[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 137 (Monday, July 19, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41850-41853]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-17519]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and 
Conduct Additional Public Scoping

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 
Administration.

ACTION: Amended Notice of Intent.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to 
modify the scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/EIS-0283-S2) 
and to conduct additional public scoping. DOE issued its Notice of 
Intent \1\ (NOI) to prepare the SPD Supplemental EIS on March 28, 2007 
(72 FR 14543). DOE now intends to revise the scope of the SPD 
Supplemental EIS to refine the quantity and types of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium material, evaluate additional alternatives, and no 
longer consider in detail one alternative identified in the NOI 
(ceramic can-in-canister immobilization). Also, DOE had identified a 
glass can-in-canister immobilization approach as its preferred 
alternative in the NOI; DOE will continue to evaluate that alternative 
but currently does not have a preferred alternative.
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    \1\ The NOI identified the title of the document as the 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Surplus Plutonium 
Disposition at the Savannah River Site.
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    DOE now proposes to analyze a new alternative to install the 
capability in K-Area at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to, among other 
things, disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and 
convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed 
uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel 
Fabrication Facility (MFFF); under this alternative, DOE would not 
build the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which DOE 
previously decided to construct. This K-Area project also would provide 
capabilities needed to prepare plutonium for other disposition 
alternatives evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS and to support the 
ongoing plutonium storage mission in K-Area. DOE also proposes to 
evaluate a new alternative to dispose of some surplus non-pit plutonium 
as transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New 
Mexico, provided the plutonium would meet the criteria for such 
disposal. In addition, DOE will analyze the potential environmental 
impacts of using MOX fuel in up to five reactors owned by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) at the Sequoyah (near Soddy-Daisy, TN) and 
Browns Ferry (near Decatur and Athens, AL) nuclear stations. TVA will 
be a cooperating agency with DOE for preparation and review of the 
sections of the SPD Supplemental EIS that address operation of TVA 
reactors.

DATES: DOE invites Federal agencies, state and local governments, 
Native American tribes, industry, other organizations, and members of 
the public to submit comments to assist in identifying environmental 
issues and in determining the scope of the SPD Supplemental EIS. The 
public scoping period will end on September 17, 2010. DOE will consider 
all comments received or postmarked by September 17, 2010. Comments 
received after that date will be considered to the extent practicable. 
Also, DOE asks that Federal, state, and local agencies that desire to 
be designated cooperating agencies on the SPD Supplemental EIS contact 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Document Manager at the 
addresses listed under Addresses by the end of the scoping period. DOE 
will hold five public scoping meetings:
     August 3, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Calhoun Community 
College, Decatur Campus, Aerospace Building, 6250 Highway 31 North, 
Tanner, AL 35671
     August 5, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Chattanooga 
Convention Center, 1150 Carter Street, Chattanooga, TN 37402
     August 17, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at North Augusta 
Municipal Center, 100 Georgia Avenue, North Augusta, SC 29841
     August 24, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Best Western 
Stevens Inn, 1829 S. Canal Street, Carlsbad, NM 88220
     August 26, 2010 (5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m.) at Courtyard by 
Marriott Santa Fe, 3347 Cerrillos Road, Santa Fe, NM 87507

ADDRESSES: Please direct written comments on the scope of the SPD 
Supplemental EIS to Ms. Sachiko McAlhany, SPD Supplemental EIS NEPA 
Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 2324, Germantown, 
MD 20874-2324. You may also send comments on the scope of the SPD 
Supplemental EIS via e-mail to [email protected], or via the 
Web site, http://www.spdsupplementaleis.com; or by toll-free fax to 
877-865-0277. DOE will give equal weight to written, e-mail, fax, and 
oral comments. Questions regarding the scoping process and requests to 
be placed on the distribution list for this Supplemental EIS should be 
directed to

[[Page 41851]]

Ms. McAlhany by any of the means given above or by calling toll-free 
877-344-0513.
    For general information concerning the DOE NEPA process, contact: 
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-
54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, 
Washington, D.C. 20585-0103; telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message 
at 1-800-472-2756; fax 202-586-7031; or send an e-mail to 
[email protected]. This Amended NOI will be available on the Internet 
at nepa.energy.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    To reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, DOE is 
engaged in a program to disposition its surplus, weapons-usable 
plutonium in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner by 
converting such plutonium into proliferation-resistant forms that can 
never again be readily used in nuclear weapons. The SPD Supplemental 
EIS will analyze the potential environmental impacts of reasonable 
alternatives \2\ to disposition approximately 7 metric tons (MT) \3\ of 
additional plutonium from pits (``pit plutonium''; a pit is the core of 
a nuclear weapon) which were declared surplus to national defense needs 
after publication of the NOI and were not included in DOE's prior 
decisions. The SPD Supplemental EIS also will analyze reasonable 
disposition alternatives for approximately 6 MT \4\ of non-pit 
plutonium. DOE also intends to evaluate the potential impacts 
associated with disposition of additional plutonium to account for the 
possibility that the United States may declare additional plutonium to 
be surplus in the future and, as analyzed in the Environmental 
Assessment for the U.S. Receipt and Storage of Gap Material--Plutonium 
(DOE/EA-1771, May 2010), small quantities of plutonium (totaling up to 
100 kilograms) that the United States may accept from at-risk foreign 
locations as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
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    \2\ The disposition alternatives to be analyzed in the SPD 
Supplemental EIS are not expected to change the type of material to 
be processed into MOX fuel or to change the annual throughput, 
annual environmental impacts, or the types of waste generated by the 
MFFF.
    \3\ In 2007, the United States declared 9 MT of pit plutonium as 
surplus to U.S. defense needs. Approximately 2 MT are included in 
the 34 MT of surplus and future-declared surplus plutonium that DOE 
previously decided to fabricate into MOX fuel (68 FR 20134, April 
24, 2003), leaving approximately 7 MT of additional surplus pit 
plutonium for disposition.
    \4\ The 2007 NOI for the SPD Supplemental EIS stated that the 
scope would include up to 13 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium that 
DOE had previously planned to immobilize, although of that 13 MT, 
DOE had decided in 2003 to fabricate approximately 6.5 MT of this 
non-pit plutonium into MOX fuel (68 FR 20134, April 24, 2003). Since 
publication of the NOI in 2007, DOE has decided to disposition 
approximately 0.6 MT of non-pit plutonium via H-Canyon and the 
Defense Waste Processing Facility (see footnote 6). Thus, DOE now 
plans to analyze disposition options for approximately 6 MT of 
surplus non-pit plutonium.
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    The SPD Supplemental EIS will not reconsider decisions already made 
to disposition surplus plutonium, other than the decision discussed 
below to construct a stand-alone PDCF. DOE already has decided to 
fabricate 34 MT of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel in the MFFF (68 FR 
20134, April 24, 2003), currently under construction at SRS, and to 
irradiate the MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors used to generate 
electricity, thereby rendering the plutonium into a spent fuel form not 
readily usable in nuclear weapons. DOE has set aside approximately 4 MT 
of surplus plutonium in the form of unirradiated reactor fuel for non-
defense programmatic use (e.g., reactor fuels research and development) 
as explained in the 2007 NOI (72 FR 14543, March 28, 2007), and 
approximately 7 MT of surplus plutonium is contained in irradiated 
reactor fuel and, thus, already is in a proliferation-resistant form 
(see 65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000). Finally, DOE already has disposed 
of approximately 3 MT of surplus plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP 
as transuranic waste \5\ and has decided to process approximately 0.6 
MT at SRS through the H-Canyon, ultimately to be incorporated into 
vitrified high-level waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility 
(DWPF).\6\
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    \5\ Disposal of certain plutonium scrap and residues at WIPP was 
undertaken pursuant to several records of decision (63 FR 66136, 
December 1, 1998; 64 FR 8068, February 18, 1999; 64 FR 47780, 
September 1, 1999; 66 FR 4803, January 18, 2001; 68 FR 44329, July 
28, 2003).
    \6\ The decisions to process approximately 0.6 MT of surplus 
non-pit plutonium through H-Canyon and DWPF are contained in two 
interim action determinations approved at SRS on December 8, 2008, 
and September 25, 2009.
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Previously Completed NEPA Analyses and Decisions Made

    In the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials 
Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December 
1996), DOE evaluated six candidate sites for plutonium disposition 
facilities and three categories of disposition technologies that would 
convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the Spent Fuel 
Standard.\7\ The three categories were: Deep Borehole Category (two 
options); Immobilization Category (three options); and Reactor Category 
(four options). DOE also analyzed a No Action Alternative. DOE selected 
a dual-path strategy for disposition that would allow immobilization of 
some or all of the surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic material for 
disposal in a geologic repository, and fabrication of some surplus 
plutonium into MOX fuel for irradiation in existing domestic commercial 
reactor(s), with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic 
repository \8\ (62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997). DOE also decided that an 
immobilization facility would be located either at the Hanford Site in 
Washington or at SRS.
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    \7\ Under that standard, the surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as 
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in 
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
    \8\ DOE has since decided to terminate the program to develop a 
Yucca Mountain repository for geologic disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level waste. DOE has established a Blue Ribbon 
Commission on America's Nuclear Future (Blue Ribbon Commission) to 
develop and recommend alternative storage and disposal approaches 
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. Notwithstanding 
termination of the Yucca Mountain program, DOE remains committed to 
meeting its obligations to manage and ultimately dispose of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level waste. The Blue Ribbon Commission will 
conduct a comprehensive review of the back-end of the fuel cycle and 
evaluate alternative approaches for meeting these obligations. The 
Blue Ribbon Commission will provide the opportunity for a meaningful 
dialogue on how best to address this challenging issue and will 
provide recommendations to DOE for developing a safe, long-term 
solution to managing the Nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
waste.
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    In November 1999, DOE issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS 
(SPD EIS, DOE/EIS-0283). The SPD EIS tiered from the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS and included an analysis of the potential 
environmental impacts associated with alternative technologies and 
sites to implement the dual-path plutonium disposition strategy. The 
SPD EIS also analyzed the impacts of using MOX fuel in certain domestic 
commercial reactors to generate electricity. In January 2000, DOE 
decided to construct and operate three disposition facilities at SRS: 
(1) the MFFF to fabricate up to 33 MT of surplus plutonium into MOX 
fuel \9\; (2)

[[Page 41852]]

a PDCF to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium 
metal to an oxide form for use as feed material for the MFFF; and (3) 
an immobilization facility using ceramic can-in-canister technology 
that would allow for the immobilization of approximately 17 MT of 
surplus plutonium (65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000). Using the can-in-
canister technology, DOE was to immobilize plutonium in a ceramic form, 
seal it in cans, and place the cans in canisters to be filled with 
borosilicate glass containing intensely radioactive high-level waste at 
DWPF.
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    \9\ In the 2000 Record of Decision (ROD), DOE noted that it had 
awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and 
Stone & Webster (known as DCS) that included reactor irradiation of 
MOX fuel at Duke Energy's Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. The 
SPD EIS and ROD also addressed two Virginia Power reactors at the 
North Anna Nuclear Station in Virginia. Virginia Power's involvement 
in the MOX program ended soon thereafter.
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    In 2002, DOE cancelled the immobilization portion of the plutonium 
disposition strategy (67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). In 2003, DOE 
affirmed the MOX-only approach for plutonium disposition, in which 34 
MT (increased from 33 MT) of surplus plutonium, including approximately 
6.5 MT of the non-pit plutonium originally intended for immobilization, 
would be dispositioned by fabrication into MOX fuel for use in power 
reactors (68 FR 20134, April 24, 2003).
    In 2005, DOE completed an Environmental Assessment for the 
Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium Materials at 
SRS (DOE/EA-1538, 2005) and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact. 
Among other things, this Environmental Assessment analyzed impacts 
associated with installation of a Container Surveillance and Storage 
Capability (CSSC) in an existing facility in K-Area at SRS. The CSSC 
capabilities are encompassed within what DOE refers to as the Plutonium 
Preparation Project (PuP). One phase of the PuP would provide 
stabilization and packaging capabilities, including direct metal 
oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage requirements pursuant to DOE-
STD-3013, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing 
Materials.
    In 2007, DOE decided to consolidate surplus non-pit plutonium 
stored separately at the Hanford Site, the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL), and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) to a single storage location in K-Area at SRS, pending 
disposition (72 FR 51807, September 11, 2007). Shipments from Hanford 
have been completed, and shipments from LANL and LLNL to SRS for 
consolidated storage are continuing.
    In 2008, DOE completed a supplement analysis (DOE/EIS-0283-SA-2) 
related to the treatment and solidification of certain liquid low-level 
radioactive waste and transuranic waste to be generated by the MFFF and 
PDCF. DOE decided to construct and operate a stand-alone waste 
solidification building in the F-Area at SRS (73 FR 75088, December 10, 
2008); this facility is now under construction.

2007 Notice of Intent and Public Scoping Comments

    On March 28, 2007, DOE issued an NOI (72 FR 14543) to prepare the 
SPD Supplemental EIS in order to evaluate the potential environmental 
impacts of disposition alternatives for up to approximately 13 MT of 
surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium originally planned for 
immobilization. In the 2007 NOI, DOE stated that its preferred 
alternative was to construct and operate a new vitrification facility 
within an existing building at SRS to immobilize some of the surplus, 
non-pit plutonium, and to process some of the surplus, non-pit 
plutonium in the existing H-Canyon and DWPF at SRS. That NOI also 
explained that DOE would analyze the impacts of fabricating some (up to 
approximately one-third) of the surplus, non-pit plutonium into MOX 
fuel.
    The original scoping period for the SPD Supplemental EIS began on 
March 28, 2007, and ended on May 29, 2007. Scoping meetings were held 
in Aiken, SC, and in Columbia, SC, on April 17 and 19, 2007, 
respectively. Some commentors favored the glass can-in-canister 
alternative for the entire surplus plutonium inventory, while others 
favored use of as much surplus plutonium as possible as feed material 
for the MFFF. One commentor asked that DOE identify the quantities of 
surplus plutonium by form and proposed disposition pathway. DOE will 
consider these comments, and others received during the upcoming 
scoping period, when preparing the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS.

Purpose and Need for Action

    DOE's purpose and need remains, as stated in the SPD EIS, to reduce 
the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting 
disposition of surplus plutonium in the United States in an 
environmentally safe and timely manner. Comprehensive disposition 
actions are needed to ensure that surplus plutonium is converted into 
proliferation-resistant forms.

Proposed Action and Alternatives

    In the SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE will analyze the potential 
environmental impacts of alternatives for the disposition of 
approximately 7 MT of surplus pit plutonium and approximately 6 MT of 
surplus non-pit plutonium. DOE also will analyze the impacts of 
irradiating MOX fuel in TVA reactors at the Sequoyah and Browns Ferry 
nuclear stations and will analyze options for the construction and 
operation of the PDCF and PuP capabilities at SRS. Brief descriptions 
of the alternatives DOE proposes to evaluate in the SPD Supplemental 
EIS are provided below.
     PDCF--DOE would construct and operate a stand-alone PDCF 
facility in F-Area at SRS to convert plutonium pits and other plutonium 
metal to an oxide form suitable for feed to the MFFF, as described in 
the SPD EIS and consistent with DOE's decision announced in the 2000 
Record of Decision (ROD) for that EIS (65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000).
     PuP--DOE would install and operate the plutonium 
processing equipment required to store and prepare non-pit plutonium 
for disposition through any of the alternative pathways (MOX fuel, H-
Canyon/DWPF, Glass Can-in-Canister, and WIPP). Differences in required 
capabilities for the alternatives will be evaluated in the SPD 
Supplemental EIS. The PuP project would be installed in K-Area at SRS.
     Combined PDCF/PuP Capability--DOE would install and 
operate a capability in K-Area at SRS necessary to perform the 
functions of both PDCF and PuP. The analysis will include 
reconfiguration of ongoing K-Area operations necessary to accommodate 
construction and operation of the combined capability.
     H-Canyon/DWPF--DOE would use the H-Canyon facility to 
process surplus non-pit plutonium for disposition. Plutonium materials 
would be dissolved, and the resulting plutonium-bearing solutions would 
be sent to a sludge batch feed tank and then to DWPF for vitrification. 
Within this alternative, DOE will analyze the potential environmental 
impacts of adding additional plutonium to the DWPF feed, which may 
increase the amount of plutonium in some DWPF canisters above 
historical levels.
     Glass Can-in-Canister--DOE would establish and operate a 
glass can-in-canister capability in K-Area at SRS. The analysis will 
assume that both surplus pit and non-pit plutonium would be vitrified 
within small cans, which would be placed in a rack inside a DWPF 
canister and surrounded with vitrified high-level waste. This 
alternative is similar to one evaluated in the SPD EIS, except that the 
capability would be installed in an existing rather than a new 
facility. Within this alternative DOE will analyze the potential 
environmental impacts of adding cans of vitrified plutonium to some of 
the DWPF canisters, which would increase the amount of

[[Page 41853]]

plutonium in those DWPF canisters above historical levels.
     WIPP--DOE would establish and operate a capability to 
prepare and package non-pit plutonium using PuP (or the combined PDCF/
PuP capability) and other existing facilities at SRS for disposal as 
transuranic waste at WIPP, provided that the material would meet the 
WIPP waste acceptance criteria. This alternative may include material 
that, because of its physical or chemical configuration or 
characteristics, could not be prepared for MFFF feed material.
     MOX Fuel--PDCF, PuP, or the combined PDCF/PuP capabilities 
would be used to prepare some surplus plutonium as feed for the MFFF, 
and the resultant MOX fuel would be irradiated in commercial nuclear 
reactors. The analysis will assume that all of the surplus pit and some 
of the surplus non-pit plutonium would be dispositioned in this manner.
     Reactor Operations--DOE will evaluate the impacts of 
construction of any reactor facility modifications \10\ necessary to 
accommodate MOX fuel operation at five TVA reactors--the three boiling 
water reactors (BWRs) at Browns Ferry and the two pressurized water 
reactors (PWRs) at Sequoyah. DOE will evaluate the impacts of operation 
of these reactors using a core loading with the maximum technically and 
economically viable number of MOX fuel assemblies.
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    \10\ The SPD Supplemental EIS also will evaluate environmental 
impacts from potential minor modifications to the MFFF that may be 
needed to accommodate fabrication of TVA reactor MOX fuel.
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    DOE no longer proposes to evaluate in detail the ceramic can-in-
canister alternative identified in the 2007 NOI for the SPD 
Supplemental EIS. In the SPD EIS, DOE identified no substantial 
differences between the ceramic can-in-canister and glass can-in-
canister approaches in terms of expected environmental impacts to air 
quality, waste management, human health risk, facility accidents, 
facility resource requirements, intersite transportation, and 
environmental justice. DOE infrastructure and expertise associated with 
the ceramic technology has not substantially evolved or matured since 
2003. In contrast, DOE has maintained research, development, and 
production infrastructure capabilities for glass waste forms. 
Therefore, DOE has decided that the glass can-in-canister technology is 
sufficiently representative of both technologies in terms of 
understanding potential environmental impacts and that the relative 
technical maturity of the glass can-in-canister approach gives it a 
greater chance of meeting DOE mission needs.

Potential Decisions

    Since initiating the SPD Supplemental EIS process in 2007, DOE has 
continued to evaluate alternatives for disposition of surplus 
plutonium. DOE is evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of 
combining the PDCF and the PuP to accomplish the functions of both 
projects in an existing facility in K-Area at SRS. DOE will decide, 
based on programmatic, engineering, facility safety, cost, and schedule 
information, and the environmental impact analysis in the SPD 
Supplemental EIS, whether to implement the combined project in K-Area 
at SRS (PDCF/PuP) or to separately construct and operate PDCF in F-Area 
and PuP in K-Area at SRS.
    DOE also will decide which alternatives to use for disposition of 
approximately 7 MT of surplus weapons-usable pit plutonium and 
approximately 6 MT of surplus weapons-usable non-pit plutonium for 
which DOE has not made a disposition decision.
    DOE is evaluating alternatives for surplus non-pit plutonium that 
currently does not meet the specification for disposition through the 
MFFF. While this material could be immobilized for disposition using 
the glass can-in-canister alternative, DOE is evaluating three other 
alternative disposition paths: processing through H-Canyon and 
incorporation into vitrified high-level waste at DWPF; preparation for 
disposal at WIPP; and pretreatment to make the material suitable as 
feed for the MFFF.
    In addition, the contract with Duke Energy Company to irradiate MOX 
fuel in four of its reactors terminated in late 2008. At present, DOE 
and TVA are evaluating use of MOX fuel in up to five TVA reactors at 
the Sequoyah and Browns Ferry nuclear stations, near Soddy-Daisy, TN, 
and Decatur and Athens, AL, respectively. DOE and TVA will determine 
whether to pursue irradiation of MOX fuel in TVA reactors and will 
determine which reactors to use initially for this purpose should DOE 
and TVA decide to use MOX fuel in TVA reactors.

Potential Environmental Issues for Analysis

    DOE has tentatively identified the following environmental issues 
for analysis in the SPD Supplemental EIS. The list is presented to 
facilitate comment on the scope of the SPD Supplemental EIS and is not 
intended to be comprehensive or to predetermine the potential impacts 
to be analyzed.
     Impacts to the general population and workers from 
radiological and nonradiological releases, and other worker health and 
safety impacts.
     Impacts of emissions on air and water quality.
     Impacts on ecological systems and threatened and 
endangered species.
     Impacts from waste management activities, including from 
storage of DWPF canisters and transuranic waste pending disposal.
     Impacts from the transportation of radioactive materials, 
reactor fuel assemblies, and waste.
     Impacts of postulated accidents and from terrorist actions 
and sabotage.
     Potential disproportionately high and adverse effects on 
low-income and minority populations (environmental justice).
     Short-term and long-term land use impacts.

NEPA Process

    Following the scoping period announced in this Amended Notice of 
Intent, and after consideration of comments received during scoping, 
DOE will prepare a Draft SPD Supplemental EIS. DOE will announce the 
availability of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS in the Federal Register 
and local media outlets. Comments received on the Draft SPD 
Supplemental EIS will be considered and addressed in the Final SPD 
Supplemental EIS. DOE will issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after 
publication by the Environmental Protection Agency of a Notice of 
Availability of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.

Other Agency Involvement

    The Tennessee Valley Authority will be a cooperating agency with 
DOE for preparation and review of the sections of the SPD Supplemental 
EIS that address operation of TVA reactors using MOX fuel assemblies. 
DOE invites Federal and non-Federal agencies with expertise in the 
subject matter of the SPD Supplemental EIS to contact the NEPA Document 
Manager (see ADDRESSES) if they wish to be a cooperating agency in the 
preparation of the SPD Supplemental EIS.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on 13 July, 2010.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 2010-17519 Filed 7-16-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P