[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 54 (Monday, March 22, 2010)]
[Pages 13656-13666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-6137]



Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

[Docket ID OCC-2010-0004]


[Docket No. OP-1362]



Office of Thrift Supervision

[Docket ID OTS-2010-0005]


Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk 

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB); Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury 
(OTS); and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).

ACTION: Final policy statement.


SUMMARY: The OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA (the agencies) in 
conjunction with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), are 
adopting this policy statement. The policy statement summarizes the 
principles of sound liquidity risk management that the agencies have 
issued in the past and, when appropriate, supplements them with the 
``Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision'' 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 
September 2008.\1\ This policy statement emphasizes supervisory 
expectations for all depository institutions including banks, thrifts, 
and credit unions.

    \1\ NCUA is not a member of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and federally insured credit unions are not directly 
referenced in the principles issued by the Committee.

DATES: This policy statement is effective on May 21, 2010. Comments on 
the Paperwork Reduction Act burden estimates only may be submitted on 
or before April 21, 2010.

    OCC: Kerri Corn, Director for Market Risk, Credit and Market Risk 
Division, (202) 874-5670 or J. Ray Diggs, Group Leader: Balance Sheet 
Management, Credit and Market Risk Division, (202) 874-5670.

[[Page 13657]]

    FRB: James Embersit, Deputy Associate Director, Market and 
Liquidity Risk, 202-452-5249 or Mary Arnett, Supervisory Financial 
Analyst, Market and Liquidity Risk, 202-721-4534 or Brendan Burke, 
Supervisory Financial Analyst, Supervisory Policy and Guidance, 202-
    FDIC: Kyle Hadley, Chief Capital Markets Examination Support, (202) 
    OTS: Rich Gaffin, Financial Analyst, Risk Modeling and Analysis, 
(202) 906-6181or Marvin Shaw, Senior Attorney, Regulations and 
Legislation Division, (202) 906-6639.
    NCUA: Amy Stroud, Program Officer, Office of Examination and 
Insurance, (703) 518-6372.


I. Background

    The recent turmoil in the financial markets clearly demonstrated 
the importance of good liquidity risk management to the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions. In light of this experience, 
supervisors worked on an international and national level through 
various groups \2\ to assess the lessons learned on individual 
institutions' management of liquidity risk and inform future 
supervisory efforts on this topic. As one result of these efforts, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued in September 2008, 
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision, which 
contains 17 principles detailing international supervisory guidance for 
sound liquidity risk management.

    \2\ Significant international groups addressing these issues 
include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Senior 
Supervisors Group, and the Financial Stability Board.

II. Comments on the Proposed Policy Statement

    On July 6, 2009, the agencies requested public comment on all 
aspects of a proposed interagency policy statement \3\ on funding and 
liquidity risk management. The comment period closed on September 4, 
2009. The agencies received 22 letters from financial institutions, 
bank consultants, industry trade groups, and individuals. Overall, the 
commenters generally supported the agencies' efforts to consolidate and 
supplement supervisory expectations for liquidity risk management.

    \3\ 74 FR 32035, (July 9, 2009).

    Many commenters expressed concern regarding the proposed policy 
statement's articulation of the principle that separately regulated 
entities would be expected to maintain liquidity commensurate with 
their own profiles on a stand-alone basis. These commenters indicated 
that the language in the proposed statement suggested that each 
regulated entity affiliated with a parent financial institution would 
be required to maintain its own cushion of liquid assets. This could 
result in restrictions on the movement of liquidity within an 
organization in a time of stress. Such restrictions are commonly 
referred to as ``trapped pools of liquidity''. These commenters assert 
that there are advantages to maintaining liquidity on a centralized 
basis that were evident during the current market disruption. Further, 
they assert that requiring separate pools of liquidity may discourage 
the use of operating subsidiaries.
    The agencies recognize the need for clarification of the principles 
surrounding the management of liquidity with respect to the 
circumstances and responsibilities of various types of legal entities 
and supervisory interests pertaining to them, and, therefore, have 
clarified the scope of application of the policy statement with regard 
to the maintenance of liquidity on a legal entity basis. Specifically, 
the policy statement indicates that the agencies expect depository 
institutions to maintain adequate liquidity both at the consolidated 
level and at significant legal entities. The agencies recognize that a 
depository institution's approach to liquidity risk management will 
depend on the scope of its business operations, business mix, and other 
legal or operational constraints. As an overarching principle, 
depository institutions should maintain sufficient liquidity to ensure 
compliance during economically stressed periods with applicable legal 
and regulatory restrictions on the transfer of liquidity among 
regulated entities. The agencies have modified the language in the 
policy statement to reflect this view.
    The principles of liquidity risk management articulated in this 
policy statement are broadly applicable to bank and thrift holding 
companies, and non-insured subsidiaries of holding companies. However, 
because such institutions may face unique liquidity risk profiles and 
liquidity management challenges, the Federal Reserve and Office of 
Thrift Supervision are articulating the applicability of the policy 
statement's principles to these institutions in transmittal letters of 
the policy statement to their regulated institutions. As a result, the 
guidance for holding companies contained in the original proposal 
issued for comment has been omitted from this final policy statement.
    Many commenters expressed concern over whether the agencies were 
being too prescriptive in the policy statement regarding expectations 
for contingency funding plans (CFPs). These commenters asserted that 
there needs to be flexibility in the design of CFPs such that 
institutions can respond quickly to rapidly moving events that may not 
have been anticipated during the design of the CFP. Other commenters 
asked whether the policy statement requires institutions to use certain 
funding sources (e.g., FHLB advances or brokered deposits) in order to 
show diversification of funding within their CFP.
    The agencies believe that the policy statement provides adequate 
flexibility in supervisory expectations for the development and use of 
CFPs. In fact the policy statement provides a basic framework that 
allows for compliance across a broad range of business models whether 
financial institutions are large or small. While the policy statement 
addresses the need to diversify an institution's funding sources, there 
is no requirement to use a particular funding source. The agencies 
believe that a diversification of funding sources strengthens an 
institution's ability to withstand idiosyncratic and market wide 
liquidity shocks.
    Many commenters representing financial institution trade 
organizations (both domestic and international) and special-purpose 
organizations such as banker's banks and clearing house organizations 
expressed concern over the treatment of federal funds purchased as a 
concentration of funding. As of this writing, under a separate 
issuance, the agencies issued for public comment, ``Correspondent 
Concentrations Risks.'' \4\ That guidance covers supervisory 
expectations for the risks that can occur in correspondent 
relationships. The draft guidance can be found at  http://www.occ.treas.gov/fr/fedregister/74fr48956.pdf.

    \4\ NCUA did not participate in this proposed guidance.

    Some commenters expressed concern over limiting the high-quality 
liquid assets used in the liquidity buffer to securities such as U.S. 
Treasuries. These commenters assert that limiting the liquidity buffer 
to these instruments would limit diversification of funding sources and 
potentially harm market liquidity.
    The agencies agree with some comments on the need for a liquidity 
buffer of unencumbered high-quality assets sized to cover an 
institution's risk

[[Page 13658]]

given an appropriate stress test. The agencies believe that such 
buffers form an essential part of an effective liquidity risk 
management system. The question centers on the composition of assets 
that make up an institution's liquidity buffer. This is an issue that 
not only resonates with this domestic policy statement but with the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's (BCBS) ``Principles for Sound 
Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision.'' It is the intention of the 
agencies for institutions to maintain a buffer of liquid assets that 
are of such high quality that they can be easily and immediately 
converted into cash. Additionally, these assets should have little or 
no loss in value when converted into cash. In addition to the example 
used in the policy statement, other examples of high-quality liquid 
assets may include government guaranteed debt, excess reserves at the 
Federal Reserve, and securities issued by U.S. government sponsored 
agencies. The policy statement was amended to include additional 
    Some commenters expressed concern over supervisory expectations for 
CFP testing. These commenters assert that the agencies need to clarify 
their expectations for testing of components of the CFP.
    The agencies agreed with the commenters and have amended the policy 
statement to include a recognition that testing of certain elements of 
the CFP may be impractical. For example, this may include the sale of 
assets in which the sale of such assets may have unintended market 
consequences. However, other components of the CFP can and should be 
tested (e.g., operational components such as ensuring that roles and 
responsibilities are up-to-date and appropriate; ensuring that legal 
and operational documents are current and appropriate; and ensuring 
that cash collateral can be moved where and when needed and back-up 
liquidity lines can be drawn).
    Two credit union commenters questioned the need for NCUA to adopt 
the proposed policy statement in light of existing guidance in NCUA's 
Examiner's Guide. The commenters questioned the appropriateness of 
imposing new requirements on credit unions. The purpose of the policy 
statement is to reiterate the process and liquidity risk management 
measures that depository institutions, including federally insured 
credit unions, should follow to appropriately manage related risks. The 
policy statement does not impose requirements and contemplates 
flexibility in its application. The policy statement is also not 
intended to replace the NCUA's Examiner's Guide but provides a uniform 
set of sound business practices, with the expectation that each 
institution will scale the guidance to its complexity and risk profile. 
The policy statement, when issued by NCUA, will likely be an attachment 
to an NCUA Letter to Credit Unions. The letter will provide additional 
guidance to federally insured credit unions on NCUA's expectations. The 
two credit union commenters also characterized the policy statement as 
imposing additional burden on federally insured credit unions, 
specifically as it relates to stress testing and overall liquidity 
management reporting. Depending on a credit union's risk profile, such 
testing and reporting is already expected. NCUA ``Letter to Credit 
Unions 02-CU-05, Examination Program Liquidity Questionnaire'', issued 
in March of 2002, includes examiner review of stress testing performed 
as well as an overall assessment of the adequacy of management 
reporting.\5\ The policy statement does not add to a credit union's 
current burden in this regard but rather clarifies NCUA's expectation 
for those credit unions with risk profiles warranting a higher degree 
of liquidity risk management.

    \5\ The letter can be found at NCUA's Web site at http://www.ncua.gov/letters/2002/02-CU-05.html.

    Lastly, the two credit union commenters encouraged NCUA to not 
include corporate credit unions within the scope of this policy 
statement as the corporate credit union network may be restructured. 
NCUA's intent is for the policy statement to apply only to federally 
insured, natural person credit unions, not corporate credit unions and 
the policy statement has been modified to clarify that point.
    Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed above, the agencies have 
determined that it is appropriate to adopt as final the proposed policy 
statement as amended.

III. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with section 3512 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521 (PRA), the Agencies may not conduct or 
sponsor, and the respondent is not required to respond to, an 
information collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The information collection 
requirements contained in this guidance have been submitted to OMB for 
    On July 6, 2009,\6\ the agencies sought comment on the burden 
estimates for this information collection. The comments are summarized 

    \6\ 74 FR 32035.

    Comments continue to be invited on:
    (a) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the 
proper performance of the Federal banking agencies' functions, 
including whether the information has practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information 
collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    (e) Estimates of capital or start up costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    Comments on these questions should be directed to:
    OCC: Communications Division, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Mailstop 2-3, Attention 1557-NEW, 250 E Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20219. In addition comments may be sent by fax to (202) 
874-5274, or by electronic mail to [email protected]. You may 
personally inspect and photocopy comments at the OCC, 250 E Street, 
SW., Washington, DC. For security reasons, the OCC requires that 
visitors make an appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by 
calling (202) 874-4700. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to 
present valid government-issued photo identification and to submit to 
security screening in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
    FRB: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. OP-1362, by 
any of the following methods:
     Agency Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     E-mail: [email protected]. Include the 
docket number in the subject line of the message.
     FAX: 202/452-3819 or 202/452-3102.
     Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, 
NW., Washington, DC 20551.

[[Page 13659]]

    All public comments are available from the FRB's Web site at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, 
unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your comments will 
not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information. Public 
comments may also be viewed in electronic or paper form in Room MP-500 
of the FRB's Martin Building (20th and C Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. 
and 5 p.m. on weekdays.
    FDIC: Interested parties are invited to submit written comments. 
All comments should refer to the name of the collection, ``Liquidity 
Risk Management.'' Comments may be submitted by any of the following 
     E-mail: [email protected].
     Mail: Leneta G. Gregorie (202.898.3719), Counsel, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, PA1730-3000, 550 17th Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivery: Comments may be hand-delivered to the guard 
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located on F 
Street), on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
    OTS: Send comments, referring to the collection by title of the 
proposal or by OMB approval number, to OMB and OTS at these addresses: 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer 
for OTS, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725-17th Street, NW., 
Room 10235, Washington, DC 20503, or by fax to (202) 395-6974; and 
Information Collection Comments, Chief Counsel's Office, Office of 
Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552, by fax to 
(202) 906-6518, or by e-mail to [email protected]. 
OTS will post comments and the related index on the OTS Internet Site 
at http://www.ots.treas.gov. In addition, interested persons may 
inspect comments at the Public Reading Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by 
appointment. To make an appointment, call (202) 906-5922, send an e-
mail to public.info@ots.treas.gov">public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a facsimile transmission to 
(202) 906-7755.
    NCUA: You may submit comments by any of the following methods 
(Please send comments by one method only):
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    NCUA Web Site: http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/ProposedRegulations.aspx Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments.
     E-mail: Address to [email protected]. Include ``[Your 
name] Comments on Proposed Interagency Guidance--Funding and Liquidity 
Risk Management,'' in the e-mail subject line.
     Fax: (703) 518-6319. Use the subject line described above 
for e-mail.
     Mail: Address to Mary F. Rupp, Secretary of the Board, 
National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, 
Virginia 22314-3428.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as mail address.
    Public inspection: All public comments are available on the 
agency's Web site at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/ProposedRegulations.aspx as submitted, except 
as may not be possible for technical reasons. Public comments will not 
be edited to remove any identifying or contact information. Paper 
copies of comments may be inspected in NCUA's law library, at 1775 Duke 
Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, by appointment weekdays between 9 
a.m. and 3 p.m. To make an appointment, call (703) 518-6546 or send an 
e-mail to --OGC Mail @ncua.gov.
    You should send a copy of your comments to the OMB Desk Officer for 
the agencies, by mail to U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th 
Street, NW., 10235, Washington, DC 20503, or by fax to (202) 
    Title of Information Collection: Funding and Liquidity Risk 
    OMB Control Numbers: New collection; to be assigned by OMB.
    Abstract: Section 14 states that institutions should consider 
liquidity costs, benefits, and risks in strategic planning and 
budgeting processes. Significant business activities should be 
evaluated for liquidity risk exposure as well as profitability. More 
complex and sophisticated institutions should incorporate liquidity 
costs, benefits, and risks in the internal product pricing, performance 
measurement, and new product approval process for all material business 
lines, products and activities. Incorporating the cost of liquidity 
into these functions should align the risk-taking incentives of 
individual business lines with the liquidity risk exposure their 
activities create for the institution as a whole. The quantification 
and attribution of liquidity risks should be explicit and transparent 
at the line management level and should include consideration of how 
liquidity would be affected under stressed conditions.
    Section 20 would require that liquidity risk reports provide 
aggregate information with sufficient supporting detail to enable 
management to assess the sensitivity of the institution to changes in 
market conditions, its own financial performance, and other important 
risk factors. Institutions should also report on the use of and 
availability of government support, such as lending and guarantee 
programs, and implications on liquidity positions, particularly since 
these programs are generally temporary or reserved as a source for 
contingent funding.
    Comment Summary: The OCC, FRB, and OTS received one comment 
regarding its burden estimates under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The 
comment, which was from a trade association, stated that some community 
banks with less than $10 billion in assets reported to them that the 
estimate of 80 burden hours for small respondents is accurate. Other 
community banks estimated that it would take significantly longer, 
especially in the first year of implementation. The agencies have 
determined that, on average, the burden estimate is accurate and, 
therefore they have not changed the burden estimates in the final 
policy statement.
    The NCUA received two comments from trade organizations regarding 
the Paperwork Reduction Act, section III, items (a) through (e). One 
commenter stated that no additional information should be required of 
credit unions if they are following current procedures addressed in 
NCUA's Examiner's Guide. Sections 14 and 20 of the proposed guidance 
include specific analysis and reporting expectations based on the 
complexity of the credit union and risk profile. The time estimates 
provided by NCUA reflect the estimated amount of time if credit unions 
complied with those expectations. The time burden estimate is not in 
addition to complying with NCUA Examiner's Guide and such analysis and 
reporting are existing expectations for complex, higher risk credit 
unions (refer to Letter to Credit Unions 02-CU-05). It is difficult to 
accurately estimate how many credit unions would have an implementation 
burden for Sections 14 and 20 under the proposed guidance and the 
extent of that additional burden. It is largely dependent upon the 
structure of the credit union and the inherent risks present, which 
will fluctuate over time. The initial comment period for the guidance 
solicited comments on time burden estimates. No specific responses were 
provided from credit unions to support or challenge the time estimates 
provided. The time estimates provided

[[Page 13660]]

are an average per credit union based on asset size alone and may not 
accurately reflect the time necessary for a particular credit union to 
comply with the expectations of Sections 14 and 20.
    Affected Public:
    OCC: National banks, their subsidiaries, and federal branches or 
agencies of foreign banks.
    FRB: Bank holding companies, state member banks, state-licensed 
branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than insured branches), 
and corporations organized or operating under sections 25 or 25A of the 
Federal Reserve Act (Agreement corporations and Edge corporations).
    FDIC: Insured state nonmember banks.
    OTS: Federal savings associations and their affiliated holding 
    NCUA: Federally-insured credit unions.
    Type of Review: Regular.
    Estimated Burden:
    Number of respondents: 1,560 total (13 large (over $100 billion in 
assets), 29 mid-size ($10-$100 billion), 1,518 small (less than $10 
    Burden Under Section 14: 720 hours per large respondent, 240 hours 
per mid-size respondent, and 80 hours per small respondent.
    Burden under Section 20: 4 hours per month.
    Total estimated annual burden: 212,640 hours.
    Number of respondents: 6,156 total (29 large (over $100 billion in 
assets); 117 mid-size ($10-$100 billion); and 6,010 small (less than 
$10 billion).
    Burden under Section 14: 720 hours per large respondent, 240 hours 
per mid-size respondent, and 80 hours per small respondent.
    Burden under Section 20: 4 hours per month.
    Total estimated annual burden: 825,248 hours.
    Number of respondents: 5,076 total (10 large (over $20 billion in 
assets), 309 mid-size ($1-$20 billion), 4,757 small (less than $1 
    Burden under Section 14: 720 hours per large respondent, 240 hours 
per mid-size respondent, and 80 hours per small respondent.
    Burden under Section 20: 4 hours per month.
    Total estimated annual burden: 705,564.
    Number of respondents: 801 total (14 large (over $100 billion in 
assets), 104 mid-size ($10-$100 billion), 683 small (less than $10 
    Burden under Section 14: 720 hours per large respondent, 240 hours 
per mid-size respondent, and 80 hours per small respondent.
    Burden under Section 20: 4 hours per month.
    Total estimated annual burden: 128,128.
    Number of respondents: 7,736 total (153 large (over $1 billion in 
assets), 501 mid-size ($250 million to $1 billion), and 7,082 small 
(less than $250 million)).
    Burden under Section 14: 240 hours per large respondent, 80 hours 
per mid-size respondent, and 20 hours per small respondent.
    Burden under Section 20: 2 hours per month.
    Total estimated annual burden: 404,104.

IV. Guidance

    The text of the Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and 
Liquidity Risk Management is as follows:

Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management

    1. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 
and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (collectively, the 
agencies) in conjunction with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
(CSBS) \7\ are issuing this guidance to provide consistent interagency 
expectations on sound practices for managing funding and liquidity 
risk. The guidance summarizes the principles of sound liquidity risk 
management that the agencies have issued in the past \8\ and, where 
appropriate, harmonizes these principles with the international 
statement recently issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
titled ``Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision.'' \9\

    \7\ The various state banking supervisors may implement this 
policy statement through their individual supervisory process.
    \8\ For national banks, see the Comptroller's Handbook on 
Liquidity. For state member banks and bank holding companies, see 
the Federal Reserve's Commercial Bank Examination Manual (section 
4020), Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual (section 4010), and 
Trading and Capital Markets Activities Manual (section 2030). For 
state non-member banks, see the FDIC's Revised Examination Guidance 
for Liquidity and Funds Management (Trans. No. 2002-01) (Nov. 19, 
2001) as well as Financial Institution Letter 84-2008, Liquidity 
Risk Management (August 2008). For savings associations, see the 
Office of Thrift Supervision's Examination Handbook, section 530, 
``Cash Flow and Liquidity Management''; and the Holding Companies 
Handbook, section 600. For federally insured credit unions, see 
Letter to Credit Unions No. 02-CU-05, Examination Program Liquidity 
Questionnaire (March 2002). Also see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ``Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision,'' (September 2008).
    \9\ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ``Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision'', September 2008. 
See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm. Federally insured credit 
unions are not directly referenced in the principles issued by the 
Basel Committee.

    2. Recent events illustrate that liquidity risk management at many 
financial institutions is in need of improvement. Deficiencies include 
insufficient holdings of liquid assets, funding risky or illiquid asset 
portfolios with potentially volatile short-term liabilities, and a lack 
of meaningful cash flow projections and liquidity contingency plans.
    3. The following guidance reiterates the process that institutions 
should follow to appropriately identify, measure, monitor, and control 
their funding and liquidity risk. In particular, the guidance re-
emphasizes the importance of cash flow projections, diversified funding 
sources, stress testing, a cushion of liquid assets, and a formal well-
developed contingency funding plan (CFP) as primary tools for measuring 
and managing liquidity risk. The agencies expect every depository 
financial institution \10\ to manage liquidity risk using processes and 
systems that are commensurate with the institution's complexity, risk 
profile, and scope of operations. Liquidity risk management processes 
and plans should be well documented and available for supervisory 
review. Failure to maintain an adequate liquidity risk management 
process will be considered an unsafe and unsound practice.

    \10\ Unless otherwise indicated, this interagency guidance uses 
the term ``depository financial institutions'' or ``institutions'' 
to include banks, saving associations, and federally insured natural 
person credit unions. Federally insured credit unions (FICUs) do not 
have holding company affiliations, and, therefore, references to 
holding companies contained within this guidance are not applicable 
to FICUs.

Liquidity and Liquidity Risk
    4. Liquidity is a financial institution's capacity to meet its cash 
and collateral obligations at a reasonable cost. Maintaining an 
adequate level of liquidity depends on the institution's ability to 
efficiently meet both expected and unexpected cash flows and collateral 
needs without adversely affecting either daily operations or the 
financial condition of the institution.
    5. Liquidity risk is the risk that an institution's financial 
condition or overall safety and soundness is adversely affected by an 
inability (or perceived inability) to meet its

[[Page 13661]]

obligations. An institution's obligations, and the funding sources used 
to meet them, depend significantly on its business mix, balance-sheet 
structure, and the cash flow profiles of its on- and off-balance-sheet 
obligations. In managing their cash flows, institutions confront 
various situations that can give rise to increased liquidity risk. 
These include funding mismatches, market constraints on the ability to 
convert assets into cash or in accessing sources of funds (i.e., market 
liquidity), and contingent liquidity events. Changes in economic 
conditions or exposure to credit, market, operation, legal, and 
reputation risks also can affect an institution's liquidity risk 
profile and should be considered in the assessment of liquidity and 
asset/liability management.
Sound Practices of Liquidity Risk Management
    6. An institution's liquidity management process should be 
sufficient to meet its daily funding needs and cover both expected and 
unexpected deviations from normal operations. Accordingly, institutions 
should have a comprehensive management process for identifying, 
measuring, monitoring, and controlling liquidity risk. Because of the 
critical importance to the viability of the institution, liquidity risk 
management should be fully integrated into the institution's risk 
management processes. Critical elements of sound liquidity risk 
management include:
     Effective corporate governance consisting of oversight by 
the board of directors and active involvement by management in an 
institution's control of liquidity risk.
     Appropriate strategies, policies, procedures, and limits 
used to manage and mitigate liquidity risk.
     Comprehensive liquidity risk measurement and monitoring 
systems (including assessments of the current and prospective cash 
flows or sources and uses of funds) that are commensurate with the 
complexity and business activities of the institution.
     Active management of intraday liquidity and collateral.
     An appropriately diverse mix of existing and potential 
future funding sources.
     Adequate levels of highly liquid marketable securities 
free of legal, regulatory, or operational impediments, that can be used 
to meet liquidity needs in stressful situations.
     Comprehensive contingency funding plans (CFPs) that 
sufficiently address potential adverse liquidity events and emergency 
cash flow requirements.
     Internal controls and internal audit processes sufficient 
to determine the adequacy of the institution's liquidity risk 
management process.
    Supervisors will assess these critical elements in their reviews of 
an institution's liquidity risk management process in relation to its 
size, complexity, and scope of operations.
Corporate Governance
    7. The board of directors is ultimately responsible for the 
liquidity risk assumed by the institution. As a result, the board 
should ensure that the institution's liquidity risk tolerance is 
established and communicated in such a manner that all levels of 
management clearly understand the institution's approach to managing 
the trade-offs between liquidity risk and short-term profits. The board 
of directors or its delegated committee of board members should oversee 
the establishment and approval of liquidity management strategies, 
policies and procedures, and review them at least annually. In 
addition, the board should ensure that it:
     Understands the nature of the liquidity risks of its 
institution and periodically reviews information necessary to maintain 
this understanding.
     Establishes executive-level lines of authority and 
responsibility for managing the institution's liquidity risk.
     Enforces management's duties to identify, measure, 
monitor, and control liquidity risk.
     Understands and periodically reviews the institution's 
CFPs for handling potential adverse liquidity events.
     Understands the liquidity risk profiles of important 
subsidiaries and affiliates as appropriate.
    8. Senior management is responsible for ensuring that board-
approved strategies, policies, and procedures for managing liquidity 
(on both a long-term and day-to-day basis) are appropriately executed 
within the lines of authority and responsibility designated for 
managing and controlling liquidity risk. This includes overseeing the 
development and implementation of appropriate risk measurement and 
reporting systems, liquid buffers (e.g., cash, unencumbered marketable 
securities, and market instruments), CFPs, and an adequate internal 
control infrastructure. Senior management is also responsible for 
regularly reporting to the board of directors on the liquidity risk 
profile of the institution.
    9. Senior management should determine the structure, 
responsibilities, and controls for managing liquidity risk and for 
overseeing the liquidity positions of the institution. These elements 
should be clearly documented in liquidity risk policies and procedures. 
For institutions comprised of multiple entities, such elements should 
be fully specified and documented in policies for each material legal 
entity and subsidiary. Senior management should be able to monitor 
liquidity risks for each entity across the institution on an ongoing 
basis. Processes should be in place to ensure that the group's senior 
management is actively monitoring and quickly responding to all 
material developments and reporting to the boards of directors as 
    10. Institutions should clearly identify the individuals or 
committees responsible for implementing and making liquidity risk 
decisions. When an institution uses an asset/liability committee (ALCO) 
or other similar senior management committee, the committee should 
actively monitor the institution's liquidity profile and should have 
sufficiently broad representation across major institutional functions 
that can directly or indirectly influence the institution's liquidity 
risk profile (e.g., lending, investment securities, wholesale and 
retail funding). Committee members should include senior managers with 
authority over the units responsible for executing liquidity-related 
transactions and other activities within the liquidity risk management 
process. In addition, the committee should ensure that the risk 
measurement system adequately identifies and quantifies risk exposure. 
The committee also should ensure that the reporting process 
communicates accurate, timely, and relevant information about the level 
and sources of risk exposure.
Strategies, Policies, Procedures, and Risk Tolerances
    11. Institutions should have documented strategies for managing 
liquidity risk and clear policies and procedures for limiting and 
controlling risk exposures that appropriately reflect the institution's 
risk tolerances. Strategies should identify primary sources of funding 
for meeting daily operating cash outflows, as well as seasonal and 
cyclical cash flow fluctuations. Strategies should also address 
alternative responses to various

[[Page 13662]]

adverse business scenarios.\11\ Policies and procedures should provide 
for the formulation of plans and courses of actions for dealing with 
potential temporary, intermediate-term, and long-term liquidity 
disruptions. Policies, procedures, and limits also should address 
liquidity separately for individual currencies, legal entities, and 
business lines, when appropriate and material, and should allow for 
legal, regulatory, and operational limits for the transferability of 
liquidity as well. Senior management should coordinate the 
institution's liquidity risk management with disaster, contingency, and 
strategic planning efforts, as well as with business line and risk 
management objectives, strategies, and tactics.

    \11\ In formulating liquidity management strategies, members of 
complex banking groups should take into consideration their legal 
structures (e.g., branches versus separate legal entities and 
operating subsidiaries), key business lines, markets, products, and 
jurisdictions in which they operate.

    12. Policies should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance 
that is appropriate for the business strategy of the institution 
considering its complexity, business mix, liquidity risk profile, and 
its role in the financial system. Policies should also contain 
provisions for documenting and periodically reviewing assumptions used 
in liquidity projections. Policy guidelines should employ both 
quantitative targets and qualitative guidelines. For example, these 
measurements, limits, and guidelines may be specified in terms of the 
following measures and conditions, as applicable:
     Cash flow projections that include discrete and cumulative 
cash flow mismatches or gaps over specified future time horizons under 
both expected and adverse business conditions.
     Target amounts of unencumbered liquid asset reserves.
     Measures used to identify unstable liabilities and liquid 
asset coverage ratios. For example, these may include ratios of 
wholesale funding to total liabilities, potentially volatile retail 
(e.g., high-cost or out-of-market) deposits to total deposits, and 
other liability dependency measures, such as short-term borrowings as a 
percent of total funding.
     Asset concentrations that could increase liquidity risk 
through a limited ability to convert to cash (e.g., complex financial 
instruments,\12\ bank-owned (corporate-owned) life insurance, and less 
marketable loan portfolios).

    \12\ Financial instruments that are illiquid, difficult to 
value, or marked by the presence of cash flows that are irregular, 
uncertain, or difficult to model.

     Funding concentrations that address diversification of 
funding sources and types, such as large liability and borrowed funds 
dependency, secured versus unsecured funding sources, exposures to 
single providers of funds, exposures to funds providers by market 
segments, and different types of brokered deposits or wholesale 
     Funding concentrations that address the term, re-pricing, 
and market characteristics of funding sources with consideration given 
to the nature of the assets they fund. This may include diversification 
targets for short-, medium-, and long-term funding; instrument type and 
securitization vehicles; and guidance on concentrations for currencies 
and geographical markets.
     Contingent liability exposures such as unfunded loan 
commitments, lines of credit supporting asset sales or securitizations, 
and collateral requirements for derivatives transactions and various 
types of secured lending.
     Exposures of material activities, such as securitization, 
derivatives, trading, transaction processing, and international 
activities, to broad systemic and adverse financial market events. This 
is most applicable to institutions with complex and sophisticated 
liquidity risk profiles.
     Alternative measures and conditions may be appropriate for 
certain institutions.
    13. Policies also should specify the nature and frequency of 
management reporting. In normal business environments, senior managers 
should receive liquidity risk reports at least monthly, while the board 
of directors should receive liquidity risk reports at least quarterly. 
Depending upon the complexity of the institution's business mix and 
liquidity risk profile, management reporting may need to be more 
frequent. Regardless of an institution's complexity, it should have the 
ability to increase the frequency of reporting on short notice, if the 
need arises. Liquidity risk reports should impart to senior management 
and the board a clear understanding of the institution's liquidity risk 
exposure, compliance with risk limits, consistency between management's 
strategies and tactics, and consistency between these strategies and 
the board's expressed risk tolerance.
    14. Institutions should consider liquidity costs, benefits, and 
risks in strategic planning and budgeting processes. Significant 
business activities should be evaluated for both liquidity risk 
exposure and profitability. More complex and sophisticated institutions 
should incorporate liquidity costs, benefits, and risks in the internal 
product pricing, performance measurement, and new product approval 
process for all material business lines, products, and activities. 
Incorporating the cost of liquidity into these functions should align 
the risk-taking incentives of individual business lines with the 
liquidity risk exposure their activities create for the institution as 
a whole. The quantification and attribution of liquidity risks should 
be explicit and transparent at the line management level and should 
include consideration of how liquidity would be affected under stressed 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Monitoring, and Reporting
    15. The process of measuring liquidity risk should include robust 
methods for comprehensively projecting cash flows arising from assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance-sheet items over an appropriate set of 
time horizons. For example, time buckets may be daily for very short 
timeframes out to weekly, monthly, and quarterly for longer time 
frames. Pro forma cash flow statements are a critical tool for 
adequately managing liquidity risk. Cash flow projections can range 
from simple spreadsheets to very detailed reports depending upon the 
complexity and sophistication of the institution and its liquidity risk 
profile under alternative scenarios. Given the critical importance that 
assumptions play in constructing measures of liquidity risk and 
projections of cash flows, institutions should ensure that the 
assumptions used are reasonable, appropriate, and adequately 
documented. Institutions should periodically review and formally 
approve these assumptions. Institutions should focus particular 
attention on the assumptions used in assessing the liquidity risk of 
complex assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions. 
Assumptions applied to positions with uncertain cash flows, including 
the stability of retail and brokered deposits and secondary market 
issuances and borrowings, are especially important when they are used 
to evaluate the availability of alternative sources of funds under 
adverse contingent liquidity scenarios. Such scenarios include, but are 
not limited to, deterioration in the institution's asset quality or 
capital adequacy.
    16. Institutions should ensure that assets are properly valued 
according to relevant financial reporting and supervisory standards. An 
institution should fully factor into its risk

[[Page 13663]]

management practices the consideration that valuations may deteriorate 
under market stress and take this into account in assessing the 
feasibility and impact of asset sales on its liquidity position during 
stress events.
    17. Institutions should ensure that their vulnerabilities to 
changing liquidity needs and liquidity capacities are appropriately 
assessed within meaningful time horizons, including intraday, day-to-
day, short-term weekly and monthly horizons, medium-term horizons of up 
to one year, and longer-term liquidity needs of one year or more. These 
assessments should include vulnerabilities to events, activities, and 
strategies that can significantly strain the capability to generate 
internal cash.
Stress Testing
    18. Institutions should conduct stress tests regularly for a 
variety of institution-specific and marketwide events across multiple 
time horizons. The magnitude and frequency of stress testing should be 
commensurate with the complexity of the financial institution and the 
level of its risk exposures. Stress test outcomes should be used to 
identify and quantify sources of potential liquidity strain and to 
analyze possible impacts on the institution's cash flows, liquidity 
position, profitability, and solvency. Stress tests should also be used 
to ensure that current exposures are consistent with the financial 
institution's established liquidity risk tolerance. Management's active 
involvement and support is critical to the effectiveness of the stress 
testing process. Management should discuss the results of stress tests 
and take remedial or mitigating actions to limit the institution's 
exposures, build up a liquidity cushion, and adjust its liquidity 
profile to fit its risk tolerance. The results of stress tests should 
also play a key role in shaping the institution's contingency planning. 
As such, stress testing and contingency planning are closely 
Collateral Position Management
    19. An institution should have the ability to calculate all of its 
collateral positions in a timely manner, including the value of assets 
currently pledged relative to the amount of security required and 
unencumbered assets available to be pledged. An institution's level of 
available collateral should be monitored by legal entity, jurisdiction, 
and currency exposure, and systems should be capable of monitoring 
shifts between intraday and overnight or term collateral usage. An 
institution should be aware of the operational and timing requirements 
associated with accessing the collateral given its physical location 
(i.e., the custodian institution or securities settlement system with 
which the collateral is held). Institutions should also fully 
understand the potential demand on required and available collateral 
arising from various types of contractual contingencies during periods 
of both marketwide and institution-specific stress.
Management Reporting
    20. Liquidity risk reports should provide aggregate information 
with sufficient supporting detail to enable management to assess the 
sensitivity of the institution to changes in market conditions, its own 
financial performance, and other important risk factors. The types of 
reports or information and their timing will vary according to the 
complexity of the institution's operations and risk profile. Reportable 
items may include but are not limited to cash flow gaps, cash flow 
projections, asset and funding concentrations, critical assumptions 
used in cash flow projections, key early warning or risk indicators, 
funding availability, status of contingent funding sources, or 
collateral usage. Institutions should also report on the use of and 
availability of government support, such as lending and guarantee 
programs, and implications on liquidity positions, particularly since 
these programs are generally temporary or reserved as a source for 
contingent funding.
Liquidity Across Currencies, Legal Entities, and Business Lines
    21. A depository institution should actively monitor and control 
liquidity risk exposures and funding needs within and across 
currencies, legal entities, and business lines. Also, depository 
institutions should take into account operational limitations to the 
transferability of liquidity, and should maintain sufficient liquidity 
to ensure compliance during economically stressed periods with 
applicable legal and regulatory restrictions on the transfer of 
liquidity among regulated entities. The degree of centralization in 
managing liquidity should be appropriate for the depository 
institution's business mix and liquidity risk profile.\13\ The agencies 
expect depository institutions to maintain adequate liquidity both at 
the consolidated level and at significant legal entities.

    \13\ Institutions subject to multiple regulatory jurisdictions 
should have management strategies and processes that recognize the 
potential limitations of liquidity transferability, as well as the 
need to meet the liquidity requirements of foreign jurisdictions.

    22. Regardless of its organizational structure, it is important 
that an institution actively monitor and control liquidity risks at the 
level of individual legal entities, and the group as a whole, 
incorporating processes that aggregate data across multiple systems in 
order to develop a group-wide view of liquidity risk exposures. It is 
also important that the institution identify constraints on the 
transfer of liquidity within the group.
    23. Assumptions regarding the transferability of funds and 
collateral should be described in liquidity risk management plans.
Intraday Liquidity Position Management
    24. Intraday liquidity monitoring is an important component of the 
liquidity risk management process for institutions engaged in 
significant payment, settlement, and clearing activities. An 
institution's failure to manage intraday liquidity effectively, under 
normal and stressed conditions, could leave it unable to meet payment 
and settlement obligations in a timely manner, adversely affecting its 
own liquidity position and that of its counterparties. Among large, 
complex organizations, the interdependencies that exist among payment 
systems and the inability to meet certain critical payments has the 
potential to lead to systemic disruptions that can prevent the smooth 
functioning of all payment systems and money markets. Therefore, 
institutions with material payment, settlement and clearing activities 
should actively manage their intraday liquidity positions and risks to 
meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both 
normal and stressed conditions. Senior management should develop and 
adopt an intraday liquidity strategy that allows the institution to:
     Monitor and measure expected daily gross liquidity inflows 
and outflows.
     Manage and mobilize collateral when necessary to obtain 
intraday credit.
     Identify and prioritize time-specific and other critical 
obligations in order to meet them when expected.
     Settle other less critical obligations as soon as 
     Control credit to customers when necessary.
     Ensure that liquidity planners understand the amounts of 
collateral and liquidity needed to perform payment-system obligations 
when assessing the organization's overall liquidity needs.

[[Page 13664]]

Diversified Funding
    25. An institution should establish a funding strategy that 
provides effective diversification in the sources and tenor of funding. 
It should maintain an ongoing presence in its chosen funding markets 
and strong relationships with funds providers to promote effective 
diversification of funding sources. An institution should regularly 
gauge its capacity to raise funds quickly from each source. It should 
identify the main factors that affect its ability to raise funds and 
monitor those factors closely to ensure that estimates of fund raising 
capacity remain valid.
    26. An institution should diversify available funding sources in 
the short-, medium-, and long-term. Diversification targets should be 
part of the medium- to long-term funding plans and should be aligned 
with the budgeting and business planning process. Funding plans should 
take into account correlations between sources of funds and market 
conditions. Funding should also be diversified across a full range of 
retail as well as secured and unsecured wholesale sources of funds, 
consistent with the institution's sophistication and complexity. 
Management should also consider the funding implications of any 
government programs or guarantees it uses. As with wholesale funding, 
the potential unavailability of government programs over the 
intermediate- and long-tem should be fully considered in the 
development of liquidity risk management strategies, tactics, and risk 
tolerances. Funding diversification should be implemented using limits 
addressing counterparties, secured versus unsecured market funding, 
instrument type, securitization vehicle, and geographic market. In 
general, funding concentrations should be avoided. Undue over-reliance 
on any one source of funding is considered an unsafe and unsound 
    27. An essential component of ensuring funding diversity is 
maintaining market access. Market access is critical for effective 
liquidity risk management as it affects both the ability to raise new 
funds and to liquidate assets. Senior management should ensure that 
market access is being actively managed, monitored, and tested by the 
appropriate staff. Such efforts should be consistent with the 
institution's liquidity risk profile and sources of funding. For 
example, access to the capital markets is an important consideration 
for most large complex institutions, whereas the availability of 
correspondent lines of credit and other sources of wholesale funds are 
critical for smaller, less complex institutions.
    28. An institution should identify alternative sources of funding 
that strengthen its capacity to withstand a variety of severe 
institution-specific and marketwide liquidity shocks. Depending upon 
the nature, severity, and duration of the liquidity shock, potential 
sources of funding include, but are not limited to, the following:
     Deposit growth.
     Lengthening maturities of liabilities.
     Issuance of debt instruments.\14\

    \14\ Federally insured credit unions can borrow funds (which 
includes issuing debt) as given in section 106 of the Federal Credit 
Union Act (FCUA). Section 106 of the FCUA as well as section 741.2 
of the NCUA Rules and Regulations establish specific limitations on 
the amount that can be borrowed. Federal Credit Unions can borrow 
from natural persons in accordance with the requirements of part 
701.38 of the NCUA Rules and Regulations.

     Sale of subsidiaries or lines of business.
     Asset securitization.
     Sale (either outright or through repurchase agreements) or 
pledging of liquid assets.
     Drawing down committed facilities.
Cushion of Liquid Assets
    29. Liquid assets are an important source of both primary 
(operating liquidity) and secondary (contingent liquidity) funding at 
many institutions. Indeed, a critical component of an institution's 
ability to effectively respond to potential liquidity stress is the 
availability of a cushion of highly liquid assets without legal, 
regulatory, or operational impediments (i.e., unencumbered) that can be 
sold or pledged to obtain funds in a range of stress scenarios. These 
assets should be held as insurance against a range of liquidity stress 
scenarios including those that involve the loss or impairment of 
typically available unsecured and/or secured funding sources. The size 
of the cushion of such high-quality liquid assets should be supported 
by estimates of liquidity needs performed under an institution's stress 
testing as well as aligned with the risk tolerance and risk profile of 
the institution. Management estimates of liquidity needs during periods 
of stress should incorporate both contractual and noncontractual cash 
flows, including the possibility of funds being withdrawn. Such 
estimates should also assume the inability to obtain unsecured and 
uninsured funding as well as the loss or impairment of access to funds 
secured by assets other than the safest, most liquid assets.
    30. Management should ensure that unencumbered, highly liquid 
assets are readily available and are not pledged to payment systems or 
clearing houses. The quality of unencumbered liquid assets is important 
as it will ensure accessibility during the time of most need. An 
institution could use its holdings of high-quality securities, for 
example, U.S. Treasury securities, securities issued by U.S. 
government-sponsored agencies, excess reserves at the central bank or 
similar instruments, and enter into repurchase agreements in response 
to the most severe stress scenarios.
Contingency Funding Plan \15\

    \15\ Financial institutions that have had their liquidity 
supported by temporary government programs administered by the 
Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve and/or FDIC should not 
base their liquidity strategies on the belief that such programs 
will remain in place indefinitely.

    31. All financial institutions, regardless of size and complexity, 
should have a formal CFP that clearly sets out the strategies for 
addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency situations. A CFP should 
delineate policies to manage a range of stress environments, establish 
clear lines of responsibility, and articulate clear implementation and 
escalation procedures. It should be regularly tested and updated to 
ensure that it is operationally sound. For certain components of the 
CFP, affirmative testing (e.g., liquidation of assets) may be 
impractical. In these instances, institutions should be sure to test 
operational components of the CFP. For example, ensuring that roles and 
responsibilities are up-to-date and appropriate; ensuring that legal 
and operational documents are up-to-date and appropriate; and ensuring 
that cash and collateral can be moved where and when needed, and 
ensuring that contingent liquidity lines can be drawn when needed.
    32. Contingent liquidity events are unexpected situations or 
business conditions that may increase liquidity risk. The events may be 
institution-specific or arise from external factors and may include:
     The institution's inability to fund asset growth.
     The institution's inability to renew or replace maturing 
funding liabilities.
     Customers unexpectedly exercising options to withdraw 
deposits or exercise off-balance-sheet commitments.
     Changes in market value and price volatility of various 
asset types.
     Changes in economic conditions, market perception, or 
dislocations in the financial markets.

[[Page 13665]]

     Disturbances in payment and settlement systems due to 
operational or local disasters.
    33. Insured institutions should be prepared for the specific 
contingencies that will be applicable to them if they become less than 
Well Capitalized pursuant to Prompt Correction Action (PCA) provisions 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act.\16\ 
Contingencies may include restricted rates paid for deposits, the need 
to seek approval from the FDIC/NCUA to accept brokered deposits, and 
the inability to accept any brokered deposits.\17\

    \16\ See 12 U.S.C. 1831o; 12 CFR 6 (OCC), 12 CFR 208.40 (FRB), 
12 CFR 325.101 (FDIC), and 12 CFR 565 (OTS) and 12 U.S.C. 1790d; 12 
CFR 702 (NCUA).
    \17\ Section 38 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o) requires 
insured depository institutions that are not well capitalized to 
receive approval prior to engaging in certain activities. Section 38 
restricts or prohibits certain activities and requires an insured 
depository institution to submit a capital restoration plan when it 
becomes undercapitalized. Section 216 of the Federal Credit Union 
Act and part 702 of the NCUA Rules and Regulations establish the 
requirements and restrictions for federally insured credit unions 
under Prompt Corrective Action. For brokered, nonmember deposits, 
additional restrictions apply to federal credit unions as given in 
parts 701.32 and 742 of the NCUA Rules and Regulations.

    34. A CFP provides a documented framework for managing unexpected 
liquidity situations. The objective of the CFP is to ensure that the 
institution's sources of liquidity are sufficient to fund normal 
operating requirements under contingent events. A CFP also identifies 
alternative contingent liquidity resources \18\ that can be employed 
under adverse liquidity circumstances. An institution's CFP should be 
commensurate with its complexity, risk profile, and scope of 
operations. As macroeconomic and institution-specific conditions 
change, CFPs should be revised to reflect these changes

    \18\ There may be time constraints, sometimes lasting weeks, 
encountered in initially establishing lines with FRB and/or FHLB. As 
a result, financial institutions should plan to have these lines set 
up well in advance.

    35. Contingent liquidity events can range from high-probability/
low-impact events to low-probability/high-impact events. Institutions 
should incorporate planning for high-probability/low-impact liquidity 
risks into the day-to-day management of sources and uses of funds. 
Institutions can generally accomplish this by assessing possible 
variations around expected cash flow projections and providing for 
adequate liquidity reserves and other means of raising funds in the 
normal course of business. In contrast, all financial institution CFPs 
will typically focus on events that, while relatively infrequent, could 
significantly impact the institution's operations. A CFP should:
     Identify Stress Events. Stress events are those that may 
have a significant impact on the institution's liquidity given its 
specific balance-sheet structure, business lines, organizational 
structure, and other characteristics. Possible stress events may 
include deterioration in asset quality, changes in agency credit 
ratings, PCA capital categories and CAMELS \19\ ratings downgrades, 
widening of credit default spreads, operating losses, declining 
financial institution equity prices, negative press coverage, or other 
events that may call into question an institution's ability to meet its 

    \19\ Federally insured credit unions are evaluated using the 
``CAMEL'' rating system, which is substantially similar to the 
``CAMELS'' system without the ``S'' component for rating Sensitivity 
to market risk. Information on NCUA's rating system can be found in 
Letter to Credit Unions 07-CU-12, CAMEL Rating System.

     Assess Levels of Severity and Timing. The CFP should 
delineate the various levels of stress severity that can occur during a 
contingent liquidity event and identify the different stages for each 
type of event. The events, stages, and severity levels identified 
should include temporary disruptions, as well as those that might be 
more intermediate term or longer-term. Institutions can use the 
different stages or levels of severity identified to design early-
warning indicators, assess potential funding needs at various points in 
a developing crisis, and specify comprehensive action plans. The length 
of the scenario will be determined by the type of stress event being 
modeled and should encompass the duration of the event.
     Assess Funding Sources and Needs. A critical element of 
the CFP is the quantitative projection and evaluation of expected 
funding needs and funding capacity during the stress event. This 
entails an analysis of the potential erosion in funding at alternative 
stages or severity levels of the stress event and the potential cash 
flow mismatches that may occur during the various stress levels. 
Management should base such analysis on realistic assessments of the 
behavior of funds providers during the event and incorporate 
alternative contingency funding sources. The analysis also should 
include all material on- and off-balance-sheet cash flows and their 
related effects. The result should be a realistic analysis of cash 
inflows, outflows, and funds availability at different time intervals 
during the potential liquidity stress event in order to measure the 
institution's ability to fund operations. Common tools to assess 
funding mismatches include:
    [cir] Liquidity gap analysis--A cash flow report that essentially 
represents a base case estimate of where funding surpluses and 
shortfalls will occur over various future time frames.
    [cir] Stress tests--A pro forma cash flow report with the ability 
to estimate future funding surpluses and shortfalls under various 
liquidity stress scenarios and the institution's ability to fund 
expected asset growth projections or sustain an orderly liquidation of 
assets under various stress events.
     Identify Potential Funding Sources. Because liquidity 
pressures may spread from one funding source to another during a 
significant liquidity event, institutions should identify alternative 
sources of liquidity and ensure ready access to contingent funding 
sources. In some cases, these funding sources may rarely be used in the 
normal course of business. Therefore, institutions should conduct 
advance planning and periodic testing to ensure that contingent funding 
sources are readily available when needed.
     Establish Liquidity Event Management Processes. The CFP 
should provide for a reliable crisis management team and administrative 
structure, including realistic action plans used to execute the various 
elements of the plan for given levels of stress. Frequent communication 
and reporting among team members, the board of directors, and other 
affected managers optimize the effectiveness of a contingency plan 
during an adverse liquidity event by ensuring that business decisions 
are coordinated to minimize further disruptions to liquidity. Such 
events may also require the daily computation of regular liquidity risk 
reports and supplemental information. The CFP should provide for more 
frequent and more detailed reporting as the stress situation 
     Establish a Monitoring Framework for Contingent Events. 
Institution management should monitor for potential liquidity stress 
events by using early-warning indicators and event triggers. The 
institution should tailor these indicators to its specific liquidity 
risk profile. The early recognition of potential events allows the 
institution to position itself into progressive states of readiness as 
the event evolves, while providing a framework to report or communicate 
within the institution and to outside parties. Early-warning signals 
may include, but are not limited to, negative publicity concerning an 
asset class owned by the institution, increased potential for 
deterioration in

[[Page 13666]]

the institution's financial condition, widening debt or credit default 
swap spreads, and increased concerns over the funding of off-balance-
sheet items.
    36. To mitigate the potential for reputation contagion, effective 
communication with counterparties, credit-rating agencies, and other 
stakeholders when liquidity problems arise is of vital importance. 
Smaller institutions that rarely interact with the media should have 
plans in place for how they will manage press inquiries that may arise 
during a liquidity event. In addition, groupwide contingency funding 
plans, liquidity cushions, and multiple sources of funding are 
mechanisms that may mitigate reputation concerns.
    37. In addition to early-warning indicators, institutions that 
issue public debt, use warehouse financing, securitize assets, or 
engage in material over-the-counter derivative transactions typically 
have exposure to event triggers embedded in the legal documentation 
governing these transactions. Institutions that rely upon brokered 
deposits should also incorporate PCA-related downgrade triggers into 
their CFPs since a change in PCA status could have a material bearing 
on the availability of this funding source. Contingent event triggers 
should be an integral part of the liquidity risk monitoring system. 
Institutions that originate and/or purchase loans for asset 
securitization programs pose heightened liquidity risk concerns due to 
the unexpected funding needs associated with an early amortization 
event or disruption of warehouse funding. Institutions that securitize 
assets should have liquidity contingency plans that address these 
    38. Institutions that rely upon secured funding sources also are 
subject to potentially higher margin or collateral requirements that 
may be triggered upon the deterioration of a specific portfolio of 
exposures or the overall financial condition of the institution. The 
ability of a financially stressed institution to meet calls for 
additional collateral should be considered in the CFP. Potential 
collateral values also should be subject to stress tests since 
devaluations or market uncertainty could reduce the amount of 
contingent funding that can be obtained from pledging a given asset. 
Additionally, triggering events should be understood and monitored by 
liquidity managers.
    39. Institutions should test various elements of the CFP to assess 
their reliability under times of stress. Institutions that rarely use 
the type of funds they identify as standby sources of liquidity in a 
stress situation, such as the sale or securitization of loans, 
securities repurchase agreements, Federal Reserve discount window 
borrowing, or other sources of funds, should periodically test the 
operational elements of these sources to ensure that they work as 
anticipated. However, institutions should be aware that during real 
stress events, prior market access testing does not guarantee that 
these funding sources will remain available within the same time frames 
and/or on the same terms.
    40. Larger, more complex institutions can benefit by employing 
operational simulations to test communications, coordination, and 
decision making involving managers with different responsibilities, in 
different geographic locations, or at different operating subsidiaries. 
Simulations or tests run late in the day can highlight specific 
problems such as difficulty in selling assets or borrowing new funds at 
a time when business in the capital markets may be less active.
Internal Controls
    41. An institution's internal controls consist of procedures, 
approval processes, reconciliations, reviews, and other mechanisms 
designed to provide assurance that the institution manages liquidity 
risk consistent with board-approved policy. Appropriate internal 
controls should address relevant elements of the risk management 
process, including adherence to policies and procedures, the adequacy 
of risk identification, risk measurement, reporting, and compliance 
with applicable rules and regulations.
    42. Management should ensure that an independent party regularly 
reviews and evaluates the various components of the institution's 
liquidity risk management process. These reviews should assess the 
extent to which the institution's liquidity risk management complies 
with both supervisory guidance and industry sound practices, taking 
into account the level of sophistication and complexity of the 
institution's liquidity risk profile.\20\ Smaller, less-complex 
institutions may achieve independence by assigning this responsibility 
to the audit function or other qualified individuals independent of the 
risk management process. The independent review process should report 
key issues requiring attention including instances of noncompliance to 
the appropriate level of management for prompt corrective action 
consistent with approved policy.

    \20\ This includes the standards established in this interagency 
guidance as well as the supporting material each agency provides in 
its examination manuals and handbooks directed at their supervised 
institutions. Industry standards include those advanced by 
recognized industry associations and groups.

    Dated: March 3, 2010.
John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency.
    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, March 15, 2010.

Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
    Dated at Washington, DC, the 4th day of March 2010.

    By order of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Valerie J. Best,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
    Dated: March 16, 2010.

    By the Office of Thrift Supervision.
John E. Bowman,
Acting Director.
    Dated: March 4, 2010.

    By the National Credit Union Administration Board.
Mary F. Rupp,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2010-6137 Filed 3-19-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6720-01-P; 4810-33-P; 6210-01-P; 6714-01-P; 7535-01-P