[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 214 (Friday, November 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57525-57529]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-26816]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2009-0485]


Draft Safety Culture Policy Statement: Request for Public 
Comments

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

ACTION: Issuance of draft safety culture policy statement and notice of 
opportunity for public comment.

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DATES: Comments are requested 90 days from the date of this Federal 
Register Notice. Comments received after this date will be considered 
if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is able to assure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date. Please 
refer to the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for additional 
information including questions for which the NRC is requesting 
comment.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0485 in the subject line of your 
comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be 
posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking website 
Regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any 
identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against 
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be 
publicly disclosed.
    The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments 
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those 
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any 
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not 
include any information in their comments that they do not want 
publicly disclosed.
    Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2009-0485. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail 
[email protected].
    Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and 
Directives Branch (RDB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alexander Sapountzis, Office of 
Enforcement, Mail Stop O-4 A15A, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to 
[email protected].
SUMMARY: The NRC is issuing a draft policy statement that sets forth 
the Commission's expectation that all licensees and certificate holders 
\1\ establish and maintain a positive safety culture that protects 
public health and safety and the common defense and security when 
carrying out licensed activities. The Commission defines safety culture 
as that assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that as an overriding 
priority, nuclear safety and security issues \2\ receive the attention 
warranted by their significance. The Commission also considers nuclear 
safety and security issues to be equally important in a positive safety 
culture. The importance of treating safety and security in an equal 
manner within NRC's regulatory framework is clearly evident in our 
mission and strategic goals. Experience has shown that certain 
organizational characteristics and personnel attitudes and behaviors 
are present in a positive safety culture. These include, but are not 
limited to, individuals demonstrating ownership and personal 
responsibility for maintaining safety and security in their day-to-day 
work activities; the implementation of processes for planning and 
controlling work activities such that safety and security are 
maintained; a work environment in which personnel feel free to raise 
safety and security concerns without fear of retaliation; prompt and 
thorough identification, evaluation, and resolution of nuclear safety 
and security issues commensurate with their significance; the 
availability of the resources needed to ensure that safety and security 
are maintained; decision-making processes that protect safety and 
security; clearly defined roles and responsibilities for maintaining 
safety and security; and the seeking out and implementation of 
opportunities to improve safety and security. The NRC expects its 
licensees and certificate holders to foster these characteristics, 
attitudes, and behaviors in their organizations and among individuals 
who are overseeing or performing regulated activities commensurate with 
the safety and security significance of their activities and the nature 
and complexity of their organization and functions.
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    \1\ Throughout this document, the phrase ``licensee and 
certificate holders'' includes licensees, certificate holders, 
permit holders, authorization holders, holders of quality assurance 
program approvals and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, 
authorization, or quality assurance program approval.
    \2\ Throughout this document, the terms ``safety'' or ``nuclear 
safety,'' ``security'' or ``nuclear security,'' and ``safety 
culture'' are used. These terms refer to matters that are related to 
NRC-regulated activities, including radiation protection, 
safeguards, material control and accounting, physical protection, 
and emergency preparedness.
    .
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    The NRC is requesting comments on the draft safety culture policy 
statement and associated questions.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

(1) Background

    The Commission has long expressed its expectations for safety 
culture in previous policy statements. In 1989, the Commission 
published its ``Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant 
Operations'' (54 FR 3424; January 24, 1989) to make clear the 
Commission's expectations of utility management and licensed operators 
with respect to the conduct of operations. The policy statement stated, 
``the phrase safety culture refers to a very general matter, the 
personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in 
any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power 
plants.'' The policy statement further stated that the Commission 
issued the policy statement to help foster the development and 
maintenance of a safety culture at every facility licensed by the NRC.

[[Page 57526]]

    In 1996, the Commission published a policy statement, ``Freedom of 
Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear 
of Retaliation'' (61 FR 24336; May 14, 1996), to set forth its 
expectations that licensees and other employers subject to NRC 
authority will establish and maintain safety-conscious environments in 
which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their 
management and to the NRC, without fear of retaliation. This policy 
statement applied to NRC-regulated activities of all licensees and 
their contractors and subcontractors. A safety conscious work 
environment is an important attribute of safety culture and is one of 
the safety culture characteristics in the draft safety culture policy 
statement.
    The importance of a positive safety culture for activities 
involving civilian uses of radioactive materials and other potential 
hazards has been demonstrated by a number of significant, high-
visibility events world-wide that have occurred in the 20-year period 
since the Commission published its 1989 policy statement addressing 
safety culture in nuclear power plants. The events occurred across 
multiple industries including at nuclear power plants, fuel cycle 
facilities, and in other industries such as chemical processing plants 
and aerospace. Examples of nuclear industry events include those that 
occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the Peach Bottom 
Atomic Power Station. Workers at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 
discovered a cavity in the reactor pressure vessel head caused by boric 
acid corrosion. The corrosion developed over a period of several years 
but was not discovered before the cavity developed. The licensee's 
analysis of the event identified weaknesses in the station's safety 
culture as the root cause of the event. It particularly noted that 
management prioritized ``production over safety.'' At the Peach Bottom 
Atomic Power Station, personnel behaviors adverse to the security of 
the plant were identified, specifically, inattentiveness by security 
officers.
    Other licensees have had recurring problems resulting in violations 
of NRC regulations. Through a Commission confirmatory order, a fuel 
cycle facility licensee committed to having a third-party assessment of 
its safety culture to determine the causes of its continuing problems 
in order to establish appropriate corrective actions. The third-party 
assessment identified weaknesses in areas important to safety culture. 
In addition, weaknesses in the safety culture of licensees and 
certificate holders have contributed to unscheduled events or incidents 
that the Commission has determined to be significant from the 
standpoint of public health and safety. Examples linked to 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
associated with weak safety cultures include inadequate procedures; 
procedures not being followed; inadequate supervision; decision-making 
that does not ensure that safety and security are maintained; and 
ineffective problem identification, evaluation, and resolution. They 
have included medical misadministrations (such as giving iodine-131 to 
lactating females that resulted in the uptake by their infants and 
multiple events associated with prostate brachytherapy treatment) and 
overexposures arising from the loss of control of radiography or well 
logging sources.

(2) Statement of Policy

    It is the Commission's policy that a strong safety culture is an 
essential element for individuals, both internal to the NRC and 
external, performing or overseeing regulated activities. As such, the 
NRC will include appropriate means to monitor safety culture in its 
oversight programs and internal management processes. The NRC defines 
safety culture as that assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and 
behaviors in organizations and individuals, which establishes that as 
an overriding priority, nuclear safety and security issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance. Further, it is important for 
all organizations to provide personnel in the safety and security 
sectors with an appreciation for the importance of each, emphasizing 
the need for integration and balance to achieve optimized protection. 
Safety and security activities are closely intertwined, and it is 
critical that consideration of these activities be integrated so as not 
to diminish or adversely affect either safety or security. A safety 
culture that accomplishes this would include all nuclear safety and 
security issues associated with NRC-regulated activities including 
radiation protection, safeguards, material control and accounting, 
physical protection, and emergency preparedness issues among the issues 
that receive attention as a matter of priority.
    The Commission's regulations are designed to protect both the 
public and workers against radiation hazards from the use of 
radioactive materials. The Commission's scope of responsibility 
includes regulation of commercial nuclear power plants; research, test, 
and training reactors; nuclear fuel cycle facilities; medical, 
academic, and industrial uses of radioactive materials; and the 
transport, storage, and disposal of radioactive materials and wastes. 
The Commission carries out these responsibilities in numerous ways 
including through such regulatory activities as inspecting licensed and 
certified facilities and activities; collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating information about operational safety and security; 
investigating nuclear incidents; and developing policy and providing 
direction on safety and security issues.
    The Commission believes that, because licensees and certificate 
holders use or provide services related to the use of radioactive 
material, they bear the primary responsibility for safely handling and 
securing these materials. It is, therefore, each licensee's and 
certificate holder's responsibility to develop and maintain a positive 
safety culture which establishes that nuclear safety issues and nuclear 
security issues, as an overriding priority, receive the attention 
warranted by their significance. Therefore, licensees and certificate 
holders should foster a positive safety culture in their organizations 
and among individuals who are overseeing or performing regulated 
activities. However, as the regulatory agency, the Commission has an 
independent oversight role (through inspection and assessment 
processes) including addressing licensees' and certificate holders' 
performance related to areas important to safety culture.

(3) Safety Culture Concept

    In 1991, as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the 
International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) emphasized the concept of 
safety culture for the nuclear industry in its report, INSAG-4, 
``Safety Culture.'' INSAG is an advisory group to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INSAG-4 definition of safety culture 
is, ``that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, 
nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance.''
    Implied in the INSAG definition of safety culture is the 
recognition that every organization is continually faced with resolving 
conflicts among its goals for cost, schedule, and quality (or safety). 
The organization's members (groups and individuals) also face conflicts 
among different goals in performing their jobs. Management establishes 
the framework (management systems, programs, processes) and 
communicates its priorities for resolving

[[Page 57527]]

conflicts among different goals. Members of the organization work 
within that framework and are influenced by management's priorities, 
but they have their own beliefs and attitudes about what is important 
and make individual choices on how to proceed when faced with multiple 
competing goals. The INSAG definition emphasizes that in a positive 
safety culture, the goal of maintaining nuclear safety receives the 
highest priority in the organization's and individuals' decision-making 
and actions when faced with a conflict with other organizational or 
individual goals.
    The Commission modified the INSAG definition of safety culture 
which refers to ``nuclear plant safety.'' The Commission is strongly 
committed to promoting positive safety cultures among its nuclear 
reactor licensees; however, the Commission regulates many other 
organizations and processes involving civilian uses of radioactive 
materials. These regulated activities include industrial radiography 
services; hospitals, clinics and individual practitioners involved in 
medical uses of radioactive materials; research and test reactors; 
large-scale fuel fabrication facilities; as well as nuclear power 
plants. The Commission also regulates the construction of new 
facilities where operations will involve radioactive materials with the 
potential to affect public health and safety and the common defense and 
security. Therefore, by revising the INSAG definition of safety culture 
to replace ``nuclear plant safety'' with ``nuclear safety,'' the 
Commission is emphasizing that it expects all of its licensees and 
certificate holders to place the highest priority on nuclear safety 
commensurate with the risks inherent in the regulated activities.
    The Commission also modified the INSAG definition to adequately 
capture or communicate the equal importance of nuclear security and 
nuclear safety in a positive safety culture. Following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Commission increased its attention 
to the important role of security in regulated facilities whose 
operations can have an impact on public health and safety. The 
Commission issued orders enhancing security at its NRC-regulated 
facilities to further ensure public health and safety and the common 
defense and security. One of the insights gained from the greater 
emphasis on security is the importance of incorporating security 
considerations into a safety culture and effectively managing the 
safety and security interface. In general, the safety and security 
interface refers to the organizational and individual awareness that 
the functions and goals of safety and security must be considered 
together so that actions to achieve either set of functions and goals 
do not inadvertently compromise the other. Therefore, to emphasize the 
equal importance of nuclear security and nuclear safety in a positive 
safety culture, the Commission has added ``nuclear security'' to the 
safety culture definition. The NRC's modified INSAG definition is 
provided in the Statement of Policy section above.

(4) Stakeholder Outreach

    The Commission's February 28, 2009, Staff Requirements Memorandum 
(SRM)-COMGBJ-08-0001, ``A Commission Policy Statement on Safety 
Culture,'' (ML080560476) stated in part that the staff should, as part 
of its public stakeholder outreach, reach out to all types of licensees 
and certificate holders. In the development of the draft policy 
statement, the NRC staff sought insights and feedback from 
stakeholders. This was accomplished by providing information in a 
variety of forums such as stakeholder organization meetings, 
newsletters, and teleconferences and by publishing questions in Federal 
Register Notices entitled ``Safety Culture Policy Statement: Public 
Meeting and Request for Public Comments'' (ML090260709) that were 
related to the Commission's SRM. In addition, a significant stakeholder 
outreach activity was accomplished by a public workshop held on 
February 3, 2009, at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. The staff 
reviewed and considered the stakeholder feedback derived from these 
different forums and incorporated it into the development of the draft 
policy statement and recommendations.

(5) Safety and Security Culture

    In SRM-COMGJB-08-0001, the Commission also considered whether 
publishing the NRC's expectations for safety and security culture is 
best accomplished in one safety/security culture statement or in two 
separate statements, one each for safety and security, while still 
considering the safety and security interface.
    Based on a variety of sources including document reviews and 
stakeholder feedback, the Commission concluded there is no one 
definitive view of this issue, but the results weighed heavily toward a 
single policy statement to be titled a ``Safety Culture Policy 
Statement.'' Document reviews and stakeholder feedback suggested that a 
single policy statement (1) builds on the fact that safety and security 
have the same ultimate purpose of protecting people and the environment 
from unintended radiation exposure and (2) encourages attention to the 
ways safety and security interface. For these reasons, the Commission 
determined that the term ``safety culture'' should include both safety 
and security.
    Safety and security have been the primary pillars of NRC's 
regulatory programs. However, in the current heightened threat 
environment, there has been a renewed focus on security, and the staff 
has implemented a number of efforts to enhance security and strengthen 
the safety and security interface. It is important to understand that 
both safety and security share a common purpose of protecting public 
health and safety. In today's environment, safety and security 
activities are closely intertwined, and it is critical that 
consideration of these activities be integrated so as to complement 
each other and not diminish or adversely impact either safety or 
security. Further, it is important for licensees and certificate 
holders to provide personnel in the safety and security sectors with an 
appreciation for the importance of each, emphasizing the need for 
integration and balance to achieve optimized protection. The importance 
of both safety and security in an equal and balanced manner within 
NRC's regulatory framework is clearly evident in the Commission's 
mission and strategic goals.
    While many safety and security activities complement each other or 
are synergistic, there remain areas where potential conflicts may 
arise. It is then imperative that mechanisms be established to resolve 
these potential conflicts to assure the adequate protection of public 
health and safety and promote the common defense and security. Hence, 
safety and security have implications for each other in connection with 
all aspects of nuclear activities.
    One potential challenge is the way in which individuals involved in 
safety and security activities approach the goal of risk mitigation and 
protection of public health and safety. The safety staff is typically 
focused on preventing errors that would result in an inadvertent 
accident while the security staff is focused on preventing deliberate 
attacks or diversion of certain materials that could cause harm. 
Another challenge is that the organization/facility must ensure that 
the existence of motivated and capable persons with ill intent is 
recognized and that the importance of nuclear security to prevent such 
persons from unauthorized access is understood.

[[Page 57528]]

To manage these potential conflicts of challenges, the Agency has 
recently issued regulations on the safety/security interface. An 
overarching safety culture policy statement which encompasses security 
supports and further enhances those regulations.
    Based on the above considerations, the Commission concluded that a 
single policy statement would accomplish its goal that, as an 
overriding priority, safety issues and security issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance. Although, in some cases, 
issues relating to security might be handled differently than issues 
related to safety. A single policy statement recognizes there is one 
overarching culture in an organization; however, safety and security 
functions and goals must be treated equally within that overarching 
safety culture.

(6) Characteristics of a Positive Safety Culture

    Experience has shown that certain organizational attributes and 
personnel attitudes and behaviors are present in a positive safety 
culture. Therefore, in 2006, when the NRC implemented an enhanced 
reactor oversight process (ROP) that more fully addressed safety 
culture, it identified and incorporated safety culture components that 
are overarching characteristics of a positive safety culture. The NRC 
based its development of the safety culture components on a review of a 
variety of sources of information including the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations; the IAEA; the Nuclear Energy Agency; the regulatory 
approaches of other domestic and international organizations; and the 
organizational behavior, safety culture, and safety climate research 
literature. The Commission presented drafts of the safety culture 
components and aspects in frequent public meetings and modified them in 
response to stakeholder feedback.
    For the purpose of this policy statement, the NRC modified the ROP 
safety culture components (termed ``safety culture characteristics'') 
to explicitly address security in the safety culture characteristics 
descriptions, create a more generic description for each safety culture 
characteristic that would apply to the range of NRC licensees and 
certificate holders, and maintain all the safety culture concepts in 
the safety culture components. The staff presented the draft safety 
culture characteristics for stakeholder comment in a February 3, 2009, 
public workshop and on the NRC's public safety culture Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/safety-culture.html).
    Although the safety culture characteristics themselves are 
applicable to all licensees and certificate holders, there may be other 
examples that more specifically address the unique characteristics of a 
licensee's or certificate holder's environment (i.e., unique for 
medical and industrial applications, operating reactors, research and 
test reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and new reactor construction 
environments). Hence, the Commission recognizes that these safety 
culture characteristics are not all inclusive; other characteristics 
and attitudes in organizations and individuals may be indicative of a 
positive safety culture. However, the Commission expects its licensees 
and certificate holders to consider the extent to which these 
characteristics and attitudes are present in their organizations and 
among individuals who are overseeing or performing regulated activities 
and to take steps, if necessary, to foster a positive safety culture 
commensurate with the safety and security significance of activities 
and the nature and complexity of the licensee's or certificate holder's 
organization and functions.
    The following characteristics that are indicative of a positive 
safety culture, are relevant across the broad range of activities 
carried out by the nuclear industry, the Agreement States and the NRC, 
and address the importance of nuclear safety and security:
     Personnel demonstrate ownership for nuclear safety and 
security in their day-to-day work activities by, for example, ensuring 
that their day-to-day work activities and products meet professional 
standards commensurate with the potential impacts of their work on 
safety and security. They proceed with caution when making safety- or 
security-related decisions and question their assumptions, especially 
when faced with uncertain or unexpected conditions, to ensure that 
safety and security are maintained.
     Processes for planning and controlling work ensure that 
individual contributors, supervisors, and work groups communicate, 
coordinate, and execute their work activities in a manner that supports 
safety and security. For example, individuals and work groups 
communicate and cooperate during work projects and activities to ensure 
their actions do not interact with those of others to adversely affect 
safety or security. In addition, managers and supervisors are 
accessible to oversee work activities, including those of contractors 
or vendors, and they challenge work activities and work products that 
do not meet their standards.
     The organization maintains a safety conscious work 
environment in which personnel feel free to raise safety and security 
concerns without fear of retaliation. For example, claims of 
harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are 
investigated consistent with the regulations regarding employee 
protection. If an instance of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or 
discrimination for raising a safety or security concern is identified, 
corrective actions are taken in a timely manner.
     The organization ensures that issues potentially impacting 
safety or security are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and 
promptly addressed and corrected, commensurate with their significance.
     The organization ensures that the personnel, equipment, 
tools, procedures, and other resources needed to assure safety and 
security are available. For example, training is developed and 
implemented or accessed to ensure personnel competence. Procedures, 
work instructions, design documentation, drawings, databases, and other 
job aids and reference materials are complete, accurate, and up-to-
date.
     The organization's decisions ensure that safety and 
security are maintained. For example, production, cost, and schedule 
goals are developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner which 
demonstrates that safety and security are overriding priorities.
     Roles, responsibilities, and authorities for safety and 
security are clearly defined and reinforced. For example, personnel 
understand their roles and responsibilities in maintaining safety and 
security. Programs, processes, procedures, and organizational 
interfaces are clearly defined and implemented as designed. Leaders at 
all levels of the organization consistently demonstrate that safety and 
security are overriding priorities.
     The organization maintains a continuous learning 
environment in which opportunities to improve safety and security are 
sought out and implemented. For example, individuals are encouraged to 
develop and maintain current their professional and technical 
knowledge, skills, and abilities and to remain knowledgeable of 
industry standards and innovative practices. Personnel seek out and 
implement opportunities to improve safety and security performance.

[[Page 57529]]

(7) Implementation of Policy

    This policy statement describes areas important to safety culture, 
but it does not address how the nuclear industry, the Agreement States, 
and the NRC should establish and maintain a positive safety culture in 
their organizations. The nuclear industry, the Agreement States, and 
the NRC differ in their size and complexity, infrastructure, and 
organizational frameworks. Therefore, a single approach for 
establishing and maintaining a positive safety culture is not possible. 
Nevertheless, the Commission expects that nuclear safety and security 
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance, and all 
organizations consider and foster the safety culture characteristics 
(commensurate with the safety and security significance of activities 
and the nature and complexity of their organization and functions) in 
carrying out their day-to-day work activities and decisions.

Questions for Which NRC Is Seeking Input

    (1) The draft policy statement provides a description of areas 
important to safety culture, (i.e., safety culture characteristics). 
Are there any characteristics relevant to a particular type of licensee 
or certificate holder (if so, please specify which type) that do not 
appear to be addressed?
    (2) Are there safety culture characteristics as described in the 
draft policy statement that you believe do not contribute to safety 
culture and, therefore, should not be included?
    (3) Regarding the understanding of what the Commission means by a 
``positive safety culture,'' would it help to include the safety 
culture characteristics in the Statement of Policy section in the 
policy statement?
    (4) The draft policy statement includes the following definition of 
safety culture: ``Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics, 
attitudes, and behaviors in organizations and individuals which 
establishes that as an overriding priority, nuclear safety and security 
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.'' Does 
this definition need further clarification to be useful?
    (5) The draft policy statement states, ``All licensees and 
certificate holders should consider and foster the safety culture 
characteristics (commensurate with the safety and security significance 
of activities and the nature and complexity of their organization and 
functions) in carrying out their day-to-day work activities and 
decisions.'' Given the diversity among the licensees and certificate 
holders regulated by the NRC and the Agreement States, does this 
statement need further clarification?
    (6) How well does the draft safety culture policy statement enhance 
licensees' and certificate holders' understanding of the NRC's 
expectations that they maintain a safety culture that includes issues 
related to security?
    (7) In addition to issuing a safety culture policy statement, what 
might the NRC consider doing, or doing differently, to increase 
licensees' and certificate holders' attention to safety culture in the 
materials area?
    (8) How can the NRC better involve stakeholders to address safety 
culture, including security, for all NRC and Agreement State licensees 
and certificate holders?
    To ensure efficient consideration of your comments, please identify 
the specific question numbers with your comments when applicable. When 
commenting, please exercise caution with regard to site-specific 
security-related information. Comments will be made available to the 
public in their entirety. Personal information such as your name, 
address, telephone number, and e-mail address will not be removed from 
your submission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of October 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E9-26816 Filed 11-5-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P