[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 240 (Wednesday, December 16, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 66589-66592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-29872]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 240 / Wednesday, December 16, 2009 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 66589]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 72 and 73

[NRC-2009-0558]


Draft Technical Basis for Rulemaking Revising Security 
Requirements for Facilities Storing SNF and HLW; Notice of Availability 
and Solicitation of Public Comments

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of availability and request for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) is 
seeking input from the public, licensees, certificate holders, and 
other stakeholders on a draft technical basis for a proposed rulemaking 
that would revise the NRC's security requirements for the storage of 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI) and the storage of SNF and/or high-level 
radioactive waste (HLW) at a Monitored Retrievable Storage Installation 
(MRS). This contemplated rulemaking would also make conforming changes 
to the ISFSI and MRS licensing requirements for security plans and 
programs. The NRC has developed a draft technical basis for this 
proposed rulemaking that describes the agency's overall objectives, 
conceptual approaches, potential solutions, integration with agency 
strategic goals, and related technical and regulatory clarity issues. 
The NRC is soliciting comments on this draft technical basis document 
from the public, licensees, and other stakeholders to confirm that an 
adequate technical basis exists to proceed with rulemaking to issue new 
risk-informed and performance-based security regulations for SNF and 
HLW storage facilities.
    The NRC will conduct a public Webinar on January 14, 2010, to 
discuss this draft technical basis and to facilitate the public's and 
stakeholder's submission of informed comments.

DATES: Comments on this draft technical basis should be submitted by 
January 31, 2010. Comments received after this date will be considered 
if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to ensure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
    Public Meeting: The NRC will also take public comments on this 
draft technical basis at a public webinar on January 14, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0558 in the subject line of your 
comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be 
posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal e-Rulemaking Web site at 
http://www.regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to 
remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you 
against including any information in your submission that you do not 
want to be publicly disclosed.
    The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments 
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those 
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any 
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not 
include any information in their comments that they do not want 
publicly disclosed.
    To ensure efficient and complete comment resolution, comments 
should include references to the section and page numbers of the 
document to which the comment applies, if possible. When commenting on 
the technical basis, please exercise caution and do not include any 
site-specific security-related information.
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2009-0558. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail 
[email protected].
    Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and 
Directives Branch (RDB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this notice 
using the following methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, 
Public File Area O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected]. The draft technical basis to revise the security 
requirements for facilities storing SNF and HLW is available 
electronically under ADAMS Accession No. ML093280743.
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and supporting 
materials related to this notice can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID: NRC-2009-0558.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip Brochman or Rupert (Rocky) 
Rockhill, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 
(301) 415-6557; e-mail: [email protected]; or (301) 415-3734; e-
mail [email protected], respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The NRC requires high assurance of adequate protection of public 
health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment 
for the secure storage of SNF and HLW. The NRC meets this strategic 
goal by requiring ISFSI licensees to comply with security requirements 
specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73 (10 
CFR Part 73), ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'' 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC has 
continued to achieve this requisite

[[Page 66590]]

high assurance for all facilities licensed to store SNF through a 
combination of these existing security regulations and the issuance of 
security orders to individual licensees. These orders ensured that a 
consistent overall protective strategy is in place for all types of 
ISFSIs, given the current threat environment. The NRC has not issued 
any licenses for an MRS, nor are any applications for a license for an 
MRS pending before the NRC. The issuance of these security orders was 
noticed in the Federal Register on October 23, 2002 (see 67 FR 65150 
and 67 FR 65152) for existing licensees. Subsequent to the issuance of 
these orders to all existing ISFSI licensees, the NRC periodically 
issued these same security orders to all new ISFSI licensees, before 
such facilities commenced operation. The NRC also noticed the issuance 
of these subsequent orders in the Federal Register.
    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
completed security assessments for a range of NRC-licensed facilities. 
For ISFSIs, the NRC's assessments were accomplished during 2003 to 2005 
and evaluated several types of dry storage cask designs that were 
viewed as being representative of the entire population of dry storage 
ISFSIs. These assessments evaluated both attacks using large aircraft 
and ground assaults using a variety of methods. The results of 
assessments indicated that no significant vulnerabilities were 
indicated and thus no immediate changes in the security requirements 
for ISFSIs were necessary. However, the assessments did challenge 
previous NRC conclusions on the ability of a malevolent act to breach 
shielding and/or confinement barriers and thus release radiation or 
radioactive material; and indicated that increased security 
requirements were warranted over the longer term. Because these 
assessments discuss vulnerability information, and thus could be used 
as potential targeting tools, they are not publicly available.
    Finally, the current security regulations for ISFSIs are quite 
complex and pose challenges both to NRC staff and to the regulated 
industry. This regulatory complexity is due to multiple factors, 
including: Two different types of ISFSI licenses (general and specific 
licenses) under 10 CFR Part 72, ``Licensing Requirements for the 
Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive 
Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste,'' and varying 
applicability of regulations based upon whether the ISFSI is collocated 
with an operating power reactor, collocated with a decommissioning 
power reactor, or is located away from any power reactors. In response 
to the new information gained from these security assessments and in 
recognition of the existing regulatory challenges, the NRC staff 
presented policy paper SECY-07-0148; dated August 28, 2007, to the 
Commission to address these issues (a redacted version of this policy 
paper is publicly available under ADAMS Package No. ML080030050 in 
NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.). This policy paper summarized the current regulatory 
structure for ISFSI security, analyzed several policy and process 
issues, and provided recommendations in order to obtain early 
Commission direction on the development of an ISFSI security 
rulemaking. In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM-SECY-07-0148), the 
Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with the development of a 
proposed rulemaking that uses a risk-informed and performance-based 
approach for these facilities (ADAMS Accession No. ML073530119). The 
NRC has recently completed the draft technical basis to support this 
rulemaking. Because of the importance of this regulation, the staff has 
decided to release the technical documentation for public comment. With 
this approach, the NRC can address stakeholder questions and respond to 
comments early in the process. In addition, the staff will hold a 
public Webinar on January 14, 2010, to discuss this draft technical 
basis and to facilitate the public's and stakeholder's submission of 
informed comments.

I. Rulemaking Objectives

    The NRC's specific objectives for this rulemaking are to:
    (1) Update the ISFSI and MRS security requirements to improve the 
consistency and clarity of the Part 73 regulations for both types of 
ISFSI licenses (i.e., general and specific), to reflect the 
Commission's current thinking on security requirements, and to 
incorporate lessons learned from security inspections and Force-on-
Force (FOF) evaluations conducted (on reactor sites) since the ISFSI 
security regulations were last updated in the 1990s;
    (2) Make generically applicable requirements similar to those 
imposed on ISFSI licensees by the post-9/11 ISFSI security orders; and
    (3) Use a risk-informed and performance based structure in updating 
the ISFSI and MRS security regulations.
    Additionally, one of the issues raised in a petition for rulemaking 
submitted by the C-10 Research and Education Foundation, Inc. (PRM-72-
6) may be relevant to this rulemaking. The NRC published a notice of 
receipt and request for comment on PRM-72-6 in the Federal Register on 
March 3, 2009 (74 FR 91718).

Objective One--Consistency

    The first objective is to propose a set of security requirements 
that will achieve consistent outcomes across the wide range of SNF and 
HLW storage facilities that either exist today, or could be licensed by 
the NRC under Part 72 in the future. The existing ISFSI and MRS 
security regulations in Part 73 are unnecessarily complex; have not 
been updated in more than a decade; and are challenging for the NRC 
staff, licensees, applicants, and other stakeholders to understand and 
apply. Accordingly, the rulemaking would--
    (1) Create a more consistent and coherent regulatory structure for 
these types of waste storage facilities; and thereby improve agency 
transparency, regulatory clarity, and the ease of use of these 
regulations;
    (2) Propose security requirements that are consistent with the 
Commission's recent final rule updating the security requirements for 
nuclear power reactors (see 74 FR 13925; March 29, 2009);
    (3) Propose security requirements that address lessons learned 
during the course of previous NRC inspections and FOF exercises held 
since the ISFSI security regulations were last updated; and lessons 
learned during licensing reviews of all of the power reactor security 
plans that were conducted in 2003 and 2004 (following the issuance of 
security orders to reactor licensees).

Objective Two--Generic Applicability of Security Orders

    The second objective is to make the appropriate provisions of the 
security orders issued by the NRC to ISFSI licensees following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, generically applicable. This 
includes both the initial security orders issued in 2005 and 
subsequently updated security orders issued in 2007. The NRC is 
proposing to make provisions of these orders generically applicable in 
the proposed rulemaking and thus to decontrol non-sensitive 
requirements to increase agency transparency and regulatory clarity. 
Additionally, measures such as vehicle barrier systems would be added 
to the regulations in Part 73. Finally, the NRC would also address 
lessons learned in inspecting the imposition of these security orders.

[[Page 66591]]

Objective Three--Use a Risk-Informed and Performance Based Structure

    Under this approach, NRC is proposing to establish a security-based 
dose limit in Part 73 that has the same values as found under the 
current limits for safety-related accidents in 10 CFR Part 72. The 
requirement for licensees to specify a controlled area boundary and to 
meet a ``5-Rem'' dose limit for design basis accidents is specified in 
the current 10 CFR 72.106.\1\ Licensees would use the information 
supplied by the NRC in combination with information specific to their 
facility (e.g., distance from the ISFSI or MRS to the controlled area 
boundary, specific storage cask type, specific fuel burn-up (i.e., 
radionuclide inventory), and distance to the facility's site boundary) 
to calculate the potential dose and to verify that a 0.05-Sv (5-Rem) 
dose limit to be included in Part 73, has been met. The NRC envisions 
that licensees would use an iterative process that considers changes to 
parameters (e.g., distance to the controlled area boundary) in order to 
meet the 0.05-Sv (5-Rem) security dose limit. Licensees who could not 
meet the 0.05-Sv (5-Rem) dose limit (either with their current facility 
or by expanding the controlled area boundary of their facility) would 
be required to consider other options. These options could include 
increasing the size of the licensee's facility, using engineered 
security barriers and features to prevent a specific ``security 
scenario,'' if possible, or shifting to a ``denial'' protective 
strategy to prevent the specific ``security scenario'' from succeeding.
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    \1\ The dose criteria in 10 CFR 72.106 includes separate limits 
of 0.05 Sv (5 Rem) total effective dose equivalent; 0.15 Sv (15 Rem) 
to the lens of the eye; and 0.5 Sv (50 Rem) as either the sum of the 
deep dose equivalent and any organ dose, or the shallow dose 
equivalent to the skin or any extremity. Collectively, these values 
are hereinafter referred to as the 0.05-Sv (5-Rem) dose limit.
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    ISFSI and MRS licensees would also be required to evaluate the 
effects from the detonation of both a land-based or waterborne vehicle 
bomb attack (the size of the explosive and the vehicle characteristics 
would be specified by the NRC) against the SNF or HLW storage casks, 
facility, or pool; against the facility's central and secondary alarm 
stations; against security personnel defensive positions (if the 
licensee employs a denial protective strategy); and against a transfer 
container if the transfer pathway is not protected by a temporary or 
permanent vehicle barrier system. ISFSI and MRS licensees would be 
required to design, install, and implement a vehicle barrier system 
(which may include the use of landform obstacles) to mitigate the 
effects of a land-based or, if applicable, a waterborne, vehicle bomb 
attack.
    In implementing this new risk-informed and performance-based 
approach for ISFSI and MRS security, the NRC would discontinue the 
application of the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage 
to general license ISFSIs. The current regulations only apply the DBT 
for radiological sabotage to general license ISFSIs. This is an example 
of inconsistent treatment of ISFSIs and MRSs. The Commission had 
previously indicated that the issue of whether or not to apply the DBT 
for radiological sabotage to all ISFSIs (and thus to MRSs as well) 
would be addressed in a future rulemaking.\2\
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    \2\ Final rule--10 CFR Part 73, ``Design Basis Threat,'' 
published on March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705), see response to public 
comment Issue 5 (at 72 FR 12716).
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    In developing this risk-informed and performance-based approach, 
the NRC staff also considered the findings and recommendations 
contained in the National Academy of Sciences' (NAS') National Research 
Council report on ``Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Storage: Report to Congress,'' dated July 2004 (particularly those 
findings and recommendations contained in sections 4 and 5 of the NAS 
report). This report contains classified national security information 
and is not publicly available. Additionally, in 2006, the NAS published 
a redacted version of this study titled ``Safety and Security of 
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report.'' This study is 
available from the NAS for a fee (see the NAS Web site at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11263#toc). The NAS study was based, 
in part, upon the results of the NRC's 2003 to 2005 security 
assessments on four representative dry SNF storage systems.

Petiton for Rulemaking (PRM-72-6)

    Petition for rulemaking (PRM-72-6), item number 11, requests that 
the NRC ``* * * require Hardened On-site Storage (HOSS) at all nuclear 
power plants as well as away-from-reactor dry cask storage; that all 
nuclear industry interim on-site or off-site dry cask storage 
installations or ISFSIs be fortified against attack.'' Consequently, 
item 11's technical content appears to be relevant to the scope of the 
proposed rulemaking and it is mentioned in the draft technical basis. 
Therefore, the NRC may consider this petition in the course of 
developing the proposed rule. However, the NRC has not yet reached a 
decision on acceptance of this petition and this notice does not 
prejudge the agency's final action on whether to accept the requests in 
PRM-72-6.

II. Specific Proposal

    The draft technical basis supports a forthcoming proposed revision 
to the current regulations in 10 CFR Parts 72 and 73, and adding new 
regulations in 10 CFR Part 73. This draft technical basis will be used 
by the NRC to develop a proposed rulemaking revising the security 
requirements for facilities storing SNF and/or HLW. The NRC notes that 
the public, licensees, certificate holders, and other stakeholders will 
have a future opportunity to comment on the proposed rulemaking when 
that document is published in the Federal Register.
    This draft technical basis does not include any revisions to the 
security requirements that are applicable to a geologic repository 
operations area that would be licensed under 10 CFR Parts 60 or 63 (see 
separate proposed rule 72 FR 72521; December 20, 2007).

III. Availability of Documents

    The following table indicates the draft technical basis and related 
documents that are available to the public and how they may be 
obtained. See the ADDRESSES section above for information on the 
physical locations and Web sites to access these documents.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Electronic
            Document                  PDR         Web      reading room
                                                              (ADAMS)
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Draft Technical Basis, Revision           X           X      ML093280743
 1 (December 2009)..............
Commission: SECY-07-0148                  X           X      ML080030050
 (redacted) (August 28, 2007)...
Commission: SRM-SECY-07-0148              X           X      ML073530119
 (December 18, 2007)............
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[[Page 66592]]

IV. Specific Considerations and Questions

    The NRC requests public comments on this draft technical basis by 
the DATES section specified above. The NRC has not identified any 
specific questions for public and stakeholder input.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of December 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and 
Incident Response.
[FR Doc. E9-29872 Filed 12-15-09; 8:45 am]
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