SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Rule G–37, on Political Contributions and Prohibitions on Municipal Securities Business

September 2, 2010.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”), 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, 2 notice is hereby given that on August 25, 2010, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by the MSRB. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

The MSRB has filed with the Commission a proposed rule change which consists of an interpretive notice regarding Rule G–37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business (referred to hereafter as “proposed rule change”). The MSRB has requested an effective date for the proposed rule change of sixty (60) days after Commission approval of the proposed rule change.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis For, the Proposed Rule Change

The proposed rule change consists of an interpretive notice regarding Rule G–37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business. 3 Under Rule G–37, certain contributions to elected officials of municipal securities issuers made by brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers ("dealers"), municipal finance professionals ("MFPs") associated with dealers, and political action committees ("PACs") controlled by dealers and their MFPs ("dealer-controlled PACs") 4 may result in prohibitions on dealers from engaging in municipal securities business with such issuers for a period of two years from the date of any triggering contributions.

Rule G–37 requires dealers to disclose certain contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns, as well as other information, on Form G–37 to allow public scrutiny of such contributions and the municipal securities business of a dealer. In addition, dealers and MFPs generally are prohibited from soliciting others (including affiliates of the dealer or any PACs) to make contributions to officials of issuers with which the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business, or to political parties of a state or locality where the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business. Dealers and MFPs are prohibited from circumventing Rule G–37 by direct or indirect actions through any other persons or means. 5

Due to changes in the financial markets since the adoption of Rule G–37 and recent market turmoil, many dealers have become affiliated with a broad range of other entities in increasingly diverse organizational structures. Some of these affiliated entities (including but not limited to banks, bank holding companies, insurance companies and investment management companies) have formed or otherwise maintain relationships with PACs ("affiliated PACs") and other political organizations, many of which may make contributions to issuer officials. Such relationships raise questions regarding the extent to which affiliated PACs may effectively be controlled by dealers or their MFPs and thereby constitute dealer-controlled PACs whose contributions are subject to Rule G–37. Further, such relationships raise concerns regarding whether the contributions of such affiliated PACs, even if not viewed as dealer-controlled PACs, may be used by dealers or their MFPs to circumvent Rule G–37 as indirect contributions for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business. As a result, the MSRB has filed the proposed rule change to provide additional guidance with regard to the potential for affiliated PACs to be viewed as dealer-controlled PACs.

The proposed rule change sets out factors that may result in an affiliated PAC being viewed as controlled by a dealer or an MFP of a dealer and thereby being treated as a dealer-controlled PAC for purposes of Rule G–37. The proposed rule change would: i) provide guidance on when a dealer’s affiliated PAC might be viewed as controlled by the dealer for purposes of Rule G–37; and ii) ensure that the industry is

6 Rule G–37 defines municipal securities business as: (i) The purchase of a primary offering of municipal securities from an issuer on other than a competitive bid basis; (ii) the offer or sale of a primary offering of municipal securities on behalf of an issuer; (iii) the provision of financial advisory or consulting services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis; or (iv) the provision of remarketing agent services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis.

7 Rule G–37(d) provides that no broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or any municipal finance professional shall, directly or indirectly, through or by any other person or means, do any act which would result in a violation of sections (b) or (c) of the rule. Section (b) relates to the ban on soliciting and coordinating contributions.
cognizant of prior MSRB guidance concerning indirect contributions under the rule. The proposed rule change notes that, when evaluating whether contributions made by affiliated PACs may be subject to the provisions of Rule G–37, dealers should first determine whether such affiliated PAC would be viewed as a dealer-controlled PAC. If an affiliated PAC is determined to be a dealer-controlled PAC, then its contributions to issuer officials would subject the dealer to the ban on municipal securities business and its contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns would be subject to disclosure under Rule G–37. Even if the affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, the dealer still must consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such affiliated PAC could ultimately be viewed as an indirect contribution under Rule G–37(d) if, for example, the affiliated PAC is being used as a conduit for making a contribution to an issuer official.

**Indicators of Control by Dealers and MFPs.** Soon after adoption of Rule G–37, the MSRB stated that each dealer must determine whether a PAC is dealer controlled, with any PAC of a non-bank dealer assumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC. The MSRB has also stated that the determination of whether a PAC of a bank dealer is a dealer-controlled PAC would depend upon whether the bank dealer or anyone from the bank dealer department has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC. Such ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC also would be indicative of control of such PAC by a non-bank dealer or any of its MFPs, although it would not be the exclusive indicator of such control. While this guidance establishes basic principles with regard to making a determination of control, it does not set out an exhaustive list of circumstances under which a PAC may or may not be viewed as dealer or MFP controlled. The specific facts and circumstances regarding the creation, management, operation and control of a particular PAC must be considered in making a determination of control with respect to such PAC.

**Creation of PAC.** The proposed rule change provides that, in general, a dealer or MFP involved in the creation of a PAC would continue to be viewed as controlling such PAC unless and until such dealer or MFP becomes wholly disassociated in any direct or indirect manner with the PAC. Thus, any PAC created by a dealer, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC. This presumption continues at least as long as the dealer or any MFP of the dealer retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether such dealer or MFP has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. This presumption also would continue for so long as any non-MFP associated person of the dealer (either an individual, whether or not an MFP, or an affiliated company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the dealer) has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. In effect, a dealer could not attempt to treat a PAC it created and then spun off to the control of an affiliated company as not being a dealer-controlled PAC. However, depending on the totality of the facts and circumstances, a PAC originally created by a dealer in which the dealer or its MFPs no longer retain any role, and with respect to which any other affiliates retain only very limited non-control roles, could be viewed as no longer controlled by the dealer.

Similarly, a PAC created by any person associated with the dealer at the time the PAC was created, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be controlled by such person under the proposed rule change. Such presumption continues at least for so long as such person retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether any such person has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. This presumption also would continue for so long as any other person associated with the same dealer as the creator of the PAC has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. Although such PAC may not be viewed as subject to Rule G–37 as an MFP-controlled PAC when originally created if such person was not then an MFP, if the person creating the PAC or any other associated person with the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of such PAC, is or later becomes an MFP, such PAC would be deemed an MFP-controlled PAC.9 Management, Funding and Control of PAC. Beyond the role of the dealer, MFP or other person in creating a PAC and maintaining an ongoing association with such PAC, the proposed rule change provides that the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC is also important. Strong indicators of management and control are not mitigated by the fact that such dealer, MFP or other person does not have exclusive, predominant or “majority” control of the PAC, its management, its policies, or its decisions with regard to making contributions. For example, the fact that a dealer or MFP may only have a single vote on a governing board or other decision-making or advisory board or committee of a PAC, and therefore does not have sole power to cause the PAC to take any action, would not obviate the status of such dealer or MFP as having control of the PAC, so long as the dealer or MFP has the ability, alone or in conjunction with other similarly empowered entities or individuals, to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC. In essence, it is possible for a single PAC to be viewed as controlled by multiple different dealers if the control of such PAC is shared among such dealers, although the presumption of control may be rebutted as described below.

The level of funding provided by dealers and their MFPs to a PAC may also be indicative of control pursuant to the proposed rule change. A PAC that receives a majority of its funding from a single dealer (including the collective contributions of its MFPs and employees) or a single MFP is conclusively presumed to be controlled by such dealer or MFP, regardless of the lack of any of the other indicia of control described in this notice. Another important factor is the size or frequency of contributions by a dealer or MFP, viewed in light of the size and frequency of contributions made by other contributors not affiliated in any way with such dealer or MFP. For example, a limited number of small

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7 MSRB Rule G–38 defines a bank dealer as a municipal securities dealer which is a bank or a separately identifiable department or division of a bank.
8 See Rule G–37 Question & Answer No. IV. 24 (May 24, 1994).
9 However, a PAC created by an individual acting in his or her formal capacity as an officer, employee, director or other representative of a dealer, regardless of whether such individual is an MFP, would be deemed a dealer-controlled PAC rather than a PAC controlled by the individual.
10 A dealer or an MFP may make sufficiently large or frequent contributions to a PAC so as to obtain effective control over the PAC, depending on the totality of facts and circumstances.
contributions freely made by employees of a dealer to an affiliated PAC (i.e., not directed by the dealer and not part of an automated or otherwise dealer-organized program of contributions) would not, by itself, automatically raise a presumption of dealer control so long as the collective contributions by the dealer or its employees is not significant as compared to the total funding of the affiliated PAC, subject to consideration of the other relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, contributions made by a dealer or MFP to an affiliated PAC could raise a stronger inference of de facto dealer or MFP control than when such contributions were made to non-affiliated PACs.

However, even where a dealer or MFP is not viewed as controlling a PAC under the principles described above, the proposed rule change cautions dealers to remain mindful of the potential for leveraging the contribution activities of affiliated PACs in soliciting municipal securities business in a way that could raise a presumption of dealer or MFP control. For example, an MFP’s references to the contributions made by a dealer or its employees is not significant as compared to the total funding of the affiliated PAC, subject to consideration of the other relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, contributions made by a dealer or MFP to an affiliated PAC could raise a stronger inference of de facto dealer or MFP control than when such contributions were made to non-affiliated PACs.

Of course, the presumptions described above may be rebutted, depending upon the totality of facts and circumstances. The proposed rule change notes considerations that may serve to rebut such presumptions, which may include whether the dealer or person creating the PAC: (i) Participates with a broad-based group of other entities and/or individuals in creating the PAC, (ii) at no time undertakes any direct or indirect role (and, in the case of a dealer, no person associated with the dealer undertakes any direct or indirect role) in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC, and/or (iii) provides funding for such PAC (and, in the case of a dealer, its associated persons collectively provide funding for such PAC) that is not substantially greater than the typical funding levels of other participants in the PAC who do not undertake a direct or indirect role in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.

**Indirect Contributions Through Bank PACs or Other Affiliated PACs.** The proposed rule change reminds dealers that, if an affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, a dealer must still consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such an affiliated PAC could be viewed as an indirect contribution that would become subject to Rule G–37 pursuant to section (d) thereof. The proposed rule change reviews prior extensive guidance on such indirect contributions, noting that the MSRB had stated in 1996 that, depending on the facts and circumstances, contributions to a non-dealer affiliated PAC that is soliciting funds for the purpose of supporting a limited number of issuer officials might result in the same prohibition on municipal securities business as would contributions made directly to the issuer official. 12 The MSRB also noted that dealers should make inquiries of a non-dealer affiliated PAC that is soliciting contributions in order to ensure that contributions to such a PAC would not be treated as an indirect contribution.13

The proposed rule change also notes that the MSRB has previously provided guidance in 2005 with regard to supervisory procedures 14 that dealers should have in place in connection with payments to a non-dealer affiliated PAC or a political party to avoid indirect rule violations of Rule G–37(d). In such guidance, the MSRB stated that in order to ensure compliance with Rule G–27(c) as it relates to payments to political parties or PACs and Rule G–37(d), each dealer must adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that neither the dealer nor its MFPs are using payments to political parties or non-dealer controlled PACs to contribute indirectly to an official of an issuer. 15 Among other things, dealers might seek to establish procedures requiring that, prior to the making of any contribution to a PAC, the dealer undertake certain due diligence inquiries regarding the intended use of such contributions, the motive for making the contribution and whether the contribution was solicited. Further, in order to ensure compliance with Rule G–37(d), dealers could consider establishing certain information barriers between any affiliated PACs and the dealer and its MFPs.16 The proposed rule change notes that dealers that have established such information barriers should review their adequacy to ensure that the affiliated entities’ contributions, payments or PAC disbursement decisions are neither influenced by the dealer or its MFPs, nor communicated to the dealers and the MFPs.

The MSRB subsequently noted that the 2005 guidance did not establish an obligation to put in place the specific procedures and information barriers described in the guidance so long as the dealer in fact has and enforces other written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the dealer and its MFPs are in compliance with Rule G–37(d).17 The proposed rule change provides the example that, when information regarding past or planned contributions of an affiliated PAC is or may be available to or known by the dealer or its MFPs, the dealer might establish and enforce written supervisory procedures that prohibit the dealer or MFP from providing information to issuer personnel regarding past or anticipated affiliated PAC contributions.

**2. Statutory Basis**

The MSRB has adopted the proposed rule change pursuant to Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Act,18 which provides that the MSRB’s rules shall be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of

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13 Rule G–27, on supervision, provides in section (c) that each dealer shall adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the dealer and its associated persons are in compliance with MSRB rules.
14 Rule G–37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005).
15 see Rule G–37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005).
16 The potential information barriers described in the guidance include: (i) A prohibition on the dealer or MFP from recommending, nominating, appointing or approving the management of affiliated PACs; (ii) a prohibition on sharing the affiliated PACs meeting agenda, meeting schedule, or meeting minutes; (iii) a prohibition on identifying prior affiliated PAC contributions, planned PAC contributions or anticipated PAC contributions; (iv) a prohibition on directly providing or coordinating information about prior negotiated municipal securities businesses, solicited municipal securities business; and (v) other such information barriers as the firms deems appropriate to effectively monitor conflicting interest and prevent abuses.

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trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in municipal securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market in municipal securities, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.

The MSRB believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act because it will help to inhibit practices constituting real and perceived attempts to influence the awarding of municipal securities business through contributions made by or through dealer-affiliated PACs. The MSRB also believes that the proposed rule change will facilitate dealer compliance with Rule G–37 and Rule G–27, on supervision.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition

The MSRB does not believe that the proposed rule change would impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act since it would apply equally to all brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action

Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:

A. By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or

B. institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved.

The MSRB has requested an effective date for the proposed rule change of sixty (60) days after Commission approval of the proposed rule change.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comment

- Use the Commission’s Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml);
- Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–MSRB–2010–07 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR–MSRB–2010–07. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the MSRB. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–MSRB–2010–07 and should be submitted on or before September 30, 2010.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.

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\(^{19}\) 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Permit Concurrent Listing of $2.50 and $1 Strikes on MNX Options

September 2, 2010.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”) \(^{1}\) and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, \(^{2}\) notice is hereby given that, on August 30, 2010, NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. (the “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange proposes to amend Chapter XIV, Section 10 (Terms of Index Options Contracts) of the Rules of the Boston Options Exchange Group, LLC ("BOX") to allow the Exchange to concurrently list $2.50 and $1 strikes on Mini- Nasdaq-100 Index ("MNX") options, and that certain listing parameters only apply to $1 strikes on MNX options. The text of the proposed rule change is available from the principal office of the Exchange, on the Commission’s Web site at http://www.sec.gov, at the Commission's Public Reference Room and also on the Exchange’s Internet Web site at http://nasdaqomxbx.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQOMXBX/Filings/.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.
