[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 90 (Tuesday, May 11, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 26180-26183]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11159]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Chapter I
[PS Docket No. 10-92; FCC 10-62]
Effects on Broadband Communications Networks of Damage To or
Failure of Network Equipment or Severe Overload
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: Consistent with the recommendations of the National Broadband
Plan, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted
this Notice of Inquiry to seek comment on the present state of
survivability in broadband communications networks and to explore
potential measures to reduce network vulnerability to failures in
network equipment or severe overload conditions, such as would occur in
natural disasters, pandemics, and other disasters or events that would
restrain our ability to communicate. The Commission seeks comment
broadly on the ability of existing networks to withstand localized or
distributed physical damage, including whether there is adequate
network redundancy and the extent of survivability of physical
enclosures in which network elements are located, and severe overloads.
DATES: Comments are due on or before June 25, 2010 and reply comments
are due on or before July 26, 2010.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments may be filed using: (1) The
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), (2) the Federal
Government's eRulemaking Portal, or (3) by filing paper copies.
Comments and reply comments may be filed electronically using the
Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/ or the
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Parties who choose to file by paper can submit filings by hand or
messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class
or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to
the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission. All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered
paper filings for the Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC
Headquarters at 445 12th St., SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554.
All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or
fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the
building.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express
Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive,
Capitol Heights, MD 20743. U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express,
and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20554. Parties who choose to file by paper must file an
original and four copies of each filing.
Parties wishing to file materials with a claim of confidentiality
should follow the procedures set forth in Sec. 0.459 of the
Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may not be filed via ECFS
but rather should be filed with the Secretary's Office following the
procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted versions of confidential
submissions may be filed via ECFS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Healy, Communications Systems
Analysis Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-
418-2448 or Jeffery Goldthorp, Chief, Communications Systems Analysis
[[Page 26181]]
Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-418-1096.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Inquiry NOI in PS Docket No. 10-92, FCC 10-62, adopted and released
on April 21, 2010. The complete text of this document is available for
inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from
the Commission's duplicating contractor Best Copy and Printing, Inc.,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554,
telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 488-5300, facsimile (202) 488-5563,
or via e-mail at [email protected]. It is also available on the
Commission's Web site at http://www.fcc.gov. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to [email protected] or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530
(voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).
Synopsis of the Notice of Inquiry
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (hereinafter
``ARRA'') directed the Commission to prepare a National Broadband Plan
(``NBP'' or ``Plan'') and report that plan to Congress. In particular,
ARRA required the Commission to explore ways in which broadband
infrastructure and services can ``advance consumer welfare * * * public
safety and homeland security * * * and other national purposes.''
In response to a number of public notices issued as part of the NBP
proceeding, the Commission received a wealth of commentary on the
rapidly increasing importance of wireline and wireless broadband
communications networks to consumers, businesses, emergency responders,
and government agencies. A number of these comments focused on the
importance of broadband survivability. Based on these comments and
independent research conducted by Commission staff, the NBP laid out
numerous proposals to ensure that our nation's critical broadband
infrastructure can serve the current and future needs of our citizens
in a consistent and reliable fashion.
Consistent with the recommendations of the NBP, the Commission
adopted this Notice of Inquiry to enhance its understanding of the
present state of survivability in broadband communications networks and
to explore potential measures to reduce network vulnerability to
failures in network equipment or severe overload conditions, such as
would occur in natural disasters, pandemics, and other disasters or
events that would restrain our ability to communicate. The Commission
seeks comment broadly on the ability of existing networks to withstand
localized or distributed physical damage, including whether there is
adequate network redundancy and the extent of survivability of physical
enclosures in which network elements are located, and severe overloads.
Reliance on broadband communications networks is increasing across
all elements of our society and all sectors of our economy. For
example, IP-based telephony services have penetrated into the consumer
and enterprise markets at a breakneck pace, in many cases without the
end-users even knowing that a major technology change has occurred.
People are no longer tied to a single public-switched telephone network
(PSTN), but communicate through a wide range of interconnected networks
(e.g., cable networks, fiber networks, local exchange carriers,
licensed wireless broadband communications networks and unlicensed
wireless internet service providers). As Americans increasingly rely on
broadband communications networks for voice, video, data, and other
communications services, the reliability and survivability of broadband
communications networks becomes an even more critical factor in the
safety, security, and well-being of the American people.
The FCC realizes that the increasing use of broadband
communications networks for telecommunications-type services has
blurred the distinction between the PSTN and IP-based broadband
communications networks. Consequently, the Commission believes it
important that it better understand the implications that this
migration will have on the communications survivability of our voice
and broadband communications networks.
Consumers, businesses, and government agencies increasingly rely on
broadband communications networks to supply voice, video, and data
service to fixed and mobile sites. For example, comments received in
the National Broadband Plan proceeding indicate levels of broadband
adoption ranging from 47% for rural residences to 79% for non-rural
businesses. The network infrastructure required to support these
diverse needs is extensive and complicated. In some instances long-term
collaboration between telecommunications providers and other major
enterprises has led to the development of robust networks with purpose-
built survivability features. The Commission is concerned, however,
that these features may not adequately ensure the survivability of all
types of broadband service throughout the country, including in lesser
developed or sparsely populated areas.
Broadband core networks are generally presumed to be quite
survivable. Survivability is generally weaker in segments of
communications networks closer to the network edge, however. In light
of the ever-growing centrality of broadband communications it is
imperative that we understand the resilience and survivability of our
national broadband infrastructure. The Commission seeks comment,
analysis, and information on the present state of broadband network
survivability to three broad classes of harm: (1) Physical damage
(whether due to malevolent acts, accidents, or force majeure), (2)
inadequate redundancy, and (3) severe network overload. The Commission
also seeks comment as specifically described below.
Enhancing our understanding of the state of survivability in
broadband communications networks and exploring potential measures to
reduce network vulnerabilities furthers the Commission's core purposes
as set forth in section 1 of the Communications Act: (1) The
establishment of ``a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facilities,'' (2) ``the
national defense,'' and (3) ``promoting safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communication.'' The Commission seeks
comment on the strongest sources of authority to act in this regard
should it choose to do so, and asks commenters to address whether
different sources of authority would be required with regard to
different types of communications providers.
For example, the Commission seeks comment on whether it has
authority under Title II and Title III to adopt specific measures to
reduce network vulnerabilities should it choose to do so. In addition,
the Commission seeks comment on whether the Commission could, if
necessary, exercise ancillary authority to reduce network
vulnerabilities, should the Commission choose to do so. In particular,
the Commission seeks comment on the scope of its ancillary authority
with regard to the matters described in this NOI in light of the recent
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Comcast Corporation v. FCC.
[[Page 26182]]
The Commission seeks comment on the survivability features and
risks presented by the physical architecture of current broadband
communications networks. What are the major single points of failure in
broadband architectures (for example, edge router, gateway router,
transport links, cell sites, and VoIP servers)? What are the impacts of
failure these points? What measures do communications providers take to
minimize the presence of single points of failure in broadband
architectures? Under what conditions might these measures not be
followed? What operational awareness do broadband service providers
have on these dependencies? For example is the state of transport link
diversity generally known and tracked by a broadband service provider?
Do service providers account vulnerability of assets to specific
threats? Is the incidence of single points of failure greater or lesser
for small service providers and/or network operators? What special
provisions are made to ensure the survivability of network services to
critical response agencies like public safety answering points (PSAPs)?
What provisions are made to ensure the survivability of cell sites
relied on by first responders? Should traffic to critical response
agencies or for critical services be prioritized? What other aspects of
physical architecture create vulnerabilities in broadband
communications networks? Besides single points of failure, are there
dual failures that could impact a large number of users for an extended
period of time? What should be the FCC's role in reducing single points
of failure in broadband communications networks? What should the FCC's
role be in increasing the level of redundancy in broadband
communications networks taking into consideration the tradeoffs between
potential regulatory burdens and the benefits of increased
survivability?
In addition to network architecture, the Commission seeks comment
on the survivability of physical facilities in which network elements
are located. At the outset, the Commission notes that the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) adopted a set of best
practices for communications physical security. What are the most
effective and widely deployed NRIC physical security best practices?
What policies are typically put in place to ensure adherence to
relevant NRIC physical security best practices? How are decisions made
about when not to apply NRIC best practices? Is the present level of
protection adequate, and, if so, by what measure? If not, what else
should be done and how should this be accomplished? In addition, what
other structural, mechanical, environmental or electrical standards are
utilized in the construction of facilities that house broadband network
elements? What should the FCC's role be in encouraging the
implementation of security best practices?
The Commission also seeks comment on the risks posed by network
facility co-location. For example, does the co-location of network
hardware in ``carrier hotels'' or ``SuperNodes'' represent a
significant vulnerability of networks to physical attack or natural
disaster? How widespread is this practice? What steps have been taken
to ensure redundancy and diversity of physical network links to and
from these facilities? Are these redundancies adequate at the metro,
national, and international scales? Are security standards at these
facilities adequate and uniformly enforced? What should the FCC's role
be in the utilization of security standards for co-located network
hardware? Finally, are the network elements housed in such facilities
commonly protected by redundant elements in physically separated
locations and will adequate power be available in an emergency? If not,
how widespread is the lack of redundancy? What should the FCC's role be
in increasing the level of redundancy for co-located network elements?
Redundancy is used in communications networks to improve
survivability. Redundancy failures occur when a network is unable to
route traffic over an alternate link when the primary or most desirable
link is down. In the public-switched telephone network (PSTN), for
example, switches, routers, and multiplexers often protect against
service interruption due to one or more physical link failures by
intelligently re-routing traffic around the failed link although calls
that are in progress may be lost. Traditional telecommunications
networks use monitoring and alarms to verify redundancy. Occasionally
the re-routing fails to occur because the monitoring equipment does not
recognize the physical link failure or because the re-routing equipment
fails to execute the re-route. In addition, the cause of the initial
link failure may also affect the redundant link, resulting in its
failure. The Commission is concerned that the level of redundancy and
the effectiveness of that redundancy in routing around failures may be
inadequate in broadband communications networks. The Commission is also
concerned that the quality of service (QoS) for the rerouted traffic is
adequate.
The Commission therefore seeks comment on the risk of physical link
failures along with the resulting risk of redundancy failures in
broadband communications networks. For example, to what extent are core
and edge network links protected with ``dark'' backup links? Are there
instances where backup circuit paths occupy the same physical link as a
primary circuit path? If so, how prevalent is this practice and what
information, systems, or procedures might help to eliminate it? How
best can the FCC help to prevent or resolve such problems? To what
extent is switching and routing capacity in broadband communications
networks protected by redundant systems or reserve switching capacity?
Does good business practice dictate some minimum level of reserve
switching capacity for a given network? If so, how is that capacity
derived? Are the protection mechanisms themselves in broadband
communications networks reliable? Are there failure mechanisms that
will affect both the primary path and the back-up path? Finally, how
can the FCC enhance the chances that redundancy works in broadband
communications networks without unduly burdening network operators?
Large-scale events such as pandemics or bioterror attacks may cause
dramatic changes in broadband usage patterns as traffic that is
ordinarily confined within enterprise or academic networks or passed
between enterprise-grade access networks suddenly shifts onto
residential-access networks. If residential access networks are
unprepared or insufficiently resourced for such changes, the resulting
network congestion could threaten the orderly functioning of our
economy and prevent citizens from accessing critical public safety
services such as 911 call centers. What can be learned from recent
events that, while not catastrophic, resulted in a surge of
telecommuting (e.g., the recent heavy snowstorms in the Mid-Atlantic
States)?
In order to better understand the risks associated with sudden
shifts of network traffic during pandemics and similar events, the
Commission seeks comment on the ability of broadband access networks
(i.e., cable, DSL, fiber-to-the-home, etc.) to maintain effective
operation during severe network congestion or overload. For example, is
the capacity of residential access networks sufficient to handle sudden
surges in use? To what degree? To the extent that network capacity is
insufficient or networks are
[[Page 26183]]
``oversubscribed,'' what methods and procedures are in place to handle
these overloads and to rapidly apply network resources to where they
are needed? What are the limits to these network management techniques?
For example, is there a need for ways to prioritize broadband traffic
during emergencies? Are some network segments or geographic areas more
vulnerable than others? The Commission also seeks detailed data on past
instances: When outbreaks of influenza have closed schools in a given
area, what changes were observed in residential access network traffic,
and how did these changes affect the networks? Should the FCC collect
data on network usage during such events?
As our broadband infrastructure continues to grow and mature, the
Commission is committed to ensuring that it stands ready to support the
myriad uses dreamed up by American innovators and enterprises. This
Notice of Inquiry is a critical first step toward understanding
survivability of our broadband communications networks to all types of
failures and severe traffic overloads. The Commission looks forward to
collaborating with consumers, businesses, and network operators to
improve and secure our broadband infrastructure for the future.
Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i),
4(j), 4(o) and 7(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151,
154(i)-(j) & (o), and 157(b) (2006), this Notice of Inquiry is adopted.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-11159 Filed 5-10-10; 8:45 am]
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