[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 12, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62592-62610]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25144]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2010-0308]


Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses 
Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing 
Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing 
Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards 
Information

I. Background

    Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this notice. The Act requires 
the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to 
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make 
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a 
determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no 
significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before 
the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.
    This notice includes notices of amendments containing sensitive 
unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the 
facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules, 
Announcements and Directives Branch (RADB), TWB-05-B01M, Division of 
Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the 
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. 
Written comments may also be faxed to the RADB at 301-492-3446. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any 
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a 
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license. 
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be 
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for 
Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s) 
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or 
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part002/part002-0309.html. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic

[[Page 62593]]

Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to 
intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding 
officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the 
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also set forth the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. 
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law 
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of 
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the 
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve 
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that 
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held 
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final 
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant 
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the 
issuance of any amendment.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 
ten (10) days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should 
contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at 
[email protected], or by telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request 
(1) a digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its 
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the 
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and 
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a 
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the 
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the 
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this 
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic 
docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic 
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may 
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should 
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, 
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance 
in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through EIE, users will be required to install a Web 
browser plug-in from the NRC Web site. Further information on the Web-
based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser 
plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others 
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or

[[Page 62594]]

their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital 
ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed 
so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by e-mail at 
[email protected], or by a toll-free call at (866) 672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
http://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant 
to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants 
are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as 
social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their 
filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of 
such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited 
excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would 
constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to 
include copyrighted materials in their submission.
    Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings 
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer 
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions 
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the 
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have 
access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power 
Plant, LLC, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
317, 50-318, 50-244, 50-220, and 50-410, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power 
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 
(Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS), 
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne County, New York, and Oswego County, 
New York, Respectively

    Date of amendment request: July 16, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendments to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses include: (1) The 
proposed Cyber Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS, (2) an 
implementation schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to be added to the 
existing physical protection license condition for CCNPP, Ginna, and 
NMPNS requiring the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect 
all provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Cyber 
Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS as required by 10 CFR 73.54. 
A Federal Register notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule 
that amended 10 CFR Part 73.54. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, 
``Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and 
Networks,'' establish the requirements for a cyber security program. 
This regulation specifically requires each licensee currently licensed 
to operate a nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to 
submit a cyber security plan that satisfies the requirements of the 
Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule, 
and implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be 
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this 
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal 
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security 
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber 
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09, 
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack, 
and provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will 
be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the 
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
    The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant 
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant 
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add 
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the 
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, 
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance 
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems 
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are 
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function 
has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of 
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license 
condition for physical protection to require implementation and 
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 
administrative and has no impact on the probability or consequences 
of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS 
and Ginna license

[[Page 62595]]

conditions does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber 
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09, 
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and 
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be 
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the 
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
    The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant 
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant 
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add 
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the 
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, 
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance 
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems 
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are 
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function 
has no impact on the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of 
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license 
condition for physical protection to require implementation and 
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 
administrative and has no impact on the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS 
and Ginna license conditions does not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The margin of safety in this case is that the implementation of 
the Cyber Security Plan does not adversely affect systems or 
equipment important to the operation of the plant.
    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber 
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09, 
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and 
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be 
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the 
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
    The plan establishes the basis for the cyber security program 
for the three stations and does not require any plant modifications, 
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be 
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, 
or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which 
systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. 
The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear 
power plant digital computer and communication systems and networks 
associated with certain systems and functions are adequately 
protected against cyber attacks. This protective function has no 
impact on the operation of vital systems or equipment. Therefore, 
the implementation of the proposed Cyber Security Plan does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of 
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license 
condition for physical protection to require implementation and 
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is 
administrative and does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna 
license conditions and implementation of the proposed Cyber Security 
Plan do not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed change 
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards 
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of no 
significant hazards consideration is justified.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, Sr. Counsel--Nuclear 
Generation, Constellation Generation Group, LLC, 750 East Pratt Street, 
17th floor, Baltimore, MD 21202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.

Carolina Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, 
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North 
Carolina

Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River 
Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida

Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam 
Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina

Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket No. 50-400, Shearon 
Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and Chatham Counties, North 
Carolina

    Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendments would establish a fleet Cyber Security Plan in conformance 
with the model Cyber Security Plan contained in Appendix A of Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 08-09, ``Cyber Security Plan for 
Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 6, dated April 2010, with one 
deviation regarding the definition of a Cyber Attack as described in 
the licensees' letter. The license amendment requests include the Cyber 
Security Plan, proposed changes to the (Renewed) Facility Operating 
Licenses (FOLs), and a proposed Cyber Security Plan Implementation 
Schedule for each facility. The proposed fleet Cyber Security Plan was 
submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and 
communication systems and networks.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided 
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, 
which is presented below:

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL, 
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 
facility's overall program for physical protection. The Cyber 
Security Plan itself does not require any plant modifications. 
Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes how the requirements of 10 
CFR 73.54 are implemented in order to identify, evaluate, and 
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat, 
thereby achieving high assurance that the facility's digital 
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from 
cyber attacks. The proposed change requiring the implementation and 
maintenance of a Cyber Security Plan does not alter the plant 
configuration, require new plant equipment to be installed, alter 
accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 
affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems 
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected; therefore, 
the inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan as a part of the facility's 
other physical protection programs specified in the FOL has no 
impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated.

    The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL, 
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 
facility's overall program for physical protection. The creation of 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident requires 
creating one or more new accident precursors. New accident 
precursors may be created by modifications of the plant's 
configuration, including changes in the

[[Page 62596]]

allowable modes of operation. The Cyber Security Plan itself does 
not require any plant modifications, nor does the Cyber Security 
Plan affect the control parameters governing unit operation or the 
response of plant equipment to a transient condition. Because the 
proposed change does not change or introduce any new equipment, 
modes of system operation, or failure mechanisms, no new accident 
precursors are created. Therefore, the proposed change does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in a Margin of Safety

    The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL, 
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the 
facility's overall program for physical protection. Plant safety 
margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation, 
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the 
Technical Specifications. Because the Cyber Security Plan does not 
require any plant modifications and does not alter the operation of 
plant equipment, the proposed change does not change established 
safety margins. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees' analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: David T. Conley, Associate General Counsel 
II--Legal Department, Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, Post Office 
Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
    NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., 
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, 
Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the River Bend Station (RBS) Cyber Security 
Plan, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In addition, the amendment would 
revise the RBS facility operating license to add a sentence to require 
the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions 
of the Commission-approved RBS Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change 
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, 
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for River Bend Station 
(RBS). The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not alter accident analysis 
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant 
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not 
require any plant modifications which affect the performance 
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to 
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber 
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems 
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber 
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. The RBS Cyber 
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in 
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 
inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant 
modifications which affect the performance capability of the 
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the 
consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber Security Plan is 
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope 
of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. Plant safety 
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, 
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the 
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these 
established safety margins, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General 
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester 
County, New York

    Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) includes: (1) The 
proposed Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a 
proposed statement to be added to the existing FOL Physical Protection 
license conditions requiring Entergy to fully implement and maintain in 
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan as 
required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Federal Register notice dated March 27, 
2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The 
regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection

[[Page 62597]]

of digital computer and communication systems and networks,'' establish 
the requirements for a cyber security program. This regulation 
specifically requires each licensee currently licensed to operate a 
nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber 
security plan that satisfies the requirements of the Rule. Each 
submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule, and 
implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be 
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this 
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal 
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security 
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Indian Point Energy Center 
(IPEC) Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant modifications 
which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, 
and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of 
postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does not alter 
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are 
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The IPEC Cyber 
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems 
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber 
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does 
not require any plant modifications which affect the performance 
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to 
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber 
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in 
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 
inspected. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule 
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Plant safety margins are 
established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting 
safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical 
specifications. Because there is no change to these established 
safety margins as [a] result of the implementation of the IPEC Cyber 
Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General 
Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White 
Plains, NY 10601.
    NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas 
Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: July 9, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 
cyber security plan and associated implementation schedule, and revise 
the physical protection license condition to require the licensee to 
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-
approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change is consistent with 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan 
for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Arkansas Nuclear One 
(ANO), Units 1 and 2. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not alter 
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the 
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are 
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber 
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect 
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and 
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated 
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule 
are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC

[[Page 62598]]

review and approval for ANO. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not 
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect 
the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are 
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber 
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect 
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and 
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated 
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule 
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for ANO. Plant safety 
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, 
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the 
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these 
established safety margins as result of the implementation of the 
ANO Cyber Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General 
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric 
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: July 15, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 
(Waterford 3) cyber security plan and associated implementation 
schedule, and revise the physical protection license condition to 
require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all 
provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change 
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, 
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The 
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant 
modifications which affect the performance capability of the 
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the 
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security 
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in 
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to 
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The 
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant 
modifications which affect the performance capability of the 
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the 
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security 
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any 
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in 
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or 
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to 
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does not create 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber 
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. Plant 
safety margins are established through limiting conditions for 
operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits 
specified in the technical specifications. Because there is no 
change to these established safety margins as result of the 
implementation of the Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan, the proposed 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing 
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General 
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

[[Page 62599]]

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (FOL) includes: (1) 
The proposed Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 
2) Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a 
proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed FOL Physical 
Protection license condition for BVPS-1 and 2 requiring FirstEnergy 
Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) to fully implement and 
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved BVPS-1 and 
2 Cyber Security Plan as required by Section 73.54 of Part 73 of Title 
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). Federal Register notice 
dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 
73. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer 
and communication systems and networks,'' establish the requirements 
for a cyber security program. This regulation specifically requires 
each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under 
Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber security plan that satisfies 
the requirements of the Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed 
implementation schedule and implementation of the licensee's cyber 
security program must be consistent with the approved schedule. The 
background for this application is addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) Notice of Availability, Federal Register Notice, Final 
Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security Requirements, published on 
March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13926).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes 
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the 
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber 
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan 
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant 
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated 
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up 
to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems are protected from cyber attacks. The 
Plan itself does not require any plant modifications. However, the 
Plan does describe how plant modifications which involve digital 
computer systems are reviewed to provide high assurance of adequate 
protection against cyber attacks, up to and including the design 
basis threat as defined in the rule. The proposed change does not 
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be 
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, 
affect the function of plant systems, or affect the manner in which 
systems are operated. The first part of the proposed change is 
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope 
of the rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for 
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and 
have no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes 
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the 
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber 
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan 
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant 
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated 
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up 
to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are 
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any 
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant 
modifications which involve digital computer systems are reviewed to 
provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber attacks, 
up to and including the design basis threat defined in the rule. The 
proposed change does not alter the plant configuration, require new 
plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis 
assumptions, add any initiators, affect the function of plant 
systems, or affect the manner in which systems are operated. The 
first part of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are 
protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for 
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in a Margin of Safety

    The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes 
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the 
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber 
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan 
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant 
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated 
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up 
to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are 
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety

[[Page 62600]]

margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation, 
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the 
Technical Specifications, methods of evaluation that establish 
design basis or change Updated Final Safety Analysis. Because there 
is no change to these established safety margins, the proposed 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an implementation 
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for 
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: David W. Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, 
Akron, OH 44308.
    NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, 
St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida

    Date of amendment request: August 2, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment includes three parts: The proposed Plan, an Implementation 
Schedule, and a proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed 
facility operating licenses (FOL) Physical Protection license condition 
to require Florida Power and Light Company to fully implement and 
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber 
security plan as required by amended 10 CFR Part 73. The proposed Cyber 
Security Plan was submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer 
and communication systems and networks.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided 
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, 
which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the 
Facility Operating License to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical 
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the Facility 
Operating License itself does not involve any modifications to the 
safety-related structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the 
Cyber Security Plan describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 
are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber 
attacks up to and including the design basis cyber attack threat, 
thereby achieving high assurance that the facility's digital 
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from 
cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will not alter previously 
evaluated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident 
analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the 
function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they are 
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the Facility Operating License 
do not result in the need for any new or different FSAR design basis 
accident analysis, and no new equipment failure modes are created. 
It does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or 
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are 
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, 
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this 
proposed amendment.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a possibility 
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides 
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees' analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Attorney, Florida Power & Light, 
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420.
    NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. 
Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

    Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee 
proposed an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for 
DCCNP1&2. The licensee requested NRC approval of the CNP Cyber Security 
Plan, provided a proposed implementation schedule, and proposed to add 
a sentence to License Condition 2.D, ``Physical Protection,'' of CNP's 
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-58 and DPR-74, respectively, to 
read as follows: ``Indiana Michigan Power Company shall fully implement 
and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Donald 
C. Cook Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan submitted by letter dated 
July 19, 2010, and withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 
10 CFR 2.390.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC). 
The NRC staff has performed its own, which is set forth below:

    (1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates new requirements in the 
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses to implement and maintain a 
Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part

[[Page 62601]]

of the facilities' overall program for physical protection. 
Inclusion of the Plan in the Renewed FOLs itself does not involve 
any modifications to the safety-related structures, systems or 
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and 
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design-basis cyber 
attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the facilities' 
digital computer and communications systems and networks are 
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and any plant modifications 
will not alter previously evaluated Updated Final Safety Analysis 
Report (UFSAR) design-basis accident analysis assumptions, add any 
accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant safety-
related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, modified, 
tested, or inspected. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    (2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the Renewed FOLs do not result 
in the need of any new or different USAR design-basis accident 
analysis. It does not introduce new equipment that could create a 
new or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure 
modes are created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure 
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result 
of these proposed amendments. Therefore, the proposed amendment does 
not create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type 
than those previously evaluated.
    (3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the units are operated. This amendment provides 
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
the NRC staff's own analysis, it appears that the three standards of 10 
CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to 
determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards 
consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: James M. Petro, Jr., Senior Nuclear Counsel, 
Indiana Michigan Power Company, One Cook Place, Bridgman, MI 49106.
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.

Luminant Generation Company LLC,, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, 
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, 
Texas

    Date of amendment request: July 15, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the Cyber Security Plan for Comanche Peak 
Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Units 1 and 2, in accordance with 10 CFR 
Section 73.54. In addition, the amendment would revise Renewed Facility 
Operating License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89 for Units 1 and 2, 
respectively, to add a sentence to the existing Physical Protection 
license condition to require CPNPP to fully implement and maintain in 
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan. 
The proposed change is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 
08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the 
Facility Operating License (FOL) to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical 
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL itself 
does not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures, 
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan 
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented 
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving 
high assurance that the facility's digital computer and 
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber 
attacks. The addition of the Cyber Security Plan to the Physical 
Security Plan will not alter previously evaluated [F]inal Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions, 
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant 
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the FOL do not result in the 
need of any new or different FSAR design basis accident analysis. It 
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or 
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are 
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, 
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this 
proposed amendment.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides 
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Timothy P. Matthews, Esq., Morgan, Lewis and

[[Page 62602]]

Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the cyber security plan and implementation 
schedule, and revise the license condition regarding physical 
protection to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in 
effect all provisions of the NRC-approved cyber security plan.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the FOL 
[facility operating license] to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical 
protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOL itself does not involve 
any modifications to safety-related structures, systems or 
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, evaluate, and 
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat, 
thereby achieving a high assurance that the facility's digital 
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from 
cyber attacks. The Plan and any associated plant modifications will 
not alter previously evaluated design basis accident analysis 
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the capability 
of SSCs to perform their design function.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a Cyber Security Plan in the FOL do not 
result in the need for any new or different design basis accident 
analysis. It does not introduce new equipment that could create a 
new or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure 
modes are created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure 
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result 
of this proposed amendment.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a possibility 
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the ability of the 
fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant 
pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the level of 
radiation to the public. The proposed amendment will not alter the 
way any safety-related SSC functions and will not alter the way the 
plant is operated. The amendment provides assurance that safety-
related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 
amendment will not introduce any new uncertainties or change any 
existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. The 
proposed amendment has no impact on the structural integrity of the 
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment 
structure. Based on the above considerations, the proposed amendment 
will not degrade the ability of the fission product barriers to 
limit the level of radiation to the public.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power 
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), Docket Nos. 50-266 and 
50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, Town of Two 
Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin

    Date of amendment request: December 8, 2008, as supplemented by 
letters dated.
    January 16, January 27, February 20, April 17 (two letters), May 8, 
May 15, June 1, July 24, August 20, September 4 (two letters), 
September 10, October 2, November 20, November 25, and December 17 of 
2009; and January 14, February 4 (two letters), March 5, April 20, July 
8, July 29, August 12, and September 3 of 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would revise the PBNP Units 1 and 2 current licensing bases 
to implement the alternate source term (AST) through reanalysis of the 
radiological consequences of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 
Chapter 14 accidents. The following technical specifications (TS) are 
requested to be modified:
    TS 1.1 will be reduced from 0.4 percent of containment air weight 
per day to 0.2 percent of containment air weight per day at peak design 
containment pressure.
    Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.16.2 will be revised to change 
the specific activity of the reactor coolant from [dose equivalent 
iodine] DEI-131 less than or equal to 0.8 microCurie per gram ([mu]Ci/
gm) to less than or equal to 0.5 [mu]Ci/gm.
    TS 3.7.9 will be modified to address Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3, Control Room Habitability, 
and joint NRC and industry guidance regarding control room 
habitability.
    SR 3.7.9.3 and SR 3.7.9.6 will be revised to delete the word 
``makeup.''
    TS 3.7.13 will be revised to change the specific activity of the 
secondary coolant from less than or equal to 1.00 [mu]Ci/gm to less 
than or equal to 0.1 [mu]Ci/gm DEI-131.
    TS 3.7.14, ``Primary Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VNPAB),'' will 
be added to the technical specifications as a result of the VNPAB 
system exhaust function being credited in the AST Loss of Coolant 
Accident (LOCA) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage analysis.
    TS 5.5.15c will be revised to change the maximum allowable 
containment leakage rate, from 0.4 percent to 0.2 percent of 
containment air weight per day.
    TS 5.5.18, ``Control Room Envelope Habitability Program,'' will be 
added to address AST-related commitments.
    TS 5.6.4 will add WCAP-16259-P-A ``Westinghouse Methodology for 
Application of 3-D Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Analyses'' to the 
list of approved analytical methods.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The results of the applicable radiological design-basis accident 
(DBA) re-evaluation

[[Page 62603]]

demonstrated that, with the requested changes, the dose consequences 
of these limiting events are within the regulatory limits and 
guidance provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and [Regulatory Guide] 
RG 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating 
Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,'' July 2000, for the 
AST methodology. The AST is an input to calculations used to 
evaluate the consequences of an accident and does not by itself 
affect the plant response or the actual pathway of the activity 
released from the fuel. It does, however, better represent the 
physical characteristics of the release, such that appropriate 
mitigation techniques may be applied.
    The change from the original source term to the new proposed AST 
is a change in the analysis method and assumptions and has no effect 
on the probability of occurrence of previously analyzed accidents. 
Use of an AST to analyze the dose effect of DBAs shows that 
regulatory acceptance criteria for the new methodology continues to 
be met. The dose consequences in the control room (CR), the 
exclusion area boundary, and the low population zone (LPZ) do not 
exceed the regulatory limits provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and 
Regulatory Guide 1.183 for the AST methodology.
    For the locked rotor (LR) event, an NRC approved methodology 
RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for 
Application of 3-D Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident 
Analysis,'') is used to determine rods in [departure from nucleate 
boiling] DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology provides an 
input assumption to the radiological dose consequences calculations. 
The use of the new methodology does not change the sequence or 
progression of the accident scenario.
    The proposed TS changes reflect the plant configuration that is 
required to implement the AST analyses. The equipment affected by 
the proposed changes is mitigating in nature and relied upon after 
an accident has been initiated. The operation of various filtration 
systems, the residual heat removal (RHR) and the containment spray 
(CS) systems, including associated support systems, has been 
considered in the evaluations of these proposed changes. The 
operation of this equipment has been evaluated for emergency diesel 
generator loading and fuel consumption. The evaluation demonstrated 
that the diesel generator loading and fuel consumption do not exceed 
the diesel generator criteria. While the operation of these systems 
does change with the implementation of an AST, the affected systems 
are not accident initiators, and application of the AST methodology 
itself is not an initiator of a DBA.
    The operation of containment spray on sump recirculation has 
been evaluated for increased strainer blockage or reduction in flow 
from the sump. The evaluation demonstrated that the increase in 
containment spray will not adversely affect the operation of the 
emergency core cooling systems during the sump recirculation phase 
of a DBA.
    The VNPAB exhaust is relied upon after an accident has been 
initiated to provide the AST LOCA ECCS equipment leakage activity 
release location for the control room dose calculation. The results 
of the LOCA radiological analysis demonstrate that while operating 
the VNPAB exhaust system, as supported by the proposed TS, the dose 
consequences of this limiting event are within the regulatory limits 
and guidance provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183.
    The Control Room Envelope Habitability Program adds 
administrative controls to the TSs ensuring control room 
habitability with an operable control room emergency filtration 
system (CREFS). The proposed TS changes, including a new 
habitability program and additional testing, produce more stringent 
TS requirements than the existing TSs, enhancing the protection of 
control room occupants.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The changes proposed in this license amendment request involve 
the use of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory 
acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes reflect the plant 
configuration that is required to implement the AST analyses. No new 
or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. 
Although the proposed changes require modifications to the [control 
room ventilation system] VNCR system, as well as modifications to 
the RHR system and CS system, the changes will not create a new or 
different kind of accident since they are related to system 
capabilities that provide protection from accidents that have 
already occurred. The operation of this equipment has been evaluated 
for emergency diesel generator loading and fuel consumption. The 
evaluation demonstrated that the diesel generator loading and fuel 
consumption do not exceed the diesel generator criteria.
    The operation of containment spray on sump recirculation has 
been evaluated for increased strainer blockage or reduction in flow 
from the sump. The evaluation demonstrated that the increase in 
containment spray will not adversely affect the operation of the 
emergency core cooling systems during the sump recirculation phase 
of a DBA.
    As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced that 
could lead to different accidents. These changes do not alter the 
nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor do they introduce any 
unique precursor mechanisms.
    For the LR event, an NRC approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse 
WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D 
Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,'') is used to 
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology 
provides an input assumption to the radiological dose consequences 
calculations. The use of the new methodology does not alter the 
nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor do they introduce any 
unique precursor mechanisms.
    The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant configuration that is 
required to implement the AST analyses, and no new or different 
accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. The LOCA 
control room dose analysis assumes that the ECCS equipment leakage 
activity release pathway X/Q to be at the location of the primary 
auxiliary building vent stack. Operation of the VNPAB exhaust fans 
assures this release point. The VNPAB system operates during normal 
unit operation.
    No new or different kinds of accidents result from performance 
of the revised TS surveillances or from the addition of the Control 
Room Envelope Habitability Program. The proposed changes do not 
involve a physical alteration of the CREFS or a significant change 
in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed TS 
changes, including a new habitability program and additional 
testing, produce more stringent TS requirements than the existing 
TSs, enhancing the protection of control room occupants.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different type of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The changes proposed in this license amendment involve the use 
of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory acceptance 
criteria. The proposed TS changes reflect the plant configuration 
that is required to implement the AST analyses. Safety margins and 
analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and have been found to 
be acceptable. The analyzed events have been carefully selected and, 
with plant modifications, no significant reduction of margin has 
occurred and analyses adequately bound postulated event scenarios. 
The proposed changes continue to ensure that the dose consequences 
of DBAs at the exclusion area and LPZ boundaries and in the CR are 
within the corresponding acceptance criteria presented in RG 1.183 
and 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety for the radiological 
consequences of these accidents is provided by meeting the 
applicable regulatory limits, which are set at or below the 10 CFR 
50.67 limits. An acceptable margin of safety is inherent in these 
limits.
    For the LR event, an NRC approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse 
WCAP-16259-P-A, ``Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D 
Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,'') is used to 
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC approved methodology 
provides an input assumption to the radiological dose consequences 
calculations. The use of the new methodology does not reduce any 
margins of safety for the LR event; therefore, the proposed change 
does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant configuration that is 
required to implement the AST analyses. The VNPAB assures the proper 
X/Q for airborne radiological protection for control room personnel, 
as demonstrated by the control room dose analyses for the LOCA. 
Safety margins and

[[Page 62604]]

analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and have been found to 
be acceptable. The proposed changes ensure that the dose 
consequences in the control room due to the DBA LOCA are within the 
acceptance criteria presented in 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety 
for the radiological consequences of these accidents is provided by 
meeting the regulatory limit.
    The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed changes do not affect safety 
analysis criteria, and will not result in plant operation in a 
configuration outside the design basis for an unacceptable period of 
time without compensatory measures. The proposed TS changes, 
including a new habitability program and additional testing, produce 
more stringent TS requirements than the existing TSs, enhancing the 
protection of control room occupants.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: William Blair, Senior Attorney, NextEra 
Energy Point Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.

Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50-263, 
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota

    Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee 
proposed an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for 
MNGP and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP); this notice 
only addresses the application as it pertains to MNGP. The licensee 
requested NRC approval of the NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a 
proposed implementation schedule, and proposed to add a sentence to 
License Condition 2.C.3, ``Physical Protection,'' of MNGP's Renewed 
Facility Operating License DPR-22 to read as follows: ``NSPM shall 
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the 
Commission-approved NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December 1, 2014.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC). 
The licensee's NSHC analysis, written for both MNGP and PINGP, 
addressing each issue described above, is reproduced below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No
    The proposed amendments incorporate new requirements in the 
[Renewed] Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and 
maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facilities' 
overall program for physical protection. Inclusion of the Plan in 
the FOLs itself does not involve any modifications to the safety-
related structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan 
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented 
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving 
high assurance that the facilities' digital computer and 
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber 
attacks. The Plan and any plant modifications will not alter 
previously evaluated Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) design 
basis accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 
affect the function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Therefore, 
the proposed amendments do not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No
    The proposed amendments provide assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the FOLs do not result in the 
need of any new or different USAR design basis accident analysis. It 
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or 
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are 
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, 
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these 
proposed amendments. Therefore, the proposed amendments do not 
create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type than 
those previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendments 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the plants are operated. These amendments provide 
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendments would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendments would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendments would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public.
    Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel, 
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.

Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50-282 and 
50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, 
Goodhue County, Minnesota

    Date of amendment request: July 20, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The licensee 
proposed an amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses for PINGP, 
Units 1 and 2, and the Renewed Facility Operating License for 
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP); this notice only addresses 
the application as it pertains to PINGP, Units 1 and 2. The licensee 
requested NRC approval of the NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a 
proposed Implementation Schedule, and proposed to add a sentence to 
License Condition 2.C.(3), ``Physical Protection,'' of PINGP's Facility 
Operating Licenses DPR-42 and DPR-60 to read as follows: ``NSPM shall 
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the 
Commission-approved NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December 1, 2014.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its 
analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC). 
The licensee's NSHC analysis, written for

[[Page 62605]]

both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each issue described above, is 
reproduced below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendments incorporate new requirements in the 
Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facilities' overall program for 
physical protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs itself does 
not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures, 
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the 
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, 
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design 
basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the 
facilities' digital computer and communications systems and networks 
are protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and any plant 
modifications will not alter previously evaluated Updated Safety 
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions, 
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant 
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected.
    Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendments provide assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan in the FOLs do not result in the 
need of any new or different USAR design basis accident analysis. It 
does not introduce new equipment that could create a new or 
different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes are 
created. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, 
or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these 
proposed amendments.
    Therefore, the proposed amendments do not create a possibility 
for an accident of a new or different type than those previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendments 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the plants are operated. These amendments provide 
assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendments would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendments would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendments would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public.
    Therefore, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel, 
Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo 
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, 
California

    Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment would approve the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 
(DCPP), Cyber Security Plan, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In 
addition, the amendment would revise the DCPP Facility Operating 
License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR 82, respectively, for Units 1 and 2, to add 
a sentence to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in 
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved DCPP Cyber Security 
Plan. The proposed change is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power 
Reactors.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the 
Facility Operating License (FOL) to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan (Plan) as part of the facility's overall program for 
physical protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL 
itself does not involve any modifications to the safety-related 
structures, systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security 
Plan describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be 
implemented to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to 
and including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby 
achieving high assurance that the facility's digital computer and 
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber 
attacks. The Plan will not alter previously evaluated Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions, 
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant 
safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected. Any plant modifications necessary to 
implement the Plan will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to 
assure they will not alter previously evaluated FSAR design basis 
accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or 
affect the function of the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they 
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Further 
amendments to the operating licenses will be pursued as necessary 
based on the results of these evaluations.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the FOL do not result in the 
need of any new or different FSAR design basis accident analysis. As 
noted in response to question 1, any plant modifications necessary 
to implement the Plan will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to 
assure they do not introduce new equipment that could create a new 
or different kind of accident, and no new equipment failure modes 
are created. Further amendments to the operating licenses will be 
pursued as necessary based on the results of these evaluations.
    As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or 
limiting single failures will be introduced as a result of this 
proposed amendment.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way any safety-related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the

[[Page 62606]]

plant is operated. The amendment provides assurance that safety-
related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. The proposed 
amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or change any 
existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. The 
proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural integrity 
of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or 
containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post, Esq., Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam 
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (FOL) includes: (1) 
The proposed SSES Units 1 and 2 Cyber Security Plan, (2) an 
implementation schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to be added to the 
existing renewed FOL Physical Protection license condition for SSES 
Units 1 and 2 requiring PPL Susquehanna, LLC to fully implement and 
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved SSES Units 
1 and 2 Cyber Security Plan as required by 10 CFR 73.54. Federal 
Register notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule that 
amended 10 CFR Part 73. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection 
of digital computer and communication systems and networks,'' establish 
the requirements for a cyber security program. This regulation 
specifically requires each licensee currently licensed to operate a 
nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber 
security plan that satisfies the requirements of the Rule. Each 
submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule and 
implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be 
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this 
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal 
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security 
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment incorporates a new requirement in the PPL 
Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 FOL to implement and maintain a Cyber 
Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for physical 
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the FOL itself 
does not involve any modifications to the safety-related structures, 
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan 
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented 
to identify, evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and 
including the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving 
high assurance that the facility's digital computer and 
communications systems and networks are protected from cyber 
attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will not alter previously evaluated 
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis 
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of 
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they are operated, 
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability 
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety-related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of a plan in the PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and 
2 FOL do not result in the need for any new or different FSAR design 
basis accident analysis. The inclusion does not introduce new 
equipment that could create a new or different kind of accident, and 
no new equipment failure modes are created. The inclusion of the 
Cyber Security Plan also does not affect the function of any safety-
related SSC as to how they are operated, maintained, modified, 
tested or inspected. As a result, no new accident scenarios, failure 
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result 
of this proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed amendment does 
not create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type 
than those previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way safety-related SSCs function and would not 
alter the way PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 are operated. The 
amendment provides assurance that safety-related SSCs are protected 
from cyber attacks. The proposed amendment would not introduce any 
new uncertainties or change any existing uncertainties associated 
with the design basis or any safety limit. The proposed amendment 
would have no impact on the structural integrity of the fuel 
cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment 
structure. Based on the above considerations, the proposed amendment 
would not degrade the confidence in the ability of the fission 
product barriers to limit the level of radiation to the public. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp, Esquire, Assoc. General 
Counsel, PPL Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St., GENTW3, 
Allentown, PA 18101-1179.
    NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, 
Salem County, New Jersey

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear 
Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

    Date of amendment request: July 14, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains 
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed 
amendments would approve the cyber security plan and associated 
implementation schedule for Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) 
and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem). In 
addition, the amendments would revise the existing license condition 
regarding physical protection in each of the three facility operating 
licenses (FOLs) to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain 
in effect all provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[[Page 62607]]

(NRC)-approved cyber security plan. The proposed amendment was 
submitted pursuant to Section 73.54 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) which requires licenses currently licensed to 
operate a nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 50 to submit a cyber 
security plan (Plan) for NRC review and approval.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below, with NRC staff edits in square 
brackets:

Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is required by Sec.  73.54 (Rule) and 
includes three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan 
for NRC review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template 
provided in [Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)] 08-09 Revision 6 and 
provides a description of how the requirements of the Rule will be 
implemented at the Salem--Hope Creek Generating Station [s]ite. The 
Plan establishes the licensing basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber 
Security Program. The Plan establishes how to achieve high assurance 
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems 
and networks associated with the following are adequately protected 
against cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems [within the scope of the Rule] are 
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any 
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant 
modifications which involve digital computer systems are reviewed to 
provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber attacks, 
up to and including the design basis threat as defined in the Rule. 
The proposed change does not alter the plant configuration, require 
new plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis 
assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect the function of plant 
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected. The first part of the proposed 
change is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within 
the scope of the Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no 
impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation 
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are 
administrative and have no impact on the probability or consequences 
of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is required by Sec.  73.54 and includes 
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 
review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template provided by 
NEI 08-09 Revision 6 and provides a description of how the 
requirements of the Rule will be implemented at [the] Salem and Hope 
Creek Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan establishes the licensing 
basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber Security Program. The Plan 
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant 
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated 
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up 
to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the Rule are 
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any 
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant 
modifications [which involve] digital computer systems are reviewed 
to provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber 
attacks, up to and including the design basis threat as defined in 
the Rule. The proposed change does not alter the plant 
configuration, require new plant equipment to be installed, alter 
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect the 
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are 
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The first part 
of the proposed change is designed to achieve high assurance that 
the systems within the scope of the Rule are protected from cyber 
attacks and does not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation 
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are 
administrative and do not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.

Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in a Margin of Safety

    The proposed change is required by Sec.  73.54 and includes 
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC 
review and approval. The Plan conforms to the template provided by 
NEI 08-09 Revision 6 and provides a description of how the 
requirements of the Rule will be implemented at the Salem and Hope 
Creek Generating Station site. The Plan establishes the licensing 
basis for the Salem-Hope Creek Cyber Security Program. The Plan 
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant 
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated 
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up 
to and including the design basis threat:
    1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
    2. Security functions,
    3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite 
communications, and
    4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would 
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 
functions.
    Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high 
assurance that the systems within the scope of the Rule are 
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety margins are established 
through Limiting Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety System 
Settings and Safety [L]imits specified in the Technical 
Specifications. Because there is no change to these established 
safety margins, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    The second part of the proposed change is an Implementation 
Schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license 
condition for Physical Protection. Both of these changes are 
administrative and do not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, with changes by the NRC staff shown in square brackets, it 
appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. 
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Vincent Zabielski, PSEG Nuclear LLC-N21, 
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
    NRC Branch Chief: Harold K. Chernoff.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek 
Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

    Date of amendment request: July 19, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains

[[Page 62608]]

sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The 
amendment requests for approval of the Cyber Security Plan in 
accordance with 10 CFR Section 73.54. In addition, the amendment would 
revise Section 2.E of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 
to incorporate the provisions for implementing and maintaining in 
effect the provisions of the approved Cyber Security Plan.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change incorporates a new requirement in the 
Renewed Facility Operating License to implement and maintain the 
Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility's overall program for 
physical protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the 
Renewed Facility Operating License itself does not involve any 
modifications to the safety related structures, systems or 
components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes how the 
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify, 
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design 
basis cyber attack threat, thereby achieving high assurance that the 
facility's digital computer and communications systems and networks 
are protected from cyber attacks. The implementation and 
incorporation of the Cyber Security Plan into the Renewed Facility 
Operating License will not alter previously evaluated Updated Safety 
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis accident analysis assumptions, 
add any accident initiators, or affect the function of the plant 
safety related SSCs as to how they are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This proposed amendment provides assurance that safety related 
SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. Implementation of 10 CFR 
73.54 and the inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the Renewed 
Facility Operating License do not result in the need of any new or 
different USAR design basis accident analysis. It does not introduce 
new equipment that could create a new or different kind of accident, 
and no new equipment failure modes are created. As a result, no new 
accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures 
are introduced as a result of this proposed amendment.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is associated with the confidence in the 
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment structure) to 
limit the level of radiation to the public. The proposed amendment 
would not alter the way any safety related SSC functions and would 
not alter the way the plant is operated. The amendment provides 
assurance that safety related SSCs are protected from cyber attacks. 
The proposed amendment would not introduce any new uncertainties or 
change any existing uncertainties associated with any safety limit. 
The proposed amendment would have no impact on the structural 
integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
or containment structure. Based on the above considerations, the 
proposed amendment would not degrade the confidence in the ability 
of the fission product barriers to limit the level of radiation to 
the public.
    Therefore the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw 
Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power 
Plant, LLC, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
317, 50-318, 50-244, 50-220, and 50-410, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power 
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 
(Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS), 
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne County, New York, and Oswego County, 
New York, Respectively

Carolina Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, 
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North 
Carolina

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., 
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, 
Louisiana

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester 
County, New York

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas 
Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric 
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County, 
Pennsylvania

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, 
St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. 
Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

Luminant Generation Company LLC,, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, 
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, 
Texas

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), Docket Nos. 50-266 and 
50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, Town of Two 
Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin

Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50-263, 
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota

Northern States Power Company--Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50-282 and 
50-306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, 
Goodhue County, Minnesota

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo 
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, 
California

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam 
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, 
Salem County, New Jersey


[[Page 62609]]


Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek 
Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

    A. This Order contains instructions regarding how potential parties 
to this proceeding may request access to documents containing Sensitive 
Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI).
    B. Within 10 days after publication of this notice of hearing and 
opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, any potential party who 
believes access to SUNSI is necessary to respond to this notice may 
request such access. A ``potential party'' is any person who intends to 
participate as a party by demonstrating standing and filing an 
admissible contention under 10 CFR 2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI 
submitted later than 10 days after publication will not be considered 
absent a showing of good cause for the late filing, addressing why the 
request could not have been filed earlier.
    C. The requestor shall submit a letter requesting permission to 
access SUNSI to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, and provide a copy to the Associate General 
Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement and Administration, Office of the 
General Counsel, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The expedited delivery or 
courier mail address for both offices is: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The e-mail 
addresses for the Office of the Secretary and the Office of the General 
Counsel are [email protected] and [email protected], 
respectively.\1\ The request must include the following information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ While a request for hearing or petition to intervene in this 
proceeding must comply with the filing requirements of the NRC's 
``E-Filing Rule,'' the initial request to access SUNSI under these 
procedures should be submitted as described in this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) A description of the licensing action with a citation to this 
Federal Register notice;
    (2) The name and address of the potential party and a description 
of the potential party's particularized interest that could be harmed 
by the action identified in C.(1);
    (3) The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to 
SUNSI and the requestor's basis for the need for the information in 
order to meaningfully participate in this adjudicatory proceeding. In 
particular, the request must explain why publicly-available versions of 
the information requested would not be sufficient to provide the basis 
and specificity for a proffered contention;
    D. Based on an evaluation of the information submitted under 
paragraph C.(3) the NRC staff will determine within 10 days of receipt 
of the request whether:
    (1) There is a reasonable basis to believe the petitioner is likely 
to establish standing to participate in this NRC proceeding; and
    (2) The requestor has established a legitimate need for access to 
SUNSI.
    E. If the NRC staff determines that the requestor satisfies both 
D.(1) and D.(2) above, the NRC staff will notify the requestor in 
writing that access to SUNSI has been granted. The written notification 
will contain instructions on how the requestor may obtain copies of the 
requested documents, and any other conditions that may apply to access 
to those documents. These conditions may include, but are not limited 
to, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement or Affidavit, or 
Protective Order \2\ setting forth terms and conditions to prevent the 
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of SUNSI by each individual who 
will be granted access to SUNSI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Any motion for Protective Order or draft Non-Disclosure 
Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must be filed with the presiding 
officer or the Chief Administrative Judge if the presiding officer 
has not yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline for the 
receipt of the written access request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    F. Filing of Contentions. Any contentions in these proceedings that 
are based upon the information received as a result of the request made 
for SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no later than 25 days after 
the requestor is granted access to that information. However, if more 
than 25 days remain between the date the petitioner is granted access 
to the information and the deadline for filing all other contentions 
(as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), 
the petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
    G. Review of Denials of Access.
    (1) If the request for access to SUNSI is denied by the NRC staff 
either after a determination on standing and need for access, or after 
a determination on trustworthiness and reliability, the NRC staff shall 
immediately notify the requestor in writing, briefly stating the reason 
or reasons for the denial.
    (2) The requestor may challenge the NRC staff's adverse 
determination by filing a challenge within 5 days of receipt of that 
determination with: (a) The presiding officer designated in this 
proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer has been appointed, the Chief 
Administrative Judge, or if he or she is unavailable, another 
administrative judge, or an administrative law judge with jurisdiction 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has been 
designated to rule on information access issues, with that officer.
    H. Review of Grants of Access. A party other than the requestor may 
challenge an NRC staff determination granting access to SUNSI whose 
release would harm that party's interest independent of the proceeding. 
Such a challenge must be filed with the Chief Administrative Judge 
within 5 days of the notification by the NRC staff of its grant of 
access.
    If challenges to the NRC staff determinations are filed, these 
procedures give way to the normal process for litigating disputes 
concerning access to information. The availability of interlocutory 
review by the Commission of orders ruling on such NRC staff 
determinations (whether granting or denying access) is governed by 10 
CFR 2.311.\3\
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    \3\ Requestors should note that the filing requirements of the 
NRC's E-Filing Rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007) apply to appeals 
of NRC staff determinations (because they must be served on a 
presiding officer or the Commission, as applicable), but not to the 
initial SUNSI request submitted to the NRC staff under these 
procedures.
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    I. The Commission expects that the NRC staff and presiding officers 
(and any other reviewing officers) will consider and resolve requests 
for access to SUNSI, and motions for protective orders, in a timely 
fashion in order to minimize any unnecessary delays in identifying 
those petitioners who have standing and who have propounded contentions 
meeting the specificity and basis requirements in 10 CFR Part 2. 
Attachment 1 to this Order summarizes the general target schedule for 
processing and resolving requests under these procedures.

    It is so ordered.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of September 2010.

    For the Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.

ATTACHMENT 1--General Target Schedule for Processing and Resolving 
Requests for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards 
Information in This Proceeding

[[Page 62610]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Day                             Event/Activity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0............................  Publication of Federal Register notice of
                                hearing and opportunity to petition for
                                leave to intervene, including order with
                                instructions for access requests.
10...........................  Deadline for submitting requests for
                                access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
                                Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with
                                information: supporting the standing of
                                a potential party identified by name and
                                address; describing the need for the
                                information in order for the potential
                                party to participate meaningfully in an
                                adjudicatory proceeding.
60...........................  Deadline for submitting petition for
                                intervention containing: (i)
                                Demonstration of standing; (ii) all
                                contentions whose formulation does not
                                require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to
                                petition for intervention; +7 requestor/
                                petitioner reply).
20...........................  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff
                                informs the requestor of the staff's
                                determination whether the request for
                                access provides a reasonable basis to
                                believe standing can be established and
                                shows need for SUNSI. (NRC staff also
                                informs any party to the proceeding
                                whose interest independent of the
                                proceeding would be harmed by the
                                release of the information.) If NRC
                                staff makes the finding of need for
                                SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC
                                staff begins document processing
                                (preparation of redactions or review of
                                redacted documents).
25...........................  If NRC staff finds no ``need'' or no
                                likelihood of standing, the deadline for
                                requestor/petitioner to file a motion
                                seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC
                                staff's denial of access; NRC staff
                                files copy of access determination with
                                the presiding officer (or Chief
                                Administrative Judge or other designated
                                officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff
                                finds ``need'' for SUNSI, the deadline
                                for any party to the proceeding whose
                                interest independent of the proceeding
                                would be harmed by the release of the
                                information to file a motion seeking a
                                ruling to reverse the NRC staff's grant
                                of access.
30...........................  Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions
                                to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
40...........................  (Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing
                                and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC
                                staff to complete information processing
                                and file motion for Protective Order and
                                draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit. Deadline
                                for applicant/licensee to file Non-
                                Disclosure Agreement for SUNSI.
A............................  If access granted: Issuance of presiding
                                officer or other designated officer
                                decision on motion for protective order
                                for access to sensitive information
                                (including schedule for providing access
                                and submission of contentions) or
                                decision reversing a final adverse
                                determination by the NRC staff.
A + 3........................  Deadline for filing executed Non-
                                Disclosure Affidavits. Access provided
                                to SUNSI consistent with decision
                                issuing the protective order.
A + 28.......................  Deadline for submission of contentions
                                whose development depends upon access to
                                SUNSI. However, if more than 25 days
                                remain between the petitioner's receipt
                                of (or access to) the information and
                                the deadline for filing all other
                                contentions (as established in the
                                notice of hearing or opportunity for
                                hearing), the petitioner may file its
                                SUNSI contentions by that later
                                deadline.
A + 53.......................  (Contention receipt +25) Answers to
                                contentions whose development depends
                                upon access to SUNSI.
A + 60.......................  (Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor
                                reply to answers.
A + 60.......................  Decision on contention admission.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2010-25144 Filed 10-8-10; 8:45 am]
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