[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 29, 2010)]
[Pages 37483-37488]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-15734]




Request for Comments on the Draft Policy Statement on the 
Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources and Notice of Public Meeting

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

ACTION: Request for public comment and notice of public meeting.


SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
adopting a statement of policy on the protection of cesium-137 chloride 
(CsCl) sources. This statement would provide the Commission's policy 
regarding secure uses of these sources at the present and express the 
Commission's potential actions in the event that changes in the threat 
environment necessitate these actions. The purpose of this policy 
statement is to delineate the Commission's expectations for security 
and safety of these sources. This draft policy statement is being 
issued for public comment.
    Additionally, the NRC is conducting a public meeting to solicit 
public input on major issues associated with the draft policy statement 
regarding the current use of certain forms of Cs-137 sources used by 
NRC- and Agreement State-licensees. Furthermore, the NRC is requesting 
names of individuals to participate at the public meeting in separate 
roundtable panel discussions of the issues identified in Sections III 
and IV of this notice.

DATES: 1. Comments on the draft policy statement should be submitted by 
December 17, 2010. Comments received after this date will be considered 
if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
    2. Nominations for participation in the roundtable discussions of 
the public meeting should be submitted by October 8, 2010. For 
expeditious handling of the nominations, the NRC established a 
dedicated e-mail address. The nominations should be sent to the 
following NRC e-mail address: [email protected].
    3. Other participants, who wish to attend the public meeting, could 
also pre-register at the dedicated e-mail address: 
[email protected]. The Commission will appreciate pre-
registration in order to properly plan for the conference facilities. 
However, pre-registration is not required and pre-registration is open 
until the opening day of the public meeting.
    Public Meeting Dates: The NRC will take public comments on the 
issues raised in this document at a public meeting on November 16-17, 
2010. The location of the public meeting has not been finalized. 
However, the location is planned to be near the NRC Headquarters in the 
Rockville, Maryland, area. The location and the agenda of the public 
meeting will be posted at the dedicated Web site  http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cc, as soon as this information is 
finalized. Please refer to the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for 
additional information.

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2010-0209 in the subject line 
of your comments. For instructions on submitting comments and accessing 
documents related to this action, see Section I, ``Submitting Comments 
and Accessing Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 
this document. You may submit comments by any one of the following 
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2010-0209. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone (301) 492-
3668; e-mail [email protected].
    Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements and 
Directives Branch, Office of Administration, MS: TWB-5 B1M, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

[[Page 37484]]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. John P. Jankovich, Office of 
Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, 
telephone (301) 415-7904, e-mail [email protected], or Dr. Cynthia 
G. Jones, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, telephone 
(301) 415-0298, e-mail [email protected].


I. Submitting Comments and Accessing Information

    Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be posted 
on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site http://www.regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove 
any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against 
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be 
publicly disclosed. The NRC requests that any party soliciting or 
aggregating comments received from other persons for submission to the 
NRC inform those persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to 
remove any identifying or contact information, and therefore, they 
should not include any information in their comments that they do not 
want publicly disclosed.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document, including the following documents, using the following 
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Room 
O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected].
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and supporting 
materials related to this document can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2010-0209.

II. Background

    Certain radioactive sources, including CsCl sources, have been 
identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of 
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of 
Conduct) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf) as sources that may pose a significant risk to individuals, 
society, and the environment if improperly handled or used in a 
malicious act. Consequently, the NRC considers it prudent to express 
its views on the safe and secure use of these sources. CsCl sealed 
sources are used in many applications, most commonly in irradiators, 
calibrators, and in devices for biological and medical research. To 
develop its draft policy statement, the NRC initiated and completed a 
number of initiatives. A significant element of these initiatives was 
an Issue Paper which was published in the Federal Register on July 31, 
2008 (73 FR 44780), and discussed with stakeholders in a public 
workshop held on September 29-30, 2008. The NRC also received numerous 
written comments on the issues. The oral and written comments as well 
as the transcript of the workshop, along with other relevant 
information, are accessible at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cesium.
    The NRC is seeking public input on the major issues associated with 
its policy involving CsCl to reduce the risk to individuals, society, 
and the environment. As a first step, the NRC has prepared a draft 
policy statement, contained in Section III of this document, which 
describes issues related to safety and security associated with IAEA 
Category 1 and 2 CsCl sources.\1\ The intent of this document is to 
foster discussion about these issues and to solicit comments on the 
draft policy statement. The NRC will also use a public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cc to make documents, 
relevant to the draft policy statement and to the public meeting, 
accessible. This public Web site will be continually updated as new 
information becomes available. The exact location and the agenda of the 
public meeting will also be posted at this site as soon as they become 

    \1\ An IAEA Category 1 cesium-137 source contains a minimum of 
3000 Ci (100 TBq) and a Category 2 source contains a minimum of 30 
Ci (1 TBq). See http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf.

III. Draft Policy Statement of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
on the Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources

The NRC's Role in Ensuring Security for Radioactive Materials

    The NRC has the responsibility to license and regulate the civilian 
use of radioactive materials for commercial, industrial, academic, and 
medical purposes in a manner that protects public health and safety and 
promotes the common defense and security. The NRC and its predecessor, 
the Atomic Energy Commission, have regulated the use of radioactive 
materials since 1946. The use of radioactive materials is regulated by 
the NRC and 37 states, known as Agreement States. Agreement States 
enter into agreements with the NRC under Section 274 of the Atomic 
Energy Act to license and regulate the use of byproduct material within 
their borders.
    The security and control of radiation sources is an essential part 
of the NRC's mission. The NRC's efforts in this regard continue to be 
effective, and there have been no security incidents involving risk-
significant radiation sources. After September 11, 2001, the NRC 
imposed additional security requirements. In addition, the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has initiated a program to 
enhance security voluntarily beyond these requirements. One type of 
radioactive source, cesium-137 chloride (CsCl), has been the focus of 
increased attention in the U.S. because these sources are extensively 
used in a wide range of applications in medicine, industry, and 
research and, while unlikely, due to the physical and chemical 
characteristics of CsCl, these sources could be used by terrorists in a 
radiological dispersal device or ``dirty bomb.''
    The NRC supports and implements the recommendations of the 
international community regarding the safe use and protection of 
radioactive materials. In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) issued the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources (the Code), which prescribes a legislative 
framework, regulatory programs, and import/export provisions to achieve 
and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive 
sources. The U.S. Government is committed to the implementation of the 
Code. The Code applies to all radioactive sources that could pose a 
significant risk to individuals, society, and the environment. The Code 
establishes five categories of radioactive sources based on their 
potential to cause severe

[[Page 37485]]

deterministic health effects if not managed in a safe and secure 
manner. Consistent with the Code, the NRC and the Agreement States have 
established national requirements for the enhanced security for 
Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material, which, if misused, 
could pose a significant risk to individuals, society, and the 
    To maintain security of sources, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPAct) directed the NRC to establish and lead the Radiation Source 
Protection and Security Task Force (Task Force) to evaluate and provide 
recommendations to the President and Congress periodically relating to 
the security of radiation sources in the U.S. from potential terrorist 
threats, including acts of sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation 
source in a radiological dispersal device. The EPAct named 12 Federal 
agencies to the Task Force. In addition to the named agencies, the NRC 
invited the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy to participate. To 
accomplish the mission in view of the regulatory responsibilities 
divided in the U.S. between the NRC and the Agreement States, the Task 
Force also invited a representative of the Organization of Agreement 
States and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to 
participate as a non-voting member. NRC has coordinated with these 
partners consistent with its regulatory role, to enhance the security 
of sources, including CsCl. The Task Force issued its first report in 
2006,\2\ and is scheduled to issue another report in 2010. The NRC's 
security requirements for radioactive sources are aligned with the 
recommendations of the first Task Force report.

    \2\ Report to the President and the U.S. Congress Under Public 
Law 109-58, The Energy Policy Act of 2005, The Radiation Source 
Protection and Security Task Force Report, NRC Reference No. 

Statement of Policy

    It is the policy of the Commission that its mission of ensuring 
adequate protection of public health and safety, common defense and 
security, and the environment while enabling the use of radioactive 
materials for beneficial civilian purposes is best accomplished with 
respect to CsCl by implementing or promoting the following principles:
     The safety and security of risk significant sources is an 
essential part of the NRC's mission;
     Licensees have the primary responsibility to securely 
manage and to protect sources in their possession from misuse, theft, 
and radiological sabotage;
     Adequate protection of public health and safety is 
maintained if CsCl sources are managed in accordance with the security 
requirements of the NRC and the Agreement States. These requirements 
are based on vulnerability assessments of the various sources and 
follow the principles of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security 
of Radioactive Sources of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
     While these sources are adequately protected under the 
current NRC requirements, design improvements could be made that 
further mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences;
     The development and use of alternative forms of cesium-
137, while not required for adequate protection, is prudent and the NRC 
intends to monitor these developments closely. In addition, the NRC 
recognizes that measures to verify effectiveness of the alternatives 
for solubility and dispersibility must be established to support future 
decision-making on this matter;
     CsCl enables three specific classes of applications that 
benefit society: (a) Blood irradiation, (b) bio-medical and industrial 
research, and (c) calibration of instrumentation and dosimetry;
     The NRC recognizes that currently there is no disposal 
capability for such commercial sources. The NRC considers it imperative 
to develop a pathway for the long term storage and disposal of these 
sources whether or not there are alternatives developed; and
     The NRC monitors the threat environment and maintains 
awareness of international and domestic security efforts. In the event 
that changes in the threat environment necessitate regulatory action, 
the NRC is ready to issue additional security requirements to apply 
appropriate limitations for the use of CsCl in its current form.


Security and Control of Radioactive Sources
    Strong measures and regulatory requirements are currently in place 
for ensuring security and control of radioactive sources. After the 
terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC and Agreement States 
issued security requirements mandating that licensees who possess IAEA 
Category 1 or 2 quantities of radioactive materials implement increased 
security and control measures to reduce the risk of malevolent use and 
intentional unauthorized access to radioactive material. The additional 
requirements enhanced and supplemented existing regulations in 10 CFR 
20.1801, ``Security of Stored Material,'' and 10 CFR 20.1802, ``Control 
of Material Not in Storage,'' which are primarily intended to prevent 
or mitigate unintended exposure to radiation.
    Current security requirements include access controls and 
background checks for personnel; monitoring, detecting and responding 
to unauthorized access; delay; advance coordination with local law 
enforcement; and the tracking of transfers and shipments. The security 
requirements require licensees to establish and implement 
trustworthiness and reliability standards to determine who will have 
unescorted access to the radioactive material. An individual's 
trustworthiness and reliability is based upon a background 
investigation. The NRC and Agreement States have jointly developed 
materials protection and security regulatory requirements that reflect 
the experience gained through implementation of existing requirements.
    In addition, the NRC has implemented new regulatory requirements 
for import/export licensing and for reporting to the National Source 
Tracking System (NSTS) which increase accountability of Category 1 and 
2 radioactive material transactions and help to ensure that such 
transactions are only made by authorized entities. The NRC developed 
and maintains the NSTS, which provides information on sources from the 
time of manufacture through transportation and use to end-of-life 
disposition. The NSTS and other systems under development, such as Web-
Based-Licensing and License Verification System, are key components of 
a comprehensive program for the security and control of radioactive 
materials. When complete, these systems will include information on all 
NRC, Agreement State, and import/export licensees and high risk 
radioactive sources.
    The measures described above are in place to ensure the security of 
all Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources, including CsCl sources. These 
measures have reduced the vulnerability of CsCl sources. In addition, 
the NRC and Agreement States are supporting the U.S. Department of 
Energy's (DOE's) NNSA voluntary program to retrofit existing CsCl 
irradiators with physical security enhancements and to incorporate 
these improvements into the designs of newly manufactured units. These 
modifications extend beyond current regulatory requirements. These 
efforts are often complemented by expert security guidance to licensees

[[Page 37486]]

(assist visits) and table-top exercises that allow participants to 
share best practices.
    The NRC and Agreement States also support the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's ongoing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
countermeasure effort to reach out to certain communities of licensees 
(including the CsCl irradiator licensee community). A critical aspect 
of this WMD countermeasure effort is information sharing through visits 
to licensees. These visits encourage communication and allow 
regulators, law enforcement, and licensees to gain an understanding of 
a licensee's security arrangements and how and when law enforcement 
would be engaged if there were a threat or an event at a licensee's 
    The NRC supports the security initiatives of international 
organizations (e.g., IAEA), and other countries, as well as the 
initiatives of Federal agencies aimed to further increase the 
protection of high risk sources overseas (e.g., NNSA's Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative). The NRC participates in the development of such 
protective measures in various international forums and will consider 
their applicability for use within the U.S. if the threat environment 
changes, warranting additional protective measures.
Uses of CsCl Sources
    CsCl sources comprise approximately 3% of the IAEA Category 1 and 2 
quantity sources in the U.S. Many in the medical and scientific 
communities indicate that these CsCl sources are important due to their 
application in blood irradiation, bio-medical and industrial research, 
and calibration of instrumentation and dosimetry, especially for 
critical reactor and first responder equipment. CsCl is used for these 
applications because of the properties of the nuclide cesium-137 (Cs-
137), including its desirable single energy spectrum (662 keV), long 
half-life, low cost, and moderate shielding requirements relative to 
other nuclides. The CsCl used in these applications is in a compressed 
powder form that is doubly-encapsulated in two stainless steel capsules 
to ensure safety and security in normal use. This physical form is used 
because of its high specific activity (gamma emission per unit volume) 
and manufacturability. However, the powder is highly soluble and 
dispersible, which presents security concerns.
    Blood irradiation is medically essential to prevent transfusion-
associated Graft-Versus-Host disease, and some hospitals use only 
irradiated blood. CsCl blood irradiators are used in over 90% of all 
blood irradiation because they are the most reliable and efficient 
blood irradiation devices currently available.
    In biomedical research, CsCl irradiation has been used for over 40 
years in fields such as immunology, stem cell research, cancer 
research, in-vivo immunology, systemic drug research, chromosome 
aberrations, DNA damage/repair, human genome, and genetic factors. For 
most research there are no alternatives to Cs-137 irradiation because 
of the unique properties of Cs-137 radiation, such as high dose rates 
with uniform fields of linear energy transfer. No alternative 
technologies that can effectively replace CsCl sources for biomedical 
research have yet been developed.
    The U.S. and international systems of radiation measurements are 
based on the energy spectrum of Cs-137. All American National Standards 
Institute standards and their associated test-and-evaluation protocols 
for radiation detection, instrumentation, and personal dosimetry rely 
on the use of Cs-137. In addition, all DHS-related standards for 
calibration of first responder and emergency response equipment, such 
as personnel self-reading dosimeters, portal monitors, and portable 
survey instruments, also require the use of Cs-137 for calibration 
purposes. Cs-137 was selected by the U.S. and the international 
community as the basis of calibration because of the optimal single 
energy spectrum of this nuclide and its long half-life. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) maintains the national 
measurement standards and calibrates the instruments for secondary 
laboratories. These instruments are sent to secondary and tertiary 
laboratories that, in turn, calibrate the instruments for end users. 
This network of facilities ensures that every radiation detection 
instrument that is used in the country measures correctly and is 
traceable to NIST.
Ensuring Secure Disposal for Disused CsCl Sources
    The disposal of CsCl radioactive sources, which are currently in 
use, is a challenge because of the high cost of disposal and the lack 
of commercial disposal facilities. The vast majority of the CsCl 
sources in use today are classified as Greater-Than-Class C low-level 
radioactive waste. Today, used and unwanted CsCl sources are stored 
safely and securely at the users' sites under the applicable NRC and 
Agreement State control and security requirements until commercial 
options become available. To maintain source safety and security, the 
sites are routinely inspected in accordance with established NRC and 
Agreement State inspection procedures. The Commission considers it 
imperative to develop a pathway for the long term storage and disposal 
of these sources because long term storage at licensee facilities 
increases the potential for safety and security issues. To resolve 
these issues, the NRC will continue to participate with its Federal and 
State partners and representatives of the private sector in initiatives 
to explore medium- and long term-solutions to address the need for 
disposal and disposition of CsCl sources.
    The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
assigned responsibility for providing disposal of this type of waste to 
DOE. However, pending the availability of a disposal capability, DOE is 
not responsible for accepting disused sources for storage, 
transportation or other activities related to disposal except under 
special circumstances.\2\ At the present time, no final decision has 
been made to proceed with approval, funding, and operation of a 
disposal facility. The Commission will actively support DOE in all 
phases of the process to establish a storage facility for permanent, 
safe and secure storage of used and unwanted sources.

    \2\ Under specified circumstances, and pursuant to other 
authority and responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
DOE may recover excess or unwanted sealed sources (including CsCl 
sources) for reuse, storage or disposal that present threats to 
public health, safety or national security.

The NRC's Perspective on Further Security Enhancements
    The NRC believes that the current enhanced regulatory framework for 
security of radioactive sources has been very effective in enhancing 
and ensuring the security and control of risk-significant sources used 
in medical, industrial, and research activities in the U.S. The NRC 
encourages stakeholders to take an active role in source security and 
continue their efforts in maintaining the current security environment. 
As is necessary and practical, and in response to any change in the 
threat environment, the NRC will work with other Federal agencies to 
further enhance the secure use of Cs-137 sources. The NRC recognizes 
that it is prudent to maintain awareness of the status of research to 
identify alternative forms of CsCl. NRC will remain cognizant of these 
issues and appropriately consider whether there are safety and security 
benefits to further risk reduction. As part of NRC's

[[Page 37487]]

responsibility to ensure the security of these sources, the NRC, in 
coordination with its Federal partners, continuously monitors the 
national threat environment and is prepared to take further regulatory 
actions should this environment change. Just as it did following the 
events following September 11, 2001, the NRC is prepared to take 
immediate action such as issuance of additional security requirements 
with orders or rulemaking to address such security-related issues, if 
    The NRC solicits stakeholder input into major issues associated 
with the use of CsCl. The Public Workshop on the Security and Continued 
Use of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources that the NRC held in September 2008, 
is an example of soliciting such input. The workshop was attended by a 
large number of stakeholders and, in addition to the oral presentations 
and comments, the NRC received a significant number of written 
submissions. The workshop provided valuable information for the 
formulation of this Policy Statement regarding the use of CsCl sources, 
security issues, and the diversity of impacts that licensees could 
experience as a result of potential further regulatory requirements.
    While the current security requirements are adequate, the NRC 
recognizes that if the use of CsCl in its current form is to continue, 
the NRC encourages the source and device manufacturers to implement 
design improvements that further mitigate or minimize the radiological 
consequences of misuse or malevolent acts involving these sources given 
that such events, while unlikely, cannot be dismissed. Similarly, the 
NRC supports efforts to develop alternate forms of Cs-137 that would 
further reduce the risk of malevolent use associated with CsCl. The 
National Research Council of the National Academies (NA) issued a 
report \3\ that supported these efforts, recommended that the NRC 
consider the potential economic and social disruption that changes to 
the CsCl requirements could cause, and supported a research and 
development program for alternative ``matrices'' for high-activity Cs-
137 sources, which would provide lowered security hazards.

    \3\ National Research Council of the National Academies, 
``Radiation Source Use and Replacement,'' The National Academies 
Press, Washington, DC, http://www.nap.org.

    The NRC recognizes that objective measures of ``solubility'' and 
``dispersibility'' need to be defined before alternate forms of Cs-137 
that are less-soluble and less-dispersible than the compressed powder 
form can be developed. The Commission has already directed the NRC 
staff to work with Federal agencies to define these measures which must 
be readily expressible in physical and chemical terms and be 
demonstrated through well-defined test protocols. In addition, the 
criteria for the solubility and the dispersibility measures must be 
established at levels that ensure enhancement of security and reduction 
of risks of malevolent use. Consequently, the criteria must be 
developed and accepted by both the cognizant technical communities and 
the communities responsible for the Nation's security.
    While it is outside the scope of NRC's mission to conduct 
developmental research, the Commission encourages stakeholder research 
to develop alternative chemical forms for large activity Cs-137 
sources. One of the recommendations made by the NA was to investigate 
the development of alternate chemical forms of Cs-137. The NRC believes 
that such research should engage cognizant Federal agencies and should 
consider the practicality of producing an end product that would 
maintain the security as well as the societal benefits of the current 
applications of CsCl sources. The NRC considers that pursuit of 
alternate forms of cesium would provide benefits in the longer term, 
because the technology of manufacturing other forms of cesium is not 
yet available. Given the state of the current technology, NRC believes 
that, for the short term, it is more feasible to focus current security 
efforts on strengthening existing security of sources as necessary 
through cooperative efforts and voluntary initiatives of industries 
that currently manufacture and use irradiators with CsCl sources. While 
current NRC security requirements ensure the safety and security of 
these sources, it has been shown through the voluntary NNSA security 
initiative program that further security enhancements and future design 
improvements further minimize the potential misuse or malevolent acts 
involving these sources.


    The NRC is continually working with its domestic and international 
partners to assess, integrate, and improve its security programs, and 
to make risk-significant radiation sources more secure and less 
vulnerable to terrorists. The NRC has the responsibility to ensure the 
safe and secure use and control of radioactive sources, including CsCl 
sources. The NRC has met this responsibility through imposition of 
additional security requirements. The NRC has articulated in the past 
that the use of alternative forms of Cs-137 is desirable. The NRC's 
actions to date have resulted in strong security measures being 
established, and the NRC recognizes that near term replacement of 
devices or CsCl sources in existing blood, research, and calibration 
irradiators is not practicable or necessary due to implementation of 
the additional requirements and considering a lack of a disposal 
capacity. A clear strategy for the end-of-life management of these 
sources, which is the responsibility of the DOE, is not mature and 
likely will not be for some time. Many medical, research, and emergency 
response stakeholders have indicated that short term replacement would 
be detrimental. Therefore, the NRC continues to believe that the 
security of these facilities should be maintained and enhanced as 
practical through the implementation of the regulatory requirements and 
through voluntary actions such as the physical security enhancements of 
existing devices and future designs against intrusion. The NRC supports 
efforts to develop alternate forms of Cs-137 that would reduce the 
security risks and will monitor these developments closely. The NRC 
will continue to work with its federal partners to ensure the safety 
and security of CsCl sources. In the event that changes in the threat 
environment necessitate regulatory action, the NRC is ready to issue 
additional security requirements to apply appropriate limitations for 
the use of CsCl in its current forms or for its replacement with 
suitable alternatives.

IV. Plans for a Public Meeting

    The NRC is holding a facilitated public meeting on November 16-17, 
2010, on the draft policy statement and the following issues:
     The NRC's role in ensuring security for radioactive 
     Statement of Policy.
     Security and control of radioactive sources.
     Uses of CsCl sources.
     Ensuring secure disposal for disused CsCl sources.
     NRC's perspective on further security enhancements.
    During the public meeting, NRC will conduct roundtable panel 
discussion, with opportunity for audience participation, for each issue 
contained in Sections III and IV of this document. NRC is seeking the 
names of individuals interested in participating on these panels. 
Nominations by interested individuals or organizations should

[[Page 37488]]

include the name of the proposed panel member, the issues they are 
interested in discussing, viewpoint(s) on the issue(s), and affiliation 
(if any). Roundtable panel participants will be selected with the goal 
of providing balanced viewpoints on each of the various issues. Please 
see the DATES section to submit nominations by October 8, 2010.
    We encourage previous participants who attended, either as panel 
members or attendees, the prior public workshop, held on September 29-
30, 2008, to also participate in this meeting. Information on the 
previous public meeting is accessible at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/licensing.html#cesium.
    Based on the comments received in both written and electronic form, 
and at the public meeting, the Commission will then be in a better 
position to proceed with the issuance of a final Policy Statement. The 
final Policy Statement, when issued by the Commission, will be 
published in the Federal Register.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22 day of June 2010.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia Carpenter,
Deputy Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs.
[FR Doc. 2010-15734 Filed 6-28-10; 8:45 am]