[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 206 (Tuesday, October 27, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55126-55130]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-24391]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0018; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-01-AD; 
Amendment 39-16044; AD 2009-21-07]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company CF6-80C2 
Series Turbofan Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2 series turbofan engines with 
certain thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length 
end actuators installed. This AD requires initial visual inspections 
and repetitive replacements of the \3/8\-inch rod-ends installed on the 
thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length end 
actuators. This AD also allows an optional terminating action to those 
repetitive replacements. This AD also requires initial visual 
inspections and replacements, if necessary, of the other hardware 
connecting the thrust reverser transcowls to the engine. This AD 
results from reports of four failures of rod-ends on certain thrust 
reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length end actuators, 
leading to partial or complete separation of the transcowl from the 
engine and airplane during thrust reversal. We are issuing this AD to 
prevent loss of asymmetric thrust and thrust control.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 1, 2009. The Director of the 
Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain 
publications listed in the regulations as of December 1, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD 
from Middle River Aircraft Systems, 103 Chesapeake Park Plaza, MF 46, 
Baltimore, MD 21220; telephone (410) 682-0080; fax (410) 682-0100; or 
e-mail: usa.com">bulletins@mras-usa.com.
    The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, 
SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-
0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher J. Richards, Aerospace 
Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller 
Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-
mail: [email protected]; telephone (781) 238-7133; fax 
(781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 
with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to GE CF6-80C2 series 
turbofan engines with certain thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox 
assembly adjustable-length end actuators installed. We published the 
proposed AD in the Federal Register on March 16, 2009 (74 FR 11043). 
That action proposed to require initial visual inspections and 
repetitive replacements of the \3/8\-inch rod-ends installed on the 
thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length end 
actuators. That action also proposed to allow optional terminating 
action to those repetitive replacements. That action also proposed to 
require initial visual inspections and replacements, if necessary, of 
the other hardware connecting the thrust reverser transcowls to the 
engine.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in 
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket 
shortly after receipt.

Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the 
development of this AD. We have considered the comments received.

Continue Operating to Next C-Check

    Lufthansa Technik asks if the current risk assessment for the \3/
8\-inch rod-ends failure also takes into account mixed configurations, 
meaning lower or upper position with \7/16\-inch or fixed configuration 
rod-ends. The commenter states that if so, then a mixed configuration 
should therefore allow the operator to continue operating until next C-
Check without any higher risk.

[[Page 55127]]

The commenter points out that transcowl liberations were already 
communicated via FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. NE-
08-44 and GE All Operators Wire 07/CF6/012, where it was stated that 
the thrust reverser is designed to be able to continue normal operation 
to the next C-Check with a single failed actuator at either the upper 
or lower position.
    We do not agree. All of the failure events occurred following the 
failure of only one rod-end. Additionally, two of the four failures 
were partial liberations, where one rod-end stayed intact, and only the 
section of the transcowl near the failed rod-end tore apart and 
liberated from the engine and aircraft. Additionally, the 
manufacturer's life assessment shows that a thrust reverser operating 
with a failed rod-end may not be capable of operating safely until the 
next C-Check.

Proposal To Change Optional Terminating Action Paragraph

    Honeywell Engine Systems and Accessories proposes that the Optional 
Terminating Action paragraph should be changed to the following: ``As 
an optional terminating action to the repetitive \3/8\-inch rod-end 
replacements required by this AD, replace the \3/8\-inch adjustable 
rod-ends with a \7/16\-inch adjustable rod-end and nut, P/N 3238729-1 
and 3238730-1 respectively, or you may replace the adjustable end 
actuator P/N 3272602-2, -3 with a fixed end actuator P/N 3275538-2, -3. 
Use paragraph 3.E. (1) of Middle River Aircraft Systems (MRAS) Alert 
Service Bulletin (ASB) No CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 1, dated 
February 13, 2009, to do the replacements.'' The commenter states that 
a shop visit is required to upgrade \3/8\-inch adjustable rod-end 
actuators P/N 3272602-2,-3 to the \7/16\-inch adjustable rod-ends. In 
the proposed AD, there is a reference to replacing the \3/8\-inch rod 
ends with either a fixed length rod-end, P/N 3238726-1, -2 or MS9560-
08. These two parts, P/N 3238726-1,-2 and MS9560-08, are components of 
and designed for, the fixed length actuator P/N 3275538-2, -3. These 
parts will not fit onto an adjustable end actuator, P/N 3272602-2, -3.
    We agree. However, we are not specifying the part numbers for the 
replacement rod-ends, to prevent prohibiting installation of third 
party equipment that has been certified to be installed on the aircraft 
and has not been shown to create a safety risk. We are also updating 
the referenced Service Bulletin to Revision 3, dated September 10, 
2009, in place of Revision 1.

Proposal To Change Applicability Paragraph

    Onur Air proposes that applicability paragraph (c) be changed to 
state that if the lower end actuator is a locking actuator assembly 
(part number 3275546-1, 3275546-2, 3275548-1, or 3275548-2), then the 
AD does not apply. This change would establish the same effectivity of 
parts for both the AD and MRAS ASB, and would eliminate confusion.
    We do not agree. Even if a locking actuator assembly is installed 
in the lower actuator position, a \3/8\-inch rod-end may be installed 
in the upper actuator position. MRAS ASB No. 78A1162 Revision 1, dated 
February 13, 2009; Revision 2, dated June 22, 2009; and Revision 3, 
dated September 10, 2009, clarify that reverser halves that have a 
locking actuator assembly installed at the lower actuator position and 
an adjustable-length end actuator with \3/8\-inch rod-end installed at 
the upper actuator position, are affected. We did not change the AD.

Request for Rod-End Serial Numbers

    Onur Air states that because the proposed AD and associated Service 
Bulletin require a repetitive replacement of \3/8\-inch rod-ends at 
11,000 flight cycle intervals, the rod-ends should have physical serial 
numbers associated with them. The rod-ends need to be traceable to 
comply with the 11,000 cycle repetitive inspection and without a serial 
number, replacement data cannot be monitored or proven.
    We do not agree. The rod-ends themselves are not serialized, but 
they can be tracked through the actuator assemblies. Only one rod-end 
is installed per actuator, so tracking the actuator assembly will track 
the number of cycles that the rod-end has accumulated. We did not 
change the AD.

Extend the Compliance Time to Next C-Check

    Onur Air, FedEx Express, and Lufthansa Technik suggest that the 
initial compliance time be extended from within 500 flight cycles from 
the effective date of the AD to within the next C-Check after the 
effective date of the AD. The commenters cite that due to some airlines 
not having access to the MRAS component maintenance manual, it would be 
difficult to replace the clevis fasteners found failed as required in 
proposed AD paragraph (g)(4). Additionally, some replacement work would 
be more suitably done off-wing as opposed to at the next on-wing 
inspection.
    We do not agree. The compliance time of 500 flight cycles is based 
on component life calculations. Additionally, a C-Check is not defined 
consistently across the industry, and may be performed at a variety of 
intervals depending on the operator's maintenance schedule, some of 
which may be significantly longer than the 500 flight-cycle-limit 
mandated in this AD.

Disagreement With the Unsafe Condition Statement

    Boeing, GE, and MRAS state that they disagree with the proposed AD 
unsafe condition statements of ``possible loss of thrust control, 
asymmetric thrust, increased stopping distance''. They state that 
conditions are not the expected result based on a review of the event 
on the Boeing 767 airplane. There was no indication, neither tactile 
nor flight deck light, that alerted the pilot that the event had 
occurred. The only effect from the failed rod-end at the airplane level 
was the parts on the runway. There was no reported thrust control 
problem or airplane control problem. The statement ``hazardous debris 
on the runway'' however, is accurate. The commenters state that this 
information was determined as not a safety matter. This was based on 
the analysis showing there was no control issue. Additionally, 
transcowl liberation does not result in the loss of engine thrust 
control.
    We do not agree. Although one particular case may not have needed 
crew response, other instances of transcowl liberation that led to the 
development of this AD included reports of airplane yaw upon loss of 
the transcowl. The possibility of this occurring again led to the 
unsafe conditions of ``possible loss of asymmetric thrust and thrust 
control.'' Loss of thrust control is included, because the asymmetric 
thrust created by transcowl liberation is not commanded by the crew. We 
changed the AD to simplify the unsafe condition by addressing only the 
conditions that pose an immediate threat to the aircraft.

Request To Re-Examine the Cost of Compliance

    FedEx Express, GE, and MRAS request that the FAA re-examine the 
criteria and considerations used to estimate the cost of compliance for 
accomplishing the proposed AD. The true costs to U.S. operators will be 
higher than the figures published in the NPRM. Revised cost estimates 
should be provided which also reflect transcowl rigging work-hours as 
well as cost for repetitive accomplishment (versus termination), 
reworking common end actuator hardware installed on non-

[[Page 55128]]

CF6-80C2 engines, and include adjustment for higher levels of 
discrepant clevis fastener discoveries. The commenters state that the 
work-hours quoted, need for repetitive inspections, percentage of 
transcowls needing repair work, and parts replacement are not 
reflective of what the actual operating fleet will encounter.
    We agree. We updated the number of work-hours to provide a more 
accurate accounting for the cost of this AD. Our best, and most 
substantiated, estimate of parts expected to fail is about 10%, 
therefore we did not change the percentage in our calculations.

Hardware Not Presently Installed

    FedEx Express requests that proposed AD paragraph (h) be clarified 
with regards to addressing what actions, if any, should be applied to 
end actuator assemblies with the \3/8\-inch diameter rod-ends that are 
identical to the subject hardware specified in the proposed AD, but 
which are not presently installed on any CF6-80C2 series engine thrust 
reverser. After the initial 500 flight cycle compliance period, the 
installation of end actuators with such rod-ends could result in 
potential noncompliance with the intent of the AD. The commenter 
recommends additional language that will direct the inspection of such 
actuator rod-ends before installation on CF6-80C2 series engine thrust 
reversers, especially after the initial 500 flight-cycle compliance 
period has been exceeded.
    We do not agree. This AD addresses what actions are required for 
end actuator assemblies installed on a CF6-80C2 engine. Any assembly 
installed on an engine affected by this AD is subject to the 
inspections and replacements as defined in this AD. Also, the AD limits 
which rod-ends may be installed on an engine. If an actuator assembly 
is to be installed on an engine, it must be verified that all parts 
comply with this AD. We did not change the AD.

Include Additional Part Numbers and Define Wear Limits

    American Airlines requests that additional part numbers for 
replacement parts should be included in paragraphs 1.E and 2.A.(1) of 
MRAS ASB No. 78A1162. Also, the commenter requests that paragraph 
3.D.(3) of this ASB should define wear limits to the torsion arm to 
prevent structurally sound torsion arms from being removed due to minor 
surface damage. The additional part numbers would allow parts to be 
purchased from vendors other than Honeywell or MRAS.
    We do not agree. We are not incorporating by reference Service 
Bulletin paragraphs 1.E., 3.D.(3), and 2.A.(1) in the AD. Therefore, 
these paragraphs are not mandated by the FAA. We did not change the AD.

Specifically Identify Items To Be Inspected

    American Airlines states that in the proposed AD in the ``FAA's 
Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD'' section, it should 
not state generally that ``the other hardware that connects the thrust 
reverser transcowl to the engine'' is subject to initial inspection and 
replacement. Rather, this section should specifically identify the 
items to be targeted in the initial inspection and replacement actions.
    We do not agree. The ``FAA's Determination and Requirements of the 
Proposed AD'' section is a summary. The specific hardware needing 
inspection per this AD is defined in paragraph (f) of this AD. We did 
not change the AD.

Request To Reference Alert Service Bulletin Revision 2

    GE and MRAS state that all references to ASB No. S/B 78A1162, 
Revision 1, should be changed to ASB No. S/B 78A1162, Revision 2, 
before the AD is issued.
    We agree that we should reference the latest revision of the ASB. 
We changed the AD to reference the latest ASB revision which is 
Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009. We also updated the previous 
credit paragraph (k) to include Revision 1 and Revision 2.

Remove Phrase From Discussion Section

    GE and MRAS request that, in the proposed AD Discussion section, we 
remove the phrase ``or the CDU clevis pin to lose its retaining 
capability''. There has never been a field finding or event 
investigation that indicates that an actuator-out condition contributes 
to the CDU clevis pin losing its retaining capability.
    We do not agree. Although the AD does not address the loss of CDU 
clevis pin retaining capability leading to the failure of an actuator 
rod end, the clevis pins should still be inspected to ensure the part 
is in good condition and is held securely in place. We did not change 
the AD.

Remove Repetitive Replacements of \3/8\-Inch Rod-Ends From the AD

    GE and MRAS request that we remove the repetitive replacements of 
\3/8\-inch rod-ends from the AD. The commenters do not envision the 
repetitive need for on-wing replacements of \3/8\-inch rod-ends, and 
state that the replacement of \3/8\-inch rod-ends with \7/16\-inch or 
fixed length rod-ends would provide terminating action.
    We do not agree. Repetitively replacing the \3/8\-inch rod-ends 
within the cyclic accumulation defined in the AD provides an adequate 
level of safety. Requiring replacement of all \3/8\-inch rod-ends with 
\7/16\-inch or fixed length rod-ends would require considerably more 
effort for a number of engines. Although it is an acceptable 
terminating action, it is not the only course of action that resolves 
the unsafe condition. We did not change the AD.

Update the Applicability Section

    GE and MRAS request that the Applicability section be updated to 
take into account the possibility of \3/8\-inch rod-ends with part 
numbers other than those defined in this AD being installed. They state 
that the AD should apply to all \3/8\-inch rod-ends, including those 
which may be a third-party design which have not been validated through 
this AD.
    We agree. The AD needs to ensure that all \3/8\-inch rod-ends are 
replaced, except as noted in the AD itself. We updated the wording of 
the Applicability section, as well as other affected sections in the 
AD, to reflect this.

Inspection and Replacement Paragraphs Should Be Expanded

    GE and MRAS state that in the compliance section, under the 
``Visual Inspection and Fastening Hardware Replacements'' heading, the 
paragraphs used for the inspection and replacement should be expanded 
to read ``Use paragraph 3.B.(1) and 3.B.(2)''. Additionally, the phrase 
``clevis brackets'' should be replaced with ``clevis assembly'', 
because this is more appropriate nomenclature. These paragraphs were 
omitted in the proposed AD, but are needed to provide instructions on 
part inspection.
    We agree. We incorporated by reference these paragraphs into the 
AD; however, we excluded the reporting requirements in those 
paragraphs, as they are not required by this AD. We also changed clevis 
bracket to clevis assembly.

Allow Deferral of the Repair and Deactivate the Thrust Reverser

    GE and MRAS state that in the compliance section, under the 
``Visual Inspection and Fastening Hardware Replacements'' heading, the 
proposed AD paragraph (g)(4), should be reworded as follows: ``If loose 
or missing clevis fasteners are found,

[[Page 55129]]

remove and replace the clevis fasteners, or defer the repair and 
deactivate the thrust reverser per existing MEL limits. Use paragraph 
3.F.(2) of MRAS CF6-80C2 ASB No. 78A1162 Revision 2, dated June 22, 
2009, to do the replacements or to deactivate the thrust reverser. 
Deactivation is not allowed/specified if referring only to steps 
3.F.(2)(a) through 3.F.(2)(c).
    We agree that the AD needs to allow thrust reverser deactivation. 
We changed the AD to allow deactivation of the thrust reverser.

Change the Company Contact Information

    GE and MRAS request that under ``Related Information'' the company 
contact information be changed to ``attn: Product Support Engineering; 
e-mail usa.com">bulletins@mras-usa.com for a copy of the service information 
identified in this AD.'' MRAS Warranty Support does not provide service 
information. MRAS Product Support Engineering distributes service 
bulletins via e-mail, not by telephone or fax.
    We partially agree. We added that contact information.

Remove Documentation Requirements

    GE and MRAS request that we remove from the AD the documentation 
requirements that are defined in paragraphs 3.C.(3)(b) and 3.E.(5) of 
the Service Bulletin.
    We agree. We excluded those paragraphs from the incorporation by 
reference of the Service Bulletin, in the AD.

Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the 
comments received, and determined that air safety and the public 
interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. 
We have determined that these changes will neither increase the 
economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 750 GE CF6-80C2 series 
turbofan engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. We also 
estimate that it will take about 1.5 work-hours per engine to perform 
the inspection, one work-hour per engine to perform the rod-end 
replacement, and 48 work-hours per engine to perform the clevis 
assembly replacement. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. 
Required rod-ends will cost about $508 per engine. We estimate that 75 
engines will require clevis bracket replacement. Required replacement 
clevis assemblies and associated labor will cost about $1,246,200. 
Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. 
operators to be $1,777,200.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and 
placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the 
address listed under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2009-21-07 General Electric Company: Amendment 39-16044. Docket No. 
FAA-2009-0018; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-01-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective December 
1, 2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2 
series turbofan engines with thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox 
assembly adjustable-length end actuators having \3/8\-inch rod-ends 
installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, 
Airbus A300-600/R/F and A310-200/300, and Boeing 747-200B/300/400/
400D/400F, 767-200/300/300F/400ER, and MD-11 airplanes.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from reports of four failures of rod-ends on 
certain thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length 
end actuators, leading to partial or complete separation of the 
transcowl from the engine and airplane during thrust reversal. We 
are issuing this AD to prevent loss of asymmetric thrust and thrust 
control.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Visual Inspection and Fastening Hardware Replacements

    (f) Within 500 flight cycles after the effective date of this 
AD, do the following:
    (1) Inspect all translating cowl clevis pin retaining clips and 
associated fastening hardware, including those on the center drive 
unit (CDU), to ensure they are properly assembled and securely 
fastened in place. If a retaining clip is not completely covering 
the clevis pin and firmly attached to the clevis, remove and replace 
the fastening hardware. Use paragraphs 3.B.(1) and 3.B.(2), 
excluding 3.B.(2)(a), of Middle River Aircraft Systems (MRAS) Alert 
Service Bulletin (ASB) No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated 
September 10, 2009, to do the inspections.
    (2) Remove and inspect all clevis pins for physical damage or 
significant corrosion. Use paragraphs 3.C.(1) through 3.C.(3), 
excluding the recording requirement in paragraph 3.C.(3)(b) of MRAS 
ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10,

[[Page 55130]]

2009, to do the removals, inspections, and part disposition as 
necessary.
    (3) Inspect the clevis assemblies and four clevis fasteners at 
each of the clevis assemblies (upper, center, and lower) for 
structural integrity. Use paragraphs 3.F.(1), excluding 3.F.(1)(c) 
of MRAS ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 
10, 2009, to do the inspections.
    (4) If loose or missing clevis fasteners are found, remove and 
replace the clevis fasteners, or defer the repair and deactivate the 
thrust reverser. Use paragraph 3.F.(2) of MRAS ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 
78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do the 
replacements.

Initial Rod-End Replacements

    (g) For all \3/8\-inch translating cowl adjustable-length 
actuator rod-ends having more than 600 flight cycles-since-new on 
the effective date of this AD, replace them with P/N M81935/1-6, or 
other approved part number, zero time rod-ends within 500 flight 
cycles after the effective date of this AD. Use paragraph 3.E., 
excluding both 3.E.(8) and the recording requirement in paragraph 
3.E.(5) of MRAS ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated 
September 10, 2009, to do the replacements.

Repetitive \3/8\-Inch Rod-End Replacements

    (h) Repetitively replace the \3/8\-inch translating cowl 
adjustable-length actuator rod-ends that were installed as specified 
in paragraph (g) of this AD, before they accumulate 11,000 flight 
cycles, with a zero time \3/8\-inch adjustable-length rod-end, P/N 
M81935/1-6 or other approved part number. Since the rod-ends are not 
serialized, track their life by using the associated actuator 
assembly's life. Use paragraphs 3.E., excluding both paragraph 
3.E.(8) and the recording requirement in paragraph 3.E.(5), of MRAS 
ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, 
to do the replacements.

Optional Terminating Action

    (i) As an optional terminating action to the repetitive \3/8\-
inch rod-end replacements required by this AD, replace the \3/8\-
inch adjustable rod-ends with a \7/16\-inch adjustable rod-end and 
nut or you may replace the adjustable end actuator with a fixed end 
actuator. Use paragraph 3.E.(1) of MRAS ASB No. CF6-80C2 S/B 
78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do the 
replacements.

Installation Prohibition

    (j) After the effective date of this AD, do not install rod-ends 
P/Ns KBE6-59, MS2124S06, B15946-13 or 15946000-13, on any engine 
subject to this AD. Rod-ends removed to comply with this AD are not 
eligible for installation on any aircraft.

Previous Credit

    (k) Inspections and replacements and optional terminating action 
performed before the effective date of this AD using MRAS ASB No. 
CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, dated December 30, 2008; Revision 1, dated 
February 13, 2009; or Revision 2, dated June 22, 2009, satisfy the 
required initial actions and optional terminating action of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (l) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority 
to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if 
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Related Information

    (m) Contact Christopher J. Richards, Aerospace Engineer, Engine 
Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New 
England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: 
[email protected]; telephone (781) 238-7133; fax (781) 
238-7199, for more information about this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (n) You must use Middle River Aircraft Systems Alert Service 
Bulletin No. CF6-80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10, 
2009, to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of 
the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this 
service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 
51. Contact Middle River Aircraft Systems, 103 Chesapeake Park 
Plaza, MF 46, Baltimore, MD 21220; telephone (410) 682-0080; fax 
(410) 682-0100; or e-mail: usa.com">bulletins@mras-usa.com, for a copy of 
this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New 
England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-
741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on October 2, 2009.
Peter A. White,
Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-24391 Filed 10-26-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P