[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 12, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62592-62610]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25144]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2010-0308]
Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing
Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing
Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this notice. The Act requires
the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a
determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before
the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.
This notice includes notices of amendments containing sensitive
unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the
facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules,
Announcements and Directives Branch (RADB), TWB-05-B01M, Division of
Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice.
Written comments may also be faxed to the RADB at 301-492-3446.
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for
Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s)
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part002/part002-0309.html. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public
Electronic
[[Page 62593]]
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to
intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also set forth the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing.
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the
issuance of any amendment.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139,
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least
ten (10) days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should
contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
[email protected], or by telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request
(1) a digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic
docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software,
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance
in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through EIE, users will be required to install a Web
browser plug-in from the NRC Web site. Further information on the Web-
based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser
plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or
[[Page 62594]]
their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital
ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed
so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by e-mail at
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at (866) 672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
http://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant
to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants
are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as
social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their
filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of
such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited
excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would
constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to
include copyrighted materials in their submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have
access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209,
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant, LLC, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
317, 50-318, 50-244, 50-220, and 50-410, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
(Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS),
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne County, New York, and Oswego County,
New York, Respectively
Date of amendment request: July 16, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses include: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to be added to the
existing physical protection license condition for CCNPP, Ginna, and
NMPNS requiring the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect
all provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Cyber
Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS as required by 10 CFR 73.54.
A Federal Register notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule
that amended 10 CFR Part 73.54. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54,
``Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and
Networks,'' establish the requirements for a cyber security program.
This regulation specifically requires each licensee currently licensed
to operate a nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to
submit a cyber security plan that satisfies the requirements of the
Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule,
and implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack,
and provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will
be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested,
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function
has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna license
[[Page 62595]]
conditions does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested,
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function
has no impact on the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna license conditions does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The margin of safety in this case is that the implementation of
the Cyber Security Plan does not adversely affect systems or
equipment important to the operation of the plant.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The plan establishes the basis for the cyber security program
for the three stations and does not require any plant modifications,
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators,
or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which
systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear
power plant digital computer and communication systems and networks
associated with certain systems and functions are adequately
protected against cyber attacks. This protective function has no
impact on the operation of vital systems or equipment. Therefore,
the implementation of the proposed Cyber Security Plan does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna
license conditions and implementation of the proposed Cyber Security
Plan do not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed change
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of no
significant hazards consideration is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, Sr. Counsel--Nuclear
Generation, Constellation Generation Group, LLC, 750 East Pratt Street,
17th floor, Baltimore, MD 21202.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Carolina Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River
Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida
Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam
Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina
Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket No. 50-400, Shearon
Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and Chatham Counties, North
Carolina
Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments would establish a fleet Cyber Security Plan in conformance
with the model Cyber Security Plan contained in Appendix A of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 08-09, ``Cyber Security Plan for
Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 6, dated April 2010, with one
deviation regarding the definition of a Cyber Attack as described in
the licensees' letter. The license amendment requests include the Cyber
Security Plan, proposed changes to the (Renewed) Facility Operating
Licenses (FOLs), and a proposed Cyber Security Plan Implementation
Schedule for each facility. The proposed fleet Cyber Security Plan was
submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and
communication systems and networks.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration,
which is presented below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. The Cyber
Security Plan itself does not require any plant modifications.
Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes how the requirements of 10
CFR 73.54 are implemented in order to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat,
thereby achieving high assurance that the facility's digital
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The proposed change requiring the implementation and
maintenance of a Cyber Security Plan does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment to be installed, alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected; therefore,
the inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan as a part of the facility's
other physical protection programs specified in the FOL has no
impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously
Evaluated.
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. The creation of
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident requires
creating one or more new accident precursors. New accident
precursors may be created by modifications of the plant's
configuration, including changes in the
[[Page 62596]]
allowable modes of operation. The Cyber Security Plan itself does
not require any plant modifications, nor does the Cyber Security
Plan affect the control parameters governing unit operation or the
response of plant equipment to a transient condition. Because the
proposed change does not change or introduce any new equipment,
modes of system operation, or failure mechanisms, no new accident
precursors are created. Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. Plant safety
margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation,
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the
Technical Specifications. Because the Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications and does not alter the operation of
plant equipment, the proposed change does not change established
safety margins. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees' analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David T. Conley, Associate General Counsel
II--Legal Department, Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, Post Office
Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the River Bend Station (RBS) Cyber Security
Plan, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In addition, the amendment would
revise the RBS facility operating license to add a sentence to require
the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions
of the Commission-approved RBS Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6,
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for River Bend Station
(RBS). The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications which affect the performance
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope
of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation,
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these
established safety margins, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester
County, New York
Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) includes: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed statement to be added to the existing FOL Physical Protection
license conditions requiring Entergy to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan as
required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Federal Register notice dated March 27,
2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The
regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection
[[Page 62597]]
of digital computer and communication systems and networks,'' establish
the requirements for a cyber security program. This regulation
specifically requires each licensee currently licensed to operate a
nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber
security plan that satisfies the requirements of the Rule. Each
submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule, and
implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Indian Point Energy Center
(IPEC) Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant modifications
which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems,
and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of
postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does not alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The IPEC Cyber
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does
not require any plant modifications which affect the performance
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Plant safety margins are
established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting
safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical
specifications. Because there is no change to these established
safety margins as [a] result of the implementation of the IPEC Cyber
Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General
Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White
Plains, NY 10601.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas
Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: July 9, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
cyber security plan and associated implementation schedule, and revise
the physical protection license condition to require the licensee to
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-
approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change is consistent with
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan
for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Arkansas Nuclear One
(ANO), Units 1 and 2. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC
[[Page 62598]]
review and approval for ANO. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect
the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for ANO. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation,
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these
established safety margins as result of the implementation of the
ANO Cyber Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 15, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
(Waterford 3) cyber security plan and associated implementation
schedule, and revise the physical protection license condition to
require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6,
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. Plant
safety margins are established through limiting conditions for
operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits
specified in the technical specifications. Because there is no
change to these established safety margins as result of the
implementation of the Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan, the proposed
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
[[Page 62599]]
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (FOL) includes: (1)
The proposed Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and
2) Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed FOL Physical
Protection license condition for BVPS-1 and 2 requiring FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved BVPS-1 and
2 Cyber Security Plan as required by Section 73.54 of Part 73 of Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). Federal Register notice
dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part
73. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer
and communication systems and networks,'' establish the requirements
for a cyber security program. This regulation specifically requires
each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under
Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber security plan that satisfies
the requirements of the Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed
implementation schedule and implementation of the licensee's cyber
security program must be consistent with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Notice of Availability, Federal Register Notice, Final
Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security Requirements, published on
March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13926).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems are protected from cyber attacks. The
Plan itself does not require any plant modifications. However, the
Plan does describe how plant modifications which involve digital
computer systems are reviewed to provide high assurance of adequate
protection against cyber attacks, up to and including the design
basis threat as defined in the rule. The proposed change does not
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators,
affect the function of plant systems, or affect the manner in which
systems are operated. The first part of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope
of the rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and
have no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications which involve digital computer systems are reviewed to
provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber attacks,
up to and including the design basis threat defined in the rule. The
proposed change does not alter the plant configuration, require new
plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, affect the function of plant
systems, or affect the manner in which systems are operated. The
first part of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety
[[Page 62600]]
margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation,
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the
Technical Specifications, methods of evaluation that establish
design basis or change Updated Final Safety Analysis. Because there
is no change to these established safety margins, the proposed
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David W. Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear
Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street,
Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389,
St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida
Date of amendment request: August 2, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment includes three parts: The proposed Plan, an Implementation
Schedule, and a proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed
facility operating licenses (FOL) Physical Protection license condition
to require Florida Power and Light Company to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber
security plan as required by amended 10 CFR Part 73. The proposed Cyber
Security Plan was submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer
and communication systems and networks.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration,
which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the
Facility Operating License to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the Facility
Operating License itself does not involve any modifications to the
safety-related structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Cyber Security Plan describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54
are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber
attacks up to and including the design basis cyber attack threat,
thereby achieving high assurance that the facility's digital
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will not alter previously
evaluated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident
analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the
function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the Facility Operating License
do not result in the need for any new or different FSAR design basis
accident analysis, and no new equipment failure modes are created.
It does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms,
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this
proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a possibility
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees' analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Attorney, Florida Power & Light,
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.
Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan
Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for
DCCNP1&2. The licensee requested NRC approval of the CNP Cyber Security
Plan, provided a proposed implementation schedule, and proposed to add
a sentence to License Condition 2.D, ``Physical Protection,'' of CNP's
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-58 and DPR-74, respectively, to
read as follows: ``Indiana Michigan Power Company shall fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Donald
C. Cook Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan submitted by letter dated
July 19, 2010, and withheld from public disclosure in accordance with
10 CFR 2.390.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC).
The NRC staff has performed its own, which is set forth below:
(1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates new requirements in the
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses to implement and maintain a
Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part
[[Page 62601]]
of the facilities' overall program for physical protection.
Inclusion of the Plan in the Renewed FOLs itself does not involve
any modifications to the safety-related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design-basis cyber
attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the facilities'
digital computer and communications systems and networks are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and any plant modifications
will not alter previously evaluated Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) design-basis accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant safety-
related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, modified,
tested, or inspected. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
(2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the Renewed FOLs do not result
in the need of any new or different USAR design-basis accident
analysis. It does not introduce new equipment that could create a
new or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure
modes are created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result
of these proposed amendments. Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type
than those previously evaluated.
(3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the units are operated. This amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
the NRC staff's own analysis, it appears that the three standards of 10
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards
consideration.
Attorney for licensee: James M. Petro, Jr., Senior Nuclear Counsel,
Indiana Michigan Power Company, One Cook Place, Bridgman, MI 49106.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.
Luminant Generation Company LLC,, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Somervell County,
Texas
Date of amendment request: July 15, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Cyber Security Plan for Comanche Peak
Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Units 1 and 2, in accordance with 10 CFR
Section 73.54. In addition, the amendment would revise Renewed Facility
Operating License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89 for Units 1 and 2,
respectively, to add a sentence to the existing Physical Protection
license condition to require CPNPP to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan.
The proposed change is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the
Facility Operating License (FOL) to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL itself
does not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving
high assurance that the facility's digital computer and
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber
attacks. The addition of the Cyber Security Plan to the Physical
Security Plan will not alter previously evaluated [F]inal Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions,
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the FOL do not result in the
need of any new or different FSAR design basis accident analysis. It
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms,
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this
proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Timothy P. Matthews, Esq., Morgan, Lewis and
[[Page 62602]]
Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the cyber security plan and implementation
schedule, and revise the license condition regarding physical
protection to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the NRC-approved cyber security plan.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the FOL
[facility operating license] to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOL itself does not involve
any modifications to safety-related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat,
thereby achieving a high assurance that the facility's digital
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The Plan and any associated plant modifications will
not alter previously evaluated design basis accident analysis
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the capability
of SSCs to perform their design function.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a Cyber Security Plan in the FOL do not
result in the need for any new or different design basis accident
analysis. It does not introduce new equipment that could create a
new or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure
modes are created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result
of this proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a possibility
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the ability of the
fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant
pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the level of
radiation to the public. The proposed amendment will not alter the
way any safety-related SSC functions and will not alter the way the
plant is operated. The amendment provides assurance that safety-
related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment will not introduce any new uncertainties or change any
existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. The
proposed amendment has no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment
structure. Based on the above considerations, the proposed amendment
will not degrade the ability of the fission product barriers to
limit the level of radiation to the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), Docket Nos. 50-266 and
50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, Town of Two
Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: December 8, 2008, as supplemented by
letters dated.
January 16, January 27, February 20, April 17 (two letters), May 8,
May 15, June 1, July 24, August 20, September 4 (two letters),
September 10, October 2, November 20, November 25, and December 17 of
2009; and January 14, February 4 (two letters), March 5, April 20, July
8, July 29, August 12, and September 3 of 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would revise the PBNP Units 1 and 2 current licensing bases
to implement the alternate source term (AST) through reanalysis of the
radiological consequences of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Chapter 14 accidents. The following technical specifications (TS) are
requested to be modified:
TS 1.1 will be reduced from 0.4 percent of containment air weight
per day to 0.2 percent of containment air weight per day at peak design
containment pressure.
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.16.2 will be revised to change
the specific activity of the reactor coolant from [dose equivalent
iodine] DEI-131 less than or equal to 0.8 microCurie per gram ([mu]Ci/
gm) to less than or equal to 0.5 [mu]Ci/gm.
TS 3.7.9 will be modified to address Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3, Control Room Habitability,
and joint NRC and industry guidance regarding control room
habitability.
SR 3.7.9.3 and SR 3.7.9.6 will be revised to delete the word
``makeup.''
TS 3.7.13 will be revised to change the specific activity of the
secondary coolant from less than or equal to 1.00 [mu]Ci/gm to less
than or equal to 0.1 [mu]Ci/gm DEI-131.
TS 3.7.14, ``Primary Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VNPAB),'' will
be added to the technical specifications as a result of the VNPAB
system exhaust function being credited in the AST Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage analysis.
TS 5.5.15c will be revised to change the maximum allowable
containment leakage rate, from 0.4 percent to 0.2 percent of
containment air weight per day.
TS 5.5.18, ``Control Room Envelope Habitability Program,'' will be
added to address AST-related commitments.
TS 5.6.4 will add WCAP-16259-P-A ``Westinghouse Methodology for
Application of 3-D Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Analyses'' to the
list of approved analytical methods.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The results of the applicable radiological design-basis accident
(DBA) re-evaluation
[[Page 62603]]
demonstrated that, with the requested changes, the dose consequences
of these limiting events are within the regulatory limits and
guidance provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and [Regulatory Guide]
RG 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating
Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,'' July 2000, for the
AST methodology. The AST is an input to calculations used to
evaluate the consequences of an accident and does not by itself
affect the plant response or the actual pathway of the activity
released from the fuel. It does, however, better represent the
physical characteristics of the release, such that appropriate
mitigation techniques may be applied.
The change from the original source term to the new proposed AST
is a change in the analysis method and assumptions and has no effect
on the probability of occurrence of previously analyzed accidents.
Use of an AST to analyze the dose effect of DBAs shows that
regulatory acceptance criteria for the new methodology continues to
be met. The dose consequences in the control room (CR), the
exclusion area boundary, and the low population zone (LPZ) do not
exceed the regulatory limits provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and
Regulatory Guide 1.183 for the AST methodology.
For the locked rotor (LR) event, an NRC approved methodology
RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for
Application of 3-D Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident
Analysis,'') is used to determine rods in [departure from nucleate
boiling] DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology provides an
input assumption to the radiological dose consequences calculations.
The use of the new methodology does not change the sequence or
progression of the accident scenario.
The proposed TS changes reflect the plant configuration that is
required to implement the AST analyses. The equipment affected by
the proposed changes is mitigating in nature and relied upon after
an accident has been initiated. The operation of various filtration
systems, the residual heat removal (RHR) and the containment spray
(CS) systems, including associated support systems, has been
considered in the evaluations of these proposed changes. The
operation of this equipment has been evaluated for emergency diesel
generator loading and fuel consumption. The evaluation demonstrated
that the diesel generator loading and fuel consumption do not exceed
the diesel generator criteria. While the operation of these systems
does change with the implementation of an AST, the affected systems
are not accident initiators, and application of the AST methodology
itself is not an initiator of a DBA.
The operation of containment spray on sump recirculation has
been evaluated for increased strainer blockage or reduction in flow
from the sump. The evaluation demonstrated that the increase in
containment spray will not adversely affect the operation of the
emergency core cooling systems during the sump recirculation phase
of a DBA.
The VNPAB exhaust is relied upon after an accident has been
initiated to provide the AST LOCA ECCS equipment leakage activity
release location for the control room dose calculation. The results
of the LOCA radiological analysis demonstrate that while operating
the VNPAB exhaust system, as supported by the proposed TS, the dose
consequences of this limiting event are within the regulatory limits
and guidance provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183.
The Control Room Envelope Habitability Program adds
administrative controls to the TSs ensuring control room
habitability with an operable control room emergency filtration
system (CREFS). The proposed TS changes, including a new
habitability program and additional testing, produce more stringent
TS requirements than the existing TSs, enhancing the protection of
control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The changes proposed in this license amendment request involve
the use of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory
acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes reflect the plant
configuration that is required to implement the AST analyses. No new
or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes.
Although the proposed changes require modifications to the [control
room ventilation system] VNCR system, as well as modifications to
the RHR system and CS system, the changes will not create a new or
different kind of accident since they are related to system
capabilities that provide protection from accidents that have
already occurred. The operation of this equipment has been evaluated
for emergency diesel generator loading and fuel consumption. The
evaluation demonstrated that the diesel generator loading and fuel
consumption do not exceed the diesel generator criteria.
The operation of containment spray on sump recirculation has
been evaluated for increased strainer blockage or reduction in flow
from the sump. The evaluation demonstrated that the increase in
containment spray will not adversely affect the operation of the
emergency core cooling systems during the sump recirculation phase
of a DBA.
As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced that
could lead to different accidents. These changes do not alter the
nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor do they introduce any
unique precursor mechanisms.
For the LR event, an NRC approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse
WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D
Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,'') is used to
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology
provides an input assumption to the radiological dose consequences
calculations. The use of the new methodology does not alter the
nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor do they introduce any
unique precursor mechanisms.
The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant configuration that is
required to implement the AST analyses, and no new or different
accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. The LOCA
control room dose analysis assumes that the ECCS equipment leakage
activity release pathway X/Q to be at the location of the primary
auxiliary building vent stack. Operation of the VNPAB exhaust fans
assures this release point. The VNPAB system operates during normal
unit operation.
No new or different kinds of accidents result from performance
of the revised TS surveillances or from the addition of the Control
Room Envelope Habitability Program. The proposed changes do not
involve a physical alteration of the CREFS or a significant change
in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed TS
changes, including a new habitability program and additional
testing, produce more stringent TS requirements than the existing
TSs, enhancing the protection of control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different type of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The changes proposed in this license amendment involve the use
of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory acceptance
criteria. The proposed TS changes reflect the plant configuration
that is required to implement the AST analyses. Safety margins and
analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and have been found to
be acceptable. The analyzed events have been carefully selected and,
with plant modifications, no significant reduction of margin has
occurred and analyses adequately bound postulated event scenarios.
The proposed changes continue to ensure that the dose consequences
of DBAs at the exclusion area and LPZ boundaries and in the CR are
within the corresponding acceptance criteria presented in RG 1.183
and 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety for the radiological
consequences of these accidents is provided by meeting the
applicable regulatory limits, which are set at or below the 10 CFR
50.67 limits. An acceptable margin of safety is inherent in these
limits.
For the LR event, an NRC approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse
WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D
Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,'') is used to
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology
provides an input assumption to the radiological dose consequences
calculations. The use of the new methodology does not reduce any
margins of safety for the LR event; therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant configuration that is
required to implement the AST analyses. The VNPAB assures the proper
X/Q for airborne radiological protection for control room personnel,
as demonstrated by the control room dose analyses for the LOCA.
Safety margins and
[[Page 62604]]
analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and have been found to
be acceptable. The proposed changes ensure that the dose
consequences in the control room due to the DBA LOCA are within the
acceptance criteria presented in 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety
for the radiological consequences of these accidents is provided by
meeting the regulatory limit.
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety
limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The proposed changes do not affect safety
analysis criteria, and will not result in plant operation in a
configuration outside the design basis for an unacceptable period of
time without compensatory measures. The proposed TS changes,
including a new habitability program and additional testing, produce
more stringent TS requirements than the existing TSs, enhancing the
protection of control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: William Blair, Senior Attorney, NextEra
Energy Point Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50-263,
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for
MNGP and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP); this notice
only addresses the application as it pertains to MNGP. The licensee
requested NRC approval of the NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a
proposed implementation schedule, and proposed to add a sentence to
License Condition 2.C.3, ``Physical Protection,'' of MNGP's Renewed
Facility Operating License DPR-22 to read as follows: ``NSPM shall
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the
Commission-approved NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December 1, 2014.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC).
The licensee's NSHC analysis, written for both MNGP and PINGP,
addressing each issue described above, is reproduced below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed amendments incorporate new requirements in the
[Renewed] Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facilities'
overall program for physical protection. Inclusion of the Plan in
the FOLs itself does not involve any modifications to the safety-
related structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving
high assurance that the facilities' digital computer and
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber
attacks. The Plan and any plant modifications will not alter
previously evaluated Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) design
basis accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Therefore,
the proposed amendments do not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed amendments provide assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the FOLs do not result in the
need of any new or different USAR design basis accident analysis. It
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms,
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these
proposed amendments. Therefore, the proposed amendments do not
create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type than
those previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendments
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the plants are operated. These amendments provide
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendments would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendments would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendments would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel,
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50-282 and
50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2,
Goodhue County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses for PINGP,
Units 1 and 2, and the Renewed Facility Operating License for
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP); this notice only addresses
the application as it pertains to PINGP, Units 1 and 2. The licensee
requested NRC approval of the NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a
proposed Implementation Schedule, and proposed to add a sentence to
License Condition 2.C.(3), ``Physical Protection,'' of PINGP's Facility
Operating Licenses DPR-42 and DPR-60 to read as follows: ``NSPM shall
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the
Commission-approved NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December 1, 2014.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC).
The licensee's NSHC analysis, written for
[[Page 62605]]
both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each issue described above, is
reproduced below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendments incorporate new requirements in the
Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facilities' overall program for
physical protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs itself does
not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify,
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design
basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the
facilities' digital computer and communications systems and networks
are protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and any plant
modifications will not alter previously evaluated Updated Safety
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions,
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendments provide assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the FOLs do not result in the
need of any new or different USAR design basis accident analysis. It
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms,
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these
proposed amendments.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do not create a possibility
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendments
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the plants are operated. These amendments provide
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendments would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendments would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendments would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel,
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
(DCPP), Cyber Security Plan, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In
addition, the amendment would revise the DCPP Facility Operating
License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR 82, respectively, for Units 1 and 2, to add
a sentence to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved DCPP Cyber Security
Plan. The proposed change is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power
Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the
Facility Operating License (FOL) to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facility's overall program for
physical protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL
itself does not involve any modifications to the safety-related
structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security
Plan describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to
and including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility's digital computer and
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber
attacks. The Plan will not alter previously evaluated Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions,
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. Any plant modifications necessary to
implement the Plan will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to
assure they will not alter previously evaluated FSAR design basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Further
amendments to the operating licenses will be pursued as necessary
based on the results of these evaluations.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the FOL do not result in the
need of any new or different FSAR design basis accident analysis. As
noted in response to question 1, any plant modifications necessary
to implement the Plan will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to
assure they do not introduce new equipment that could create a new
or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes
are created. Further amendments to the operating licenses will be
pursued as necessary based on the results of these evaluations.
As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or
limiting single failures will be introduced as a result of this
proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the
[[Page 62606]]
plant is operated. The amendment provides assurance that safety-
related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or change any
existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. The
proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural integrity
of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or
containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post, Esq., Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (FOL) includes: (1)
The proposed SSES Units 1 and 2 Cyber Security Plan, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to be added to the
existing renewed FOL Physical Protection license condition for SSES
Units 1 and 2 requiring PPL Susquehanna, LLC to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved SSES Units
1 and 2 Cyber Security Plan as required by 10 CFR 73.54. Federal
Register notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule that
amended 10 CFR Part 73. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection
of digital computer and communication systems and networks,'' establish
the requirements for a cyber security program. This regulation
specifically requires each licensee currently licensed to operate a
nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber
security plan that satisfies the requirements of the Rule. Each
submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule and
implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the PPL
Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 FOL to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL itself
does not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving
high assurance that the facility's digital computer and
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber
attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will not alter previously evaluated
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and
2 FOL do not result in the need for any new or different FSAR design
basis accident analysis. The inclusion does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or different kind of accident, and
no new equipment failure modes are created. The inclusion of the
Cyber Security Plan also does not affect the function of any safety-
related SSC as to how they are operated, maintained, modified,
tested or inspected. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result
of this proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type
than those previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way safety-related SSCs function and would not
alter the way PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 are operated. The
amendment provides assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected
from cyber attacks. The proposed amendment would not introduce any
new uncertainties or change any existing uncertainties associated
with the design basis or any safety limit. The proposed amendment
would have no impact on the structural integrity of the fuel
cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment
structure. Based on the above considerations, the proposed amendment
would not degrade the confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation to the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp, Esquire, Assoc. General
Counsel, PPL Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St., GENTW3,
Allentown, PA 18101-1179.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station,
Salem County, New Jersey
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: July 14, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments would approve the cyber security plan and associated
implementation schedule for Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek)
and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem). In
addition, the amendments would revise the existing license condition
regarding physical protection in each of the three facility operating
licenses (FOLs) to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain
in effect all provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[[Page 62607]]
(NRC)-approved cyber security plan. The proposed amendment was
submitted pursuant to Section 73.54 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) which requires licenses currently licensed to
operate a nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 50 to submit a cyber
security plan (Plan) for NRC review and approval.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below, with NRC staff edits in square
brackets:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by Sec. 73.54 (Rule) and
includes three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan
for NRC review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template
provided in [Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)] 08-09 Revision 6 and
provides a description of how the requirements of the Rule will be
implemented at the Salem--Hope Creek Generating Station [s]ite. The
Plan establishes the licensing basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber
Security Program. The Plan establishes how to achieve high assurance
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with the following are adequately protected
against cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems [within the scope of the Rule] are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications which involve digital computer systems are reviewed to
provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber attacks,
up to and including the design basis threat as defined in the Rule.
The proposed change does not alter the plant configuration, require
new plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The first part of the proposed
change is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within
the scope of the Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no
impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are
administrative and have no impact on the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by Sec. 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template provided by
NEI 08-09 Revision 6 and provides a description of how the
requirements of the Rule will be implemented at [the] Salem and Hope
Creek Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan establishes the licensing
basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber Security Program. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the Rule are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications [which involve] digital computer systems are reviewed
to provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber
attacks, up to and including the design basis threat as defined in
the Rule. The proposed change does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment to be installed, alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect the
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The first part
of the proposed change is designed to achieve high assurance that
the systems within the scope of the Rule are protected from cyber
attacks and does not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are
administrative and do not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change is required by Sec. 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template provided by
NEI 08-09 Revision 6 and provides a description of how the
requirements of the Rule will be implemented at the Salem and Hope
Creek Generating Station site. The Plan establishes the licensing
basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber Security Program. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the Rule are
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety margins are established
through Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety System
Settings and Safety [L]imits specified in the Technical
Specifications. Because there is no change to these established
safety margins, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are
administrative and do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, with changes by the NRC staff shown in square brackets, it
appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Vincent Zabielski, PSEG Nuclear LLC-N21,
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K. Chernoff.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas
Date of amendment request: July 19, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
[[Page 62608]]
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The
amendment requests for approval of the Cyber Security Plan in
accordance with 10 CFR Section 73.54. In addition, the amendment would
revise Section 2.E of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42
to incorporate the provisions for implementing and maintaining in
effect the provisions of the approved Cyber Security Plan.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement in the
Renewed Facility Operating License to implement and maintain the
Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for
physical protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the
Renewed Facility Operating License itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify,
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design
basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the
facility's digital computer and communications systems and networks
are protected from cyber attacks. The implementation and
incorporation of the Cyber Security Plan into the Renewed Facility
Operating License will not alter previously evaluated Updated Safety
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions,
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety related
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR
73.54 and the inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the Renewed
Facility Operating License do not result in the need of any new or
different USAR design basis accident analysis. It does not introduce
new equipment that could create a new or different kind of accident,
and no new equipment failure modes are created. As a result, no new
accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures
are introduced as a result of this proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding,
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment
would not alter the way any safety related SSC functions and would
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit.
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to
the public.
Therefore the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant, LLC, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
317, 50-318, 50-244, 50-220, and 50-410, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
(Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS),
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne County, New York, and Oswego County,
New York, Respectively
Carolina Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester
County, New York
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas
Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County,
Pennsylvania
Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389,
St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida
Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan
Luminant Generation Company LLC,, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Somervell County,
Texas
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), Docket Nos. 50-266 and
50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, Town of Two
Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50-263,
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50-282 and
50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2,
Goodhue County, Minnesota
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station,
Salem County, New Jersey
[[Page 62609]]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas
A. This Order contains instructions regarding how potential parties
to this proceeding may request access to documents containing Sensitive
Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI).
B. Within 10 days after publication of this notice of hearing and
opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, any potential party who
believes access to SUNSI is necessary to respond to this notice may
request such access. A ``potential party'' is any person who intends to
participate as a party by demonstrating standing and filing an
admissible contention under 10 CFR 2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI
submitted later than 10 days after publication will not be considered
absent a showing of good cause for the late filing, addressing why the
request could not have been filed earlier.
C. The requestor shall submit a letter requesting permission to
access SUNSI to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, and provide a copy to the Associate General
Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement and Administration, Office of the
General Counsel, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The expedited delivery or
courier mail address for both offices is: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The e-mail
addresses for the Office of the Secretary and the Office of the General
Counsel are [email protected] and [email protected],
respectively.\1\ The request must include the following information:
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\1\ While a request for hearing or petition to intervene in this
proceeding must comply with the filing requirements of the NRC's
``E-Filing Rule,'' the initial request to access SUNSI under these
procedures should be submitted as described in this paragraph.
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(1) A description of the licensing action with a citation to this
Federal Register notice;
(2) The name and address of the potential party and a description
of the potential party's particularized interest that could be harmed
by the action identified in C.(1);
(3) The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to
SUNSI and the requestor's basis for the need for the information in
order to meaningfully participate in this adjudicatory proceeding. In
particular, the request must explain why publicly-available versions of
the information requested would not be sufficient to provide the basis
and specificity for a proffered contention;
D. Based on an evaluation of the information submitted under
paragraph C.(3) the NRC staff will determine within 10 days of receipt
of the request whether:
(1) There is a reasonable basis to believe the petitioner is likely
to establish standing to participate in this NRC proceeding; and
(2) The requestor has established a legitimate need for access to
SUNSI.
E. If the NRC staff determines that the requestor satisfies both
D.(1) and D.(2) above, the NRC staff will notify the requestor in
writing that access to SUNSI has been granted. The written notification
will contain instructions on how the requestor may obtain copies of the
requested documents, and any other conditions that may apply to access
to those documents. These conditions may include, but are not limited
to, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement or Affidavit, or
Protective Order \2\ setting forth terms and conditions to prevent the
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of SUNSI by each individual who
will be granted access to SUNSI.
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\2\ Any motion for Protective Order or draft Non-Disclosure
Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must be filed with the presiding
officer or the Chief Administrative Judge if the presiding officer
has not yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline for the
receipt of the written access request.
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F. Filing of Contentions. Any contentions in these proceedings that
are based upon the information received as a result of the request made
for SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no later than 25 days after
the requestor is granted access to that information. However, if more
than 25 days remain between the date the petitioner is granted access
to the information and the deadline for filing all other contentions
(as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing),
the petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
G. Review of Denials of Access.
(1) If the request for access to SUNSI is denied by the NRC staff
either after a determination on standing and need for access, or after
a determination on trustworthiness and reliability, the NRC staff shall
immediately notify the requestor in writing, briefly stating the reason
or reasons for the denial.
(2) The requestor may challenge the NRC staff's adverse
determination by filing a challenge within 5 days of receipt of that
determination with: (a) The presiding officer designated in this
proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer has been appointed, the Chief
Administrative Judge, or if he or she is unavailable, another
administrative judge, or an administrative law judge with jurisdiction
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has been
designated to rule on information access issues, with that officer.
H. Review of Grants of Access. A party other than the requestor may
challenge an NRC staff determination granting access to SUNSI whose
release would harm that party's interest independent of the proceeding.
Such a challenge must be filed with the Chief Administrative Judge
within 5 days of the notification by the NRC staff of its grant of
access.
If challenges to the NRC staff determinations are filed, these
procedures give way to the normal process for litigating disputes
concerning access to information. The availability of interlocutory
review by the Commission of orders ruling on such NRC staff
determinations (whether granting or denying access) is governed by 10
CFR 2.311.\3\
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\3\ Requestors should note that the filing requirements of the
NRC's E-Filing Rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007) apply to appeals
of NRC staff determinations (because they must be served on a
presiding officer or the Commission, as applicable), but not to the
initial SUNSI request submitted to the NRC staff under these
procedures.
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I. The Commission expects that the NRC staff and presiding officers
(and any other reviewing officers) will consider and resolve requests
for access to SUNSI, and motions for protective orders, in a timely
fashion in order to minimize any unnecessary delays in identifying
those petitioners who have standing and who have propounded contentions
meeting the specificity and basis requirements in 10 CFR Part 2.
Attachment 1 to this Order summarizes the general target schedule for
processing and resolving requests under these procedures.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of September 2010.
For the Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
ATTACHMENT 1--General Target Schedule for Processing and Resolving
Requests for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information in This Proceeding
[[Page 62610]]
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Day Event/Activity
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0............................ Publication of Federal Register notice of
hearing and opportunity to petition for
leave to intervene, including order with
instructions for access requests.
10........................... Deadline for submitting requests for
access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with
information: supporting the standing of
a potential party identified by name and
address; describing the need for the
information in order for the potential
party to participate meaningfully in an
adjudicatory proceeding.
60........................... Deadline for submitting petition for
intervention containing: (i)
Demonstration of standing; (ii) all
contentions whose formulation does not
require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to
petition for intervention; +7 requestor/
petitioner reply).
20........................... Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff
informs the requestor of the staff's
determination whether the request for
access provides a reasonable basis to
believe standing can be established and
shows need for SUNSI. (NRC staff also
informs any party to the proceeding
whose interest independent of the
proceeding would be harmed by the
release of the information.) If NRC
staff makes the finding of need for
SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC
staff begins document processing
(preparation of redactions or review of
redacted documents).
25........................... If NRC staff finds no ``need'' or no
likelihood of standing, the deadline for
requestor/petitioner to file a motion
seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC
staff's denial of access; NRC staff
files copy of access determination with
the presiding officer (or Chief
Administrative Judge or other designated
officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff
finds ``need'' for SUNSI, the deadline
for any party to the proceeding whose
interest independent of the proceeding
would be harmed by the release of the
information to file a motion seeking a
ruling to reverse the NRC staff's grant
of access.
30........................... Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions
to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
40........................... (Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing
and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC
staff to complete information processing
and file motion for Protective Order and
draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit. Deadline
for applicant/licensee to file Non-
Disclosure Agreement for SUNSI.
A............................ If access granted: Issuance of presiding
officer or other designated officer
decision on motion for protective order
for access to sensitive information
(including schedule for providing access
and submission of contentions) or
decision reversing a final adverse
determination by the NRC staff.
A + 3........................ Deadline for filing executed Non-
Disclosure Affidavits. Access provided
to SUNSI consistent with decision
issuing the protective order.
A + 28....................... Deadline for submission of contentions
whose development depends upon access to
SUNSI. However, if more than 25 days
remain between the petitioner's receipt
of (or access to) the information and
the deadline for filing all other
contentions (as established in the
notice of hearing or opportunity for
hearing), the petitioner may file its
SUNSI contentions by that later
deadline.
A + 53....................... (Contention receipt +25) Answers to
contentions whose development depends
upon access to SUNSI.
A + 60....................... (Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor
reply to answers.
A + 60....................... Decision on contention admission.
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[FR Doc. 2010-25144 Filed 10-8-10; 8:45 am]
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