[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 103 (Friday, May 28, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 30160-30195]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-12645]
[[Page 30159]]
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Part III
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Part 91
Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance
Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 30160]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
[Docket No. FAA-2007-29305; Amdt. No. 91-314]
RIN 2120-AI92
Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule amends FAA regulations by adding equipage
requirements and performance standards for Automatic Dependent
Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out avionics on aircraft operating in
Classes A, B, and C airspace, as well as certain other specified
classes of airspace within the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).
ADS-B Out broadcasts information about an aircraft through an onboard
transmitter to a ground receiver. Use of ADS-B Out will move air
traffic control from a radar-based system to a satellite-derived
aircraft location system. This action facilitates the use of ADS-B for
aircraft surveillance by FAA and Department of Defense (DOD) air
traffic controllers to safely and efficiently accommodate aircraft
operations and the expected increase in demand for air transportation.
This rule also provides aircraft operators with a platform for
additional flight applications and services.
DATES: This final rule is effective on August 11, 2010. The compliance
date for this final rule is January 1, 2020. Affected parties, however,
do not have to comply with the information collection requirement in
Sec. 91.225 until the FAA publishes in the Federal Register the
control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for this information collection requirement. Publication of the control
number notifies the public that OMB has approved this information
collection requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule
is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 11,
2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this final rule, contact Vincent Capezzuto, Surveillance and Broadcast
Services, AJE-6, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 385-8637; e-mail [email protected].
For legal questions concerning this final rule, contact Lorelei
Peter, Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC-220, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone 202-267-3134; e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I, Section
106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's
authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103, Sovereignty and use of
airspace, and Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements. Under
section 40103, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations on the
flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for
navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and the efficient use
of the navigable airspace. Under section 44701, the FAA is charged with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce.
This regulation is within the scope of sections 40103 and 44701
because it prescribes aircraft performance requirements to meet
advanced surveillance needs to accommodate increases in NAS operations.
As more aircraft operate within the U.S. airspace, improved
surveillance performance is necessary to continue to balance the growth
in air transportation with the agency's mandate for a safe and
efficient air transportation system.
Guide to Terms and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
ACI-NA--Airports Council International-North America
ACSS--Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems
ADIZ--Air Defense Identification Zone
ADS-B--Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
ADS-C--Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract
ADS-R--Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast
AGL--Above Ground Level
AIA--Aerospace Industries Association of America
ALPA--Air Line Pilots Association, International
AOPA--Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee
ASA--Aircraft Surveillance Applications
ASAS--Aircraft Surveillance Applications System
ASDE-X--Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X
ASSA--Airport Surface Situational Awareness
ATC--Air Traffic Control
CAA--Cargo Airline Association
CDTI--Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
CNS--Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance
EAA--Experimental Aircraft Association
ELT--Emergency Locator Transmitter
ES--Extended Squitter
EUROCAE--European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
EUROCONTROL--European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
FAROA--Final Approach Runway Occupancy Awareness
FedEx--Federal Express
FIS-B--Flight Information Service-Broadcast
FL--Flight Level
GA--General Aviation
GAMA--General Aviation Manufacturers Association
GNSS--Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS--Global Positioning System
HAI--Helicopter Association International
IATA--International Air Transport Association
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
MHz--Megahertz
MOPS--Minimum Operational Performance Standards
MSL--Mean Sea Level
NACP--Navigation Accuracy Category For Position
NACV--Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity
NAS--National Airspace System
NBAA--National Business Aviation Association
NextGen--Next Generation Air Transportation System
NIC--Navigation Integrity Category
NM--Nautical Mile
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
OPD--Optimized Profile Descent
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
RAA--Regional Airline Association
RAIM--Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
RNP--Required Navigation Performance
SANDIA--Sandia National Laboratories
SARPs--Standards and Recommended Practices
SCAP--Security Certification and Accreditation Procedures
SDA--System Design Assurance
SIL--Source Integrity Level
SSR--Secondary Surveillance Radar
TCAS--Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance System
TIS-B--Traffic Information Service-Broadcast
TMA--Traffic Management Advisor
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TSO--Technical Standard Order
UAT--Universal Access Transceiver
UPS--United Parcel Service
URET--User Request Evaluation Tool
VFR--Visual Flight Rules
WAAS--Wide Area Augmentation System
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
B. ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee
C. Summary of the Final Rule
1. Airspace
2. Datalink Requirements
3. System Performance Requirements
4. Antenna Diversity and Transmit Power Requirements
5. Latency of the ADS-B Out Message Elements
6. Conforming Amendments and Editorial Changes
D. Differences Between the Proposed Rule and The Final Rule
E. Separation Standards Working Group
II. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Airspace
1. 2,500 Feet Above Ground Level Exclusion in Class E Airspace
2. Airspace for Which ADS-B is Required
3. Requests for Deviations From ADS-B Out Requirements
B. Dual-Link Strategy
1. Altitude To Require the 1090 MHz ES Datalink
2. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R)
3. 1090 MHz Frequency Congestion
C. Performance Requirements--System
1. Performance Requirements Tailored to Operator, Airspace, or
Procedure
2. Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP)
3. Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACV)
4. Navigation Integrity Category (NIC)
5. Surveillance Integrity Level
6. Source Integrity Level (SIL) and System Design Assurance
(SDA)
7. Secondary Position Sources
D. Performance Requirements--Antenna Diversity
E. Performance Requirements--Transmit Power
F. Performance Requirements--Total and Uncompensated Latency
G. Performance Requirements--Time To Indicate Accuracy and
Integrity Changes
H. Performance Requirements--Availability
1. Preflight Determination of Availability
2. System Availability
I. Performance Requirements--Continuity
J. Performance Requirements--Traffic Information Service--
Broadcast Integrity (TIS-B)
K. Broadcast Message Elements
1. NACP/NACV/NIC/SDA/SIL
2. Receiving ATC Services
3. Length and Width of the Aircraft
4. Indication of the Aircraft's Barometric Pressure Altitude
5. Indication of the Aircraft's Velocity
6. Indication if Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II
or Airborne Collision Avoidance System is Installed and Operating in
a Mode That May Generate Resolution Advisory Alerts
7. For Aircraft With an Operable Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System II or Airborne Collision Avoidance System,
Indication If a Resolution Advisory Is in Progress
8. Indication of the Mode 3/A Transponder Code Specified by ATC
(Requires Flightcrew Entry)
9. Indication of the Aircraft's Call Sign That Is Submitted on
the Flight Plan, or the Aircraft's Registration Number (Aircraft
Call Sign Requires Flight Crew Entry)
10. Indication if the Flight Crew Has Identified an Emergency,
Radio Communication Failure, or Unlawful Interference (Requires
Flightcrew Entry)
11. Indication of the Aircraft's ``IDENT'' to ATC (Requires
Flightcrew Entry)
12. Indication of the Emitter Category
13. Indication Whether an ADS-B in Capability Is Installed
14. Indication of the Aircraft's Geometric Altitude
L. Ability To Turn Off ADS-B Out Transmissions
M. Existing Equipment Requirements
1. Transponder Requirement
2. Emergency Locator Transmitter Requirement
N. Program Implementation
1. Timeline
2. Financial and Operational Incentives
3. Decommissioning Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B)
O. Safety
P. Efficiency
1. Improved Position Reporting
2. Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs)
3. Reduced Aircraft Separation
4. Expanded Surveillance Coverage
Q. ADS-B In
R. ADS-B In Applications
1. Surface Situational Awareness With Indications and Alerting
2. In-Trail Procedures
3. Interval Management
4. Airport Surface Situational Awareness and Final Approach
Runway Occupancy Awareness
S. International Harmonization
T. Backup ATC Surveillance
U. Privacy
V. Security
W. Alternatives to ADS-B
X. ADS-B Equipment Scheduled Maintenance
Y. Specific Design Parameters
Z. Economic Issues
1. ADS-B Out Equipage Cost
2. FAA Cost Savings With ADS-B Out Compared To Radar
3. Business Case for ADS-B Out and In
4. Improved En Route Conflict Probe Benefit Performance
5. Capacity Enhancements, Airspace Efficiency, and Fuel Savings
Benefits
6. Deriving Benefits From Capstone Implementation in Alaska
7. Regional Airline Benefits
8. General Aviation: High Equipage Costs With Little Benefit
AA. Revisions to Other Regulations
III. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. International Compatibility
C. Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility
Determination, International Trade Impact Analysis, and Unfunded
Mandates Assessment
VI. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
VII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
VIII. Environmental Analysis
IX. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
X. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
I. Background
While there is currently a drop in air travel due to a general
economic downturn, delay and congestion continue to build in the
nation's busiest airports and the surrounding airspace. The FAA must
not only address current congestion, but also be poised to handle
future demand that will surely return as the nation's economy improves.
The FAA has been developing the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) for the purpose of changing the way the National
Airspace System (NAS) operates. NextGen will allow the NAS to expand to
meet future demand and support the economic viability of the system. In
addition, NextGen will improve safety and support environmental
initiatives such as reducing congestion, noise, emissions and fuel
consumption through increased energy efficiency. for more information
on NextGen, go to http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nextgen/.
As part of NextGen development, the FAA has determined that it is
essential to move from ground-based surveillance and navigation to more
dynamic and accurate airborne-based systems and procedures if the
agency is to enhance capacity, reduce delay, and improve environmental
performance. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
equipment is an advanced surveillance technology that combines an
aircraft's positioning source, aircraft avionics, and a ground
infrastructure to create an accurate surveillance interface between
aircraft and ATC. It is a key component of NextGen that will move air
traffic control (ATC) from a radar-based system to a satellite-derived
aircraft location system. ADS-B is a performance-based surveillance
technology that is more precise than radar. ADS-B is expected to
provide air traffic controllers and pilots with more accurate
information to help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on
runways. The technology combines a positioning capability, aircraft
avionics, and ground infrastructure to enable more accurate
transmission of information from aircraft to ATC.
ADS-B consists of two different services: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In.
ADS-B Out, which is the subject of this
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rulemaking, periodically broadcasts information about each aircraft,
such as identification, current position, altitude, and velocity,
through an onboard transmitter. ADS-B Out provides air traffic
controllers with real-time position information that is, in most cases,
more accurate than the information available with current radar-based
systems. With more accurate information, ATC will be able to position
and separate aircraft with improved precision and timing.
ADS-B In refers to an appropriately equipped aircraft's ability to
receive and display another aircraft's ADS-B Out information as well as
the ADS-B In services provided by ground systems, including Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R),\1\ Traffic Information
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B),\2\ and, if so equipped, Flight Information
Service-Broadcast (FIS-B).\3\ When displayed in the cockpit, this
information greatly improves the pilot's situational awareness in
aircraft not equipped with a traffic alert and collision avoidance
system (TCAS)/airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS). Benefits from
universal equipage for ADS-B In currently are not substantiated, and
standards for ADS-B In air-to-air applications are still in their
infancy. Thus it is premature to require operators to equip with ADS-B
In at this time. This rule, however, imposes certain requirements that
will support some ADS-B In applications.
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\1\ ADS-R collects traffic information from each broadcast link
and rebroadcasts it to ADS-B In-equipped operators on the other
broadcast link. This is further explained in section B.2., Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast.
\2\ TIS-B uses primary and secondary surveillance radars and
multilateration systems to provide proximate traffic situational
awareness, including position reports from aircraft not equipped
with ADS-B. TIS-B data may not provide as much information as could
be received directly from an aircraft's ADS-B Out broadcast, because
of the required data processing. The TIS-B signal is an advisory
service that is not designed for aircraft surveillance or
separation, and cannot be used for either purpose.
\3\ With FIS-B, aircraft equipped with 978 megahertz (MHz)
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B In avionics can receive
weather information, notices to airmen, temporary flight
restrictions, and other relevant flight information, at no
additional cost.
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As noted in the preamble of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) associated with this rule, published in the Federal Register on
October 5, 2007 (72 FR 56947), Congress enacted the ``Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act'' in 2003. That Act mandated that the
Secretary of Transportation establish a Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) to manage NextGen-related work, including coordinating
the development and use of new technologies for aircraft in the air
traffic control system. Since 2006, Congress has appropriated over $500
million to the FAA for implementing ADS-B and developing air-to-air
capabilities. The FAA remains committed to implementing NextGen and
adopts this final rule, with some modifications, as discussed in
further detail below.
A. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The FAA published the NPRM for ADS-B Out in the Federal Register on
October 5, 2007 (72 FR 56947). The comment period for the NPRM was
scheduled to close on January 3, 2008. In response to several
commenters, the FAA subsequently extended the comment period to March
3, 2008 (72 FR 64966, Nov. 19, 2007). The FAA received approximately
190 comments to the docket on the NPRM. Commenters included air
carriers, manufacturers, associations, Government agencies, and
individuals.
B. ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee
As part of the rulemaking effort, the FAA chartered an aviation
rulemaking committee (ARC) on July 15, 2007, to provide a forum for the
U.S. aviation community to make recommendations on presenting and
structuring an ADS-B Out mandate, and to consider additional actions
that may be necessary to implement its recommendations. The ADS-B ARC
submitted its first report, ``Optimizing the Benefits of Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast,'' \4\ on October 3, 2007.
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\4\ A copy of this report is available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. To find the report, enter FAA-2007-29305-0009.1
in the search field.
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The FAA also tasked the ARC to make specific recommendations
concerning the proposed rule based on the comments submitted to the
docket. The ARC submitted its second report, ``Recommendations on
Federal Aviation Administration Notice No. 7-15, Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Performance Requirements to Support
Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,'' \5\
to the FAA on September 26, 2008.
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\5\ A copy of this report is available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. To find the report, enter FAA-2007-29305-0221.1
in the search field
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To give the public an opportunity to comment on the recommendations
received from the ARC, the FAA published a notice in the Federal
Register on October 2, 2008 (73 FR 57270), reopening the comment period
of the ADS-B Out NPRM docket for an additional 30 days. The purpose of
reopening the comment period was to receive public comments on the ARC
recommendations only. This comment period closed November 3, 2008, with
the FAA receiving approximately 50 comments to the ARC's
recommendations. Commenters included air carriers, manufacturers,
associations, and individuals.
C. Summary of the Final Rule
This final rule will add equipage requirements and performance
standards for ADS-B Out avionics. ADS-B Out broadcasts information
about an aircraft through an onboard transmitter to a ground receiver.
Use of ADS-B Out will move air traffic control from a radar-based
system to a satellite-derived aircraft location system. As discussed
more fully in the sections of this preamble describing equipage
requirements and performance standards, operators will have two options
for equipage under this rule--the 1090 megahertz (MHz) extended
squitter \6\ (ES) broadcast link or the Universal Access Transceiver
(UAT) broadcast link. \7\ Generally, this equipment will be required
for aircraft operating in Classes A, B, and C airspace, certain Class E
airspace, and other specified airspace. See section C.1. ``Airspace''
below for additional details.
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\6\ An extended squitter is a long message that Mode S
Transponders transmit automatically, without needing to be
interrogated by radar, to announce the own-ship aircraft's presence
to nearby ADS-B equipped aircraft or ground based Air Traffic
Control.
\7\ The 1090 MHz ES broadcast link uses the 1090 MHz frequency.
The UAT broadcast link uses the 978 MHz frequency.
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The NPRM proposed performance requirements for ADS-B Out to be used
for ATC surveillance. In addition, several aspects of the proposal
would be necessary for future ADS-B In applications. The comments to
the NPRM and the ARC recommendations raised significant concerns about
the operational needs and costs of the proposed performance
requirements, as well as the proposed antenna diversity requirement.
The FAA specifically proposed higher ADS-B Out and antenna
diversity requirements than what is needed for ATC surveillance to
enable certain ADS-B In applications. As discussed in further detail in
this document, the FAA has reconsidered these elements in view of the
comments and has changed the implementation plan for ADS-B.
The FAA has concluded that this rule will require only the
performance requirements necessary for ADS-B Out. While certain
requirements adopted in this rule will support some ADS-B In
applications, the agency is not adopting
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the higher performance standards that would enable all of the initial
ADS-B In applications. The agency is mindful, and operators are
advised, that in accepting the commenters' and the ARC's positions
regarding antenna diversity and position source accuracy, compliance
with this rule alone may not enable operators to take full advantage of
certain ADS-B In applications. Operators may voluntarily choose
equipment that meets the higher performance standards in order to
enable the use of these applications.
The following table provides an overview of the costs and benefits
of this final rule.
Summary of Costs and Benefits
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3% Discount Rate:
Low Costs................................................. $2.74
High Benefits............................................. 5.03
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Net Benefits-High Benefit/Low Cost...................... 2.29
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High Costs................................................ 5.47
Low Benefits.............................................. 3.98
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Net Benefits-Low Benefits/High Costs.................... (1.49)
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7% Discount Rate:
Low Costs................................................. 2.15
High Benefits............................................. 2.74
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Net Benefits-High Benefit/Low Cost...................... 0.59
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High Costs................................................ 4.11
Low Benefits.............................................. 2.09
Net Benefits-Low Benefits/High Costs.................... (2.02)
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1. Airspace
This final rule prescribes ADS-B Out performance requirements for
all aircraft operating in Class A, B, and C airspace within the NAS;
above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries of a Class B or
Class C airspace area up to 10,000 feet mean sea level (MSL); and Class
E airspace areas at or above 10,000 feet MSL over the 48 contiguous
United States and the District of Columbia, excluding the airspace at
and below 2,500 feet above the surface.
The rule also requires that aircraft meet these performance
requirements in the airspace within 30 nautical miles (NM) of certain
identified airports \8\ that are among the nation's busiest (based on
annual passenger enplanements, annual airport operations count, and
operational complexity) from the surface up to 10,000 feet MSL. In
addition, the rule requires that aircraft meet ADS-B Out performance
requirements to operate in Class E airspace over the Gulf of Mexico at
and above 3,000 feet MSL within 12 NM of the coastline of the United
States.
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\8\ These airports are listed in appendix D to part 91.
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2. Datalink Requirements
ADS-B requires a broadcast link for aircraft surveillance and to
support ADS-B In applications. Operators have two options for equipage
under this rule-- the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link or the UAT broadcast
link. The 1090 MHz ES broadcast link is the internationally agreed upon
link for ADS-B and is intended to support ADS-B In applications used by
air carriers and other high-performance aircraft. The 1090 MHz ES
broadcast link does not support FIS-B (weather and related flight
information) because the bandwidth limitations of this link cannot
transmit the large message structures required by FIS-B. The UAT
broadcast link supports ADS-B In applications \9\ and FIS-B, which are
important for the general aviation (GA) community.
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\9\ These applications include enhanced visual acquisition,
conflict detection, enhanced visual approach, Airport Surface
Situational Awareness (ASSA), and Final Approach Runway Occupancy
Awareness (FAROA).
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This final rule requires aircraft flying at and above 18,000 feet
MSL (flight level (FL) 180) (Class A airspace) to have ADS-B Out
performance capabilities using the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. This
rule also specifies that aircraft flying in the designated airspace
below 18,000 feet MSL may use either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT broadcast
link.
3. System Performance Requirements
When activated, ADS-B Out continuously transmits aircraft
information through the 1090 MHz ES or UAT broadcast link. The accuracy
and integrity of the position information transmitted by ADS-B avionics
are represented by the navigation accuracy category for position
(NACP), the navigation accuracy category for velocity
(NACV), the navigation integrity category (NIC), the system
design assurance (SDA), and the source integrity level (SIL).
In the proposed rule, the FAA referenced the accuracy and integrity
requirements to the appropriate NACP, NACV, NIC,
and SIL values defined in Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C166a \10\
(for operators using the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link), and TSO-C154b
\11\ (for operators using the UAT broadcast link) as the baseline
requirements for ADS-B Out equipment. TSO-C166a adopted the standards
in RTCA, Inc.\12\ (RTCA) DO-260A.\13\ TSO-C154b adopted the standards
in RTCA DO-282A.\14\
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\10\ Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service--Broadcast (TIS-B)
Equipment Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz).
\11\ Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent
Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Frequency
of 978 MHz.
\12\ RTCA, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation formed to
advance the art and science of aviation and aviation electronic
systems for the benefit of the public. The organization functions as
a Federal Advisory Committee and develops consensus-based
recommendations on contemporary aviation issues. The organization's
recommendations are often used as the basis for government and
private sector decisions as well as the foundation for many FAA
TSOs. For more information, see http://www.rtca.org.
\13\ Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-
B) and Traffic Information Services--Broadcast (TIS-B).
\14\ Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance--
Broadcast.
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After the NPRM was published, the ADS-B ARC issued numerous
recommendations in response to public comments on the TSOs referenced
in the proposal. Based on the ARC recommendations and broad industry
input, RTCA revised DO-260A to become DO-260B \15\ and revised DO-282A
to become DO-282B.\16\ The new RTCA revisions include: (1) An allowance
for transmitting a NIC of 7 on the surface, (2) procedures for
correctly setting the NACV, (3) clarifying the latency
requirements, (4) removing the vertical component of NACP,
NACV, NIC, and SIL, (5) revising the definition of SIL to
correspond to the definition in the FAA NPRM, (6) clarifying the
definition of SIL by dividing it into SIL and SDA message elements, (7)
creating a medium power single antenna class, and (8) redefining the
bit for the ``ADS-B In capability installed'' message element.\17\ DO-
260B and DO-282B are more mature standards and fully support domestic
and international ADS-B air traffic control surveillance. The updated
standards do not increase performance requirements.
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\15\ Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B).
\16\ Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal
Access Transceiver Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast.
\17\ A number of these items address issues with the current
TSOs.
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The FAA updated the TSOs in accordance with these new RTCA
standards. In addition, the FAA has
[[Page 30164]]
decided that it is necessary to require the new standards contained in
TSO-C166b \18\ (1090 MHz ES) and TSO-C154c \19\ (UAT) as the minimum
performance standards in this final rule.\20\ The updated standards
incorporate multiple changes that address public comments and the ARC's
recommendations on the proposal. On September 11, 2009, the FAA
announced in the Federal Register the availability of draft TSO-C166b
and TSO-C154c for comment (74 FR 46831). The FAA issued final versions
of the above TSOs on December 2, 2009. The FAA also added additional
language in Sec. Sec. 91.225 and 91.227 stating that equipment with an
approved deviation under Sec. 21.618 also meet the requirements of the
rule.
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\18\ Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B)
Equipment Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz).
\19\ Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Frequency
of 978 MHz.
\20\ Operators with equipment installed that meets a later
version of TSO-C166b or TSO-C154c, as applicable, are in compliance
with this rule.
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In addition, this final rule specifies the performance requirements
for accuracy and integrity (NACP, NACV, and NIC)
in meters and nautical miles rather than referencing the numerical
values used in DO-260B, DO-282B, or the NPRM. This change translates
the values but does not alter the actual performance requirements. The
FAA wants to avoid any misinterpretations of the performance
requirements for this rule, if in the future, RTCA revises
NACP, NACV, and NIC.
Table 1 summarizes the NACP, NACV, NIC, and
SIL values proposed in the NPRM and their equivalent measurements, as
noted in DO-260A and DO-282A. Table 2 summarizes NACP,
NACV, NIC, SDA, and SIL values as defined in DO-260B and DO-
282B. These two tables contain only the values applicable to the NPRM
and the final rule. See DO-260B paragraph 2.2.3 or DO-282B paragraph
2.2.4 for complete information on all values.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28MY10.000
[[Page 30165]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28MY10.001
In this final rule, the NACP must be less than 0.05 NM.
The NACV and NIC values are adopted as proposed. The
NACV must be less than 10 meters per second. The NIC must be
less than 0.2 NM. The SIL parameter from the NPRM has been divided into
two separate parameters and is discussed in detail later in this
document.\21\ In this final rule, the SDA parameter must be less than
or equal to 1x10 -5 per hour, which is equivalent to an SDA
of 2, and the SIL parameter must be less than or equal to 1x10
-7 per hour or per sample, which is equivalent to a SIL of
3. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) systems \22\ will set
their SILs based on a 1x10 -7 per-hour probability.
Operators must meet these performance requirements to operate in the
airspace where ADS-B is required. Any ADS-B position source that meets
the specified performance standards is acceptable and complies with the
requirements in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ In the NPRM, SIL was defined as surveillance integrity
level and represented the maximum probability of exceeding the NIC
containment radius and a maximum probability of a failure causing
false or misleading data to be transmitted. In this final rule, SIL
is referred to as source integrity level and defines the probability
of exceeding the NIC containment radius; SDA represents the
probability of transmitting false or misleading position
information.
\22\ Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is a generic term
for a satellite navigation system, such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS), that provides autonomous worldwide geo-spatial
positioning and may include local or regional augmentations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Antenna Diversity and Transmit Power Requirements
The aircraft antenna is a major contributor to ADS-B system link
performance and an important part of the overall ADS-B Out system. In
the NPRM, the FAA proposed an antenna diversity requirement that would
support ADS-B In applications, such as Airport Surface Situational
Awareness (ASSA) and Final Approach Runway Occupancy Awareness (FAROA).
The FAA has reconsidered the need for antenna diversity in view of
the comments submitted. The agency has determined that a single bottom-
mounted antenna is the minimum requirement for ATC surveillance.
Furthermore, the analysis of ASSA and FAROA does not conclude that
antenna diversity is required for these applications. As discussed
later, the FAA decision to require a NACP less than 0.05 NM
signifies that certain ADS-B In applications, including ASSA and FAROA,
will not be fully supported.
If future analysis indicates that antenna diversity is required for
ASSA and FAROA, a higher NACP than that required in this
rule also would be necessary to support these applications. The FAA
does not adopt antenna diversity as a requirement for ADS-B Out under
this rule because it is not required to support ATC surveillance.
Operators must note that this rule does not remove or modify any
existing antenna diversity requirements for transponders or TCAS/ACAS.
Aircraft must transmit signals at a certain level of power to
ensure ground stations and ADS-B In-equipped aircraft and vehicles can
receive the transmitted signals. As proposed, the final rule requires
UAT systems to broadcast at a 16-watt minimum-transmit power, and 1090
MHz ES systems to broadcast at a 125-watt minimum-transmit power.
5. Latency of the ADS-B Out Message Elements
When using an ADS-B system, aircraft receive information from a
position source and process it with onboard avionics. The aircraft's
ADS-B system then transmits position and other information to the
ground stations through antenna(s) using either the UAT or 1090 MHz ES
broadcast link. Generally, latency is the time lag between the time
that position measurements are taken to determine the aircraft's
position, and the time that the position information is transmitted by
the aircraft's ADS-B transmitter. The latency requirements in this
final rule, although different from the proposal, represent a more
appropriate way to address latency. The proposal created ambiguities
that are addressed in these modifications and are supported by the
commenters. Under this rule, total
[[Page 30166]]
latency cannot exceed 2.0 seconds. Within those 2.0 seconds,
uncompensated latency cannot exceed 0.6 seconds. Total and
uncompensated latency are explained in further detail in section II F.
``Performance Requirements--Total And Uncompensated Latency.''
6. Conforming Amendments and Editorial Changes
Section 91.225 requires ADS-B Out for operations in Class A, B, and
C airspace. In the NPRM, the FAA inadvertently left out the proposed
conforming amendments to Sec. Sec. 91.130, 91.131, and 91.135, which
address Class A, B, and C airspace. This rule amends these sections to
include the ADS-B Out performance requirements for the appropriate
airspace.
In addition, the regulatory text for Sec. 91.225 has been
reorganized from the proposed rule language. The restructuring of the
text should make this section clearer and more reader-friendly.
Lastly, the proposed regulatory text has been moved from Appendix H
to new Sec. 91.227.
All substantive changes to this rule are fully discussed in Section
II, Discussion of the Final Rule.
D. Differences Between the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule
Table 3 summarizes the substantive changes between the proposed
rule and this final rule. Editorial changes and clarifications are
explained elsewhere in this preamble.
Table 3.-- Substantive Differences Between the Proposed Rule and the
Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue area The NPRM-- The final rule--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical Standard Order.... Proposed performance Requires performance
standards as standards as
defined in TSO- defined in TSO-
C166a (1090 MHz ES) C166b (1090 MHz ES)
or TSO-C154b (UAT). or TSO-C154c (UAT).
Airspace.................... Proposed requiring Requires all
all aircraft above aircraft in Class A
FL 240 to transmit airspace (FL 180
on the 1090 MHz ES and above) to
broadcast link. transmit on the
1090 MHz ES
broadcast link.
Proposed ADS-B Requires ADS-B
performance performance
standards for standards for
operations in all operations in Class
Class E airspace at E airspace at and
and above 10,000 above 10,000 feet
feet MSL. MSL, excluding the
airspace at and
below 2,500 feet
AGL.
NACP........................ Proposed a NACP >= Requires NACP < 0.05
9, which provides NM.
navigation accuracy (NACP >= 8)
< 30 meters.
NIC......................... Proposed changes in Requires changes in
NIC be broadcast NIC be broadcast
within 10 seconds. within 12 seconds.
SIL......................... Proposed a SIL of 2 Requires an SDA of
or 3. 2.
Requires a SIL of
3.
Antenna Diversity........... Proposed antenna Does not require
diversity in all antenna diversity.
airspace specified
in the rule.
Total Latency............... Proposed latency in Requires
the position source uncompensated
< 0.5 seconds and latency <= 0.6
latency in the ADS- seconds and maximum
B source < 1 second. total latency <=
2.0 seconds.
Message Elements............ Proposed a broadcast Does not require a
message element for broadcast message
``receiving ATC element for
services''. ``receiving ATC
services.''
An ability to turn off ADS-B Proposed that the Does not require the
Out. pilot be able to pilot be able to
turn off ADS-B disable or turn off
transmissions if ADS-B
directed by ATC. transmissions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Separation Standards Working Group
The FAA established an internal Surveillance and Broadcast Systems
Separation Standards Working group (SSWG) to develop methodologies and
define metrics as appropriate that evaluate the end-to-end performance
of ADS-B and wide area multilateration surveillance systems. These
evaluations include investigating the integration of these technologies
in conjunction with legacy surveillance technologies, that is,
separation between target positions that are derived from ADS-B, radar,
and wide area multilateration on ATC displays.
This SSWG was tasked to perform: (1) Analyses of performance using
system models and simulations, including the identification of key
performance drivers and the development of test scenarios; (2)
preliminary evaluations with prototype system components to enable
verification and validation of the models and as early evidence of
system performance; and (3) analyses of test results, operational
testing and dedicated separation standards flight tests for each key-
site with fully functional end-to-end systems. Also included is a test
period for each system where performance data is collected on aircraft
operating in the surveillance service volume.
The SSWG analyses and evaluations are the basis for most of the
performance requirements specified in this rule.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The SSWG findings are available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number for this rulemaking is FAA -
2007-29305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Discussion of the Final Rule
Below is a more detailed discussion of the final rule relative to
the comments received on the proposal:
A. Airspace
1. 2,500 Feet Above Ground Level Exclusion in Class E Airspace
The NPRM proposed that aircraft meet ADS-B Out performance
requirements to operate in Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet
MSL over the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.
Several commenters, including the DOD and the Experimental Aircraft
Association (EAA), stated that the proposed ceiling of 10,000 feet MSL
for aircraft without ADS-B would be a major hardship and safety issue
for aircraft operators flying in mountainous terrain. Commenters and
the ARC suggested that the final rule exclude Class E airspace at and
below 2,500 feet above ground level (AGL), similar to the exclusion in
Sec. 91.215, ATC Transponder and Altitude Reporting Equipment and Use.
The FAA recognizes the benefit of excluding this airspace in the
rule, particularly for visual flight rules (VFR) pilots flying in
mountainous areas. This modification addresses airspace that is not
affected by the agency's efforts to maximize NAS efficiency and
capacity. Excluding this airspace from the rule minimizes any
unnecessary financial and operational burdens being placed on aircraft
operators who fly in mountainous areas that encroach on
[[Page 30167]]
Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet MSL, but choose not to equip
for the ADS-B Out performance standards in this rule. Consequently, the
final rule does not require ADS-B performance standards for operations
2,500 feet AGL and below in Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet
MSL.
2. Airspace for Which ADS-B Is Required
The NPRM proposed requiring ADS-B performance standards for
operations in most classes of airspace where operators currently are
required to carry a transponder.
Numerous commenters recommended that the FAA limit ADS-B
performance requirements to aircraft operating in Class A airspace
only, or Class A and B airspace only. Several commenters questioned the
proposed ADS-B performance requirements in Class E airspace above
10,000 feet MSL. Many of these commenters made varying requests to the
FAA concerning the proposed altitude for which ADS-B Out would be
required, including 12,000 feet MSL, 15,000 feet MSL, FL 180, and FL
250. The United States Parachute Association noted that skydiving
operations are typically conducted above 10,000 feet MSL and sometimes
conducted in Class A, B, and C airspace.
ADS-B cannot be used for ATC surveillance if all aircraft are not
appropriately equipped. Moreover, it is unreasonable to set up a
regulatory framework and performance standards that are based on using
two primary systems for surveillance; nor is it feasible to fund and
maintain two such systems. The airspace requirements specified in this
rule for ADS-B Out meet ATC surveillance needs.
Class B and C airspace have the highest volume of air carrier and
GA traffic. They also experience the most complex transitions of
aircraft from the en route environment to the terminal area. With the
intricate nature of the airspace, current regulations dictate more
stringent operational requirements to operate within Class B and C
airspace areas.
In addition, ATC must have surveillance data for all aircraft
operating in these areas to ensure appropriate situational awareness
and to maximize the use of the NAS. ADS-B Out will enhance surveillance
in controlled airspace areas where secondary surveillance radar (SSR)
currently exists.
One commenter stated that the FAA should expand the airspace in
which ADS-B is required and specifically recommended including Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) \24\ and Offshore Control Area
Extensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is an area of
airspace over land or water in which the ready identification,
location, and control of civil aircraft is required in the interest
of national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rule applies to aircraft operating within U.S. airspace, which
extends 12 NM from the U.S. coast. (The airspace also includes the
Washington, DC, Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA), referred to as an
``ADIZ'' prior to 2009.) Most of the airspace in the ADIZ falls outside
the 12 NM boundaries.
3. Requests for Deviations From ADS-B Out Requirements
This rule requires operators to broadcast ADS-B Out information
when operating in specified airspace. If an aircraft is not capable of
meeting the performance requirements, the operator may request a
deviation from the ATC facility responsible for that airspace. However,
as noted in the NPRM, ATC authorizations may contain conditions
necessary to provide the appropriate level of safety for all operators
in the airspace. ATC may not be able to grant authorizations in all
cases for a variety of reasons, including workload, runway
configurations, air traffic flows, and weather conditions.
B. Dual-Link Strategy
The NPRM proposed a dual-link strategy for ADS-B Out broadcasts.
Under the proposal, aircraft operating above FL 240 would be required
to use the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. Aircraft operating below FL 240
and in airspace where ADS-B Out performance requirements were proposed
could use either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT broadcast link.
Many commenters suggested that a single-link system would reduce
operational complexity. The commenters noted that the installation and
maintenance costs of a dual-link system exceed those of a single-link
system. Some of the commenters proposed a single-link solution but
disagreed over which link should be chosen. Commenters supporting a
single-link UAT system noted that 1090 MHz ES does not support FIS-B
and is at risk for frequency congestion in a future air traffic
management environment. Commenters supporting a single-link 1090 MHz ES
system explained that UAT is not internationally interoperable and
opposed a system that requires international operators to equip with
both links.
Boeing noted that most of the NAS system delays are associated with
arrivals and departures. Therefore, Boeing recommended that the
airborne surveillance functions should provide benefits at all
altitudes and on the ground. Ultimately, Boeing commented that a single
1090 MHz ES broadcast link would advance future ADS-B In applications
at low altitudes.
In mandating ADS-B, the FAA is mindful that some members of the
international air transport community and the GA community have already
purchased ADS-B Out equipment, which use either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT
broadcast link. The FAA finds that a dual-link system is necessary for
the United States to meet the operational needs of all NAS operators.
Moreover, if the FAA were to require one segment of the aviation
community to equip to meet the needs of another segment of the
community, this would present additional costs for some operators to
equip.
1. Altitude To Require the 1090 MHz ES Datalink
Under the proposal, aircraft operating above FL 240 would be
required to use the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. Operators using only
the UAT broadcast link would be limited to operations below FL 240.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) recommended
that the FAA require operators to use 1090 MHz ES above 18,000 feet MSL
to be consistent with the Class A airspace lower boundary (rather than
introduce a new subclassification of established airspace). In
addition, several GA commenters requested limiting ADS-B performance
requirements to only Class A airspace. The EAA and some individuals
stated that UAT would work just as well as 1090 MHz ES above FL 240 and
that aircraft should be permitted to use exclusively UAT for operations
above FL 240.
The final rule specifies FL 180 (the lower boundary of Class A
airspace) as the ceiling for operating an aircraft equipped only with
UAT. Using 1090 MHz ES at or above FL 180 provides a clear operational
boundary for controllers and pilots, and does not create conditions of
mixed equipage for existing or future applications. The FAA recognizes
that this modification will affect certain operators that want to
operate above FL 180 and equip only with UAT. However, the agency
concludes that requiring 1090 MHz ES performance standards for
operations in all of Class A airspace is not only reasonable for
surveillance, but also establishes a baseline for ADS-B In.
The requirement to broadcast 1090 MHz ES at and above FL 180 does
not
[[Page 30168]]
preclude UAT reception of FIS-B services up to FL 240 for aircraft with
a dual-link reception capability.
2. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R)
Under a dual-link strategy, the FAA will use ADS-R to allow ADS-B
In-equipped aircraft using one type of broadcast link to receive
messages about aircraft transmitting on the other broadcast link.
Various commenters, including the Air Transport Association of
America, Inc. (ATA), Airservices Australia, the Australia Civil
Aviation Safety Authority, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA), Boeing, British Airways, and the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), expressed concern about a dual-link system. Some of
these commenters asserted that the need for ADS-R introduces additional
system-wide latency into the ADS-B system and poses a single point of
failure for the degradation or loss of surveillance data. In their
view, this could limit potential separation and efficiency improvements
and affect the air-to-air surveillance element of future ADS-B In
applications. In addition, some commenters expressed concern about the
additional risk of faults or failures that could result from
translating, merging, and rebroadcasting data from the 1090 and 978 MHz
frequencies.
Some commenters, including Boeing, contended that ADS-R may not
have sufficient growth capability to support future ADS-B In air-to-air
applications. Such applications include merging and spacing, self
separation, or using ADS-B data to supplement or replace TCAS because
of potential of latency or loop delays. Rockwell-Collins stated that
ADS-R should be able to support many ADS-B In air-to-air applications,
including closely spaced parallel approaches and enhanced visual
approach. It recommended developing ADS-R to support more demanding
aircraft surveillance applications (ASA).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ASA comprises a number of flight-deck-based aircraft
surveillance and separation assurance capabilities that may directly
provide flight crews with surveillance information and alerts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters, including AOPA, asserted that the dual-link
system presents a safety hazard because aircraft equipped with
different links cannot ``see'' each other on ADS-B In displays in areas
without ADS-R coverage. The commenters suggested providing ADS-R at all
public airports where a mix of both systems will be encountered.
The FAA is deploying ADS-R in all areas where ADS-B ATC
surveillance exists.\26\ ADS-R collects traffic information broadcast
on the 978 MHz UAT broadcast link and rebroadcasts the information to
1090 MHz ES users. Similarly, ADS-R collects traffic information
provided on the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link and rebroadcasts the
information to UAT users. ADS-R permits aircraft equipped with either
1090 MHz ES or UAT to take advantage of ADS-B In applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The service coverage volume for ADS-B In applications is
explained in greater detail at http://www.adsb.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA disagrees with the comments suggesting that ADS-R
introduces safety issues because of the added latencies attributed to
ADS-R processing. ATC automation systems do not require or use ADS-R to
provide surveillance. The added latency in the rebroadcast of the
original ADS-B message are measurably small and do not degrade the
reported NACP, NACV, and NIC values. The ARC
agreed in its report that the latency in ADS-R processing does not
degrade the reporting of the position quality parameters.\27\ Latency
attributed to ADS-R does not compromise the safety of the initial ADS-B
In applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ADS-B ARC Task II Report to the FAA Appendix N, ADS-R
Latency and Reliability Expectations (September 26, 2008), available
on the Web site, http:///www.regulations.gov, FAA-2007-29305-0221.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intended functions of ADS-B, as identified in the NPRM, are not
compromised by the latency introduced with rebroadcasting the messages.
However, future ADS-B In applications necessarily may be limited
becauseof the latency associated with ADS-R.\28\ The FAA has a strong
interest in providing the option for operators to equip with UAT, so
they may benefit from FIS-B service. In making the decision to use a
dual-link strategy, the FAA acknowledged and weighed the fact that
potential benefits of future applications may not be fully realized
based on this decision. In situations where an airport is not within
the planned ADS-B coverage area, the airport will not have ADS-R
coverage. Consequently, an aircraft with ADS-B In will not have the
benefit of ADS-R, and ADS-B In will not provide awareness of aircraft
that are broadcasting on a different broadcast link.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ To date, the requirements for using ADS-B for advanced
iterations of merging and spacing, and self separation have yet to
be defined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If an aircraft leaves the ADS-B coverage area, there will be an
indication to the pilot that the aircraft is no longer within range of
ADS-R service. In this case, the pilot needs to maintain separation in
the same manner done today, which is relying on visual scanning and
directions from ATC. The FAA will ensure that the dual-link strategy
does not impact safety as future applications are developed.
3. 1090 MHz Frequency Congestion
Boeing, Federal Express (FedEx), and IATA suggested that the FAA
assess future 1090 MHz frequency congestion. The ARC supported the
dual-link strategy, but recommended that the FAA study the necessary
mitigations of 1090 MHz frequency congestion. The ARC specifically
recommended that these mitigations ensure 1090 MHz ES is interoperable
with ACAS and SSR, while providing sufficient air-to-air range to
support NextGen ADS-B In applications.
Congestion on the 1090 MHz frequency is a risk shared by TCAS/ACAS
and SSR systems using the Mode S transponder. The FAA conducted a study
to assess 1090 MHz frequency congestion in the future air traffic
environment.\29\ The FAA is analyzing alternatives and will enact the
necessary mitigations to reduce the 1090 MHz frequency congestion risk
for ADS-B, TCAS, and SSR, while enabling ranges appropriate for many
ADS-B In applications through 2035.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ A copy of this report is available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number for this rulemaking is FAA-
2007-29305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Performance Requirements--System
While some commenters supported the proposed performance
requirements, numerous organizations and individuals commented that the
performance requirements generally were too stringent, unnecessary, and
would entail an undue economic burden on operators.
1. Performance Requirements Tailored to Operator, Airspace, or
Procedure
The NPRM proposed specific performance requirements for ADS-B Out.
Several commenters, including the Aerospace Industries Association of
America (AIA), Boeing, the DOD, EAA, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, and
the ARC, asked the FAA to tailor the ADS-B performance requirements
based on specific application requirements or airspace.
Lockheed Martin and the DOD noted that some military aircraft may
not meet the proposed equipage requirements and would need
accommodations to operate in ADS-B Out-designated airspace. One
commenter was concerned that the DOD was exempt from the proposed
requirements.
[[Page 30169]]
The FAA has determined that it is not operationally feasible to
assign different performance requirements dependent on the nature of
the operation. It would not be effective to require both pilots and
controllers to verify specific performance parameters before any given
operation or change of airspace. Therefore, the FAA is specifying
minimum performance requirements for all ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft to
operate in certain designated airspace.
No special allowance is made in this rule to relieve the military
from the same performance requirements as the civilian aviation
community. The FAA recognizes that the DOD and other Federal agencies
are NAS users, and need access to all areas of the NAS today and in the
future. This rule provides procedures for an aircraft that does not
meet the ADS-B Out performance requirements, i.e., to obtain an ATC
authorized deviation to operate in the airspace for which ADS-B is
required. The FAA will collaborate with the appropriate U.S. Government
departments or agencies (including but not limited to DOD, and the
Department of Homeland Security) to develop Memorandums of Agreement to
accommodate their National defense mission requirements while
supporting the needs of all other NAS users.
2. Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP)
The NPRM proposed requiring a NACP greater than or equal
to 9. This is equivalent to horizontal position accuracy of less than
30 meters and vertical position accuracy of less than 45 meters. A
NACP of less than 30 meters horizontal would support ATC
surveillance, ASSA, FAROA, and other future ADS-B In applications.
Airbus, ATA, Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems
(ACSS), Boeing, Rockwell-Collins, United Airlines, and United Parcel
Service (UPS) questioned the necessity of a NACP greater
than or equal to 9. The ARC recommended that the FAA institute
NACP requirements based on domains of airspace defined by
different types of operations, with minimum NACP values
ranging from 5 through 9.\30\ The ARC also recommended that when a
NACP greater than or equal to 9 is necessary, operators
should only be required to equip with a position source that could meet
a NACP greater than or equal to 9 for 95 percent of an hour
and meet a NACP greater than or equal to 8 for 99.9 percent
of an hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ ADS-B ARC Task II Report to the FAA 6 (September 26,
2008), available on the Web site, http://www.regulations.gov, FAA-
2007-29305-0221.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing commented that there is no need for vertical accuracy
because neither ATC nor any of the initial ADS-B In applications
require it. The ARC recommended that the FAA not apply the vertical
position accuracy requirement associated with a NACP of 9
for surface operations. The ARC also recommended that the FAA modify
the definition of a NACP of 9 in DO-260A and DO-282A. This
modification would remove the vertical accuracy requirement if the
aircraft is on the surface.
The FAA reviewed these comments and the necessary requirements for
the ADS-B Out and ADS-B In applications that are contemplated today. A
NACP of less than 0.05 NM is required for ATC surveillance.
A NACP of less than 30 meters is required only for ASSA and
FAROA. Because surface surveillance benefits enabled by ADS-B will only
be fully available where Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X
(ASDE-X) systems,\31\ and ADS-R and TIS-B are in use, the FAA has
reconsidered the universal requirement of a NACP of less
than 30 meters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ ASDE-X is a traffic management system for the airport
surface that provides seamless coverage and aircraft identification
to air traffic controllers. The system uses a combination of surface
movement radar and transponder multilateration sensors to display
aircraft position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the higher NACP would support a limited number of
ADS-B In applications, it could also increase costs \32\ to all
operators required to meet the ADS-B performance standards. Therefore,
this final rule reduces the position accuracy reporting requirement and
adopts a NACP of less than 0.05 NM. This NACP
requirement applies to all aircraft operating in the airspace
identified in this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ADS-B ARC Report to the FAA Appendix P, Programmatic
Decision Analysis (September 26, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov, FAA-2007-29305-0221.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the FAA considered the comments regarding the vertical
accuracy component of NACP. As there are no ATC separation
services requirements for vertical accuracy or integrity, the FAA has
removed the vertical accuracy and integrity requirement from
NACP, NACV, NIC, and SIL in TSO-C154c and TSO-
C166b.
3. Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACV)
The NPRM proposed requiring a NACV greater than or equal
to 1, which is equivalent to velocity accuracy of less than 10 meters
per second.
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL) commented that a NACV of 1 is not sufficient
for ATC services or advanced ADS-B In applications. The ARC recommended
that NACV should not be required.
Different air navigation service providers may need different
performance requirements depending on the airspace in which they
implement ADS-B separation services. The FAA reviewed this requirement
and concludes that a NACV is required for separation
services in the United States. The agency modeled and calculated the
NACV requirements for aircraft separation, using assumptions
unique to the U.S. environment. Based on this analysis, the FAA
determined that a horizontal velocity accuracy of less than 10 meters
per second, as proposed in the NPRM, is required for ATC surveillance
within the NAS.\33\ Therefore, this requirement is adopted as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ A copy of the Separation Standards Working Group report is
available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket
number for this rulemaking is FAA-2007-29305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Navigation Integrity Category (NIC)
The NPRM proposed requiring a NIC greater than or equal to 7, which
provides navigation integrity of less than 0.2 NM. Boeing questioned
the necessity of this requirement. The ARC recommended that the FAA
adopt NIC requirements based on airspace, with minimum NIC values
ranging from 0 to 7.
The FAA reviewed this requirement and determined that a NIC of less
than 0.2 NM is necessary for ATC separation services, particularly in
the approach environment. Similar to the NACP, it is not
practical to assign different NIC values based on types of airspace.
Therefore, this rule requires a NIC of less than 0.2 NM.
5. Surveillance Integrity Level
The FAA's proposal for surveillance integrity level stated that the
surveillance integrity level is based on both the design assurance
level of the ADS-B Out avionics and the position source. Several
commenters, including Rockwell-Collins, pointed out that the proposed
definition was inconsistent with the surveillance integrity level
definition provided in DO-260A. Commenters stated that DO-260A Change 2
defined surveillance integrity level as including only the position
source. The ARC recommended that the FAA use the definition of
surveillance integrity level found in RTCA DO-
[[Page 30170]]
289,\34\ which also limited the design assurance to the position
source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for
Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA asserts that the design assurance of the ADS-B system needs
to represent the complete system, and not a single piece of that
system, to provide air traffic separation services. The FAA agrees that
the inconsistency between the proposed rule and the RTCA standard is
unworkable; however, RTCA has updated the design assurance requirements
in DO-260B and DO-282B to include the entire ADS-B avionics system,
rather than just the position source. The ADS-B system includes ADS-B
transmission equipment, ADS-B processing equipment, position source,
and any other equipment that processes the position data transmitted by
the ADS-B system. The DO-260B change is consistent with the rule.
6. Source Integrity Level (SIL) and System Design Assurance (SDA)
In DO-260A (TSO-C166a) and DO-282A (TSO-C154b), SIL was defined as
surveillance integrity level and represented two separate components:
(1) The maximum probability of exceeding the NIC containment radius and
(2) a maximum probability of a failure causing false or misleading data
to be transmitted. DO-260B (TSO-C166b) and DO-282B (TSO-C154c) separate
these two components into two distinct parameters. SIL is now referred
to as source integrity level and defines the maximum probability of
exceeding the NIC containment radius; SDA now defines the maximum
probability of a failure causing false or misleading data to be
transmitted.
The FAA proposed a SIL value of 2 or 3. A SIL of 2, as stated in
TSO-C166a and TSO-C154b, represented: (1) A maximum probability of
exceeding the NIC containment radius of 1x10-5 per hour or
per sample; and (2) a maximum probability of a failure causing false or
misleading data to be transmitted of 1x10-5 per hour.
A SIL of 3 represented: (1) A maximum probability of exceeding the
NIC containment radius of 1x10-7 per hour or per sample and
(2) a maximum probability of a failure causing false or misleading data
to be transmitted of 1x10-7 per hour.
The FAA proposed these two values for SIL because its separation
standards modeling determined that the probability of exceeding the NIC
containment radius must be less than 1x10-7 per hour or per
sample and the probability of a failure causing false or misleading
data must be less than 1x10-5 per hour. The FAA's TSOs and
the corresponding RTCA documents did not allow for this combination.
Therefore, in developing and issuing the NPRM, the FAA assumed that
most operators, in upgrading their equipment for ADS-B, would equip
with a global positioning system (GPS) \35\ that would provide a NIC
containment radius of 1x10-7 per hour (a SIL of 3). However,
to require the associated maximum probability of failure causing false
or misleading data to be transmitted at 1x10-7 per hour was
not only unreasonable but also unnecessary. Therefore, the FAA proposed
that a SIL of 2 was also acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ GPS is a U.S. satellite-based radio navigation system that
provides a global-positioning service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the separate SIL and SDA values available under DO-260B and
DO-282B, the rule requires a maximum probability of exceeding the NIC
containment radius of 1x10-7 per hour or per sample (which
equates to a SIL of 3), and a maximum probability of 1x10-5
per hour of a failure causing false or misleading data to be
transmitted (which equates to an SDA of 2).
Changing the proposed probability of exceeding the NIC containment
radius from 1x10-5 per hour or per sample to
1x10-7 per hour or per sample should not impact NAS users.
This is because currently available ADS-B Out systems using GNSS will
provide an integrity metric based on 1x10-7 per hour.
7. Secondary Position Sources
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), IATA, and
Rockwell-Collins commented that the final rule should specify separate
performance requirements for secondary position sources in the event
that their primary position source is unavailable.
The FAA disagrees that a separate set of requirements is necessary
for secondary position sources because the rule does not require a
secondary source. The NACP, NACV, NIC, SDA and
SIL requirements in this rule apply regardless of the position source
in use.
D. Performance Requirements--Antenna Diversity
The NPRM proposed that aircraft meet optimum system performance by
equipping with both a top and a bottom antenna to support ADS-B In
applications.
Several commenters, including AOPA, did not support this aspect of
the proposal because antenna diversity significantly increases the cost
of ADS-B. AOPA also noted that historical TCAS and transponder use does
not indicate that dual antennas are necessary.
Airservices Australia and the Australia Civil Aviation Safety
Authority noted that Australia is not requiring antenna diversity for
GA aircraft. The ARC recommended allowing non-diversity antenna
installations for VFR aircraft flying through Class B and C airspace
and below 15,000 feet MSL (1090 MHz ES) or below 18,000 feet MSL (UAT),
but not landing at a primary airport. The ARC also recommended that the
FAA undertake further studies to assess and validate the need for
antenna diversity in low-altitude airspace.
The FAA proposed dual antennas to support ADS-B Out and ADS-B In
air-to-air applications. For ATC surveillance, only a single bottom-
mounted antenna is necessary. The commenters and the ARC identified
this element of the proposal as requiring significant costs for the GA
operators.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ADS-B ARC Task II Report to the FAA Appendix T, Antenna
Diversity Comments on Cost, (September 26, 2008), available at
http://www.regulations.gov, FAA-2007-29305-0221.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has reconsidered its initial strategy for launching the
ADS-B requirements and is adopting the performance standards necessary
for ATC surveillance. Therefore, this rule does not require antenna
diversity for ADS-B to operate in any airspace. This change does not
alter or affect antenna diversity requirements for other aircraft
systems, such as transponders or TCAS II.
Operators should be aware that a dual antenna installation could
provide additional benefits that are not included in the scope of this
rule. Airport surface situational awareness or alerting applications
may be compromised by a single-antenna installation. Operators who
equip with a single antenna may not be able to accrue all available
benefits from some or all future ADS-B In applications.
While requirements for these applications have not yet been fully
defined, modeling performed by both the ARC and the FAA has indicated
that a single antenna may not be able to perform adequately for surface
applications. If the FAA, for example, issues a future mandate
requiring surface performance capability, operators of single-antenna-
equipped aircraft may need to upgrade the avionics installed on their
aircraft.
Operators should also be aware that single-antenna installations
are not as capable as dual-antenna installations of receiving ADS-B
messages in an
[[Page 30171]]
environment with a highly congested spectrum. Because of increasing
congestion on the 1090 MHz frequency over time, single-antenna
installations of ADS-B may not be able to achieve the same range for
ADS-B In applications as aircraft with two antennas.
This limitation on the upper bound of ADS-B In application range
for single-antenna installations does not impact any of the application
benefits cited in this rule. The FAA is actively pursuing strategies to
mitigate spectrum congestion concerns of the 1090 MHz frequency.
However, operators employing the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link should be
aware that future air-to-air applications that require longer range
reception may require dual antennas or a UAT system.
E. Performance Requirements--Transmit Power
The NPRM proposed that aircraft equipped with UAT would have a
minimum 16-watt transmit power performance and aircraft equipped with
1090 MHz ES would have a minimum 125-watt transmit power performance.
Some commenters, particularly AOPA, argued that the proposal was not
warranted and imposed unnecessary expense. The ARC commented that using
the existing power level without antenna diversity may provide the
performance needed to make broader use of non-diversity antenna
installations.
The FAA has determined that reducing the transmit power requirement
would significantly impact the ground infrastructure. The FAA will rely
on a series of approximately 800 ground stations to provide ATC
separation services throughout the United States. The ground stations
will be placed 150 to 200 miles apart and will require the minimum
aircraft output power specified in the rule to ensure coverage.
Lowering the aircraft output power requirements, as suggested by the
commenters, would require the FAA to expand and redesign the ADS-B
ground infrastructure. Consequently, the power levels remain unchanged
in the final rule.
F. Performance Requirements--Total and Uncompensated Latency
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to define latency as the time
information enters the aircraft through the aircraft antenna(s) until
the time it is transmitted from the aircraft. The FAA further proposed
that the navigation sensor should process information received by the
aircraft's antenna(s) and forward this information to the ADS-B
broadcast link avionics in less than 0.5 seconds. The processed
information then would be transmitted in the ADS-B message from the
ADS-B Out broadcast link avionics in less than 1.0 second from the time
it was received from the navigation sensor.
Several commenters, including Airbus, Boeing, EUROCONTROL, GAMA,
and Honeywell, commented that the latency requirements are not well
defined, are too stringent, and are not consistent with other
standards.\37\ United Airlines and UPS recommended that the FAA specify
the accuracy of position information at the time of transmission.
Boeing and Honeywell recommended that the FAA specify latency, based on
the time of applicability of the position source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The commenters specifically referenced the RTCA Airborne
Surveillance Applications Minimum Aviation System Performance
Standards and DO-303 Safety ``Safety, Performance and Inoperability
Requirements Document of the ADS-B Non-Radar-Airspace (NRA)
Application.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ARC stated that the FAA should: (1) Specify latency
requirements at the aircraft level, not the equipment level; (2)
specify the maximum uncompensated latency to minimize or eliminate
installation wiring changes of existing ADS-B Out implementations,
while meeting ATC surveillance requirements; (3) specify total latency
and uncompensated latency; and (4) reference latency to the time of
applicability of the position provided by the position sensor, rather
than the time of measurement.
The FAA adopts three of the four ARC recommendations. First, the
FAA agrees that latency must be defined at the aircraft level and not
the equipment level. Second, the latency requirements are set at the
maximum value that will allow ATC surveillance. Although the latency
requirements will drive wiring changes in some aircraft, the
requirements will minimize the number of aircraft affected to the
maximum extent possible. Third, the FAA has defined the latency
requirements as total latency and uncompensated latency. The FAA does
not agree with the fourth recommendation to measure latency at the time
of applicability. To do so would place latency requirements only on
part of the overall system and specifically exclude the position source
latency. Since the entire system's latency, including the position
source, must be limited to ensure accuracy of the transmitted position
the rule requires latency to be measured from the position source time
of measurement and not the time of applicability.
This rule specifies two separate latency requirements: Total
latency and uncompensated latency. Total latency is defined as the time
between when measurements are taken to determine the aircraft's
geometric position (latitude, longitude, and geometric altitude) and
when the ADS-B transmitter broadcasts the aircraft's position. Under
this rule, the total latency cannot exceed 2.0 seconds. Latency is
compensated to account for the movement of the aircraft while the unit
is processing the position information. The avionics usually compensate
latency based on velocity but may also compensate based on
acceleration.
Uncompensated latency is defined as the time the avionics does not
compensate for latency. Under this rule, within the 2.0 second total
latency allocation, a maximum of 0.6 seconds may be uncompensated
latency. The avionics must compensate for any latency above 0.6 seconds
up to the maximum of 2.0 seconds by extrapolating the position to the
time of transmission.
Aircraft velocity, as well as position accuracy and integrity
metrics (NACP, NACV, NIC, SDA, and SIL), must be
transmitted with their associated position measurement, but are not
required to be compensated.
G. Performance Requirements--Time To Indicate Accuracy and Integrity
Changes
The NPRM proposed that changes in NIC and NACP must be
broadcast within 10 seconds. This proposed requirement would bind the
latency of the NIC and NACP, however this requirement would
also bind the maximum amount of time an integrity fault can exist
without an indication, as an integrity fault is indicated by changing
the NIC and NACP to zero.
The ARC, GAMA, and Rockwell-Collins commented that 10.0 seconds is
not enough time to indicate a change in the NIC. They specifically
noted that GNSS position sources use the entire 10-second allocation,
which does not allow time for the ADS-B equipment to actually transmit
the change. Rockwell-Collins, GAMA, and the ARC recommended instead
that changes in NIC and SIL be broadcast within 12.1 seconds.
Position sources typically provide an accuracy and integrity metric
with each position that is output. To allow GNSS-based position sources
time to detect and eliminate possible satellite faults, GNSS systems
allow the integrity metric associated with a position to actually lag
behind the output of the position. TSO-C145/146 and TSO-C196 GNSS
systems have up to 8.0 seconds to alert to an
[[Page 30172]]
integrity fault. TSO-C129 systems do not have an overarching integrity
fault time-to-alert requirement, but they do have navigation mode
specific integrity fault time-to-alert requirements. Specifically, TSO-
C129 systems must indicate an integrity fault within 10 seconds in
terminal and approach modes.
The requirement to indicate a change in NIC applies to the time
between when a fault-free NIC is transmitted with a faulted position
and when the NIC is updated to indicate the fault. Thus, the clock to
indicate the change in NIC does not start at the onset of the fault,
but rather at the broadcast of the faulted position from the ADS-B
system. Thus, the total time to update the NIC is based on the
cumulative effect of--(1) the position source fault detection and
exclusion time, and (2) the worst-case asynchronous transmission
difference between when the fault-free NIC with faulted position is
transmitted and when the faulted NIC is transmitted.
The FAA reviewed the separation standards work to determine if a
12.0 second delay in the broadcast of an integrity fault would impact
separation standards. The FAA found that no existing terminal and en
route surveillance standards would be impacted with a 12.0 second
delay, and thus the rule requires that changes in NIC be broadcast
within 12.0 seconds.
The ARC, GAMA, and Rockwell-Collins also commented that changes in
NACP, NACV, and SIL should be broadcast within
3.1 seconds versus 10.0 seconds. The FAA determined that there is no
basis to tighten the requirement. Therefore, the 10.0 second
requirement applies to indicating changes in NACP,
NACV, SDA, and SIL.
H. Performance Requirements--Availability
The FAA did not propose any availability \38\ requirements for this
rule. The proposed rule generated multiple comments concerning
statements in the preamble regarding availability and whether the FAA
should require operators to accomplish a preflight determination of
GNSS availability. Other commenters focused on a perceived requirement
for operators to equip with avionics that had a system availability
equivalent to Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) \39\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ RTCA DO-229, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for
Global Positioning System/Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne
Equipment, defines the availability of a navigation system as the
ability of the system to provide the required function and
performance at the initiation of the intended operation.
Availability is an indication of the ability of the system to
provide usable service with the specified coverage area. Signal
availability is the percentage of time that navigational signals
transmitted from external sources are available for use.
Availability is a function of both the physical characteristics of
the environment and the technical capabilities of the transmitter
facilities.
\39\ WAAS is a U.S. wide-coverage augmentation system to GPS
that calculates integrity and correction data on the ground and uses
geostationary satellites to broadcast the data to GPS/SBAS
(Satellite-Based Augmentation System (non-U.S.)) users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Preflight Determination of Availability
The proposal preamble explained that operators must verify ADS-B
Out availability before flight as part of their pre-flight
responsibilities. This is similar to the requirement for preflight
determination of availability for certain Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) \40\ operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Required Navigation Performance (RNP) is a statement of the
total aircraft navigation performance necessary for operation within
a defined airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATA argued that the process to determine availability could be time
consuming for operators and that the FAA should provide further
justification. Boeing stated that the NPRM did not include an
availability requirement; therefore, the FAA should correct its
statement in the NPRM preamble advising operators to make this part of
their preflight actions.
The ARC recommended that the FAA provide preflight prediction
systems that assess the ability of typical positioning sources to meet
the position accuracy and integrity requirements.
This rule requires operators to meet the adopted minimum position
accuracy and integrity performance requirements to operate in the
airspace described in the rule. To facilitate compliance with the rule
and assist pilots for the flight planning, the FAA will provide a
preflight availability prediction service by 2013. Therefore, prior to
departure, operators should verify that the predicted performance
requirements will be met for the duration of the flight. This service
will determine whether GNSS equipment is capable of meeting Sec.
91.227 position accuracy and integrity requirements for operating in
the airspace defined in this rule. Operators may also use their own
preflight availability prediction tools, provided the predictions
correspond to the performance of their equipment. The FAA advises
operators to consult manufacturers' information on specific avionics
and prediction services.
2. System Availability
Numerous commenters, including the DOD, contended that the proposal
required WAAS (or implied that the positioning service used by the
aircraft have an availability equivalent to WAAS.)
As stated in the NPRM, operators may equip with any position
source. Although WAAS is not required, at this time it is the only
positioning service that provides the equivalent availability to radar
(99.9 percent availability). The FAA expects that future position
sources such as GNSS using the L5 GPS signal, GPS using Galileo
signals, and GPS tightly integrated with inertial navigation systems
will also provide 99.9 percent availability. Operators who equip with
other position sources, such as non-augmented GPS, may experience
outages that limit their access to the airspace defined in this rule.
If an aircraft's avionics meet the requirements of this rule but
unexpected GPS degradations during flight inhibit the position source
from providing adequate accuracy (within 0.05 NM) and integrity (within
0.2 NM), ATC will be alerted via the aircraft's broadcasted data and
services will be provided to that aircraft using the backup strategy.
An aircraft that is not equipped to meet the requirements of this rule
will not have access to the airspace for which ADS-B is required. The
FAA notes that preflight availability verification eliminates any need
for the system to meet a specified availability requirement upon
installation.
I. Performance Requirements--Continuity
The FAA did not propose a continuity \41\ requirement in the NPRM.
Several commenters, including Airbus, GAMA, Rockwell-Collins, and the
ARC, suggested that the FAA add a continuity requirement. These
commenters argued that such a requirement would ensure that an aircraft
could continue providing the ADS-B information throughout a flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ DO-229 defines the continuity of the system as the ability
of the total system (comprising all elements necessary to maintain
aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform its
function without interruption during the intended operation. More
specifically, continuity is the probability that the specified
system performance will be maintained for the duration of a phase of
operation (presuming that the system was available at the beginning
of that phase of operation), and predicted to exist throughout the
operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft are to meet the performance requirements for the duration
of the operation, not just a portion of the flight. The FAA's preflight
availability prediction service will help pilots ensure that the
aircraft can continue transmitting ADS-B information throughout their
planned flight, based on expected operations. Unexpected
[[Page 30173]]
failures will be accommodated, as described in the discussion on
availability; therefore, there is no need for a separate continuity
requirement.
J. Performance Requirements--Traffic Information Service--Broadcast
Integrity (TIS-B)
The NPRM did not propose any changes to the standards for TIS-B.
Boeing stated that the FAA's plans to implement TIS-B with a SIL of 0
would severely limit its utility for ADS-B In applications. Boeing
recommended that the FAA change TIS-B to provide a SIL of 2 or greater,
to be consistent with the SIL proposed for ADS-B Out. Honeywell
commented that a TIS-B integrity level should be established for value-
added, near-term applications. The ARC did not specifically comment on
the TIS-B SIL, but did recommend that the FAA include a discussion of
the FIS-B and TIS-B benefits in the preamble to the ADS-B Out final
rule.
The TIS-B system is expected to support four of the five initial
ADS-B In applications. The FAA acknowledges that future ADS-B In
applications may require improved representation of the position
integrity metrics. With the SIL and SDA changes incorporated in DO-260B
and DO-282B and possible changes to future versions of DO-317, the FAA
plans, outside of this rulemaking effort, to evaluate the usefulness of
the broadcast of integrity parameters from TIS-B.
K. Broadcast Message Elements
1. NACP/NACV/NIC/SDA/SIL
The NPRM did not specifically propose NACP,
NACV, NIC, or SIL as broadcast message elements in section 4
of appendix H to part 91, Minimum Broadcast Message Element Set for
ADS-B Out. These requirements were specified in section 3 of appendix H
to part 91, ADS-B Out Performance Requirements for NIC, NAC, and SIL.
Honeywell noted that NACP, NACV, NIC, and SIL
are required message elements in DO-260A.
To resolve any questions, the FAA has repeated the indications for
these elements in Sec. 91.227(d)(16) through (19). In addition, and
consistent with TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c, SIL and SDA are listed as
separate values.
2. Receiving ATC Services
The NPRM proposed requiring the message element ``Receiving ATC
Services.'' Several commenters, including ACSS, Airbus, Boeing,
EUROCONTROL, United Airlines, and UPS, commented that this message
element is unnecessary and poorly defined. UPS and United Airlines
suggested that the FAA use the ground automation system to accomplish
the function of this message element. Some commenters also contended
that this message element could require an additional user interface,
which is not available on current equipment.
The ARC recommended that the FAA clarify the definition of this
message element and explain how it can be implemented without pilot
entry. The ARC also requested that the FAA research whether both
``Receiving ATC Services'' and ``Mode 3/A Code'' are necessary.
The FAA concludes that ``Receiving ATC Services'' is not necessary
for ATC surveillance because this information can be directly inferred
from the Mode 3/A code. Furthermore, this message element could
increase costs for an additional user interface. Therefore, this rule
does not include ``Receiving ATC Services'' as a required broadcast
message element.
3. Length and Width of the Aircraft
The NPRM proposed requiring a message element to broadcast the
length and width of the aircraft.
Airbus and EUROCONTROL commented that length and width information
is not necessary for surveillance or airborne ADS-B Out applications.
Airbus and an individual commenter noted that length and width
information should be quantified relative to the aircraft position
reference point or to a known offset.
GAMA and Rockwell-Collins noted that the TSOs allow some aircraft
to continuously transmit ``in-air'' because these aircraft do not have
a means to determine their air/ground status. Rockwell-Collins
commented that the rule should require all aircraft to assess their
air/ground status and broadcast the appropriate set of messages for
that status. The ARC recommended that the FAA address this issue in the
preamble to the final rule.
The FAA notes that TSO-C154c and TSO-C166b allow the operator to
determine whether to transmit the aircraft's latitude and longitude
referenced to the GPS antenna location or the ADS-B position reference
point. The ADS-B position reference point is the center of a box, based
on the aircraft length and width. With the position offset to the ADS-B
reference point, the ADS-B is able to report the position of the edges
of the aircraft. This rule does not require operators to apply the
position offset because ATC surveillance does not require a position
offset.
The FAA concludes that the requirement to transmit aircraft length
and width is necessary because this message element will be used as an
input for ASDE-X systems and allows the FAA to decommission ASDE-3
radars \42\ that interface with ASDE-X, as well as the surface movement
radar systems that are at certain ASDE-X sites without ASDE-3. The
length-width code will be preset when ADS-B equipment, meeting the
standards in TSO-C154c or TSO-C166b, is installed in the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ ASDE-3 is an airport radar that shows to tower controllers
the location of aircraft on the surface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADS-B equipment transmits an airborne position message when the
aircraft is airborne, and a surface position message when the aircraft
is on the ground. Aircraft automatically determine airborne or ground
status and transmit the appropriate message. For aircraft that are
unable to determine their air-ground status automatically, the RTCA
standards and TSOs allow the aircraft to continuously transmit the
airborne position message. However, the length width code is a required
message element in this rule, and is only transmitted in the surface
position message. Thus, to comply with the rule, the aircraft must
automatically determine its air-ground status and transmit the surface
position message which includes the length width code when on the
ground.
4. Indication of the Aircraft's Barometric Pressure Altitude
The NPRM proposed a broadcast message that would report the
aircraft's barometric pressure altitude. Several commenters, including
the ARC, GAMA, Rockwell-Collins, Sandia National Laboratories (SANDIA),
and UPS, identified an inconsistency regarding the barometric altitude
message element between the proposed rule's preamble and regulatory
text.
The FAA agrees that the NPRM preamble was not completely clear and
should have better reflected the proposed regulatory text. The proposed
regulatory text stated that the pressure altitude reported for ADS-B
Out and Mode C/S transponder is derived from the same source for
aircraft equipped with both a transponder and ADS-B Out. The FAA
confirms that the barometric altitude reported from the aircraft's
transponder and ADS-B Out must be derived from the same source.
In addition, the FAA is striking the January 1, 2020 compliance
date from proposed Sec. 91.217(b). If an operator chooses to use ADS-B
before January 1,
[[Page 30174]]
2020, the operator must meet the provisions of that section.
5. Indication of the Aircraft's Velocity
The NPRM proposed a message element that would provide ATC with
information about the aircraft's velocity and direction. However, the
NPRM preamble mistakenly referred to velocity as airspeed. Several
commenters, including Airbus, the ARC, Rockwell-Collins, SANDIA, and
UPS, recommended that the message element reflect velocity instead of
airspeed. Rockwell-Collins noted that velocity could be derived from
other sources, including an inertial navigation system. ACSS, United
Airlines, and UPS recommended that the FAA require the velocity source
for ADS-B transmissions to be the most accurate velocity source on the
aircraft. The ARC recommended that the issue of velocity source be
referred to RTCA.
This message element will provide ATC with the aircraft's velocity,
as well as a clearly stated direction and description of the rate at
which an aircraft changes its position. The velocity must be
transmitted with a NACV of less than 10 meters per second.
Any velocity source that meets these requirements will comply with this
rule. The FAA referred the question on velocity source to RTCA for
further review, as the ARC recommended. RTCA determined that the
velocity source must be the same source that provides the aircraft's
position, and included this requirement in DO-260B and DO-282B.
6. Indication If Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II or
Airborne Collision Avoidance System Is Installed and Operating in a
Mode That May Generate Resolution Advisory Alerts
The NPRM proposed requiring a message element that would (1)
identify to ATC whether the aircraft is equipped with TCAS II or ACAS
and (2) identify whether the equipment is operating in a mode that
could generate resolution advisory alerts. Airbus asked for more
information on why this message element is required. EUROCONTROL
commented that this message element should be internationally
harmonized before the FAA adopts this requirement. UPS asked whether
this message should be indicated if the TCAS II is operated in the
traffic advisory mode. The ARC sought to retain this message element,
but asked the FAA to clarify its intended use in the final rule.
The TCAS installed and operating in a mode that can generate a
resolution advisory message will be used by the FAA to monitor in-
service performance to address NAS inefficiencies and take appropriate
corrective actions. This information may also be used to support future
ADS-B In applications. This message element was harmonized with the
international community in the development of DO-260B and ED-102A.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ EUROCAE MOPS for 1090 MHz Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. For Aircraft With an Operable Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System II or Airborne Collision Avoidance System, Indication If a
Resolution Advisory Is in Progress
The NPRM proposed a message element to indicate that a resolution
advisory is in progress. EUROCONTROL recommended that the FAA
internationally harmonize this message element before adopting the
requirement. Airbus noted that this element may be achieved with DO-
260A.
Similar to the discussion in II.K.6. above, the message that a TCAS
resolution advisory is in progress will be used by the FAA to monitor
in-service performance to address NAS inefficiencies and take
appropriate corrective actions. This information may also be used to
support future ADS-B In applications. This message element was
harmonized with the international community in the development of DO-
260B and ED-102A.
8. Indication of the Mode 3/A Transponder Code Specified by ATC
(Requires Flightcrew Entry)
The NPRM proposed a message element to transmit the aircraft's
assigned Mode 3/A transponder code.
Several commenters, including ACSS, Boeing, SANDIA, and UPS, argued
that this message element should not be necessary with ADS-B
surveillance, and suggested deleting the requirement. GAMA expressed
concern that different codes in the Mode 3/A transponder and the ADS-B
could result in an indication of a traffic conflict. GAMA specifically
recommended a one code entry or revising the automation to resolve
conflicting information. Airbus and the ARC supported this message
element requirement and the ARC requested more information on its
intended use.
The FAA has determined that the same ATC-assigned Mode 3/A code
must be transmitted by both the transponder and the ADS-B Out message.
If the code transmitted by ADS-B differs from the Mode 3/A code
transmitted by the transponder, it could result in duplicative codes or
inaccurate reporting of aircraft position. If the aircraft's avionics
are not capable of allowing a single point of entry for the transponder
and ADS-B Out Mode 3/A code, the pilot must ensure that conflicting
codes are not transmitted to ATC.
ATC uses the Mode 3/A code to identify aircraft that are under
surveillance and possibly under ATC direction. This identifier is
necessary to issue directions to specific aircraft about nearby air
traffic. The Mode 3/A code and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) 24-bit address are duplicative for some functions.
This duplication is necessary because many current ATC automation
systems are not yet capable of using the ICAO 24-bit address.
Therefore, the FAA retains this message element in the rule.
9. Indication of the Aircraft's Call Sign That Is Submitted on the
Flight Plan, or the Aircraft's Registration Number (Aircraft Call Sign
Requires Flightcrew Entry)
The NPRM proposed a requirement for this message element to
indicate either the aircraft's call sign (as submitted on its flight
plan), or the aircraft's registration number. An individual commenter
disagreed with the required broadcast message element for aircraft
identity and noted that it uses unnecessary bandwidth.
This message element correlates flight plan information with the
data that ATC views on the radar display, and facilitates ATC
communication with the aircraft. This message element also will support
certain ADS-B In applications such as enhanced visual approach.
In the final rule, the regulatory text is amended to provide that
an operator does not need to populate the call sign/aircraft
registration field for a UAT equipped aircraft if he or she has not
filed a flight plan, is not requesting ATC services, and is using a UAT
self-assigned temporary 24-bit address. Although the FAA does not
prohibit the anonymity feature, operators using the anonymity feature
will not be eligible to receive ATC services, may not be able to
benefit from enhanced ADS-B search and rescue capabilities, and may
impact ADS-B In situational awareness benefits.
10. Indication If the Flightcrew Has Identified an Emergency, Radio
Communication Failure, or Unlawful Interference (Requires Flightcrew
Entry)
The NPRM proposed this message element to alert ATC that an
aircraft is experiencing emergency conditions. Airbus asked the FAA to
clarify which emergency/priority codes are required.
[[Page 30175]]
The ARC recommended that the FAA explain in the final rule the
emergency status requirement and describe how it will be used.
This message element alerts ATC that the aircraft is experiencing
emergency conditions and indicates the type of emergency. Both TSO-
C154c and TSO-C166b identify six unique emergency codes. All emergency
codes may be transmitted. Under this rule, only emergency, radio
communication failure, and unlawful interference are required. This
information will alert ATC to potential danger to the aircraft so it
can take appropriate action. Message elements for minimum fuel, downed
aircraft, and medical emergency are not required by this rule.\44\ ADS-
B equipment may automatically set these required emergency conditions
based on the Mode 3/A code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Mode A codes 7700, 7600, and 7500 currently are reserved
for these emergencies. See Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume
4, Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems, 4th Edition, July
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Indication of the Aircraft's ``IDENT'' to ATC (Requires Flightcrew
Entry)
The NPRM proposed this message element to help controllers quickly
identify a specific aircraft. United Airlines and UPS commented that
they believe controllers use the ``IDENT'' function to attain aircraft
identification information. They noted that future identification
systems should include aircraft information; therefore, they believed
this element is not necessary. FreeFlight commented that ``IDENT''
should be retained. The ARC recommended that the FAA clarify how the
``IDENT'' requirement will be used.
The ``IDENT'' function is used regularly in current ATC operations
to help controllers quickly identify a specific aircraft. The ``IDENT''
feature also allows ATC to quickly identify aircraft that have entered
incorrect flight identification or Mode 3/A codes. The FAA is adopting
this message element in this rule.
12. Indication of the Emitter Category
The NPRM proposed requiring a message element for an aircraft's
emitter category.
EUROCONTROL questioned the business case behind this requirement.
UPS asked that the FAA better define the emitter categorizations in the
final rule.
This message element is necessary for ATC separation services and
wake turbulence separation requirements. TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c
provide a list and description of the different emitter categories.
Emitter category is set during installation of the ADS-B avionics in
the aircraft and will not change over time.
13. Indication Whether an ADS-B In Capability Is Installed
The NPRM proposed this message element to indicate to ATC whether a
cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) \45\ is installed and
operational. Several commenters, including Boeing, EUROCONTROL, and
SANDIA, commented that this message element was poorly defined,
difficult and expensive to implement, and of little value to ADS-B In
applications and ATC surveillance. UPS asked whether a message is
required when a CDTI is installed but not operating. The ARC
recommended that the FAA clarify the use of this data element.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ CDTI is a generic display that provides a flight crew with
traffic surveillance information about other aircraft, surface
vehicles, and obstacles, including their identification, position,
and other message set parameters. CDTI information would commonly be
displayed on a Multifunction Display (MFD).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RTCA updated the definition of this message element in DO-260B and
DO-282B. The FAA adopted these updates in TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c. This
message element now indicates which aircraft are capable of receiving
ADS-B In services and therefore require TIS-B and ADS-R transmissions
from the ground. Under the new definition, this message element now
indicates whether an ADS-B In capability is installed in the aircraft,
but does not require a report of operational status.
14. Indication of the Aircraft's Geometric Altitude
The NPRM proposed a message element indicating the aircraft's
geometric altitude.
Several commenters, including Airbus, Boeing, Dassault, the
European Business Aviation Association (EBAA), EUROCONTROL, Honeywell,
and Rockwell-Collins, commented on the proposed requirement. Most of
the commenters questioned this message element and stated that neither
ATC surveillance nor ADS-B In require geometric altitude. Dassault,
EBAA, EUROCONTROL, and Honeywell supported this message element. The
ARC recommended that the FAA justify the need for this message element.
Geometric altitude is the height of the aircraft above the World
Geodetic System 84 ellipsoid, which is a scientific approximation of
the earth's surface. This message element will be used within the ADS-B
ground system to confirm accuracy and identify discrepancies between
geometric altitude and barometric altitude. Additionally, the FAA will
integrate this comparison function into a continuing airworthiness
monitoring function.
L. Ability To Turn Off ADS-B Out Transmissions
The NPRM proposed requiring a pilot to turn off ADS-B equipment if
directed by ATC, for example, if the ADS-B unit was broadcasting
erroneous information.
The ARC, Boeing, United Airlines, and UPS recommended eliminating
the requirement to turn off ADS-B Out transmissions. A few commenters,
including British Airways, were concerned that being able to turn off
ADS-B Out, while keeping the transponder on, could require additional
design changes and increase costs because most existing equipment is
not capable of operating in this manner. Boeing stated that eliminating
erroneous ADS-B transmissions could be accomplished by turning the
transponder off or having a capability within the ground system to
allow the controller to manually remove selected targets. Rockwell-
Collins recommended that the FAA require the ADS-B equipment to detect
failures and disable ADS-B Out transmissions of erroneous data.
The FAA modified the ground automation system to be able to exclude
incorrect ADS-B data. With this enhancement to the automation, the
aircraft does not need to have a capability for a pilot to disable ADS-
B transmissions. Therefore, the final rule does not require the pilot
to be able to turn off ADS-B Out transmissions.
M. Existing Equipment Requirements
1. Transponder Requirement
The NPRM specified that the proposal for ADS-B equipage would not
alter existing transponder regulations.
Several organizations and individuals, including AOPA, opposed
adding ADS-B Out performance requirements without removing the
transponder requirement. ATA and Boeing requested that the FAA make a
commitment to remove transponders. Several organizations and
individuals further commented that the FAA should pursue an ADS-B based
collision-avoidance system and reconsider the backup strategy, which is
based on secondary surveillance systems. ALPA supported the FAA's plan
to retain transponders.
The ARC made multiple recommendations associated with
[[Page 30176]]
transponder removal: (1) The ADS-B implementation strategy should
include the removal of transponders from low-altitude aircraft without
an ACAS; (2) the FAA should commit to a strategy for achieving
transponder removal from low-altitude domestic aircraft; and (3) the
FAA should study whether ACAS can be modified to use ADS-B as the
primary surveillance data for collision avoidance, as well as what ACAS
upgrades are required to support NextGen.
Removing the transponder requirement would involve substantial
changes to the ADS-B backup strategy and TCAS II/ACAS, which are
outside the scope of this rulemaking. Transponders will still be
required when the backup surveillance strategy using SSR is necessary
and to interact with TCAS- and ACAS-equipped aircraft. Separate from
this rulemaking, the FAA may consider (in coordination with the
appropriate surveillance and NextGen planning organizations), whether
transponders could eventually be removed and, if so, what steps are
necessary to accomplish this.
2. Emergency Locator Transmitter Requirement
The NPRM did not propose any changes to the emergency locator
transmitter (ELT) \46\ requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ An ELT is an electronic battery-operated transmitter
developed as a means of locating downed aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters, including ATA and the National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA), argued that ADS-B should be used instead
of an ELT, and that ELT requirements could be included in this rule.
AOPA also recommended a long-term strategy to include ELT removal, and
stated that ADS-B could enhance current search-and-rescue procedures to
increase the number of successful rescues.
The ARC recommended that the FAA explore whether an ADS-B tracking
service also could be used for search and rescue to aid in crash
locating. The ARC also recommended that the FAA conduct a study
considering an ADS-B-based search-and-rescue solution that would enable
removal of 121.5 MHz ELTs for certain domestic operations.
The FAA has determined that the ADS-B system currently cannot
replace the ELT function. The ADS-B system is not required to be
crashworthy and, thus, may not be operable or able to transmit
following an aircraft accident. Additionally, current search-and-rescue
technology is not compatible with ADS-B operations because ELTs
broadcast on 121.5 or 406 MHz (not 1090 or 978 MHz). The FAA recognizes
the value of a ground application that could allow for timely and
accurate flight tracking of downed aircraft and is evaluating this
capability separate from this rulemaking.
The FAA considered the ARC recommendation to evaluate the
feasibility of replacing the ELT with the ADS-B system. However, the
FAA has determined that ADS-B is not a feasible replacement for the
ELT, as discussed above; therefore, the FAA does not plan to undertake
such a study at this time.
N. Program Implementation
1. Timeline
The FAA proposed that all aircraft operating in the airspace areas
specified in the rule meet the performance requirements by January 1,
2020.
The majority of commenters recommended various options for the
implementation of ADS-B, including the discontinuation of secondary
and/or primary radar systems once ADS-B is operational NAS-wide. Some
commenters, including AIA and AOPA, requested that the FAA provide
certain basic levels of ADS-B service for several years before the ADS-
B compliance date.
Several commenters, including ALPA and the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), suggested that the compliance date or service
provision of ADS-B occur sooner than 2020, to obtain benefits more
quickly. United Airlines recommended a 2015 compliance date for
operations above FL 240. The Cargo Airline Association (CAA)
recommended lower performance requirements for a 2015 compliance date.
Several commenters, including the Aircraft Electronics Association,
FedEx, and the National Air Carriers Association, suggested extending
or adding flexibility to the 2020 compliance date.
Numerous commenters, including ATA, Boeing, IATA, and Rockwell-
Collins, suggested a two-phased implementation strategy. The first
phase would use existing equipment, avionics standards, and
capabilities, which would allow industry and the FAA to demonstrate,
validate, and evaluate ADS-B applications. After operational experience
in the first phase was sufficient to generate the appropriate
standards, the second phase would establish a mandate for ADS-B Out
performance standards. Some commenters suggested that the second phase
be a combined ADS-B In and ADS-B Out rule.
The ARC endorsed the proposed 2020 compliance date, but recommended
that the FAA allow operators to use existing equipage to accrue early
benefits. Specifically, the ARC recommended that the FAA: (1) Take
advantage of existing 1090 MHz ES-equipped aircraft and allow their
operation in the Gulf of Mexico for non-radar airspace and (2)
transition to a fully functional ADS-B Out capability enabled by DO-
260B,\47\ to allow access to the additional applications and services
for ADS-B In. The ARC also recommended that the FAA adopt the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Acceptable Means of Compliance 20-24
(permitting the use of early DO-260 avionics for separation) in non-
radar airspace, with appropriate measures to ensure ADS-B integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ The ARC recommended DO-260A Change 3, which is DO-260B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After reviewing all the comments, the FAA finds that a 2020
compliance date remains appropriate because NAS users need time to
equip to the requirements of the rule. Most air carriers can use
regularly scheduled maintenance to install or upgrade their equipment.
The FAA also expects that this timeframe will provide sufficient
operational experience to make ADS-B the primary source for
surveillance in 2020.
FIS-B and TIS-B services are already available in several areas of
the country for ADS-B In-equipped aircraft and will continue as an
integral part of the implementation of the ADS-B ground infrastructure.
NAS-wide ground infrastructure implementation is scheduled to be
complete in 2013, which would provide operators with at least 7 years
of operational experience with these services before the ADS-B
compliance date of 2020.
The FAA examined whether it is operationally feasible and
economically beneficial to use DO-260 avionics in radar and non-radar
airspace before 2020. From an operational perspective, the FAA found
that the existing DO-260 equipment does not meet the surveillance needs
for ATC in the United States for various reasons: (1) DO-260 avionics
do not independently report the accuracy and integrity metrics; (2) DO-
260 avionics allow the integrity metric to be populated with accuracy
information during integrity outages, which is unacceptable for
aircraft separation services; (3) DO-260 avionics do not include a
message element for Mode 3/A code, which is necessary for aircraft
surveillance; and (4) the majority of existing DO-260 installations
were accomplished on a noninterference basis under the transponder
approval guidelines. (This certification verifies that the equipment
[[Page 30177]]
is safe onboard the aircraft, but does not issue any approval that
would permit its use for ADS-B operations.)
Therefore, the FAA concluded that without upgrades to the
equipment, the use of DO-260 avionics will not meet the surveillance
needs in the NAS. Furthermore, without appropriate integrity
monitoring, DO-260 avionics cannot be used for separation of aircraft.
Its utility would be limited to potentially reducing separation in non-
radar areas, or increasing efficiency in radar airspace through more
timely updates of information.
Further analysis addressed whether existing DO-260 avionics could
be beneficial to provide separation services in the Gulf of Mexico, or
to provide efficiency benefits through improved performance of User
Request Evaluation Tool (URET) \48\ and Traffic Management Advisor
(TMA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ URET is an air traffic control tool that assists
controllers with timely detection and resolution of predicted air
traffic problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To use DO-260 avionics in the Gulf of Mexico, the FAA estimated it
would incur approximately $4 million in costs to upgrade the
automation; would need to provide additional ground stations and
receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) predictions; would need
to develop procedures; and would need to address aircraft certification
issues.\49\ Comparatively, the FAA concluded that benefits from this
action would only recover approximately 70 percent of the costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ A copy of the DO-260 Business Case Analysis is available
from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number for
this rulemaking is FAA-2007-29305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The costs associated with using existing DO-260 avionics relative
to improved performance of URET and TMA were estimated at $31 million
and the estimated benefit in performance was $72 million. While this
analysis indicated that the benefits of improved URET and TMA
performance outweigh the costs of accommodating DO-260 equipped
aircraft,\50\ the FAA found that it raised some policy concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ The analysis concluded that it was not cost-beneficial to
use DO-260 avionics in the Gulf of Mexico prior to 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the FAA does not expect to have the full NAS-wide ADS-B
infrastructure completed for this effort until 2013. As the ADS-B rule
would go into effect in 2020, any benefits accrued through the use of
DO-260 avionics would only be available for approximately 7 years.
Operators would be required to make a second investment in avionics to
comply with the rule in 2020.
Second, a collection of broadcast samples indicated that there is a
wide variety of equipage among current DO-260 users. Although
approximately 7,500 aircraft in the United States transmit some ADS-B
data that would conform to DO-260, only about 1,500 aircraft transmit
enough data to be useful for 5 NM separation in the Gulf of Mexico and
input into ATC decision support tools (URET and TMA).\51\ Many DO-260
operators would require some upgrade costs to bring their existing
systems into compliance with a unified standard; these would be in
addition to the costs incurred for taking aircraft out of service for
certification. Although the user costs were not thoroughly assessed by
the ARC, the FAA estimated the costs at $15,000 per aircraft.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ A copy of the Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. DO-260
study is available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. The
docket number for this rulemaking is FAA-2007-29305.
\52\ The DO-260 Business Case Analysis assumed the cost of
$15,000 to upgrade an aircraft equipped with DO-260 only. The cost
does not include all costs to meet the rule. The cost was used for
the DO-260 Business Case Analysis and not used in the Regulatory
Impact Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the above, the FAA could not justify the proliferation of
avionics for the short-term that would not be compliant with the final
rule in 2020. Therefore, the agency concluded that the public interest
was not best served by using DO-260 avionics for ADS-B applications in
radar and non-radar airspace before 2020.
2. Financial and Operational Incentives
Numerous commenters, including AIA, the ARC, and NBAA, recommended
a variety of financial and operational incentives to make ADS-B more
cost-beneficial for the end user. Some commenters specifically
recommended that the FAA offer additional incentives for operators who
adopt early. NBAA recommended accelerated operational benefits to
encourage early installation of ADS-B equipment. Several commenters
stated that without operational incentives, aircraft operators with
legacy equipment will delay upgrades until the mandated compliance
date.
AOPA and the Helicopter Association International (HAI) recommended
several operational improvements and safety enhancements for ADS-B,
including: (1) Flight following and radar services at lower altitudes,
(2) terminal ATC services at GA airports, (3) automatic instrument
flight plan closure, (4) instrument flight rules (IFR) low altitude
direct routing, (5) enhanced flight service information, and (6)
improved real time weather. HAI also recommended that the FAA install
ground stations near hospitals and trauma centers to maximize benefits
for the emergency medical services community and encourage ADS-B
equipage.
ATA, CAA, the National Air Transportation Association, NBAA, and
UPS recommended specific operational incentives for early equipage,
including: (1) Implementing ADS-B in under-used areas of the NAS, (2)
providing preferential access to congested airspace, (3) deploying the
necessary ADS-B infrastructure for traffic crossing the Gulf of Mexico,
and (4) providing services for on-demand operators at small community
airports.
Some commenters, including AOPA, HAI, and CAA, recommended
financial incentives or tax credits for ADS-B equipage.
The following activities are scheduled to be complete by 2013:
Ground infrastructure coverage needed for the mandated
airspace,\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ The planned ADS-B service coverage is explained in greater
detail at http://www.adsb.gov/ gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADS-B interface to automation systems,
Guidelines for equipment certification,
Operations Specifications approval,
Approval to use ADS-B to meet established separation
standards,
ATC operational procedures for non-radar airspace that has
ADS-B coverage, and
FAA controller training and procedures.
The ADS-B program is currently funded and designed to provide
services in parts of Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, and areas in the NAS
where radar coverage currently exists. Additionally, actual ADS-B
coverage may exceed the defined radar coverage at lower altitudes in
some areas. The FAA cannot assess, however, the extent of this coverage
or its potential use for the ADS-B service until the ADS-B
implementation is complete in 2013.
The FAA acknowledges that the ADS-B system could be improved by
expanding the surveillance coverage of ADS-B to non-radar airspace. The
improved accuracy and update rate afforded by ADS-B provides the
ability to improve future NAS operations. As the number of projected
flight operations continues to increase, efficiency improvements to the
NAS are critical to addressing new demands. Therefore, the FAA will
continue to explore opportunities to use the ADS-B infrastructure to
provide additional coverage in non-radar areas. The FAA also notes that
ADS-B implementation will not affect flight following services in
effect today.
[[Page 30178]]
The FAA is actively pursuing agreements with airlines, avionics
manufacturers, airports, and other NAS users to encourage early
equipage of ADS-B. These agreements incorporate a variety of items,
including: (1) The possibility of developing preferred routes and cost
sharing for avionics in testing new applications, and (2) early
equipage and experience with advanced ADS-B applications that are not
available to non-equipped aircraft.
The FAA currently has several agreements with airlines and state
entities specifying that the FAA may enable benefits in exchange for
early ADS-B equipage. Additionally, the FAA, HAI, and oil platform
owners have an agreement for the Gulf of Mexico by which the FAA is
providing communication, navigation, and surveillance for ADS-B-
equipped helicopter operators.
The FAA and UPS have an agreement for testing and developing
merging and spacing, CDTI/Multi Function Display Assisted Visual
Separation (CAVS), and surface situational awareness applications in an
environment that provides measurable benefits. Additionally, the FAA is
working with Honeywell and ACSS to accelerate ASSA, FAROA, and surface
indication and alerting applications.
The FAA is working with US Airways to develop a work plan for
implementing ADS-B/NextGen technologies and procedures in parts of the
East Coast as a prelude to national implementation. In addition, the
FAA has an agreement with United Airlines to expedite oceanic in-trail
procedures development. The FAA is also working with NetJets on several
NextGen initiatives for performance-based navigation, communication,
and surveillance applications.
The FAA has established an ADS-B compatible Wide Area
Multilateration system in the mountainous areas of Colorado pursuant to
an agreement with the Colorado Department of Transportation. The FAA
continues to examine different areas of the country to determine
opportunities for surveillance service expansion and is continuing to
work with various state aviation offices.
In addition, the FAA continues to examine opportunities to provide
ADS-B services in areas that would benefit from increased surveillance.
The FAA does not currently have a list of airports that are targets for
ADS-B expansion. However, the FAA has started to identify areas that
would benefit most from ADS-B services. The FAA encourages cities,
states, airports, and private interests (such as hospitals and trauma
centers) to help determine surveillance needs and opportunities.
ADS-B can provide surveillance at lower altitudes than radar.
Moreover, ADS-B infrastructure is more easily deployed than most radar
in remote and hard-to-reach areas. The flexibility associated with
implementing ADS-B can facilitate service by helicopters to certain
communities. Deployment of ADS-B systems on medical, police, or tourist
helicopters could provide a level of asset tracking and search-and-
rescue capability that would be difficult to replicate with existing
surveillance systems. The FAA has already developed agreements with HAI
to support operations in the Gulf of Mexico. The FAA is open to
implementing similar agreements as opportunities for ADS-B service
expansion present themselves.
While this rule does not mandate ADS-B equipage in all airspace
classifications, the FAA is analyzing whether ADS-B services can be
expanded to provide improved safety and capacity enhancements for low
altitude flight operations and airports underlying non-mandated
airspace. The FAA will work with users to identify new candidate
airports for these services. This activity will continue throughout the
initial implementation period and post 2013 when the nationwide ADS-B
infrastructure is expected to be available NAS-wide.
The extent to which ADS-B can contribute to operations in special
use airspace is still being studied; however, the FAA is committed to
examining any proposals for the use of ADS-B outside of the scope of
implementation described in this rule.
3. Decommissioning Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B)
In the NPRM preamble, the FAA noted that once all aircraft are
equipped with ADS-B Out, ADS-R will provide the complete traffic
picture and the FAA will decommission TIS-B.
A few commenters, including the DOD, questioned the assumption that
all aircraft would be equipped for ADS-B Out. Rockwell-Collins
recommended retaining TIS-B after the ADS-B mandate takes effect,
because it provides a critical support for ADS-B airborne applications.
The original purpose of TIS-B was to provide proximate traffic
information to ADS-B In-equipped aircraft about targets that were not
equipped with ADS-B. When this rule takes effect in 2020 aircraft
operating in the airspace subject to this rule must be equipped with
ADS-B, thus theoretically eliminating the need for the TIS-B service.
However, the FAA realizes that TIS-B may still have value after 2020 as
a backup traffic service for ADS-B In aircraft during GNSS outages or
when an individual target's ADS-B system is inoperative. Thus, the FAA,
outside of this rulemaking effort, will evaluate the benefits of
continuing TIS-B past the 2020 rule compliance date.
O. Safety
Several commenters, including AOPA, the ARC, and Boeing, suggested
that the FAA expand the ADS-B service volume and ensure that TIS-B,
FIS-B, and ADS-R are included in the ADS-B expanded coverage area.
Some commenters believed that reducing primary radars would reduce
safety. These commenters noted that primary radar is important to track
aircraft without ADS-B. They also recommended that the FAA continue
requiring transport category aircraft to equip with Mode S transponders
and TCAS II as an independent collision avoidance system. Some
commenters argued that the complexity of the ADS-B system poses a
collision risk.
Other commenters noted that ADS-B In cockpit displays can be
confusing and distracting, which may cause a pilot to lose situational
awareness. They added that the FAA should evaluate the CDTI to
understand the additional monitoring responsibility and workload placed
on the flightcrew. One individual contended that ADS-B will increase a
pilot's dependence on cockpit equipment and reduce the pilot's tendency
to look outside the aircraft. Another individual commenter asked for
data to prove that ADS-B will not be susceptible to own-ship ghosting
or target duplication. (``Own-ship ghosting'' is a term that is used to
describe a traffic display showing one's own aircraft as an actual
target. Ensuring targets that are transmitting ADS-B are not also
transmitted as TIS-B targets helps reduce the chances of seeing one's
own aircraft as a target on the display.)
The final rule does not eliminate the requirement for transponders,
TCAS, or primary radars. The FAA notes that any aircraft required to
have TCAS II or ACAS, or that voluntarily has TCAS II or ACAS
installed, must also be equipped with a Mode S transponder. This
generally includes all aircraft operated under 14 CFR parts 121, 125,
and 129, and certain aircraft operated under 14 CFR part 135.
Mode S transponders transmit both aircraft altitude and aircraft
identification information. Both Mode A/C transponders and Mode S
transponders require interrogation to provide information. ADS-B In
Conflict
[[Page 30179]]
Detection does not replace the functions of TCAS II or ACAS; however,
future versions of hybrid surveillance systems may use passive ADS-B
messages to reduce unnecessary interrogations and, thus, reduce 1090
MHz spectrum congestion.
As stated in the NPRM, the FAA is maintaining its current network
of primary radars. However, the FAA expects to reduce a large
percentage of its secondary radars as a result of this rule. Both
primary surveillance radar and SSR will continue to be used for
surveillance during the transition period of ADS-B avionics equipage.
The benefits of certain ADS-B In applications cannot be fully
realized in areas where there is no ADS-B coverage; however, the lack
of ADS-B surveillance or ADS-R does not present a safety risk. When an
aircraft is outside of the ADS-B coverage area, the ADS-R/TIS-B system
will inform the pilot that the traffic picture is not complete. In all
areas, regardless of ADS-B coverage, pilots will use the same
procedures they have today to maintain safe separation of aircraft.
TIS-B and FIS-B services are advisory and cannot be used to maneuver an
aircraft without ATC clearance. The FAA will investigate ADS-B service
expansion as part of the ADS-B NAS-wide implementation.
With regard to the comment regarding own-ship ghosting, the ADS-B
system minimizes the chance of target duplication because it will not
transmit TIS-B data on a target that is broadcasting ADS-B. This is
because ADS-R is designed to relay information about aircraft
transmitting on a different broadcast link, and TIS-B is designed to
relay information only about aircraft not broadcasting ADS-B messages.
This rulemaking only mandates ADS-B Out, which does not involve any
requirements for a cockpit display. Before any mandate of ADS-B In, the
FAA will conduct extensive safety analysis and training. The current
ADS-B Out rule does not eliminate or reduce the requirement under Sec.
91.113 for pilots to see and avoid other aircraft.
P. Efficiency
In the NPRM preamble, the FAA stated that ADS-B will enhance ATC
surveillance, which will increase airspace efficiency and capacity to
meet the predicted demand for ATC services.
Several commenters, including the Airports Council International--
North America (ACI-NA), Boeing, and FedEx, commented on the anticipated
efficiency improvements stated in the NPRM. Some commenters contended
that the proposed rule did not prove that a decrease in en route
separation of aircraft will decrease delays or increase airspace
capacity. Two commenters argued that the FAA has not demonstrated that
system choke points can handle the increased capacity if en route
separation is reduced.
Other commenters, including the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, argued that reducing separation will not mitigate
commercial traffic delays caused by an inadequate number of runways,
weather, hub-and-spoke operations, or airline scheduling practices. Era
Corporation recommended that the FAA improve the infrastructure at
small airports to relieve congestion. Boeing stated that ADS-B alone
will not lead to the advances required by NextGen.
The FAA has consistently stated that ADS-B will not produce a
complete NextGen air traffic management solution, but rather will set
the initial steps to achieving a NextGen solution. The airport
infrastructure is a crucial component of the NAS. Efficiency and
capacity of the NAS can be positively affected by improving the
efficiency of individual flights and improving the quality of input to
air traffic controllers. ADS-B can help maximize the use of existing
airport infrastructure. The ability to transmit ADS-B Out messages can
increase the efficiency of the NAS in radar airspace by providing
accurate updates at a faster rate than many existing surveillance
systems. This increased update rate permits ATC to merge and sequence
aircraft more effectively into existing airport choke points, which
should mitigate, rather than increase, congestion and delay. This
rule's regulatory evaluation does not include any benefits that are
dependent on, or attributable to, other NextGen systems outside the
scope of this rulemaking.
The FAA expects that ADS-B Out will enable the establishment of
more direct routes outside airspace subject to this rule, which would
use less fuel, emit less carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide, and
increase NAS efficiency. The FAA is currently developing specific ADS-B
routes for certain areas that have the potential for significant
benefits (airspace off the shore of the east coast and over the Gulf of
Mexico). The FAA expects that other opportunities for routes enabled by
ADS-B will emerge as the ground infrastructure is implemented NAS-wide.
1. Improved Position Reporting
According to operational evaluations,\54\ ADS-B provides improved
accuracy over radar in most air traffic scenarios. While some terminal
radars can provide increased accuracy the closer the aircraft is to the
receiver, ADS-B provides consistent position accuracy regardless of the
aircraft's range from a receiver. ADS-B also provides more timely
information updates than conventional radar. Unlike radar, the accuracy
and integrity of ADS-B Out is uniform and consistent throughout the
service areas. Therefore, ATC's ability to accurately identify and
locate aircraft that are further away from the air traffic control
facilities will be better than radar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Surveillance and Broadcast Services Systems Engineering
Separation Standards Working Group, Final Report on Operational
Evaluation of 5 NM ADS-B to Radar Separation Services in Alaska,
November 30, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADS-B does not scan an environment in the same way as radar;
therefore, ADS-B does not provide unnecessary returns based on weather
or other obstructions, which can impede the effectiveness of primary
radars.
ADS-B provides consistent, frequently updated position reporting
and additional aircraft information for ATC decision-support tools,
which increases ATC confidence in aircraft position. This will allow
ATC to apply existing separation standards more exactly and without the
need for ATC to correct for possible radar inaccuracies. The regulatory
evaluation provides more discussion on the benefits of improved
surveillance information.
2. Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs)
The FAA plans to use the information broadcast by ADS-B to better
sequence aircraft approaching the terminal area with the development of
a Merging and Spacing application. This ground-based system sends
precise suggested speed instructions to en route aircraft. These exact-
speed instructions should allow aircraft to arrive at extended terminal
area merge points at times that are much more precise than currently
feasible.
As part of the Merging and Spacing application, the FAA is
developing both a ground tool and aircraft requirements that can be
used to optimize aircraft spacing. In addition to other airspace
efficiencies, this tool will enable a fuel-saving procedure called
Optimized Profile Descent (OPD), previously referred to as Continuous
Descent Arrivals (CDAs).
OPDs are a type of terminal arrival procedure, specifically
designed to keep an aircraft at, or near idle power during
[[Page 30180]]
the entire arrival until the final approach fix.\55\ These procedures
increase flight efficiencies while reducing noise, fuel consumption,
and emissions. OPDs eliminate step-down altitudes and the associated
inefficient power adjustments. OPDs depend on minimal aircraft
vectoring to maintain the arrival pattern. Therefore, aircraft must be
accurately metered with ADS-B-enabled spacing and sequencing tools
prior to and during descent and approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ The final approach fix identifies the beginning of the
final approach segment, and is the fix from which the final
instrument flight rule (IFR) approach to an airport is executed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below a certain level of demand, controllers can authorize OPDs
using current onboard equipment and procedures. As the terminal demand
increases, it becomes progressively more difficult for controllers to
allow OPDs because of interference with other traffic flows in the
airspace. As demand approaches capacity, the tradeoff between total
airport throughput (and delays) and individual flight profile
efficiency (that is, OPDs) would most likely prohibit OPDs for very
high traffic density situations. This situation will be aggravated over
time as air traffic resumes growth and terminal airspace constraints
increase.
Many airports start to exhibit significant delays when demand
reaches approximately 70 percent of capacity. The proposed FAA spacing
tool, using more accurate ADS-B position information, would enable OPDs
in medium-density terminal airspace when the demand approaches the
point where delays would be encountered. The FAA believes that ADS-B
Out can expand use of OPDs into medium levels of traffic density (40
percent to 70 percent), which may not be possible without ADS-B Out.
Accomplishing OPDs at this level of traffic density would have
important environmental and energy benefits with no increase in
congestion or delay.
3. Reduced Aircraft Separation
In non-radar airspace, ADS-B Out allows ATC to apply radar-like
separation standards in areas where ATC currently applies non-radar,
procedural separation. In some cases, routes laterally separated
without radar by as much as 90 NM are now separated with ADS-B at only
20 NM. Longitudinal separation of typically 10 minutes (80 NM) can be
reduced to 5 NM.
Boeing commented that the accuracy and integrity values proposed in
the NPRM will not support reduced en route separation standards. ADS-B
position accuracy supports current surveillance standards. Experience
with the mature system may allow reductions at a future time. The FAA
plans to expand 3 NM separation to locations in the NAS that currently
only permit 5 NM separation. Currently, the FAA is modeling several
scenarios to determine if ADS-B can support 3 NM en route separation
based on a target level of safety. The FAA will not move forward with
reduced separation until all safety and operational analyses have been
completed and ADS-B has been certified to perform this service.
4. Expanded Surveillance Coverage
In the future, there may also be an opportunity for ATC to use ADS-
B Out data for surveillance in areas of the NAS below the floor or
outside the lateral coverage of existing radar surveillance. The FAA
does not yet know where in the NAS this extra coverage might be
available. This information will likely not be available until ADS-B
surveillance has already been implemented in a service area. As the FAA
identifies areas with additional coverage, the FAA will investigate how
this additional coverage could be used.
Q. ADS-B In
Many commenters, including ACSS, ALPA, CAA, Lockheed Martin, the
NTSB, and UPS, commented that the majority of the ADS-B benefits will
be derived from ADS-B In. Numerous commenters asserted that ADS-B Out
alone would not be cost-beneficial or provide them with any added
benefits compared to their operations today. Some commenters noted that
ADS-B In, however, would provide necessary services to the cockpit.
Many of these commenters asserted that ADS-B In should be mandated as
well. However, AOPA specifically recommended that ADS-B In be voluntary
because it is cost-prohibitive for most GA owners. British Airways also
questioned the business case for ADS-B In.
Many commenters, including the DOD, ACI-NA, and AIA, pointed out
that the capabilities and functions of ADS-B Out alone will not provide
the full range of benefits available from ADS-B. To improve the overall
system, they recommended developing standards for ADS-B Out in unison
with standards for ADS-B In. GAMA and IATA recommended that the FAA
work to define the requirements for ADS-B In to encourage ADS-B
equipage. ATA specifically asked the FAA to define ADS-B In standards
by 2010. IATA noted that many operators will delay upgrades until there
is a single, defined ADS-B package with avionics and procedures to
support NextGen and the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management
(ATM) Research Program.
The ARC recommended that the FAA, in partnership with industry,
define a strategy for ADS-B In by 2012 and ensure that the strategy is
compatible with ADS-B Out avionics. The ARC also recommended that the
FAA describe how to proceed with ADS-B In beyond the voluntary equipage
concept discussed in the NPRM.
A few commenters, including NBAA, praised the benefits of ADS-B and
recommended that the FAA resolve ADS-B In display requirements,
including human factors. The NTSB stated that ADS-B would significantly
improve situational awareness for pilots, especially during ground
operations. GAMA recommended that the FAA not limit display options in
the final rule.
The FAA fully recognizes that ADS-B In and other future air-to-air
applications are functions that could provide substantial benefits to
aircraft operators and the NAS. While additional benefits can be
accrued using ADS-B In functions, requirements for an ADS-B In system
are not sufficiently defined to implement them at this time.
ADS-B Out is necessary to establish an air transportation
infrastructure that is consistent with the NextGen plan and will change
the way the NAS operates. Further, the economic evaluation of the ADS-B
Out proposal found the system to be cost-beneficial if ADS-B Out
avionics costs are at the low end of the estimated cost range and if
the benefits are at the high end of the estimated benefits range.
Given the value of ADS-B In services to individual operators and
the benefits to future NAS operations, the requirements adopted for
ADS-B Out also support certain ADS-B In applications.\56\ The FAA has
modified several aspects of the proposed rule to minimize the cost
impact to operators of the requirements driven by ADS-B In. The
requirements in this final rule also establish a stable infrastructure
for current and future applications of ADS-B In.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ These applications include Enhanced visual acquisition,
conflict detection, and enhanced visual approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA concurs with the ARC's recommendation to define a strategy
for ADS-B In equipage by 2012 and is working with industry to develop a
strategy for future ADS-B In applications. By 2012, the requirements
and benefits of ADS-B In applications should be well enough defined for
the
[[Page 30181]]
FAA to specify a set of performance requirements that would be tied to
a well-defined bundle of applications.
Furthermore, RTCA has completed the DO-317, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for Aircraft Surveillance Applications
System (ASAS), \57\ and the FAA is currently developing a TSO to
utilize this RTCA standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ ASAS provides the platform for the processing and display
of ADS-B In applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
R. ADS-B in Applications
Multiple commenters, including SANDIA, asked for more information
about potential ADS-B In applications. This information is provided
below.
1. Surface Situational Awareness With Indications and Alerting
This application is being designed to provide information regarding
potential traffic conflicts on or near the airport surface to the
flightcrew. The ADS-B In cockpit display would indicate the relevant
runway occupancy status. Depending on the severity of the conflict, the
system would alert the flight crew with visual and/or audible alerts.
2. In-Trail Procedures
This application is being designed to facilitate aircraft
conducting oceanic in-trail flight level changes using a reduced
separation standard. This application should improve the use of oceanic
airspace, increase efficiency, reduce fuel consumption, and increase
safety by helping flightcrews avoid turbulent flight levels. With this
application, ATC will continue to provide procedural non-radar
separation services. However, the FAA is exploring whether controllers
would be able to allow flight level changes where aircraft are
separated by only 15 NM during climb or descent, instead of 100 NM in
use today.
3. Interval Management
This application is intended to improve current merging and spacing
capabilities to ensure more consistent aircraft spacing, and
potentially increase airspace capacity. With this application,
controllers would issue a different set of instructions to pilots, for
example, to maintain a given time or distance from the preceding
aircraft. The flight crews will then use ADS-B In information to adjust
their airspeeds or flight paths to maintain the instructed separation.
4. Airport Surface Situational Awareness and Final Approach Runway
Occupancy Awareness
ASSA and FAROA increase situational awareness of potential airport
ground conflicts at several of the nation's busiest airports. However,
the reduced NACP requirement in this rule, while sufficient
for ADS-B Out, is not sufficient for all aircraft to use in ASSA and
FAROA.
S. International Harmonization
Several commenters stated that the ADS-B program technical
standards and requirements in the NPRM may be exclusive of, and not
harmonized with, ICAO and international efforts under way in Europe,
Australia, and Canada. Several individual commenters and AOPA
questioned the interoperability of UAT in international airspace,
including Canada and Mexico. They also questioned the applicability of
UAT through ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The ARC
recommended that the FAA advocate national policies that explicitly
allow for the use of non-U.S. positioning sources (for example,
Galileo) as part of the infrastructure to meet aviation performance
requirements.
The FAA fully supports the need for international regulators to
focus on a global interoperability of ADS-B through the continuing
development of standards for equipment, applications, flight
procedures, and operating rules. The RTCA standards for DO-260B and DO-
282B (referenced in TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c) were developed with close
international cooperation. The FAA supports the RTCA/European
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Requirements Focus
Group, which is internationally coordinating ADS-B In. Additionally,
the FAA actively meets with EUROCONTROL, the Australian Civil Aviation
Safety Authority, and Transport Canada to internationally coordinate
ADS-B regulation.
The FAA has structured the ADS-B Out program on performance
requirements and not a specific navigation or positioning source. The
FAA is proposing harmonized requirements for aircraft separation to
ICAO, with the support of Australia, Canada, and EUROCONTROL. The
United States is working with other GNSS providers to ensure system
interoperability, improve performance, and reduce costs for integrated
receiver equipment. This rule does not prohibit the use of
international GNSS; any navigation source that meets the requirements
complies with this rule.
The performance standards for the UAT were developed by RTCA
through international cooperation and coordination. The standards were
published in DO-282B, (MOPS for UAT ADS-B). Additionally, DO-282B was
developed in accordance with Annex 10 to the convention of
international civil aviation. As such, individual states are allowed to
invoke these standards as their own requirements.
T. Backup ATC Surveillance
In the NPRM, the FAA described an ADS-B backup strategy that
included a reduced network of SSRs to support high-density terminal
airspace, all en route airspace above 18,000 feet MSL, and medium-
density terminal airspace above certain altitudes. In the proposal, the
FAA noted that it intends to retain all primary surveillance radar as a
means to mitigate single-aircraft avionics failures.
Several aviation associations, air carriers, pilots, and various
other organizations commented on the proposed backup strategy. The
commenters suggested several potential alternatives including Automatic
Dependent Surveillance--Contract (ADS-C), long range navigation
(LORAN), enhanced long range navigation (eLORAN), fusion, and
multilateration.
Some commenters, including UPS and United Airlines, recommended
that the FAA develop a backup system that not only backs up
surveillance, but also works in a fusion process to increase the
accuracy, integrity, and availability of the primary surveillance
system. Boeing recommended that during RAIM outages, ADS-B could
broadcast position data derived from a flight management system or an
inertial navigation system. Other commenters questioned whether there
was a robust and fully independent airborne- or ground-based backup
timing system in the event of GPS timing signal loss. The DOD contended
that the backup must be able to support planned GPS electronic testing
and solar flare activity.
Several commenters opposed having one interdependent service for
both navigation and surveillance. They believed that this combination
of navigation and surveillance could be detrimental when a pilot
experiences a GPS outage while operating in instrument meteorological
conditions. The ARC recommended that the FAA, in coordination with
other Government agencies, develop an integrated communication
navigation and
[[Page 30182]]
surveillance (CNS) strategy to address GNSS interference and outages.
Various entities also questioned the procedures that would be in
place for aircraft operating with a NACP value of less than
9. One individual asked how the system will accommodate aircraft
without ADS-B, if an entire broadcast link is inoperable.
The FAA will provide ATC separation services for aircraft meeting
the minimum ADS-B-required performance parameters (NACP,
NACV, NIC, SDA, and SIL) for airspace subject to this rule.
If, during flight, an individual aircraft does not meet the minimum
ADS-B-required performance parameters, then ATC may provide separation
services using the backup (for example, radar where available and
procedural separation elsewhere). This transition will be seamless
because secondary surveillance data will be one of several surveillance
sources fused into the display used by ATC.
The ADS-B ground automation combines or ``fuses'' all available
surveillance information from ADS-B with primary surveillance radar and
SSR. This provides a complete or ``fused'' picture of all the traffic
operating in a given area. Multi-sensor fusion allows the automation to
combine data from various sensors, and use the most accurate
measurements. In most cases, a Kalman Filter Tracker optimizes the
accuracy of track estimates from multiple sensors. In addition to
improved aircraft position accuracy, data fusion uses all the updates
from multiple sensors, which increases the overall update rate. The FAA
currently uses practical trackers for data fusion with the Common-
Automated Radar Terminal System and the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System.
If the ADS-B ground infrastructure or a particular broadcast link
is out of service, or a sufficient number of aircraft cannot meet the
minimum required performance for a given airspace and controller
workload is adversely impacted, ATC will use the backup system to
provide ATC separation services for all aircraft in that airspace.
Transition to the backup strategy will not impact the ability of ATC to
provide separation services to the operator.
The FAA completed the Surveillance/Positioning Backup Strategy
Alternatives Analysis \58\ on January 8, 2007. This study included a
comprehensive analysis of various strategies for mitigating the impact
of the loss of GPS on ADS-B surveillance. The analysis identified a
reduced network of SSRs as the recommended backup for ADS-B. This
strategy retains all existing en route SSRs (150) and approximately 50
percent of SSRs in high-density terminal areas (40).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ It is important to recognize that this is a performance-
based rule and does not require GNSS. For the purpose of the backup
strategy evaluation the FAA assumed that users would equip with a
GNSS as their position source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA assessed numerous technologies as part of this analysis,
including: Multilateration; eLORAN; distance measuring equipment (DME);
DME/inertial reference units; satellite-based augmentation systems;
ground-based augmentation systems; and various combinations and
implementations of these technologies. The FAA determined the backup
strategy based on the most effective tradeoff between performance,
schedule, and cost factors among airborne and ground segments of the
NAS architecture.
This backup strategy will support continued use of the separation
standards in effect today. However, for select areas experiencing
degraded surveillance coverage during an outage, ATC may increase
aircraft separation as operationally required.\59\ The FAA concludes
that these operational capabilities are sufficient, given that loss of
required position information is expected to be a rare event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ The standard for reverting to backup surveillance is also
discussed in H.2, System Availability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In meeting the performance standards adopted by this rule, an
aircraft's navigation and surveillance functions may be dependent on
the same position source. Using GNSS technology for ADS-B provides for
improved performance (i.e., increased update rate, increased accuracy
at long range, and cleaner surveillance picture to ATC) over other
surveillance systems and allows for a more flexible ground
infrastructure.
The risks posed by this dependency have been accepted because the
navigation and surveillance functions have independent backup systems.
In evaluating the options, the FAA specifically considered the scenario
in which the satellite positioning source failed. As a result, the FAA
determined that an effective backup system could not also be satellite-
based. The FAA further determined that these backup capabilities ensure
sufficient navigation and surveillance capabilities during a
positioning source outage and maintain appropriate levels of safety.
U. Privacy
The NPRM proposed requiring a message element to transmit the
aircraft's assigned 24-bit ICAO address.
Many commenters, including AOPA and Rockwell-Collins, strongly
argued against ADS-B Out broadcasts of identifiable data, including
aircraft tail number and operator name. These commenters argued that
the information could be used to continuously watch all aircraft and
ultimately could be used by the FAA for enforcement or assessing user
fees. Certain commenters argued in favor of retaining the anonymous
mode for VFR operations because aircraft identification is only
required for ATC purposes.
Commenters suggested several alternatives: (1) Use UAT's privacy
message function (which allows the pilot to select ``VFR'' mode) to
have the UAT system randomly select a 24-bit ICAO address; (2) require
manufacturers to design ADS-B systems that archive data onboard, and
advise pilots to archive the data so there is an independent data
source that corroborates government data; and (3) design a system host
configuration protocol to assign transponder codes through a unique
address when the UAT or 1090 MHz ES is turned on. They contended that
this would allow a network to eliminate system duplicity and guarantee
anonymity to the pilot of the aircraft (therefore, the 24-bit Mode S
identifiers would no longer be needed).
The ARC made three recommendations regarding privacy: (1) The FAA
should treat the 24-bit ICAO code assignments as information covered
under privacy laws, so they are available only to authorized personnel
or released by the holder; (2) the FAA should use the anonymity feature
of UAT and develop an equivalent anonymity feature for 1090 MHz ES that
would apply to VFR operations not using ATC services; and (3) the FAA
should accommodate assignment of the 24-bit ICAO codes so that they do
not easily correlate to an aircraft tail number and they permit
aircraft call signs to be something other than the aircraft
registration number when receiving ATC services.
The FAA reviewed all the comments regarding privacy and notes that
most of the commenters specifically addressed VFR operations. The FAA
notes that there is no right to privacy when operating in the NAS. The
FAA specifically designates airspace for which the identification of
aircraft is necessary, so that the agency can effectively separate
aircraft. The transponder rule specifies that an
[[Page 30183]]
aircraft operating in airspace designated in Sec. 91.215 must have ATC
transponder equipment installed that meets the performance requirements
of TSO-C74b, TSO-C74c, or TSO-C112.
Many GA aircraft are equipped with Mode C, which has the capability
to squawk 1200 and meets the requirements of Sec. 91.215, without
specifically identifying the aircraft. Most of these commenters are
seeking similar treatment under ADS-B so that ATC can track the
aircraft without specifically identifying the aircraft.
TSO-C154c includes a feature to temporarily and randomly assign a
24-bit address for UAT-equipped aircraft. This rule does not prohibit
the use of this feature. UAT-equipped aircraft conducting VFR
operations that have not filed a flight plan and are not requesting ATC
services may use this feature. Although the FAA does not prohibit the
anonymity feature, operators using the anonymity feature will not be
eligible to receive ATC services and will not be able to benefit from
enhanced ADS-B search and rescue capabilities. TSO-C166b does not
include a feature to accommodate anonymous 24-bit addresses. Should
safety or efficiency of the NAS so require, the FAA could initiate
rulemaking to prohibit an operator from using the anonymity feature.
Additionally, if the FAA, in coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), determines that the anonymity feature is an
unacceptable risk to security, the FAA could initiate rulemaking to
prohibit an operator from using the anonymity feature.
This rule does not implement any type of user fee. Subsequent
agency rulemaking would be necessary to establish such fees.
Furthermore, this rule does not affect the process for the FAA
assigning the 24-bit ICAO codes.
The FAA has not determined that archiving data onboard the aircraft
is necessary for ATC surveillance. However, this rule does not preclude
manufacturers from designing equipment with this function.
V. Security
Various commenters, including the DOD, commented on the security
aspects of the ADS-B system. They contended that, as ADS-B will
broadcast the location and identity of users, malicious parties could
monitor transmissions from the aircraft and ATC to obtain information
to target and harm the aircraft. Another commenter stated that the ADS-
B information could be used by an unmanned aircraft to target passenger
aircraft. Some commenters alleged that security safeguards are needed
for ADS-B to protect aircraft from terrorist attacks.
Other commenters argued that an aircraft's ADS-B transmissions or
GPS position/timing signals could be subject to inadvertent or
intentional interruption or loss of the GPS timing signal. Several
commenters recommended a planned oversight feature (for example,
requiring ADS-B ground receivers to be licensed) to ensure that only
authorized personnel access the data collected, and that the data is
only accessed for authorized purposes. The DOD recommended that the FAA
work with DHS and the DOD to determine ADS-B risks and appropriate
countermeasures.
The FAA conducted several analyses on the security aspects of ADS-
B. These analyses include the information system for collecting data,
transmitting and storing data, as well as risk assessments on the
vulnerability of ADS-B broadcast messages. All FAA information,
including ADS-B transmissions received by the FAA, that is collected,
processed, transmitted, stored, or disseminated in its general support
systems and applications is subject to certification and accreditation,
under National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST)
information technology standards. It is a continuing process that
protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
information.
The FAA's Security Certification and Accreditation Procedures
(SCAP) were developed in accordance with Federal law, including: (1)
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, (2) OMB
Circular A-130 (Management of Federal Information Resources), (3)
Federal Information Processing Standards 199, and (4) NIST Special
Publications (SP) 800-37 (Guide for the Security Certification and
Accreditation of Federal Information Systems), NIST SP 800-53
(Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems), and
NIST SP 800-53A (Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal
Information Systems).
The FAA completed the SCAP for the ADS-B system originally in
September 2008. The FAA completed a new SCAP in October 2009 as a
result of changes made to the ADS-B system. This process ensures that
ADS-B does not introduce new security weaknesses. It also ensures that
the hardware and software composing the ADS-B system meets rigid and
well-documented standards for infrastructure security. ADS-B meets all
qualifications and mandates of this process. As part of the SCAP, the
system is tested annually for security compliance, and every 3 years
the system goes through an entirely new SCAP. In addition, the FAA
specifically assessed the vulnerability risk of ADS-B broadcast
messages being used to target air carrier aircraft. This assessment
contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR
parts 1 and 1520, and its content is otherwise protected from public
disclosure. While the agency cannot comment on the data in this study,
it can confirm, for the purpose of responding to the comments in this
rulemaking proceeding, that using ADS-B data does not subject an
aircraft to any increased risk compared to the risk that is experienced
today. As part of this process, the FAA forwarded the assessment to its
interagency partners, including the DOD, the Transportation Security
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States
Secret Service, and other appropriate agencies for review. These
entities evaluated the modeling approach, analysis, and risk outcome.
They did not identify any reason to invalidate the analysis which
determined that ADS-B data does not increase an aircraft's
vulnerability. The FAA commits to annual updates of this assessment to
monitor any changes in the underlying assumptions in the risk analysis,
and to monitor new threat information that becomes available.
The FAA concludes that ADS-B transmissions would be no more
susceptible to spoofing (that is, intentionally broadcasting a false
target) or intentional jamming than that experienced with SSR
transmissions (Mode A, C, and S) today. Spoofing of false targets and
intentional jamming very rarely occur with the surveillance systems in
place today.
The ADS-B transmission signals from aircraft will be fused with
surveillance data from both primary and secondary radars before it is
displayed for ATC. The controllers, therefore, are receiving and
viewing a composite of aircraft data from multiple surveillance
systems. The FAA does not expect spoofing and jamming to occur during
the transition to using this fused data for surveillance. This is
because the automation will reveal the discrepancy between a spoofed or
jammed ADS-B target and the target reported by radar and SSR position
reports. Fusion also provides for a smooth transition to backup
surveillance if an ADS-B system is experiencing interference.
Furthermore, encryption of any ADS-B data would unnecessarily limit its
use internationally.
[[Page 30184]]
The FAA also concludes that additional certification and
accreditation of ground equipment will not be necessary because of the
strict SCAP provision certifying that crucial information and equipment
are not available to unauthorized individuals.
The FAA finds no basis at this point that ADS-B Out provides any
greater security risks to air navigation systems to the United States.
The FAA continues to meet regularly with DOD and DHS representatives
regarding the use of ADS-B information and national security issues.
W. Alternatives To ADS-B
The NPRM compared: (1) Radar as it exists today, (2)
multilateration, and (3) ADS-B. In the NPRM, the FAA's alternatives
analysis found radar to be the most cost-effective solution; however,
radar would neither be effective in supporting air traffic growth over
time nor provide the necessary technical capabilities to support the
NextGen concept of operations.
Several commenters indicated that the existing radar system is
sufficient for operations. Some commenters suggested expanding the
radar infrastructure or implementing an alternative reporting system
using commercial off-the-shelf technologies that have a means to encode
and transmit GPS position data.
Other commenters believed that multilateration could provide
similar benefits to ADS-B at a potentially lower cost. Boeing requested
that the FAA provide an analysis explaining its conclusion that
multilateration would not provide the same level of benefits as ADS-B.
ATA specifically stated that they do not believe multilateration is a
viable alternative; however, it can provide highly accurate position
reports for surface ADS-B In applications. Several commenters objected
to the prohibitive cost of upgrading the avionics with ADS-B because
there are commercial products currently available that provide real
time weather and traffic information.
The agency has determined that the improved accuracy and update
rate afforded by ADS-B is a critical segment of the NextGen
infrastructure and capabilities that offer the opportunity to make the
system more efficient. Specifically, enhanced surveillance data via
ADS-B will improve the performance of ATC decision-support tools (URET
and TMA) which rely on surveillance data to make predictions. The end
result will be fewer, more efficient reroutes to avoid potential
conflicts, as well as improved metering into the terminal area. This
will allow increased and more efficient use of OPDs, which have lower
energy and emissions profiles. Unlike radar and multilateration, ADS-B
provides more detailed flight information (for example, update rate,
velocity, and heading) that supports ground-based merging and spacing
tools. These tools use this information to determine optimal tracks for
ATC arrival planning.
FIS-B and TIS-B provide the uplink of weather and traffic
information to the cockpit. Equipping with the necessary ADS-B In
avionics (receiver and display components) is voluntary for operators
and is not required by the ADS-B rule. The FAA analyzed alternative
sources for weather and traffic information. Individually, these
alternative sources may be less costly than the ADS-B solution.
However, the FAA's analysis showed that the bundling of surveillance,
weather, and traffic information is cost-effective for users who have
not already invested in alternative capabilities. The FAA compared the
costs and benefits of ADS-B, multilateration, and radar, as well as the
cost savings for bundling services. A report (``Exhibit 300, Attachment
2, Business Case Analysis Report for Future Surveillance, JRC Phase
2a'') is available in the docket for this rulemaking.
In sum, none of the alternatives offers the range of capabilities
nor supports the NextGen concept of operations as well as ADS-B.
X. ADS-B Equipment Scheduled Maintenance
The NPRM did not propose any additional continuing airworthiness
requirements associated with the installation of ADS-B avionics
equipment. A few commenters questioned the FAA's plan for continued
airworthiness inspections for ADS-B equipment.
This final rule does not add any continuing airworthiness
inspection requirements. Transponder-based ADS-B systems will still be
required to meet the requirements of Sec. 91.413. However, ADS-B
systems, without a transponder, do not have any new inspection
requirements. The FAA will use the ground automation system to
continuously monitor ADS-B functionality, which accomplishes the
purposes of a recurrent inspection.
Y. Specific Design Parameters
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed performance standards for ADS-B Out,
but did not specify any specific design parameters.
Several commenters, including the EAA, and the United States
Parachute Association, recommended specific design parameters for ADS-B
avionics, including size, weight, and power consumption.
The FAA again notes that this is a performance-based rule and does
not mandate a particular system or design specifications (including
size, weight, or power consumption). A performance-based rule provides
industry with the opportunity to use innovative approaches in designing
ADS-B avionics to meet the needs of their customers.
Z. Economic Issues
The FAA updated the cost and benefit estimates in the final
regulatory impact analysis for this rule. For a summary of the final
regulatory impact analysis, see Section III. The full final regulatory
impact analysis may be found in the docket for this rulemaking. The
following section discusses comments the FAA received on the proposal's
regulatory evaluation. Where appropriate, the discussion includes
information on the updated costs and benefits for this final rule.
1. ADS-B Out Equipage Cost
The FAA estimated that costs for the proposed rule would be between
$2.3 billion and $8.5 billion. The FAA also considered that industry
would start to incur equipage costs in 2012, ranging from $1.27 billion
to $7.46 billion. In the final rule, the FAA estimates total costs to
range from $3.3 billion to $7.0 billion, and industry equipage costs to
range from $2.5 billion to $6.2 billion.
Several commenters, including ATA, Boeing, British Airways, Delta
Airlines, EAA, Honeywell, NBAA, and the Regional Airline Association
(RAA), questioned specific cost estimates in the proposal's economic
analysis or asked for more information about the cost and benefit
estimates. Most of the commenters believed that equipage costs for ADS-
B Out would exceed the estimates provided in the proposal.
Several commenters, including AOPA, EAA, Embraer, and the United
States Parachute Association, stated that the cost to equip with ADS-B
Out was too high. Commenters pointed out that, given the value of most
GA aircraft, the cost of equipage could represent a significant
percentage of, or possibly exceed, the current value of the aircraft.
Some commenters noted that costs of this magnitude could make
recreational or business flying cost-prohibitive. Some commenters,
including FedEx, noted that equipage costs will be significantly higher
for aircraft not currently equipped with a certified GPS/WAAS position
source.
[[Page 30185]]
For the proposed rule, the FAA contacted manufacturers, industry
associations, and ADS-B Out suppliers to estimate ADS-B equipage and
maintenance costs by aircraft model. The proposal included industry
estimates for the cost of installation, maintenance, additional weight,
and the addition of ADS-B Out equipment to meet the performance
mandate. The proposal's regulatory impact analysis also assumed that
all active airframes in service would be retrofitted by 2020.
The FAA expects that the increased demand for the ADS-B Out
equipment required by this performance-based rule will result in a more
competitive market, such that the prices may decrease in the coming
years for certain aircraft groups. The FAA also anticipates that any
investment in ADS-B Out equipage will increase the residual value of
that aircraft and will allow easier access to the regulated airspace.
The FAA agrees that equipping aircraft with ADS-B Out will cost
more for those aircraft that are not equipped with a position source
capable of providing the necessary accuracy and integrity. To capture
this cost in the proposal, the FAA requested that industry categorize
large category turbojet airplanes by classic, neo-classic, modern, and
new production classes, as well as the existing level of airplane
equipage for each class. However, due to the confidentiality of cost
data, the regulatory evaluation does not present ADS-B-supplier level
data details. The FAA fully acknowledges that the general aviation
community will incur significant costs from this rule. However, this
must be balanced against the foundation this capability provides in
moving toward the NextGen infrastructure and benefits from its overall
usage.
2. FAA Cost Savings With ADS-B Out Compared to Radar
The FAA considered the following three systems for future NAS
surveillance: (1) Radar, (2) multilateration, and (3) ADS-B. The FAA
explained in the proposal that radar was the lowest cost option. Based
on forecasts at the time of the NPRM, the FAA did not expect that radar
could accommodate the projected increase in traffic.
Several commenters, including EAA and RAA, stated that the ADS-B
program would result in a cost savings to the FAA because it would have
less radar to maintain, operate, and replace. Most of the commenters
claimed that the ADS-B program would shift costs from the FAA to
aircraft operators.
The ADS-B program is not expected to result in a cost savings to
the FAA from 2009 through 2035. As ADS-B becomes operational, the FAA
plans to decommission some SSR. While this will reduce the operational
costs of maintaining radar, the FAA will incur additional costs for
ADS-B ground stations. This results in a net increase in cost for the
FAA.
3. Business Case for ADS-B Out and In
In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that the total costs of ADS-B Out
and In (excluding avionics for ADS-B In), relative to the radar
baseline, would range from $2.8 billion to $9.0 billion. The FAA
further estimated that ADS-B Out and In would yield $13.8 billion in
total benefits.
The FAA concluded that ADS-B Out and In would be cost beneficial at
a present value of 7 percent, if: The avionics costs for ADS-B Out are
low ($670 million at a 7 percent present value) and the avionics costs
for ADS-B In do not exceed $1.85 billion at a 7 percent present value.
As stated in the NPRM, ADS-B Out and In would be cost beneficial at
a 3 percent present value if: (1) The avionics costs for ADS-B Out are
low ($950 million at a 3 percent present value) and the avionics costs
for ADS-B In do not exceed $5.3 billion at a 3 percent present value or
(2) the avionics costs for ADS-B Out are high ($5.35 billion at a 3
percent present value) and the avionics costs for ADS-B In do not
exceed $870 million.
Boeing asked for further clarification of scenarios in which ADS-B
may not be cost beneficial. Specifically, Boeing referred to the 3
percent present value estimate in the NPRM with high avionics costs.
Boeing noted that it does not believe ADS-B In avionics costs will be
less than ADS-B Out avionics costs. Boeing also asked for the cost
beneficial values of ADS-B Out and In at a 7 percent present value if
avionics costs are high.
Boeing suggested that the FAA conduct a thorough cost-benefit
analysis for the ADS-B program, including accurate cost estimates for
ADS-B In. Boeing further recommended that if the FAA cannot determine
the costs associated with ADS-B In, the FAA should not include these
costs and benefits in the economic analysis.
Boeing also questioned why the FAA estimated the benefits for ADS-B
Out and In at $13.9 billion in the proposal, while the FAA estimated
the ADS-B Out and In benefits at $18.5 billion in the ``Surveillance
and Broadcast Services Benefits Basis of Estimates'' \60\ (SBS BOE)
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ This report was published in August 2007. A copy of this
report is available from the Web site http://www.regulations.gov. To
find the report, enter FAA-2007-29305-0013.1 in the search box.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA agrees with Boeing that if the costs of ADS-B Out avionics
are at the high end of our estimates and if ADS-B In avionics are more
expensive than ADS-B Out avionics, then the costs estimated for ADS-B
Out and In will exceed the quantified benefits, given the assumptions
in the economic evaluation. The FAA also notes that at a 7 percent
present value with the assumptions in the economic evaluation (i.e., if
industry costs for ADS-B Out avionics are at the high end of the
range), then ADS-B Out and In will not be cost-beneficial. The FAA does
not agree that the estimates in the regulatory impact analysis need to
be consistent with the estimates in the SBS BOE report. The economic
analysis quantifies the potential benefits that the FAA expects to
result from adoption of the rule. The economic analysis does not
include benefits that could be realized without the rule.
Specifically, the regulatory impact analysis did not include
benefits from ADS-B in Alaska or for low altitude operations in the
Gulf of Mexico because these benefits would occur without the rule. The
regulatory evaluation also did not include benefits related to
controlled flight into terrain because terrain avoidance warning
systems currently provide these benefits. Other benefits that the FAA
did not consider in the proposal, but are in the SBS BOE, include: An
estimate of the reduction in FAA subscription charges because of value
added services and a reduction in costs to obtain weather information.
In addition, the regulatory impact analysis did not specifically
include a benefit for radar system replacement cost avoidance. Rather,
the FAA compared the total cost of continuing full radar surveillance
(the baseline) to the cost of providing surveillance with ADS-B. This
included the costs of gradually discontinuing some radar and continuing
some radar as a backup. The lower costs of radar (what is referred to
as ``surveillance cost avoidance'' in the SBS BOE) were captured in the
cost comparison of radar under the baseline and radar under the ADS-B
Out scenario (the rule).
The draft regulatory impact analysis released with the NPRM
included a cost-benefit analysis of ADS-B Out alone, as well as for the
scenarios for ADS-B Out and In. For the final rule,
[[Page 30186]]
the FAA also queried industry for equipage costs for ADS-B Out and In.
Although the FAA initially attempted to capture the benefits for ADS-B
In, upon further consideration the agency has determined that the
performance requirements are not sufficiently developed to conduct a
meaningful analysis. The FAA has not included ADS-B In costs and
benefits in the final regulatory impact analysis.
4. Improved En Route Conflict Probe Benefit Performance
In the NPRM, the FAA estimated the benefit for en route conflict
probe at $3.3 billion.\61\ To calculate this savings, the FAA estimated
the reduction in ATC vectors resulting from improved en route conflict
probe. Then, the FAA attributed this time savings to direct aircraft
operating costs and the passenger value of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ This translates to $840 million at a 7 percent present
value or $1.8 billion at a 3 percent present value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters questioned the improved en route conflict probe
benefit estimates. The commenters noted that the amount of time saved
per passenger was low, compared to other delays in the overall travel
environment (for example, late arrivals at the airport and waiting for
baggage). They recommended that the FAA delete the passenger value of
time from its benefit estimate.
The FAA does not agree that the passenger value of time should be
removed from its benefit estimate and therefore includes it in the
final regulatory impact analysis. There has been significant discussion
about whether small increments of time should be valued at lower rates
than larger increments. The present state of theoretical and empirical
knowledge does not appear to support valuing small increments of time
less than larger ones.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Economic Values For FAA Investment and Regulatory
Decisions, A Guide, Final Report Revised Oct. 3, 2007, GRA
Incorporated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Capacity Enhancements, Airspace Efficiency, and Fuel Saving Benefits
In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that between 2017 and 2035, ADS-B
would allow for more efficient handling of potential en route
conflicts. In the NPRM, the FAA estimated this would save 410 million
gallons of fuel and eliminate 4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
emissions. The FAA also noted in the initial regulatory impact analysis
that, during this same time period, continuous descent approaches (now
referred to as OPDs), would allow for a 10 billion pound fuel savings
and a 14 million ton reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.
Furthermore, the FAA noted that optimal routing over the Gulf of Mexico
would eliminate 300,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions between
2012 and 2035. In the final regulatory impact analysis, the FAA
estimated a net reduction in carbon dioxide emissions attributable to
the rule and calculated a monetary value to this net reduction. See the
full regulatory impact analysis for details.
A few commenters, including RAA, questioned the cost savings
associated with more efficient flights using ADS-B. Some of these
commenters also asked the FAA to remove the discussion on reduced
carbon dioxide emissions because the efficiency and fuel saving claims
have not been validated.
RAA noted that the FAA has considerable experience justifying rules
that enhance safety, but suggested that the FAA is not experienced in
justifying rules based on increased airspace capacity and fuel savings.
RAA asked the FAA to validate whether the reduced vertical separation
minimum (RVSM) program reduced fuel consumption, as estimated in the
RVSM regulatory evaluation. RAA also noted that the benefit analysis
should quantify the benefits that ADS-B would provide over current
descent procedures enabled without ADS-B.
GAMA and an individual commenter noted the environmental impact of
airspace modernization. GAMA encouraged the FAA to provide additional
details and quantify the benefit from fuel savings that the FAA expects
ADS-B surveillance will provide.
In the proposal's benefit analysis, the FAA quantified the benefits
that ADS-B alone will provide over current, recognized OPD procedures.
The agency agrees that the efficiency benefits are, in part,
conceptual, and with new technologies, conceptual efficiency benefits
analysis is the only option. While outside the scope of this
rulemaking, as noted by a commenter, the RVSM program offers an example
of how airspace redesign and new technological capabilities can result
in significant efficiency and operational (fuel savings) gains.
6. Deriving Benefits From Capstone Implementation in Alaska
In the NPRM, the FAA explained that ADS-B has been demonstrated and
used in Alaska for terrain and traffic awareness, and that it had a
noticeable effect on safety. Several commenters argued that Capstone is
an insufficient basis to assume benefits from ADS-B equipage. The
commenters noted that Capstone is a strong component of the
justification for the system; they added that a major component of
Capstone is the addition of terrain information and warnings.
Commenters also noted that the flight environment in southeast Alaska
is unlike any in the lower 48 states.
The FAA understands that the conditions in Alaska do not translate
to the continental United States. While the regulatory impact analysis
does not include any benefits from Capstone, the rulemaking action does
highlight the potential benefits derived from more accurate and timely
positioning information from ADS-B.
7. Regional Airline Benefits
In the NPRM, the FAA quantified the benefits as shown in Table 4.
Table 4--Estimated Benefits Included in the NPRM Regulatory Evaluation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefit 2007 Discounted at Discounted at
Benefit area M$ 3% 7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Benefits.................................................. $9,948.5 $5,484.3 $2,657.7
Gulf of Mexico:
High Altitude Operations.................................... 2,067.2 1,104.4 509.9
More Efficient En Route Separation Delay Savings............ 1,810.6 946.1 421.3
Additional Flights Accommodated Optimal and More Direct 256.6 158.4 88.6
Routing....................................................
Improved En Route Conflict Probe Performance.................... 3,258.1 1,774.0 840.1
More Efficient Metering Based on Improved TMA Accuracy.......... 1,746.6 944.9 441.1
Increased Ability to Perform Continuous Descent Approaches...... 2,876.7 1,661.0 866.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 30187]]
RAA expressed concern that regional operators do not have equal
access to large airports; therefore, they will not achieve the same
benefits as larger air carriers. RAA specifically noted that the FAA
has not committed to a measurable reduction in aircraft-to-aircraft
separation standards. They believed that without reduced separation
standards, the benefits would be localized and would not apply to
regional airlines. RAA also noted that regional aircraft typically do
not carry life rafts and, therefore, they cannot conduct extended over-
water operations. As a result, they will not benefit from more
efficient aircraft separation over the Gulf of Mexico.
The FAA agrees that regional operators who cannot operate over the
Gulf of Mexico will not attain this separation benefit. However, the
FAA did not estimate benefits specifically for regional carriers. The
agency expects regional airlines to benefit from ADS-B Out even without
reduced aircraft-to-aircraft separation standards. This is because
other benefits, including improved en route conflict probe performance,
apply to all aircraft in Class A airspace, including regional airlines.
8. General Aviation: High Equipage Costs With Little Benefit
In the proposal, the FAA estimated that the total cost to equip GA
aircraft from 2012 through 2035 would range from $1.2 billion to about
$4.5 billion with a mid-point average of nearly $2.9 billion.\63\
Although the FAA did not specifically estimate GA benefits in the NPRM,
the agency now estimates that GA could receive up to $200 million in
ADS-B Out benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ The FAA also calculated this midpoint to be $2.1 billion at
a 3 percent present value or $1.5 billion at a 7 percent present
value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numerous commenters, including AOPA and EAA, expressed concern that
the proposed rule would require GA operators to add costly equipment to
their aircraft, while providing these operators with few benefits. GAMA
noted that many of the benefits for GA operators exist with ADS-B In.
Several of the commenters noted that GA aircraft do not substantially
contribute to delays or congestion in the NAS. They further stated that
if ADS-B lessens traffic delays, it will benefit the airlines rather
than the GA community. AOPA recommended that the FAA work with key
stakeholders to identify a strategy that either removes low-altitude
airspace users from the proposal or greatly improves the benefits for
them.
The FAA considered three options to resolve the GA cost benefit
comments. First, the FAA considered modifying performance requirements
to reduce equipage costs. Second, the FAA evaluated options to provide
additional benefits to GA operators. Third, the FAA explored tailoring
the rule such that fewer GA operators would be affected.
For the first option, the FAA determined that opportunities do
exist for reducing the equipage costs for GA operators. In the rule,
the FAA bases the performance requirements solely on ATC separation
services; whereas in the proposal, the performance requirements were
based on ATC separation services and five initial ADS-B In
applications. This change eliminated the need for ADS-B antenna
diversity because the ATC separation services can operate effectively
without it and the ADS-B Out benefits can be achieved. Multiple
commenters and the ARC felt that removing antenna diversity would help
make the rule cheaper to implement for light general aviation
operators.
For the second option, using comments received by the GA community,
the FAA has identified opportunities to provide additional benefits to
GA operators by expanding ADS-B services throughout the NAS to areas
not currently serviced. Thus, outside of this rulemaking effort, the
FAA intends to explore the costs and benefits for the following ADS-B
enabled service expansions:
(a) Expanding low altitude surveillance coverage, both in areas
receiving increased collateral coverage from the initial ADS-B ground
station infrastructure and in areas that could benefit from additional
ground station coverage.
(b) Providing radar-like terminal ATC services at airports not
currently served.
(c) Providing an automated mechanism for the closure of IFR flight
plans based on the new technologies ability to detect an aircraft's
arrival at its destination airport.
(d) Making enhancements to current search and rescue technology and
procedures that will assist rescue personnel in determining the last
known location of aircraft that are reported missing.
(e) Providing Flight Service Stations (FSSs) with ADS-B positional
display information and assisting in the development of automation
systems that will allow for more tailored in flight service functions.
For the third option, the FAA looked at tailoring the ADS-B
airspace such that the number of general aviation aircraft needing to
equip would be minimized. Specifically the FAA considered limiting the
rule to only Class A and B airspace. Although ADS-B surveillance is not
as critical to the NexGen goals in lower density airspace, such as
Class E airspace above 10,000 feet and Class C airspace, ADS-B equipage
for all aircraft in these areas is essential to gaining the overall
stated ADS-B benefits, realizing savings associated with radar
decommissioning,\64\ the expansion of potential future benefits
discussed above, and moving towards the NextGen concept of operations.
Thus, the airspace subject to this rule remains unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ The costs of radar will be about $1 billion less with ADS-B
Out, although the total ground costs of ADS-B Out with the cost to
sustain and decommission select radar will exceed the cost of
continuing radar without implementing ADS-B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AA. Revisions To Other Regulations
Several commenters, including ACI-NA, ACSS, ATA, United Airlines,
and UPS, recommended changes to other regulations. Specifically, they
recommended that the FAA update subpart F of 14 CFR part 25 to include
ADS-B requirements. ACI-NA recommended that the FAA amend 14 CFR part
139 to require airport surface vehicles to equip with ADS-B to prevent
runway incursions. Airbus recommended that the FAA update advisory
circular (AC) 120-86, Aircraft Surveillance Systems and Applications.
This rule only amends the operating regulations in part 91. At this
point, the FAA has not identified any ADS-B Out requirements for parts
23, 25, 27, and 29. The FAA will issue the appropriate aircraft
installation and operational guidance material consistent with the
requirements of this rule upon issuance or shortly thereafter. The FAA
is discussing with airports and the Federal Communications Commission
whether ADS-B would benefit airport ground vehicles.
III. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of the new (or amended) information
collection requirement(s) in this final rule to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for its review. OMB assigned the number
2120-0728 in advance, but has not yet approved the collection. Affected
parties do not have to comply with the information collection
requirements until the FAA publishes in the Federal Register notice of
the approval of the control number
[[Page 30188]]
assigned by OMB for these information requirements. Approval of the
control number notifies the public that OMB has approved these
information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995.
The FAA received comments on the proposed performance requirements
for ADS-B Out aircraft equipment. Those comments are discussed in
section II, Discussion of the Final Rule, elsewhere in this preamble.
However, the agency received no comments specifically on the burden
associated with collecting aircraft transmissions from the ADS-B Out
equipment required by this rule.
A description of the annual burden is shown below.
Use: This final rule will support the information needs of the FAA
by requiring avionics equipment that continuously transmits aircraft
information to be received by the FAA, via automation, for use in
providing air traffic surveillance services.
Respondents: The average number of aircraft that will be equipped
annually for the first 3 years--577. The number of aircraft (general
aviation, regional, and majors) that will be equipped by 2035: 247,317.
Frequency: ADS-B equipment will continuously transmit aircraft
information in ``real time'' to FAA ground receivers. The information
is collected electronically, without input by a human operator. Old
information is overwritten on a continuous basis.
Annual Burden Estimate: Base-case start-up cost for an ADS-B Out-
compliant transponder: $4,371.09 million (in 2009 dollars).
An agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information,
nor may it impose an information collection requirement unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control number.
B. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO SARPs
to the maximum extent practicable. ATA, British Airways, and
EUROCONTROL recommended that the FAA harmonize this rule with the
appropriate ICAO SARPs. Considering that the long-term global
capabilities of ADS-B are not yet fully defined, ICAO SARPs will
continue to evolve to reflect developing ADS-B applications. In
addition, current ICAO SARPs for the 1090 MHz ES and UAT ADS-B links
will be updated to reflect harmonized changes to both RTCA and EUROCAE
minimum performance standards, as appropriate, for ADS-B Out
operations. The FAA has reviewed the existing ICAO requirements \65\ as
related to ADS-B Out operations and has identified no differences with
these regulations. The FAA also will continue to work with the
international community to ensure harmonization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ ICAO references: Procedures for Air Navigation Services--
Air Traffic Management, Doc 4444, Amendment 4, (24/11/05) Procedures
for Air Navigation Services--Air Traffic Management; Doc 9694, ICAO
Manual of Air Traffic Services Data Link Applications; Annex 2,
Rules of the Air; Annex 4, Aeronautical Charts; Annex 6 Part II,
Operation of Aircraft; Annex 11, Air Traffic Services; Annex 15,
Aeronautical Information Services; Doc 9689, Manual for
Determination of Separation Minima; Circular 311, SASP Circular--
ADS-B Comparative Assessment; Circular 278, National Plan for CNS/
ATM Systems Guidance Material; Annex 10 Vol. IV, Amendment 82,
Aeronautical Telecommunications; Doc 9871, Technical Provisions for
Mode S Services and Extended Squitter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility Determination,
International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from
setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with a base year of
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of
the economic impacts of this final rule. The FAA suggests that readers
seeking greater detail read the full regulatory impact analysis, a copy
of which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
final rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ``significant'' as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States; and (6) will impose an unfunded mandate on the private sector
but not on state, local, or tribal governments. These analyses are
summarized below.
Regulatory Impact Analysis
The FAA reviewed the following three alternatives for surveillance
and found Alternative 2 (the rule) to be the preferred alternative:
1. Baseline radar--Maintain the current radar based surveillance
system and replace radar facilities when they wear out;
2. ADS-B--Aircraft operators equip to meet performance requirements
required by the rule and the FAA provides surveillance services based
on downlinked aircraft information.
3. Multilateration--The FAA provides surveillance using
multilateration.
Key Assumptions
All costs and benefits are denominated in 2009 dollars.
The final rule will be published in 2010 and have a
compliance date of 2020.
Present value rates are 3% and 7%.
Period of analysis: 2009-2035.
Benefits of the Final Rule
The benefits of the final rule include the dollar value of savings
in fuel, time, net reduction in CO2 emissions, and the
consumer surplus associated with the additional flights accommodated
because of the rule. The estimated quantified benefits of the rule
range from $6.8 billion ($2.1 billion at 7% present value) to $8.5
billion ($2.7 billion at 7% present value).
Costs of the Final Rule
The estimated incremental costs of the final rule range from a low
of $3.3 billion ($2.2 billion at 7% present value) to a high of $7.0
billion ($4.1 billion at 7% present value). These include costs to the
government, as well as to the aviation industry and other users of the
NAS, to deploy ADS-B, and are incremental to maintaining surveillance
via current technology (radar). The aviation industry would begin
incurring costs for avionics equipage in 2012 and would incur total
costs ranging from $2.5 billion ($1.4 billion at 7% present value) to
$6.2 billion ($3.3 billion at 7% present value) with an estimated
[[Page 30189]]
midpoint of $4.4 billion ($2.3 billion at 7% present value) from 2012
to 2035.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination and Analysis
Introduction and Purpose of this Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that the rule will have such an
impact, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as
described in the RFA. Section 603 of the RFA requires agencies to
prepare and make available for public comment a final regulatory
flexibility analysis (FRFA) describing the impact of final rules on
small entities. As the FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The purpose of this analysis is to provide the reasoning
underlying this FAA determination.
Section 603(b) of the RFA specifies the content of a FRFA.
Each FRFA must contain:
A description of the reasons why action by the agency is
being considered;
A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis
for, the final rule;
A description and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply;
A description of the projected reporting, record keeping
and other compliance requirements of the final rule including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
An identification, to the extent practicable, of all
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with
the final rule;
A description of any significant alternatives to the final
rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and
minimize any significant economic impact of the final rule on small
entities.
A summary of significant issues raised by public comments
in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis and how the
agency resolved those comments.
Reasons Why the Final Rule is Being Promulgated
Public Law 108-176, referred to as ``The Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act,'' was enacted December 12, 2003 (Pub. L. 108-176).
This law set forth requirements and objectives for transforming the air
transportation system to progress further into the 21st century.
Section 709 of this statute required the Secretary of Transportation to
establish in the FAA a Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to
manage work related to NextGen. Among its statutorily defined
responsibilities, the JPDO coordinates the development and use of new
technologies to ensure that, when available, they may be used to the
fullest potential in aircraft and in the air traffic control system.
The FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security have
launched an effort to align their resources to develop and further
NextGen. The goals of NextGen, as stated in section 709, that are
addressed by this final rule include: (1) Improving the level of
safety, security, efficiency, quality, and affordability of the NAS and
aviation services; (2) Taking advantage of data from emerging ground-
and space-based communications, navigation, and surveillance
technologies; (3) Being scalable to accommodate and encourage
substantial growth in domestic and international transportation and
anticipate and accommodate continuing technology upgrades and advances;
and (4) Accommodating a wide range of aircraft operations, including
airlines, air taxis, helicopters, GA, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The JPDO was also charged to create and carry out an integrated
plan for NextGen. The NextGen Integrated Plan, transmitted to Congress
on December 12, 2004, ensures that the NextGen system meets the air
transportation safety, security, mobility, efficiency and capacity
needs beyond those currently included in the FAA's Operational
Evolution Plan (OEP).
As described in the NextGen Integrated Plan, the current approach
to air transportation (i.e., ground based radars tracking congested
flyways and passing information among the control centers for the
duration of flights) is becoming operationally obsolete. The current
system is increasingly inefficient, and despite decreases in air
traffic, still subject to significant delays. Resumption of growth will
only aggravate congestion and delays, given the capabilities of the
present system. The current method of handling air traffic flow will
not be able to adapt to the volumes, density, and approach to managing
air traffic in the future. The need for significant improvements
towards operational efficiency and reduced environmental impacts, as
well as resumed growth, will create significant challenges. Moreover,
the diversity of aircraft is forecast to grow as the use of unmanned
aircraft systems and very light jets are developed for special
operations.
The FAA believes that ADS-B technology is a key component in
achieving many of the goals set forth in the NextGen Integrated Plan.
This final rule is a major step toward strategically ``establishing an
agile air traffic system that accommodates future requirements and
readily responds to shifts in demand from all users,'' by embracing a
new approach to surveillance that can lead to greater and more
efficient airspace use. ADS-B technology not only assists in the
transition to a system with less dependence on ground infrastructure
and facilities, but also creates capabilities for precision and
accuracy, which in turn will make the system more operationally and
environmentally efficient.
Statement of the Legal Basis and Objectives
The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106,
Federal Aviation Administration, describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103, Sovereignty and Use of
Airspace, and Subpart III, Section 44701, General Requirements. Under
section 40103, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations on: (1)
The flight of aircraft, including regulations on safe altitudes; (2)
the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft; and (3) the
safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace. Under section 44701,
the FAA is charged with promoting safe flight of
[[Page 30190]]
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce.
This final rule is within the scope of sections 40103 and 44701
because it promulgates aircraft performance requirements to meet
advanced surveillance needs that will accommodate projected increases
in operations within the NAS. As more aircraft operate within the U.S.
airspace, improved surveillance performance is necessary to continue
balancing air transportation growth with the agency's mandate for a
safe and efficient air transportation system.
Projected Reporting, Record Keeping and Other Requirements
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of the new information collection
requirements in this final rule to the Office of Management and Budget
for its review. See discussion in Section III elsewhere in this
preamble.
Overlapping, Duplicative, or Conflicting Federal Rules
The FAA is not aware that the final rule will overlap, duplicate or
conflict with existing Federal rules.
Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments to the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis
In the NPRM, the FAA addressed the impact of the proposed rule on
small-business part 91, 121, and 135 operators with less than 1,500
employees. The proposal noted that a substantial number of small
entities would be significantly affected by the proposed rule.
One individual commented and challenged the assumption that only
small businesses directly involved in aviation would be affected. The
commenter explained that many businesses use aircraft indirectly in
their operations and that higher aircraft equipage costs will affect
overall business costs. The commenter believed that one half of all
non-turbine GA aircraft are involved in small business activity.
Publicly available data regarding internal company financial
statistics for GA operators is limited. Therefore, the FAA estimated
the financial impact by obtaining a sample population of GA operators
from (1) the U.S. DOT Form 41 filings, (2) World Aviation Directory,
and (3) ReferenceUSA. The FAA applied this sample to U.S. Census Bureau
data on the Small Business Administration Web site. This was done to
develop an estimate of the total number of small businesses affected by
the proposed rule.
The FAA agrees that GA operators use airplanes for indirect
business use and has determined that this final rule will have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses.
Estimated Number of Small Firms Potentially Impacted
Under the RFA, the FAA must determine whether a rule significantly
affects a substantial number of small entities. This determination is
typically based on small entity size and cost thresholds that vary
depending on the affected industry.
Using the size standards from the Small Business Administration for
Air Transportation and Aircraft Manufacturing, the FAA defined
companies as small entities if they have fewer than 1,500 employees.
The FAA considered the economic impact on small-business part 91,
121, and 135 operators. Many of the GA aircraft that are operating
under part 91 are not for hire or flown for profit, so the FAA does not
include these operators in its small business impact analysis.
This final rule will become effective in 2020. Although the FAA
forecasts traffic and air carrier fleets to 2040, our forecasts are of
a generic nature and do not forecast the number of small entities.
These forecasts also do not estimate whether an operator will still be
in business or will be a small business entity. Therefore the FAA uses
current U.S. operator's revenues and applies the industry-provided
costs to determine if this final rule will have a significant impact on
a substantial number of small entity operators.
The FAA obtained a list of part 91, 121 and 135 U.S. operators from
the FAA Flight Standards Service. Using information provided by the
U.S. DOT Form 41 filings, World Aviation Directory, and ReferenceUSA,
the FAA eliminated operators that are subsidiary businesses of larger
businesses and businesses with more than 1,500 employees from the list
of small entities. In many cases, the employment and annual revenue
data are not public, so the FAA did not include these companies in its
analysis. For the remaining businesses, the FAA obtained company
revenue and employment from the above three sources.
The methodology discussed above resulted in a list of 34 U.S. part
91, 121 and 135 operators, with less than 1,500 employees, who operate
341 airplanes. Due to the sparse amount of publicly available data on
internal company financial statistics for small entities, it was not
feasible to estimate the total population of small entities affected by
this final rule. The total population of U.S. part 91, 121 and 135
operators, with less than 1,500 employees, has the potential to be
large. We used this sample set of small business operators to develop
percentage estimates to apply to the U.S. Census Bureau data to
estimate the population.
These 34 U.S. small entity operators are a representative sample.
The sample was used to assess the cost impact on the total population
of small businesses who operate aircraft affected by this final
rulemaking. This representative sample was then applied to the U.S.
Census Bureau data on the Small Business Administration's Web site to
develop an estimate of the total number of affected small business
entities.
The U.S. Census Bureau data lists small entities in the air
transportation industry that employ less than 500 employees. Other
small businesses may own aircraft and may not be included in the U.S.
Census Bureau air transportation industry category. Therefore our
estimate of the number of small entities affected by this final rule
will likely be understated. The estimate of the total number of
affected small entities is developed below.
Cost and Affordability for Small Entities
To assess the cost impact to small business part 91, 121 and 135
operators, the FAA contacted manufacturers, industry associations, and
ADS-B equipage providers to estimate ADS-B equipage costs. The FAA
requested estimates of airborne installation costs, by aircraft model,
for the output parameters listed in the ``Equipment Specifications''
section of the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
To satisfy the manufacturers' request to keep individual aircraft
pricing confidential, the FAA calculated low, baseline, and high range
of costs by equipment class. The baseline estimate equals the average
of the low and high industry cost estimates. The dollar value ranges
consist of a wide variety of avionics within each aircraft group. The
aircraft architecture within each equipment group can vary, causing
different carriage, labor, and wiring requirements for the installation
of ADS-B. Volume discounting, versus single line purchasing, also
affects the dollar value ranges. On the low end, the dollar value may
represent a software upgrade or original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
option change. On the high end, the dollar value may represent a new
installation of upgraded
[[Page 30191]]
avionic systems necessary to assure accuracy, reliability and safety.
The FAA used the estimated baseline dollar value cost by equipment
class in determining the impact to small business entities.
The FAA estimated each operator's total compliance cost as follows:
Multiplying the baseline dollar value cost (by equipment class) by the
number of aircraft each small business operator currently has in its
fleet. The FAA summed these costs by equipment class and group. The FAA
then measured the economic impact on small entities by dividing the
estimated baseline dollar value compliance cost for their fleet by the
small entity's annual revenue.
Each equipment group operated by a small entity may have to comply
with different requirements in the final rule, depending on the state
of the aircraft's avionics. In the ``ADS-B Out Equipage Cost Estimate''
section of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the FAA details its
methodology to estimate operators' total compliance cost by equipment
group.
For small entity operators in the sample population of 34 small
aviation entities, the ADS-B cost is estimated to be: (1) Greater than
2% of annual revenues for about 35% of the operators; and (2) greater
than 1% of annual revenues for about 54% of the operators. Applying
these percentages to the air transportation industry category of the
2006 U.S. Census Bureau data, the ADS-B cost is estimated to be: (1)
Greater than 2% of annual revenues for at least 1,015 small entities;
and (2) greater than 1% of annual revenues for at least 1,562 small
entity operators.
As a result of the above analysis, the FAA has determined that a
substantial number of small entities will be significantly affected by
the rule. Every small entity that operates an aircraft in the airspace
defined by this final rule will be required to install ADS-B out
equipage and therefore will be affected by this rulemaking.
Business Closure Analysis
For commercial operators, the ratio of costs to annual revenue
shows that 7 of 34 small business air operator firms would have ratios
in excess of 5%. Since many of the other commercial small business air
operator firms do not make their annual revenue publicly available, it
is difficult to assess the financial impact of this final rule on their
business. To fully assess whether this final rule could force a small
entity into bankruptcy requires more financial information than is
publicly available.
In the NPRM, the FAA requested comment and supporting
justification, from small entities, to assist the FAA in determining
the degree of hardship the final rule will have on these entities.
Comments were also requested on feasible alternative methods of
compliance. The FAA did not receive any comments specific to this
request.
Competitive Analysis
The aviation industry is an extremely competitive industry with
slim profit margins. The number of operators who entered the industry
and have stopped operations because of mergers, acquisitions, or
bankruptcy litters the history of the aviation industry.
The FAA analyzed five years of operating profits for the affected
small-entity operators listed above, and was able to determine the
operating profit for 18 of the 34 small business entities. The FAA
discovered that the average operating profit for 33% of these 18
affected operators was negative. Only four of the 18 affected operators
had average annual operating profits that exceeded $10,000,000.
In this competitive industry, cost increases imposed by this
regulation will be hard to recover by raising prices, especially by
those operators showing an average five-year negative operating profit.
Further, large operators may be able to negotiate better pricing from
outside firms for inspections and repairs, so small operators may need
to raise their prices more than large operators. These factors make it
difficult for small operators to recover their compliance costs by
raising prices. If small operators cannot recover all the additional
costs imposed by this regulation, market shares could shift to the
large operators.
Small operators successfully compete in the aviation industry by
providing unique services and controlling costs. The extent to which
affected small entities operate in niche markets will affect their
ability to pass on costs. Currently small operators are much more
profitable than established major scheduled carriers. This final rule
will offset some of the advantages of lower capital costs of older
aircraft.
Overall, in terms of competition, this rulemaking reduces small
operators' ability to compete.
Disproportionality Analysis
The disproportionately higher impact of the final rule on the
fleets of small operators results in disproportionately higher costs to
small operators. Due to the potential of fleet discounts, large
operators may be able to negotiate better pricing from outside sources
for inspections, installation, and ADS-B hardware purchases.
Based on the percent of potentially affected current airplanes over
the analysis period, small U.S. business operators may bear a
disproportionate impact from the final rule.
Analysis of Alternatives
Alternative One
The status quo alternative has compliance costs to continue the
operation and commissioning of radar sites. The FAA rejected this
status quo alternative because it is becoming operationally obsolete to
use ground-based radars to track congested airways and pass information
among control centers for the duration of flights. The current system
is not able to upgrade to the NextGen capabilities, nor accommodate the
estimated increases in air traffic, which would result in mounting
delays or limitations in service for many areas.
Alternative Two
Alternative Two would employ a technology called multilateration.
Multilateration is a separate type of secondary surveillance system
that is not radar-based and has limited deployment in the U.S. At a
minimum, multilateration requires at least four ground stations to
deliver the same volume of coverage and integrity of information as
ADS-B, because of the need to ``triangulate'' the aircraft's position.
Multilateration is a process that determines aircraft position by
using the difference in time of arrival of a signal from an aircraft at
a series of receivers on the ground. Multilateration meets the need for
accurate surveillance and is less costly than ADS-B (however, more
costly than radar), but cannot achieve the same level of benefits as
ADS-B, such as system capacity and environmental improvements.
Multilateration would provide the same benefits as radar, but the FAA
estimates that the cost of providing multilateration (including the
cost to sustain radar until multilateration is operational), would
exceed the cost to continue full radar surveillance.
Alternative Three
Alternative Three would provide relief by having the FAA provide an
exemption to small air carriers from all requirements of this rule.
This alternative would mean that small air carriers would rely on the
status quo ground-based radars to track their flights and pass
information among control centers for the duration of the flights.
As discussed previously, ADS-B Out cannot be used effectively as
the
[[Page 30192]]
primary surveillance system if certain categories of airspace users are
subject to separate surveillance systems. The small air carriers
operate in the same airspace as the larger carriers and general
aviation. Such an exemption would require two primary surveillance
systems, which adds the cost of an additional surveillance system
without improving the existing benefits. Thus, this alternative is not
considered to be acceptable.
Alternative Four
Alternative Four exempts small-piston engine GA operators from the
requirements of this final rule. This final rule provides minimal
benefits to small-piston engine GA operators, while adding significant
costs by mandating these operators to retrofit and equip about 150,000
small piston engine GA airplanes with ADS-B Out. Even though the FAA
determined that the percentage of small piston engine GA airplanes
operating at the top Operational Evolution Plan 35 airports is less
than 5%, the number of GA operations within a 30-nautical-mile radius
of these airports is significant. This alternative was not considered
acceptable because ADS-B equipage for all aircraft operating in the
airspace subject to this rule is essential to gaining the overall
stated ADS-B benefits, realizing savings associated with radar
decommissioning, and the expansion of potential future benefits.
Alternative Five
This alternative is the final ADS-B rule. ADS-B does not employ
different classes of receiving equipment or provide different
information based on its location. Therefore, controllers will not have
to account for transitions between surveillance solutions as an
aircraft moves closer to or farther away from an airport. To address
congestion and delay, fuel consumption, emissions, and future demand
for air travel without significant delays or denial of service, the FAA
found ADS-B to be the most cost-effective solution to maintain a viable
air transportation system. ADS-B provides a wider range of services to
aircraft users and could enable applications that are not available
with multilateration or radar.
International Trade Impact Analysis
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined that it
will impose the same unit costs on domestic and international entities
and thus has a neutral trade impact.
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $136.1 million in lieu of $100
million. This rule is not expected to impose significant costs on small
governmental jurisdictions such as State, local, or tribal governments.
However, the rule will result in an unfunded mandate on the private
sector because it will result in expenditures in excess of the $136.1
million annual threshold. The FAA considered two alternatives to the
rule, as described above, and four alternatives in the regulatory
flexibility analysis described above.
VI. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and, therefore, does not have federalism implications.
VII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation,
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. The FAA did not
receive any comments on whether the proposed rule should apply
differently to intrastate aviation in Alaska. The FAA has determined,
based on the administrative record of this rulemaking, that there is no
need to make any regulatory distinctions applicable to intrastate
aviation in Alaska.
VIII. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined that this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
IX. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution,
or Use
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The FAA has determined that it is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 13211.
This is because, while it is a ``significant regulatory action'' under
Executive Order 12866 and DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures, it
is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy. In fact, adoption of this final rule
offers the potential to produce reductions in energy use in the NAS.
X. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the
Internet by--
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov;
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Be sure
to identify the amendment number or docket number of this rulemaking.
[[Page 30193]]
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a
question regarding this document, you may contact your local FAA
official, or the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. You can find out more
about SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91
Aircraft, Airmen, Air traffic control, Aviation safety,
Incorporation by Reference, Reporting, and recordkeeping requirements.
The Amendment
0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration
amends chapter I of 14 CFR as follows:
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101,
44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717,
44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-
47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 stat. 1180).
0
2. Amend Sec. 91.1 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1 Applicability.
* * * * *
(b) Each person operating an aircraft in the airspace overlying the
waters between 3 and 12 nautical miles from the coast of the United
States must comply with Sec. Sec. 91.1 through 91.21; Sec. Sec.
91.101 through 91.143; Sec. Sec. 91.151 through 91.159; Sec. Sec.
91.167 through 91.193; Sec. 91.203; Sec. 91.205; Sec. Sec. 91.209
through 91.217; Sec. 91.221, Sec. 91.225; Sec. Sec. 91.303 through
91.319; Sec. Sec. 91.323 through 91.327; Sec. 91.605; Sec. 91.609;
Sec. Sec. 91.703 through 91.715; and Sec. 91.903.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 91.130 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.130 Operations in Class C airspace.
* * * * *
(d) Equipment requirements. Unless otherwise authorized by the ATC
having jurisdiction over the Class C airspace area, no person may
operate an aircraft within a Class C airspace area designated for an
airport unless that aircraft is equipped with the applicable equipment
specified in Sec. 91.215, and after January 1, 2020, Sec. 91.225.
* * * * *
0
4. Amend Sec. 91.131 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.131 Operations in Class B airspace.
* * * * *
(d) Other equipment requirements. No person may operate an aircraft
in a Class B airspace area unless the aircraft is equipped with--
(1) The applicable operating transponder and automatic altitude
reporting equipment specified in Sec. 91.215 (a), except as provided
in Sec. 91.215 (e), and
(2) After January 1, 2020, the applicable Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast Out equipment specified in Sec. 91.225.
0
5. Amend Sec. 91.135 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 91.135 Operations in Class A airspace.
* * * * *
(c) Equipment requirements. Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no
person may operate an aircraft within Class A airspace unless that
aircraft is equipped with the applicable equipment specified in Sec.
91.215, and after January 1, 2020, Sec. 91.225.
* * * * *
0
6. Amend Sec. 91.217 by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (c) as
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3), redesignating the introductory text
as paragraph (a) introductory text, and by adding paragraph (b) to read
as follows:
Sec. 91.217 Data correspondence between automatically reported
pressure altitude data and the pilot's altitude reference.
* * * * *
(b) No person may operate any automatic pressure altitude reporting
equipment associated with a radar beacon transponder or with ADS-B Out
equipment unless the pressure altitude reported for ADS-B Out and Mode
C/S is derived from the same source for aircraft equipped with both a
transponder and ADS-B Out.
0
7. Add Sec. 91.225 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.225 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
equipment and use.
(a) After January 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by ATC,
no person may operate an aircraft in Class A airspace unless the
aircraft has equipment installed that--
(1) Meets the requirements in TSO-C166b, Extended Squitter
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz); and
(2) Meets the requirements of Sec. 91.227.
(b) After January 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by ATC,
no person may operate an aircraft below 18,000 feet MSL and in airspace
described in paragraph (d) of this section unless the aircraft has
equipment installed that--
(1) Meets the requirements in--
(i) TSO-C166b; or
(ii) TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the
Frequency of 978 MHz;
(2) Meets the requirements of Sec. 91.227.
(c) Operators with equipment installed with an approved deviation
under Sec. 21.618 of this chapter also are in compliance with this
section.
(d) After January 1, 2020, and unless otherwise authorized by ATC,
no person may operate an aircraft in the following airspace unless the
aircraft has equipment installed that meets the requirements in
paragraph (b) of this section:
(1) Class B and Class C airspace areas;
(2) Except as provided for in paragraph (e) of this section, within
30 nautical miles of an airport listed in appendix D, section 1 to this
part from the surface upward to 10,000 feet MSL;
(3) Above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries of a Class
B or Class C airspace area designated for an airport upward to 10,000
feet MSL;
(4) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, Class E
airspace within the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia
at and above 10,000 feet MSL, excluding the airspace at and below 2,500
feet above the surface; and
(5) Class E airspace at and above 3,000 feet MSL over the Gulf of
Mexico from the coastline of the United States out to 12 nautical
miles.
(e) The requirements of paragraph (b) of this section do not apply
to any
[[Page 30194]]
aircraft that was not originally certificated with an electrical
system, or that has not subsequently been certified with such a system
installed, including balloons and gliders. These aircraft may conduct
operations without ADS-B Out in the airspace specified in paragraphs
(d)(2) and (d)(4) of this section. Operations authorized by this
section must be conducted--
(1) Outside any Class B or Class C airspace area; and
(2) Below the altitude of the ceiling of a Class B or Class C
airspace area designated for an airport, or 10,000 feet MSL, whichever
is lower.
(f) Each person operating an aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out must
operate this equipment in the transmit mode at all times.
(g) Requests for ATC authorized deviations from the requirements of
this section must be made to the ATC facility having jurisdiction over
the concerned airspace within the time periods specified as follows:
(1) For operation of an aircraft with an inoperative ADS-B Out, to
the airport of ultimate destination, including any intermediate stops,
or to proceed to a place where suitable repairs can be made or both,
the request may be made at any time.
(2) For operation of an aircraft that is not equipped with ADS-B
Out, the request must be made at least 1 hour before the proposed
operation.
(h) The standards required in this section are incorporated by
reference with the approval of the Director of the Office of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved
materials are available for inspection at the FAA's Office of
Rulemaking (ARM-1), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202-267-9677), or at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
This material is also available from the sources indicated in
paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this section.
(1) Copies of Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C166b, Extended
Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) (December 2, 2009) and TSO-C154c,
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Frequency of 978 MHz
(December 2, 2009) may be obtained from the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, DOT Warehouse M30,
Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785;
telephone (301) 322-5377. Copies of TSO -C166B and TSO-C154c are also
available on the FAA's Web site, at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/tso/. Select the link ``Search Technical
Standard Orders.''
(2) Copies of Section 2, Equipment Performance Requirements and
Test Procedures, of RTCA DO-260B, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services-
Broadcast (TIS-B), December 2, 2009 (referenced in TSO-C166b) and
Section 2, Equipment Performance Requirements and Test Procedures, of
RTCA DO-282B, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B), December 2, 2009 (referenced in TSO C-154c) may be obtained
from RTCA, Inc., 1828 L Street, NW., Suite 805, Washington, DC 20036-
5133, telephone 202-833-9339. Copies of RTCA DO-260B and RTCA DO-282B
are also available on RTCA Inc.'s Web site, at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/allproducts.cfm.
0
8. Add Sec. 91.227 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.227 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
equipment performance requirements.
(a) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
ADS-B Out is a function of an aircraft's onboard avionics that
periodically broadcasts the aircraft's state vector (3-dimensional
position and 3-dimensional velocity) and other required information as
described in this section.
Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP) specifies the
accuracy of a reported aircraft's position, as defined in TSO-C166b and
TSO-C154c.
Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACV) specifies the
accuracy of a reported aircraft's velocity, as defined in TSO-C166b and
TSO-C154c.
Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) specifies an integrity
containment radius around an aircraft's reported position, as defined
in TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c.
Position Source refers to the equipment installed onboard an
aircraft used to process and provide aircraft position (for example,
latitude, longitude, and velocity) information.
Source Integrity Level (SIL) indicates the probability of the
reported horizontal position exceeding the containment radius defined
by the NIC on a per sample or per hour basis, as defined in TSO-C166b
and TSO-C154c.
System Design Assurance (SDA) indicates the probability of an
aircraft malfunction causing false or misleading information to be
transmitted, as defined in TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c.
Total latency is the total time between when the position is
measured and when the position is transmitted by the aircraft.
Uncompensated latency is the time for which the aircraft does not
compensate for latency.
(b) 1090 MHz ES and UAT Broadcast Links and Power Requirements--
(1) Aircraft operating in Class A airspace must have equipment
installed that meets the antenna and power output requirements of Class
A1, A1S, A2, A3, B1S, or B1 equipment as defined in TSO-C166b, Extended
Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz).
(2) Aircraft operating in airspace designated for ADS-B Out, but
outside of Class A airspace, must have equipment installed that meets
the antenna and output power requirements of either:
(i) Class A1, A1S, A2, A3, B1S, or B1 as defined in TSO-C166b; or
(ii) Class A1H, A1S, A2, A3, B1S, or B1 equipment as defined in
TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Frequency of
978 MHz.
(c) ADS-B Out Performance Requirements for NAC P, NACV, NIC, SDA,
and SIL--
(1) For aircraft broadcasting ADS-B Out as required under Sec.
91.225 (a) and (b)--
(i) The aircraft's NACP must be less than 0.05 nautical
miles;
(ii) The aircraft's NACV must be less than 10 meters per
second;
(iii) The aircraft's NIC must be less than 0.2 nautical miles;
(iv) The aircraft's SDA must be 2; and
(v) The aircraft's SIL must be 3.
(2) Changes in NACP, NACV, SDA, and SIL must
be broadcast within 10 seconds.
(3) Changes in NIC must be broadcast within 12 seconds.
(d) Minimum Broadcast Message Element Set for ADS-B Out. Each
aircraft must broadcast the following
[[Page 30195]]
information, as defined in TSO-C166b or TSO-C154c. The pilot must enter
information for message elements listed in paragraphs (d)(7) through
(d)(10) of this section during the appropriate phase of flight.
(1) The length and width of the aircraft;
(2) An indication of the aircraft's latitude and longitude;
(3) An indication of the aircraft's barometric pressure altitude;
(4) An indication of the aircraft's velocity;
(5) An indication if TCAS II or ACAS is installed and operating in
a mode that can generate resolution advisory alerts;
(6) If an operable TCAS II or ACAS is installed, an indication if a
resolution advisory is in effect;
(7) An indication of the Mode 3/A transponder code specified by
ATC;
(8) An indication of the aircraft's call sign that is submitted on
the flight plan, or the aircraft's registration number, except when the
pilot has not filed a flight plan, has not requested ATC services, and
is using a TSO-C154c self-assigned temporary 24-bit address;
(9) An indication if the flightcrew has identified an emergency,
radio communication failure, or unlawful interference;
(10) An indication of the aircraft's ``IDENT'' to ATC;
(11) An indication of the aircraft assigned ICAO 24-bit address,
except when the pilot has not filed a flight plan, has not requested
ATC services, and is using a TSO-C154c self-assigned temporary 24-bit
address;
(12) An indication of the aircraft's emitter category;
(13) An indication of whether an ADS-B In capability is installed;
(14) An indication of the aircraft's geometric altitude;
(15) An indication of the Navigation Accuracy Category for Position
(NACP);
(16) An indication of the Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity
(NACV);
(17) An indication of the Navigation Integrity Category (NIC);
(18) An indication of the System Design Assurance (SDA); and
(19) An indication of the Source Integrity Level (SIL).
(e) ADS-B Latency Requirements--
(1) The aircraft must transmit its geometric position no later than
2.0 seconds from the time of measurement of the position to the time of
transmission.
(2) Within the 2.0 total latency allocation, a maximum of 0.6
seconds can be uncompensated latency. The aircraft must compensate for
any latency above 0.6 seconds up to the maximum 2.0 seconds total by
extrapolating the geometric position to the time of message
transmission.
(3) The aircraft must transmit its position and velocity at least
once per second while airborne or while moving on the airport surface.
(4) The aircraft must transmit its position at least once every 5
seconds while stationary on the airport surface.
(f) Equipment with an approved deviation. Operators with equipment
installed with an approved deviation under Sec. 21.618 of this chapter
also are in compliance with this section.
(g) Incorporation by Reference. The standards required in this
section are incorporated by reference with the approval of the Director
of the Office of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. All approved materials are available for inspection at the
FAA's Office of Rulemaking (ARM-1), 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-267-9677), or at the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the
availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to
http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html. This material is also available from
the sources indicated in paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this section.
(1) Copies of Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C166b, Extended
Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio
Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) (December 2, 2009) and TSO-C154c,
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on the Frequency of 978 MHz
(December 2, 2009) may be obtained from the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, DOT Warehouse M30,
Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785;
telephone (301) 322-5377. Copies of TSO -C166B and TSO-C154c are also
available on the FAA's Web site, at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/tso/. Select the link ``Search Technical
Standard Orders.''
(2) Copies of Section 2, Equipment Performance Requirements and
Test Procedures, of RTCA DO-260B, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services-
Broadcast (TIS-B), December 2, 2009 (referenced in TSO-C166b) and
Section 2, Equipment Performance Requirements and Test Procedures, of
RTCA DO-282B, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B), December 2, 2009 (referenced in TSO C-154c) may be obtained
from RTCA, Inc., 1828 L Street, NW., Suite 805, Washington, DC 20036-
5133, telephone 202-833-9339. Copies of RTCA DO-260B and RTCA DO-282B
are also available on RTCA Inc.'s Web site, at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/allproducts.cfm.
9. Amend appendix D to part 91 by revising section 1 introductory
text to read as follows:
APPENDIX D TO PART 91--AIRPORTS/LOCATIONS: SPECIAL OPERATING
RESTRICTIONS
Section 1. Locations at which the requirements of Sec.
91.215(b)(2) and Sec. 91.225(d)(2) apply. The requirements of
Sec. Sec. 91.215(b)(2) and 91.225(d)(2) apply below 10,000 feet
above the surface within a 30-nautical-mile radius of each location
in the following list.
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 21, 2010.
J. Randolph Babbitt,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-12645 Filed 5-27-10; 8:45 am]
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