[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 125 (Wednesday, July 1, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31420-31424]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15534]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Finding of No Significant Impact: Disposition of DOE Excess 
Depleted Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Finding of No Significant Impact.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, the Department) has 
completed an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Disposition of DOE 
Excess Depleted Uranium (DU), Natural Uranium (NU), and Low-Enriched 
Uranium (LEU) (DOE/EA-1607). Based on the analysis in the EA, the 
Department has determined that the proposed action, DOE dispositioning 
its excess uranium inventory using one or a combination of two 
methods--(1) enrichment to either NU or LEU product and subsequent 
storage or sale of the resultant NU or LEU product (Enrichment 
Alternative), and (2) direct sale to appropriately licensed entities 
(Direct Sale Alternative)--does not constitute a major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the 
context of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 
Therefore, the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
is not required and the Department is issuing this Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI).

ADDRESSES: Single copies of the EA and FONSI may be obtained from:

Mr. Ronald Hagen, NEPA Document Manager, NE-6, Forrestal Building, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 
20585-0113, Phone: (202) 586-1381, Facsimile: (202) 287-3701, 
Electronic mail: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Ronald Hagen, Phone: (202) 586-1381, Electronic mail: 
[email protected].
For information on DOE's NEPA process:
Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, NEPA Policy and Compliance, GC-20, 
Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-0113, Phone: (202) 586-4600, 
Facsimile: (202) 586-7031.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background: DOE owns and manages an 
inventory of excess DU, NU, and LEU. This inventory is currently stored 
in large cylinders as depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6), 
natural uranium hexafluoride (NUF6), and low-enriched 
uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) at the DOE Paducah site in 
western Kentucky (DOE Paducah) and the DOE Portsmouth site near Piketon 
in south-central Ohio (DOE Portsmouth). This inventory exceeds DOE's 
current and projected energy and defense program needs. The Secretary 
of Energy policy statement on the management of DOE excess uranium 
inventory issued on March 11, 2008, commits DOE to managing all of its 
excess uranium inventory in a manner that (1) is consistent with all 
applicable legal requirements; (2) maintains sufficient uranium 
inventory at all times to meet the current and reasonably foreseeable 
needs of Departmental missions; (3) undertakes transactions involving 
non-U.S. Government entities in a transparent and competitive manner, 
unless the Secretary determines in writing that overriding Departmental 
mission needs dictate otherwise; and (4) is consistent with and 
supportive of the maintenance of a strong domestic nuclear industry.
    In conformance with the requirements of the Council on 
Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA 
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021), the Department prepared a 
draft EA which was issued for public review on December 24, 2008. 
Comments were received from potentially affected states, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and uranium industry organizations. The draft EA 
was revised in response to the comments, as appropriate.
    Alternatives and Environmental Impacts: The potential environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed disposition of excess uranium 
inventory were analyzed for the following alternatives:
    No Action Alternative: DOE would continue with existing plans to 
convert DU to a more stable chemical form at the two new conversion 
facilities and would not enrich or sell any of its excess DU inventory 
as proposed in this EA. DOE would also continue to store excess NU and 
LEU in their current configurations at Portsmouth and Paducah.
    Alternative 1--Enrichment: DOE would contract for enrichment of 
excess DU, NU, and LEU and subsequent storage or sale of the resultant 
NU or LEU product. DOE would ship by commercial carriers (truck, rail, 
barge, and/or ship) excess DU, NU, and LEU to one or more of four 
enrichment facilities (three domestic and one foreign). LEU product 
could be stored at up to three U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabrication 
facilities in North Carolina, South Carolina, and/or Washington State, 
and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. NU product could be stored 
at enrichment facilities in Kentucky, New Mexico, and/or Ohio, and/or 
at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. DOE would contract with the 
enrichment facility to store and/or dispose of the DU tails or, in the 
case of domestic enrichment facilities, to ship the DU tails to DOE 
Paducah and/or DOE Portsmouth for storage.
    Alternative 2--Direct Sale: DOE would introduce excess DU, NU, and 
LEU into the commercial market through direct sales to appropriately 
licensed entities. The licensed purchasers would take delivery, 
transport and enrich the excess inventory, and transport and store the 
NU or LEU product in essentially the same manner and using essentially 
the same facilities as would DOE under the Enrichment Alternative.
    The potential environmental impacts of all aspects of enrichment 
operations and the conversion of DU tails have been previously analyzed 
in existing NEPA documents and have been summarized and incorporated by 
reference in the EA. In addition, the EA analyzed (1) previously 
unanalyzed impacts on health and safety from transportation of the 
excess inventory, LEU product, NU, and DU tails, (2)

[[Page 31421]]

impacts associated with accidents and intentional destructive acts 
(terrorism, sabotage), and (3) economic impacts of the proposed action 
on the domestic uranium industry. In general, the impacts identified 
for the Enrichment and Direct Sale Alternatives are similar if not 
identical. The attached Summary of the EA provides a summarization of 
the alternatives and the impacts.
    Mitigation: The Mitigation Action Plan (MAP), which follows this 
determination and is an integral part of this FONSI, specifies the 
analyses the Department would undertake prior to sales and transfers of 
excess NU, DU, and LEU and commits the Department to implement 
appropriate mitigation measures to avoid or minimize any potentially 
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry.
    Conclusion: The potential environmental impacts of the proposed 
action have been analyzed in the EA. The analysis shows that no 
significant impacts are likely to occur as a result of the Department 
undertaking the proposed action. Further, no adverse impacts on the 
uranium industry are expected as the Department has committed to 
conduct analysis prior to each transaction and to take appropriate 
action to mitigate any adverse impacts on the uranium industry.
    Determination: Based on the analysis in the subject EA and the 
commitments in the Mitigation Action Plan outlined below, the 
Department has determined that the proposed disposition of the excess 
uranium inventory of DU, NU, and LEU using one or a combination of two 
methods--(1) enriching it and then storing or selling the resultant 
product, and/or (2) selling excess DU, NU, and LEU inventory to 
appropriately licensed entities--would not have significant 
environmental impacts, including impacts on the domestic uranium 
mining, conversion or enrichment industry (domestic uranium industry) 
and is not a major Federal action that would significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment within the context of NEPA. Therefore, 
the preparation of an EIS is not required.

Mitigation Action Plan for the Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted 
Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium

    Purpose: This Mitigation Action Plan will be implemented by DOE to 
mitigate any potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium 
industry from DOE's decision to disposition the excess NU, DU, and LEU 
inventory at DOE's Paducah and Portsmouth sites by enriching it, and 
then storing or selling the resultant product, and/or selling excess 
NU, DU, and LEU inventory to appropriately licensed entities, as 
analyzed in the Environmental Assessment for the Disposition of DOE 
Excess Depleted Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium.
    Mitigation Action Plan: The DOE NEPA requirements governing 
mitigation action plans are set forth at 10 CFR 1021.331. This 
regulation specifies at 10 CFR 1021.331(b) that, in cases where an EA 
supports a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE shall also 
prepare a MAP for commitments to mitigation that are essential to 
render the impacts of the proposed action not significant. In such 
cases, the MAP must address all commitments to such necessary 
mitigations and explain how mitigation will be planned and implemented. 
The MAP must be prepared before the FONSI is issued, and referenced in 
the FONSI. In addition, the MAP must be as complete as possible, 
commensurate with the information available regarding the action to be 
covered by the FONSI, and may be revised as more specific and detailed 
information becomes available. 10 CFR 1021.331(c).
    This MAP addresses the DOE commitments that are necessary and how 
they will be planned or implemented to mitigate any potentially 
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from DOE's 
Proposed Action. In the EA, DOE identified two mitigation measures that 
underlie its analysis and would be utilized to mitigate any potentially 
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from its Proposed 
Action: (1) Prior to particular sales or transfers of NU and LEU, as 
applicable, a Secretarial Determination pursuant to section 3112(d) of 
the USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134) would be prepared to 
determine that there is no adverse material impact from the sale or 
transfer on the domestic uranium industry; and (2) prior to particular 
sales or transfers of DU, DOE would conduct an analysis to ensure there 
would be no potentially significant impacts from the sale or transfer 
on the domestic uranium industry (EA, Section 4.3.2).
    The first mitigation measure is required under the USEC 
Privatization Act for certain sales or transfers of NU and LEU and DOE 
would plan and implement that measure consistent with existing law \1\ 
and policy. That is, DOE would conduct a market impact analysis to 
determine the potential impacts of the proposed sale or transfer on the 
domestic uranium industry taking into account the sales of uranium 
under the Russian HEU Agreement and the Suspension Agreement, and other 
uranium sales or transfers by the DOE (including the National Nuclear 
Security Administration). Among other things, the market impact 
analysis would consider, as appropriate, current and projected uranium 
prices, enrichment capacity, uranium mining activities, and commercial 
contracting practices. Should the market impact analysis indicate 
adverse material impacts on the domestic uranium industry, the proposed 
sale or transfer would be adjusted as necessary to ensure that such 
adverse impacts are avoided or mitigated. The sale or transfer may be 
approved and implemented only if the Secretary determines that the sale 
or transfer would not have adverse material impacts on the domestic 
uranium industry.
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    \1\ Although DOE compliance with the requirements of section 
3112(d) of the USEC Privatization Act is included in this MAP as a 
mitigation measure, it should be noted that it is an integral 
element of the Proposed Action and, as such, need not be included or 
described in this MAP. However, it has been included herein to 
provide a comprehensive explanation of the actions that would be 
undertaken by DOE to mitigate any potentially significant impacts on 
the domestic uranium industry from the Proposed Action.
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    The second mitigation measure applies to DU and is not required 
under the USEC Privatization Act; however, as indicated in the EA, DOE 
would conduct an analysis prior to particular sales or transfers of DU 
to ensure there would be no potentially significant impacts to the 
domestic uranium industry. Conducting such an analysis would be 
consistent with DOE policies for uranium management as outlined in the 
Secretarial Policy Statement, and is a commitment DOE will undertake 
and include in this MAP in order to mitigate any potentially 
significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry from DOE's 
proposed sale or transfer of DU. The market impact analysis would be 
prepared prior to a particular sale or transfer, and would be similar 
in form and content to the market impact analysis that underlies a 
Secretarial Determination pursuant to the USEC Privatization Act. That 
is, DOE would conduct a market impact analysis to determine the 
potential impacts of the proposed sale or transfer on the domestic 
uranium industry, taking into account the sales of uranium under the 
Russian HEU Agreement and the Suspension Agreement, and other uranium 
sales or transfers by the DOE (including the National Nuclear Security 
Administration). Among other things, the market impact analysis would 
consider, as appropriate, current

[[Page 31422]]

and projected uranium prices, enrichment capacity, uranium mining 
activities, and commercial contracting practices. Should the market 
impact analysis indicate potentially significant impacts on the 
domestic uranium industry, the proposed sale or transfer would be 
adjusted as necessary to ensure that such potentially significant 
impacts are avoided or mitigated. The sale or transfer of DU may be 
approved and implemented only if the market impact analysis indicates 
that the sale or transfer would not result in potentially significant 
impacts on the domestic uranium industry.
    With these commitments in place, the Proposed Action would be 
implemented by DOE in a manner that would avoid or mitigate any 
potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium industry. This 
MAP may be revised in the future as more specific and detailed 
information becomes available.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 24, 2009.
R. Shane Johnson,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear Energy.

Final Environmental Assessment Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted 
Uranium, Natural Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium (DOE/EA-1607)

Summary

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owns and manages an inventory 
of depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NU), and low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) that is currently stored in large cylinders as depleted 
uranium hexafluoride (DUF6), natural uranium hexafluoride 
(NUF6), and low-enriched uranium hexafluoride 
(LEUF6) at the DOE Paducah site in western Kentucky (DOE 
Paducah) and the DOE Portsmouth site near Piketon in south-central Ohio 
(DOE Portsmouth)\2\. This inventory exceeds DOE's current and projected 
energy and defense program needs.
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    \2\ DOE also has additional uranium of varying levels of 
enrichment that, in the future, may be added to the excess DU, NU, 
and LEU inventory (e.g., uranium that could be recovered during 
facility decontamination and decommissioning [D&D]). In addition, 
the DOE uranium inventory includes quantities of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), which is being dispositioned through an ongoing 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) program and is not 
addressed in this EA.
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    On March 11, 2008, the Secretary of Energy issued a policy 
statement (the Secretarial Policy Statement) on the management of DOE's 
excess uranium inventory (Appendix A). The policy statement commits DOE 
to manage all of its excess uranium inventories in a manner that (1) is 
consistent with all applicable legal requirements; (2) maintains 
sufficient uranium inventories at all times to meet the current and 
reasonably foreseeable needs of Departmental missions; (3) undertakes 
transactions involving non-U.S. Government entities in a transparent 
and competitive manner, unless the Secretary of Energy determines in 
writing that overriding Departmental mission needs dictate otherwise; 
and (4) is consistent with and supportive of the maintenance of a 
strong domestic nuclear industry.
    In accordance with this policy, DOE proposes to disposition part of 
its excess uranium inventory using one or a combination of two methods: 
(1) Enrichment to either NU or LEU product, and subsequent storage or 
sale of the resultant NU or LEU product (the Enrichment Alternative), 
and (2) direct sale \3\ to appropriately licensed entities (the Direct 
Sale Alternative). Under the Enrichment Alternative, DOE could enrich 
DU to the \235\U content of NU (i.e., 0.711 percent \235\U), and DOE 
could enrich DU, NU, and/or LEU (with a current \235\U content of less 
than 4.95 percent) up to 4.95 percent \235\U content. This 
environmental assessment (EA) assumes that the Proposed Action would 
result in the annual enrichment and/or sale of amounts of the excess 
inventory that, combined with other DOE sales or transfers to the 
market, generally would not exceed 10 percent of the total annual fuel 
requirements of all licensed U.S. nuclear power plants--that is, 
approximately 2,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). In some years, the 
annual amount enriched and/or sold could be greater than 2,000 MTU (for 
example, due to startup of new reactors, which requires approximately 
two times the amount of natural uranium needed for subsequent routine 
re-loads).
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    \3\ In this EA, the term ``sale'' includes direct sales, 
transfers, or other transactions the Department may undertake to 
disposition its excess uranium inventory.
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    As mentioned previously, the excess inventory that DOE currently 
proposes to disposition is stored as UF6 at the DOE 
Portsmouth site in Ohio and the DOE Paducah site in Kentucky. DOE also 
anticipates the potential identification of additional amounts of LEU 
with a \235\U content of less than 4.95 percent. Under the Enrichment 
Alternative, the uranium could be transported by truck or rail to one 
or more of three enrichment facilities in the United States or to a 
foreign enrichment facility. A facility in France is identified as a 
representative foreign facility for the purposes of assessing potential 
impacts. Shipments to France could be via any of several east-coast or 
gulf-coast U.S. ports; however, this EA assumes, for purposes of 
analysis, that the uranium would be transported by barge to New 
Orleans, Louisiana, then by ship to France. The LEU product could be 
stored at up to three U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabrication 
facilities (FFFs) in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Washington 
State, and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. When DU is enriched 
to NU, it would be stored at enrichment facilities in Kentucky, New 
Mexico, and/or Ohio, and/or at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah sites. The 
DU that would result from the enrichment process, called ``DU tails'', 
would be stored and managed at the enrichment facility or be 
transported to and stored and managed at DOE's Portsmouth or Paducah 
sites.
    In this EA, DOE assesses the potential environmental impacts 
associated with this Proposed Action and a No Action Alternative. The 
potential impacts of all aspects of enrichment operations and the 
conversion of DU tails, per se, have been previously addressed in 
existing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents. This EA 
focuses on previously unanalyzed impacts: (1) Health and safety impacts 
from transportation of the excess inventory, LEU product, NU, and DU 
tails; (2) impacts associated with accidents and intentional 
destructive acts (terrorism, sabotage); and (3) economic impacts of the 
Proposed Action on the domestic uranium industry.
    In general, the impacts identified for the Enrichment and Direct 
Sale Alternatives are similar if not identical. The potential impacts 
are summarized as follows:
     For all truck, rail, and barge transport options, for all 
domestic and foreign enrichment facility locations, and for all storage 
options, transportation of the entire inventory of DU, NU, and LEU 
subject to this EA is estimated to result in up to 3 transportation-
related fatalities \4\ over approximately 25 years \5\. For overseas 
transportation, this includes impacts from sea transit, U.S. port 
operations, and overland transport. These transportation impacts 
include the

[[Page 31423]]

radiological and nonradiological impacts from incident-free 
transportation and transportation accidents. The range in impacts 
presented in this EA is primarily due to differences in the amounts of 
materials that would be shipped for each case analyzed and differences 
in the distances over which the materials would be shipped.
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    \4\ For perspective, over the period 2002 to 2006, about 43,000 
people were killed each year in motor vehicle accidents and about 
900 people were killed each year in railroad accidents and incidents 
in the United States (DOT 2007).
    \5\ Because the actual annual amounts of excess inventory 
enriched would likely be less than the maximum annual amount, and 
because it would probably change from year to year, DOE is not 
limiting the Proposed Action to a particular number of years. 
However, for purposes of modeling the impacts of processing the 
entire inventory, 25 years is used.
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     For enrichment at the National Enrichment Facility (NEF) 
near Eunice, New Mexico, the truck or rail transportation impacts would 
be higher than for enrichment at Paducah, Kentucky, or Portsmouth, 
Ohio, because the NU, LEU, or DU feed would be shipped greater 
distances; the DU tails and NU product, could be stored/dispositioned 
by NEF, or could be shipped back to Paducah or Portsmouth.
     The probability of a latent cancer fatality (LCF) for the 
maximally exposed individual (MEI) along the truck transportation 
routes was estimated to range from 8.3 x 10-\8\ to 5.3 x 
10-\7\ over 25 years. For the analysis, the MEI was located 
30 meters from the highway and was exposed to all truck shipments. The 
shipments are assumed to travel at a speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles) 
per hour, which is representative of speeds in urban areas.
     The probability of an LCF for the MEI along the rail 
transportation routes was almost identical to truck transport, ranging 
from 8.2 x 10-\8\ to 5.2 x 10-\7\ over 25 years. 
For the analysis, the MEI was located 30 meters from the railroad and 
was exposed to all rail shipments. The shipments are assumed to travel 
at a speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles) per hour, which is 
representative of speeds in urban areas.
     The transportation-related impacts of transporting the 
uranium to New Orleans by barge would be less than the impacts of 
transporting the uranium there by truck or rail due to the fewer number 
of required shipments and the fact that the exposed population would be 
smaller for barge transport.
     Severe rail accidents would have higher consequences than 
truck accidents because each railcar would carry four cylinders of DU, 
NU, or LEU (feed), compared with only one for each truck. For LEU 
product, each railcar would carry 12 cylinders, compared with 3 to 5 
for each truck.
     DOE estimated that the radiological risks of 
transportation accidents for truck shipments (probability of occurrence 
x consequence summed over a complete spectrum of accidents, including 
the severe accidents discussed below) ranged from 0.042 to 0.96 LCFs 
over 25 years.
     DOE also estimated the consequences of severe truck 
accidents. For a severe truck accident involving one cylinder of 
depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6), the population 
radiation dose could be as high as 32,000 person-rem in an urban area 
if stable atmospheric conditions existed at the time of the accident. 
Based on this population radiation dose, it was estimated that there 
could be 20 LCFs in the assumed exposed population of about 3 million 
people. The radiation dose for the MEI was estimated to be as high as 
0.91 rem and the probability of an LCF for this individual was 
estimated to be 0.0005. The probability of this accident ranged from 
8.1 x 10-\4\ to 0.016 over 25 years.
    If the severe transportation accident involved NU feed or product, 
the radiological consequences would be higher--about 28 LCFs in the 
assumed exposed population. For the MEI, the probability of an LCF 
would be 8 x 10-\4\. The probability of this accident ranged 
from 1.5 x 10-\4\ to 0.0055 over 25 years for those cases 
where NU is shipped. However, for several cases, NU would not be 
shipped and the probability of this accident would be zero.
    If the severe transportation accident involved LEU product, the 
radiological consequences would range from about 75 to 125 LCFs in the 
assumed exposed population, assuming that all three or five 30B 
cylinders, respectively, in a truck shipment were breached during the 
severe accident. For the MEI, the probability of an LCF would be 0.002 
or 0.0036 if three or five 30B cylinders, respectively, were breached 
during the severe accident. If three 30B cylinders were involved in the 
accident, the probability of the accident would range from 2.2 x 
10-\4\ to 9 x 10-\4\ over 25 years for those 
cases where LEU is shipped. If five 30B cylinders were involved in the 
accident, the probability would range from 1.3 x 10-\4\ to 
5.4 x 10-\4\ over 25 years for those cases were LEU is 
shipped. However, for several cases, LEU would not be shipped and the 
probability of this accident would be zero. In addition, the 
probability associated with this accident does not incorporate the 
effects of the protective overpack surrounding the 30B cylinders, which 
would reduce the probability of the accident to a range of 4.4 x 
10-\5\ to 1.8 x 10-\4\ over 25 years if three 30B 
cylinders were involved or a range of 2.7 x 10-\5\ to 1.1 x 
10-\4\ over 25 years if five 30B cylinders were involved
     DOE estimated that the radiological risks of 
transportation accidents for rail shipments (probability of occurrence 
x consequence summed over a complete spectrum of accidents, including 
the severe accidents discussed below) ranged from 0.051 to 0.97 LCFs 
over 25 years. The radiological risks for rail and truck transportation 
accidents are similar because the total number of cylinders shipped by 
rail and truck is the same.
     DOE also estimated the consequences of severe rail 
accidents. For a severe rail accident involving four cylinders of 
DUF6, the population radiation dose could be as high as 
130,000 person-rem in an urban area if stable atmospheric conditions 
existed at the time of the accident. Based on this population radiation 
dose, it was estimated that there could be 80 LCFs in the assumed 
exposed population of about 3 million people. Under this scenario, the 
radiation dose for the MEI was estimated to be as high as 3.7 rem, and 
the probability of an LCF for this individual was estimated to be 
0.002. The probability of this accident ranged from 2.4 x 
10-\4\ to 0.003 over 25 years.
    If the severe transportation accident involved NU feed or product, 
the radiological consequences would be higher--about 110 LCFs in the 
assumed exposed population and the probability of an LCF for the MEI 
would be 0.003. The probability of this accident ranged from 4.4 x 
10-\5\ to 0.0011 over 25 years for those cases where NU is 
shipped. However, for several cases, NU would not be shipped and the 
probability of this accident would be zero.
    If the severe transportation accident involved LEU product, the 
radiological consequences would be about 310 LCFs in the assumed 
exposed populations, assuming that all twelve 30B cylinders in a rail 
shipment were breached during the severe accident. For the MEI, the 
probability of an LCF would be 0.009. The probability of this accident 
ranged from 4.3 x 10-\5\ to 2.6 x 10-\4\ over 25 
years for those cases where LEU is shipped. However, for several cases, 
LEU would not be shipped and the probability of this accident would be 
zero. In addition, the probability associated with this accident does 
not incorporate the effects of the protective overpack surrounding the 
30B cylinders, which would reduce the probability of the accident to a 
range of 4.3 x 10-\6\ to 2.6 x 10-\5\ over 25 
years.
     For both the truck and rail severe transportation 
accidents, the accidents were assumed to take place in an urban area 
with a population density of 1,600 people per square kilometer. 
Potential consequences were estimated for the population within a 50-
mile (80-kilometer) radius, assuming that this population density 
extended out to 50

[[Page 31424]]

miles (80 kilometers). It is important to note that according to the 
2000 census, the average population density within 50 miles of the 
center of the 20 highest population urbanized areas in the United 
States is about 380 people per square kilometer, so the consequences 
would likely be lower if a severe truck or rail accident took place in 
an urban area. In addition, the severe accidents were assumed to take 
place during stable atmospheric conditions. As illustrated in Table 4-
13, if the accidents took place during neutral atmospheric conditions, 
the consequences would be substantially lower. For example, if the 
severe truck accident involving LEU product occurred during neutral 
atmospheric conditions, the consequences would range from 3 to 5 LCFs, 
substantially lower than 75 to 125 LCFs. If the severe rail accident 
involving LEU product occurred during neutral atmospheric conditions, 
the consequences would be about 12 LCFs, substantially lower than 310 
LCFs.
     Three individuals could suffer irreversible health effects 
from severe truck accidents and four individuals could suffer 
irreversible health effects from severe rail accidents due to the 
chemical toxicity associated with UF6, hydrogen fluoride 
(HF), and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). No fatalities 
are estimated to result from chemical exposure.
     Although it is not possible to predict the probability of 
an intentional destructive act, implementation of elements identified 
in the Department of Transportation-required security plan (personnel 
security, unauthorized access, and en route security) are judged to 
make these occurrences very unlikely. The consequences of such acts 
would be similar to the consequences discussed above for severe truck 
and rail accidents involving DU, NU, and LEU.
     If a severe accident involving stored LEU product were to 
occur, the accident would result in an estimated population dose. For 
example, at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF-A), a severe accident was 
estimated to result in a population dose of 29,000 person-rem. In the 
assumed exposed population around the GNF-A facility, this radiation 
dose is estimated to result in 17 LCFs. The radiation dose for an 
individual located 2 kilometers from the facility was estimated to be 5 
rem. The probability of an LCF for this person is estimated to be 
0.003. If this accident occurred at other sites, the results would vary 
depending on the amount of material involved in the accident; the 
enrichment of the UF6; the release fractions, aerosolized 
fractions, and respirable fractions; release assumptions such as 
whether the release was elevated or from ground level; the number of 
people exposed; atmospheric conditions; and radiation dosimetry 
assumptions.
     The potential market impacts (including socioeconomic 
impacts) on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment 
industries (i.e., domestic uranium industry) from direct sales or 
transfers of uranium under the Proposed Action are expected to be 
small. In any event, DOE has prepared a mitigation action plan (MAP) to 
mitigate any potentially significant impacts on the domestic uranium 
industry from DOE decisions to disposition the excess NU, DU, and LEU 
inventory at DOE's Paducah and Portsmouth sites as analyzed in this EA.
     Cumulative impacts under the Enrichment Alternative would 
essentially be the same as those previously evaluated for the sites 
involved because DOE's uranium inventory would not increase the sites' 
enrichment capacity or throughput. Under the Direct Sale Alternative, 
DOE assumes that actions by the purchasers would be essentially the 
same as DOE under the Enrichment Alternative. For that reason, DOE 
finds that the cumulative transportation, enrichment, and storage 
impacts of the Direct Sale Alternative would be essentially identical 
to those of the Enrichment Alternative. The cumulative impacts that 
would occur under the No Action Alternative assessed in this EA are the 
same as the cumulative impacts identified for the two new conversion 
facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth.

[FR Doc. E9-15534 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P