[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 15, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47289-47298]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-22182]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2009-0403]
Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment on the Proposed Model
Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical
Specification Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed
Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion
Times (WCAP-15791)''
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.
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SUMMARY: The NRC is requesting public comment on the enclosed proposed
model safety evaluation, model no significant hazards consideration
determination, and model application for plant-specific adoption of
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3,
``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve
Completion Times (WCAP-15791).'' The TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 is
available in the Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS)
under Accession Number ML080510164. The proposed changes would revise
technical specification (TS) containment isolation valve (CIV)
completion times for Westinghouse plants. This model safety evaluation
will facilitate expedited approval of plant-specific adoption of TSTF
Traveler-446, Revision 3.
DATES: Comment period expires October 15, 2009. Comments received after
this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include Docket ID NRC-2009-0403 in the subject line of your
comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be
posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site
Regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be
publicly disclosed.
The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not
include any information in their comments that they do not want
publicly disclosed.
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2009-0403. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail
[email protected].
Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and
Directives Branch (RDB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492-
3446.
You can access publicly available documents related to this notice
using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public
File Area O-1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
[email protected]. The Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-
Specific Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-446,
Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment
Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-15791)'' is available
electronically under ADAMS Accession Number ML092260664.
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and supporting
materials related to this notice can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID: NRC-2009-0403.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Michelle C. Honcharik, Senior
Project Manager, Special Projects Branch, Mail Stop: O-12 D1, Division
of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; telephone
301-415-1774 or e-mail at [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This notice provides an opportunity for the public to comment on
proposed changes to the Standard TS (STS) after a preliminary
assessment and finding by the NRC staff that the agency will likely
offer the changes for adoption by licensees. This notice solicits
comment on a proposed change to the STS that modifies the TS. The NRC
staff will evaluate any comments received for the proposed change to
the STS and reconsider the change or announce the availability of the
change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS
change are responsible for reviewing the NRC staff's evaluation,
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any
necessary plant-specific information. The NRC will process and note
each amendment application responding to the notice of availability
according to applicable NRC rules and procedures.
Applicability
TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, is applicable to all Westinghouse
nuclear power reactors. The Traveler requires that a licensee's plant-
specific application must: (a) address or meet the requirements stated
in Pressurized Water Reactor Owners' Group (PWROG) (formerly
Westinghouse Owners' Group) Topical Report (TR) WCAP-15791-NP-
[[Page 47290]]
A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment
Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' and (b) address or meet the
requirements stated in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, Revision
0, ``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' (ADAMS Accession
No. ML003680088), and (c) include a demonstration of probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) quality for the licensee's Tier 3 assessments. The NRC
staff approved NEI 99-04, by letter dated March 31, 2000 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML003679799). The NRC issued the final safety evaluation
(SE) for TR WCAP-15791-P, Revision 2, on February 13, 2008 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML080170680). The PWROG issued accepted proprietary and
non-proprietary versions of the WCAP (ADAMS Package Accession No.
ML003696998). To efficiently process the incoming license amendment
requests (LARs), the NRC staff requests that each licensee applying to
implement the changes proposed in TSTF Traveler-446 include
documentation regarding the technical adequacy of the PRA consistent
with the requirements of Section 4.2 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200,
Revision 2, ``An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,''
dated March 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090410014). Applicants
proposing to use PRA models for which NRC-endorsed standards do not
exist must submit documentation that identifies the characteristics of
those models consistent with Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of RG 1.200 or
identify and justify the methods to be applied for assessing the risk
contribution for those sources of risk not addressed by PRA models.
The proposed change does not prevent licensees from requesting an
alternate approach or proposing changes other than those proposed in
TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3. However, significant deviations from the
approach recommended in this notice or the inclusion of additional
changes to the license require additional NRC staff review. This may
increase the time and resources needed for the review or result in NRC
staff rejection of the LAR. Licensees desiring significant deviations
or additional changes should instead submit an LAR that does not claim
to adopt TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Stacey L. Rosenberg,
Chief, Special Projects Branch, Division of Policy and Rulemaking,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Proposed Model Application for Plant-Specific Adoption of TSTF
Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of Extensions to
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-15791)''
Subject: Plant Name
Docket No. 50--
Application For Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed
Justification For Containment Isolation Valve Allowed Outage Time
Changes
Dear Sir or Madam:
In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.90, ``Application for Amendment
of License, Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit,'' [LICENSEE] is
submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
The proposed amendment would modify [LICENSEE] technical
specifications (TS) requirements for allowed outage time changes for
containment isolation valves with the implementation of Topical Report
WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions
to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times.''
Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific
verifications. Attachment 2 gives the existing TS pages marked to show
the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages.
Attachment 4 summarizes the regulatory commitments made in this
submittal. Attachment 5 provides the proposed changes to the TS Bases.
Attachment 6 provides the statement of proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration.
[LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X
DAYS].
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ``Notice for Public Comment; State
Consultation,'' a copy of this application, with attachments, is being
provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is correct and true.
Executed on [date] [Signature]
If you should have any questions about this submittal, please
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER].
Sincerely,
[Name, Title]
Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
3. Revised Technical Specification Pages
4. Regulatory Commitments
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
6. Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Office
NRC Resident Inspector
ATTACHMENT 1
DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT
1.0 DESCRIPTION
The proposed amendment would modify technical specifications (TS)
requirements for allowed outage times for containment isolation valves
(CIVs) associated with the implementation of Topical Report (TR) WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times for Westinghouse Plants.''
The changes are consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC's) approved industry/Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) Standard TS (STS) change, TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession
No. ML080510164). The Federal Register notice published on [DATE]
announced the availability of this TS improvement.
2.0 ASSESSMENT
2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the model safety evaluation (SE) dated
[DATE]. The [LICENSEE] has also reviewed the NRC staff SE (ADAMS
Accession No. ML080170680) approving TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2,
and the requirements specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04,
``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' (ADAMS Accession
No. ML003680088). [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications
presented in the TSTF proposal and the SE are applicable to [PLANT,
UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the
changes to the [PLANT] TS.
[[Page 47291]]
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
[LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the
STS changes described in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, and the NRC
staff's model safety evaluation, dated [DATE].
[If the licensee proposes variations or deviations, then the
licensee needs to describe and justify these variations/deviations and
include a statement, such as, the proposed amendment is consistent with
the STS changes described in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, but
[LICENSEE] proposes variations or deviations from TSTF Traveler-446, as
identified and justified below.]
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards
consideration (NSHC) published in the Federal Register [DATE] ([ ] FR [
]). [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHC presented in the
Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] and is
provided as Attachment [6] to this amendment request, which satisfies
the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Section 50.91(a). [LICENSEE] has forwarded the NSHC to the
appropriate State officials.
3.2 Verifications, Commitments, and Additional Information Needed
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated the applicability of TSTF Traveler-446,
Revision 3, to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS] by addressing requirements
specified in TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, in this license amendment
request (LAR). This LAR provides the plant-specific information on
limitations and conditions specified in Section 4.0 and the additional
information specified in Section 5.0 of the SE approving TR WCAP-15791-
NP-A, Revision 2. In addition, consistent with TSTF Traveler-446,
[LICENSEE] must demonstrate in this LAR applicable documentation/
evaluation for Items 3.2.1 through 3.2.12 as noted below.
3.2.1 Demonstration (Simultaneous LCO Entry Consideration)
Option A:
[LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice
Condenser, and Dual),''] as specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
Option B:
[If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D, then it must
demonstrate that the potential for any cumulative risk impact of failed
CIVs and multiple CIV LCO entries was evaluated by the licensee. In
addition, the licensee must demonstrate that the licensee's Tier 3 risk
management program addresses the possibility of simultaneous LCO
entries for inoperable CIVs in separate penetrations. The licensee must
provide sufficient information such that defense-in-depth for safety
systems will be maintained.]
Discussion:
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, is based on only one CIV being in
maintenance at any given time. The TR states that multiple systems are
not expected to be out of service simultaneously during extended
completion times (CTs), but it does not preclude the practice. Although
TS LCO 3.6.3, Note 2, allows a separate condition entry for each
penetration flow path, proposed Condition D addresses an inoperable CIV
in more than one penetration flow path and limits the CT to 4 hours. If
the licensee's proposed TS change does not include this Condition D,
then the licensee's application must demonstrate that the potential for
any cumulative risk impact of failed CIVs and multiple CIV LCO entries
has been evaluated and is acceptable. The licensee must demonstrate
that its Tier 3 risk management program, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4), will address the possibility of simultaneous LCO entries
of inoperable CIVs in separate penetrations to maintain defense-in-
depth for safety systems.
3.2.2 Demonstration (Penetration Configuration)
Option A:
[LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as
specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
Option B;
[If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D, then it must
demonstrate that the remaining CIVs in the affected penetration flow
path (or another penetration flow path) are closed before entering the
extended CT for the inoperable CIV and that the risk impacts (i.e.,
core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF),
incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and incremental
conditional large early release probability (ICLERP)) were evaluated by
the licensee.]
Discussion:
The existing and proposed TS LCO 3.6.3 must not allow multiple
simultaneous extended CIV CTs to occur for more than 4 hours, which is
the existing CT for an inoperable CIV in LCO 3.6.3. This is to meet the
TR assumption that only one valve within a single penetration can be in
maintenance at a time (i.e., for more than the 4 hours allowed by the
current LCO 3.6.3 Condition A). The existing LCO 3.6.3 Condition B, and
the proposed LCO 3.6.3 Conditions A and D, ensure that this assumption
is being met. If the TS do not prevent this case (i.e., Condition D is
not adopted), then this case must be evaluated in the plant-specific
applications to demonstrate that the risk-impact assumptions of CDF,
LERF, ICCDP and ICLERP remain less than the acceptance guidelines in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the
Licensing Basis,'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific,
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.'' Also, the
plant-specific application must address whether the position of the
remaining CIVs in the affected penetration flow path (or another
penetration flow path) have been confirmed before entering the extended
CT for the inoperable CIV.
3.2.3 Demonstration (Failed CIVs and Multiple CIV LCO Entries)
Option A:
[LICENSEE] has incorporated new Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as
specified in TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3.
Option B:
[If the licensee did not incorporate Condition D then it must
demonstrate that the cumulative risk impact of failed CIVs and multiple
CIV LCO entries was evaluated, and that remaining CIVs in the affected
penetration flow path (or another penetration flow path) are closed
prior to entering the extended CT. In addition, the licensee must
demonstrate that the licensee's Tier 3 risk management program address
the possibility of simultaneous LCO entries for inoperable CIVs in
separate penetrations. The licensee must provide sufficient information
such that defense-in-depth for safety systems will be maintained.]
Discussion:
The licensee needs to address how the following basis and general
assumptions of TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, are incorporated in the
specific plant practices, procedures, TS, and probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA):
Only one CIV is in maintenance with an extended CT at any
given time. This is a Tier 2 requirement, unless the
[[Page 47292]]
licensee has proposed the additional STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition D in its
plant-specific application.
Before maintenance or corrective maintenance (repair) is
performed on a CIV, the TR evaluation assumes that any other CIVs in
the penetration flow path have been checked to ensure that they are in
their proper position. This is a Tier 2 requirement.
Multiple systems are not expected to be out of service
simultaneously during the extended CTs.
3.2.4 Demonstration (CIV Configuration)
Option A:
[LICENSEE] has confirmed that (a) the CIV configurations for [PLANT
NAME, UNIT NOS.] match the configurations in TR WCAP-15791-NP-A,
Revision 2, and (b) the risk-parameter values used in the TR are
representative or bounding for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS].
Option B:
[If the licensee's does not confirm the above, it must provide
justification for the deviation.]
Discussion:
Not all penetrations have the same impact on CDF, LERF, ICCDP, or
ICLERP; therefore, the licensee needs to address the applicability of
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, to the specific plant. This analysis
must include verification that (a) the CIV configurations for the
specific plant match the configurations in the TR and (b) the risk-
parameter values used in the TR are bounding for the specific plant.
Any additional CIV configurations and extended CTs, not specifically
evaluated by the TR, or nonbounding risk-parameter values outside the
scope of the TR, will require an NRC staff review of the specific
penetrations and related justifications for the proposed CTs.
3.2.5 Demonstration (Tier 2 Evaluation)
Option A:
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that its Tier 2 evaluation has
identified potentially high-risk plant configurations associated with
the proposed CIV CTs that should not be entered while a CIV is in
maintenance, and how these controls have been implemented by the
licensee.
Option B:
[If the licensee's evaluation identifies no risk-significant plant
configurations associated with the proposed CIV CTs, then it must
provide justification/evaluation and state applicable compensatory
measures or commitments.]
Discussion:
A Tier 2 conclusion of the TR as applicable to the specific plant,
or the plant-specific Tier 2 requirements must be provided by the
licensee.
3.2.6 Demonstration (Tier 3 Evaluation)
[LICENSEE] has addressed Tier 3 evaluation for [PLANT NAME, UNIT
NOS.] by demonstrating conformance to the requirements of the
maintenance rule as the requirements relate to the proposed CIV CTs and
the guidance contained in the Nuclear Management and Resources Council
(NUMARC) document, NUMARC 93-01, ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 2,
Section 11, issued April 1996, as endorsed by RG 1.182, ``Assessing and
Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.''
[LICENSEE] has provided documentation on the [LICENSEE'S] maintenance
rule program, with respect to CIVs, includes a LERF/ICLERP (i.e.,
ICLERP as defined in NUMARC 93-01) assessment as part of the
maintenance rule process, and that the PRA quality is adequate, as part
of the basis of a risk-informed licensing action.
Discussion:
The licensee needs to describe its configuration risk management
program (CRMP) or maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) program (as
appropriate), including how it reflects the current PRA model, any
simplifications or deviations in the CRMP model from the current plant
model, and methods to update the CRMP to reflect the current plant-
specific model.
The licensee needs to address the Tier 3 aspects of RG 1.177,
including a description of the CRMP, and confirm that the licensee's
Maintenance Rule Program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) meets all aspects of
Section 2.3.7.2 of RG 1.177, including the referenced four key
components.
Also, the licensee needs to confirm that the plant (units) conform
to the requirements of the maintenance rule, as they relate to the
proposed CIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section
11, as endorsed by RG 1.182, including verification that the
maintenance rule program, with respect to CIVs, includes a LERF and
ICLERP assessment, as part of the maintenance rule process, and that
the CRMP is adequate, as part of the basis for evaluating the risk
impact of CIV maintenance configurations. The licensee needs to confirm
that its CRMP model calculates ICCDP (or ICDP) and ICLERP (or ILERP)
and that the licensee's model is capable of modeling CIVs or has been
modified to include CIVs.
3.2.7 Demonstration (Plant-Specific PRA Quality)
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the plant-specific PRA quality is
acceptable for Tier 3 application, in accordance with the guidelines
given in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.
Discussion:
The licensee needs to describe the scope of the plant-specific PRA
and justify its technical adequacy for this application, in accordance
with the guidance provided in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177. Specifically, the
supporting documentation needs to address each area in sufficient
detail to satisfy the following:
Assurance that the plant-specific PRA reasonably reflects
the as-built, as-operated plant.
Assurance that plant-specific PRA updates, including any
plant improvements or commitments cited and credited in the analysis,
have been implemented from the individual plant evaluation (IPE) and
the IPE for external events (IPEEE) and subsequent peer reviews and
self-assessments. Reference to past submittals discussing this
information is acceptable.
Assurance that conclusions from the peer review, including
facts and observations (A and B), that are applicable to proposed
extended CTs for CIVs were considered and resolved consistent with RG
1.200, Revision 2. If not resolved, the licensee must provide the
justification for the acceptability of the conclusions (e.g.,
sensitivity studies showing negligible impact). The licensee should
indicate the PRA revisions that underwent the peer review and were used
in the plant-specific application.
Assurance that there is PRA configuration control and
updating, including PRA quality assurance programs, associated
procedures, and PRA revision schedules.
Assurance that there is PRA adequacy, completeness, and
applicability with respect to evaluating the risk associated with the
proposed CIV CT extensions.
Assurance that plant design or operational modifications
that are related to or could affect the proposed CT extensions are
reflected in the PRA revision used in the plant-specific application or
that a justification is provided for not including these modifications
in the PRA.
As clarified in Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-06, ``Regulatory
Guide 1.200 Implementation,'' dated March 22, 2007, the NRC staff will
use RG 1.200 to assess the technical adequacy of all risk-informed
applications received
[[Page 47293]]
after December 2007. RG 1.200, ``An Approach for Determining the
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-
Informed Activities,'' describes an acceptable approach for defining
the technical adequacy of an acceptable base PRA. This assessment can
be performed by directly comparing the base PRA to the supporting
requirements in the endorsed American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) Standard RA-Sb-2005 and addressing the NRC staff position on
each requirement discussed in Appendix A to RG 1.200. Alternatively, a
licensee can perform the assessment starting with the results of a
previous peer review, performed in accordance with the process
documented in NEI 00-02 and addressing the NRC staff position on each
requirement discussed in Appendix B to RG 1.200.
3.2.8 Demonstration (External Events Risk)
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that external events risk is bounded by
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, assumptions and will not have an
adverse impact on the conclusions of the [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]
analysis for extending the CIV CTs.
Discussion:
External events may include seismic, high winds, fires, floods, or
other related events applicable to each licensee. The licensee needs to
demonstrate, by either quantitative or qualitative means, that external
event risk will not have an adverse impact on the conclusions of the
plant-specific analyses with respect to the TR evaluation. For some
participating plants, internal fires and other external event risks may
contribute significantly to the overall plant baseline risk, which may
affect TR WCAP-15791, so that a plant-specific application of the TR
methodology may not be found acceptable in all cases. Specifically, the
risk from external events should not make the total baseline risk
exceed 1E-4/yr CDF or 1E-5/yr LERF without justification.
The licensee's submittal must discuss the plant risk associated
with external events and specifically identify (quantitatively or
qualitatively) that the impact of the proposed CIV CTs on the risk
associated with external events is small. The licensee needs to confirm
that any increase in external event risk associated with the proposed
CIV CTs should be minimal. The licensee must address this impact and
discuss why the risk of external events (including internal fires) is
negligible. Insights from IPEEE screening or quantitative approaches
may be used to support the licensee's evaluations.
If the licensee has performed an updated analysis of an external
event since the NRC staff review of the licensee's IPEEE, and a
quantitative PRA demonstration is used to support the submittal, the
licensee needs to describe the significant changes involved in its
updated analysis and the impact of these changes on plant risk
associated with the external event and the proposed CIV CT extensions.
For external events for which the licensee has a PRA, the licensee
needs to provide the change in CDF, the change in LERF, the ICCDP, and
the ICLERP associated with specifically analyzed external events. The
licensee needs to also provide the total plant risk and total change in
risk from all PRA contributors (the combination of internal events,
internal flooding, internal fires, and external events). To conclude
that the quantified risk associated with the proposed CIV CTs is
acceptable, the total CDF and LERF values and the change in CDF, change
in LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP must meet the acceptance guidelines of RG
1.174 and RG 1.177.
For external events not included in the plant PRA but that rely on
a non-PRA method (e.g., seismic margins analysis or fire-induced
vulnerability evaluation) to confirm that plant risk remains
acceptable, the licensee must confirm the following: a) that there are
no vulnerabilities or outliers associated with these external events,
b) that any vulnerabilities or outliers that were identified have been
resolved, or c) that appropriate plant modifications have been
implemented according to the licensee's analysis.
3.2.9 Demonstration (CIV Availability Monitoring)
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] how plant-
specific CIV availability is monitored and assessed at the plant under
the maintenance rule, and that, performance continues to be consistent
with the analysis assumptions used to justify extended CIV CTs,
including the assumptions in TR WCAP-15791.
Discussion:
The licensee needs to address how CIV availability is monitored and
assessed under the maintenance rule, which includes confirmation that
performance continues to be consistent with the analysis assumptions
used to justify extended CIV CTs and needs to describe what actions are
to be taken if a previously approved risk-informed licensing action is
found to no longer meet the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.174 and RG
1.177.
3.2.10 Demonstration (Cumulative Risk Evaluation)
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the cumulative risk has been
evaluated for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] in accordance with guidance in RG
1.174, with respect to past [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] license amendments
or additional [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] applications for a TS change
under NRC review that have not been incorporated into the baseline PRA
used to evaluate the proposed change.
Discussion:
The cumulative risk impact of the proposed CT extensions for CIVs
must be addressed in the plant-specific application, in accordance with
the acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174. The cumulative risk impact must
include both previous plant license changes and additional plant
applications still under review.
3.2.11 Demonstration (PRA Uncertainty)
[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that uncertainty caused by plant PRA
models is addressed in the [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal according
to RG 1.174 guidance.
Discussion:
Licensee needs to address that uncertainty due to plant PRA models
do not significantly impact the risk assessment results and decisions
regarding acceptability.
3.2.12 Demonstration (Regulatory Commitment)
[LICENSEE] has incorporated a regulatory commitment addressing how
LERF/ICLERP is assessed and has provided documentation in the [PLANT
NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal.
Discussion:
Licensee needs to address the plant CRMP, including the maintenance
rule program implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and explain how the
LERF/ICLERP is assessed in the program.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in
the proposed safety evaluation dated [DATE]. [LICENSEE] has concluded
that the proposed determination presented in the notice is applicable
to [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] and the determination is provided as an
attachment to this LAR to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).
[[Page 47294]]
Attachment 2: Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
Attachment 3: Proposed Technical Specification Pages
Attachment 4: List Of Regulatory Commitments
The following table identifies those actions committed to by
[LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are
provided for information purposes and are not considered to be
regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these
commitments to [CONTACT NAME].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory commitments Due date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] commits to implementing a [Complete, implemented
methodology for assessing the effect on with amendment, OR
large early release frequency and within X days of
incremental conditional large early release implementation of
probability when using the extended amendment].
completion times for containment isolation
valves in the program for managing risk in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment 5: Proposed Changes To Technical Specification Bases
Attachment 6: Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Proposed Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination for
Plant-Specific Adoption of Tstf Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk
Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve
Completion Times (Wcap-15791)''
Description of Amendment Request: The change requests the adoption
of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS)
for Westinghouse plants (NUREG-1431), to allow modification of
containment isolation valve (CIV) completion times associated with the
implementation of topical report (TR) WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2.
``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve
Completion Times,'' dated March 10, 2006. Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (Topical Report WCAP-
15791-P, Revision 2),'' dated February 19, 2008 (Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML080510164). The
Notice of Availability published in the Federal Register on [Date] [xx
FR xxxxx] described the proposed change.
The proposed change extends the completion times for containment
penetration flow paths with one CIV inoperable from 4 hours up to 168
hours (7 days) for Westinghouse plants. This change is applicable to
containment penetrations with one or more CIVs, in which one CIV is
inoperable [for reasons other than shield building bypass or purge
valve leakage not within limit] and where the CIV is either intact or
not intact. In addition, this change addresses conditions where there
are two or more penetration flow paths with one CIV inoperable (for
reasons other than that the shield building bypass or purge valve
leakage are not within limits). Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration:
As required by Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.91(a), the [LICENSEE] analysis of the issue of no
significant hazards consideration is presented below:
1: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the completion times do not change the
response of the plant to any accidents, have no impact on the
reliability of the CIV, and have an insignificant impact on the
availability of the CIVs. The proposed changes will not result in a
significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is
demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety, as measured by
core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF),
is not significantly increased, and is acceptable. In addition, for the
completion time change, the incremental conditional core damage
probabilities (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release
probabilities (ICLERP) are also acceptable. These changes are
consistent with the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide (RG)
1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-
Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,''
and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed
Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.''
The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or
precursors nor do they alter the design assumptions, conditions, or
configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is
operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent
the structures, systems, and components from performing their intended
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the
assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the
source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not increase
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released
offsite, nor do they significantly increase individual or cumulative
occupational or public radiation exposures. The proposed changes do not
invalidate the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2: Does the Proposed Change Create the Possibility of a New or
Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in
which the CIVs provide plant protection. No design changes are
associated with the proposed changes. The changes to completion times
do not change any existing accident scenarios nor do they create any
new or different accident scenarios. The changes do not involve a
physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of
equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods
[[Page 47295]]
governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not
impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing
requirements. The proposed changes do not alter assumptions made in the
safety analysis and do not invalidate the safety analysis assumptions
and current plant operating practice.
3: Does the Proposed Change Involve a Significant Reduction in a
Margin of Safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety
limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are
not affected by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The
calculated impact on risk is consistent with the acceptance guidelines
contained in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, the licensee concludes
that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards
consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), ``Issuance of
Amendment.''
Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific Adoption of
Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk
Informed Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve
Completion Times (WCAP-15791)''
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated [DATE], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) proposed changes
to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. The requested
change is the adoption of NRC-approved Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, ``Risk Informed Evaluation of
Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (Topical Report WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2) RITSTF Initiative 4b,'' dated February 19, 2008
(Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.
ML080510164). TSTF Traveler-446 proposes a generic change to NUREG-
1431, Revision 3, ``Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse
Plants,'' issued June 2004, to implement containment isolation valve
(CIV) completion time changes associated with the implementation of
Topical Report (TR) WCAP-15791, Revision 1, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation
of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' dated
April 30, 2004. When implemented, the traveler would extend the CIV
completion times for TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3,
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice
Condenser, and Dual),'' from 4 hours up to 168 hours (7 days). (For
isolation valves that cannot demonstrate acceptable results for 168
hours, shorter times are considered and evaluated).
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
In Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.36, ``Technical Specifications,'' the NRC established its regulatory
requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS
are required to include items in the following five specific categories
related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system
settings, and limiting control settings, (2) LCOs, (3) surveillance
requirements, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls.
However, the regulation does not specify the particular TS to be
included in a plant's license. TSTF Traveler-446 is proposing changes
to the TS LCO that concern the Category 2 requirements. The LCOs are
the lowest functional capability, or performance levels, of equipment
required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO of a nuclear
reactor is not met, the licensee shall follow any remedial actions
permitted by the TS until the condition can be met or shall shut down
the reactor.
Furthermore, the completion times specified in the TS must be based
on the reasonable protection of public health and safety. As set forth
in 10 CFR 50.36, a licensee's TS must establish the LCOs that are the
lowest functional capability, or performance levels, of equipment
required for safe operation of the facility. This requirement includes
completion times for structures, systems, and components (SSCs), such
as CIVs. These completion times allow a certain amount of time in which
to correct a condition that does not meet the LCO before the reactor
must be brought to a condition that exits the mode of applicability, in
most cases resulting in the reactor being shut down.
The Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, ``Requirements for Monitoring
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' requires
licensees to monitor the performance, or condition, of SSCs against
licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance that SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.
The implementation and monitoring program guidance in Section 2.3 of
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the
Licensing Basis,'' and Section 3 of RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-
Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,''
states that monitoring performed in conformance with the Maintenance
Rule can be used when such monitoring is sufficient for the SSCs
affected by the risk-informed application. In addition, 10 CFR
50.65(a)(4), as it relates to the proposed extension of CIV completion
times, requires the assessment and management of the increase in risk
that may result from the proposed maintenance activity.
The CIVs help ensure that adequate primary containment boundaries
are maintained during and after accidents by minimizing potential
pathways to the environment and help ensure that the primary
containment function assumed in the safety analysis is maintained. The
following general design criteria (GDC) apply to this change and
establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and
performance requirements for SSCs important to safety, which provide
reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue
risk to the health and safety of the public. [Pre-GDC (PGDC) facilities
not licensed under the GDC in Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' are licensed under similar
plant-specific design criteria, as described in the facility's
licensing-basis documents (such as updated final safety analysis
reports).]
GDC 54 (or PGDC), ``Piping Systems Penetrating
Containment,'' requires the following: Those piping systems that
penetrate primary containment be provided with leak detection,
isolation, and containment capabilities having redundancy, reliability,
and performance capabilities that reflect the importance to safety of
isolating these piping systems. Such piping systems shall be designed
with a capability to test periodically the operability of the isolation
valves and associated apparatus and to determine if valve leakage is
within acceptable limits.
GDC 55 (or PGDC), ``Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
Penetrating Containment,'' requires the following: Each line that is
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and that penetrates
primary reactor containment shall be provided with CIVs as follows,
unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions
for a
[[Page 47296]]
specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on
some other defined basis:
(1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed
isolation valve outside containment; or
(2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed
isolation valve outside containment; or
(3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment; or
(4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to
containment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic
isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides
greater safety.
Other appropriate requirements to minimize the probability or
consequences of an accidental rupture of these lines or of lines
connected to them shall be provided as necessary to assure adequate
safety. Determination of the appropriateness of these requirements,
such as higher quality in design, fabrication and testing, additional
provisions for inservice inspection, protection against more severe
natural phenomena, and additional isolation valves and containment,
shall include consideration of the population density, use
characteristics, and physical characteristics of the site environs.
GDC 56 (or PGDC), ``Primary Containment Isolation,''
requires the following:
Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and
penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with CIVs as
follows, unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation
provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are
acceptable on some other defined basis:
(1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed
isolation valve outside containment; or
(2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed
isolation valve outside containment; or
(3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment; or
(4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic
isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be
used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to
containment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic
isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides
greater safety.
GDC 57 (or PGDC), ``Closed System Isolation Valves,''
requires the following: Each line that penetrates the primary reactor
containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure
boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall
have at least one CIV which shall be either automatic, or locked
closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be
outside containment and located as close to the containment as
practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic
isolation valve.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the Proposed Changes
[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, would allow
extending CIV completion times specified in TS [LCO 3.6.3,
``Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice
Condenser, and Dual)'']. TR WCAP-15791-P-A, Revision 2, referenced in
TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, describes a method to revise the
completion time for specific conditions in TS LCO 3.6.3. The NRC staff
reviewed, the risk impact, using the three-tiered approach referenced
in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 associated with the proposed TS changes. The
first tier evaluates the probabilistic risk assessment and the impact
of the proposed extension of completion times for CIVs on plant
operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude
potentially high-risk plant equipment outage configurations by
identifying the need for additional controls or compensatory actions to
be implemented during the time a CIV is unavailable because of
maintenance. The third tier evaluates the licensee's overall
configuration risk management program and confirms that risk insights
are incorporated into the decisionmaking process before equipment is
taken out of service before or during CIV maintenance.
The NRC staff determined that the risk analysis methodology and
approach used by TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, to estimate the risk
impact was reasonable. The NRC staff stated that the risk impact of the
proposed extended completion times for CIVs, as estimated by the change
in CDF, the change in LERF, the ICCDP, and the ICLERP, is consistent
with the acceptance guidelines specified in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 and
the associated NRC guidance outlined in Sections 16.1, 19.1, and 19.2
of NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis
Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.'' CIV configurations, completion
times, or nonbounding risk analysis parameters not evaluated by TR
WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, require additional justification of the
specific penetrations for the proposed CIV completion times.
The NRC staff also noted that Tier 2, as presented in TR WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2, did not identify generic Tier 2 risk-
significant configurations as a result of the proposed CIV completion
times. In its review of TR WCAP-15791, the NRC staff identified TS and
analysis bases that allow only one CIV to be in maintenance with an
extended completion time at any given time. In addition, before
maintenance or corrective maintenance is performed, other CIVs in the
penetration flow path shall be checked for proper position. The NRC
staff's safety evaluation (SE), (ADAMS Accession No ML080170680) also
noted that, for licensees adopting TR WCAP-15791, a plant-specific Tier
2 evaluation should be performed to confirm the conclusions of the
subject WCAP concerning Tier 2 remaining applicable to the licensee's
plant.
TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, did not address Tier 3, and
therefore the NRC SE concluded that licensees adopting the subject TR
would need to include an evaluation with respect to Tier 3 in their
plant-specific application in accordance with the principles in RG
1.177.
The NRC-approved TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2, for referencing in
license applications to the extent specified and under the limitations
and conditions stated in the TR and Section 4.0 of the NRC SE. In
addition, per the SE, applications referencing TR WCAP-15791 must
address items specified in Section 3.4, ``Regulatory Commitments,'' and
Section 5.0, ``Additional Information Needed'' of the SE.
The licensee's plant-specific application requesting adoption of
TSTF Traveler-446 evaluated the conditions, limitations, and additional
information needed that are referenced in the Sections 3.4, 4.0, and
5.0 of the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791-NP-A, Revision 2. In its application
dated [DATE], the licensee provided supporting information for each of
the conditions, limitations, and additional information
[[Page 47297]]
needed that are referenced in the NRC SE. The licensee's supporting
information for each condition and limitation, as well as for the
additional information needed, met the NRC staff's expectations and
acceptance criteria [with the following exceptions: List any exceptions
to the conditions and limitations or additional information required,
as stated in the licensee's submittal, and include the NRC staff's
evaluation and conclusions].
Technical Assessment for the Proposed Changes:
[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 would make
changes to the TS [LCO 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves
(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual),''] as follows:
TSTF Traveler-446 revises [LCO 3.6.3], which states ``Each
containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE,'' to read ``Each
containment isolation valve (CIV) shall be OPERABLE.'' Adding the
abbreviation ``(CIV)'' to the LCO statement is editorial in nature and
does not change the LCO requirement; therefore, this change is
acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the Condition A NOTE, which
states ``Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two [or more]
containment isolation valves.'' The existing Condition C, which is
applicable to penetration flow paths with only one CIV and a closed
system, is being deleted and replaced by a new Condition B. The new
Condition B, along with the revised Condition A, accounts for all of
the CIVs covered under existing Condition C; therefore, the Condition A
NOTE is no longer required. Revised Condition A and new Condition B
apply to all penetration flow paths with at least one CIV. This is
consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is therefore
acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 revises Condition A's applicability from
``[for reasons other than Condition[s] D [and E]]'' to ``[for reasons
other than Condition[s] E [and F]].'' This change is required by the
addition of new Conditions B and D, which results in renumbering the
conditions that follow Condition D. This change is editorial and does
not result in a technical change; therefore, it is acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new requirement to Condition A,
which states ``Containment isolation valve pressure boundary intact.''
This is required to meet the entry condition for Condition A. This
requirement is necessary, along with the addition of new Condition B,
which is applicable when the CIV pressure boundary is not intact,
because existing Condition C is being deleted. Existing Condition C is
applicable to penetration flow paths with only one CIV and a closed
system. In addition, revised Condition A and new Condition B are
applicable to all conditions in which a CIV may be INOPERABLE. Revised
Condition A, along with new Condition B, encompasses existing Condition
C and is consistent with the NRC's SE for WCAP-15791; therefore, it is
acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 revises the existing 4-hour completion
time for Condition A to completion times that range from 4 hours up to
7 days, depending upon the category of the applicable CIV (Category 1
through 7). This change has been evaluated and documented in the NRC SE
of TR WCAP-15791. This change proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 is
consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is therefore
acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new Condition B, which states
``One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation
valve inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]] AND
containment isolation valve pressure boundary not intact.'' This new
condition, in conjunction with revised Condition A, accounts for all
situations where one or more CIVs become or are made inoperable. The
new Condition B required actions and completion times are the same as
those in the revised Condition A, with the exception of the Condition B
category of valves. Condition A completion times apply to Category 1
through 7 valves and Condition B completion times apply to Category 8
through 14 valves. The addition of new Condition B has been evaluated
and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791. This change proposed by
TSTF Traveler-446 is consistent with the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791 and is
therefore acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 renames existing Condition B and
Required Action B.1 as Condition C and Required Action C.1. In
addition, existing Condition B wording, which states ``[for reasons
other than Condition[s] D [and E]]'' is changed to ``[for reasons other
than Condition[s] E [and F]].'' These changes are editorial in nature,
are caused by adding conditions proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 that have
been evaluated and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791, and are
therefore acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the existing Condition C and
Required Actions C.1 and C.2, which are applicable to penetration flow
paths with only one CIV and a closed system. The existing Condition C
entry condition is ``One or more penetration flow paths with one
containment isolation valve inoperable.'' With revised Condition A and
the addition of Condition B, this covers all CIVs that would have been
applicable to existing Condition C. The required actions for revised
Condition A and new Condition B are identical to the existing Condition
C. The completion times for revised Condition A and new Condition B are
changed from the existing Condition C time of 72 hours and have been
evaluated and documented in the NRC SE of TR WCAP-15791. The deletion
of existing Condition C is consistent with WCAP-15791, is accounted for
by the revision to Condition A, and the addition of new Condition B,
and is therefore acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new Condition D, which states
``Two or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation
valve inoperable [for reasons other than Condition[s] E [and F]].''
This condition requires isolating all but one of the affected
penetrations within 4 hours (the existing completion time for Condition
A). Once this completion time is satisfied, and since revised Condition
A and new Condition B will still be applicable, this essentially limits
the completion times in Condition A and B to a single penetration. This
added requirement enforces the basis of WCAP-15791 that only one CIV
should be in maintenance at a time. This change addresses Section 4.0,
``Limitations and Conditions,'' items 1 and 2, in the NRC SE of TR
WCAP-15791 and is therefore acceptable.
TSTF Traveler-446 renames Conditions D, E, and F, along
with Required Actions D.1, E.1, E.2, E.3, F.1, and F.2, as Conditions
E, F, and G, along with Required Actions E.1, F.1, F.2, F.3, G.1, and
G.2. With the addition of new Conditions B and D, and the deletion of
current Condition C, the remaining conditions and required actions need
to be renumbered. This change is editorial, results in no technical
change, and is therefore acceptable.
4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The NRC staff has reviewed the [LICENSEE] proposed adoption of TSTF
Traveler-446, Revision 3, to modify the TS requirements for allowed
outage times for CIVs associated with the implementation of TR WCAP-
15791-NP-A, Revision 2. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes for
consistency with the current NUREG-1431 and found them to be
consistent.
The NRC staff has concluded, on the basis of the considerations
discussed
[[Page 47298]]
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or
to the health and safety of the public.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with
subsequent disposition by the NRC staff].
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the
installation or use of a facility component located within the
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, ``Standards for
Protection Against Radiation.'' The NRC staff has determined that the
amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no
significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released
offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no
significant hazards considerations, and there has been no public
comment on the finding [FR]. Accordingly, the amendment meets the
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection
with the issuance of the amendments.
7.0 REFERENCES
1. ``Forwarding of TSTFs,'' dated October 21, 2002 (ADAMS Package
Accession No. ML022960409).
2. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 1, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated January 31, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML050460293).
3. WCAP-15791, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions
to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times,'' (ADAMS Package
Accession No. ML071550223).
4. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 2, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated January 11, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070110620).
5. ``TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, `Risk-Informed Evaluation of
Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion Times (WCAP-
15791),' '' dated February 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080510164).
6. NUREG-1431, ``Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse
Plants,'' Revision 3, June 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041830612).
7. Nuclear Energy Institute 99-04, Revision 0, ``Guidelines for
Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' July 1999 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003680088).
8. Final Safety Evaluation (SE) of Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG)
Topical Report (TR) WCAP-15791-P, Revision 2, ``Risk-Informed
Evaluation of Extensions to Containment Isolation Valve Completion
Times,'' dated February 13, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080170680).
[FR Doc. E9-22182 Filed 9-14-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P