
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial 
evidence.'').\39\ I therefore conclude that the Government has not met 
its burden and that this allegation is not proved.
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    \39\ Moreover, while months before the hearing, Respondent 
provided the Government with additional sales records, the 
Government offered no statistical analysis of the data to show why, 
based on its sales level alone, Respondent had ``reasonable cause to 
believe'' that the products it distributed would be used to 
manufacture methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Alleged Sales of Drug Paraphernalia

    The Government further alleged that Respondent sold Love Roses, a 
product consisting of a small glass tube which contains a plastic 
flower and has removable ends. It is undisputed that this item is 
``commonly used'' to smoke crack cocaine, and that it has no legitimate 
purpose. Tr. 191. It is also undisputed that during the June 2005 
inspection, the DI told Respondent that this item was used to smoke 
crack and yet Respondent continued to sell the product and was still 
doing so at the time of the hearing. The ALJ did not, however, address 
the allegation in her decision. See ALJ at 36-38.
    Under Federal law, ``[i]t is unlawful for any person * * * to sell 
or offer for sale drug paraphernalia.'' 21 U.S.C. 863(a). As relevant 
here, this statute defines ``[t]he term `drug paraphernalia' [to] 
mean[] any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is 
primarily intended or designed for use in * * * ingesting, inhaling, or 
other introducing into the human body a controlled substance, 
possession of which is unlawful under the'' CSA. Id. section 863(d). 
Section 863(d) further provides that drug paraphernalia ``includes 
items primarily intended or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or 
otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, hashish oil, PCP, 
methamphetamine, or amphetamines into the human body, such as * * * 
metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or 
without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal 
bowls.'' Id. section (d) & (1).
    The Supreme Court has explained that Section 863(d) ``identifies 
two categories of drug paraphernalia: those items `primarily intended * 
* * for use' with controlled substances and those items `designed for 
use' with such substances.'' Posters `N'' Things, Ltd. v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 513, 518 (1994).\40\ With respect to the latter 
category, the Court explained that ``[a]n item is `designed for use' * 
* * if it `is principally used with illegal drugs by virtue of its 
objective features, i.e., features designed by the manufacturer.' '' 
Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 501 (1982)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ While Posters `N' Things addressed the prior version of the 
Federal drug paraphernalia statute, the Court explained that ``[t]he 
language of Sec.  863 is identical to that of former Sec.  857 
except in the general description of the offense.'' 511 U.S. at 516 
n.5. Of note, section 863 expanded the scope of prohibited acts with 
respect to drug paraphernalia and did not alter the definition of 
the term ``drug paraphernalia.'' See id. Accordingly, the Court's 
interpretation of the term remains lawful authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In construing the ``primarily intended * * * for use'' language, 
the Court acknowledged that the phrase ``could refer to the intent of 
nondefendants, including manufacturers, distributors, retailers, buyers 
or users.'' Id. at 519. Based on its analysis of the statute's text and 
structure, the Court concluded that the term ``is to be understood 
objectively and refers generally to an item's likely use.'' Id at 521. 
The Court further explained that where an item has multiple uses, ``it 
is the likely use of customers generally, [and] not [of] any particular 
customer, that can render a multiple-use item drug paraphernalia.'' Id. 
at 522 n.11.
    While the Court construed section 863 as imposing a scienter 
requirement of knowledge, the Court held that ``the knowledge standard 
in this context [does not] require knowledge on the defendant's part 
that a particular customer actually will use an item of drug 
paraphernalia with illegal drugs.'' Id. at 524. The Court further 
explained that ``[i]t is sufficient that the defendant be aware that 
customers in general are likely to use the merchandise with drugs. 
Therefore, the Government must establish that the defendant knew that 
the items at issue are likely to be used with illegal drugs.'' Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 444 (1978) (``knowledge of `probable consequences' sufficient 
for conviction'')).\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See also 511 U.S. at 524 n.13 (quoting United States v. 
Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 1992) (``Government must prove 
that defendant `contemplated, or reasonably expected under the 
circumstances, that the item sold or offered for sale would be used 
with illegal drugs' '') and United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d 
1564, 1567 (2d Cir. 1992) (``Government must prove that defendant 
`knew there was a strong probability the items would be so used.' 
'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence establishes that a Love Rose's likely use is to smoke 
illicit drugs, and that Respondent sold this item knowing that they 
were ``likely to be used with illegal drugs.'' Id. As explained above, 
Congress expressly included in the definition of ``drug 
paraphernalia,'' a list of items which ``constitute[e] per se drug 
paraphernalia.'' Id. at 519. Of relevance here, Congress included in 
this list ``metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic 
pipes with or without screens.'' 21 U.S.C. 863(d). As the record shows, 
a Love Rose is nothing more than a small and fake flower inserted in a 
glass pipe; that the pipe contains a flower does not make it any less a 
pipe. Tr. 118; See also Posters `N' Things, 511 U.S. at 518 (observing 
that certain items ``including bongs, cocaine freebase kits, and 
certain kinds of pipes, have no other use besides contrived ones (such 
as use of a bong as a flower vase)''). The item thus falls within the 
statutory definition of ``drug paraphernalia.'' See 21 U.S.C. 863(d).
    Furthermore, even if the Love Rose does not fall strictly within 
the ``list of * * * items constituting per se drug

[[Page 78744]]

paraphernalia,'' 511 U.S. at 519, there was ample evidence establishing 
that the item's ``likely use'' is to ingest illicit drugs. Id. at 521. 
The DI testified that Love Roses are ``commonly used'' to smoke crack 
and that the product has no legitimate purpose.\42\ Tr. 191; see also 
Gregg & Son Distributors, 74 FR 17517, 17522 (2009) (quoting Sharon 
Tubbs, ``A Crack Pipe by Any Other Name,'' St. Petersburg Times (Aug. 
10, 2001) (Floridian Section) (``The outsider assumes the rose tubes 
are meant to attract the impulse buyer who picks up a chintzy gift for 
his sweetie. But for addicts, the buy is anything but an impulse. 
Addicts go to stores looking for rose tubes, calling them `stems'--
street talk for [a] crack pipe.'')). The DI further testified as to how 
the product is adapted for use to smoke crack by removing the cork. Tr. 
118.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Indeed, even if one is cheap, if one is intent on 
expressing his/her affection for a loved one, there are plenty of 
other ways of doing so such as buying a real flower and not a fake 
one inside a small glass pipe. Mr. Mitchell's testimony proved this 
point. When asked on cross-examination what he understood the 
product was used for, Mr. Mitchell initially testified: ``Well they 
take them home to their wives to keep from getting beat up.'' Tr. 
390-91. Before the Government's counsel could even ask his next 
question, Mr. Mitchell added: ``I don't know. I'd get beat up if I 
took one home.'' Tr. 391. Mr. Mitchell then acknowledged that he had 
been told that the product was used as drug paraphernalia. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr. Mitchell was told by the DI 
during the June 2005 inspection that the product was used to smoke 
crack. Mr. Mitchell was thus ``aware that customers in general [we]re 
likely to use the merchandise with drugs.'' Posters N' Things, 511 U.S. 
at 524. Yet Mr. Mitchell admitted that Respondent continued to sell the 
product and was still doing so at the time of the inspection. I thus 
conclude that Respondent violated Federal law by selling drug 
paraphernalia. 21 U.S.C. 863(a).
    In conclusion, I find that Respondent violated Federal law and DEA 
regulations by failing to report six regulated transactions which were 
suspicious and by knowingly selling drug paraphernalia. These findings 
further support the conclusion that Respondent's continued registration 
is inconsistent with the public interest.

Factor Five--Other Factors Relevant to and Consistent With Public 
Health and Safety

    The illicit manufacture and abuse of methamphetamine have had 
pernicious effects on families and communities throughout the nation. 
This is especially so in States such as Tennessee and Kentucky, which, 
notwithstanding the enactment of laws at both the state and Federal 
level which more closely regulate or restrict the sale of certain 
listed chemical products, still have an extraordinarily serious problem 
with illicit methamphetamine production and its abuse. As the record 
demonstrates, in 2008, law enforcement authorities in Tennessee and 
Kentucky still seized 553 and 416 illegal meth. lab sites respectively. 
The illicit production of methamphetamine thus remains a grave threat 
to public health and safety in both States. Cutting off the supply 
source of methamphetamine traffickers is of critical importance in 
protecting the citizens of Tennessee and Kentucky (as well as the 
citizens of adjoining States) from the devastation wreaked by this 
drug.
    While listed chemical products containing ephedrine can still be 
lawfully marketed for over-the-counter use as a bronchodilator, 
numerous DEA orders have found (and the record here establishes) that 
convenience stores and gas stations constitute the non-traditional 
retail (or gray) market for legitimate consumers of products containing 
these chemicals. See, e.g., Tri-County Bait Distributors, 71 FR 52160, 
52161-62 (2006); D & S Sales, 71 FR at 37609; Branex, Inc., 69 FR 8682, 
8690-92 (2004); Resp. Br. 13 (``Respondent's evidence demonstrates that 
it sold List I chemical product to non-traditional retailers.''). DEA 
has further found that there is a substantial risk of diversion of list 
I chemicals into the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine when these 
products are sold by non-traditional retailers. See Sunny Wholesale, 
Inc., 73 FR 57655, 57667 (2008) (noting testimony of special agent, who 
had debriefed more than 200 individuals involved in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine, that gas stations, convenience stores, 
and other small retailers ``were the primary and preferred source of'' 
list I chemicals used by smaller meth. labs); TNT Distributors, Inc., 
70 FR 12729, 12730 (2005) (special agent testified that ``80 to 90 
percent of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine being used [in Tennessee] to 
manufacture methamphetamine was being obtained from convenience 
stores'').\43\ See also Joy's Ideas, 70 FR at 33199 (finding that the 
risk of diversion was ``real'' and ``substantial''); Jay Enterprises of 
Spartanburg, Inc., 70 FR 24620, 24621 (2005) (noting ``heightened risk 
of diversion'' if application to distribute to non-traditional 
retailers was granted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See OTC Distribution Co., 68 FR 70538, 70541 (2003) (noting 
``over 20 different seizures of [gray market distributor's] 
pseudoephedrine product at clandestine sites,'' and that in an 
eight-month period, distributor's product ``was seized at 
clandestine laboratories in eight states, with over 2 million dosage 
units seized in Oklahoma alone.''); MDI Pharmaceuticals, 68 FR 4233, 
4236 (2003) (finding that ``pseudoephedrine products distributed by 
[gray market distributor] have been uncovered at numerous 
clandestine methamphetamine settings throughout the United States 
and/or discovered in the possession of individuals apparently 
involved in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For this reason, DEA has closely scrutinized the adequacy of the 
diversion controls and the compliance records of those entities which 
distribute listed chemicals into this market. Moreover, even where a 
distributor's violations are not extensive and/or identified 
inadequacies in its diversion controls might be redressed through 
compliance conditions, DEA may still conclude that revocation is 
necessary to protect the public interest based on evidence that a 
registrant and/or its principals do not take seriously their 
responsibility either to prevent diversion or to comply with the CSA. 
See, e.g., Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52703 (2008) 
(revoking registration and rejecting ALJ's recommendation to impose 
compliance conditions based, in part, on registrant's failure to 
enforce its own policies), pet. for review denied, 571 F.3d 1176 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009); Holloway Distributing, 72 FR at 42126 (revoking 
registration and noting that while registrant had ``taken corrective 
actions, these measures [were] still not adequate to protect against 
the diversion of its products'').\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an Agency is not 
required to give a licensee the ``opportunity to demonstrate or 
achieve compliance with all lawful requirements'' prior to revoking 
a license ``in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, 
interest, or safety requires otherwise.'' 5 U.S.C. 558(c). While 
this exception likely applies here given the continued scope of the 
methamphetamine problem, especially in the States where Respondent 
distributes its products, I apply DEA's longstanding precedent that 
where ``the Government has proved that a registrant has committed 
acts inconsistent with the public interest, a registrant must 
present sufficient mitigating evidence to assure the Administrator 
that [it] can be entrusted with the responsibility carried by such a 
registration.'' Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008) 
(quoting cases). See also id. (``DEA has repeatedly held that where 
a registrant has committed acts inconsistent with the public 
interest, the registrant must accept responsibility for its actions 
and demonstrate that it will not engage in future misconduct.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As found above, Respondent's diversion controls are inadequate for 
four reasons: (1) Its practice of storing products on the trucks 
overnight, both at Respondent's facility and while the salesmen are 
servicing their routes; (2) it could not account for all of each 
product that was audited and did not have a contemporaneous record of 
products it destroyed; (3) its employees

[[Page 78745]]

do not ask their customers whether they are purchasing from other 
distributors; and (4) Mr. Mitchell acknowledged that he continued to 
sell to stores even when he knew they were obtaining ``large 
quantities'' from other distributors. Regarding these four 
deficiencies, Mr. Mitchell addressed only one of them--the storage of 
products on its trucks--and did so only with respect to when the trucks 
were at his facility.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ It is acknowledged that Respondent undertook to ensure that 
its customers obtained the necessary certifications required by the 
CMEA. Tr. 399. Yet this is only one of many factors that are 
properly considered in assessing whether Respondent's registration 
is consistent with the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence also showed that Respondent failed on six occasions to 
report suspicious monthly sales to a store as required by Federal law 
even though Mr. Mitchell acknowledged that the transactions were 
suspicious. Here again, Respondent did not offer any evidence that it 
has instituted a program to identify and report suspicious orders.
    Relatedly, when asked whether he had ``ever pause[d] to think'' 
that the ephedrine products his firm distributes could be resold to 
traffickers, Mr. Mitchell explained: ``I've guess I've taken the 
attitude that I have no control on what the retail public does with the 
product.'' Tr. 404. As noted above, consistent with this attitude, Mr. 
Mitchell admitted that his firm had continued to sell to stores even 
when he knew the stores were buying large quantities from other 
distributors. And as if further evidence of Mr. Mitchell's and his 
firm's indifference to their obligations to comply with the law is 
needed, the record further showed that Respondent violated the CSA by 
selling a product whose likely use is as drug paraphernalia, and did so 
even after the DI told Mr. Mitchell that the product was used for this 
purpose.
    Mr. Mitchell's and his firm's clear disregard of their 
responsibility to protect against diversion and comply with the law 
``is fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of a DEA 
registrant.'' Holloway, 72 FR at 42124; see also D & S Sales, 71 FR 71 
FR at 37610 (noting that a registrant is ``required to exercise a high 
degree of care in monitoring its customers' purchases'') (int. 
quotations and citations omitted). Because it is clear that Mr. 
Mitchell does not understand the nature of his firm's obligations, I 
conclude that Respondent's continued registration ``would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h). Accordingly, 
Respondent's registration will be revoked and any pending application 
will be denied.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(h) and 
824(a), as well as by 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order that DEA 
Certificate of Registration, 004413RAY, issued to R & M Sales Company, 
Inc., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending 
application of R & M Sales Company, Inc., for renewal or modification 
of its registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This order is 
effective January 18, 2011.

    Dated: December 3, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-31640 Filed 12-15-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P