opportunity for public comment on this action. After obtaining and considering public comment, NSF will prepare the submission requesting OMB clearance of this collection for no longer than three years.

Comments are invited on (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

DATES: Written comments should be received by October 5, 2010, to be assured of consideration. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Written comments regarding the information collection and requests for copies of the proposed information collection request should be addressed to Suzanne Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room 295, Arlington, VA 22230, or by e-mail to splimpto@nsf.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Suzanne Plimpton on (703) 292–7556 or send e-mail to splimpto@nsf.gov.

Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time, Monday through Friday.


Abstract: The ADVANCE Program was established by the National Science Foundation in 2001 to address the underrepresentation and inadequate advancement of women on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) faculties at postsecondary institutions. The evaluation being conducted by the Urban Institute focuses on the implementation of ADVANCE projects at institutions throughout the nation. The three major funding components—institutional transformation, leadership, and partnership awards—as well as all cohorts funded that completed their funding cycles will be included. The study will rely on a thorough review of project documents, telephone interviews with all grantees, and detailed case studies at selected sites. The goal of the evaluation will be to identify models of implementation and, depending on outcomes by model, conduct case studies at selected institutions to understand how ADVANCE models operate and may be effective in differing settings.

Respondents: Faculty and staff at institutions of higher education awarded an ADVANCE grant from NSF. Estimated Number of Annual Respondents: 151 (total).

1. Site visit interviews. Conduct interviews in 6 sites selected for case studies. Interview project staff, administrators and faculty. Burden calculated as follows: Approximately 8 interviews in each site + interview recipients of leadership awards at case study sites (if any).

Total respondents: 48 estimated interviewees + 7 leadership and PAID award recipients = 55

2. Site visit focus groups with faculty: 2 per site; 6 sites; 6–8 faculty in each; total = 96

Burden on the Public: 149 hours (maximum). Calculated as follows:

1. Site visit interviews: 48 interviews of 1 hour duration = 48 hours and 7 interviews of 45 minutes duration = 5.25 hours (53)

2. Focus groups: 96 participates of 1 hour duration = 96 hours


Suzanne H. Plimpton,
Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 2010–19458 Filed 8–5–10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P
were not certified to handle the materials;
   c. Without proper Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) Department of Transportation (DOT) certified containers;
   d. Without proper labeling for transport on public roads; and
   e. Concealed via fraudulent Annual Operating Reports in which the licensee failed to address uncontrolled by-product material distribution and facility modifications and which were never amended after NOV 93–1.
(6) The licensee must permanently revoke the Broad Form License.
(7) The licensee must publicly acknowledge that there was a loss of control of Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
(8) The licensee must publicly acknowledge persons that served as an accessory to concealing unlawful distribution of controlled substances, fraud (both Annual Operating Reports and National Whistleblower Center), loss of control of SNM, and child endangerment.

Petitioner’s Bases for the Requested Action

The petitioner, Dr. Crawford, stated that during his tenure as the Reactor Supervisor at the Idaho State University research reactor from December 19, 1991 until March 12, 1993, he witnessed regulatory, criminal, and ethical violations associated with the operation of the NRC licensed facility. Furthermore, Dr. Crawford contends that the NRC was grossly negligent in concealing violations in the Notice of Violation (NOV) (Inspection Report 50–284/93–01) (ADAMS Accession No. ML092600304) and that Idaho State University continued to operate its reactor in violation of regulatory requirements. The petitioner provided a detailed historical chronology of events with regards to observed activity and alleged acts of misconduct involving staff who worked during the said period of Dr. Crawford’s tenure.

Determination for NRC Review Under 10 CFR 2.206

On September 15, 2009, the NRC Petition Review Board (PRB) convened to discuss the petition under consideration and determine whether it met the criteria for further review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process. The PRB comprised NRC technical and enforcement staff and legal counsel, and it was chaired by an NRC senior-level manager. The PRB determined that the petition under consideration met the criteria established in NRC Management Directive 8.11, “Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions,” and was accepted in part into the 10 CFR 2.206 process.

Issues that were not accepted into the 2.206 petition process did not satisfy the criteria as specified in NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.11, “Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions.” In such instances: (1) The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns and/or, (2) The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation, either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. Additionally, portions of the petition raised several concerns not within the jurisdiction of NRC.

The PRB’s final recommendation was to accept for review, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, the following concerns from the petition:
(1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented prior to 1991. The June 26, 2009, petition states that the modification allowed random student access to the roof of the reactor room.
(2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the required labeling.
(3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup procedures to wear protective clothing during routine removal of the activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. In the petition Dr. Crawford states that this was cited as an Apparent Violation, but the NRC should not have dropped this item in the final NOV.
(4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source (reactor start-up source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, violating the 10 CFR Part 20 as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) requirements.

On September 28, 2009, the petitioner was contacted via telephone and was provided the initial recommendations of the PRB in Director’s Decision (DD No. 10–03), the complete text of which is available in ADAMS (Accession No. ML1004917500) for inspection at the Commission’s Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and via the NRC’s Web site (http://www.nrc.gov) on the World Wide Web, under the “Public Involvement” icon.

Summary of Staff Findings

The following lists the four issues from Dr. Crawford’s petition which the PRB accepted for review, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, and the associated conclusion made during the inspection:
(1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented prior to 1991.
Observations

The inspectors reviewed numerous records available onsite, dating from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews the inspectors ascertained that the Siphon Breaker Experiment (SBE) was an experiment that did not involve, and was not connected to, the licensee’s research and test reactor. Because of the height of the piping involved in the SBE, the experiment was conducted inside the Reactor Room. Some of the piping extended out of the roof of the Reactor Room (through a temporary penetration in the equipment hatch cover plate) while the bottom portion of the SBE rested in the Gamma Irradiation pit. This provided sufficient vertical space for the experiment to be conducted but also required people working on the experiment to access the Reactor Room.

No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the SBE was found among the records reviewed by the inspectors. However, upon reviewing the SBE as it was described, evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required, as the facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the Idaho State AGN–201M Reactor did not describe the equipment access hatch in detail, aside from dimensions and material composition. A 10 CFR 50.59 review by the licensee would have been necessary if the modification would have changed structures, systems, and components as described in the SAR.

During the August 1989 timeframe, there were concerns about the security of the Reactor Room (Room 20) because of various people needing access to the area. These concerns were brought to the attention of the Reactor Supervisor. After a review of the practices and security arrangements for operation of the SBE, a temporary procedure was implemented to restrict access to the Reactor Room and to ensure that the experimenters’ activities were in compliance with the Physical Security Plan.

The inspectors also reviewed numerous records available onsite, dating from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees concerning the installation of the personnel roof access ladder and hatch. This was an issue Dr. Crawford identified during the transcribed conference call with the PRB on September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092650381). It was noted by the inspectors that the ladder and roof hatch were installed to provide a secondary means of escape from the Reactor Room in case of emergency.

Through records review, it was noted that during the meeting of the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) in 1989, the installation of the emergency escape ladder in either the Reactor Room or Reactor Laboratory (Lab) was discussed, as was the installation of a fire alarm and smoke detector. The personnel roof access hatch was also addressed in Rev. 3 and Rev. 4 of the Physical Security Plan for the facility dated February 23, 1990, and January 27, 2003, respectively. No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the roof access hatch was found among the records reviewed by the inspectors. Regarding the SBE, evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required since it was not a modification to existing structures and/or equipment, as described in the SAR.

The review of recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 reviews demonstrated that the licensee is aware of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and that various operating and safety aspects of modifications to existing structures and/or equipment needed to be reviewed (and, if needed, approved by the RSC, or the NRC if applicable) prior to implementing the changes.

Conclusion

Although no 10 CFR 50.59 reviews were found covering the Siphon Breaker Experiment or the personnel roof access ladder and hatch, evidence does not support that such a review was needed since they were not modifications to the existing structures and/or equipment, as described in the SAR. In addition, the inspectors became aware through record review that the licensee acknowledged and addressed the security aspects of the SBE. Furthermore, the licensee developed a procedure to restrict access to the Reactor Room to be in compliance with the Physical Security Plan during the timeframe which the SBE was in use.

(2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the required labeling.

Observations

The inspectors reviewed various records dating from 1975 through the present and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews the inspectors determined that radioactive materials produced in the reactor were (and are) typically used in the Reactor Room or the adjacent Lab and then left in the Reactor Room for decay. On occasion radioactive material is transferred to other individuals or groups for use elsewhere. In the past, the NRC noted problems in this area as documented in Inspection Report No. 50–284/93–01, dated November 4, 1993. As a result, the licensee took various actions to correct the problems and deficiencies. One action was to revise and improve the record keeping system for tracking byproduct material. The record system and the forms used in tracking material were reviewed by the inspectors. The material had either been transferred to an authorized/licensed individual or company as required or it was held in the Reactor Room until it had decayed to background or near background activity levels. No violations were noted.

Another action the licensee took as a result of the problems in 1993 was to revise the procedures for shipping radioactive materials from the ISU campus. In reviewing the current shipping procedures used at ISU, it was noted that radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor facility is required to be transferred to the campus Technical Safety Office (TSO). A person from that office, designated as the ISU Certified Shipper, is responsible for ensuring that the material is shipped in accordance with the rules specified by the DOT in 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180. If assistance is needed, a certified shipper from the Idaho National Laboratory is called in for advice and consultation to ensure that all aspects of the regulations are met including (but not limited to): (1) Completion of the appropriate shipping papers, (2) use and marking of properly certified containers, (3) attachment of the proper labeling, and (4) use of appropriate placards for the transport vehicle as needed.

The inspectors also conferred with NRC inspectors from the Region IV office concerning their review of the radioactive material shipping program at ISU. In 1993, inspectors from Region IV indicated that they had reviewed the ISU program for receiving, handling, and shipping byproduct and source material. Recent reviews noted no violations during the last three inspections.

A review of the available records indicated that no shipments of radioactive material from the reactor had been made in the past several years.

Conclusion

The NRC review did not find any inappropriate release of material in uncertified containers and not properly labeled. Regarding present operations, radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor facility is required to be transferred to the TSO and that office is responsible for completing the transfer
or shipment. Shipments of radioactive material are verified to be in compliance with the regulations and, if needed, with the help of a consultant. No shipments of radioactive material from or produced in the reactor have been made in the past several years.

(3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup procedures to wear protective clothing to routinely remove the activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. The June 26, 2009, letter states that this was cited and mishandled in the 93–1 Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report 50–284/93–01).

**Observations**

NRC Inspection Report (50–284/93–01) (ADAMS Access No. ML100490079) addressed the Apparent Violation (50–284/9301–07), where the inspectors noted that a radiation detector was used in association with Experimental Procedure 21 (EP–21), “Auto Reactivity Control System Operation” and was placed in the thermal column of the reactor, but not surveyed when removed. The survey would have determined if activation products presented a radiological hazard to persons handling the detector. At the time, 10 CFR 20.201 (b), “Surveys” was cited as the basis for an apparent violation for the licensee’s failure to make reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present.

The 93–1 NOV contains Enclosure No. 4, “Idaho State University Presentation” which was conducted by the ISU reactor facility staff during the NRC–ISU Enforcement Conference held on October 8, 1993, which discussed the licensee’s process for EP–21. The supplemental information showed that upon EP–21’s completion the ion chamber was left in the thermal column until another experiment required the thermal column to be altered, which at that time the surveys would be taken to determine radiation levels which would be recorded in the operations log. Based on the supplemental information provided during the Enforcement Conference, no citation was issued for the apparent violation as surveys of the ion chamber were conducted at the time of thermal column alteration.

The inspectors interviewed facility staff and determined that EP–21 has not been employed since 1995, and equipment is presently not in service at the facility. The inspectors followed-up on the current procedure with regards to handling of the startup channel detector (Channel No. 1). By verification of the procedure and through interviews with facility staff, it was determined that when reactor power reached the target threshold (as stated in Operational Procedure (OP)-1), an operator would depress an automated raise switch which would move the detector from an area of high flux, to an area of lower flux within the water tank. The Channel No. 1 detector is not removed from the water tank where it would be reasonable to conduct radiological surveys. The Channel No. 1 detector is lowered back into its fixed position by extending a solenoid arm external to the water tank, without direct contact of potentially contaminated equipment.

The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety manual (RSM) Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures (e.g., Experimental Procedure-8). The inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed an independent radiation survey and determined that readings were consistent and comparable to those with the licensee.

**Conclusion**

Supporting information from the 1993 NRC–ISU Enforcement Conference provided is consistent with the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for conducting reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present. Currently, the licensee does not employ EP–21 and the equipment is not in service at the facility. The present handling of the startup channel detector is performed in accordance with procedure which does not require the use of protective clothing. A review of contamination and radiation survey logs was performed without issue.

(4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source (reactor startup source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, violating 10 CFR Part 20 ALARA requirements.

**Observations**

During the inspection period the reactor was inoperable due to maintenance of control systems. The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety Manual Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures (e.g., EP–8). Additionally, the inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed an independent radiation survey and determined that readings were consistent and comparable to those with the licensee. During the last Reactor Full Power Survey, conducted on July 21, 2009, by ISU TSO staff, the inspectors determined, through record review, that the radiation level at the reactor console during 4 W reactor power was 0.4 mr/hr. Streaming radiation from the one inch diameter access hole or “glory hole” is shielded by 12-inch thick, high density baryte concrete blocks which reduce the radiation levels. The level of radiation on the unshielded side of the glory hole, streaming away from reactor console, was 70 mr/hr at a distance of 1 m.

The inspectors reviewed records for leak checks of the 10 mCi Ra-Be source which is used during reactor startup. The records indicated that recorded levels during analyses were below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter.

The inspectors interviewed facility staff and reviewed the reactor startup procedure, OP–1. The procedure provides guidance for the operator to insert the Ra-Be startup source into the glory hole, Thermal Column, or a beam port as needed for startup, however the procedure does not explicitly provide a step for startup source removal and storage. Reactor Operators are trained to remove the startup source at the point where the nominal rod height has been established and power has stabilized. The startup source is removed by hand and is stored in a lead shielded storage receptacle, known as a “pig” for subsequent use.

The procedure does not explicitly state a requirement for protective clothing as the startup source does not directly come in contact with the operator during handling; it is currently threaded onto the end of a 6 foot aluminum rod which facilitates placement into the reactor.

**Conclusion**

The NRC review did not find unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source and uncontrolled access to the source. No violations of 10 CFR Part 20 were identified. Radiation surveys performed by TSO staff during reactor operations indicate consistent dose rates on the order of 0.4 mr/hr at the reactor console. Contamination surveys, involving the leak check for the Ra-Be startup source indicate levels below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter. Handling of the Ra-Be startup source is conducted in accordance with the approved procedure.
A copy of the Director’s Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission’s review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission’s regulations. As provided for by this regulation, the Director’s Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director’s Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 30th day of July 2010.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2010–19407 Filed 8–5–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

—

POSTAL SERVICE

International Product Change—Global Expedited Package Services—Non-Published Rates

AGENCY: Postal Service™

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add Global Expedited Package Services Contracts—Non-Published Rates to the Competitive Products List pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642.

DATES: August 6, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret M. Falwell, 703–292–3576.


Neva R. Watson,
Attorney, Legislative.

[FR Doc. 2010–19407 Filed 8–5–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

—

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Actuarial Advisory Committee With Respect to the Railroad Retirement Account; Notice of Public Meeting

Notice is hereby given in accordance with Public Law 92–463 that the Actuarial Advisory Committee will hold a meeting on September 23, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. at the office of the Chief Actuary of the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois, on the conduct of the 25th Actuarial Valuation of the Railroad Retirement System. The agenda for this meeting will include a discussion of the assumptions to be used in the 25th Actuarial Valuation. A report containing recommended assumptions and the experience on which the recommendations are based will have been sent by the Chief Actuary to the Committee before the meeting. The meeting will be open to the public. Persons wishing to submit written statements or make oral presentations should address their communications or notices to the RRB Actuarial Advisory Committee, c/o Chief Actuary, U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611–2092.

Dated: August 2, 2010.

Beatrice Ezerski,
Secretary to the Board.

[FR Doc. 2010–19394 Filed 8–5–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7905–01–P

—

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #12260 and #1226]

Oklahoma Disaster #OK–00042

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a disaster for the State of OKLAHOMA dated 08/03/2010.

Incident: Tornadoes, Severe Storms and Flooding.

Incident Period: 07/06/2010 through 07/12/2010.

Effective Date: 08/03/2010.

Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 10/04/2010.

Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 05/03/2011.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator’s disaster declaration, applications for disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations.

The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster:

Primary Counties:
Oklahoma.

Contiguous Counties:
Oklahoma: Canadian, Cleveland, Kingfisher, Lincoln, Logan, Pottawatomie.

The Interest Rates are: