[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 53 (Friday, March 19, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13323-13327]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-6069]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-333; NRC-2010-0095]
James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exemption
1.0 Background
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License No. DPR-59, which authorizes operation of
the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP). The license
provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all
rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a boiling-water reactor located in Oswego
County in New York State.
2.0 Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50,
Section 50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed
before January 1, 1979, satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities
Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' Section III.G, ``Fire protection
of safe shutdown capability.'' JAFNPP was licensed to operate prior to
January 1, 1979. As such, the licensee's Fire Protection Program (FPP)
must provide the established level of protection as intended by 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix R, and Section III.G.
By letter dated February 18, 2009, ``Request for Exemption from 10
CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 Requirements Based on Manual
Actions,'' (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML090860980), as supplemented by letter dated March 30,
2009, ``James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant-Response to Request
for Information Required for Acceptance Review Regarding: Request for
Exemption'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML091320387), the licensee requested
an exemption for the JAFNPP from certain technical requirements of 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (III.G.2) for the use of an
operator manual action (OMA) in lieu of meeting the circuit separation
and protection requirements contained in III.G.2 for Fire Area 10 at
the plant.
In response to the NRC staff's requests for additional information
(RAI), the licensee provided supplemental information by letters dated
November 17, 2009, (ADAMS Accession No. ML093270075), December 11,
2009, (ADAMS Accession No. ML093520408), and January 19, 2010 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML100210195).
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present. The licensee has stated
that special circumstances are present in that the application of the
regulation in this particular circumstance is not necessary to achieve
the underlying purpose of the rule, which is consistent with the
language included in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(b), nuclear power plants licensed
before January 1, 1979, are required to meet Section III.G, of 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix R. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
R, and Section III.G is to ensure that the ability to achieve and
maintain safe shutdown is preserved following a fire event. The
regulation intends for licensees to accomplish this by extending the
concept of defense-in-depth to:
(1) Prevent fires from starting;
(2) Rapidly detect, control, and extinguish promptly those fires
that do occur;
(3) Provide protection for structures, systems, and components
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by
the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of
the plant.
The stated purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
(III.G.2) is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire
damage in the event of a fire. III.G.2 requires one of the following
means to ensure that a redundant train of safe shutdown cables and
equipment is free of fire damage, where redundant trains are located in
the same fire area outside of primary containment:
a. Separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-
hour rating;
[[Page 13324]]
b. Separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of
more that 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards and
with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed
in the fire area; or
c. Enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a
fire barrier having a 1-hour rating and with fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area.
Entergy has requested an exemption from the requirements of III.G.2
for JAFNPP to the extent that one of the redundant trains of systems
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown is not maintained free
of fire damage in accordance with one of the required means, for a fire
occurring in Fire Area 10 in the Reactor Building. In their November
17, 2009, response to the NRC's RAI-02 the licensee specifically stated
that, ``JAFNPP does not comply with any of the methods provided and
relies on an OMA to operate the SRVs from the Local SRV Control Panel
for a fire in Fire Area 10. In addition, Fire Area 10 does not have a
full area automatic suppression system.'' In summary, JAFNPP does not
meet the requirements of III.G.2 for a fire in Fire Area 10 and an OMA
may be necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown capability. The
licensee also stated in their November 17, 2009, letter that the only
credible fire scenario that would result in loss of the redundant
cables involved a fire in one of the motor control cabinets (MCCs),
which are located nominally 6 feet, measured horizontally, from the
stack of trays containing the control cables. In addition to the
horizontal offset, the bottom tray in the stack is located
approximately 9 feet, measured vertically, above the MCCs.
For a fire in Fire Area 10, JAFNPP assumes the High-Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Injection Cooling (RCIC))
systems are both lost in addition to one side of the control and power
cables for the main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (the ``A''
division cables for the SRV X1 solenoids) which would be used with the
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) in conjunction with either Core
Spray (CS) or Residual Heat Removal--Low-Pressure Coolant Injection
(RHR-LPCI) to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. Control cables for all
these systems are located in the same cable tray. The operation of
these SRVs is necessary in the event of a fire in this area. In the
event that the safe shutdown equipment including the redundant trains
of SRVs are lost due to a fire in Fire Area 10, the licensee has
indicated that the implementation of the OMA procedure will provide the
necessary assurance that safe shutdown capability is maintained. The
OMA procedure directs operators to operate an alternative SRV panel
located in Fire Area 8, which is located adjacent to Fire Area 10.
The licensee has described in their initial request, and subsequent
documents, elements of their fire protection program that provide their
justification that the concept of defense-in-depth that is in place in
Fire Area 10 is consistent with that intended by the regulation. To
accomplish this, the licensee provides various forms of protection in
order to maintain the concept of defense-in-depth. The licensee's
approach is discussed below.
3.1 Fire Prevention
The licensee has stated that it has an administrative controls
program in place to strictly control ignition sources and transient
combustibles for Fire Area 10. Controls are also in place to ensure
fire barrier breaches are tracked and that compensatory measures are
established in accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).
In addition to these administrative programs, the licensee has also
stated that there are no in situ combustible materials, aside from the
contents of the MCCs and the cables within the same stack of cable
trays, within the immediate vicinity of the hot shutdown control cables
in Fire Area 10. The cables meet the requirements of Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-383, ``Standard for
Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cable and Field Splices for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations,'' or they are equivalent to the same, and they are
thermoset, therefore self-ignited cable fires and flame propagation are
not expected.
3.2 Detection, Control and Extinguishment
The licensee has stated that Fire Area 10 is separated from other
fire areas including Fire Areas 8 and 9, by 3-hour rated fire barriers
or water spray curtains (installed in accordance with National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) 13: Standard for the Installation of
Sprinkler Systems--1982 Edition), which provides assurance that a fire
in Fire Area 10 will not propagate beyond the boundaries of the fire
area. Fire rated barriers installed to separate Fire Area 10 from
surrounding fire areas meet the design requirements of a 3-hour fire
rated barrier when tested in accordance with the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E119, ``Standard Test Methods for
Fire Tests of Building Construction and Material,'' and deviations from
these designs have been evaluated by the licensee and found to be
acceptable with regard to providing an equivalent level of protection
to what is intended by the standards.
In addition, the licensee has indicated that an ionization smoke
detection system (installed in accordance with NFPA 72E: National Fire
Alarm Code--1978 Edition) is installed throughout the entire Reactor
Building with the exception of the 369'6'' elevation and below the
removable hatchway cover on the 300' elevation. The lack of coverage in
these two areas is not expected to impact the staff conclusions
because, as noted in their response to RAI-05 in their November 17,
2009, letter, the licensee stated that for the 300' elevation ``the
deviation was determined to be acceptable based on the other fire
protection features and the low combustible loading in the area.'' The
369'6'' elevation is above the 272' elevation and a postulated fire
event on the 369'6'' elevation would not be expected to impact
equipment on lower elevations in the Reactor Building. The installed
smoke detection systems on lower elevations of the Reactor Building are
installed to detect and alert operators of a fire event allowing prompt
commencement of fire brigade operations for fires that could affect the
redundant train cables.
The Reactor Building has manual hose stations installed in
accordance with NFPA 14-1978 Edition and portable fire extinguishers
installed in accordance with NFPA 10-1990 Edition, which will enable
for fire brigade to effectively perform their operations. The licensee
has also stated that all of the automatic and manual fire protection
features discussed above are tested and maintained in accordance with
the guidance provided in the respective NFPA standards and the TRM.
3.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability
The licensee has indicated that the postulated fire event for Fire
Area 10 that could affect safe shutdown capability would be from one of
the MCCs, which are located minimally 6 feet, measured horizontally,
from the stack of trays containing the control cables of concern and
that the bottom of the stack is located approximately 9 feet, measured
vertically, above the MCCs. A fire in the MCCs would likely either
remain within the MCC enclosure or be detected and extinguished before
any cable damage in the overhead cable trays could occur. For fires
that
[[Page 13325]]
propagate beyond the MCC enclosure, the heat and smoke would be
dissipated and stratified due to the large volume and high ceiling of
the space making the exposure of cables to elevated temperatures even
less likely. JAFNPP contends that these fire scenarios would be
detected early and that the fire brigade would respond with manual fire
suppression to minimize the impact of the fire.
The licensee also considered the possibility of self ignited cable
fires however, the licensee deemed this unlikely. Self ignited cable
fires are not postulated due to the fire retardant properties of the
thermoset cables themselves (IEEE-383 qualified, or equivalent) and the
absence of power cables in the same cable tray stack as described in
2009 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.5-3.
For a fire in Fire Area 10, JAFNPP assumes the HPCI and RCIC
systems are both lost in addition to one side of the control and power
cables for the main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (the ``A''
division cables for the SRV X1 solenoids) which would be used with the
ADS in conjunction with either CS or RHR-LPCI to achieve and maintain
hot shutdown. JAFNPP credits the ADS in conjunction with either RHR-
LPCI or the CS system to achieve and maintain hot shutdown for a fire
occurring in Fire Area 10, but procedurally directs operators to
perform an OMA to operate the SRVs from outside the control room. The
OMA is comprised of traveling to a Local SRV Panel and a sequence of
manipulations of the SRV X2 solenoids at the panel.
JAFNPP has indicated that the redundant control cables for the SRVs
are routed through Fire Areas 8 and 9 and that the redundant SRV power
cables are routed through Fire Areas 8, 9, and 17. The cables for the
``B'' division cables that serve the SRV X2 solenoids for redundant
initiation of reactor depressurization utilizing the ADS in conjunction
with a low pressure emergency core cooling system (i.e. CS or RHR-LPCI)
are located outside Fire Area 10. The manual operation of the SRV X2
solenoids at the local SRV Control Panel 02ADS-071 in Fire Area 8 is
necessary in the event of a fire in Fire Area 10. According to the
licensee's February 18, 2009, letter, this panel was installed as part
of a modification to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G.3 (III.G.3). As such, this panel is maintained in accordance with
the JAFNPP approved fire protection program.
Since the control cables associated with the operation of the SRVs
from the Control Room (at Panel 09-4 for the X1 solenoids) are assumed
lost for a fire in Fire Area 10, the safe shutdown procedures also
direct the operators to isolate the electric lift function of the X1
solenoids from the Relay Room (to prevent spurious operation) and that
an operator be dispatched to the Local SRV Control Panel (02ADS-071)
located in Fire Area 8 to operate the SRVs as directed by the shift
manager. For a fire in Fire Area 10, plant shutdown is performed from
the Control Room which JAFNPP considers a normal plant shutdown, except
for operation of the SRVs from the Local Control Panel in Fire Area 8,
which is considered the OMA. The OMA for bypassing the SRV X1 solenoids
and for SRV operation at the Local Control Panel are necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions for the postulated fire
event in Fire Area 10.
Bases for Establishing Feasibility and Reliability
The licensee's analysis addresses factors such as environmental
concerns, equipment functionality and accessibility, available
indications, communications, portable equipment, personnel protection
equipment, procedures and training, staffing and demonstrations. In its
February 18, 2009, letter, the licensee stated that environmental
considerations such as radiation levels, emergency lighting,
temperature and humidity conditions and smoke and toxic gases were
evaluated and found to not represent a negative impact on the
operators' abilities to complete the OMA.
The licensee's analysis demonstrates that there are no components
present in Fire Area 8 or Fire Area 10 that, due to fire damage, would
result in an increased radiological hazard in the area of the Local SRV
Panel where the action is to be completed. Since the Local SRV Panel is
part of JAFNPP's alternate shutdown strategy, there is adequate
emergency lighting provided along the path between the Control Room and
the panel to ensure that operators can perform the actions and there
are two travel paths, both independent of Fire Area 10, available to
access the panel. Additionally, since Fire Area 8 is separated from
Fire Area 10 by water curtains (installed in accordance with NFPA 13--
1982 Edition guidance) or 3-hour fire rated barriers, fires would be
contained within Fire Area 10. Any smoke and products of combustion
that may propagate into Fire Area 8 would be dissipated due to the
large volume and high ceiling of the Reactor Building areas. For these
reasons, no personnel protective equipment is relied upon when
performing this action.
The licensee has also stated that the Local SRV Panel is located at
the floor level in an open area of the plant that is normally
accessible and that while the panel is locked at all times, all shift
operators carry keys to access the panel. Aside from these keys, no
other tools or equipment are required to perform the action. Once
operators access the panel, they manipulate a breaker to energize the
panel and then each SRV can be operated by a switch when requested by
the Shift Manager. The OMA procedure also contains steps for the
operators to place the electric lift function of the X1 solenoids in
``BYPASS'' to prevent spurious operation prior to dispatching an
operator to the Local SRV Panel to operate the SRVs as directed by the
Shift Manager. Operators are in constant communication with the Control
Room throughout the procedure via a headset and dedicated shutdown
communication system that is maintained at the Local SRV Panel.
The steps necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a
fire in Fire Area 10 are contained in Abnormal Operating Procedure
(AOP)-28, ``Operation During Plant Fires,'' Attachment 5 and AOP-43,
``Plant Shutdown From Outside the Control Room.'' The procedure AOP-28
is structured such that each fire area has an individual attachment to
provide operators the necessary information to achieve and maintain
safe shutdown during a fire. The licensee has also stated that
operators receive training on AOP-28 and AOP-43, during initial
training and annually thereafter and that operations staff also perform
annual walkthroughs of the safe shutdown procedures. Additionally, only
one operator is required to complete the action at the Local SRV Panel
aside from a control room operator who places the electric lift
function of the X1 solenoids in ``BYPASS'' to prevent spurious
operation.
A scenario involving initiating shutdown with decay heat removal by
ADS in conjunction with CS or RHR-LPCI and Control Room abandonment
represents a more challenging scenario than the postulated scenario
involving a fire event in Fire Area 10 because Control Room abandonment
is not necessary. The licensee has stated that the scenario involving
Control Room abandonment would result in a 30-minute time to achieve
hot shutdown conditions but since the Control Room is not abandoned for
a fire in Fire Area 10, a 15-minute time for the operator to get to the
local panel in Fire Area 8 and perform the requested OMA, as directed
by the Shift Manager, is conservative
[[Page 13326]]
especially given the 15-minute safety margin.
Feasibility
JAFNPP indicates that the OMA included in this review has been
evaluated and found to be feasible and reliable. The OMA is feasible
because there is adequate time available for the operator to perform
the required manual action to achieve and maintain hot shutdown after a
single fire. The licensee's analysis demonstrates that, for the
expected scenario, the OMA can be diagnosed and executed in 15 minutes
while the available time to complete it is 30 minutes. The licensee's
analysis also demonstrates that various factors, as discussed above,
have been considered to address uncertainties in estimating the time
available.
Reliability
The action is reliable because the licensee's analysis demonstrates
that there is adequate time available to account for uncertainties not
only in estimates of the time available, but also in estimates of how
long it takes to diagnose and execute the operator manual action (e.g.,
as based, at least in part, on a plant demonstration of the action
under nonfire conditions). The stated completion time of 15 minutes
provides reasonable assurance that the OMA can reliably be performed
under a wide range of conceivable conditions by different plant crews
because it, in conjunction with the 15-minute margin and other
installed fire protection features, accounts for sources of uncertainty
such as variations in fire and plant conditions, factors unable to be
recreated in demonstrations and human-centered factors.
In summary, the defense-in-depth concept for a fire in Fire Area 10
provides a level of safety that results in the unlikely occurrence of
fires, rapid detection, control and extinguishment of fires that do
occur and the protection of structures, systems and components
important to safety. As discussed above, the licensee has provided
preventative and protective measures in addition to a feasible and
reliable OMA that together demonstrate the licensee's ability to
preserve or maintain safe shutdown capability at JAFNPP in the event of
a fire in Fire Area 10.
Authorized by Law
This exemption would allow JAFNPP to rely on an OMA, in conjunction
with the other installed fire protection features, to ensure that at
least one means of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown remains
available during and following a postulated fire event, as part of its
fire protection program, in lieu of meeting the requirements specified
in III.G.2 for a fire in Fire Area 10. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12
allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore,
the exemption is authorized by law.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G
is to ensure that at least one means of achieving and maintaining hot
shutdown remains available during and following a postulated fire
event. Based on the above, no new accident precursors are created by
the use of the specific OMA, in conjunction with the other installed
fire protection features, in response to a fire in Fire Area 10, thus,
the probability of postulated accidents is not increased. Also based on
the above, the consequences of postulated accidents are not increased.
Therefore, there is no undue risk to public health and safety.
Consistent With Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would allow JAFNPP to credit the use of the
specific OMA, in conjunction with the other installed fire protection
features, in response to a fire in Fire Area 10 in lieu of meeting the
requirements specified in III.G.2. This change, to the operation of the
plant, has no relation to security issues. Therefore, the common
defense and security is not diminished by this exemption.
Special Circumstances
One of the special circumstances described in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) is that the application of the regulation is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying
purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G is to ensure that
at least one means of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown remains
available during and following a postulated fire event. While the
licensee does not comply with the explicit requirements of III.G.2,
specifically, they do meet the underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R, and Section III.G as a whole. Therefore, special
circumstances exist that warrant the issuance of this exemption as
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).
4.0 Response to Comments From the State of New York
In accordance with its stated policy and the requirements of 10 CFR
51.30(a)(2), on May 4, 2009, the NRC staff consulted with the New York
State official, at the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action.
The New York State official provided following comments by e-mail dated
June 12, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML091690397):
Public Notice and Opportunity To Request a Hearing
It appears that the requested action will effectively amend the
facility's operating license as well as the operative regulation, 10
CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. Thus,
regardless of what words are used to refer to the requested change,
notice of the request should be published in the Federal Register
and the public should be offered an opportunity to comment on the
environmental impacts and request a hearing. Such transparency and
opportunity for participation is consistent with the Atomic Energy
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Federal Council on Environmental Quality
regulations, and the Commission's commitment to public participation
in its administrative matters.
The Fire Safety Regulation
Specifically, paragraph III.G.2 of 10 CFR, Appendix R requires
that, where electrical cables or equipment, including associated
non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause
maloperation [as a result of hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to
ground ] of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire
area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of
ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage
shall be provided:
(a) Separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having
a 3-hour rating,
(b) Separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance
of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire
hazards and with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression
system in the fire area, and
(c) enclosure of cables and equipment in a fire barrier having a
1-hour rating and with fire detectors and an automatic fire
suppression system in the fire area.
Paragraph III.G.2 of Appendix R does not list operator manual
actions as a means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is
free of fire damage.
This regulation has been applicable since November 1980 when it
was promulgated by the NRC. According to RIS 2006-10, in 2000, the
NRC implemented the Reactor Oversight Process which included
systematic inspections of licensees' safe shutdown capability.
During these inspections, fire protection inspectors noticed that
many licensees had not upgraded or replaced
[[Page 13327]]
Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier material or had not provided the
required separation distance between redundant safe shutdown trains,
in order to satisfy the requirements in paragraph III.G.2 of
Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
In the present situation, the licensee states that the Safety
Relief Valve electrical trains or cables, which control the
emergency depressurization system, do not meet the required minimum
separation distances prescribed in Appendix R. (The issue of fire
insulation material does not come in to play here since the facility
does not use significant amounts of such insulation around electric
cables or trains.)
The Proposed Operator Manual Action
According to the February 2009 filing, the licensee relies upon
an Operator Manual Action that is not allowed per 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Further, the NRC has stated that manual
actions are not specifically authorized by Appendix R, Section
III.G.2.
If a fire were to occur, the manual action proposed by the
licensee requires an operator to leave the control room, travel to a
local control panel located in the reactor building, and then
operate up to eleven (11) valves that are essential for the
depressurization system and the emergency core cooling system. Based
on the submissions, it appears that it could take up to fifteen
minutes for an operator to reach the local control panel in the
reactor building.
While it may be appropriate to regularize and formalize the
proposal to have an employee manually operate the safety related
valves, the February 2009 application seeks to do so in a way that
avoids the opportunity for the public to request a proceeding or
comment on potential environmental impacts. Also, the application
does not appear to discuss the impact of the proposed change on the
defense and security of the facility and host community, the
feasibility of the proposed change during a significant fire event,
or the cumulative effect of the proposed change given the several
previous changes to the fire protection program at the facility. It
would seem appropriate to address these issues via a public forum
under the AEA, APA, and NEPA before reaching any final decision.
The NRC staff has reviewed the comments provided by the State of
New York, dated June 12, 2009, on the fire safety regulation and the
proposed OMA and has concluded that the consideration or granting of
the requested exemption does not violate the fire safety regulation or
diminish the level of safety that is present at JAFNPP. Additionally,
upon review of the request, NRC staff has concluded that the licensee
is not solely reliant upon the requested OMA for compliance with the
regulation and that the overall defense-in-depth concept employed in
the specific fire area is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
fire safety regulation.
Regarding the comment concerning ``Public Notice and Opportunity to
Request a Hearing,'' the regulations under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific
exemptions'' do not include comment period and opportunity for a
hearing. The public can pursue other avenues, such as petition for
changes to the regulatory framework to allow hearings via the
rulemaking process (10 CFR 2.802), or a petition for enforcement action
(10 CFR 2.206) where stakeholders assert that license holders are not
meeting regulatory requirements.
4.0 Conclusion
Based on the all of the features of the defense-in-depth concept
discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the use of the requested
OMA, in this particular instance and in conjunction with the other
installed fire protection features, in lieu of strict compliance with
the requirements of III.G.2 is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the rule. As such, the level of safety present at JAFNPP is
commensurate with the established safety standards for nuclear power
plants.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, is consistent with the common
defense and security and that special circumstances are present to
warrant issuance of the exemption. Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants Entergy an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of
Appendix R of 10 CFR Part 50, to JAFNPP for the OMA discussed above.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (75 FR11575).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of March 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010-6069 Filed 3-18-10; 8:45 am]
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