[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 157 (Monday, August 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49992-49994]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-20201]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Peter W.S. Grigg, M.D.; Revocation of Registration

    On January 2, 2009, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate 
Suspension of Registration to Peter W.S. Grigg, M.D. (Respondent), of 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Show Cause Order proposed the 
revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration, BG2107856, 
which authorized him to dispense controlled substances as a 
practitioner, and the denial of any pending application to renew or 
modify the registration on the ground that his ``continued registration 
is inconsistent with the public interest.'' Show Cause Order at 1.
    More specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that on four 
separate occasions beginning on October 17, 2008, and ending on 
December 5, 2008, Respondent violated Federal law by selling 
prescriptions for oxycodone, a schedule II controlled substance, to a 
police officer acting in an undercover capacity, which lacked a 
``legitimate medical purpose'' and were ``outside the usual course of 
professional practice.'' Id. at 1-2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 
CFR 1306.04(a)). The Show Cause Order further alleged that on November 
25, 2008, Respondent post-dated the oxycodone prescription and also 
``provided three capsules of MDMA, a schedule I controlled substance'' 
and 60 tablets of oxycodone 10 mg. to the undercover officer, and that 
these distributions also lacked a legitimate medical purpose and were 
outside of the usual course of professional practice. Id. at 2. 
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged that, on December 5, 2008, 
Respondent also unlawfully distributed four fentanyl 400 mg. tablets 
and one fentanyl transdermal patch 12 mcg./hr. to the undercover 
officer. Id.
    Based on the above, I further found that Respondent's continued 
registration during the pendency of the proceeding would ``constitute[] 
an imminent danger to the public health and safety.'' Id. I therefore 
immediately suspended Respondent's registration. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
824(d) & 21 CFR 1301.36(e)). The Order also notified Respondent of his 
right to request a hearing on the allegations and the procedure for 
doing so. Id. at 3.
    On January 8, 2009, a DEA Diversion Investigator personally served 
the Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration on

[[Page 49993]]

Respondent. Affidavit of DI at 12. Since then, neither Respondent, nor 
anyone purporting to represent him, has either requested a hearing or 
submitted a written statement in lieu of a hearing. See 21 CFR 
1301.43(a) & (c). Accordingly, I find that Respondent has waived his 
right to a hearing and issue this Decision and Final Order based on the 
record submitted by the Government. See id. at 1301.43(d) & (e). I make 
the following findings.

Findings

    Respondent is the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration, 
BG2107856, which expires on September 30, 2010. Respondent has not 
filed a renewal application.
    On August 14, 2009, Respondent, who had been criminally charged 
with multiple counts of violating Federal law, entered into a Plea 
Agreement, Cooperation Agreement, and Stipulation of Facts with the 
United States. See Plea Agreement at 15, U.S. v. Grigg, No. 09-CR-
00012-REB (D. Col. Aug. 19, 2009). Therein, Respondent admitted to the 
following:
    First, Respondent admitted that on October 17, 2008, he met an 
undercover police officer in a parking lot in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado and sold to the officer a prescription for 60 tablets of 
oxycodone 30 mg., a schedule II controlled substance, in exchange for 
$100. Id. at 10. Respondent further admitted that ``[t]he writing of 
the prescription was not done as part of [his] legitimate medical 
practice and was not for legitimate medical purposes.'' Id.
    Second, Respondent admitted that on November 6, 2008, he met an 
undercover police officer in Colorado Springs and sold to the officer a 
prescription for 150 tablet of oxycodone 30 mg., in exchange for $1000. 
Id. Respondent further admitted that ``[t]he writing of the 
prescription was not done as part of [his] legitimate medical practice 
and was not for legitimate medical purposes.'' Id.
    Third, Respondent admitted that on November 25, 2008, he met an 
undercover police officer in Colorado Springs and sold to the officer a 
post-dated prescription for 150 oxycodone 30 mg., in exchange for 
$1,000. Id. at 11. Respondent further admitted that ``[t]he writing of 
the prescription was not done as part of [his] legitimate medical 
practice and was not for legitimate medical purposes.'' Id. Respondent 
also admitted that on this date, he distributed to the officer 60 
tablets of oxycodone 10 mg., a schedule II controlled substance, and 
that the distribution ``was not done as part of legitimate medical 
practice and was not for legitimate medical purposes.'' Id. In 
addition, Respondent admitted that on this date, he ``supplied the 
undercover police officer with three doses of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA/ecstasy),'' a schedule II 
controlled substance. Id. Based on the affidavit of a DEA Investigator, 
I further find that Respondent distributed the MDMA as part of the same 
transaction. Affidavit of DI at 9-10. I thus also find that the 
distribution was not for a legitimate medical purpose.
    Fourth, Respondent admitted that on December 5, 2008, he met an 
undercover police officer in Colorado Springs and sold to the officer 
320 tablets of oxycodone 10 mg., in exchange for $1,000. Plea Agreement 
at 11-12. Respondent further admitted that the distribution ``was not 
done as part of [his] legitimate medical practice and was not for 
legitimate medical purposes.'' Id. at 11. Respondent admitted that on 
this date, he also supplied the undercover officer with one fentanyl 
transdermal patch and four tablets of fentanyl 400 mcg., both of which 
are schedule II controlled substances. Id. at 12.

Discussion

    Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provides that 
a registration to ``dispense a controlled substance * * * may be 
suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the 
registrant * * * has committed such acts as would render his 
registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with the 
public interest as determined under such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(4). With respect to a practitioner, the Act requires the 
consideration of the following factors in making the public interest 
determination:

    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled 
substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

Id. Sec.  823(f).
    ``[T]hese factors are * * * considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert 
A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ``may rely on any one or 
a combination of factors, and may give each factor the weight [I] 
deem[] appropriate in determining whether a registration should be 
revoked.'' Id. Moreover, I am ``not required to make findings as to all 
of the factors.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see 
also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
    The record contains no evidence as to whether the State of Colorado 
has taken action against Respondent's controlled substance prescribing 
authority (factor one). Moreover, while the record establishes that 
Respondent has been charged with multiple felony violations of the CSA 
and that Respondent has entered into a plea agreement with the United 
States in which he admitted to multiple violations of the CSA, the 
record does not contain a judgment of conviction (factor three). 
However, under Agency precedent, neither of these findings is 
dispositive. See Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580, 6590 n.22 (2007); Mortimer 
B. Levin, 55 FR 8209, 8210 (1990). Moreover, the evidence with respect 
to factors two (Respondent's experience in dispensing controlled 
substances) and four (Respondent's compliance with applicable laws 
related to controlled substances) establishes that Respondent has 
committed numerous acts which render his continued registration 
``inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).

Factors Two and Four--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled 
Substances and Record of Compliance with Applicable Controlled 
Substance Laws

    Under a longstanding DEA regulation, a prescription for a 
controlled substance is not ``effective'' unless it is ``issued for a 
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the 
usual course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This 
regulation further provides that ``an order purporting to be a 
prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment * 
* * is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of [21 U.S.C. 
829] and * * * the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties 
provided for violations of the provisions of law related to controlled 
substances.'' Id. See also 21 U.S.C. 802(10) (defining the term 
``dispense'' as meaning ``to deliver a controlled substance to an 
ultimate user by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, 
including the prescribing and administering of a controlled 
substance'') (emphasis added).
    As the Supreme Court recently explained, ``the prescription 
requirement * * * ensures patients use controlled substances under the

[[Page 49994]]

supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational 
abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients 
who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 
135, 143 (1975)).
    Under the CSA, it is fundamental that a practitioner must establish 
and maintain a bonafide doctor-patient relationship in order to act 
``in the usual course of * * * professional practice'' and to issue a 
prescription for a ``legitimate medical purpose.'' Laurence T. 
McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22 (2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 
142-43 (noting that evidence established that physician ``exceeded the 
bounds of `professional practice,''' when ``he gave inadequate physical 
examinations or none at all,'' ``ignored the results of the tests he 
did make,'' and ``took no precautions against * * * misuse and 
diversion''). While the CSA generally looks to state law to determine 
whether a doctor and patient have established a bonafide doctor-patient 
relationship, see Kamir Garces-Mejias, 72 FR 54931, 54935 (2007); 
United Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397, 50407 (2007), here, 
there is no need to analyze the applicable provisions of Colorado law 
because Respondent admitted in his plea agreement that he acted outside 
of the usual course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose in issuing the prescriptions which he sold to the 
undercover officer.
    As found above, on four different occasions, Respondent sold 
prescriptions for oxycodone, a schedule II controlled substance, to an 
undercover police officer. Three of the prescriptions were for either 
60 (Oct. 17) or 150 (Nov. 6 & 25) tablets of 30 mg. strength; the 
remaining prescription was for 320 tablets of 10 mg. strength. In 
addition, Respondent also physically distributed to the undercover 
officer 60 tablets of oxycodone 10 mg., three tablets of MDMA/ecstasy, 
one fentanyl patch, and four tablets of fentanyl 400 mcg., all of which 
are schedule II controlled substances. In exchange, Respondent received 
cash payments of $100 at the first transaction and $1000 at the 
remaining three. As Respondent has admitted, his conduct during each of 
the four transactions bears no semblance to the legitimate practice of 
medicine. Rather, during each of these transactions, he engaged in a 
drug deal and violated 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1).
    I thus conclude that Respondent's experience in dispensing 
controlled substances and his criminal conduct in violation of Federal 
law make clear that his continued registration ``is inconsistent with 
the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Finally, for the same reasons 
which led me to find that Respondent posed ``an imminent danger to the 
public health or safety,'' id. section 824(d), I conclude that the 
public interest requires that his registration be revoked effective 
immediately and that any pending applications be denied. See 21 CFR 
1316.67.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I hereby order that DEA 
Certificate of Registration, BG2107856, issued to Peter W.S. Grigg, 
M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. This Order is effective 
immediately.

    Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-20201 Filed 8-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P