[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37483-37488]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-15734]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2010-0209]
Request for Comments on the Draft Policy Statement on the
Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources and Notice of Public Meeting
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
ACTION: Request for public comment and notice of public meeting.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
adopting a statement of policy on the protection of cesium-137 chloride
(CsCl) sources. This statement would provide the Commission's policy
regarding secure uses of these sources at the present and express the
Commission's potential actions in the event that changes in the threat
environment necessitate these actions. The purpose of this policy
statement is to delineate the Commission's expectations for security
and safety of these sources. This draft policy statement is being
issued for public comment.
Additionally, the NRC is conducting a public meeting to solicit
public input on major issues associated with the draft policy statement
regarding the current use of certain forms of Cs-137 sources used by
NRC- and Agreement State-licensees. Furthermore, the NRC is requesting
names of individuals to participate at the public meeting in separate
roundtable panel discussions of the issues identified in Sections III
and IV of this notice.
DATES: 1. Comments on the draft policy statement should be submitted by
December 17, 2010. Comments received after this date will be considered
if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
2. Nominations for participation in the roundtable discussions of
the public meeting should be submitted by October 8, 2010. For
expeditious handling of the nominations, the NRC established a
dedicated e-mail address. The nominations should be sent to the
following NRC e-mail address: [email protected].
3. Other participants, who wish to attend the public meeting, could
also pre-register at the dedicated e-mail address:
[email protected]. The Commission will appreciate pre-
registration in order to properly plan for the conference facilities.
However, pre-registration is not required and pre-registration is open
until the opening day of the public meeting.
Public Meeting Dates: The NRC will take public comments on the
issues raised in this document at a public meeting on November 16-17,
2010. The location of the public meeting has not been finalized.
However, the location is planned to be near the NRC Headquarters in the
Rockville, Maryland, area. The location and the agenda of the public
meeting will be posted at the dedicated Web site http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cc, as soon as this information is
finalized. Please refer to the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for
additional information.
ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2010-0209 in the subject line
of your comments. For instructions on submitting comments and accessing
documents related to this action, see Section I, ``Submitting Comments
and Accessing Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document. You may submit comments by any one of the following
methods.
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2010-0209. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone (301) 492-
3668; e-mail [email protected].
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements and
Directives Branch, Office of Administration, MS: TWB-5 B1M, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
[[Page 37484]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. John P. Jankovich, Office of
Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs,
telephone (301) 415-7904, e-mail [email protected], or Dr. Cynthia
G. Jones, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, telephone
(301) 415-0298, e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Submitting Comments and Accessing Information
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be posted
on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site http://www.regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove
any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be
publicly disclosed. The NRC requests that any party soliciting or
aggregating comments received from other persons for submission to the
NRC inform those persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to
remove any identifying or contact information, and therefore, they
should not include any information in their comments that they do not
want publicly disclosed.
You can access publicly available documents related to this
document, including the following documents, using the following
methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Room
O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
[email protected].
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and supporting
materials related to this document can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2010-0209.
II. Background
Certain radioactive sources, including CsCl sources, have been
identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of
Conduct) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf) as sources that may pose a significant risk to individuals,
society, and the environment if improperly handled or used in a
malicious act. Consequently, the NRC considers it prudent to express
its views on the safe and secure use of these sources. CsCl sealed
sources are used in many applications, most commonly in irradiators,
calibrators, and in devices for biological and medical research. To
develop its draft policy statement, the NRC initiated and completed a
number of initiatives. A significant element of these initiatives was
an Issue Paper which was published in the Federal Register on July 31,
2008 (73 FR 44780), and discussed with stakeholders in a public
workshop held on September 29-30, 2008. The NRC also received numerous
written comments on the issues. The oral and written comments as well
as the transcript of the workshop, along with other relevant
information, are accessible at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cesium.
The NRC is seeking public input on the major issues associated with
its policy involving CsCl to reduce the risk to individuals, society,
and the environment. As a first step, the NRC has prepared a draft
policy statement, contained in Section III of this document, which
describes issues related to safety and security associated with IAEA
Category 1 and 2 CsCl sources.\1\ The intent of this document is to
foster discussion about these issues and to solicit comments on the
draft policy statement. The NRC will also use a public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cc to make documents,
relevant to the draft policy statement and to the public meeting,
accessible. This public Web site will be continually updated as new
information becomes available. The exact location and the agenda of the
public meeting will also be posted at this site as soon as they become
finalized.
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\1\ An IAEA Category 1 cesium-137 source contains a minimum of
3000 Ci (100 TBq) and a Category 2 source contains a minimum of 30
Ci (1 TBq). See http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf.
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III. Draft Policy Statement of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
on the Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources
The NRC's Role in Ensuring Security for Radioactive Materials
The NRC has the responsibility to license and regulate the civilian
use of radioactive materials for commercial, industrial, academic, and
medical purposes in a manner that protects public health and safety and
promotes the common defense and security. The NRC and its predecessor,
the Atomic Energy Commission, have regulated the use of radioactive
materials since 1946. The use of radioactive materials is regulated by
the NRC and 37 states, known as Agreement States. Agreement States
enter into agreements with the NRC under Section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act to license and regulate the use of byproduct material within
their borders.
The security and control of radiation sources is an essential part
of the NRC's mission. The NRC's efforts in this regard continue to be
effective, and there have been no security incidents involving risk-
significant radiation sources. After September 11, 2001, the NRC
imposed additional security requirements. In addition, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has initiated a program to
enhance security voluntarily beyond these requirements. One type of
radioactive source, cesium-137 chloride (CsCl), has been the focus of
increased attention in the U.S. because these sources are extensively
used in a wide range of applications in medicine, industry, and
research and, while unlikely, due to the physical and chemical
characteristics of CsCl, these sources could be used by terrorists in a
radiological dispersal device or ``dirty bomb.''
The NRC supports and implements the recommendations of the
international community regarding the safe use and protection of
radioactive materials. In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) issued the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources (the Code), which prescribes a legislative
framework, regulatory programs, and import/export provisions to achieve
and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive
sources. The U.S. Government is committed to the implementation of the
Code. The Code applies to all radioactive sources that could pose a
significant risk to individuals, society, and the environment. The Code
establishes five categories of radioactive sources based on their
potential to cause severe
[[Page 37485]]
deterministic health effects if not managed in a safe and secure
manner. Consistent with the Code, the NRC and the Agreement States have
established national requirements for the enhanced security for
Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material, which, if misused,
could pose a significant risk to individuals, society, and the
environment.
To maintain security of sources, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct) directed the NRC to establish and lead the Radiation Source
Protection and Security Task Force (Task Force) to evaluate and provide
recommendations to the President and Congress periodically relating to
the security of radiation sources in the U.S. from potential terrorist
threats, including acts of sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation
source in a radiological dispersal device. The EPAct named 12 Federal
agencies to the Task Force. In addition to the named agencies, the NRC
invited the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy to participate. To
accomplish the mission in view of the regulatory responsibilities
divided in the U.S. between the NRC and the Agreement States, the Task
Force also invited a representative of the Organization of Agreement
States and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to
participate as a non-voting member. NRC has coordinated with these
partners consistent with its regulatory role, to enhance the security
of sources, including CsCl. The Task Force issued its first report in
2006,\2\ and is scheduled to issue another report in 2010. The NRC's
security requirements for radioactive sources are aligned with the
recommendations of the first Task Force report.
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\2\ Report to the President and the U.S. Congress Under Public
Law 109-58, The Energy Policy Act of 2005, The Radiation Source
Protection and Security Task Force Report, NRC Reference No.
ML062190349.
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Statement of Policy
It is the policy of the Commission that its mission of ensuring
adequate protection of public health and safety, common defense and
security, and the environment while enabling the use of radioactive
materials for beneficial civilian purposes is best accomplished with
respect to CsCl by implementing or promoting the following principles:
The safety and security of risk significant sources is an
essential part of the NRC's mission;
Licensees have the primary responsibility to securely
manage and to protect sources in their possession from misuse, theft,
and radiological sabotage;
Adequate protection of public health and safety is
maintained if CsCl sources are managed in accordance with the security
requirements of the NRC and the Agreement States. These requirements
are based on vulnerability assessments of the various sources and
follow the principles of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security
of Radioactive Sources of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
While these sources are adequately protected under the
current NRC requirements, design improvements could be made that
further mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences;
The development and use of alternative forms of cesium-
137, while not required for adequate protection, is prudent and the NRC
intends to monitor these developments closely. In addition, the NRC
recognizes that measures to verify effectiveness of the alternatives
for solubility and dispersibility must be established to support future
decision-making on this matter;
CsCl enables three specific classes of applications that
benefit society: (a) Blood irradiation, (b) bio-medical and industrial
research, and (c) calibration of instrumentation and dosimetry;
The NRC recognizes that currently there is no disposal
capability for such commercial sources. The NRC considers it imperative
to develop a pathway for the long term storage and disposal of these
sources whether or not there are alternatives developed; and
The NRC monitors the threat environment and maintains
awareness of international and domestic security efforts. In the event
that changes in the threat environment necessitate regulatory action,
the NRC is ready to issue additional security requirements to apply
appropriate limitations for the use of CsCl in its current form.
Background
Security and Control of Radioactive Sources
Strong measures and regulatory requirements are currently in place
for ensuring security and control of radioactive sources. After the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC and Agreement States
issued security requirements mandating that licensees who possess IAEA
Category 1 or 2 quantities of radioactive materials implement increased
security and control measures to reduce the risk of malevolent use and
intentional unauthorized access to radioactive material. The additional
requirements enhanced and supplemented existing regulations in 10 CFR
20.1801, ``Security of Stored Material,'' and 10 CFR 20.1802, ``Control
of Material Not in Storage,'' which are primarily intended to prevent
or mitigate unintended exposure to radiation.
Current security requirements include access controls and
background checks for personnel; monitoring, detecting and responding
to unauthorized access; delay; advance coordination with local law
enforcement; and the tracking of transfers and shipments. The security
requirements require licensees to establish and implement
trustworthiness and reliability standards to determine who will have
unescorted access to the radioactive material. An individual's
trustworthiness and reliability is based upon a background
investigation. The NRC and Agreement States have jointly developed
materials protection and security regulatory requirements that reflect
the experience gained through implementation of existing requirements.
In addition, the NRC has implemented new regulatory requirements
for import/export licensing and for reporting to the National Source
Tracking System (NSTS) which increase accountability of Category 1 and
2 radioactive material transactions and help to ensure that such
transactions are only made by authorized entities. The NRC developed
and maintains the NSTS, which provides information on sources from the
time of manufacture through transportation and use to end-of-life
disposition. The NSTS and other systems under development, such as Web-
Based-Licensing and License Verification System, are key components of
a comprehensive program for the security and control of radioactive
materials. When complete, these systems will include information on all
NRC, Agreement State, and import/export licensees and high risk
radioactive sources.
The measures described above are in place to ensure the security of
all Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources, including CsCl sources. These
measures have reduced the vulnerability of CsCl sources. In addition,
the NRC and Agreement States are supporting the U.S. Department of
Energy's (DOE's) NNSA voluntary program to retrofit existing CsCl
irradiators with physical security enhancements and to incorporate
these improvements into the designs of newly manufactured units. These
modifications extend beyond current regulatory requirements. These
efforts are often complemented by expert security guidance to licensees
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(assist visits) and table-top exercises that allow participants to
share best practices.
The NRC and Agreement States also support the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's ongoing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
countermeasure effort to reach out to certain communities of licensees
(including the CsCl irradiator licensee community). A critical aspect
of this WMD countermeasure effort is information sharing through visits
to licensees. These visits encourage communication and allow
regulators, law enforcement, and licensees to gain an understanding of
a licensee's security arrangements and how and when law enforcement
would be engaged if there were a threat or an event at a licensee's
site.
The NRC supports the security initiatives of international
organizations (e.g., IAEA), and other countries, as well as the
initiatives of Federal agencies aimed to further increase the
protection of high risk sources overseas (e.g., NNSA's Global Threat
Reduction Initiative). The NRC participates in the development of such
protective measures in various international forums and will consider
their applicability for use within the U.S. if the threat environment
changes, warranting additional protective measures.
Uses of CsCl Sources
CsCl sources comprise approximately 3% of the IAEA Category 1 and 2
quantity sources in the U.S. Many in the medical and scientific
communities indicate that these CsCl sources are important due to their
application in blood irradiation, bio-medical and industrial research,
and calibration of instrumentation and dosimetry, especially for
critical reactor and first responder equipment. CsCl is used for these
applications because of the properties of the nuclide cesium-137 (Cs-
137), including its desirable single energy spectrum (662 keV), long
half-life, low cost, and moderate shielding requirements relative to
other nuclides. The CsCl used in these applications is in a compressed
powder form that is doubly-encapsulated in two stainless steel capsules
to ensure safety and security in normal use. This physical form is used
because of its high specific activity (gamma emission per unit volume)
and manufacturability. However, the powder is highly soluble and
dispersible, which presents security concerns.
Blood irradiation is medically essential to prevent transfusion-
associated Graft-Versus-Host disease, and some hospitals use only
irradiated blood. CsCl blood irradiators are used in over 90% of all
blood irradiation because they are the most reliable and efficient
blood irradiation devices currently available.
In biomedical research, CsCl irradiation has been used for over 40
years in fields such as immunology, stem cell research, cancer
research, in-vivo immunology, systemic drug research, chromosome
aberrations, DNA damage/repair, human genome, and genetic factors. For
most research there are no alternatives to Cs-137 irradiation because
of the unique properties of Cs-137 radiation, such as high dose rates
with uniform fields of linear energy transfer. No alternative
technologies that can effectively replace CsCl sources for biomedical
research have yet been developed.
The U.S. and international systems of radiation measurements are
based on the energy spectrum of Cs-137. All American National Standards
Institute standards and their associated test-and-evaluation protocols
for radiation detection, instrumentation, and personal dosimetry rely
on the use of Cs-137. In addition, all DHS-related standards for
calibration of first responder and emergency response equipment, such
as personnel self-reading dosimeters, portal monitors, and portable
survey instruments, also require the use of Cs-137 for calibration
purposes. Cs-137 was selected by the U.S. and the international
community as the basis of calibration because of the optimal single
energy spectrum of this nuclide and its long half-life. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) maintains the national
measurement standards and calibrates the instruments for secondary
laboratories. These instruments are sent to secondary and tertiary
laboratories that, in turn, calibrate the instruments for end users.
This network of facilities ensures that every radiation detection
instrument that is used in the country measures correctly and is
traceable to NIST.
Ensuring Secure Disposal for Disused CsCl Sources
The disposal of CsCl radioactive sources, which are currently in
use, is a challenge because of the high cost of disposal and the lack
of commercial disposal facilities. The vast majority of the CsCl
sources in use today are classified as Greater-Than-Class C low-level
radioactive waste. Today, used and unwanted CsCl sources are stored
safely and securely at the users' sites under the applicable NRC and
Agreement State control and security requirements until commercial
options become available. To maintain source safety and security, the
sites are routinely inspected in accordance with established NRC and
Agreement State inspection procedures. The Commission considers it
imperative to develop a pathway for the long term storage and disposal
of these sources because long term storage at licensee facilities
increases the potential for safety and security issues. To resolve
these issues, the NRC will continue to participate with its Federal and
State partners and representatives of the private sector in initiatives
to explore medium- and long term-solutions to address the need for
disposal and disposition of CsCl sources.
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
assigned responsibility for providing disposal of this type of waste to
DOE. However, pending the availability of a disposal capability, DOE is
not responsible for accepting disused sources for storage,
transportation or other activities related to disposal except under
special circumstances.\2\ At the present time, no final decision has
been made to proceed with approval, funding, and operation of a
disposal facility. The Commission will actively support DOE in all
phases of the process to establish a storage facility for permanent,
safe and secure storage of used and unwanted sources.
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\2\ Under specified circumstances, and pursuant to other
authority and responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
DOE may recover excess or unwanted sealed sources (including CsCl
sources) for reuse, storage or disposal that present threats to
public health, safety or national security.
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The NRC's Perspective on Further Security Enhancements
The NRC believes that the current enhanced regulatory framework for
security of radioactive sources has been very effective in enhancing
and ensuring the security and control of risk-significant sources used
in medical, industrial, and research activities in the U.S. The NRC
encourages stakeholders to take an active role in source security and
continue their efforts in maintaining the current security environment.
As is necessary and practical, and in response to any change in the
threat environment, the NRC will work with other Federal agencies to
further enhance the secure use of Cs-137 sources. The NRC recognizes
that it is prudent to maintain awareness of the status of research to
identify alternative forms of CsCl. NRC will remain cognizant of these
issues and appropriately consider whether there are safety and security
benefits to further risk reduction. As part of NRC's
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responsibility to ensure the security of these sources, the NRC, in
coordination with its Federal partners, continuously monitors the
national threat environment and is prepared to take further regulatory
actions should this environment change. Just as it did following the
events following September 11, 2001, the NRC is prepared to take
immediate action such as issuance of additional security requirements
with orders or rulemaking to address such security-related issues, if
necessary.
The NRC solicits stakeholder input into major issues associated
with the use of CsCl. The Public Workshop on the Security and Continued
Use of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources that the NRC held in September 2008,
is an example of soliciting such input. The workshop was attended by a
large number of stakeholders and, in addition to the oral presentations
and comments, the NRC received a significant number of written
submissions. The workshop provided valuable information for the
formulation of this Policy Statement regarding the use of CsCl sources,
security issues, and the diversity of impacts that licensees could
experience as a result of potential further regulatory requirements.
While the current security requirements are adequate, the NRC
recognizes that if the use of CsCl in its current form is to continue,
the NRC encourages the source and device manufacturers to implement
design improvements that further mitigate or minimize the radiological
consequences of misuse or malevolent acts involving these sources given
that such events, while unlikely, cannot be dismissed. Similarly, the
NRC supports efforts to develop alternate forms of Cs-137 that would
further reduce the risk of malevolent use associated with CsCl. The
National Research Council of the National Academies (NA) issued a
report \3\ that supported these efforts, recommended that the NRC
consider the potential economic and social disruption that changes to
the CsCl requirements could cause, and supported a research and
development program for alternative ``matrices'' for high-activity Cs-
137 sources, which would provide lowered security hazards.
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\3\ National Research Council of the National Academies,
``Radiation Source Use and Replacement,'' The National Academies
Press, Washington, DC, http://www.nap.org.
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The NRC recognizes that objective measures of ``solubility'' and
``dispersibility'' need to be defined before alternate forms of Cs-137
that are less-soluble and less-dispersible than the compressed powder
form can be developed. The Commission has already directed the NRC
staff to work with Federal agencies to define these measures which must
be readily expressible in physical and chemical terms and be
demonstrated through well-defined test protocols. In addition, the
criteria for the solubility and the dispersibility measures must be
established at levels that ensure enhancement of security and reduction
of risks of malevolent use. Consequently, the criteria must be
developed and accepted by both the cognizant technical communities and
the communities responsible for the Nation's security.
While it is outside the scope of NRC's mission to conduct
developmental research, the Commission encourages stakeholder research
to develop alternative chemical forms for large activity Cs-137
sources. One of the recommendations made by the NA was to investigate
the development of alternate chemical forms of Cs-137. The NRC believes
that such research should engage cognizant Federal agencies and should
consider the practicality of producing an end product that would
maintain the security as well as the societal benefits of the current
applications of CsCl sources. The NRC considers that pursuit of
alternate forms of cesium would provide benefits in the longer term,
because the technology of manufacturing other forms of cesium is not
yet available. Given the state of the current technology, NRC believes
that, for the short term, it is more feasible to focus current security
efforts on strengthening existing security of sources as necessary
through cooperative efforts and voluntary initiatives of industries
that currently manufacture and use irradiators with CsCl sources. While
current NRC security requirements ensure the safety and security of
these sources, it has been shown through the voluntary NNSA security
initiative program that further security enhancements and future design
improvements further minimize the potential misuse or malevolent acts
involving these sources.
Summary
The NRC is continually working with its domestic and international
partners to assess, integrate, and improve its security programs, and
to make risk-significant radiation sources more secure and less
vulnerable to terrorists. The NRC has the responsibility to ensure the
safe and secure use and control of radioactive sources, including CsCl
sources. The NRC has met this responsibility through imposition of
additional security requirements. The NRC has articulated in the past
that the use of alternative forms of Cs-137 is desirable. The NRC's
actions to date have resulted in strong security measures being
established, and the NRC recognizes that near term replacement of
devices or CsCl sources in existing blood, research, and calibration
irradiators is not practicable or necessary due to implementation of
the additional requirements and considering a lack of a disposal
capacity. A clear strategy for the end-of-life management of these
sources, which is the responsibility of the DOE, is not mature and
likely will not be for some time. Many medical, research, and emergency
response stakeholders have indicated that short term replacement would
be detrimental. Therefore, the NRC continues to believe that the
security of these facilities should be maintained and enhanced as
practical through the implementation of the regulatory requirements and
through voluntary actions such as the physical security enhancements of
existing devices and future designs against intrusion. The NRC supports
efforts to develop alternate forms of Cs-137 that would reduce the
security risks and will monitor these developments closely. The NRC
will continue to work with its federal partners to ensure the safety
and security of CsCl sources. In the event that changes in the threat
environment necessitate regulatory action, the NRC is ready to issue
additional security requirements to apply appropriate limitations for
the use of CsCl in its current forms or for its replacement with
suitable alternatives.
IV. Plans for a Public Meeting
The NRC is holding a facilitated public meeting on November 16-17,
2010, on the draft policy statement and the following issues:
The NRC's role in ensuring security for radioactive
materials.
Statement of Policy.
Security and control of radioactive sources.
Uses of CsCl sources.
Ensuring secure disposal for disused CsCl sources.
NRC's perspective on further security enhancements.
During the public meeting, NRC will conduct roundtable panel
discussion, with opportunity for audience participation, for each issue
contained in Sections III and IV of this document. NRC is seeking the
names of individuals interested in participating on these panels.
Nominations by interested individuals or organizations should
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include the name of the proposed panel member, the issues they are
interested in discussing, viewpoint(s) on the issue(s), and affiliation
(if any). Roundtable panel participants will be selected with the goal
of providing balanced viewpoints on each of the various issues. Please
see the DATES section to submit nominations by October 8, 2010.
We encourage previous participants who attended, either as panel
members or attendees, the prior public workshop, held on September 29-
30, 2008, to also participate in this meeting. Information on the
previous public meeting is accessible at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cesium.
Based on the comments received in both written and electronic form,
and at the public meeting, the Commission will then be in a better
position to proceed with the issuance of a final Policy Statement. The
final Policy Statement, when issued by the Commission, will be
published in the Federal Register.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22 day of June 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia Carpenter,
Deputy Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs.
[FR Doc. 2010-15734 Filed 6-28-10; 8:45 am]
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