[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 151 (Friday, August 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47646-47650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-19407]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2009-0522; Docket No. 50-284; License No. R-110]
Idaho State University; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a petition
dated June 26, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440721), filed by Dr. Kevan Crawford,
hereinafter referred to as the ``petitioner.'' Additionally, the
petitioner requested further enforcement action against the licensee,
during a transcribed conference call which addressed the Petition
Review Board (PRB) on September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML09244072), supplementing the June 26, 2009, petition.
Action Requested
The petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) take the following enforcement actions:
(1) The reactor operating license should be suspended immediately.
All continuing violations, including items that Dr. Crawford alleged
were unresolved from the Notice of Violation (NOV) 93-1 as well as 20
violations that Dr. Crawford alleged to be concealed must be reconciled
with the regulatory requirements immediately. The alleged violations
correspond to regulatory, criminal, and ethical misconduct which Dr.
Crawford contends had impacted public health and safety and the
environment of Pocatello, Idaho.
(2) The licensee should be fined for all damages related to the
violations and cover-up of violations.
(3) The licensee should be required to carry a 50-year $50,000,000
bond to cover latent radiation injuries instead of covering these
injuries with unreliable State budget allocations for contingency
funds.
(4) During the fall semester of 1993, Dr. Crawford alleges that
students utilizing the reactor lab facilities were handling irradiated
samples without permission. Furthermore he alleges that the samples
were handled without anti-contamination clothing and no radiological
surveys were conducted, although he states neither of which was
required. Dr. Crawford contends said students proceeded to the local
hospital to visit friends in the neonatal unit. Upon this basis, Dr.
Crawford requests every potential exposure and contamination victim be
identified through facility records, located, and informed of the
potential risk to them and their families. The Medical Center in
Pocatello, Idaho, should also be informed so that they may do the same.
Those who were exposed should be informed of the entire range of
expected symptoms and of their right to seek compensation from the
licensee.
(5) The following should warrant immediate revocation of the
operating license due to the inability of the licensee to account for,
with documentation, controlled byproduct nuclear materials that were:
a. Released in clandestine, undocumented shipments before August 4,
1993;
b. Possessed by individuals not licensed to control the materials,
and
[[Page 47647]]
were not certified to handle the materials;
c. Without proper Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR)
Department of Transportation (DOT) certified containers;
d. Without proper labeling for transport on public roads; and
e. Concealed via fraudulent Annual Operating Reports in which the
licensee failed to address uncontrolled by-product material
distribution and facility modifications and which were never amended
after NOV 93-1.
(6) The licensee must permanently revoke the Broad Form License.
(7) The licensee must publicly acknowledge that there was a loss of
control of Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
(8) The licensee must publicly acknowledge persons that served as
an accessory to concealing unlawful distribution of controlled
substances, fraud (both Annual Operating Reports and National
Whistleblower Center), loss of control of SNM, and child endangerment.
Petitioner's Bases for the Requested Action
The petitioner, Dr. Crawford, stated that during his tenure as the
Reactor Supervisor at the Idaho State University research reactor from
December 19, 1991 until March 12, 1993, he witnessed regulatory,
criminal, and ethical violations associated with the operation of the
NRC licensed facility. Furthermore, Dr. Crawford contends that the NRC
was grossly negligent in concealing violations in the Notice of
Violation (NOV) (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML092600304) and that Idaho State University continues to operate its
reactor in violation of regulatory requirements. The petitioner
provided a detailed historical chronology of events with regards to
observed activity and alleged acts of misconduct involving staff who
worked during the said period of Dr. Crawford's tenure.
Determination for NRC Review Under 10 CFR 2.206
On September 15, 2009, the NRC Petition Review Board (PRB) convened
to discuss the petition under consideration and determine whether it
met the criteria for further review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process. The
PRB comprised NRC technical and enforcement staff and legal counsel,
and it was chaired by an NRC senior-level manager. The PRB determined
that the petition under consideration met the criteria established in
NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206
Petitions,'' and was accepted in part into the 10 CFR 2.206 process.
Issues that were not accepted into the 2.206 petition process did
not satisfy the criteria as specified in NRC Management Directive (MD)
8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions.'' In such instances:
(1) The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related
action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition,
but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or
existence of safety concerns and/or, (2) The petitioner raises issues
that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation,
either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic
basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been
resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
Additionally, portions of the petition raised several concerns not
within the jurisdiction of NRC.
The PRB's final recommendation was to accept for review, pursuant
to 10 CFR 2.206, the following concerns from the petition:
(1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the
modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an
undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented
prior to 1991. The June 26, 2009, petition states that the modification
allowed random student access to the roof of the reactor room.
(2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in
containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for
transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the
required labeling.
(3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup
procedures to wear protective clothing during routine removal of the
activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. In the
petition Dr. Crawford states that this was cited as an Apparent
Violation, but the NRC should not have dropped this item in the final
NOV.
(4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source
(reactor start-up source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access
by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source,
violating the 10 CFR Part 20 as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA)
requirements.
On September 28, 2009, the petitioner was contacted via telephone
and was provided the initial recommendations of the PRB. Pursuant to
NRC MD 8.11, Dr. Crawford was afforded the opportunity to comment on
the recommendations and to provide any relevant additional explanation
and support for the request in light of the PRB's recommendations.
Through subsequent e-mail communication, Dr. Crawford declined the
opportunity to respond to the PRB's recommendations or to provide
further information for support of the petition request (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML092720460 and ML092720824).
The PRB's final recommendation for the petition was documented in
the acknowledgment letter dated November 19, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML092800432).
During the week of February 23-24, 2010, a non-routine inspection
(Idaho State University-NRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-284/
2010-201, ADAMS Accession No. ML100321367) was conducted at the Idaho
State University research reactor to review logs, records, and observe
the performance of licensed activities, pertinent to the issues
accepted for Dr. Crawford's 2.206 Petition. Copies of Inspection Report
No. 50-284/2010-201 were provided to reactor facility staff at the
Idaho State University and to the petitioner.
On March 19, 2010, the NRC sent a copy of the Proposed Director's
Decision (ADAMS Accession No. ML104917500) to Dr. Crawford and to staff
at Idaho State University for comment. Neither the petitioner nor the
licensee responded with comment.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the request for enforcement action against the Idaho
State University AGN-201M research reactor to be denied. The reasons
for this decision are explained in the Director's Decision pursuant to
10 CFR 2.206 (DD No. 10-03), the complete text of which is available in
ADAMS (Accession No. ML100491750) for inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and via the NRC's Web site
(http://www.nrc.gov) on the World Wide Web, under the ``Public
Involvement'' icon.
Summary of Staff Findings
The following lists the four issues from Dr. Crawford's petition
which the PRB accepted for review, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, and the
associated conclusion made during the inspection:
(1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the
modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an
undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented
prior to 1991.
[[Page 47648]]
Observations
The inspectors reviewed numerous records available onsite, dating
from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and former
licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews the
inspectors ascertained that the Siphon Breaker Experiment (SBE) was an
experiment that did not involve, and was not connected to, the
licensee's research and test reactor. Because of the height of the
piping involved in the SBE, the experiment was conducted inside the
Reactor Room. Some of the piping extended out of the roof of the
Reactor Room (through a temporary penetration in the equipment hatch
cover plate) while the bottom portion of the SBE rested in the Gamma
Irradiation pit. This provided sufficient vertical space for the
experiment to be conducted but also required people working on the
experiment to access the Reactor Room.
No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the SBE was found among the records
reviewed by the inspectors. However, upon reviewing the SBE as it was
described, evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was
required, as the facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the Idaho
State AGN-201M Reactor did not describe the equipment access hatch in
detail, aside from dimensions and material composition. A 10 CFR 50.59
review by the licensee would have been necessary if the modification
would have changed structures, systems, and components as described in
the SAR.
During the August 1989 timeframe, there were concerns about the
security of the Reactor Room (Room 20) because of various people
needing access to the area. These concerns were brought to the
attention of the Reactor Supervisor. After a review of the practices
and security arrangements for operation of the SBE, a temporary
procedure was implemented to restrict access to the Reactor Room and to
ensure that the experimenters' activities were in compliance with the
Physical Security Plan.
The inspectors also reviewed numerous records available onsite,
dating from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and
former licensee facility employees concerning the installation of the
personnel roof access ladder and hatch. This was an issue Dr. Crawford
identified during the transcribed conference call with the PRB on
September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092650381). It was noted by
the inspectors that the ladder and roof hatch were installed to provide
a secondary means of escape from the Reactor Room in case of emergency.
Through records review, it was noted that during the meeting of the
Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) in 1989, the installation of the
emergency escape ladder in either the Reactor Room or Reactor
Laboratory (Lab) was discussed, as was the installation of a fire alarm
and smoke detector. The personnel roof access hatch was also addressed
in Rev. 3 and Rev. 4 of the Physical Security Plan for the facility
dated February 23, 1990, and January 27, 2003, respectively. No 10 CFR
50.59 review of the roof access hatch was found among the records
reviewed by the inspectors. Regarding the SBE, evidence does not
support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required since it was not a
modification to existing structures and/or equipment, as described in
the SAR.
The review of recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 reviews demonstrated
that the licensee is aware of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and that various
operating and safety aspects of modifications to existing structures
and/or equipment needed to be reviewed (and, if needed, approved by the
RSC, or the NRC if applicable) prior to implementing the changes.
Conclusion
Although no 10 CFR 50.59 reviews were found covering the Siphon
Breaker Experiment or the personnel roof access ladder and hatch,
evidence does not support that such a review was needed since they were
not modifications to the existing structures and/or equipment, as
described in the SAR. In addition, the inspectors became aware through
record review that the licensee acknowledged and addressed the security
aspects of the SBE. Furthermore, the licensee developed a procedure to
restrict access to the Reactor Room to be in compliance with the
Physical Security Plan during the timeframe which the SBE was in use.
(2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in
containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for
transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the
required labeling.
Observations
The inspectors reviewed various records dating from 1975 through
the present and interviewed present and former licensee facility
employees. From these records and interviews the inspectors determined
that radioactive materials produced in the reactor were (and are)
typically used in the Reactor Room or the adjacent Lab and then left
in/returned to the Reactor Room for decay. On occasion radioactive
material is transferred to other individuals or groups for use
elsewhere. In the past, the NRC noted problems in this area as
documented in Inspection Report No. 50-284/93-01, dated November 4,
1993. As a result, the licensee took various actions to correct the
problems and deficiencies. One action was to revise and improve the
record keeping system for tracking byproduct material. The record
system and the forms used in tracking material were reviewed by the
inspectors. The material had either been transferred to an authorized/
licensed individual or company as required or it was held in the
Reactor Room until it had decayed to background or near background
activity levels. No violations were noted.
Another action the licensee took as a result of the problems in
1993 was to revise the procedures for shipping radioactive materials
from the ISU campus. In reviewing the current shipping procedures used
at ISU, it was noted that radioactive material to be shipped from the
reactor facility is required to be transferred to the campus Technical
Safety Office (TSO). A person from that office, designated as the ISU
Certified Shipper, is responsible for ensuring that the material is
shipped in accordance with the rules specified by the DOT in 49 CFR
Parts 171 through 180. If assistance is needed, a certified shipper
from the Idaho National Laboratory is called in for advice and
consultation to ensure that all aspects of the regulations are met
including (but not limited to): (1) Completion of the appropriate
shipping papers, (2) use and marking of properly certified containers,
(3) attachment of the proper labeling, and (4) use of appropriate
placards for the transport vehicle as needed.
The inspectors also conferred with NRC inspectors from the Region
IV office concerning their review of the radioactive material shipping
program at ISU. In 1993, inspectors from Region IV indicated that they
had reviewed the ISU program for receiving, handling, and shipping
byproduct and source material. Recent reviews noted no violations
during the last three inspections.
A review of the available records indicated that no shipments of
radioactive material from the reactor had been made in the past several
years.
Conclusion
The NRC review did not find any inappropriate release of material
in uncertified containers and not properly labeled. Regarding present
operations, radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor
facility is required to be transferred to the TSO and that office is
responsible for completing the transfer
[[Page 47649]]
or shipment. Shipments of radioactive material are verified to be in
compliance with the regulations and, if needed, with the help of a
consultant. No shipments of radioactive material from or produced in
the reactor have been made in the past several years.
(3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup
procedures to wear protective clothing to routinely remove the
activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. The June 26,
2009, letter states that this was cited and mishandled in the 93-1
Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report 50-284/93-01).
Observations
NRC Inspection Report (50-284/93-01) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML100490079) addressed the Apparent Violation (50-284/9301-07), where
the inspectors noted that a radiation detector was used in association
with Experimental Procedure 21 (EP-21), ``Auto Reactivity Control
System Operation'' and was placed in the thermal column of the reactor,
but not surveyed when removed. The survey would have determined if
activation products presented a radiological hazard to persons handling
the detector. At the time, 10 CFR 20.201 (b), ``Surveys'' was cited as
the basis for an apparent violation for the licensee's failure to make
reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of
radiation hazards that may be present.
The 93-1 NOV contains Enclosure No. 4, ``Idaho State University
Presentation'' which was conducted by the ISU reactor facility staff
during the NRC-ISU Enforcement Conference held on October 8, 1993,
which discussed the licensee's process for EP-21. The supplemental
information showed that upon EP-21's completion the ion chamber was
left in the thermal column until another experiment requires the
thermal column to be altered, which at that time the surveys would be
taken to determine radiation levels which would be recorded in the
operations log. Based on the supplemental information provided during
the Enforcement Conference, no citation was issued for the apparent
violation as surveys of the ion chamber were conducted at the time of
thermal column alteration.
The inspectors interviewed facility staff and determined that EP-21
has not been employed since 1995, and equipment is presently not in
service at the facility. The inspectors followed-up on the current
protocol with regards to handling of the startup channel detector
(Channel No. 1). By verification of the procedure and through
interviews with facility staff, it was determined that when reactor
power reached the target threshold (as stated in Operational Procedure
(OP)-1), an operator would depress an automated raise switch which
would move the detector from an area of high flux, to an area of lower
flux within the water tank. The Channel No. 1 detector is not removed
from the water tank where it would be reasonable to conduct
radiological surveys. The Channel No. 1 detector is lowered back into
its fixed position by extending a solenoid arm external to the water
tank, without direct contact of potentially contaminated equipment.
The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records
as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety manual (RSM) Sections
6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures (e.g., Experimental
Procedure-8). The inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and
shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed an
independent radiation survey and determined that readings were
consistent and comparable to those with the licensee.
Conclusion
Supporting information from the 1993 NRC-ISU Enforcement Conference
provided is consistent with the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for
conducting reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the
extent of radiation hazards that may be present. Currently, the
licensee does not employ EP-21 and the equipment is not in service at
the facility. The present handling of the startup channel detector is
performed in accordance with procedure which does not require the use
of protective clothing. A review of contamination and radiation survey
logs was performed without issue.
(4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source
(reactor start-up source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access
by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source,
violating 10 CFR Part 20 ALARA requirements.
Observations
During the inspection period the reactor was inoperable due to
maintenance of control systems. The inspectors reviewed contamination
and radiation survey records as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation
Safety Manual Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures
(e.g., EP-8). Additionally, the inspectors reviewed logs of reactor
operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed
an independent radiation survey and determined that readings were
consistent and comparable to those with the licensee. During the last
Reactor Full Power Survey, conducted on July 21, 2009, by ISU TSO
staff, the inspectors determined, through record review, that the
radiation level at the reactor console during 4 W reactor power was 0.4
mr/hr. Streaming radiation from the one inch diameter access hole or
``glory hole'' is shielded by 12-inch thick, high density baryte
concrete blocks which reduce the radiation levels. The level of
radiation on the unshielded side of the glory hole, streaming away from
reactor console, was 70 mr/hr at a distance of 1 m.
The inspectors reviewed records for leak checks of the 10 mCi Ra-Be
source which is used during reactor startup. The records indicated that
recorded levels during analyses were below the threshold for minimum
detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter.
The inspectors interviewed facility staff and reviewed the reactor
startup procedure, OP-1. The procedure provides guidance for the
operator to insert the Ra-Be startup source into the glory hole,
Thermal Column, or a beam port as needed for startup, however the
procedure does not explicitly provide a step for startup source removal
and storage. Reactor Operators are trained to remove the startup source
at the point where the nominal rod height has been established and
power has stabilized. The startup source is removed by hand and is
stored in a lead shielded storage receptacle, known as a ``pig'' for
subsequent use.
The procedure does not explicitly state a requirement for
protective clothing as the startup source does not directly come in
contact with the operator during handling; it is currently threaded
onto the end of a 6 foot aluminum rod which facilitates placement into
the reactor.
Conclusion
The NRC review did not find unprotected handling of an unshielded
neutron source and uncontrolled access to the source. No violations of
10 CFR Part 20 were identified. Radiation surveys performed by TSO
staff during reactor operations indicate consistent dose rates on the
order of 0.4 mr/hr at the reactor console. Contamination surveys,
involving the leak check for the Ra-Be startup source indicate levels
below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid
scintillation counter. Handling of the Ra-Be startup source is
conducted in accordance with the approved procedure.
[[Page 47650]]
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's
Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 30th day of July 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010-19407 Filed 8-5-10; 8:45 am]
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