[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 195 (Friday, October 9, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52268-52274]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-24407]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2009-0444]


Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment on the Proposed Model 
Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical 
Specification Task Force Traveler-513, Revision 2, ``Revise PWR 
Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation''

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The NRC is requesting public comment on the enclosed proposed 
model safety evaluation, model no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and model application for plant-specific adoption of 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler-513, Revision 2, 
``Revise PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage 
Instrumentation.'' The TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2, is available in 
the Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS) under 
Accession Number ML091810158. The proposed changes revise Standard 
Technical Specification (STS) [3.4.15], ``[Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
Leakage Detection Instrumentation].'' The proposed changes also revise 
the STS Bases to clearly define the RCS leakage detection 
instrumentation Operability requirements in the Limiting Condition for 
Operation (LCO) Bases, eliminate discussion from the STS Bases that 
could be erroneously construed as Operability requirements, and reflect 
the changes to the TSs. This model safety evaluation will facilitate 
expedited approval of plant-specific adoption of TSTF Traveler-513, 
Revision 2.

DATES: Comment period expires November 9, 2009 Comments received after 
this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0444 in the subject line of your 
comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be 
posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site 
Regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any 
identifying or contact information,

[[Page 52269]]

the NRC cautions you against including any information in your 
submission that you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
    The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments 
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those 
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any 
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not 
include any information in their comments that they do not want 
publicly disclosed.
    Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2009-0444. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail 
[email protected].
    Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and 
Directives Branch (RDB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this notice 
using the following methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public 
File Area O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected]. The Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-
Specific Adoption of TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2, available 
electronically under ADAMS Accession Number ML092460664.
    Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and supporting 
materials related to this notice can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID: NRC-2009-0444.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Michelle C. Honcharik, Senior 
Project Manager, Special Projects Branch, Mail Stop: O-12D1, Division 
of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; telephone 
301-415-1774 or e-mail at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    This notice provides an opportunity for the public to comment on 
proposed changes to the Standard TS (STS) after a preliminary 
assessment and finding by the NRC staff that the agency will likely 
offer the changes for adoption by licensees. This notice solicits 
comment on a proposed change to the STS, which if implemented by a 
licensee will modify the plant-specific TS. The NRC staff will evaluate 
any comments received for the proposed change to the STS and reconsider 
the change or announce the availability of the change for adoption by 
licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible 
for reviewing the NRC staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable 
technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific 
information. The NRC will process and note each amendment application 
responding to the notice of availability according to applicable NRC 
rules and procedures.

Applicability

    TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2, is applicable to pressurized water 
reactors. The Traveler revises the TS and TS Bases to clearly define 
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation Operability requirements as 
well as revise Conditions and Required Actions related to leakage 
detection instrumentation.
    The proposed change does not prevent licensees from requesting an 
alternate approach or proposing changes other than those proposed in 
TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2. However, significant deviations from the 
approach recommended in this notice or the inclusion of additional 
changes to the license require additional NRC staff review. This may 
increase the time and resources needed for the review or result in NRC 
staff rejection of the license amendment request (LAR). Licensees 
desiring significant deviations or additional changes should instead 
submit an LAR that does not claim to adopt TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 
2.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of September 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stacey L. Rosenberg,
Chief, Special Projects Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Proposed Model Application for Plant-Specific Adoption of TSTF 
Traveler-513, Revision 2, ``Revise PWR Operability Requirements and 
Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation''

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, 
DC 20555.

Subject: [Plant Name]
    DOCKET NO. 50-[XXX]
    LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 
TASK FORCE (TSTF) TRAVLER-513, REVISION 2, ``REVISE PWR OPERABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS AND ACTIONS FOR RCS LEAKAGE INSTRUMENTATION''

    In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), [LICENSEE] is submitting a 
request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for 
[PLANT NAME, UNIT NO.].
    The proposed amendment would revise the TS and TS Bases to clearly 
define the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage detection 
instrumentation Operability requirements as well as revise Conditions 
and Required Actions related to leakage detection instrumentation. The 
revised Required Actions employ alternate methods of monitoring RCS 
leakage when one or more required monitors are inoperable. This change 
is consistent with NRC approved Revision 2 to TSTF Improved Standard 
Technical Specification (STS) Change Traveler-513, ``Revise PWR 
Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation'' 
[Discuss any differences with Traveler-513, Revision 2.] The 
availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal 
Register on [Date] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the consolidated line item 
improvement process (CLIIP).
    The proposed amendment contains a less restrictive TS change. The 
less restrictive change is justified because alternate RCS leakage 
monitoring methods are required to be performed when no required 
monitoring methods are Operable. Further detailed justification is 
contained in Attachment 1.
    Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change. 
Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked to show the proposed 
change. Attachment 3 provides the existing TS

[[Page 52270]]

Bases pages marked up to show the proposed change. Attachment 4 
provides the proposed TS changes in final typed format. Attachment 5 
provides the proposed TS Bases changes in final typed format. 
Attachment 6 provides the regulatory commitment[s].
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ``Notice for Public Comment; State 
Consultation,'' a copy of this application, with attachments, is being 
provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that 
the foregoing is correct and true.
    Executed on [date] [Signature].
    If you should have any questions about this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER].

 Sincerely,
[Name, Title]

Attachments: 1. Evaluation of Proposed Change
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
3. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-Up)
4. Proposed Technical Specification Change (Re-Typed)
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Re-Typed)
6. List of Regulatory Commitments
    cc: [NRR Project Manager]
    [Regional Office]
    [Resident Inspector]
    [State Contact]

Evaluation of Proposed Change

1.0 Description

    The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specification 
(TS) and TS Bases to clearly define the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
leakage detection instrumentation Operability requirements as well as 
revise Conditions and Required Actions related to leakage detection 
instrumentation. This change is consistent with NRC-approved Revision 2 
to Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard 
Technical Specification (STS) Change Traveler-513, ``Revise PWR 
Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation.'' 
[Minor differences between the proposed plant-specific TS changes, and 
the changes proposed by Traveler-513 are listed in Section 2.0.] The 
availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal 
Register on [Date] ( ] FR [ ]) as part of the consolidated line item 
improvement process (CLIIP).

2.0 Proposed Change

    Consistent with the NRC-approved Revision 2 of Traveler-513, the 
proposed changes revise and add a new Condition to TS [3.4.15], ``[RCS 
Leakage Detection Instrumentation],'' and revise the associated bases. 
New Condition [D] is applicable when the containment atmosphere gaseous 
radioactivity monitor is the only Operable monitor (i.e., all other 
monitors are inoperable). The Required Actions require analyzing grab 
samples of the containment atmosphere or performing an RCS water 
inventory balance every 12 hours and restoring another monitor within 7 
days. Existing Condition [F] applies when all required monitors are 
inoperable and requires immediate entry into Limiting Condition for 
Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. This Condition is revised to require obtaining 
and analyzing a containment atmosphere grab sample and performance of 
an RCS water inventory balance every 6 hours. At least one RCS leakage 
detection monitor must be restored within 72 hours or a plant shutdown 
is required. Existing Condition [E] applies when the Required Actions 
and associated Completion Times are not met. It is moved to the last 
Condition and applies to all the previous Conditions. The TS Bases are 
revised to clearly define the RCS leakage detection instrumentation 
Operability requirements in the LCO Bases, eliminate discussion from 
the Bases that could be erroneously construed as Operability 
requirements, and reflect the changes to the TSs.
    [The proposed changes also correct inappropriate references to 
``required'' equipment in TS [3.4.15]. In several locations the 
specifications incorrectly refer to a ``required'' [equipment name]. 
The term ``required'' is reserved for situations in which there are 
multiple ways to meet the LCO, such as the requirement for either a 
gaseous or particulate radiation monitor. The incorrect use of the term 
``required'' is removed from TS [3.4.15] Conditions [A, B, and C].
    [LICENSEE] is [not] proposing variations or deviations from the TS 
changes described in Traveler-513, Revision 2, or the NRC staff's model 
safety evaluation published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP 
Notice of Availability. [Discuss any differences with Traveler-513, 
Revision 2 and the effect of any changes on the NRC staff's model 
safety evaluation.]

3.0 Background

    The background for this application is adequately addressed by the 
NRC Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]).

4.0 Technical Analysis

    The proposed amendment contains a less restrictive TS change to 
existing Condition [F]. The proposed Required Actions for Condition [F] 
would eliminate the requirement to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and 
would add the requirement to analyze grab samples of the containment 
atmosphere once per 6 hours, perform an RCS water inventory balance 
once per 6 hours per Surveillance Requirement 3.4.13.1, and restore at 
least one RCS leakage detection monitor to Operable status within 72 
hours. The less restrictive change is justified because alternate RCS 
leakage monitoring methods are required to be performed when no 
monitoring methods are operable. These alternate methods provide an RCS 
leakage detection capability similar to the required methods. The RCS 
mass balance is capable of identifying a one gallon per minute (gpm) 
RCS leak rate and uses instrumentation readily available to control 
room operators. The grab sample has an RCS leakage detection capability 
that is comparable to that of the containment particulate radiation 
monitor. The proposed Actions and Completion Times for grab samples and 
mass balance calculations are adequate because use of frequent grab 
samples and RCS mass balance calculations provide assurance that any 
significant RCS leakage will be detected prior to significant RCS 
pressure boundary degradation. The proposed 72 hour Completion Time for 
Restoration of at least one RCS leakage detection monitor to Operable 
status is appropriate given the low probability of significant RCS 
leakage during the time when no required RCS leakage detection monitors 
are Operable, and the need for time to restore at least one monitor to 
Operable status.
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation published on [DATE] 
([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability. [LICENSEE] 
has concluded that the technical justifications presented in the safety 
evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT 
NO.].

5.0 Regulatory Safety Analysis

5.1 No Significant Hazards Determination
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the no significant hazards determination 
published on [DATE] ([] FR []) as part of the CLIIP Notice of 
Availability. [LICENSEE] and has concluded that the determination 
presented in the notice is

[[Page 52271]]

applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NO.]. [LICENSEE] has evaluated the proposed 
changes to the TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined 
that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards 
consideration. An analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration is presented below:
    [LICENSEE INSERT ANALYSIS HERE.]
5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria
    A description of the proposed TS change and its relationship to 
applicable regulatory requirements was provided in the NRC Notice of 
Availability published on [DATE] ([] FR []). [LICENSEE] has reviewed 
the NRC staff's model safety evaluation published on [DATE] ([] FR[]) 
as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability and concluded that the 
regulatory evaluation section is applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NO.].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in 
the model safety evaluation published on [DATE] ([] FR []) as part of 
the CLIIP Notice of Availability. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the NRC 
staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to [PLANT, 
NO.].
    The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, and would change an 
inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change 
does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a 
significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts 
of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant 
increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. 
Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
proposed change.

7.0 References

    1. Federal Register Notice, Notice of Availability published on 
[DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]).
    2. TSTF-513, Revision 2, ``Revise PWR Operability Requirements and 
Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation.''
    [3. Other References]

Proposed Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination for 
Plant-Specific Adoption of TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2, ``Revise PWR 
Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation''

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) [3.4.15], ``[Reactor Coolant System 
(RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation.]'' Conditions and Required 
Actions as well as make associated TS Bases changes for TS [3.4.15].
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration: As 
required by Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 
50.91(a), the [LICENSEE] analysis of the issue of no significant 
hazards consideration is presented below:

    1: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in 
the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change clarifies the Operability requirements for 
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and reduces the time 
allowed for the plant to operate when the only Operable RCS leakage 
instrumentation monitor is the containment atmosphere gaseous 
radiation monitor. The proposed change also extends the allowed 
operating time when all RCS leakage instrumentation is inoperable. 
The monitoring of RCS leakage is not a precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. The monitoring of RCS leakage is not used to 
mitigate the consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2: Does the Proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or 
Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change clarifies the Operability requirements for 
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and reduces the time 
allowed for the plant to operate when the only Operable RCS leakage 
instrumentation monitor is the containment atmosphere gaseous 
radiation monitor. The proposed change also extends the allowed 
operating time when all RCS leakage instrumentation is inoperable. 
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change maintains sufficient continuity and diversity of leak 
detection capability that the probability of piping evaluated and 
approved for Leak-Before-Break progressing to pipe rupture remains 
extremely low. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
previously evaluated.
    3: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a 
Margin of Safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change clarifies the Operability requirements for 
the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and reduces the time 
allowed for the plant to operate when the only Operable RCS leakage 
instrumentation monitor is the containment atmosphere gaseous 
radiation monitor. The proposed change also extends the allowed 
operating time when all RCS leakage instrumentation is inoperable to 
allow time to restore at least one RCS leakage monitoring instrument 
to Operable status. Reducing the amount of time the plant is allowed 
to operate with only the containment atmosphere gaseous radiation 
monitor Operable increases the margin of safety by increasing the 
likelihood that an increase in RCS leakage will be detected before 
it potentially results in gross failure. Allowing a limited period 
of time to restore at least one RCS leakage monitoring instrument to 
Operable status before requiring a plant shutdown avoids putting the 
plant through a thermal transient without RCS leakage monitoring. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    Based upon the reasoning presented above, the NRC staff concludes 
that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards 
consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), ``Issuance of 
Amendment.''

Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of 
Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-513, Revision 2, ``Revise 
PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage 
Instrumentation''

1.0 Introduction

    By letter dated [DATE], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) proposed changes 
to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. The proposed 
changes revise TS [3.4.15], ``[Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage 
Detection Instrumentation].'' The proposed changes also revise the TS 
Bases to clearly define the RCS leakage detection instrumentation 
Operability requirements in the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 
Bases, eliminate discussion from the TS Bases that could be erroneously 
construed as Operability requirements, and reflect the changes to the 
TSs.
    The licensee stated that the application is consistent with NRC-
approved Revision 2 to Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 
Improved Standard Technical Specification (STS) Change Traveler-513, 
``Revise PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage 
Instrumentation.'' [Discuss any differences with TSTF-513, Revision 2.] 
The availability of this TS improvement

[[Page 52272]]

was announced in the Federal Register on [Date] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of 
the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    The regulation in General Design Criterion (GDC) 30 of Appendix A 
to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, 
``Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary,'' requires means for 
detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the 
source of RCS Leakage. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.45, Revision 0, 
``Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems,'' May 
1973, describes acceptable methods of implementing the GDC 30 
requirements with regard to the selection of leakage detection systems 
for the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). Revision 1 of RG 1.45 
was issued in May 2008. RG 1.45, Revision 1, describes different 
methods of implementing the GDC 30 requirements compared to RG 1.45, 
Revision 0, and was intended to be applicable only to new reactors. 
Therefore, operating nuclear power plants are not committed to Revision 
1 of RG 1.45.
    RG 1.45, Revision 0, Regulatory Position C.2, states that ``Leakage 
to the primary reactor containment from unidentified sources should be 
collected and the flow rate monitored with an accuracy of one gallon 
per minute (gpm) or better.'' Regulatory Position C.3 states, ``At 
least three separate detection methods should be employed and two of 
these methods should be (1) sump level and flow monitoring and (2) 
airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring. The third method may be 
selected from the following: (a) monitoring of condensate flow rate 
from air coolers or (b) monitoring of airborne gaseous radioactivity. 
Humidity, temperature, or pressure monitoring of the containment 
atmosphere should be considered as alarms or indirect indication of 
leakage to the containment.'' Regulatory Position C.5 states, ``The 
sensitivity and response time of each leakage detection system in 
regulatory position 3 above employed for unidentified leakage should be 
adequate to detect a leakage rate, or its equivalent, of one gpm in 
less than one hour.'' RG 1.45, Revision 0, states, ``In analyzing the 
sensitivity of leak detection systems using airborne particulate or 
gaseous radioactivity, a realistic primary coolant radioactivity 
concentration assumption should be used. The expected values used in 
the plant environmental report would be acceptable.'' The appropriate 
sensitivity of a plant's containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity 
monitors is dependent on the design assumptions and the plant-specific 
licensing basis as described in the plant's updated final safety 
analysis report (UFSAR).
    As stated in NRC Information Notice (IN) 2005-24, ``Nonconservatism 
in Leakage Detection Sensitivity,'' the reactor coolant activity 
assumptions for containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors 
may be nonconservative. This means the monitors may not be able to 
detect a one gpm leak within one hour under all likely operating 
conditions.
    The NRC's regulatory requirements related to the content of the TS 
are contained in 10 CFR Part 50.36. Paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR 
50.36 lists criteria for determining whether particular items are 
required to be included in the TS LCOs. Criterion 1 of that regulation 
applies to installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and 
indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary. As described in the Federal Register 
Notice associated with this regulation (60 FR 36953, July 16, 1995), 
this criterion is intended to apply to process variables that alert the 
operator to a situation when accident initiation is more likely.
    The NRC's guidance for the format and content of PWR TS can be 
found in NUREG-1430, Revision 3.0, ``Standard Technical Specifications 
Babcock and Wilcox Plants,'' NUREG-1431, Revision 3.0, ``Standard 
Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants,'' and NUREG-1432, 
Revision 3.0, ``Standard Technical Specifications Combustion 
Engineering Plants.'' STS 3.4.15, ``RCS Leakage Detection 
Instrumentation'' contains the guidance specific to the RCS leakage 
detection instrumentation for PWRs. The STS Bases provide a summary 
statement of the reasons for the STS. Operability requirements should 
be defined in the LCO section of the STS Bases.
    The STS Bases for STS 3.4.15 contained in NUREG-1430, Revision 3.0; 
NUREG-1431, Revision 3.0; and NUREG-1432, Revision 3.0, included 
information that could be construed as Operability requirements in the 
Background, Applicable Safety Analysis, and LCO sections. These STS 
Bases did not accurately describe the Operability of a detector as 
being based on the design assumptions and licensing basis for the 
plant. This situation and the issue described in IN 2005-24 have caused 
questions to arise regarding the Operability requirements for 
containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors. Traveler-513, 
Revision 2, contained changes to the STS Bases that revised PWR 
Operability requirements. In addition, Traveler-513, Revision 2, 
includes NRC-approved revisions to TS Actions for RCS Leakage 
Instrumentation that recognize the potentially reduced sensitivity of 
the gaseous radioactivity instrument and more appropriate actions when 
all RCS leakage detection instrumentation is inoperable.
2.1 Adoption of Traveler-513, Revision 2, by [Facility Name]
    Proper plant-specific adoption of Traveler-513, Revision 2, by 
[licensee] will revise the RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation TS and 
TS Bases and clarify the Operability requirements for RCS Leakage 
Detection Instrumentation.
    The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes for compliance with 10 
CFR 50.36 and agreement with the precedent as established in NUREG-
[1430, 1431, or 1432]. In general, licensees cannot justify technical 
specification changes solely on the basis of adopting the model STS. To 
ensure this, the NRC staff makes a determination that proposed changes 
maintain adequate safety. Changes that result in relaxation (less 
restrictive condition) of current TS requirements require detailed 
justification.
    In general, there are two classes of changes to TSs: (1) Changes 
needed to reflect contents of the design basis (TSs are derived from 
the design basis), and (2) voluntary changes to take advantage of the 
evolution in policy and guidance as to the required content and 
preferred format of TSs over time. This amendment request deals with 
both classes of change. The amendment request includes proposed changes 
to the TS Bases to more accurately reflect the contents of the facility 
design basis related to operability of the RCS leakage detection 
instrumentation and proposed changes to the TS that take advantage of 
revised guidance on required actions for inoperable RCS leakage 
detection instrumentation. Guidelines for TS and TS Bases content are 
found in NUREG-[1430, 1431, or 1432], as amended by Traveler-513, 
Revision 2.
    Licensees may revise the TSs to adopt improved STS format and 
content provided that plant-specific review supports a finding of 
continued adequate safety because: (1) The change is editorial, 
administrative or provides clarification (i.e., no requirements are 
materially altered), (2) the change is more restrictive than the 
licensee's current requirement, or (3) the change is less restrictive 
than the licensee's current requirement, but nonetheless still affords 
adequate assurance of safety when judged against current regulatory

[[Page 52273]]

standards. The detailed application of this general framework, and 
additional specialized guidance, are discussed in Section 3.0 in the 
context of specific proposed changes.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    The current Bases for TS [3.4.15], ``[Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
Leakage Detection Instrumentation],'' do not clearly define the basis 
for Operability for the RCS Leakage Instrumentation. The current TS 
Bases contain information that could be construed as Operability 
requirements in the Background, Applicable Safety Analysis, and LCO 
sections. In addition, the current TS Bases do not accurately describe 
the Operability of a detector as being based on the design assumptions 
and licensing basis for the plant.
    In adopting Traveler-513, Revision 2, the licensee proposed changes 
that would revise the Bases for TS [3.4.15] to clearly define the RCS 
leakage detection instrumentation Operability requirements in the LCO 
Bases and reflect the changes to the TSs. The proposed changes to the 
Operability requirements included in the LCO Bases are acceptable 
because they define, consistent with the design basis of the facility, 
the minimum set of diverse instruments that must be operable, the plant 
parameters monitored by the instrumentation, the design sensitivity of 
the leakage detection instruments, and factors that affect the 
operational sensitivity of the instrument. These instruments satisfy 
Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) in that they are installed 
instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control 
room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant 
pressure boundary.
    In adopting the changes to TS included in Traveler-513, Revision 2, 
the licensee also proposed to revise TS [3.4.15], ``[Reactor Coolant 
System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation]'' Conditions and 
Required Actions. The licensee proposed adding new Condition [D] to TS 
[3.4.15]. New Condition [D] would be applicable when the containment 
atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor is the only operable RCS 
leakage detection monitor. The proposed Required Actions for new 
Condition [D] require the licensee to analyze grab samples of the 
containment atmosphere once per 12 hours and restore the required 
containment sump monitor to Operable status within seven days, or 
analyze grab samples of the containment atmosphere once per 12 hours 
and restore the containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitor to 
Operable status within 7 days. The NRC staff determined that the 
proposed change is more restrictive than the current requirement, 
because there is no current Condition for the situation when the 
containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor is the only 
operable RCS leakage detection monitor. The proposed Actions and 
Completion Times are adequate because the grab samples will provide an 
alternate method of monitoring RCS leakage when the containment 
atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor is the only operable RCS 
leakage detection monitor and the 12-hour interval is sufficient to 
detect increasing RCS leakage. In addition, Surveillance Requirement 
(SR) 3.4.13.1 requires verification that RCS operational leakage is 
within limits by performance of an RCS water inventory balance at a 
frequency of once per 72 hours, which provides periodic confirmation 
that RCS leakage is within limits using diverse instrumentation. 
Allowing 7 days to restore another RCS leakage monitor to Operable 
status ensures that the plant will not be operated in a degraded 
configuration for a long time.
    Existing TS [3.4.15] Condition [F] is applicable when all required 
RCS leakage detection monitors are inoperable. The current Required 
Action for Condition [F] is to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3. The 
licensee proposed modifying the Required Actions for Condition [F]. The 
proposed Required Actions for Condition [F] would eliminate the 
requirement to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and would add the 
requirement to analyze grab samples of the containment atmosphere once 
per 6 hours, perform an RCS water inventory balance once per 6 hours 
per SR 3.4.13.1, and restore at least one RCS leakage detection monitor 
to Operable status within 72 hours. The NRC staff determined that the 
proposed change is less restrictive than the current requirement 
because it would allow a longer time to operate when all required RCS 
leakage detection monitors are inoperable.
    The licensee provided justification for the less restrictive change 
in its LAR, which the NRC staff reviewed. The grab sample has an RCS 
leakage detection capability that is comparable to that of the 
containment particulate radiation monitor. The RCS water inventory 
balance is capable of identifying a one-gpm RCS leak rate and uses 
instrumentation readily available to control room operators. The 
proposed Actions and Completion Times for grab samples and water 
inventory balance calculations are adequate because use of frequent 
grab samples and RCS water inventory balance calculations provide 
assurance that any significant RCS leakage will be detected prior to 
significant RCS pressure boundary degradation. The proposed 72-hour 
Completion Time for Restoration of at least one RCS leakage detection 
monitor to Operable status is appropriate given the low probability of 
significant RCS leakage during the time when no required RCS leakage 
detection monitors are Operable, and the need for time to restore at 
least one monitor to Operable status.
    [Facility] has been licensed for Leak-Before-Break (LBB). The basic 
concept of LBB is that certain piping material has sufficient fracture 
toughness (i.e., ductility) to resist rapid flaw propagation. The 
licensee has evaluated postulated flaws in [RCS loop] piping and 
determined the piping has sufficient fracture toughness that the 
postulated flaw would not lead to pipe rupture and potential damage to 
adjacent safety related systems, structures and components before the 
plant could be placed in a safe, shutdown condition. The NRC staff has 
previously reviewed and approved these analyses. Before pipe rupture, 
the postulated flaw would lead to limited but detectable leakage, which 
would be identified by the leak detection systems in time for the 
operator to take action. The proposed actions for inoperable RCS 
leakage detection instrumentation maintain sufficient continuity and 
diversity of leakage detection capability that an extremely low 
probability of undetected leakage leading to pipe rupture is 
maintained. This extremely low probability of pipe rupture continues to 
satisfy the basis for acceptability of LBB.
    The licensee proposed minor changes to ensure continuity of the TS 
format. These changes re-lettered current Condition [D], which applies 
when the containment sump monitor is the only operable leakage 
detection instrument, to Condition [E], and current Condition [E], 
which applies when the required action and the associated completion 
time are not satisfied, to Condition [G]. Similar changes were made to 
the associated Required Actions. The NRC staff determined that these 
changes were editorial, and therefore acceptable.
    The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's proposed change against the 
applicable regulatory requirements listed in Section 2 of this safety 
evaluation. The NRC staff also compared the proposed change to the 
change made to STS by Traveler-513, Revision 2. The NRC staff 
determined that all the proposed changes afford adequate assurance of 
safety when judged against current regulatory standards. Therefore, the

[[Page 52274]]

NRC staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

4.0 Conclusions

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.

5.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the NRC staff].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, ``Standards for 
Protection Against Radiation.'' The NRC staff has determined that the 
amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no 
significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released 
offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has 
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no 
significant hazards considerations, and there has been no public 
comment on the finding [FR]. Accordingly, the amendment meets the 
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 References

    1. [Licensee] Licensee Amendment Request to adopt TSTF-513, [DATE].
    2. Federal Register Notice, Notice of Availability published on 
[DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]).
    3. TSTF Traveler-513, Revision 2, ``Revise PWR Operability 
Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation''.

[FR Doc. E9-24407 Filed 10-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P