[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 4 (Thursday, January 7, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 922-927]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-30398]
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
49 CFR Part 830
Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and
Overdue Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo,
and Records
AGENCY: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The NTSB is amending its regulations concerning notification
and reporting requirements regarding aircraft accidents or incidents.
In particular, the NTSB is adding regulations to require operators to
report certain incidents to the NTSB. The NTSB is also amending
existing regulations to provide clarity and ensure that the appropriate
means for notifying the NTSB of a reportable incident is listed
correctly in the regulation.
[[Page 923]]
DATES: The revisions and additions published in this final rule will
become effective March 8, 2010.
ADDRESSES: A copy of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
published in the Federal Register (FR), is available for inspection and
copying in the NTSB's public reading room, located at 490 L'Enfant
Plaza, SW., Washington, DC 20594-2000. Alternatively, a copy of the
NPRM is available on the government-wide Web site on regulations at
http://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Deepak Joshi, Lead Aerospace Engineer
(Structures), Office of Aviation Safety, (202) 314-6348.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Regulatory History
On October 7, 2008, the NTSB published an NPRM titled
``Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and
Overdue Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo,
and Records'' in 73 FR 58520. This NPRM proposed and the final rule
herein codifies the addition of five reportable incidents, the
reporting of which the NTSB believes will improve aviation safety. In
particular, the new subsections within 49 CFR 830.5(a) will require
operators to report the following: failure of any internal turbine
engine component that results in the escape of debris other than out
the exhaust path; release of all or a portion of a propeller blade from
an aircraft, excluding release caused solely by ground contact; a
complete loss of information, excluding flickering, from more than 50
percent of an aircraft's cockpit displays, known as Electronic Flight
Instrument System displays, Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
displays, Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor displays, or other
such displays; Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) resolution
advisories issued either (1) when an aircraft is being operated on an
instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and compliance with the
advisory is necessary to avert a substantial risk of collision between
two or more aircraft, or (2) to an aircraft operating in class A
airspace; damage to helicopter tail or main rotor blades, including
ground damage, that requires major repair or replacement of the
blade(s); and any event in which an aircraft operated by an air carrier
lands or departs on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not
designed as a runway, or experiences a runway incursion that requires
the operator or the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to take
immediate corrective action to avoid a collision. The NPRM also
proposed certain wording changes to other existing subsections within
49 CFR 830.5(a) for clarity and proposed a change in the footnote that
provides the locations of NTSB regional offices.
The NTSB notes that it further analyzed the potential application
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as published in Title 5 United
States Code (U.S.C.), sections 601-612, to this rule. Prior to
publishing the NPRM, the NTSB considered whether this rule would have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities
and certified under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule would not have such
an impact. The NTSB verifies this assessment and notes that while this
rule will require some affected individuals to complete NTSB Form
6120.1, ``Pilot/Operator Accident/Incident Report,'' the cost to
complete this form is nominal. Therefore, the NTSB verifies that its
certification under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) was valid.
In response to the publication of this NPRM, the NTSB received and
carefully considered six comments. The NTSB did not receive any
requests for a public meeting; therefore, the NTSB did not hold a
public meeting on the NPRM. Below is a summary of and response to each
concern that commenters raised, arranged by issue.
Discussion of Comments and Changes
In the interest of ensuring that the provisions of 49 CFR 830.5 are
complete, comprehensible, and enforceable, the NTSB's final rule herein
includes revisions to three new subsections of 49 CFR 830.5 that the
NTSB proposed, including subsections (a)(9), (a)(10), and (a)(12),
which proposed requiring reports of a complete loss of information from
certain electronic displays, certain types of resolution advisories,
and certain runway incursions, respectively. These changes are
described in the sections below.
Proposed Revision to Section 830.5(a)(3)
The NPRM proposed to amend 49 CFR 830.5(a)(3) to require
notification of incidents in which ``[f]ailure of any internal turbine
engine component that results in the escape of debris other than out
the exhaust path'' occurs. The NTSB received two comments on this
proposed addition.
One commenter, an aviation industry manufacturing association,
objected to the requirement that the NTSB be notified immediately for
the following proposed events: Failure of any internal turbine engine
component that results in the escape of the debris other than out the
exhaust path and release of all or a portion of a propeller blade from
an aircraft, excluding release caused solely by ground contact. The
commenter stated that, in accordance with 14 CFR 21.3(c), operators are
already required to report such failures to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The commenter further stated that the requirement
to report these events to the NTSB would put an additional burden on
the operator by requiring duplicate reporting of events. The commenter
suggested the development of a joint FAA/NTSB reporting system that
would alert both agencies concurrently when one of the reportable
events occurs.
The NTSB disagrees with these comments. The NTSB is aware that 14
CFR 21.3 requires holders of type certificates, supplemental type
certificates, and parts manufacturing approval to notify the FAA within
24 hours, or the next business day on weekends or holidays, of an
engine or component failure. But the NTSB also notes that 14 CFR
21.3(d)(1)(iii) states that a report to the FAA is not required if the
event has been reported to the NTSB. The NTSB needs immediate
notification of a reportable event to determine the appropriate level
of response, which might include immediately dispatching an
investigator to the scene. The NTSB continues to believe that utilizing
the 14 CFR 21.3 notification system alone that initially reports
failures to the FAA presents an unacceptable delay in the notification
to the NTSB and the initiation of a response. The NTSB reiterates that
it has investigated catastrophic engine failures after being belatedly
notified, and critical evidence was lost as a result of the delay in
notification, thus hampering the investigation. The NTSB also notes
that 49 CFR 830.10 requires the operator of an aircraft involved in a
reportable event to preserve the wreckage and all pertinent records
until the NTSB takes custody or until the wreckage and records have
been released pursuant to 49 CFR 831.12. The NTSB believes that relying
on 14 CFR 21.3 reports that would initially be sent to the FAA would
delay not only the NTSB's response to the event but also the return of
custody of the airplane and/or engine to the operator, thus delaying
their repair and return to service. The NTSB is aware that 14 CFR
121.703 and 135.415 require those respective Part 121 or 135
certificate holders to notify their FAA certificate-holding district
offices of an engine failure within 24 hours, or the next business day
on weekends or holidays. While engine or component failures are
[[Page 924]]
relatively rare, the NTSB is not concerned with every engine or
component failure that occurs; therefore, this rule will not materially
affect operators. However, the NTSB is very concerned about engine
failures that result in debris coming out of the engine through a path
other than the exhaust, also referred to as uncontained engine
failures. These failures can and have liberated debris, resulting in
damage to the airplane or its systems and/or injured passengers.
Fortunately, these types of reportable events are very rare. Thus, the
NTSB does not expect that it will be unduly burdensome for Part 121 and
135 operators who experience engine failures resulting in debris
exiting the engine through a path other than the exhaust or one of the
other previously reportable events to make the dual notification to
their FAA certificate-holding district offices as well as the NTSB.
The commenter also suggested that a system be developed so that the
FAA-required 14 CFR 21.3 data would be shared concurrently with the
NTSB. While the NTSB appreciates the commenter's suggestion, the NTSB
believes that situations could occur in which the notification that the
NTSB receives would be delayed, such as occurrences under 14 CFR 21.3
in which notification occurs within 24 hours, or the next business day
if the event occurred on the weekend or a holiday.
One commenter, a professional pilots' union, fully concurred with
the proposed rule requiring the NTSB to be notified immediately of an
event where debris exited an engine through some other path besides the
engine's exhaust. The NTSB appreciates the commenter's support on this
proposed immediate notification requirement.
In summary, the NTSB understands that this new rule will require
Part 121 and 135 operators who, in accordance with 14 CFR 121.703 and
135.415, respectively, must report any engine or component malfunctions
or failures to both their FAA certificate-holding district offices and
the NTSB. The NTSB continues to believe, however, that the language of
the reporting requirement will result in timely notification of
incidents in which a failure of an internal engine component resulted
in the escape of debris from an exit other than out the exhaust path.
Therefore, the NTSB has not amended this addition.
Proposed Addition of Section 830.5(a)(8)
The NPRM proposed to add section 830.5(a)(8) to 49 CFR Part 830 to
require the reporting of any ``release of all or a portion of a
propeller blade from an aircraft, excluding release caused solely by
ground contact.'' One commenter, a professional pilots' union,
dissented with the NTSB regarding the exclusion of a structural failure
of a propeller or portion of a propeller caused solely by ground
contact. The NTSB disagrees with the commenter's position that the NTSB
should broaden the section to include all incidents in which propeller
blades or blade sections have separated from an aircraft. The commenter
stated that liberated propeller blades or blade segments pose a
significant hazard to the crew, passengers, and bystanders.
The NTSB agrees with the commenter regarding the hazards that
liberated propeller blades or segments of propeller blades pose to
crews, passengers, and bystanders. However, the NTSB notes that
propeller blades are designed and certified to operate within the
atmosphere and, as such, the expectation is that they remain intact and
in place during normal operation. Propeller blades are not designed or
expected to continue to remain intact and in place following contact
with the ground. The NTSB continues to believe that the language of the
reporting requirement will achieve the NTSB's objective of receiving
notification of any release of all or a portion of a propeller blade
from an aircraft, inconsistent with its design parameters and
certification, thus excluding releases caused solely by ground contact.
Therefore, the NTSB has not amended this addition.
Proposed Addition of Section 830.5(a)(9)
The NPRM proposed to add section 830.5(a)(9) to 49 CFR Part 830 to
require the reporting of ``[a] complete loss of information, excluding
flickering, from more than 50 percent of an aircraft's certified
electronic primary displays.'' The NTSB has carefully reviewed the
comments received concerning this section and has concluded that the
language should be amended to require notification of ``[a] complete
loss of information, excluding flickering, from more than 50 percent of
an aircraft's cockpit displays known as: (A) Electronic Flight
Instrument System (EFIS) displays; (B) Engine Indication and Crew
Alerting System (EICAS) displays; (C) Electronic Centralized Aircraft
Monitor (ECAM) displays; or (D) Other displays of this type, which
generally include a primary flight display (PFD), primary navigation
display (PND), and other integrated displays.''
The NTSB now recognizes the need to revise the proposed language to
avoid capturing an excessive number of failures. For example, under the
proposed language, a failed electronic exhaust gas temperature (EGT)
gauge that is the only means of monitoring EGT would have been
reportable. However, the NTSB would not likely be concerned with
collecting data concerning or investigating such events; therefore, the
NTSB has narrowed the language of this section. The NTSB maintains that
this change in the proposed regulatory language is a logical outgrowth
of the proposed rule and therefore does not violate the rulemaking
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The NTSB received three comments that addressed this notification
requirement. Two commenters stated that they had difficulty determining
exactly what types of failures for which notification was required. One
commenter provided an example of an electronic display on a general
aviation aircraft where a mechanical indication was also included. This
commenter was concerned that when the electronic display failed, this
event would have to be reported even though a mechanical display of the
information was still available. The other commenter stated that the
criteria for reporting should be based on the aircraft's certification
requirements.
Based on these comments and the NTSB's careful review of the
proposed language of the notification requirement, the NTSB decided
that some adjustment of the language of this section was required to
ensure that the relevant failures will be reported, as described above.
The NTSB's principal goal in promulgating this requirement is to
capture ``display blanking'' events in which many of the newer ``glass
cockpit'' type displays have gone blank. The proposed language of this
requirement was intended to capture this type of failure, but the NTSB
recognizes that a revision specifically mentioning the various types of
displays would be advantageous. Therefore, the NTSB has changed the
language of this subsection to require the reporting of any ``complete
loss of information, excluding flickering, from more than 50 percent of
an aircraft's cockpit displays known as: (A) Electronic Flight
Instrument System (EFIS) displays; (B) Engine Indication and Crew
Alerting System (EICAS) displays; (C) Electronic Centralized Aircraft
Monitor (ECAM) displays; or (D) Other displays of this type, which
generally include a primary flight display (PFD), primary navigation
display (PND), and other integrated displays.''
[[Page 925]]
Furthermore, another commenter disagreed with the exclusion of
``flickering'' of instrument displays when considering the reporting
requirements in this section. The commenter felt that the
``flickering'' of displays could be an indication of underlying
hardware or software problems. The NTSB considered this potential
meaning of ``flickering'' when it originally defined the language of
this section. After reviewing this concept, the NTSB has decided
against revising the language of this section. While the NTSB agrees
that ``flickering'' can be a symptom of underlying problems, the NTSB
feels that the operator's maintenance organization is best equipped to
deal with this type of symptom. If the ``flickering'' becomes so severe
that the display is unusable, then it should be reported under this
section (providing that over 50 percent of the displays were similarly
unusable).
One commenter stated that the requirement to report these types of
failures to the NTSB constituted a duplicative reporting requirement,
as failures are already required to be reported to the FAA. The NTSB
feels that the requirement to report these types of failures directly
to the NTSB is essential to aviation safety because it ensures that
these events will be investigated by NTSB personnel as quickly as
possible. In addition, duplicative notifications are not required
because the regulations state that any incident reported to the NTSB
does not have to be reported separately to the FAA.
As described above, the NTSB continues to believe that it is in the
best interest of aviation safety to receive reports of a complete loss
of information from certain types of electronic displays. After
carefully considering all comments that addressed this section, the
NTSB has determined that it must receive notification of complete
losses of information, as described above. Consistent with the above
discussion, the NTSB has amended this addition.
Proposed Addition of Section 830.5(a)(10)
The NPRM proposed to add section 830.5(a)(10) to 49 CFR Part 830 to
require the reporting of the following: Airborne Collision and
Avoidance System (ACAS) resolution advisories issued either: When an
aircraft is being operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan
and corrective or evasive action is required to maintain a safe
distance from other aircraft; or to an aircraft operating in class A
airspace.
The intent of this requirement is for the NTSB to be notified of
incidents where ACAS-equipped aircraft must actively maneuver to avert
a substantial risk of collision with another aircraft and to be
notified of incidents where the stringent separation requirements
inherent in operations within class A airspace may have been
compromised. The NTSB has carefully reviewed the comments received
concerning this requirement and amends the language of this requirement
to require reports of ACAS resolution advisories issued either (A) when
an aircraft is being operated on an IFR flight plan and compliance with
the advisory is necessary to avert a substantial risk of collision
between two or more aircraft; or (B) to an aircraft operating in class
A airspace.
Five commenters were concerned that the original proposed
requirement would result in an unmanageable number of reports. In
general, regarding the proposed rule's effect outside class A airspace,
commenters placed most of their emphasis on the ``corrective or evasive
action'' language, despite the language that a report would be
necessary only when such maneuvers are ``* * * required to maintain a
safe distance from other aircraft.'' The NTSB fully recognizes that
when a resolution advisory occurs, it does not necessarily follow that
an unsafe encounter is about to occur. The NTSB intends to require
reports only when failure to comply with a resolution advisory would
lead to an unsafe encounter with another aircraft, that is, an
encounter presenting a substantial risk of collision. The NTSB's
expectation is that there are not an unmanageable number of such
encounters occurring in the air traffic control (ATC) system. However,
if reports show that a large number of these incidents are occurring,
the circumstances leading up to the incidents would certainly be a
safety issue of major interest to the NTSB. Concern about dealing with
the associated reports is not a persuasive rationale for not requiring
them, especially if the number of serious incidents is unexpectedly
high. The NTSB believes that by further clarifying the definition of
incidents to be reported, the burden on both aircraft operators and the
NTSB will be limited to addressing high-risk events that warrant
further examination and potentially full investigation.
The NTSB recognizes that ``substantial risk of collision'' is
somewhat subjective, but the infinite variety of encounter geometries
does not lend itself to specific guidance that would apply to every
possible scenario. The FAA's definition of a near midair collision is
``an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a
possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than
500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or a
flight crew member stating that a collision hazard existed between two
or more aircraft.'' This definition is not incorporated to limit or
precisely define the reports desired, but it may be useful in
illustrating the nature of the types of incidents for which the NTSB
will require notification. Resolution advisories that command maximum
vertical speed, ``reversal'' advisories that require a change in
vertical direction after the initial advisory is issued, or encounters
that result in zero vertical separation between the aircraft involved
are all examples of the types of advisories that the NTSB believes may
be indicative of substantial collision risk. Conversely, resolution
advisories issued to aircraft operating on closely spaced parallel
approaches or in other circumstances where there is no substantial risk
of collision need not be reported under this rule.
Four commenters stated that this requirement would effectively
mandate the reporting of all resolution advisories. As stated above,
the NTSB does not intend for all resolution advisories to be reported.
The NTSB expects that the revised language fully addresses this concern
and explicitly limits the need for reporting to situations where
compliance with a resolution advisory is necessary to avert a
significant risk of collision.
Two commenters expressed concern about the potential need to
download flight recorder data or remove recorders from aircraft,
thereby incurring expense and potential schedule disruption to the
aircraft operator. As the NTSB has previously noted, requiring an
operator to provide flight recorder data can be disruptive and
burdensome. The NTSB carefully considers the need for such information
in determining how to investigate serious incidents properly and limits
requests to situations where the data is clearly required to understand
the sequence of events because other available information, such as
recorded radar data, is inadequate. Unless a large number of unreported
serious incidents occur, the NTSB does not expect to substantially
increase the number of recorder requests made to support this reporting
requirement.
Two commenters stated that the NTSB should rely on the FAA for
reports of traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) events.
The NTSB does not believe that the FAA's processes for assessing and
reporting
[[Page 926]]
incidents, particularly those involving losses of separation, are
sufficiently reliable. Recent Department of Transportation Inspector
General investigations have documented repeated failures to report
incidents, misclassification of incidents, and other circumstances
which lead the NTSB, as an independent agency, to seek additional means
of monitoring the performance of the ATC system. The NTSB expects that
information provided by aircraft operators under this reporting
requirement will help validate the effectiveness of the FAA's reporting
process, especially relating to more serious incidents occurring in the
system. One of the commenters noted that the NTSB should, in lieu of
the proposed reporting requirement, correct the FAA's procedures. The
NTSB does occasionally interact with the FAA regarding the efficacy of
its internal processes. However, the NTSB has no authority to direct
changes to FAA procedures. The NTSB believes that for the significant
types of incidents the NTSB expects to investigate under this
requirement, occasional duplicative reports are worthwhile to ensure
that a complete examination of the circumstances takes place.
Five commenters stated that the proposed reporting requirement
should be dropped in favor of existing voluntary confidential data
collection systems such as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP),
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, and the MITRE-
operated Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program.
While the NTSB does support such programs in principle, the de-
identified and otherwise filtered information available through them is
not useful for investigative purposes. The NTSB's duty is to define the
types of events that may warrant a safety investigation, evaluate those
events as they occur, and investigate as necessary. Existing NTSB
reporting requirements predated and, to a large extent, overlap with
the types of incidents and accidents for which reports are made to
these programs. Nonetheless, the NTSB continues to define reporting
requirements and investigate safety incidents as necessary to protect
the public interest. The NTSB cannot delegate such responsibilities to
external organizations, become wholly dependent on information such
organizations may or may not see fit to share, or limit the
investigative use of that information to comply with accompanying
restrictions. Therefore, the NTSB does not view the data collection
programs suggested by the commenters as an adequate substitute for the
proposed reporting requirement.
One commenter noted that pilots may not report incidents without
the protection of an ASAP or FOQA program and further inquired about
the possible consequences of failing to report such incidents. While a
pilot's decision to disregard a reporting requirement is an unfortunate
possibility, it is beyond the control of the NTSB. The NTSB presumes
good faith on the part of professional aviators with regard to
reporting, and the NTSB does not intend to use this requirement to
prompt enforcement actions.
The NTSB emphasizes that the intent of this reporting requirement
is to identify, evaluate, and investigate (when appropriate) serious
incidents where aircraft maneuvers were required to avert substantial
risk of collision between TCAS-equipped aircraft and other aircraft in
the system and to evaluate situations where resolution advisories occur
between aircraft under positive control in class A airspace. The NTSB's
intent is not to require the reporting of all resolution advisories or,
outside of class A airspace, to require the reporting of any resolution
advisory resulting from an encounter between aircraft where no
substantial risk of collision exists.
In summary, the NTSB continues to believe that this reporting
requirement will achieve the NTSB's objective of receiving notification
of aircraft encounters that present a significant risk of collision.
The NTSB, however, has determined that amending the language will
provide further clarity and assist operators, crews, and other
individuals and entities affected by this rule in recognizing that the
NTSB seeks notification of the category of occurrences in which
hazardous encounters involving ACAS-equipped aircraft occur. As such,
the NTSB will require notification of the following: Airborne Collision
and Avoidance System (ACAS) resolution advisories issued either: when
an aircraft is being operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan
and compliance with the advisory is necessary to avert a substantial
risk of collision between two or more aircraft; or to an aircraft
operating in class A airspace.
Proposed Addition of Section 830.5(a)(11)
The NPRM proposed to add section 830.5(a)(11) to 49 CFR Part 830 to
require that the public report ``[d]amage to helicopter tail or main
rotor blades, including ground damage, that requires major repair or
replacement of the blade(s).'' The NTSB did not receive any comments
concerning this proposed requirement. Moreover, the NTSB continues to
believe that the proposed reporting requirement will achieve the NTSB's
objective of receiving notification of all rotor blade strikes that
result in damage, regardless of what the blades strike. Therefore, the
NTSB has not amended this addition and will require notification of any
damage to helicopter tail or main rotor blades that requires major
repair or replacement of the blade(s).
Proposed Addition of Section 830.5(a)(12)
The NPRM proposed to add section 830.5(a)(12) to 49 CFR Part 830 to
require that the public report the following: Any runway incursion
event in which an operator, when operating an aircraft as an air
carrier: lands or departs on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area
not designed as a runway; or experiences a reduction in separation that
requires the operator or another aircraft or vehicle to take immediate
corrective action to avoid a collision.
The NTSB received one comment on this section, which partially
concurred with the proposal and provided suggestions. The commenter
stated that the phrase ``runway incursion'' in the qualifying statement
should be deleted because landing and taking off on a taxiway is not a
runway incursion. Additionally, the commenter stated that the reporting
requirements should include nonrevenue operations (such as ferry
flights, maintenance flights/taxi, and reposition flights/taxi).
Finally, the commenter believed that events resulting in a go-around
should be excluded because that would require a report each time a go-
around was conducted if an aircraft or vehicle was on the runway.
Although the commenter believed that the events as stated should be
reportable, the commenter felt that the language should be clarified.
The NTSB agrees that the term ``runway incursion'' should be
deleted from the beginning of the statement for the reasons provided by
the commenter. However, to clarify that the NTSB is requesting reports
of separation issues on the runway, the NTSB hereby amends subsection
(B) to restrict reports to runway operations. The NTSB also agrees with
the commenter's suggestion to include nonrevenue flights because the
same pilots fly both revenue and nonrevenue flights.
Finally, the commenter opined that all go-around maneuvers
conducted because the runway was not clear would need to be reported.
The NTSB disagrees with this assessment. For
[[Page 927]]
example, if a controller instructs the pilot to go around because an
aircraft or vehicle is on the runway, that is a controlled situation.
The tower controller was aware of the situation and directed a go
around. However, if the pilot had to execute a go-around on his own and
the tower controller was not aware of the situation, the NTSB would
want to know about that event because it may go unreported. Similarly,
a tower controller could clear an aircraft to land and inadvertently
clear another aircraft onto the runway; if the arriving pilot has to
conduct a go-around because of the airplane on the runway, the NTSB
should receive a report of the incident.
Based on the NTSB's careful review of the above commentary, the
NTSB will now require the reporting of ``[a]ny event in which an
aircraft operated by an air carrier: (A) [l]ands or departs on a
taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not designed as a runway; or
(B) [e]xperiences a runway incursion that requires the operator or the
crew of another aircraft or vehicle to take immediate corrective action
to avoid a collision.''
The NTSB has concluded that this clarification in the regulatory
language is a logical outgrowth of the proposed language and is
therefore consistent with the rulemaking requirements of the APA.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 830
Aircraft accidents, Aircraft incidents, Aviation safety, Overdue
aircraft notification and reporting, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
0
In conclusion, for the reasons discussed in the preamble, the NTSB
amends 49 CFR Part 830 as follows:
PART 830--NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS OR
INCIDENTS AND OVERDUE AIRCRAFT, AND PRESERVATION OF AIRCRAFT
WRECKAGE, MAIL, CARGO, AND RECORDS
0
1. The authority citation for 49 CFR Part 830 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, as amended (49
U.S.C. 1101-1155); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Public Law 85-726,
72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 40101).
0
2. Section 830.5 is amended as follows:
0
A. The section introductory text, paragraph (a) introductory text,
paragraphs (a)(3) through (a)(5), and footnote 1 are revised.
0
B. Paragraphs (a)(8) through (a)(12) are added.
Sec. 830.5 Immediate notification.
The operator of any civil aircraft, or any public aircraft not
operated by the Armed Forces or an intelligence agency of the United
States, or any foreign aircraft shall immediately, and by the most
expeditious means available, notify the nearest National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) office,\1\ when:
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\1\ NTSB regional offices are located in the following cities:
Anchorage, Alaska; Atlanta, Georgia; West Chicago, Illinois; Denver,
Colorado; Arlington, Texas; Gardena (Los Angeles), California;
Miami, Florida; Parsippany, New Jersey (metropolitan New York City);
Seattle, Washington; and Ashburn, Virginia. In addition, NTSB
headquarters is located at 490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW., Washington, DC
20594. Contact information for these offices is available at http://www.ntsb.gov.
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(a) An aircraft accident or any of the following listed serious
incidents occur:
* * * * *
(3) Failure of any internal turbine engine component that results
in the escape of debris other than out the exhaust path;
(4) In-flight fire;
(5) Aircraft collision in flight;
* * * * *
(8) Release of all or a portion of a propeller blade from an
aircraft, excluding release caused solely by ground contact;
(9) A complete loss of information, excluding flickering, from more
than 50 percent of an aircraft's cockpit displays known as:
(i) Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) displays;
(ii) Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) displays;
(iii) Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) displays; or
(iv) Other displays of this type, which generally include a primary
flight display (PFD), primary navigation display (PND), and other
integrated displays;
(10) Airborne Collision and Avoidance System (ACAS) resolution
advisories issued either:
(i) When an aircraft is being operated on an instrument flight
rules flight plan and compliance with the advisory is necessary to
avert a substantial risk of collision between two or more aircraft; or
(ii) To an aircraft operating in class A airspace.
(11) Damage to helicopter tail or main rotor blades, including
ground damage, that requires major repair or replacement of the
blade(s);
(12) Any event in which an aircraft operated by an air carrier:
(i) Lands or departs on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area
not designed as a runway; or
(ii) Experiences a runway incursion that requires the operator or
the crew of another aircraft or vehicle to take immediate corrective
action to avoid a collision.
Dated: December 16, 2009.
Deborah A. P. Hersman,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. E9-30398 Filed 1-6-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7533-01-P