

TABLE 1 TO § 983.150(d)(2)—INSHELL PISTACHIO LOT SAMPLING INCREMENTS FOR AFLATOXIN CERTIFICATION

Lot weight (lbs.)	Minimum number of incremental samples for the lot sample	Total weight of lot sample (kilograms)	Weight of test sample (kilograms)
220 or less	10	2.0	2.0
221–440	15	3.0	3.0
441–1,100	20	4.0	4.0
1,101–2,200	30	6.0	6.0
2,201–4,400	40	8.0	8.0
4,401–11,000	60	12.0	6.0
11,001–22,000	80	16.0	8.0
22,001–150,000	100	20.0	10.0

TABLE 2 TO § 983.150(d)(2)—SHELLED PISTACHIO KERNEL LOT SAMPLING INCREMENTS FOR AFLATOXIN CERTIFICATION

Lot weight (lbs.)	Minimum number of incremental samples for the lot sample	Total weight of lot sample (kilograms)	Weight of test sample (kilograms)
220 or less	10	1.0	1.0
221–440	15	1.5	1.5
441–1,100	20	2.0	2.0
1,101–2,200	30	3.0	3.0
2,201–4,400	40	4.0	4.0
4,401–11,000	60	6.0	3.0
11,001–22,000	80	8.0	4.0
22,001–150,000	100	10.0	5.0

(3) *Testing of pistachios.* Test samples shall be received and logged by an accredited laboratory and each test sample shall be prepared and analyzed using High Pressure Liquid Chromatography (HPLC), Vicam Method (Aflatest), or other methods as recommended by not fewer than eight members of the committee and approved by the Secretary. The aflatoxin level shall be calculated on a kernel weight basis.

(4) *Certification of lots “negative” as to aflatoxin.* (i) Lots which require a single test sample will be certified as “negative” on the aflatoxin certificate if the sample has an aflatoxin level at or below 15 ppb. If the aflatoxin level is above 15 ppb, the lot fails and the accredited laboratory shall fill out a failed lot notification report as specified in §§ 983.52 and 983.152.

(ii) Lots which require two test samples will be certified as “negative” on the aflatoxin inspection certificate if Test Sample #1 has an aflatoxin level at or below 10 ppb. If the aflatoxin level of Test Sample #1 is above 20 ppb, the lot fails and the accredited laboratory shall fill out a failed lot notification report as specified in §§ 983.52 and 983.152. If the aflatoxin level of Test Sample #1 is above 10 ppb and at or below 20 ppb, the accredited laboratory may at the handler’s discretion analyze Test Sample #2 and the test results of Test Samples #1 and #2 will be averaged. Alternately, the handler may

elect to withdraw the lot from testing, rework the lot, and resubmit it for testing after reworking. If the handler directs the laboratory to proceed with the analysis of Test Sample #2, a lot will be certified as negative to aflatoxin and the laboratory shall issue an aflatoxin inspection certificate if the averaged results of Test Sample #1 and Test Sample #2 is at or below 15 ppb. If the averaged aflatoxin level of Test Samples #1 and #2 is above 15 ppb, the lot fails and the accredited laboratory shall fill out a failed lot notification report as specified in §§ 983.52 and 983.152.

(iii) The accredited laboratory shall send a copy of the failed lot notification report to the Committee and to the failed lot’s owner within 10 working days of any failure described in this section. If the lot is certified as negative as described in this section, the aflatoxin inspection certificate shall certify the lot using a certification form identifying each lot by weight, grade, and date. The certification expires for the lot or remainder of the lot after 12 months.

* * * * *

(6) *Test samples that are not used for analysis.* If a handler does not elect to use Test Sample #2 for certification purposes, the handler may request that the laboratory return it to the handler.

Dated: July 20, 2010.

Rayne Pegg,
Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0733; Directorate Identifier 2010–CE–038–AD; Amendment 39–16375; AD 2010–15–09]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB–500 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that will supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

It has been found the possibility of heating deactivation of Air Data System (ADS) sensors due to its inadequate automatic logic, when ADS/AOA knob is on AUTO position associated with the following messages:

- DC BUS 1 OFF displayed on Crew Alerting System—CAS in conjunction with STBY HTR FAIL (which means loss of power on DC BUS 1); or
- EMER BUS OFF displayed on CAS (which means loss of power on EMERGENCY BUS); or
- ELEC EMERGENCY displayed on CAS (which means Electrical Emergency).

The loss of airplane air data sensors heating may cause ice buildup on their surfaces, which in turn may cause wrong pressure acquisitions resulting in erroneous flight parameters indication to the flight crew. Since this condition may occur in other airplanes of the same type and affects flight safety, an immediate corrective action is required. Thus, sufficient reason exists to request compliance with this AD in the indicated time limit.

This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: This AD becomes effective August 12, 2010.

We must receive comments on this AD by September 7, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4146; fax: (816) 329-4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On November 2, 2009, we issued AD 2009-23-11, Amendment 39-16085 (74 FR 58195; November 12, 2009). That AD required actions intended to address an unsafe condition on the products listed above.

Since we issued AD 2009-23-11, Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A. (EMBRAER) has issued service bulletin 500-27-0003, dated May 18, 2010. The service bulletin changes flap position 3 from 36 degrees to 26 degrees. The service bulletin also changes flap position 3 V_{ref} airspeeds and landing distance correction factors.

Consequently, accomplishing the service bulletin necessitates changes to the Abnormal Procedures section of the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (AFM). The AFM changes were not included as part of the service bulletin.

The AGENCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL—BRAZIL, which is the aviation authority for Brazil, has issued AD No.: 2009-10-01R2, dated July 28, 2010 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

It has been found the possibility of heating deactivation of Air Data System (ADS) sensors due to its inadequate automatic logic, when ADS/AOA knob is on AUTO position associated with the following messages:

- DC BUS 1 OFF displayed on Crew Alerting System—CAS in conjunction with STBY HTR FAIL (which means loss of power on DC BUS 1); or

- EMER BUS OFF displayed on CAS (which means loss of power on EMERGENCY BUS); or
- ELEC EMERGENCY displayed on CAS (which means Electrical Emergency).

The loss of airplane air data sensors heating may cause ice buildup on their surfaces, which in turn may cause wrong pressure acquisitions resulting in erroneous flight parameters indication to the flight crew. Since this condition may occur in other airplanes of the same type and affects flight safety, an immediate corrective action is required. Thus, sufficient reason exists to request compliance with this AD in the indicated time limit.

This AD action requires inserting information into the Abnormal Procedures section of the FAA-approved AFM. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of the AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our

bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by the State of Design Authority and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might have also required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are described in a separate paragraph of the AD. These requirements take precedence over those copied from the MCAI.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because the loss of airplane air data sensors heating may cause ice buildup on their surface. This condition may cause wrong pressure acquisitions, resulting in erroneous flight parameters indication to the flight crew. Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30 days.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2010-0733; Directorate Identifier 2010-CE-038-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments

received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
- (2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by removing Amendment 39–16085 (74 FR 58195; November 12, 2009), and adding the following new AD:

2010–15–09 Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A. (EMBRAER):
Amendment 39–16375; Docket No. FAA–2010–0733; Directorate Identifier 2010–CE–038–AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 12, 2010.

Affected ADs

(b) This AD supersedes AD 2009–23–11; Amendment 39–16085.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to the following Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB–500 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category:

(i) *Group 1 Airplanes* (retains the actions and applicability from AD 2009–23–11): Airplanes for which service bulletin (SB) 500–27–0003 has not been accomplished or that do not have an equivalent modification

that was incorporated in the production line; and

(ii) *Group 2 Airplanes:* Airplanes for which SB 500–27–0003 has been accomplished or have an equivalent modification that was incorporated in the production line.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 30: Ice and Rain Protection.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

It has been found the possibility of heating deactivation of Air Data System (ADS) sensors due to its inadequate automatic logic, when ADS/AOA knob is on AUTO position associated with the following messages:

—DC BUS 1 OFF displayed on Crew Alerting

System—CAS in conjunction with STBY HTR FAIL (which means loss of power on DC BUS 1); or

—EMER BUS OFF displayed on CAS (which means loss of power on EMERGENCY BUS); or

—ELEC EMERGENCY displayed on CAS (which means Electrical Emergency).

The loss of airplane air data sensors heating may cause ice buildup on their surfaces, which in turn may cause wrong pressure acquisitions resulting in erroneous flight parameters indication to the flight crew. Since this condition may occur in other airplanes of the same type and affects flight safety, an immediate corrective action is required. Thus, sufficient reason exists to request compliance with this AD in the indicated time limit.

This AD action requires inserting information into the Abnormal Procedures section of the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (AFM).

Actions and Compliance

(f) *Group 1 Airplanes:* unless already done, before further flight after December 2, 2009 (the effective date retained from AD 2009–23–11), incorporate into the AFM the following procedures section revisions. You may insert a copy of this AD into the appropriate sections of the AFM to comply with the requirements of this AD.

(1) Revise the AFM by replacing the ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY procedures in AFM section 4–08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 1:

ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY

Reset both generators.

If message persists:

LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON

Exit and avoid icing conditions.

Confirm that IESI has reverted. If not, select ADSTBY on PFD.

PRESSURIZATION MODE Selector.... MAN

CABIN ALT Switch..... AS REQUIRED

Airspeed..... 250 KIAS
MAXIMUM

Altitude..... 25000 ft
MAXIMUM

CAUTION: BATTERIES DURATION IS 45 MINUTES MAXIMUM.

When landing maintain airspeed according to the following:

FLAPS POSITION	MINIMUM AIRSPEED
0	V _{REF FULL} + 30 KIAS
1	V _{REF FULL} + 15 KIAS
2	V _{REF FULL} + 5 KIAS
3 and FULL	V _{REF FULL}

- NOTE:**
- If flaps stop between two positions, use the minimum airspeed associated to the next retracted position and the V_{FE} associated to the next extended position.
 - Disregard green circle indication, as it may indicate slower speeds.

During landing run:

Emergency/Parking Brake..... APPLY

CAUTION: WHEN APPLYING EMERGENCY BRAKES, PULL THE HANDLE PROGRESSIVELY, MONITORING THE EMERGENCY/PARKING BRAKE LIGHT.

NOTE: The emergency/parking brake accumulator allows 6 actuations.

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CAUTION: TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM SUITABLE LANDING DISTANCE, MULTIPLY THE UNFACTORED LANDING DISTANCE FOR FLAPS FULL BY ONE OF THE FACTORS BELOW:

FLAPS POSITION	CORRECTION FACTOR
0	2.25
1	1.75
2	1.65
3 and FULL	1.50

If a go-around is required, maintain the minimum airspeed presented in the applicable flaps configuration from the table above, until the acceleration altitude is reached.

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- ADC 1 and 2 (*)
- AHRS 2 (*)
- Air Conditioning
- Anti-Ice/De-Ice Systems
- Audio Panel 2 (*)
- Autopilot (*)
- DMEs
- Flap System (*)
- FMS Panel
- GIA 2 (*)
- GPS 2/VOR 2/ILS 2
- Landing/Taxi Lights
- Main Brake (*)
- PFD 2
- Pitch Trim (Main) (*)
- Pressurization Auto (*)
- Roll Trim
- Stick Pusher (*)
- TCAS
- Transponder 2
- VHF 2
- Windshield Heater (*)
- WX Radar
- Yaw Damper
- Yaw Trim

Figure 1 – AFM Section 4-08, ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY

(2) Revise the AFM by replacing the DC BUS 1 OFF procedure in AFM section 4-08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 2:

DC BUS 1 OFF

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON
 Icing Conditions..... EXIT/AVOID

For landing procedures:

- Maintain airspeed according to the following:

FLAPS POSITION	MINIMUM AIRSPEED	
	NO ICING	IN ICING/WITH ICE
0	V _{REF FULL} + 25 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 40 KIAS
1	V _{REF FULL} + 15 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 35 KIAS
2	V _{REF FULL} + 5 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 30 KIAS
3 and FULL	V _{REF FULL}	V _{REF FULL} + 25 KIAS

NOTE: - If flaps stop between two positions, use the minimum airspeed associated to the next retracted position and V_{FE} associated to the next extended position.

- Disregard green circle indication, as it may indicate slower speeds.

CAUTION: TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM SUITABLE LANDING DISTANCE, MULTIPLY THE UNFACTORED LANDING DISTANCE FOR FLAPS FULL BY ONE OF THE FACTORS BELOW:

FLAPS POSITION	CORRECTION FACTOR	
	NO ICING	IN ICING/WITH ICE
0	1.40	1.70
1	1.20	1.60
2	1.10	2.00
3 and FULL	1.00	1.95

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- ADC 1 (*)
- Cockpit FCISOV
- De-Ice System (*)
- DME 1
- Engine 1 Anti-Ice (*)
- Engine 1 Flowmeter
- Flap System (*)
- Left Landing/Taxi Light
- Roll Trim
- Stick Pusher (*)
- VHF 2
- Windshield Heater 1 (*)
- WX Radar
- Yaw Trim

Figure 2 – AFM Section 4-08, DC BUS 1 OFF

(3) Revise the AFM by replacing the EMERGENCY BUS OFF procedure in AFM

section 4-08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 3:

EMERGENCY BUS OFF

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON

Airspeed 250 KIAS
MAXIMUMAltitude..... 25000 ft
MAXIMUM

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| - AHRS 1 (*) | - LDG Indication/Warning |
| - Audio Panel 1 (*) | - Red Beacon |
| - Autopilot (*) | - Oxygen Transducer |
| - EFCU 1 | - Pax Mask Deploy (Auto) |
| - Engines Fire Detection (*) | - PFD 1 |
| - Flight Director 1 | - Pitch Trim (Back-Up) (*) |
| - AFCS Control Unit | - PRSOV 1 & 2 |
| - Fuel Booster Pumps | - Transponder 1 |
| - Fuel Shutoff Valves | - Stick Pusher (*) |
| - Fuel Transfer Valve (*) | - Stall Warning |
| - GIA 1 (*) | - WOW (*) |
| - GPS 1/VOR 1/ILS 1 | - Yaw Damper |

Figure 3 – AFM Section 4-08, EMERGENCY BUS OFF

(g) *Group 2 Airplanes*: Unless already done, before further flight after August 12, 2010 (the effective date of this AD), incorporate into the AFM the following

procedures section revisions. You may insert a copy of this AD into the appropriate sections of the AFM to comply with the requirements of this AD.

(1) Revise the AFM by replacing the ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY procedures in AFM section 4-08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 4:

ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY

Reset both generators.

If message persists:

LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON

Exit and avoid icing conditions.

Confirm that IESI has reverted. If not, select ADSTBY on PFD.

PRESSURIZATION MODE Selector.... MAN

CABIN ALT Switch..... AS REQUIRED

Airspeed..... 250 KIAS
MAXIMUM

Altitude..... 25000 ft
MAXIMUM

CAUTION: BATTERIES DURATION IS 45 MINUTES MAXIMUM.

When landing maintain airspeed according to the following:

FLAPS POSITION	MINIMUM AIRSPEED
0	$V_{REF FULL} + 30$ KIAS
1	$V_{REF FULL} + 15$ KIAS
2 and 3	$V_{REF FULL} + 5$ KIAS
FULL	$V_{REF FULL}$

- NOTE:** - If flaps stop between two positions, use the minimum airspeed associated to the next retracted position and the V_{FE} associated to the next extended position.
- Disregard green circle indication, as it may indicate slower speeds.

During landing run:

Emergency/Parking Brake..... APPLY

CAUTION: WHEN APPLYING EMERGENCY BRAKES, PULL THE HANDLE PROGRESSIVELY, MONITORING THE EMERGENCY/PARKING BRAKE LIGHT.

NOTE: The emergency/parking brake accumulator allows 6 actuations.

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CAUTION: TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM SUITABLE LANDING DISTANCE, MULTIPLY THE UNFACTORED LANDING DISTANCE FOR FLAPS FULL BY ONE OF THE FACTORS BELOW:

FLAPS POSITION	CORRECTION FACTOR
0	2.25
1	1.75
2 and 3	1.65
FULL	1.50

If a go-around is required, maintain the minimum airspeed presented in the applicable flaps configuration from the table above, until the acceleration altitude is reached.

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- ADC 1 and 2 (*)
- AHRS 2 (*)
- Air Conditioning
- Anti-Ice/De-Ice Systems
- Audio Panel 2 (*)
- Autopilot (*)
- DMEs
- Flap System (*)
- FMS Panel
- GIA 2 (*)
- GPS 2/VOR 2/ILS 2
- Landing/Taxi Lights
- Main Brake (*)
- PFD 2
- Pitch Trim (Main) (*)
- Pressurization Auto (*)
- Roll Trim
- Stick Pusher (*)
- TCAS
- Transponder 2
- VHF 2
- Windshield Heater (*)
- WX Radar
- Yaw Damper
- Yaw Trim

Figure 4 – AFM Section 4-08, ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY

(2) Revise the AFM by replacing the DC BUS 1 OFF procedure in AFM section 4-08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 5:

DC BUS 1 OFF

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON
 Icing Conditions..... EXIT/AVOID

For landing procedures:

- Maintain airspeed according to the following:

FLAPS POSITION	MINIMUM AIRSPEED	
	NO ICING	IN ICING/WITH ICE
0	V _{REF FULL} + 25 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 40 KIAS
1	V _{REF FULL} + 15 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 35 KIAS
2 and 3	V _{REF FULL} + 5 KIAS	V _{REF FULL} + 30 KIAS
FULL	V _{REF FULL}	V _{REF FULL} + 25 KIAS

NOTE: - If flaps stop between two positions, use the minimum airspeed associated to the next retracted position and V_{FE} associated to the next extended position.

- Disregard green circle indication, as it may indicate slower speeds.

CAUTION: TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM SUITABLE LANDING DISTANCE, MULTIPLY THE UNFACTORED LANDING DISTANCE FOR FLAPS FULL BY ONE OF THE FACTORS BELOW:

FLAPS POSITION	CORRECTION FACTOR	
	NO ICING	IN ICING/WITH ICE
0	1.40	1.70
1	1.20	1.60
2 and 3	1.10	2.00
FULL	1.00	1.95

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- ADC 1 (*)
- Cockpit FCISOV
- De-Ice System (*)
- DME 1
- Engine 1 Anti-Ice (*)
- Engine 1 Flowmeter
- Flap System (*)
- Left Landing/Taxi Light
- Roll Trim
- Stick Pusher (*)
- VHF 2
- Windshield Heater 1 (*)
- WX Radar
- Yaw Trim

Figure 5 – AFM Section 4-08, DC BUS 1 OFF

(3) Revise the AFM by replacing the EMERGENCY BUS OFF procedure in AFM

section 4-08, Abnormal Procedures, with Figure 6:

EMERGENCY BUS OFF

ADS/AOA Knob..... ON

Airspeed 250 KIAS
MAXIMUMAltitude..... 25000 ft
MAXIMUM

The list below presents the relevant inoperative equipment. Items marked with an asterisk have dedicated failure procedures, which may have to be performed, at pilot's discretion:

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| - AHRS 1 (*) | - LDG Indication/Warning |
| - Audio Panel 1 (*) | - Red Beacon |
| - Autopilot (*) | - Oxygen Transducer |
| - EFCU 1 | - Pax Mask Deploy (Auto) |
| - Engines Fire Detection (*) | - PFD 1 |
| - Flight Director 1 | - Pitch Trim (Back-Up) (*) |
| - AFCS Control Unit | - PRSOV 1 & 2 |
| - Fuel Booster Pumps | - Transponder 1 |
| - Fuel Shutoff Valves | - Stick Pusher (*) |
| - Fuel Transfer Valve (*) | - Stall Warning |
| - GIA 1 (*) | - WOW (*) |
| - GPS 1/VOR 1/ILS 1 | - Yaw Damper |

Figure 6 – AFM Section 4-08, EMERGENCY BUS OFF

FAA AD Differences

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

(h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to Attn.: Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4146; fax: (816) 329-4090. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) *Airworthy Product:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority

(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

(i) Refer to MCAI ANAC, AD No.: 2009-10-01R2, dated July 28, 2010, for related information.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 16, 2010.

Kim Smith,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**Federal Energy Regulatory Commission****18 CFR Parts 38 and 40**

[Docket Nos. RM08-19-003, RM05-5-019; Order No. 729-B]

Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Calculation of Available Transfer Capability, Capacity Benefit Margins, Transmission Reliability Margins, Total Transfer Capability, and Existing Transmission Commitments; Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System; and Standards for Business Practices and Communications Protocols for Public Utilities

July 15, 2010.

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Order on Rehearing and Reconsideration.