[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 94 (Monday, May 18, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23254-23286]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10947]
[[Page 23253]]
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Part II
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed
Rules
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
RIN 3150-AI10
[NRC-2008-0122]
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is
proposing to amend certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in
its regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and
utilization facilities. A conforming provision would also be added in
the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for
new nuclear power plants. The proposed amendments would codify certain
voluntary protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02,
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based
Events,'' and other generically applicable requirements similar to
those previously imposed by Commission orders. They would also amend
other licensee emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive
review of the NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The proposed
requirements would enhance the ability of licensees in preparing to
take and taking certain emergency preparedness and protective measures
in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part, security
issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001;
clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan implementation
among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to be more
effective and efficient.
DATES: Submit comments on the proposed rule by August 3, 2009. Submit
comments on the information collection aspects of this proposed rule by
June 17, 2009. Comments received after the above dates will be
considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration
cannot be given to comments received after these dates.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made
available for public inspection. Because your comments will not be
edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC
cautions you against including any information in your submission that
you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for documents filed under Docket ID [NRC-2008-0122]. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone (301) 492-
3668; e-mail [email protected].
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments,
contact us directly at (301) 415-1677.
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 492-3446.
You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public
File Area O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to
[email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Qui[ntilde]ones, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2007, e-mail
[email protected]; or Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security
and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2966, e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Proposed Rule
IV. Specific Request for Comments
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Plain Language
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP
programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued
adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications
were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026),
dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license
holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United
States. This order required licensees to implement interim compensatory
measures (ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and
take actions such as:
(1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility
between the plans;
(2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response
facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations
facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting
emergency response;
(3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification
(including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees),
activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response
organizations (OROs);
(4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties
are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency
response; and
(5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to
provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.
Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted
inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear
power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and
the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.
Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the
changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear
Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis
[[Page 23255]]
Adequacy in the Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22,
2003 (not publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission
that the EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing
issues. However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events
differ from accident events due to the planned action to maximize
damage and loss of life and that the EP response to such events also
differed. The NRC staff noted several EP issues that required further
action to better respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat
environment.
On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP
program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the
Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP
regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the
Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B,
``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m.,
Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White
Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
December 20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a
schedule of activities for the completion of the comprehensive review.
The NRC staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of
Emergency Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/
11 Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available),
requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for
enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11,
2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005
(not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide
the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance.
The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to
proceed with enhancements to EP issues as described in SECY-05-0010. As
a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated
July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that licensees could
integrate into EP programs at power reactors. BL-05-02 also sought to
obtain information from licensees on their actions taken to implement
Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP programs to adjust to the
current threat environment. Based on the results of the post BL-05-02
inspections, meetings with members of the nuclear power industry, and
licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC determined that licensees
were implementing strategies to satisfy Order EA-02-026 and enhance
their programs to address the changed threat environment.
As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff
conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure,
including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of
this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders
through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the
elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and
guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public
and other stakeholder meetings.
On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its
review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance''. In that paper, the
NRC staff discussed the activities it had conducted to complete the
review and provided its recommendation to pursue rulemaking for
enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff explained that the
comprehensive review of the EP program identified several areas where
the implementation of EP regulations and guidance, recent technological
advances, and lessons learned from actual events, drills, and exercises
had revealed to the NRC areas for potential improvement and increased
clarity for the EP program. The staff divided the potential
enhancements into two categories: hostile action-based EP issues and
other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and assigned it a
priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of the issue's
relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC strategic
goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.
The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and
analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority,
including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In
SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential
enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these
issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and
resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that
the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient
means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an
opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.
In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and
guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007,
the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission via a
memorandum. During the development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed
the issues identified in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of
conducting rulemaking and updating guidance on all issues. The staff
determined that the best course of action was to conduct rulemaking on
the 12 issues identified in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and
to reassess the remaining issues at a later date. The decision to
conduct rulemaking on the highest priority issues would allow a more
timely rulemaking effort to occur and would enable the staff to more
completely assess the remaining lower priority issues. Due to the
similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking plan as
``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,'' these
issues have been partially combined in this proposed rule. The NRC is
considering non-rulemaking options for some of the elements of shift
staffing and is also requesting stakeholder comments in Section V of
this document. Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency
Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May
2, 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North,
Rockville, Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006,
to coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop
emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills
and exercises were challenging and did not precondition participant
responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue
regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it
was so closely related.
In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that is transparent and open
to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through
various means during the development of this proposed rule. The NRC
discussed the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance
at several conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007
Regulatory Information Conference and the 2008 National Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Conference. These
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meetings are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.
The NRC posted draft rule language on the e-rulemaking Web site,
http://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited
stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the
draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule.
This is discussed further in Section IV of this document. The NRC
continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open
communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March
5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC
staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking
on enhancements to emergency preparedness regulations and guidance and
answered stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8,
2008 meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft
preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders' questions on how
these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.
II. Discussion
The proposed amendments would require 10 CFR Part 50 licensees that
are currently subject to the EP requirements, and applicants for
operating licenses under Part 50 or combined licenses under Part 52
that would be subject to the proposed EP requirements to ensure that
their EP programs meet the amended EP requirements. The proposed
amendments would similarly apply to applicants for construction permits
under Part 50 with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for
coping with emergencies (Sec. 50.34(a)(10)), and to applicants for
early site permits under Part 52 that choose to propose either major
features of an, or a complete and integrated, emergency plan (Sec.
52.17(b)(2)).
The 16 planning standards in Sec. 50.47(b) apply to both onsite
and offsite plans because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC
looks at the application (or the licensee's activities in the case of
existing facilities), the current State and local government emergency
plans, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
recommendation, which is based on the content of the State and local
plans. FEMA's regulations in 44 CFR Part 350 also contain these 16
planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on the
adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local governments
to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only offsite
(State and local government) plans. The changes that are proposed by
the NRC in this rulemaking are designed to affect the onsite plans, not
the offsite plans. The proposed changes have been written in a way that
is expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA
regulations.
An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating
event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident. EP
cannot affect the probability of the initiating event, but a high level
of EP increases the probability of accident mitigation if the
initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial operator actions.
As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is not normally
quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the level of EP
does affect the outcome of an accident in that the accident may be
mitigated by the actions of the ERO or in the worst case, consequences
to the public are reduced through the effective use of protective
actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this manner enhance
protection of public health and safety through improvements in the
response to unlikely initiating events that could lead to severe
accidents without mitigative response.
The discussion of the proposed amendments is divided into two
sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section II.B
for non-security-related EP issues. The security-related issues are
topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in Order
EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related issues
are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive review of
EP regulations and guidance.
A. Security-Related Issues
The NRC is proposing amendments to enhance its EP regulations by
clearly addressing EP actions for a hostile action event. Some of these
proposed changes are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was
issued to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety
and common defense and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026,
however, the Commission took several additional steps to ensure
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense
and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access
Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR
1643); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification
Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68
FR 24514); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,''
issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517); the Design Basis
Threat (DBT) final rule (March 19, 2007; 72 FR 12705); and the Power
Reactor Security Requirements final rule (March 27, 2009; 74 FR 13926).
As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission
has determined that the proposed EP changes that are based on the
requirements of Order EA-02-026 would no longer be necessary to ensure
adequate protection during a hostile action event. Therefore, because
the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate protection of the
public health and safety and common defense and security, the NRC has
determined that, in the current threat environment, the following
proposed amendments would not be necessary to ensure adequate
protection during a hostile action event. These amendments are
considered enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, these
enhancements would result in a substantial increase in emergency
preparedness and the protection of public health and safety.
1. On-Shift Multiple Responsibilities
The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned
to emergency plan implementation functions may have multiple
responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of their
assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift
responsibilities are addressed in Sec. 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV.A. Currently, these regulations do not
specifically require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan
implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from
performing their primary emergency plan tasks. NRC regulations and
guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some
flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to
emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate
completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event.
The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to
problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for
emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:
A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the
licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel
(communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and
perform numerous response actions
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required by the event resulted in a heavy workload for the shift staff.
A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another
plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event,
notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating
procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff
contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of
Unusual Event.
The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise
On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective
implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering
expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a
shift technical advisor (STA) on shift to provide engineering and
accident assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned
additional response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire
brigade member, which could result in overburdening the control room
staff during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as
fire brigade leader which could hinder the STA from performing the
primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering
expertise.
After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated
that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued.
The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift
staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results
of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several
observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could
be a large workload for radiological support personnel during
emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant
staffing practices for performing response activities during two
accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with
complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation
and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included
the following:
Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for
establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.
Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant-
specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by
licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.
Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed
personnel to staff the fire brigade.
Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and
non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed
operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.
Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the
licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.
Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for
regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to
on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee
revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and
assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As
previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to
provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC
determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate
reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in
effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec. 50.54(q). In
April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the
assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech) as the
interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented
ERO responder. The HP Tech had assigned emergency plan tasks including
in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid.
The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate
assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and
assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency
plan in violation of Sec. 50.54(q).
These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to
explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these
emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency
event. Assigning additional duties, such as fire brigade member could
result in on-shift responders being overburdened, resulting in
inadequate or untimely response.
The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff
responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient
number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan
and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some
licensees were utilizing security personnel to implement the emergency
plan when many of these responders would likely not be available due to
a hostile action.
The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One
option was to take no action, but this alternative would not subject
new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's requirement of
an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated security plan and
emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the shift staffing study
referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees surveyed did not use a
systematic process for establishing shift staffing levels and
additional tasks, not required by regulation, were assigned to the
licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice could result in
operators being overburdened during an emergency. A second option was
to allow licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift
staffing. However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to
reduce on-shift staffing levels and the NRC expects this practice to
continue. This could increase the risk of over-burdening on-shift
responders and result in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore,
both of these options were considered unacceptable. Instead, the NRC is
proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A. to address this
issue, as discussed in Section V of this document.
2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action Events
Section 50.47(b)(4) currently stipulates that emergency plans must
include a standard emergency classification and action level scheme.
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., currently specifies that emergency
plans shall include EALs that are to be used as criteria for
determining the need for notification of State and local agencies, and
participation of those agencies in emergency response. However, NRC
regulations do not require EALs for hostile action events and do not
address the issue of anticipatory response to hostile action events.
Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02 addressed these issues, those
improvements to the EAL requirements to address hostile action events
are only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC cannot ensure consistent
and effective implementation of these enhancements among existing and
future licensees.
Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least an Unusual
Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In 2005, the NRC
issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples for hostile
action events up to the General Emergency level. BL-05-02 provided
examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be
implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
[[Page 23258]]
Power Plants,'' NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of
Emergency Action Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01,
``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also
pointed out that because of improvements in Federal agencies'
information-sharing and assessment capabilities, hostile action
emergency declarations can be accomplished in a more anticipatory
manner, based on a credible threat, than the current method of making
declarations for accidental events. This would enable earlier
implementation of emergency response actions.
Although all licensees have implemented both the credible threat
EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL enhancements specified in
BL-05-02, there is no requirement to maintain the enhancements
identified in the bulletin. This could result in inconsistent EAL
implementation among licensees for response to hostile action events.
Also, future licensees would not be required to include these
enhancements in their emergency plans. This rulemaking would serve to
establish consistent EALs across the nuclear power industry for hostile
action events. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided enhancements to EAL
schemes which would allow event declarations to be accomplished in a
more anticipatory manner. This is of the utmost importance because EALs
are used as criteria for determining the need for notification and
participation of State and local agencies. The NRC believes that these
enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile action events
should be codified by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., as
discussed in Section V of this document.
The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these
issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by
licensees. These options were rejected since there would continue to be
no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to
incorporate EALs for hostile action events in their emergency plans,
nor would there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that
the NRC had determined to be adequate.
3. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation and Alternative
Facilities
Currently, Sec. 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.
require licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff
within a short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to
assist in mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members
typically staff an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) which relieves
the Control Room (CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff
to focus on reactor safety. ERO members also staff an onsite
Operational Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage
repair teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in
close proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation
and coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal
point of information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities
involved in the response.
However, the regulations at Sec. 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix
E, Section IV.E. do not require licensees to identify alternative
facilities to support ERO augmentation during hostile action events.
During a hostile action event, ERO members would likely not have access
to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if it is
located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless these
events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can travel
quickly to the site.
Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of
staffing plans at emergency response facilities during a hostile action
event, assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify
alternative facilities capable of supporting event response. These
facilities would function as staging areas for augmentation staff until
the site was secured, which would minimize delays in overall site
response by permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the
danger of hostile action. NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness
of the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the
identification and staffing of alternative emergency response
facilities.
BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite emergency
response facilities support EP functions during a hostile action event.
It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner that
supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the
potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that
some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during a
hostile action event until the site was secured. However, the NRC
considers it prudent to fully activate ERO members for off-normal
working hour hostile action events to promptly staff alternative
facilities, in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Even
during normal working hours, licensees should consider deployment of
onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility near the site during a
hostile action event.
To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory
action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as
a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue
Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute
Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile
Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action were taken, there would
continue to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding the actions
necessary during hostile action events for the ERO to staff an
alternative facility. ERO members would likely not have access to the
site during a hostile action event, but timely augmentation would still
be necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may
result in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines,
and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using
a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those
developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, do not provide
a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed enhancements for
hostile action events. The use of voluntary programs does not ensure
long-term continuity of the enhancements for both licensees and
applicants. Thus, the NRC believes that the ICM requirement and the
enhancement examples described in BL-05-02 concerning ERO augmentation
to alternative facilities during hostile action events should be
codified in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E. to maximize the
effectiveness of the site response. These proposed changes are
discussed in Section V of this document.
4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During
Hostile Action Events
The NRC believes that a unique challenge posed by a hostile action
event at a nuclear power plant is the increased demand on local law
enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that are expected to implement portions of
ORO emergency plans, as well as respond to the plant. Currently, Sec.
50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to Part 50 do not explicitly require
licensees to coordinate with OROs to ensure that personnel are
available to carry out preplanned actions, such as traffic control and
route alerting by LLEAs, during a hostile action event directed at the
plant.
Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency
response as well as demonstrate that various ORO
[[Page 23259]]
capabilities exist through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and
OROs have successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years.
However, the NRC recognized that hostile action events may challenge
OROs in ways unforeseen at the time the current regulations were
developed. For example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned
both evacuation plan and armed response duties during a hostile action
event. The NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-
026 and included provisions that licensees address coordination with
OROs for hostile action events. Specifically, the order required that
licensees develop plans, procedures, and training regarding
coordination between the site and OROs and directed licensees to review
emergency plans to ensure sufficient numbers of personnel would be
available in a hostile action event.
The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and
communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during a
hostile action event. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and
OROs through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,''
dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based
on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF)
exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills
conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005.
In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that
conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every
nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource
planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile
action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the
NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees
concerning effective coordination with OROs to ensure that adequate
resources are available to respond to a hostile action event at a
nuclear power plant.
Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to
respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the
licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered
encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program;
however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved
means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11,
2001, threat environment. The NRC believes that a voluntary approach
would not ensure consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM
requirements and there would be no requirement for new licensees to
incorporate the changes into their emergency plans.
The NRC is proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7.
to require licensees to ensure that ORO personnel assigned emergency
plan implementation duties would be available to do so during hostile
action events. These proposed changes are discussed in Section V of
this document.
5. Protection for Onsite Personnel
NRC regulations at Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 do
not currently require specific emergency plan provisions to protect
onsite emergency responders, and other onsite personnel, in emergencies
resulting from hostile action events at nuclear power plants. Licensees
are required to provide radiological protection for emergency workers
and the public in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone
(EPZ), including actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for
evacuation and accountability of individuals, and providing for
protective clothing and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these
personnel are required by the site emergency plan that the licensee
must follow and maintain. The emergency plan requires responders with
specific assignments to be available on-shift 24 hours a day to
minimize the impact of radiological emergencies and provide for the
protection of public health and safety. However, in analyses performed
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff
determined that a lack of protection for emergency responders who are
expected to implement the emergency plan could result in the loss of
those responders and thus an inability to effectively implement the
emergency plan.
The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site
evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite
emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance
because these actions may place at risk the response personnel
necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action.
BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those normally
prescribed may be more appropriate during a hostile action,
particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as
evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and
accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise
actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the
location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures
would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely
and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.
The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue.
The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying
upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being
implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. The NRC believes that
taking no action could result in the vulnerability of onsite personnel
during a hostile action event. Action is necessary to ensure effective
coordination to enable licensees to more effectively implement their
pre-planned actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent,
NRC-approved means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the
implementation of voluntary actions does not ensure that these measures
would be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.
The NRC is proposing to revise Appendix E by creating a new Section
IV.I. to address this issue, as discussed in Section V of this
document.
6. Challenging Drills and Exercises
A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises
to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise
programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance
that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health
and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency.
Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance
of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear
plant site.
In the unlikely event that a licensee faces a hostile action event,
the response organization will encounter challenges that differ
significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise
programs because these programs have not included hostile action event
scenarios. The NRC regulations addressing this issue are general in
nature and do not explicitly require licensees to include hostile
action event scenarios in drills and exercises, nor do they directly
allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC believes
that its regulations should be revised to do so.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted
[[Page 23260]]
a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed threat
environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains valid. The
NRC observed licensee performance during hostile-action EP tabletop
drills at four sites, a drill at one site, and an exercise at one site,
as well as several security FOF exercise evaluations. The NRC also
discussed security-based EP issues with licensees and Federal, State,
and local EP professionals and advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to
collect information from licensees on the enhancements to drill and
exercise programs to address the hostile action contingency.
Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that although EP measures
are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile
action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO
drills and exercises, such as:
Extensive coordination between operations, security, and
EP;
Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for
activation of the ERO;
Execution of initial response actions in a hostile
environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);
The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or
aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during
radiological emergencies;
Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site
conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security
measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;
Conduct of operations and repair activities with large
areas of the plant damaged or on fire;
Rescue of and medical attention to significant numbers of
personnel; and
Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to
secure access to plant areas for repairs.
In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear plant licensees stated that
they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise
program. Program elements are captured in a guidance document developed
by NEI, NEI 06-04, Rev. 1, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based
Emergency Response Drill.'' The NRC endorsed this document for use in a
pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear
Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a Hostile
Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19, 2008.
However, implementation of these enhancements is voluntary, and the NRC
cannot require licensees to maintain these enhancements, absent
issuance of an order or a regulation. Issuance of orders is resource
intensive and an inefficient approach to address a generic problem.
The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise
scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises
and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed
many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations.
Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local
agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that
facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable
and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency
classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release.
Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor
accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent
containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used
by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as
a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However,
certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise
scenarios, including the following:
The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident
before a release occurs;
The release will occur after a General Emergency is
declared;
The release will be terminated before the exercise ends;
and
The exercise will escalate sequentially through the
emergency classes.
In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences
that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically
face.
In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the
NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as
follows:
The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency planning
exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory responses
associated with preconditioning of participants by incorporating a wide
spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no release to a large
release) and events, including security-based events. These scenarios
should emphasize the expected interfaces and coordination between key
decision-makers based on realistic postulated events. The staff should
share experiences of preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.
As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed
to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The
working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA
regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios
and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these
regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport
with proposed changes to NRC regulations to address preconditioning and
the incorporation of hostile action exercise scenarios.
FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to discuss
potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC supported
these meetings to facilitate questions as they may relate to the EP
rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example,
stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development
and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification
levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs
can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could
vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more
realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the several
different focus groups will inform the update to the REP Program
Manual. The NRC also considered stakeholder views as they relate to
this proposed rule and enhancements to EP guidance, although some
comments were received after the deadline to be considered in this
proposed rule.
The NRC believes that a regulatory change would be necessary to
enhance scenario content to include hostile action scenarios and reduce
preconditioning through a wide spectrum of challenges. This change
would improve licensee ERO capability to protect public health and
safety under all accident scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward
preconditioning.
The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations,
but rejected that option because it would not ensure correction of the
issues discussed above. The NRC also discussed the use of voluntary
programs and although this option could be successful, the NRC could
not require that changes made would be permanent and consistent across
all sites.
The NRC is proposing to revise Appendix E, Section IV.F. to address
these issues, as discussed in Section V of this document.
B. Non-Security Related Issues
The remaining proposed changes would be new or amended requirements
[[Page 23261]]
that would result in a substantial increase to public health and safety
because they would maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to
effectively implement their emergency plans.
1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS)
capabilities are found in Sec. 50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3. and require licensees to establish the capability to
promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event
while meeting certain ANS design objectives. NRC regulations do not
currently require backup power for sirens or other backup ANS alerting
capabilities when a major portion of the primary alerting means is
unavailable. The regulations also do not address backup notification
capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's ANS is unavailable and
no backup exists, then the public may not be promptly alerted of an
event at the facility and the protective actions to be taken, which
could affect the public's response to the event.
An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case
of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions
may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear
power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to
provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such
as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or
supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives
information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency
alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile
loudspeakers.
In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major
portion of the alert function of an ANS for various reasons, such as
damage to ANS components caused by severe weather, loss of offsite
alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of ANS activation
equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS hardware/software
modifications. In other situations, the notification capability has
been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert radios which are
used to provide both an alert signal and notification function).
The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when
ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to
Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and
Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26,
2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System
Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28,
``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated
December 22, 2006. IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert Radios to
Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated April 2,
1996, addressed the inability to activate some tone alert radios
because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS
implementation. Without the ability to warn the population, the
effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced.
Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of
the primary ANS.
Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread
loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren-based systems,
such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern
United States and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station Blackout'' (August 1988),
although the likelihood of failure of the onsite AC power system
coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout
events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some
plants.
The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification
systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and
encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Report 107-
740, FEMA was directed to update its guidance on outdoor warning and
mass notification systems and require all warning systems to be
operable in the absence of an AC power supply. The House Appropriations
Committee also urged FEMA to consult with other relevant agencies and
revise the national standard for outdoor warning and mass notification
to reflect state-of-the-art technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 directed the Commission to require backup power for the
emergency notification system, including siren systems, for nuclear
power plants located where there is a permanent population, as
determined by the 2000 decennial census, in excess of 15,000,000 within
a 50-mile radius of the power plant. Therefore, it is appropriate that
the NRC also consider changes to its existing regulations and guidance
regarding warning systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.
The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this
issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related
guidance documents to address ANS backup means. Several NRC and FEMA
guidance documents, such as NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated November 1985, and FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1,
``FEMA Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10,'' dated April 21, 1987, contain
detailed information on ANS capabilities and design review methodology.
Additional information on ANS backup capabilities could be provided in
revisions to these documents. As guidance, a provision for an ANS
backup means would not be considered a requirement and its
applicability to existing approved ANS designs would be considered
optional. As noted previously in this discussion, FEMA was also
directed to update its guidance to require all warning systems to be
operable in the absence of an alternating current power supply.
However, guidance changes limited to backup power requirements for the
alerting function would not address backup capabilities for other types
of alerting devices or the ANS notification function. In summary, this
option does not provide a regulatory resolution to ensure that nuclear
power plant ANS designs include a backup method to the primary means
for both alerting and notification, and thus the NRC considered this
option to be unacceptable.
Use of a voluntary approach for ANS backup means was also
considered. Some current nuclear power plant ANS designs address one or
more aspects of backup ANS capabilities, such as providing backup power
in the event primary power to sirens is lost, using backup route
alerting when sirens are inoperable, or designating multiple EAS
broadcast stations to ensure that instructional messages can be
transmitted. A voluntary approach may be appropriate because State and
local authorities can usually compensate for the temporary loss of some
ANS capabilities. However, allowing licensees or applicants to
voluntarily install backup ANS capabilities will not ensure that both
the alerting and notification functions are addressed, or that new
sites will have warning systems designed with comprehensive backup ANS
capabilities. Given the importance of ANS to alert the public of an
event at a facility and the protective actions to be taken, and without
any voluntary industry commitment that
[[Page 23262]]
existing or new warning systems will have a backup means available, the
NRC considered a voluntary approach to be inappropriate and found this
option unacceptable.
The NRC believes that nuclear power reactor licensees should be
required to have backup ANS methods and therefore is proposing
rulemaking to address backup capabilities for both the alert and
notification functions. Three alternatives for addressing this issue in
rulemaking were considered.
The first alternative would add a regulatory requirement for ANS
backup power. The most common warning system used at U.S. nuclear power
plants is based on sirens that are powered directly, or indirectly
through batteries, by an AC power source. As noted previously in this
discussion, the loss of power is not the only failure mode that can
impact warning systems. Causes of past ANS inoperability problems have
included the inability to detect siren failures, the inability to
activate sirens, the failure to test and maintain personal home
alerting devices, the use of telephone call-inhibiting devices, and the
failure to provide and maintain distribution lists of tone alert
radios. Thus, a regulatory requirement addressing only backup ANS power
would not eliminate any of these other failure modes. This approach
would prescribe one specific method as a backup means, precluding
licensees (or applicants) and offsite officials from considering
alternative methods, such as route alerting or newer communications
technology, that may be more suitable for certain nuclear power plant
sites. In summary, it would address only one of several ANS failure
modes (i.e., loss of AC power) for one alerting method (i.e., sirens).
It would not address backup methods for other types of alerting devices
or any part of the notification process. Therefore, the NRC considered
this approach to be unacceptable.
The second alternative would require that the primary ANS be
designed so there would be no common single failure mode for the
system; therefore, a backup system would not be needed. This approach
would ensure that the entire ANS is designed and built to a very high
level of reliability. Any equipment necessary for ANS activation and
operation (e.g., computers, radio transmitters and radio towers, plus
the actual alerting devices and notification means) would have
redundant components and power sources as necessary to eliminate any
common single failure mode, such as a widespread power outage affecting
a siren-based system. However, ensuring that all ANS common single
failure vulnerabilities have been identified and adequately addressed
would be difficult. Even after extensive analysis and testing of a
warning system, a common failure mechanism may not become evident until
the system is to be activated for an emergency event. For a siren-based
system, several additional sirens (with backup power capabilities) may
need to be installed to provide overlapping acoustic coverage in the
event clusters of sirens fail and thus may discourage licensees at
future nuclear power plant sites from using these systems due to the
increased cost for installing additional sirens. This approach may not
be applicable to non-electronic primary warning systems based on other
methods, such as route alerting. For these reasons, the NRC considered
this approach to be unacceptable. Rejecting this approach does not mean
that the issue of backup power for warning systems will be left
unaddressed. As discussed previously, the House Committee on
Appropriations has directed FEMA to require all outdoor warning systems
to be operable in the absence of AC power.
The third alternative was selected for rulemaking and would revise
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. to require backup measures that
would be implemented when the primary means of alerting and
notification are unavailable. These proposed changes are discussed in
Section V of this document.
2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness
In its oversight of licensee EP programs, the NRC has observed a
few licensees whose responses in performing emergency declarations were
inappropriately delayed. This situation may be a result of a lack of a
specific regulatory timeliness requirement. Emergency declaration is
the process by which a licensee determines whether an off-normal plant
condition warrants declaration as an emergency and, if so, which of the
four emergency classes--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area
Emergency, or General Emergency--is to be declared.
These declarations are fundamental to the licensee's EP program in
that onsite and offsite emergency response activities are implemented
in a staged, proportional manner, based upon the level of the declared
emergency. If an emergency declaration is delayed, the subsequent
emergency response actions may not be timely. Emergency response
personnel, facilities, and equipment may not be in position should it
become necessary to implement measures to protect public health and
safety.
The NRC has issued generic communications to alert licensees of
these concerns and to advise them of the NRC's expectation that
emergency classifications \3\ would be made in a prompt manner. In
1985, the NRC published IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency
Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency
Notifications,'' to alert licensees of two instances in which
declarations and/or notifications of an actual emergency condition were
significantly delayed and to express the NRC expectation of timely
emergency declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it necessary to publish
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-2, ``Emergency Preparedness
Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency
Conditions,'' to provide guidance to NRC staff in evaluating licensee
performance in the area of timely classification. The NRC cited
classification delays in actual events and exercises as the reason for
issuing the guidance. EPPOS-2 provided the NRC expectation that the
classification should be made promptly following indications that
conditions have reached an EAL threshold and that 15 minutes would be a
reasonable goal for completing the classification once indications are
available to the control room operators. The NRC based that conclusion
on the belief that 15 minutes is a reasonable period of time for
assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available
to cognizant personnel, and that a delay in classification for up to 15
minutes would have a minimal impact upon the overall emergency response
and protection of the public health and safety. The NRC noted that
emergency classification schemes have reached a level of maturity in
which the classification of emergencies can be accomplished in a
relatively short period of time once the abnormal condition and
associated plant parameters are known by cognizant licensee personnel.
EPPOS-2 stated that the 15-minute period was not to be viewed as a
grace period in which a licensee could resolve a condition that had
already exceeded an EAL threshold to avoid a declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Early NRC generic communications routinely used the phrase
``emergency classification'' to denote the outcome of the process to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition. This document
uses the phrase ``emergency declaration'' in place of ``emergency
classification'' except when summarizing an earlier document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This 15-minute goal was not a regulatory requirement but was rather
a
[[Page 23263]]
guideline for staff evaluation of a licensee's performance in
responding to an actual radiological emergency. This goal was
subsequently incorporated as a criterion in the industry-proposed and
NRC-approved Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone performance
indicators (PIs). Although the reported classification performance
during drills and exercises remains high, there have been a few
instances, during actual events, in which classifications were
inappropriately delayed. Although these few actual events did not
warrant public protective measures, this may not always be the case.
The NRC considered the following options for addressing this
regulatory problem. The first option, take no action, was rejected
because it would not address the regulatory problem. The second option,
continue to rely on the industry's voluntary PI, was rejected because
the existence of the PI has not prevented untimely classifications
during actual emergencies. Although these occurrences were associated
with Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed weaknesses could also have
occurred under different circumstances in which the potential impact to
the public could have been greater. The third option, issue regulatory
guidance, was rejected because although regulatory guidance is an
appropriate mechanism for identifying acceptable means for complying
with broadly worded regulatory requirements, there is currently no
regulatory requirement, broad or otherwise, that emergency declarations
meet any particular timeliness criterion. The NRC believes that the
fourth option, an amendment of the regulations, would be the best
course of action to ensure that licensees are aware that they are
responsible for completing emergency declarations in a timely manner in
the event of a radiological emergency.
Placing a declaration timeliness criterion into the regulations
would clearly establish the NRC's expectations, as well as provide a
regulatory framework to consistently enforce these expectations. The
NRC considered amending Sec. 50.47(b)(4), Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.B., IV.C., or IV.D., or a combination of all of them. The NRC opted
not to amend Sec. 50.47(b)(4) because it is applicable to both onsite
and offsite emergency plans, whereas Appendix E is applicable to an
applicant or licensee--the entity responsible for making emergency
declarations.
The NRC also considered providing either a performance criterion or
a capability criterion. Similar to the notification timeliness
criterion in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which the NRC requires
licensees to be capable of notifying responsible State and local
governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency,
the NRC opted to propose a capability criterion, rather than an
inflexible performance criterion. This would allow licensees some
degree of flexibility during an actual radiological emergency in
addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise when an emergency
declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant
operations that are more urgently needed to protect public health and
safety. These delays would be found acceptable if they did not deny
State and local authorities the opportunity to implement actions to
protect the public health or safety under their emergency plans and the
cause of the delay was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to
foresee and prevent. Based upon these considerations, the NRC is
proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C. to address this
issue by providing a capability criterion. These proposed changes are
discussed in Section V of this document.
3. Emergency Operations Facility--Performance-Based Approach
Several nuclear power plant licensees have submitted requests for
NRC approval to combine EOFs for plants they operate within a State or
in multiple States into a consolidated EOF. In some instances, the
consolidated EOF is located at a substantial distance from one or more
of the plant sites and is no longer considered a ``near-site''
facility, as required by Sec. Sec. 50.34(f)(2)(xxv), 50.47(b)(3),
50.47(d)(1), 50.54(gg)(1)(i), and Appendix E, Sections IV.E.8.,
IV.E.9.c., and IV.E.9.d. Guidance documents, including NUREG-0696,
``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,'' and NUREG-
0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,'' Supplement 1,
``Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,'' that provide
criteria for establishing and locating emergency response facilities
also refer to the EOF as a near-site facility. However, the regulations
and guidance do not explicitly define the term ``near-site.'' This
regulatory structure has resulted in confusion for licensees with
reasonable technical bases for moving or consolidating EOFs that would
no longer be considered ``near-site'' and led to requests for
exceptions to NRC guidance and exemptions from NRC regulations to move
or consolidate their EOFs.
In addition, neither regulations nor guidance documents address the
capabilities and functional requirements for a consolidated EOF, such
as capabilities for handling simultaneous events at two or more sites,
or having provisions for the NRC and offsite officials to relocate to a
facility nearer the site if they desire. Thus, licensees have been
uncertain about when they need to submit requests for exceptions or
exemptions, which alternative approaches to existing EOF distance and
other facility criteria may be acceptable, and what additional
capabilities they need to address for a consolidated EOF. A regulatory
mechanism (Sec. 50.54(q)) is already in place that allows licensees to
make changes to their emergency plans without prior Commission approval
when certain conditions are met. This mechanism could be applied to
consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria were established. In the
absence of clear criteria, several recent licensee requests to
consolidate EOFs have been evaluated by the NRC staff and reviewed by
the Commission on a case-by-case basis.
Each nuclear power plant site is required to have an EOF where the
licensee provides overall management of its resources in response to an
emergency and coordinates emergency response activities with Federal,
State, local, and tribal agencies. The original EOF siting criteria
called for the facility to be located near the nuclear power reactor
site and imposed a 20-mile upper limit (later modified by the
Commission to 25 miles) for the distance between the site and the EOF.
This upper limit was generally considered to be the maximum distance
from the nuclear power reactor site within which face-to-face
communications between the licensee, offsite officials, and NRC staff
could be facilitated, and which also permitted the timely briefing and
debriefing of personnel going to and from the site. However, advances
in computer and communication technology after the original EOF siting
criteria were established now allow EOF functions to be effectively
performed independent of distance from the site. Computer-based systems
allow plant parameter, meteorological data, and radiological
information for multiple sites to be collected, analyzed, trended, and
displayed in a remotely located facility. Data and voice communications
between the EOF and other onsite/offsite emergency response facilities
can be addressed through a variety of independent systems, such as
microwave, telephone, internet,
[[Page 23264]]
intranet, and radio, which provide a high degree of availability and
reliability.
Furthermore, nuclear utility consolidation has resulted in
initiatives to standardize fleet emergency plans, use consolidated
EOFs, and staff EOFs by designated corporate personnel. Standardized
plans, implementing procedures, and accident assessment tools, such as
a common dose projection model, allow emergency responders in a
consolidated facility to effectively perform their functions for
multiple sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site facility.
Consolidated facilities eliminate the need to duplicate work space,
displays, communication networks, and other capabilities for each site.
Consolidated facilities can also be located at or near corporate
offices where nuclear support personnel designated to fill EOF
positions can respond more quickly.
The Commission, in the SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear
Operating Company's Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating
Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005,
directed the NRC staff to consider resolving these issues through
rulemaking. In that SRM, the Commission approved the proposal for a
consolidated EOF for three nuclear power reactor sites operated by
Southern Nuclear Operating Company at the company's corporate
headquarters. The Commission also instructed the NRC staff to consider
making ``the requirements for EOFs more performance-based to allow
other multi-plant licensees to consolidate their EOFs, if those
licensees can demonstrate their emergency response strategies will
adequately cope with an emergency at any one of the associated
plants.''
To address the EOF ``near-site'' and consolidation issues, the NRC
considered maintaining EOF distance criteria as guidance only and to
specify other EOF criteria in guidance rather than in the regulations.
However, providing these criteria as guidance only would not ensure
that future applicants would follow the criteria. Thus, an EOF could be
located within 10 miles of a site with no backup facility provided, or
could be located beyond 25 miles of a site without providing a facility
closer to a site for NRC site team and offsite response personnel. An
EOF could be implemented without meeting the proposed performance-based
criteria. A licensee could relocate or consolidate an existing approved
facility without meeting all or some of the criteria and without prior
NRC approval as long as the licensee determined that the provisions of
Sec. 50.54(q) were met. Under these circumstances, an EOF could be
implemented that may not provide all of the capabilities that the NRC
believes are necessary for such a facility to be fully effective.
Therefore, the NRC determined that this option would not be
appropriate.
The NRC also considered revising the regulations (and providing
associated performance-based criteria) to allow an EOF to be located
more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site without prior NRC
approval only in situations involving the consolidation of EOFs for
multiple sites operated by the same licensee. However, the NRC
determined that excluding licensees from the ability to locate an EOF
for a single site, or to co-locate an EOF for two or more nuclear power
plants operated by different licensees, at distances beyond 25 miles
from a site without prior NRC approval would be unnecessarily
restrictive. The capability of existing EOFs located more than 25 miles
from a site to function as effective emergency response facilities has
been demonstrated in numerous exercises and several actual events,
indicating that the distance between the EOF and a site is not a
critical factor in determining the overall effectiveness of the
facility. The siting of a single-site or co-located EOF at greater
distances from a nuclear power plant may also offer benefits to
licensees and offsite officials in terms of increased staffing
flexibility and reduced response times. Licensees may be able to use
additional employees as EOF emergency responders (who would otherwise
be unavailable due to long response times) when the EOF is located
closer to their workplace, such as a corporate office, or areas where
these employees reside. Offsite officials that report to the EOF may
have shorter response times when the EOF can be located in the vicinity
of government facilities, or they may be able to co-locate their
emergency operations at the EOF. For these reasons, the NRC believes
that the options for EOF locations should be available to all licensees
as long as the EOF would meet the applicable functional requirements
associated with consolidated EOFs previously approved by the NRC and
licensees would provide a facility closer to the site in situations
where the EOF is more than 25 miles from a site. This approach would
ensure that an EOF would have the capabilities necessary to be fully
effective regardless of its location with respect to the nuclear power
plant site, and that provisions would be in place for a facility closer
to the site for use by NRC site team and offsite responders. Therefore,
the NRC is proposing changes to NRC regulations (and associated
guidance) so the criteria for all EOFs would reflect a performance-
based approach. The NRC is also proposing revisions to regulations (and
guidance) to remove the references to an EOF as a ``near-site''
facility and to incorporate specific EOF distance criteria into the
regulations, as discussed in Section V of this document.
In a conforming change, Sec. 52.79(a)(17) would be revised to make
clear that combined license applications need not address the
requirement governing TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in Sec. 50.34(f)(2)(xxv).
Instead, the requirements in Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) would
apply. That section would accurately reflect the need for the combined
license application to address an EOF; by contrast Sec.
50.34(f)(2)(xxv) only requires construction permits (and not combined
licenses) to address an EOF. The NRC considered, as an alternative to
modifying Sec. 52.79(a)(17), correcting Sec. 50.34(f)(xxv) to remove
the language limiting the requirement to address an EOF to construction
permit applications. The NRC decided not to propose that approach, but
instead have the general requirements for EP, including Appendix E,
apply to combined license applications by virtue of Sec. 52.79(a)(21).
4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating
EP regulations at Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E,
Sections II.G., III., and IV. currently require nuclear power plant
operating license applicants to provide evacuation time estimates
(ETEs) for the public located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These
ETEs are used in the planning process to identify potential challenges
to efficient evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event
of an accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response
managers in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of
the public. The current regulations do not require any review or
revision of ETEs following the initial licensing of the plant. Although
some licensees do revise ETEs based on updated census data, the use of
ETEs in evacuation planning is inconsistent and they currently do not
affect the development of public protective action strategies.
Nuclear power plant operating license applicants are responsible
for developing the ETE analysis for their respective sites. They submit
the analysis to the NRC in support of their emergency plans, usually as
a stand-
[[Page 23265]]
alone document. Applicants include the results of the ETE analysis in
the onsite emergency plan, typically in the emergency plan implementing
procedures for protective action recommendations. The ETEs are also in
the offsite emergency plans for the State and local governments within
the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The NRC has traditionally taken the
lead in reviewing the ETE analyses with the assistance of a traffic
expert contractor, especially for contested licensing cases involving
ETE contentions.
In NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3,
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,''
the NRC presented the results of a study of its protective action
recommendation guidance. The NRC concluded in the study that ETE
information is important in developing public protective action
strategies and should be used to identify improvements to evacuation
plans. The effectiveness of protective action recommendation strategies
is sensitive to the ETE, and therefore, it is important to reduce the
uncertainties associated with ETEs. Improving the accuracy and quality
of ETE values would help licensees recommend and offsite officials
determine the most appropriate protective action. For instance, in the
study, the NRC determined that for some scenarios sheltering may be
more protective than immediate evacuation if the evacuation time is
longer than a few hours, depending on site-specific factors. Further,
the NRC concluded that the effect of population change upon evacuation
times should be understood by OROs and incorporated into protective
action strategies.
To address this issue, the NRC considered amending the current
regulations to require licensees to assess changes to the EPZ
infrastructure and population. The NRC believed that changes in
infrastructure, or addition of a large subdivision to the EPZ, could
also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted with Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL), who are experts in emergency evacuations and have
researched and drafted several NRC studies related to evacuation (e.g.,
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear
Power Plants,'' NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors
Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' and NUREG/CR-6953). Based upon their
expert opinion, SNL confirmed that the major contributor to changes in
ETE is changes in population. Although changes in infrastructure can
impact the ETE, population is the more important factor.
The planning and budget cycle for infrastructure projects is
measured in years, as indicated in GAO-03-764T, ``Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, `Federal Aid
Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge Projects--
Issues and Options.' '' Within the years it takes to plan, budget, and
construct highway infrastructure, the opportunity exists to include
such improvements in the ETE as planned or constructed, based on the
timing of the infrastructure, whereas significant population changes
can occur over shorter periods of time. Therefore, with population
changes as the major contributor and infrastructure changes as an
enveloped contributor, the NRC determined that simplifying the
regulations to explicitly require assessment of ETEs based on
population changes was adequate for updates to ETEs. In the case of an
infrastructure change due to a catastrophic event, the NRC already has
regulations in place to ensure that licensees consult with OROs to
consider the impact of offsite events on evacuation routes and ETEs.
The NRC also considered using guidance as a means to solve the
problem of the lack of specificity in regulations directing applicants
and licensees on the periodicity for updating ETEs. Although the
availability of more detailed guidance would provide applicants and
licensees with the tools to better update their ETEs, this option would
not provide the regulatory means for enforcing the desired frequency of
ETE updates and consistency of ETE determinations.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.47(b)(10) and Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV. to require the periodic review of ETEs. The NRC
considered codifying that all population changes result in updates to
ETEs, but determined that population changes of less than 10 percent
would not significantly impact the ETE. The basis for establishing a
requirement to update ETEs when the population has changed by at least
10 percent is derived from the U.S. Department of Transportation
``Highway Capacity Manual'' (HCM), which contains analysis techniques
for determining the capacity of a roadway, (i.e., Level of Service
(LOS)). The analysis applies a series of curves called the ``Speed Flow
Curves and LOS for Basic Freeway Segments'' to roadways and determines
the LOS for a given traffic volume. The analysis shows that traffic
volume is a direct indicator of the population involved in an
evacuation given the roadway system in the area of concern. The HCM
analysis shows that an increase in 10 percent of vehicles on roadways
that are near capacity (such as would be the case in an evacuation)
likely creates a decrease of one level of roadway service (i.e., from
Level D to Level E). This decrease in roadway service results in slower
moving traffic and longer ETEs. The decrease in LOS is not apparent for
a vehicle, or population, increase of less than 10 percent.
Additionally, the NRC believes that the 10 percent threshold would
balance potential inadequacies and burdens. Based on the HCM analysis,
SNL research, and NRC experience, not requiring licensees to assess
their ETEs until the population changes by more than 15 percent or 20
percent would allow too large a population change before assessing the
impact on ETEs, thereby potentially reducing the effectiveness of the
ETEs. At the same time, requiring an assessment of licensee ETEs for a
change in population of less than 10 percent would require licensees to
make assessments when the change in population would not likely have a
meaningful impact on the ETEs. Thus the NRC believes that a population
change of 10 percent is the adequate threshold for requiring an
assessment of licensees' ETEs.
5. Amended Emergency Plan Change Process
Applicants for operating licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power
reactors, research reactors, and certain fuel facilities, and early
site permits (as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52 for
nuclear power plants, are required by regulation to develop emergency
plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 and, for
nuclear power reactor license applicants, the standards of Sec.
50.47(b). After the facility license is issued, the holder of the
license is required by Sec. 50.54(q) to follow and maintain in effect
emergency plans which meet the requirements of Appendix E and, for
nuclear power reactor licensees, the standards of Sec. 50.47(b).
Currently, Sec. 50.54(q) also provides a process under which a
licensee may make changes to its approved emergency plans without prior
NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the effectiveness
of the emergency plans as approved and the plans, as modified, would
continue to meet applicable regulations. However, the NRC has
determined that the language of Sec. 50.54(q) does not clearly
describe the requirements the NRC intended to impose on licensees,
leading to
[[Page 23266]]
confusion and inefficiencies in implementation.
A licensee must follow and maintain in effect its emergency plan if
the NRC is to continue to find that there is reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency as stipulated by Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The EP
regulations generally refer to the onsite emergency plan as a stand-
alone document. However, emergency plans rely upon facility
capabilities, equipment, and resources that are typically outside of
the control of the licensee's emergency planning organization. The NRC
has identified several occurrences in which licensee personnel outside
of the emergency planning group have changed the status of capabilities
and resources under their cognizance without considering the impact on
the effectiveness of the emergency plan or without alerting the
emergency planning group.
Several enforcement actions in the past few years have been
associated with EALs being rendered ineffective by configuration
changes made to instruments referenced in an EAL without the change
being reflected in the EAL, or without a compensatory action being put
into place. Examples include modifications to installed seismic
instruments that eliminated the direct readout of acceleration needed
for classifying a seismic event and changes in reactor vessel level
criteria (in a boiling water reactor) being made without a conforming
change being made to the EAL. In another finding, concrete barriers
installed in a security-initiated change blocked a site access road
required by the emergency plan to be used for site evacuation. Another
licensee failed to provide adequate oversight on utility (external to
the plant) personnel maintaining the site's ANS, resulting in
degradation of that system and subsequent enforcement actions. Based on
its experience in reviewing root cause analyses and corrective actions
associated with inspection findings, the NRC believes that an
underlying cause of these occurrences is often that the licensees'
configuration control programs may not adequately consider the impact
of configuration changes on the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
The NRC has determined that the phrase ``maintain in effect'' in
Sec. 50.54(q) is not adequately clear in conveying the NRC expectation
that an effective emergency plan also requires maintaining the various
capabilities and resources relied on in the plan. The phrase ``maintain
in effect,'' as applied to emergency plans in Sec. 50.54(q), has two
senses: the first is that the plans are in force; the second is that
the plans can achieve the desired result of providing reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency. Accordingly, the NRC is
proposing to amend Sec. 50.54(q) to clarify that the regulatory intent
is the latter sense by requiring licensees to follow and ``maintain the
effectiveness'' of their approved emergency plans.
Currently, Sec. 50.54(q) also provides a process under which a
licensee may make changes to its approved emergency plan without prior
NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the effectiveness
of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as modified, would
continue to meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC approval is required
for any change that could decrease the effectiveness of the emergency
plan. The NRC and licensees have experienced significant difficulties
in implementing this portion of Sec. 50.54(q) because the current rule
language does not define what constitutes a decrease in effectiveness
of an emergency plan nor does it identify the type of changes that
would constitute a decrease in effectiveness of the plan. The lack of
clear evaluation criteria has resulted in regulatory inefficiencies,
such as licensees submitting for review changes that do not rise to the
level requiring prior NRC approval and enforcement actions due to
licensees failing to submit changes that were later deemed to warrant
such a review. A large fraction of the enforcement actions in the EP
Cornerstone are attributable to these findings.
The NRC has attempted to resolve this issue through the publication
of regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC issued EPPOS-4, ``Emergency
Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' to provide guidance to NRC
inspectors regarding their review of licensees' emergency plan changes.
In 2004, the NEI submitted two white papers proposing a definition of
``decrease in effectiveness'' for NRC consideration. The NRC could not
reach consensus with NEI and thus, did not endorse the NEI guidance. In
2005, the NRC withdrew EPPOS-4 and issued RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the
Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005,
to (1) clarify the meaning of ``decrease in effectiveness,'' (2)
clarify the process for making changes to emergency plans, and (3)
provide some examples of changes that are not decreases in
effectiveness. Although RIS 2005-02 provides useful guidance, the NRC
and NEI have continued to discuss ways to improve the Sec. 50.54(q)
change process, including the use of a regulatory framework parallel to
that of Sec. 50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance programs, Sec.
50.54(p)(2) for safeguards plans, and Sec. 50.59, ``Changes, Tests,
and Experiments.''
During the development of the proposed rule language, a concern was
raised regarding the process to be used by the NRC for reviewing
proposed emergency plan changes. Section 50.54(q) directs the licensee
to submit such changes under the provisions of Sec. 50.4, which
provides the procedures for making certain submissions to the NRC. Some
confusion exists as to whether all proposed emergency plan changes
submitted under Sec. 50.4 would result in a reduction in effectiveness
and whether Commission review of such submissions is necessary. The NRC
proposes to clarify that the license amendment process is the correct
process to use when reviewing submittals involving a proposed emergency
plan change that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in
effectiveness of the plan. The proposed rule language addresses this
clarification. (See Section V of this document for further discussion.)
The NRC also considered other options for addressing the Sec.
50.54(q) problems. Using a voluntary industry initiative was rejected
because the NRC and NEI have yet to agree on the best approach to
resolve the problems. Issuing more regulatory guidance was rejected
because that approach has been tried but has not resolved the problems.
The NRC believes that an amendment to the regulations, supplemented as
necessary by regulatory guidance, would be the best course of action
and would ensure that (1) the effectiveness of the emergency plans
would be maintained, (2) changes to the approved emergency plan would
be properly evaluated, and (3) any change that reduces the
effectiveness of the plan would be reviewed by the NRC prior to
implementation. The NRC proposes to issue regulatory guidance
concurrently with the implementation of the amended rule language and
would consider stakeholder-developed and -proposed guidance as an
alternative to NRC-developed guidance.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.54(q) to replace the
existing language. Conforming changes have been proposed in Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV.B. The NRC also believes that the proposed rule
changes would promote consistent and predictable implementation and
enforcement, while
[[Page 23267]]
minimizing inefficient and ineffective use of licensee and NRC staff
resources.
6. Removal of Completed One-Time Requirements
The NRC is proposing to eliminate several regulatory provisions
that required holders of licenses to take certain one-time actions to
improve the state of EP following the Three Mile Island incident in
1979. These actions are complete and the requirements are no longer
binding on any current licensee. Corresponding requirements for license
applicants are provided in Sec. Sec. 50.33 and 50.34.
The requirements proposed to be removed are:
(1) Section 50.54(r), which requires licensees of research or test
reactors to submit emergency plans to the NRC for approval by September
7, 1982, and, for the facilities with an authorized power level of less
than 2 MW thermal, by November 3, 1982. There is no longer a need for
this provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes
to delete this requirement and designate the section as ``reserved.''
(2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which requires nuclear power plant
licensees to submit State and local governmental emergency plans within
60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective date of the rule that added
Sec. 50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that date has elapsed. However, that
portion of Sec. 50.54(s)(1) that discusses the size of the EPZs would
be retained. There is no longer a need for this provision because this
requirement has expired. However, the rule language regarding EPZ size
and footnotes 1 and 2 regarding those EPZs remain applicable. The NRC
proposes to delete the obsolete text while retaining the current
language regarding EPZs and footnotes 1 and 2.
(3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which requires the nuclear power plant
licensee, State, and local emergency response plans be implemented by
April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need for this provision because
this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes to delete Sec.
50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section as ``reserved.''
(4) Section 50.54(u), which requires nuclear power reactor
licensees to submit, within 60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective
date of the rule that added Sec. 50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC plans
for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in Sec. 50.47(b)
and the requirements of Appendix E. There is no longer a need for this
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes to
delete this requirement and designate the section as ``reserved.''
The NRC is proposing to eliminate these completed one-time
requirements in the interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these
requirements would not relax any currently effective regulatory
requirement and would cause no regulatory burden on any current or
future licensee or applicant.
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Proposed Rule
A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings
As part of its comprehensive assessment of the NRC's EP regulations
and guidance and development of this proposed rule, the NRC staff met
with internal and external stakeholders, including FEMA management, on
numerous occasions including the following:
1. Meeting with NRC regional EP inspectors in January 2005 and
January 2006;
2. Meetings with State, local, and Tribal governments and nuclear
power industry representatives at the National Radiological Emergency
Preparedness (NREP) Conference on April 11-14, 2005, March 27-30, 2006,
and April 7-10, 2008;
3. Public meeting with interested stakeholders on August 31 and
September 1, 2005;
4. Public meeting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on May
19, 2006;
5. Public meeting with the NEI/nuclear power industry
representatives on July 19, 2006;
6. Regional meetings with State and local representatives and
nuclear power industry working groups that started in 2007;
7. Regulatory Information Conference on March 16, 2007;
8. Public meeting with external stakeholders on March 5, 2008;
9. Meeting with nuclear power industry representatives at the 2008
NEI EP and Communications Forum; and
10. Public meeting with external stakeholders on July 8, 2008.
The NRC also met routinely with representatives of FEMA to coordinate
issues of mutual interest and to keep them informed of NRC EP
activities. These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA to collaborate on
rulemaking and guidance issues, and to ensure alignment and regulatory
consistency. In addition, FEMA attended the NRC public meetings
regarding the NRC's EP rulemaking.
B. Public and Stakeholder Comments Received
At the April 11, 2005, NREP Conference, the NRC and FEMA conducted
a workshop with stakeholders. The workshop covered a broad range of EP
topics. Unanswered stakeholder comments and questions were recorded by
NRC staff, and the NRC and FEMA responded to those questions and
comments in ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items.''
The NRC conducted a public meeting on August 31-September 1, 2005,
to obtain input regarding EP requirements and guidance for commercial
nuclear power plants. The first day of meetings involved a roundtable
discussion of topics related to the review of EP regulations and
guidance. During the second day, the NRC staff and stakeholders
addressed the ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items'' from the April
2005 NREP conference and other stakeholder comments and questions. The
NRC requested comments in writing before the August 31-September 1,
2005, meeting and also received comments at the meeting. In addition to
comments transcribed from the 2-day public meeting, the NRC accepted
written comment submissions until October 31, 2005.
The NRC and FEMA responded to generic comments from the August 31-
September 1, 2005, meeting and comments received thereafter in
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and
October 31, 2005).'' Site-specific comments from the public meeting
were addressed in ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments
(Received Between August 31 and October 31, 2005).''
The NRC also received comments on the review of the EP regulations
and guidance for nuclear power plants at public meetings with
stakeholders on May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The May 19, 2006,
meeting was transcribed. The NRC staff informed the meeting
participants that their comments would be presented to the Commission
in a September 2006 SECY paper. These comments were provided to the
Commission in an attachment to SECY-06-0200 and, like the stakeholder
comments from 2005, were used to inform the staff's recommendations to
the Commission in SECY-06-0200.
The NRC received three comment letters that focused on the draft
preliminary rule language posted for comment on http://www.regulations.gov on February 29, 2008. One comment letter was
submitted by the State of Pennsylvania, one was submitted by NEI, and
one was submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists on behalf of
several NGOs. A detailed discussion of the public comments and the
Commission's responses is contained in
[[Page 23268]]
a separate document (see Section IX of this document). The NRC also
received comments on issues that are outside the scope of this proposed
rule and on regulatory provisions that are not proposed to be revised
in this proposed rule. The NRC determined that these comments did not
support changing the scope of the proposed rule.
IV. Specific Request for Comments
In addition to the general invitation to submit comments on the
proposed rule, the NRC also requests comments on the following
questions:
1. Inclusion of National Incident Management System/Incident
Command System in EP programs. The NRC is considering the need to
integrate the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and more
specifically, the Incident Command System (ICS), into licensee EP
programs. On February 28, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which directed DHS to develop and
administer a NIMS. NIMS/ICS provides a consistent nationwide template
to enable all government, private-sector, and NGOs to work together
during domestic incidents. HSPD-5 requires Federal departments and
agencies to make the adoption of NIMS by State and local organizations
a condition for Federal preparedness assistance. Non-government
entities, such as nuclear power plant licensees, are not required to
adopt NIMS. More information about NIMS and ICS may be found at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm.
The NRC has observed coordination challenges during hostile action
drills and observed discussions in some of the focus groups discussing
the FEMA REP Program Manual with respect to the use of the ICS between
onsite and offsite responders. It is likely that these issues will be
addressed through lessons learned in drills and other training, but
consistency across all nuclear plant sites may be an issue. The NRC is
seeking comments on whether the NRC should issue regulations requiring
that licensees train responders and implement the ICS to improve
interface with offsite response organizations.
2. Shift staffing and augmentation. Licensees are required by Sec.
50.47(b)(2) and Appendix E to Part 50 to maintain an ERO comprising
both an on-shift emergency organization and an organization capable of
augmenting the shift in a timely manner. However, the regulations state
that this shift staffing for emergency response must be ``adequate''
without providing a definition of ``adequate'' and are silent with
regard to what constitutes a timely augmentation. NUREG-0654 defines
the measure of adequacy and divides the ERO augmentation into 30-minute
and 60-minute responders. However, the guidance is not succinct,
resulting in inconsistencies in ERO shift staffing and augmentation
strategies among nuclear power reactor licensees.
In SECY-06-0200, the NRC staff identified shift staffing as an area
of concern, noting the challenge in evaluating the adequacy of licensee
shift staffing because of the lack of clarity regarding the functional
requirements for emergency response. To address this issue, the NRC
considered a revision to its regulations to establish functional
requirements for the emergency responders instead of focusing on
specific emergency responder positions. The NRC also realized that the
functional requirements may be dependant upon site- and scenario-
specific parameters. Consequently, the NRC attempted to design a
performance-based system for identifying shift staffing needs and
intended to include it in the development of a broader EP performance-
based regulatory regimen. As a result, the shift staffing element was
no longer considered in this rulemaking effort.
However, some stakeholders continue to express concern regarding
emergency response organization staffing. The NRC recognizes that there
is merit in enhancing the regulations to provide clear direction
regarding adequate staffing, such as achieving regulatory stability
through industry consistency and accommodating technological
advancements. Toward that end, the NRC requests comments on whether the
NRC should enhance its current regulations to be more explicit in the
number of ERO staff necessary for nuclear power plant emergencies. When
responding to this question, please consider the following draft
staffing table. The table provides proposed staff functions and minimum
staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting emergency response
organization. The table modifies the original guidance of NUREG-0654,
Table B-1 with lessons learned from several years of EP program
inspections by the NRC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Augment w/in 60 Augment w/in 90
On-shift \1\ min.\1\ min.\1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Director (1) Emergency Director Emergency Director
(Shift Manager): (1) (TSC): (1) (EOF):
Responsible for
overall ERO Command & Responsible for Responsible for
Control until relieved. overall ERO overall ERO
Command & Command &
Control until Control.
relieved.
Responsible for
approving event Responsible for Responsible for
classifications and approving event approving PARs.
PARs until relieved. classifications
and PARs until
relieved.
Communicator (1): Communicator (1) Communicator (1)
Responsible for (TSC) [In addition (EOF):
communicating event to the one already Assumes
classifications and PARs to on-shift]: responsibility for
offsite agencies, including Assume communicating PARs,
the NRC. responsibility for as well as plant
either ORO or NRC updates, to the NRC
communications from (HPN).
on-shift
Communicator.
Qualified Health Physics Site Radiation Site Radiation
Personnel (2): \3\ Protection Protection Director
Responsible for Coordinator (SRPC) (SRPD) (1) (EOF):
providing Health Physics (1) (TSC): Responsible
coverage to the on-shift Responsible for evaluating and
staff. for evaluating and assessing plant and
assessing plant and offsite data in the
offsite data in the development of
development of offsite PARs.
onsite protective Responsible
actions and offsite for recommending
PARs. offsite PARs to the
Responsible Emergency Director.
for recommending Responsible
onsite and offsite for Field Team
PARs to the direction.
Emergency Director.
Responsible
for all Radiation
Protection
activities,
including Field
Team direction.
[[Page 23269]]
Dose Projections (1): Additional Qualified Additional Qualified
Responsible for Health Physics Health Physics
providing dose projections Technicians [In Technicians [In
to the Emergency Director addition to the addition to the
for PAR determinations, personnel already personnel already
until relieved. on-shift] (OSC): on-site] (OSC):
(4) (2)
Responsible for Responsible for
providing Health providing health
Physics coverage physics support for
for OSC personnel the emergency
in the plant. response
(2) organization.
Responsible for
plant surveys.
(1)
Responsible for
controlling
dosimetry
issuance and
maintaining
plant access
control for
radiologically
controlled
areas.
EAL Classifications/PARs Dose Projections (1) Dose Projections (1)
(1): \4\ (TSC): (EOF):
Responsible for
evaluating plant Responsible for Responsible for
conditions and dose providing dose providing dose
projections and projections to projections to
recommending event the SRPC for PAR the SRPD for PAR
classifications and determinations. determinations.
PARs to the Emergency
Director, until
relieved.
Core/Thermal Hydraulics Eng Event Off-Site Field Team
(1): \4\ Classifications (1) B:
Responsible for (TSC): (1)
evaluating reactor Responsible Qualified Radiation
conditions and providing for evaluating Monitor responsible
input to the Emergency plant conditions for assessing
Director until relieved. and recommending environ radiation/
event contamination and
classifications to providing input to
the Emergency SRPC. Also
Director. responsible for
providing Health
Physics coverage
for team.
(1) Driver
responsible for
transportation.
Fire Brigade as Defined by Core/Thermal OSC Supervisors (4):
Tech Specs: Hydraulics/PRA (1)
The Fire Brigade is Engineer (1) (TSC): Electrical:
controlled by the site- Responsible Responsible for
specific Technical for evaluating supervising OSC
Specifications. reactor conditions activities related
and providing input to electrical
to the Emergency equipment.
Director. (1)
Responsible Mechanical:
for evaluating Responsible for
plant system status supervising OSC
and providing PRA activities related
input to the to mechanical
Emergency Director. equipment.
(1) I&C:
Responsible for
supervising OSC
activities related
to IC equipment.
(1) HP:
Responsible for
supervising OSC
activities related
to radiation
protection.
Ops Crew as Defined by Tech Maintenance (OSC) (1 IT Lead (1) (TSC):
Specs: electrician, 1 For sites
Number of Operators on-shift mechanic; 1 I&C): with digital I&C:
is controlled by the site- (1) Responsible for
specific Technical Electrician: assisting in
Specifications. Responsible for ensuring that the
providing digital I&C
electrical support equipment operates
for ECCS equipment, properly.
event mitigation,
and equipment
repair.
(1)
Mechanic:
Responsible for
providing
mechanical
support for ECCS
equipment, event
mitigation, and
equipment
repair.
(1) I&C
Technician:
Responsible for
providing assist
with logic
manipulation,
for providing
I&C support for
event mitigation
and equipment
repair, and for
support of
digital I&C if
applicable.
On-Site Field Team Joint Information
(1 qualified Center Manager
radiation monitor (JIC):
and 1 driver): (1)
(1) Responsible for
Radiation Monitor managing and
responsible for coordinating media
assessing environ information related
radiation/ to the event.
contamination and
providing input to
SRPC. Also
responsible for
providing Health
Physics coverage
for team.
(1)
Driver
responsible for
transportation.
Off-Site Field Team
A:
(1)
Qualified
Radiation
Monitor
responsible for
assessing
environmental
radiation/
contamination
and providing
input to SRPC.
Also responsible
for providing
Health Physics
coverage for
team.
(1)
Driver
responsible for
transportation.
TSC Engineering:
(1)
Electrical/I&C:
Responsible for
providing
engineering
coverage for the
ERO related to
electrical or
I&C equipment.
(1)
Mechanical:
Responsible for
providing
engineering
coverage for the
ERO related to
mechanical
equipment.
[[Page 23270]]
Lead OSC Supervisor
(1):
Responsible for
OSC activities
as directed by
Emergency
Director.
Security Supervisor
(1) (TSC):
Responsible for
coordinating
security-related
activities and
information with
the Emergency
Director.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. No collateral duties are assigned to an individual that are beyond
the capability of that individual to perform at any given time.
2. Specified TSC/OSC personnel must be performing their required
functions within 60 (90) minutes of an Alert or higher event
classification. Specified EOF/JIC personnel must be performing their
required functions within 90 minutes of a Site Area Emergency or
higher event classification.
3. Two qualified Health Physics personnel for a single-unit site, or one
per unit for a multi-unit site.
4. Could be the STA if justification for collateral duties supports
additional responsibilities.
3. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for
detailed analyses demonstrating timely performance of emergency
response functions by on-shift personnel. The NRC is proposing to
require nuclear power reactor licensees to demonstrate through detailed
analyses that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned emergency
plan implementation functions without having competing responsibilities
that could prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions.
The NRC is seeking comments on whether it is necessary to add a
requirement for non-power reactor licensees (i.e., research and test
reactor licensees) to include in their emergency plans detailed
analyses demonstrating that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned
emergency plan implementation functions in a timely manner without
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from
performing their emergency plan functions.
4. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for the
capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition
within 15 minutes and a requirement to promptly declare an emergency
condition. The NRC proposes to require nuclear power reactor licensees
to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and
declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability
of indications to plant operators that an EAL has been exceeded, and to
also require that an emergency condition be promptly declared as soon
as possible following a determination that an EAL has been exceeded.
The NRC is considering whether it is necessary to add the emergency
declaration timeliness criteria for non-power reactor licensees. The
NRC is seeking comments on whether to issue regulations requiring that
non-power reactor licensees meet these criteria.
5. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for
hostile action event EALs. The NRC is proposing that EALs for nuclear
power plants must address hostile action events. The proposed rule
regarding EALs would not apply to non-power reactors because the EALs
for these reactors are generally based on projected or actual offsite
dose and not an initiating event. However, hostile action directed
toward a non-power reactor is an initiating event that could
conceivably cause an offsite dose. The NRC is seeking comments on
whether the NRC should issue regulations requiring that non-power
reactor licensees include hostile action event EALs in their emergency
plans.
6. Effective date. As proposed, the effective date of this rule
would be 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register, with an option for a licensee or applicant to defer
implementation until 180 days after publication of the final rule in
the Federal Register (with certain exceptions). The NRC is concerned
that combined license (COL) and early site permit (ESP) applicants
would need to submit timely revisions to docketed applications, to
avoid schedule impacts to application reviews, in order to comply with
the proposed amendments should they become final before the staff's
licensing review is complete. The NRC is seeking comments on how COL
and ESP applicants would implement this rule as proposed, including any
impacts to the process and schedule for the applicant to submit and the
NRC to review those revisions to COL or ESP applications.
7. Implementation Schedule. As proposed, each element of the
proposed rule would be implemented on a schedule that may vary from
approximately 30 days to 3 years. The wide variance in the proposed
implementation schedule is a result of the varying degree of difficulty
and scheduling problems for some elements including the need for
analysis, development of processes, procurement of equipment/
facilities, and/or coordination with offsite response organizations.
The NRC is concerned that the proposed implementation schedule may not
be appropriate for some offsite response organizations and licensees.
The NRC is seeking comments regarding the appropriateness of the
proposed implementation schedule.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
The Commission is proposing to amend portions of Sec. 50.47,
``Emergency plans,'' Sec. 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses;'' Part 50,
Appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and
Utilization Facilities;'' and Sec. 52.79, ``Contents of applications;
technical information in final safety analysis report.''
Section 50.47 Emergency Plans
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.47(b)(3) to remove the
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3
of this document.)
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.47(b)(10) to require
licensees to review and update their ETEs periodically and submit them
to the NRC for review and approval. Proposed changes to Appendix E to
Part 50 would provide the required frequency and details of the ETE
updates and submissions. Although requirements for ETEs are found in
both Sec. 50.47(b) and in Appendix E to Part 50, the level of
[[Page 23271]]
detail between them greatly differs. Section 50.47(b) establishes the
EP planning standards that licensees must meet, whereas Appendix E sets
forth more detailed implementation requirements. (A discussion of this
issue is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
This new requirement would ensure that ETEs are reviewed
periodically to determine whether population changes have caused
significant changes in the ETE. NRC review of ETE updates would ensure
they are performed routinely, are consistent across the industry, and
are technically sound. NRC guidance would provide more details of NRC
expectations for development of an adequate ETE, as well as provide NRC
reviewers with guidance on the review of ETE updates. The NRC would
expect that the updated ETEs would be shared with OROs to be
incorporated into protective action strategies.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.47(d)(1) to remove the
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3
of this document.)
Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses
The NRC proposes to revise Sec. 50.54(q) in its entirety. Proposed
Sec. 50.54(q)(1) would define four terms whose meanings would be
limited to application within the proposed Sec. 50.54(q). Proposed
Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(i) would define a ``change'' to the emergency plan as
an action that results in modification or addition to, or removal from,
the licensee's emergency plan or the resources, capabilities, and
methods identified in the emergency plan. Thus, a change to the
emergency plan would not be limited to revisions to the document
labeled ``emergency plan.'' For example, a proposed plant configuration
change that removes a seismic instrument relied upon in the emergency
plan as an EAL threshold would be encompassed by this definition. The
last sentence in this definition calls attention to the possibility
that other regulatory change processes may be applicable. In the
example above, the plant configuration change would likely be subject
to the requirements of Sec. 50.59 and a technical specification change
may also be involved. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.B.5 of this document.)
The proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(ii) definition of ``Emergency plan''
would encompass any document that describes the programmatic methods
that the licensee uses to maintain and perform emergency planning
functions and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b). Under the proposed Sec. 50.54(q), sub-tier documents,
such as emergency plan implementing procedures, would not ordinarily be
subject to the Sec. 50.54(q) change process because these procedures
generally only provide instructions in performing the programmatic
methods identified and described in the emergency plan. This would be
consistent with the current Sec. 50.54(q) requirements. However, if a
license were to relocate a programmatic description to another
document, that description would remain subject to the proposed Sec.
50.54(q) change process. For example, if a licensee were to relocate
the details of its emergency classification scheme from the emergency
plan to a wall chart posted in the control room, the wall chart would
be subject to the proposed Sec. 50.54(q) change process. The
definition would also emphasize, by incorporation, the role of the
licensee's original emergency plan approved by the NRC in minimizing
the likelihood that a series of incremental changes over time will
constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the original approved
emergency plan.
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iii) would define the term ``emergency
planning function'' in terms of a capability or resource necessary to
prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency. During the
development of the EP Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP subject
matter experts, including NRC staff and nuclear power industry
stakeholders, with input from the public, developed a series of
planning standard functions that would be used in determining the
significance of inspection findings. These planning standard functions
are paraphrases of the broadly worded Sec. 50.47(b) planning standards
and the corresponding requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 in terms of
the significant functions that need to be accomplished, or the
capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of
a licensee's emergency plan and emergency response capability. Within
the EP Cornerstone, the significance of inspection findings depends on
whether the planning standards can be accomplished (i.e., loss of
planning standard function) or can be accomplished only in a degraded
manner (i.e., degraded planning standard function). The
characterization of a reduction in effectiveness in the proposed rule
would capitalize on this earlier effort in that any degradation or loss
of a planning standard function would be deemed to constitute a
reduction in effectiveness. The NRC is proposing to use the phrase
``emergency planning function'' in lieu of ``planning standard
function'' as used in the ROP to allow the definition to be applicable
to licensed facilities that are subject to Appendix E, but are not
subject to the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b). The emergency
planning functions would be established in regulatory guidance along
with examples of typical emergency plan changes that would be expected
to constitute a reduction in effectiveness and examples of changes that
would not.
The emergency planning functions would not replace or supplement
the regulations upon which they would be based and as such, compliance
with these functions would not be required. They would be only used to
differentiate between changes that the licensee would be allowed to
make without prior NRC approval and those that would require prior NRC
approval. The NRC would not establish these emergency planning
functions in regulations because the underlying regulations already
exist, and the expression of the emergency planning functions would
differ between nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, and fuel
facilities licensed under Part 50 or Part 52. A draft regulatory guide
that discusses these emergency planning functions for nuclear power
reactors has been prepared and will be made available for public
comment in conjunction with this proposed rule.
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iv) would define the term ``reduction in
effectiveness'' as a change to the emergency plan that results in a
reduction of the licensee's capability to perform an emergency planning
function in the event of a radiological emergency. The phrase
``reduction in effectiveness'' would be an evaluation concept that
would be used in proposed Sec. 50.54(q) to differentiate between
changes that the licensee would be allowed to make without prior NRC
approval and those that would require prior NRC approval. A
determination that a change may result in a reduction in effectiveness
does not imply that the licensee could no longer implement its
[[Page 23272]]
plan and provide adequate measures for the protection of the public.
The NRC may approve a proposed emergency plan change that the licensee
determined to be a reduction in effectiveness, if the NRC can find that
the emergency plan, as modified, would continue to meet the
requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees,
the planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b), and would continue to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ``Radiological
emergency'' as used in the proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iv), would mean
any condition that would result in the declaration of any emergency
classification level and the implementation of the licensee's emergency
plan. A nuclear power reactor licensee evaluating whether a particular
emergency plan change would constitute a reduction in effectiveness
would be expected to consider the spectrum of accidents addressed in
the planning basis described in NUREG-0654. In making this
determination, licensees of non-power reactors and fuel facilities
licensed under Part 50 would base their evaluations on the planning
bases for their respective facilities.
Current regulations in Parts 50 and 52 require applicants for
licenses to develop emergency plans that meet the requirements of
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, Sec. 50.47(b), as
applicable, during facility licensing. A holder of a license under Part
50 or a combined license under Part 52 after the Commission makes the
finding under Sec. 52.103(g) would be required by proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(2) to follow and maintain the effectiveness of its emergency
plan, as originally approved. The proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(2) references
to Appendix E and Sec. 50.47(b), as applicable, would extend the
applicability of these requirements as a condition of the facility
license (as does the current language in Sec. 50.54(q)). The NRC would
expect licensees to identify conditions and situations which could
reduce the effectiveness of its emergency plan, and to take corrective
and/or compensatory actions to restore and maintain the requisite
effectiveness.
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(3) would grant authority to the holder of a
license to make changes to its emergency plan without prior NRC
approval only if an analysis demonstrates that the changes do not
reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed,
continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for nuclear power
reactor licensees, Sec. 50.47(b). The reference to Appendix E and
Sec. 50.47(b), as applicable, in this paragraph, would serve to
exclude any change for which the licensee must request an exemption
from requirements under Sec. 50.12.
The NRC would expect a licensee considering a change under this
section to perform an evaluation of the change to a level of rigor and
thoroughness consistent with the scope of the proposed change. A
licensee's analysis of the impact of a change on the effectiveness of
the plan would need to consider the accidents included in the emergency
planning basis, the licensing basis of the particular emergency plan,
and any emergency plan elements implemented to address site-specific
emergency response constraints (e.g., delay in staff augmentation
associated with a remote site, commitments to State or local
governments, existence of significant external hazards, etc.).
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(4) would define the process by which a
licensee would request prior approval of a change to the emergency plan
that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in
effectiveness of the plan. Licensees pursuing these changes would be
required to apply for an amendment to the license as provided in Sec.
50.90. Courts have found that Commission actions that expand licensees'
authority under their licenses without formally amending the licenses
constitute license amendments and should be processed through the
Commission's license amendment procedures. (See Citizens Awareness
Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 651
F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459
U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re Three Mile Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729
(3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). See also Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-
13, 44 NRC 315 (1996)). A proposed emergency plan change that would
reduce the effectiveness of the plan would give the licensee a
capability to operate at a level of effectiveness that was not
previously authorized by the NRC. In this situation, the licensee's
operating authority would be expanded beyond the authority granted by
the NRC as reflected in the emergency plan without the proposed change.
Thus, an emergency plan change that would reduce the effectiveness of
the plan would expand the licensee's operating authority under its
license. A change expanding the licensee's operating authority is,
according to the courts, a license amendment and must be accomplished
through a license amendment process.
In addition to satisfying the filing requirements for a license
amendment request in Sec. 50.90 and Sec. 50.91, the proposed Sec.
50.54(q)(4) request would include all emergency plan pages affected by
the change, a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason for
the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's emergency
plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements of Appendix E,
and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b). The NRC would review the amendment application to make
its no significant hazards consideration determination and to determine
if the emergency plan, as modified, is a reduction in effectiveness
under Sec. 50.54(q) and continues to meet the requirements in Appendix
E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b).
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(5) would apply to all licensees subject to
Sec. 50.54(q) and require that licensees retain a record of all
changes to the emergency plans made without prior NRC approval for a
period of three years from the date of change. The section would also
require the licensee to submit, as specified under Sec. 50.4, a report
of each such change, including its evaluation, within 30 days of the
change. The NRC expects that the record of changes would include
documentation of the evaluation that determined the change not to be a
reduction in effectiveness. The NRC would use this record of changes
during inspection oversight of the licensee's implementation of
proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(2).
Proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(6) would require a licensee of a nuclear
power reactor to retain the emergency plan and each change for which
prior NRC approval was obtained under proposed Sec. 50.54(q)(4) as a
record until the Commission terminates the license.
The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (r) of Sec. 50.54. Section
50.54(r) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402)
to require then-existing licensees authorized to possess and/or operate
a research or test reactor facility to submit emergency plans complying
with Appendix E to Part 50 to the NRC for approval within one year or
two years, as applicable, from the effective date of the rule (November
3, 1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section
II.B.6 of this document.)
The NRC proposes to amend Sec. 50.54 by revising Sec. 50.54(s)(1)
to remove language addressing a one-time requirement that has now been
completed. Section 50.54(s)(1) was published as a final rule on August
19,
[[Page 23273]]
1980 (45 FR 55402). This provision required existing nuclear power
reactor licensees to submit to the NRC within 60 days after the
effective date of the rule (November 3, 1980), the radiological
response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United
States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway
EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially
within an ingestion pathway EPZ. Section 50.54(s)(1) continued to
further establish the size of the two EPZs. (A discussion of this issue
is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this document.)
The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (s)(2)(i) from Sec. 50.54.
Section 50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a final rule on August
19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) as a single paragraph. The rule was amended on
May 29, 1981 (46 FR 28838), resulting in Sec. 50.54(s)(2) being split
into two paragraphs, Sec. Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The
rule language in Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(i) requires that the licensee,
State, and local emergency plans for all operating power reactors be
implemented by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3. of
Appendix E to Part 50. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.B.6 of this document.)
The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (u) from Sec. 50.54. Section
50.54(u) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402)
to require then-existing nuclear power reactor licensees to submit to
the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in
Sec. 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 within 60
days after the effective date of the rule (November 3, 1980). (A
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this
document.)
The NRC is proposing to revise paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of
Sec. 50.54 to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains
within DHS, the responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power plants
is with FEMA. FEMA has requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather than
``DHS'' for clarity of communication with stakeholders.
The NRC is proposing to amend Sec. 50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3
of this document.)
Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
The NRC is proposing to amend several paragraphs within Section IV.
of Appendix E to Part 50 that would apply to licensees and applicants
for licenses under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, as applicable.
The NRC would amend the first paragraph of Section IV. by adding
language to require nuclear power reactor licensees and license
applicants to revise their ETEs when the decennial census data is
available. The proposed regulation would require that within 180 days
of the issuance of the 2010 decennial census data (expected to be
available in 2011), ETE revisions be submitted to the NRC under Sec.
50.4 for review and approval. The NRC would establish a schedule for
review and approval of the updated ETEs. Thereafter, nuclear power
reactor licensees and license applicants would be required to annually
review changes in the population of their EPZ and most populous
Emergency Response Planning Area (ERPA). ERPAs are local areas,
typically defined by geographic or political boundaries that are used
to communicate protective actions to members of the public in familiar
geographic terms. When the new population, including permanent
residents and transient populations, in either the EPZ or most populous
ERPA would be less than 90 percent or greater than 110 percent of the
population that formed the basis for the currently approved ETE, the
licensee or applicant would be required to update the ETE to reflect
the impact of this population change. The licensee or applicant would
be required to submit the updated ETE to the NRC under the procedures
of Sec. 50.4 within 180 days of the availability of the population
data used in the update. (A discussion of this issue is also provided
in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
The NRC proposes to require licensees and applicants to review
changes in the population of the EPZ and the most populous ERPA because
population density in an EPZ is generally not homogeneous and EPZ
evacuation times are significantly influenced by the ERPA with the
largest population. The NRC considered requiring review of all ERPAs or
the review of individual counties and States in addition to the whole
EPZ. Review of the ERPA with the largest population was considered to
be a reasonable balance between the burden on licensees and applicants
and the need to ensure that the ETE is accurate because the ERPA with
the largest population is generally the one with the most impact on
evacuation times.
The proposed requirement for nuclear power reactor licensees to
evaluate a population change impact on the ETE during the period
between decennial censuses would balance the burden on licensees and
the expected rates of change among the relevant populations. The U.S.
Census Bureau currently projects population growth at approximately one
percent per year in the United States. However, certain areas
experience much greater growth. The population of Maricopa County,
Arizona, for example, experienced approximately 6.4 percent growth in
the two-year period from 2005 to 2007. The Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station is located in Maricopa County. St. Lucie County in
Florida, where the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant is located, experienced
approximately 9.7 percent population growth in the same period. A
nuclear plant's EPZ population may not grow at the same rate as the
corresponding county(ies) population, but a review of population growth
would be appropriate, as discussed in Section II.B.4 of this document.
The review would consist of analysis of population growth based on
either U.S. Census Bureau data (e.g., Subcounty Population Datasets for
population estimates) or State/local government estimates and would
examine the whole EPZ as well as the most populous emergency planning
area within the EPZ. If an ETE revision were necessary, it would be
submitted to the NRC under the provisions of Sec. 50.4 for review and
approval. The NRC would review the ETEs to ensure they were consistent
with NRC guidance on the development of ETEs that would be expected to
be issued with the final rule.
The updated ETEs would allow for more effective development of
public protective action strategies and review of evacuation planning.
Sites with little population change would be minimally impacted by the
proposed requirement, while those sites with a greater rate of
population change would be required to perform more frequent updates.
Licensees would also be expected to identify and analyze potential
enhancements to improve evacuation times and document whether
implementation was appropriate.
The NRC is also proposing to revise the first paragraph of Section
IV. to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.'' It is also
clarifying in this paragraph that
[[Page 23274]]
the requirements for the submittal of emergency response plans apply to
not only applicants for nuclear power reactor operating license
applicants under Part 50, but also to applicants for early site permits
(as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52. This clarification
was intended for but inadvertently omitted from a rulemaking to update
Part 52 (72 FR 49517, dated August 28, 2007).
The NRC is proposing to make two editorial revisions to Appendix E
to Part 50, Section IV.A.2. One change would be to include the
abbreviation of emergency response organization, ``ERO,'' in paragraph
2 of Section IV.A. The second revision would clarify that paragraph
2.c. should read as follows: ``Authorities, responsibilities, and
duties of an onsite emergency coordinator. * * *''
The NRC is proposing to amend Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7.
to require licensees to confirm that ORO resources, such as local law
enforcement, firefighting, and medical services, are available to
respond to an emergency, including a hostile action event, at the plant
site. Currently, the regulations do not explicitly require the licensee
to take action to ensure that OROs are capable of adequately responding
to the site during a hostile action event. This new requirement would
require licensee coordination with the OROs to ensure that licensees
and OROs are able to effectively implement their pre-planned actions
for any contingency, including hostile action events as required by
Order EA-02-026. This requirement would be enforced through routine
inspection and observation of emergency exercises. (A discussion of
this issue is also provided in Section II.A.4 of this document.)
The proposed requirement would also contain a new footnote, which
would define ``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a nuclear
power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to
destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to
achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns,
explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver
destructive force.
The NRC is proposing to add a new paragraph A.9. in Section IV. of
Appendix E to Part 50. This new paragraph would require nuclear power
plant licensees under this part and Part 52 to provide a detailed
analysis to show that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan
implementation functions are not assigned any responsibilities that
would prevent them from performing their assigned emergency plan
functions when needed. This proposed amendment would constitute a new
requirement. The proposed rule would not specify, by position or
function, which responsibilities must be assigned, but would allow
licensees the flexibility to determine the limit of assigned
responsibilities for effective emergency plan implementation on a site-
specific basis. This would allow licensees to take credit for new
technologies that could potentially affect the number of on-shift staff
that would be needed. However, licensees would need to ensure that the
duties assigned to on-shift staff were reasonable for one person to
perform and would not be so burdensome as to negatively impact
emergency response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.1 of this document.)
The licensees would have to perform a detailed analysis, such as a
job task analysis (JTA) or a time motion analysis, to demonstrate that
on-shift personnel could implement the plan effectively without having
competing responsibilities that could prevent them from performing
their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC would expect the analysis
to identify all the tasks which must be performed by available staff
during an evolution such as response to an emergency.
Licensees would first need to identify the spectrum of accidents
defined in their licensing bases (i.e., design basis accidents (DBAs),
as well as the DBT, as applicable), for which there must be emergency
planning. The analysis would identify all tasks which must be completed
for each DBA and the DBT, as applicable, and the responders responsible
for the performance of those tasks. Then licensees would ensure that
there would be sufficient on-shift staff to perform all necessary tasks
until augmentation staff arrives to provide assistance. Enhancing the
regulations to require licensees to ensure that multiple
responsibilities assigned to on-shift staff would not detract from
adequate emergency plan implementation would establish a regulatory
framework that more clearly codifies the NRC's shift staffing
expectations for effective emergency response.
The NRC proposes to amend Section IV.B. of Appendix E to Part 50 to
add a requirement that nuclear power reactor licensees and license
applicants would take hostile action events, which may adversely affect
the plant (e.g., cause personnel harm and/or equipment damage), into
account in their EAL schemes. It would also serve to establish
consistent EALs for hostile action events among existing and future
nuclear power reactor licensees and allow the licensees to make hostile
action emergency declarations based on a credible threat. (A discussion
of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.2 of this document.)
The proposed language would also make changes to conform to
proposed changes to Sec. 50.54(q), which address the issue described
in Section II.B.5 of this document. The current requirement in
paragraph (1) in Section IV.B. of Appendix E that licensees obtain
prior NRC approval via Sec. 50.4 for changes to an EAL scheme from
NUREG-0654 to one based on NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01 would be
retained, but the paragraph numbering would be removed. Paragraphs (2)
and (3) would be deleted and replaced with a new requirement that all
other EAL changes would be required to be made under the proposed
amended Sec. 50.54(q) change process, as discussed earlier in Section
V of this document. The two remaining paragraphs in this section would
be designated B.1. and B.2.
The NRC proposes to retain the existing language of Section IV.C.
of Appendix E to Part 50, redesignate that language as paragraph C.1.,
and add a new paragraph C.2. Proposed paragraph C.2.would require that
nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this part and Part
52 have and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an
emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of
indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been
exceeded and will promptly declare the emergency condition upon
determining that an emergency action level has been exceeded. The NRC
believes that the amended language would emphasize the NRC's
expectations regarding the timeliness of emergency declarations while
retaining sufficient operational flexibility to respond to extenuating
circumstances necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC
would consider the 15-minute criterion to commence when plant
instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal
reports that correspond to an EAL become available to cognizant
personnel within the control room, or in another emergency facility in
which emergency declarations are performed. On receipt of such
information, the licensee personnel would assess the data for validity
and compare the indications to the EALs in the licensee's emergency
classification scheme. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.B.2 of this document.)
This 15-minute criterion would end as soon as the licensee
determines that
[[Page 23275]]
an EAL has been exceeded and the licensee makes the emergency
declaration. The proposed rule would also require the licensee to
promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as the licensee
determined that an EAL had been exceeded. Because the NRC would require
emergency declarations to be made promptly, the proposed rule states
that the 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace period
in which a licensee may attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid
declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. If the EAL threshold
specifies a duration (e.g., ``fire lasting for greater than 10 minutes
from detection''), the NRC would expect the licensee to assess and
classify the event concurrently with the specified condition duration.
The licensee would then be required to promptly declare the emergency
condition as soon as the specified duration has been exceeded. The
licensee would be expected, but not required, to declare the emergency
condition once it has been determined that the condition cannot be
corrected before the specified duration is exceeded.
The NRC is proposing a capability criterion, rather than an
inflexible performance criterion, to allow licensees some degree of
flexibility in addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise
during an actual emergency. For example, an emergency declaration may
need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant operations that
are urgently needed to protect public health and safety. These delays
would be found acceptable if they did not deny State and local
authorities the opportunity to implement actions to protect the public
health or safety under their emergency plans and the cause of the delay
was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and
prevent.
The NRC is proposing to add language to Section IV.D.3. of Appendix
E to require licensees and applicants to have backup ANS methods for
both the alert and notification functions without specifying which
backup measures should be used. This approach would allow flexibility
in the selection of the method best suited for each site and would also
allow the use of newer technologies or other alternative methods.
Available backup ANS methods would enhance the public's ability to be
promptly alerted of an event at a facility and of possible protective
actions. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.1
of this document.)
Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E currently acknowledges that, for the
events more likely to warrant use of the alert and notification
capability, State and local officials will have substantial time
available to make a judgment regarding activation of the warning system
to alert and notify the public. Accordingly, the proposed amendment
would not impose specific time requirements for using a backup method.
The alerting function could involve one or more methods that are
already used as a backup means at several sites, such as multiple,
independent siren activation points in conjunction with siren backup
power, route alerting, reverse call-out systems or newer technologies,
such as intelligent notification and communication systems for
notifying targeted populations. The notification function could involve
the designation of multiple EAS broadcast stations or use of weather
alert radios or newer technologies, such as advanced messaging systems.
Guidance would be provided for determining the acceptability of the
backup methods based on the alerting and notification capabilities of
the methods selected, administrative provisions for implementing and
maintaining backup methods, identification of resources to implement
backup methods, and periodic demonstration of the backup methods.
Guidance would also be provided to licensees and offsite officials
regarding the need to ensure that the backup methods could alert and
notify the public in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ, that the
personnel and resources required to implement the backup methods would
be available during any type of emergency (including hostile action
events), and that designated personnel know how to implement backup
methods.
The backup method of alerting and notification would be capable of
providing warning signals and instructional messages to the population
in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ when the primary ANS is
unavailable during an emergency (i.e., the primary ANS cannot alert or
notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population).
The backup means could be designed so that it can be implemented using
a phased approach in which the populations most at risk are alerted and
notified first, followed by alerting and notification of people in less
immediately affected areas. The backup method may have the additional
capability of being employed only in the specific areas impacted when a
portion of the primary ANS, such as a single siren or sirens within a
community, fails and the extent of the affected area and population can
be determined.
The new requirement for a backup method would apply to both the
alerting function and notification function of the FEMA-approved ANS.
However, the NRC recognizes that some backup methods would not be
capable of meeting the timeframes that are part of the primary ANS
design objectives. The intent of the proposed amendment would not be to
have a duplicate primary ANS, but to have a means of backup alerting
and notification in place so the public could be alerted in sufficient
time to allow offsite officials to consider a range of protective
actions for the public to take in the event of a severe accident with
potential offsite radiological consequences. Guidance would be provided
to clarify the design objectives and other criteria for ANS backup
methods.
For nuclear power plant sites with no backup measures currently in
place, backup provisions would need to be identified, incorporated into
the site's ANS design, and submitted for FEMA approval as specified in
FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification
Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.'' For nuclear power plant sites that
already have provisions for ANS backup means in FEMA-approved ANS
designs, licensees and offsite officials would need to confirm that the
backup methods meet the proposed requirements and submit revised ANS
designs for FEMA approval if changes were deemed necessary. Timeframes
for submitting and approving ANS designs, along with implementation of
the backup methods, could vary considerably depending on the level of
ANS backup measures already in place. Therefore, backup methods must be
ready for demonstration no later than its first biennial exercise
conducted more than one year after the effective date of the rule,
which would result in a maximum of approximately 3 years for
implementation across the industry.
Additional changes to Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. are being
proposed to more clearly distinguish between the alerting and
notification functions of the ANS (including clarification of how the
15-minute design objective applies to these functions), to use
consistent terminology when referring to the officials responsible for
ANS activation, and to update language regarding demonstration of ANS
capabilities and correction of deficiencies. References to the alerting
function would be added to Section IV.D.3. to clearly indicate that the
requirements for the primary and backup ANS apply to both the alerting
[[Page 23276]]
and notification functions. The wording of the primary ANS design
objective would be revised to clarify that the 15-minute criterion
applies to the completion of the initial alerting and start of the
initial notification of the public (See Public Service Company of New
Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-935, 32 NRC 57, 68
(1990)). The phrase ``appropriate governmental authorities'' would be
used in place of ``State and local officials'' when referring to ANS
activation to encompass site-specific variations in the assignment of
the responsibility for this function according to each offsite
emergency plan and established ANS activation protocols. This
responsibility may be assigned to a single State or local organization,
or to multiple organizations among various State, county, local, and
other governmental agencies. The use of ``appropriate governmental
authorities'' addresses all of these combinations. The current language
in Section IV.D.3. refers to the February 1, 1982, date for then-
existing nuclear power reactor licensees to have demonstrated ANS
capabilities for their sites. The NRC is proposing to remove the
reference to the February 1, 1982 date and require that ANS
capabilities to alert the public and provide instructions promptly must
be demonstrated before exceeding 5 percent rated thermal power of the
first reactor at each site, consistent with the requirements of Sec.
50.47(d). It is also important that licensees promptly correct
deficiencies found during initial ANS installation and testing, as well
as deficiencies identified thereafter, as required by Sec.
50.54(s)(2). However, the requirement for correction of ANS
deficiencies is clearly stated in Sec. 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not
need to be repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
The NRC is also proposing to add language to Section IV.D.3. of
Appendix E to require licensees under this part and Part 52 to
implement the requirements for a backup means of alerting and
notification under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. no
later than its first biennial exercise conducted more than one year
after the effective date of the rule.
Note that no changes are proposed to the basic requirement in Sec.
50.47(b)(5) for nuclear power plant licensees or applicants to ensure
that the means to provide early notification and clear instruction
(i.e., alerting and notification) to the populace in the plume exposure
pathway EPZ have been established. It is not necessary to address
backup methods in Sec. 50.47(b)(5) because the current provision
establishes the overall requirement for alerting and notification.
The NRC is also proposing to revise Section IV.E.5. of Appendix E
to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency''; and the
existing language of Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. to redesignate the
revised language as Section IV.E.8.a.; and add new Sections IV.E.8.b.,
IV.E.8.c., IV.E.8.d., and IV.E.8.e.
Proposed Section IV.E.8.a. would remove the reference to the EOF as
a ``near-site'' facility and add the requirement that nuclear power
plant licensees and applicants under this part and Part 52 must provide
an OSC. In a conforming change, Sec. 52.79(a)(17) would be revised to
make it clear that combined license applications would not be subject
to the TMI action requirements in Sec. 50.34(f)(2)(xxv), which address
the need for an onsite TSC, an onsite OSC, and for an EOF. Instead, the
requirements governing the need for such facilities in Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) would apply to combined license
applications. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section
II.B.3 of this document.)
Proposed Section IV.E.8.b. would incorporate EOF distance criteria
currently found in NRC guidance and specify that an EOF must be located
within 10 to 25 miles of each nuclear power reactor site that the
facility serves or, if the EOF is located less than 10 miles from a
nuclear power reactor site, then a backup facility must be provided
within 10 to 25 miles of a site. The distance between the EOF and a
site would be determined by the straight-line distance from the site's
TSC to the EOF, which would be consistent with the approach described
in NUREG-0696, Table 2, ``Relation of EOF Location to Habitability
Criteria.'' An exception to the 25-mile limit would be made for an EOF
as long as provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to
that nuclear power reactor site are made so they can interact face-to-
face with personnel going to and leaving the site for briefings and
debriefings. During an event, NRC and offsite agency staff may wish to
relocate from a remotely located EOF to another facility closer to the
nuclear power plant site. Suitable space near the site would be
available so NRC and offsite agency staff could coordinate their
actions efficiently, communicate with responders in other onsite and
offsite emergency response facilities, and interface directly with
responders at the site as needed. This space would allow NRC site team
and offsite response personnel, including Federal, State, and local
responders, to conduct briefings and debriefings with emergency
response personnel entering and leaving the site, communicate with
responders at other emergency response facilities, maintain awareness
of conditions at the site, and share information with other emergency
response organizations via computer links, such as the Internet.
Proposed Section IV.E.8.c. would provide performance-based criteria
applicable to all EOFs. The functions that an EOF would have to address
include the capability to obtain and display plant data and
radiological information for each reactor unit or plant that the
facility serves. In some cases, an EOF could serve units or plants
involving more than one type of reactor technology, such as pressurized
water reactors and boiling water reactors, or more than one design of
the same reactor type. The EOF staff would need to be capable of
understanding conditions for each type of reactor and translating
technical information into a useful form for offsite officials and
media relations staff. A co-located or consolidated facility would also
need to be capable of supporting effective response to events at more
than one site simultaneously, because widespread events affecting
multiple sites can and have occurred, such as the electrical blackout
in several areas of the northeastern U.S. and portions of Canada in
August 2003. The ability to simultaneously display information for
multiple plants would also enhance effective response to events
occurring at more than one site.
By codifying EOF distance requirements in Section IV.E.8.b. of
Appendix E and providing specific criteria for EOFs in Section
IV.E.8.c., the proposed language would obviate the need for licensees
to seek NRC approval at either the staff or Commission level to locate
an EOF or consolidate EOFs meeting certain performance-based
requirements and having provisions for NRC site team and offsite agency
responders closer to a site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles
from a site. Licensees could then implement a relocated or consolidated
facility as part of their emergency response plans under the provisions
of Sec. 50.54(q) without prior NRC approval. The proposed language
would also address Commission direction provided in the SRM to SECY-04-
0236, as discussed in Section II.B.3 of this document. During exercises
and actual events, EOFs located more than 25 miles from a site that
have been previously approved by the NRC have functioned as effective
[[Page 23277]]
emergency response facilities and demonstrated that a near-site EOF is
not necessary to adequately protect public health and safety.
Although not included in the proposed rule language of Sections
IV.E.8.b. or IV.E.8.c. as a requirement, the NRC believes it is
important for licensees or applicants to consult with offsite agencies
that send representatives to the EOF prior to relocating or
consolidating such facilities. This consultation is particularly
important when a licensee or applicant intends to use an EOF located
more than 25 miles from a site to ensure that response times to the
facility would be acceptable to offsite responders, adequate
communications with offsite responders at other locations would be
available, and there would be no jurisdictional concerns with the EOF
location (e.g., when the EOF is located in a different State than a
nuclear power plant). Additional criteria regarding EOF habitability,
size, staffing, and other characteristics would remain as guidance.
Proposed Section IV.E.8.d. would require nuclear power plant
licensees and applicants under this part and Part 52, to identify
alternative facilities to function as staging areas for augmentation of
ERO staff during hostile action events to minimize delays in emergency
response and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response. To
accomplish this, the alternative facility would be required to have the
following characteristics: Accessibility even if the site is under
threat or actual attack; communication links with the EOF, Control
Room, and plant security; the capability to notify offsite agencies if
the EOF is not performing this action; and the capability for
engineering assessment activities, including damage control team
planning and preparation. The alternative facility should also be
equipped with general plant drawings and procedures, telephones, and
computer links to the site to ensure that the ERO is aware of
conditions at the site and prepared to return when personnel are
allowed to re-enter the site. This would enable rapid staffing of
onsite emergency response facilities and implementation of mitigation
actions when ERO personnel enter the protected area. However,
alternative facilities would not be required to reproduce the full
documentation present at primary emergency response facilities. (A
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.3 of this
document.)
The NRC also proposes to add a new Section IV.E.8.e. to permit a
nuclear power reactor licensee, that, on the day the final rule becomes
effective, has an approved EOF that does not meet the distance criteria
for a primary or backup EOF, or does not have provisions for a facility
closer to the site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles from a
nuclear power reactor site, to not be subject to the requirements of
Section IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already received approval from
the Commission for variances from existing requirements (and guidance)
regarding EOF locations, backup EOF facilities, or other EOF
characteristics. (Also refer to the discussion of this issue in Section
II.B.3 of this document.)
The NRC is proposing to amend Sections IV.E.9.c. and IV.E.9.d. to
remove references to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria
would be provided in Section IV.E.8. of Appendix E, regarding EOF
distance from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based
approach for EOFs. The criteria would specify that these facilities
would need to meet certain functional requirements rather than
requiring that they be located within a certain distance of the plant.
The intent of this change is discussed in the proposed changes to
Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E. (A discussion of this issue is also
provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
The NRC is proposing to revise paragraph F.1.a. of Section IV. to
remove the word ``radiation'' because the advent of hostile action-
based scenarios renders usage of the word as too limiting in describing
potential emergencies. This change would provide consistent use of the
term ``emergency plan.'' The NRC is also proposing to revise paragraph
F.1.b. to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
The NRC proposes to add a new requirement to Section IV.F.2.a. to
require licensees to submit, for NRC review and approval, scenarios for
full participation exercises required by Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.
This proposed requirement would enable the NRC to ensure that licensee
exercise scenarios implement the proposed requirements of Sections
IV.F.2.i. and IV.F.2.j. of Appendix E, including hostile action events
and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of respondents.
The NRC also proposes to insert the word ``initial'' in paragraph
F.2.a. to distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and
F.2.b. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.6
of this document.)
The NRC is proposing to revise paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and
F.2.a.(iii) of Appendix E, Section IV. to replace ``DHS'' with
``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains within DHS, the responsibility for
offsite EP for nuclear power plants is with FEMA. FEMA has requested
that ``FEMA'' be used rather than ``DHS'' for clarity of communication
with stakeholders.
The NRC is proposing several revisions to Section IV.F.2.b. to
require licensees to submit, for NRC review and approval, scenarios for
their onsite biennial exercises. This proposed requirement would enable
the NRC to ensure licensee exercise scenarios implement the proposed
requirements of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i. and IV.F.2.j., including
hostile action events and a variety of challenges to reduce
preconditioning of respondents. The NRC also proposes to insert the
word ``subsequent'' in paragraph F.2.b. of Section IV. to distinguish
between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and F.2.b.
The current language in Section IV.F.2.b. requires that licensees
ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained to
address several principal emergency response functional areas. The NRC
is proposing to expand the list of principal functional areas of
emergency response in paragraph F.2.b. to include event classification,
notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the impact of onsite
and offsite radiological releases, and development of protective action
recommendations. These additional functional areas are associated with
the planning standards in Sec. 50.47(b) that have a significant impact
on determining the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to
protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency (i.e.,
Sec. 50.47(b)(4) regarding event classification, Sec. 50.47(b)(5)
regarding notification of offsite authorities, Sec. 50.47(b)(9)
regarding assessment of radiological releases, and Sec. 50.47(b)(10)
regarding protective actions).
The NRC proposes to amend the last sentence of Section IV.F.2.b. to
add ``in all participating facilities'' after ``operating staff'' to
clarify that the operating staff from all facilities need not
participate in the drill. The NRC also proposes to change ``the drills
could focus on onsite training objectives'' to ``the drills may focus
on the onsite exercise training objectives'' to make the permissive
intent of the regulatory language more explicit.
The NRC is proposing to amend Section IV.F.2.f. to add a second
situation when remedial exercises would be required. The proposed
amendment would explain that
[[Page 23278]]
remedial exercises would be required if the emergency plan is not
satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC,
in consultation with FEMA, could not find reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures could be taken in response to an emergency
or determine that key ERO skills had been maintained. This change would
demonstrate the NRC's intent to invoke this requirement for exercises
where the scope of the exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate the
maintenance of key ERO skills. In the past, some exercises have not
provided such a demonstration due to the use of simplistic scenarios.
The proposed rule change is intended to prevent this trend in the
future. The key skills necessary to implement the emergency plan vary
among ERO members, emergency response facilities, and licensees. In
general, key skills include the ability to implement emergency response
procedures specific to the duties of the ERO member. Key skills include
specific response capabilities that may be assigned in a site-specific
manner such as:
Timely classification of events;
Timely notification of offsite authorities;
Assessment of radiological releases onsite and offsite;
Development of protective action recommendations;
Dissemination of information to the public via media
channels;
Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and
repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions;
Protection of workers during emergency response, including
medical care;
Response to operational transients while implementing the
emergency plan; and
Coordination with offsite response organizations.
The NRC also proposes to revise Section IV.F.2.g. to require
licensees to correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified during
training evolutions, exercises, or drills. This change would explicitly
state the regulatory intent that training evolutions, drills, and
exercises are included in the requirement for critique and correction
of weaknesses or deficiencies.
The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.i. to Appendix E
to require all nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part
52 to include hostile action events in biennial evaluated exercises.
The proposed rule would also ensure that scenarios would be
sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of
radiological releases and events, to properly train responders in
response to more realistic events than currently used in training and
avoid preconditioning the responders to success with inappropriate
anticipatory responses. Licensees would also be required to emphasize
coordination in their drills and exercises among onsite and offsite
response organizations to strengthen the capabilities of the OROs to
adequately respond to an emergency at the plant that would require
offsite response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.6 of this document.)
The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.j. to Appendix E
to require that nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part
52 conduct exercises that provide ERO members the opportunity to
demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the
principal emergency response functional areas identified in Section
IV.F.2.b. Each exercise would also be required to provide ERO members
the opportunity to demonstrate key skills specific to the emergency
response duties in each emergency response facility. Each exercise
planning cycle would consist of six successive (i.e., non-rolling)
calendar years. During each exercise planning cycle, licensees would be
required to vary the content of exercise scenarios to provide ERO
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills
necessary to respond to several specific scenario elements, including
hostile action directed at the plant site; no radiological release or
an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public
protective actions; an initial classification of or rapid escalation to
a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency; implementation of
strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under Sec. 50.54(hh);
and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. In addition
to occurring every exercise planning cycle, the proposed rule would
also require that the frequency of exercises involving response to a
hostile action event not exceed 8 years. This proposed amendment would
prescribe the minimum exercise scenario elements necessary for
licensees to meet NRC expectations for challenging and varied scenario
content in biennial exercises.
Proposed Section IV.F.2.j. would require that licensees maintain a
record of exercises that documents the contents of scenario elements
used for each exercise during an exercise planning cycle to comply with
the requirements of paragraph F.2.j. The documentation would include,
but not be limited to, the following items for each scenario: sequence
and timeline of events; extent of ERO participation and objectives to
be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO demonstration of classification,
notification, and development of protective action recommendations;
expected radiological release conditions and demonstration of dose
assessment, including dose projection results; and expected onsite/
offsite radiological survey activities and results.
The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.k. to Appendix E,
to require a licensee under this part or Part 52 to implement the
requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. no
later than its first biennial exercise conducted more than one year
after the effective date of the final rule.
The NRC proposes to add a new Section IV.I. to Appendix E that
would require nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52
to provide an expanded range of protective measures for onsite
personnel that would be appropriate for protection against a hostile
action event. These measures would be site-specific and consider issues
such as the location of workers in relation to potential targets, which
would dictate if sheltering and/or evacuation would be appropriate to
adequately protect the workers. Such measures are prudent to protect
personnel necessary to safely shut down the reactor and emergency
responders who would be necessary to implement the licensee's emergency
plan. By specifying such measures for personnel designated to carry out
site emergency actions, other onsite workers would also be protected
because the onsite protective measures that were deemed appropriate to
protect against a hostile action event would be provided via plant page
announcements or at the direction of site security personnel to the
site as a whole and would not be directed to any particular group of
workers. The new requirement would not direct any specific actions, but
would allow licensees flexibility to determine the most effective
protective measures for onsite personnel protection on a site-specific
basis. It also would allow licensees to take advantage of new
technologies or other innovations that could further enhance the
protection of workers. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in
Section II.A.5 of this document.)
If this proposed rule becomes final, the NRC proposes to make it
effective 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register. Licensees and applicants, as applicable, would be permitted
to defer implementation of the final rule until 180 days after
publication of the final rule in the
[[Page 23279]]
Federal Register, except for the following proposed rule changes:
(1) The requirements under proposed Sec. 50.54(q) (emergency plan
change process), which would become effective 30 days after publication
of the final rule in the Federal Register;
(2) The requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.F.2. (challenging drills and exercises), which each applicable
licensee would be required to implement no later than its first
biennial exercise conducted more than one year after the effective date
of the rule. Also, the implementation schedule for the proposed changes
in Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. would allow licensees to complete
biennial exercises that would already be in the planning process when
the final rule becomes effective, without having to consider the new
requirements of the final rule. This schedule also would have the
general effect of allowing exercises which meet the new requirements to
be conducted over a two-year period, following the effective date of
the final rule, thereby allowing licensees and the NRC to gain
experience during initial implementation. Consideration will be given
to States with multiple reactor sites for the implementation schedule
of the exercise requirement under Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.; and
(3) The requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.D.3. (backup means for alert and notification systems), which each
applicable licensee would be required to implement no later than its
first biennial exercise conducted more than one year after the
effective date of the rule. The implementation schedule for the
proposed changes in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. would provide licensees
a maximum of approximately 3 years for implementation across the
industry.
VI. Guidance
The NRC proposes to revise existing guidance and provide new
guidance for the new requirements in this proposed rule. This guidance
is intended to provide an acceptable method of how licensees and
applicants can meet the requirements of the proposed rule. Final
guidance would be published concurrently with publication of the final
rule.
VII. Criminal Penalties
Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),
provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted
violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. For the purposes of Section
223 of the AEA, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR Parts 50
and 52 and Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 161b, 161i, and 161o of
the AEA.
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3,
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility
is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program
elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of this
chapter. Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements
reserved to the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain
requirements by a mechanism that is consistent with the particular
States administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do
not confer regulatory authority on the State.
IX. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the documents identified below available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC Public Document Room is located
at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
Regulations.gov (Web). These documents may be viewed and downloaded
electronically through the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov, Docket number NRC-2008-0122.
NRC's Electronic Reading Room (ERR). The NRC's public electronic
reading room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim X ............ ML020510635
Safeguards and Security Compensatory
Measures,'' issued February 25, 2002.
SRM-M041214B--``Briefing on Emergency X ............ ML043550354
Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1:00
p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004,
Commissioners' Conference Room, One
White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland
(Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
December 20, 2004.
Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency X ............ ML051990027
Preparedness and Response Actions for
Security[dash]Based Events,'' dated
July 18, 2005.
SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of X ............ ML061910707
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
Guidance,'' dated September 20, 2006.
SRM to SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the X ............ ML070080411
Review of Emergency Preparedness
Regulations and Guidance'' dated
January 8, 2007.
Memorandum to the Commission, X ............ ML070440148
``Rulemaking Plan for Enhancements to
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
Guidance,'' dated April 17, 2007.
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements-- X ............ ML061810014
Briefing on Status of Emergency
Planning Activities, (Two sessions)
9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2,
2006, Commissioners' Conference Room,
One White Flint North, Rockville,
Maryland (Open to public attendance)''
dated June 29, 2006.
``Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to X X ML080940227
Discuss Emergency Preparedness Draft
Preliminary Rule Language,'' dated
April 3, 2008.
Draft Preliminary Rule Language, X X ML080370069
Emergency Preparedness Rulemaking,
February, 2008.
``Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to X X ML082180005
Discuss Comments on Emergency
Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule
Language,'' dated August 6, 2008.
Order EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization X ............ ML030060360
Order,'' issued January 7, 2003
(January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel X ............ ML030910625
Training and Qualification Requirements
(Training) Order,'' issued April 29,
2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24514).
Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis X ............ ML030740002
Threat Order,'' issued April 29, 2003
(May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).
[[Page 23280]]
Federal Register Notice--Final Rule to X ............ ML070520692
Amend 10 CFR 73.1: Design Basis Threat
(March 19, 2007; 72 FR 12705).
Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift X ............ ML031190405
Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated November 26, 1991.
IN 93-81, ``Implementation of X ............ ML031070314
Engineering Expertise On-Shift,'' dated
October 12, 1993.
IN 95-48, ``Results of Shift Staffing X ............ ML031060170
Study,'' dated October 10, 1995.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for X ............ ML040420012
Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans
and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
Power Plants,'' dated November 1980.
NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, X ............ ML041120174
``Methodology for Development of
Emergency Action Levels,'' dated
January 1992.
NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for X ............ ML073330643
Development of Emergency Action
Level,'' dated September 2007.
Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15, X ............ Non-Publicly Available.
``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/
11,'' dated October 18, 2004.
NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a Hostile Action- X ............ ML073100460
Based Emergency Response Drill,'' Rev.
1, dated October 30, 2007.
RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 X ............ ML080110116
to Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance
Document NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a
Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response
Drill,'' dated March 19, 2008.
IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to Licensees' X ............ ML022380474
Ability to Provide Prompt Public
Notification and Information During an
Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated
August 26, 2002.
IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert X ............ ML050680335
and Notification System Tone Alert
Radio Capability,'' dated March 30,
2005.
IN 2006-28, ``Siren System Failures Due X ............ ML062790341
to Erroneous Siren System Signal,''
dated December 22, 2006.
IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert X ............ ML031060187
Radios to Activate When Receiving a
Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated
April 2, 1996.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station X ............ ML003740034
Blackout,'' issued August 1988.
IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an X ............ ML031180307
Emergency Class, Implementation of an
Emergency Plan, and Emergency
Notifications,'' dated October 15, 1985.
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)- X ............ ML023040462
2, ``Emergency Preparedness Position
(EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification
of Emergency Conditions,'' dated August
1, 1995.
NUREG/CR-6953 Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG- X ............ ML080360602
0654 Supplement 3, Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for
Severe Accidents,'' dated December 2007.
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of X ............ ML050250240
Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear
Power Plants,'' dated January 2005.
NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and X ............ ML050250245
Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency
Evacuations,'' dated January 2005.
Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness X ............ ML050800537
Position (EPPOS) 4, ``Emergency Plan
and Implementing Procedure Changes,''
dated November 19, 1998.
RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the Process X ............ ML042580404
for Making Emergency Plan Changes,''
dated February 14, 2005.
``Summary of the Public Meeting to X ............ ML052650446
Discuss Selected Topics for the Review
of Emergency Preparedness Regulations
and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear
Power Plants,'' dated September 27,
2005.
``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' X ............ ML052000263
Items,'' dated August 11, 2005.
Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and X ............ ML052620366
September 1, 2005 Portion of the
Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting.
``Summary and Analysis of Comments X ............ ML060450376
(Received Between August 31 and October
31, 2005),'' dated February 28, 2006.
``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific X ............ ML060860401
Comments (Received Between August 31
and October 31, 2005),'' dated March
31, 2006.
Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow ............ ............ ML061590186
Up Discussions of Selected Topics for
the Review of Emergency Preparedness
Regulations and Guidance for Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants, held May 19, 2006.
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for X ............ ML051390358
Emergency Response Facilities,'' dated
February 1981.
SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear X ............ ML050550131
Operating Company's Proposal to
Establish a Common Emergency Operating
Facility at Its Corporate
Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005.
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI X ............ ML051390367
Action Plan Requirements,'' Supplement
1, ``Requirements for Emergency
Response Capabilities,'' dated January
1983.
Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy X X ML081690809
Institute on EP draft preliminary rule
language (Letter identifier for
comments: NEI1-X).
Comments submitted by Union of Concerned X X ML081840067
Scientists on EP draft preliminary rule
language (Letter identifier for
comments: NGO1-X).
Comments submitted by PA Bureau of X X ML081690778
Radiation Protection on EP draft
preliminary rule language (Letter
identifier for comments: SPA1-X).
EP proposed rule Regulatory Analysis and X X ML091180228
Backfit Analysis.
EP proposed rule Environmental X X ML091180223
Assessment.
EP Paperwork Burden Analysis............ X X ML091180224
[[Page 23281]]
NRC comment responses for EP draft X X ML091180198
preliminary rule language.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X. Plain Language
The Presidential memorandum ``Plain Language in Government
Writing'' published on June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the
Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC
requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the
clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent
to the NRC as explained in the ADDRESSES heading of this document.
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with
applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any
voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed
Government-unique standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary
consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified.
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
Subpart A, ``National Environmental Policy Act; Regulations
Implementing Section 102(2),'' of 10 CFR Part 51, ``Environmental
Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory
Functions,'' that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there
will be no significant offsite impact to the public from this action.
However, the general public should note that the NRC is seeking public
participation and the environmental assessment is available as
indicated in Section IX of this document. Comments on any aspect of the
environmental assessment may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under
the ADDRESSES heading of this document.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their
comments on the environmental assessment.
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The proposed rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information
collection requirements.
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
The title of the information collection: 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.''
The form number if applicable: Not applicable.
How often the collection is required: One-time, on occasion and
annually
Who will be required or asked to report: Operating nuclear power
reactors.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 987.
The estimated number of annual respondents: 97.
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to
complete the requirement or request: 177,242 hours.
Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations
in 10 CFR 50.34, 50.47, 50.54, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E prescribe
requirements for emergency preparedness plans and coordination in
protecting nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, and the
surrounding community against consequences resulting from accidents and
sabotage. The proposed rule contains reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, including those for third parties, which are necessary to
help ensure that an adequate level of emergency preparedness is
attained by nuclear power reactor licensees, non-power reactors, and
the surrounding community. This revision addresses changes in
information collections contained in the proposed rule, ``Enhancements
to Emergency Preparedness Regulations.'' Specifically, the draft
proposed rule results in changes to information collection requirements
in Sec. 50.47, Sec. 50.54, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the
information collections contained in this proposed rule and on the
following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Estimate of burden?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized,
including the use of automated collection techniques?
A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Room O-1F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the
signature date of this notice.
Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by June 17, 2009 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services
Branch (T-5F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, or by e-mail to [email protected] and to the
Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202
(3150-0011), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical
to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments
received after this date. You may also e-mail comments to
[email protected] or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4638.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The Commission requests
public comments
[[Page 23282]]
on the draft regulatory analysis. Availability of the regulatory
analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document. Comments on the
draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the
ADDRESSES heading.
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the
Commission certifies that this rule would not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This proposed rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear
power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within
the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the
Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC
(10 CFR 2.810).
XVI. Backfit Analysis
As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a
backfit analysis for the proposed rule. The Commission finds that the
backfits contained in the proposed rule, when considered in the
aggregate, would constitute a substantial increase in emergency
preparedness and would be justified in view of this increased
protection of the public health and safety. Availability of the backfit
analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees,
Inspections, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting
criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Standard design, Standard design certification.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Part 52.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189,
68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec.
234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,
2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202,
206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842,
5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101,
185, 68 Stat. 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub.
L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec.
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23,
50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42
U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued
under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245
(42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under
Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also
issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80
and 50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955
(42 U.S.C. 2237).
2. Section 50.47 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10)
and (d)(1) to read as follows:
Sec. 50.47 Emergency plans.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance
resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local
staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made,
and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have
been identified.
* * * * *
(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume
exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In
developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic
use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates
have been developed by applicants and licensees and must be updated on
a periodic basis. Evacuation time estimates and updates must be
submitted by applicants and licensees to the NRC for review and
approval. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an
emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in
place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ
appropriate to the locale have been developed.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite
assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State
and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have
been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *
3. Section 50.54 is amended as follows:
a. Revise paragraphs (q), (s)(1), (gg)(1), (gg)(1)(i), and (gg)(2);
b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), (s)(2)(i), and (u).
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(q) Emergency Plans. (1) Definitions for the purpose of this
section:
(i) Change means an action that results in modification or addition
to, or removal from, the licensee's emergency plan or the resources,
capabilities, and methods identified in the plan. All such changes are
subject to the provisions of this section except where the applicable
regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a particular
change.
(ii) Emergency plan means the document(s), prepared and maintained
by the licensee, that identify and describe the licensee's methods for
maintaining and performing emergency planning functions. An emergency
plan includes the plans as originally approved by the NRC and all
subsequent changes made by the licensee with, and without, prior NRC
review and approval under Sec. 50.54(q).
(iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, as
set forth in the elements of section IV. of appendix E to this part
and, for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b).
(iv) Reduction in effectiveness means a change in an emergency plan
that results in reducing the licensee's capability to perform an
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.
(2) A holder of a license under this part, or a combined license
under part
[[Page 23283]]
52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding under Sec.
52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the effectiveness
of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E to this
part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards
of Sec. 50.47(b).
(3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC
approval only if the licensee can demonstrate through analysis that the
changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as
changed, continues to meet the requirements in appendix E to this part
and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of
Sec. 50.47(b).
(4) The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the
effectiveness of the plans as defined in Sec. 50.54(q)(1)(iv) may not
be implemented without prior approval by the NRC. A licensee desiring
to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to
its license. In addition to the filing requirements of Sec. Sec. 50.90
and 50.91, the request must include all emergency plan pages affected
by that change and must be accompanied by a forwarding letter
identifying the change, the reason for the change, and the basis for
concluding that the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will
continue to meet the requirements in appendix E to this part and, for
nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of Sec.
50.47(b).
(5) The licensee shall retain a record of each change to the
emergency plan made without prior NRC approval for a period of three
years from the date of the change and shall submit, as specified in
Sec. 50.4, a report of each such change, including its analysis,
within 30 days after the change is made.
(6) The nuclear power reactor licensee shall retain the emergency
plan and each change for which prior NRC approval was obtained pursuant
to Sec. 50.54(q)(4) as a record until the Commission terminates the
license for the nuclear power reactor.
* * * * *
(r) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(s)(1) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power
reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and
the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80
km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs for a
particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to
local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by
such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access
routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be
determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and
for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.
The plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ shall focus on such actions as
are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
* * * * *
(2)(i) Reserved.
* * * * *
(u) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 52.103, if following the conduct of
the exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a of appendix E to part 50 of
this chapter, FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of
offsite emergency preparedness, the holder of a combined license under
10 CFR part 52 may operate at up to 5 percent of rated thermal power
only if the Commission finds that the state of onsite emergency
preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the
applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in
Sec. 50.47 and appendix E to this part. Review of the applicant's
emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite
aspects:
(i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite
assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and
local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been
made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite
response have been identified.
* * * * *
(2) The condition in this paragraph, regarding operation at up to 5
percent power, ceases to apply 30 days after FEMA informs the NRC that
the offsite deficiencies have been corrected, unless the NRC notifies
the combined license holder before the expiration of the 30-day period
that the Commission finds under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this
section that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
* * * * *
4. In Appendix E to Part 50, Section IV. is amended as follows:
a. Revise the introductory text to the section, paragraphs A.,
A.2.c., A.7., B.1., B.2., C.1., C.2., D.3., E.5., E.8., E.9.c., E.9.d.,
F.1., F.2.a., F.2.a(ii), F.2.a(iii), F.2.b., F.2.f., F.2.g.;
b. Redesignate E.8. as E.8.a.; add new paragraphs E.8.b., E.8.c.,
E.8.d., and E.8.e.; and
c. Add new paragraphs A.9., F.2.i., F.2.j., F.2.k., and I.,,
redesignate footnotes 3 through 11, as footnotes 4 through 12 and add a
new footnote 3 to paragraph IV.A.7.
Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
* * * * *
IV. Content of Emergency Plans
The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not
necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate
compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for
coping with radiological emergencies, assessment action, activation
of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency
facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency
preparedness, and recovery. In addition, the emergency response
plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor
operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as
applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain
information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards
described in Sec. 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against
those standards. The applicant shall also provide an analysis of the
time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions
for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway
EPZ for transient and permanent populations. NRC-approved evacuation
time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs shall be used by
licensees in the formulation of protective action recommendations
and must be provided to State and local governmental authorities for
use in developing protective action strategies. Within 180 days of
issuance of the decennial census data by the U.S. Census Bureau,
nuclear power reactor licensees and license applicants shall develop
an ETE and submit it to the NRC for review and approval under Sec.
50.4. During the years between decennial censuses, licensees shall
estimate permanent resident population changes at least annually
using U.S. Census Bureau data and/or State/local government
population estimates. Licensees shall maintain these estimates so
that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between
censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any
updated ETEs. If at any time during the decennial period, the
population of either the EPZ or the most populous Emergency Response
Planning Area increases or decreases by more than 10 percent from
the population that formed the basis for the licensee's currently
approved ETE, the ETE must be updated to reflect the impact of that
population change. This updated ETE must be submitted to the NRC for
review and approval under Sec. 50.4 no later than 180 days after
the licensee's determination that a
[[Page 23284]]
population change of more than 10 percent has occurred.
A. Organization
The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall
be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities,
and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency
organization and the means for notification of such individuals in
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be
included:
* * * * *
2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization
(ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
* * * * *
c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating
and implementing offsite emergency measures.
* * * * *
7. Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate
State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping
with emergencies. Nuclear power plant licensees shall ensure that
offsite response organization resources (e.g., local law
enforcement, firefighting, medical assistance) are available to
respond to an emergency including a hostile action \3\ event at the
nuclear power plant site.
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\3\ A hostile action is an act directed toward a nuclear power
plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to
destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to
achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using
guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to
deliver destructive force.
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* * * * *
9. Nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52
must provide a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent the timely
performance of their assigned functions as specified in the
emergency plan.
B. Assessment Actions
* * * * *
1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and
for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive
materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification
and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and
other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to
be used for determining when and what type of protective measures
should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect
health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-
plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and
offsite monitoring. These action levels must include hostile action
events that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. These
initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by
the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental
authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action
levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental
authorities on an annual basis.
2. A revision to an emergency action level scheme must be
submitted as specified in Sec. 50.4 for NRC approval before
implementation if the licensee is changing from an emergency action
level scheme based upon NUREG-0654 to another emergency action level
scheme based upon NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01. The licensee shall
follow the change process in Sec. 50.54(q) for all other emergency
action level changes.
* * * * *
C. Activation of Emergency Organization
1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the
alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total
emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps
to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each
class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels
(based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that
indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment
and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for
notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence,
but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be
noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall
include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site
area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further
discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.
2. Nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this part
and Part 52 shall establish and maintain the capability to assess,
classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after
the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency
action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the
emergency condition as soon as possible following a determination
that an emergency action level has been exceeded. These criteria
must not be construed as a grace period to attempt to restore plant
conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an EAL that
has been exceeded. These criteria must not be construed as
preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee
to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that
any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local
authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to
protect the public health and safety.
D. Notification Procedures
* * * * *
3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible
State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after
declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the
appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a
public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed
by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial
operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first
reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall
demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been
established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective
of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have
the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and
initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and
notification capability will range from immediate alerting and
notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State
and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring
urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial
time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make
a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and
notification system. The licensee shall identify and demonstrate
that the appropriate governmental authorities have both the
administrative and physical means for a backup method of public
alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the
primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an
emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure
pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability
to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway
EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute design objective for
the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there
is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the
appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to
activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or
in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating
such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the
appropriate governmental authorities.
A licensee under this part or Part 52 shall implement the
requirements for a backup method of public alerting and notification
under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 no later than the first
biennial exercise conducted at the site more than one year after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment
* * * * *
5. Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical
personnel qualified to handle radiological emergencies on-site;
* * * * *
8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an
emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be
given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;
(ii) For nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this
part and Part 52, a licensee onsite operational support center;
b. For the emergency operations facility required by paragraph
8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and
25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility
located less than 10
[[Page 23285]]
miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility
located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor
site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one
nuclear power reactor site. An emergency operations facility may be
located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site as long
as provisions are made for locating NRC and offsite responders
closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite
responders could interact face-to-face with emergency response
personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site.
Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a
nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the
emergency operations facility shall include the following: (1) Space
for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local
responders; (2) additional space for conducting briefings with
emergency response personnel; (3) communication links with other
licensee and offsite emergency response facilities; (4) computer
links to the site with Internet access; and (5) access to copying
equipment and office supplies;
c. For the emergency operations facility required by paragraph
8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:
(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and
radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor
site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility
serves, (2) the capability to analyze plant technical information
and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to
licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a
nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site
that the facility serves, and (3) the capability to support response
to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power
reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than
one site;
d. For nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this
part and Part 52, an alternative facility (or facilities) to
function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response
staff and having the following characteristics: Accessibility even
if the site is under threat or actual attack; communication links
with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant
security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the
capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage
control team planning and preparation; for use when onsite emergency
facilities cannot be safely accessed during a hostile action event.
The alternative facility will also be equipped with general plant
drawings and procedures, telephones, and computer links to the site;
e. A licensee with an approved emergency operations facility on
[INSERT THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE] shall not be subject
to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section;
9. * * *
* * * * *
c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor
control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency
operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal
State and local emergency operations centers, and the field
assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested
annually.
d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations
Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite
technical support center, and the emergency operations facility.
Such communications shall be tested monthly.
F. Training
1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and
exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that
employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency
response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and
drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event
of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a
description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining
programs to be provided to each of the following categories of
emergency personnel:
* * * * *
2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of
emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test
the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and
methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test
the public notification system, and ensure that emergency
organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable
for any exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. An initial full participation \5\ exercise which tests as
much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is
reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall
be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located.
Nuclear power plant licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under
Sec. 50.4 for prior NRC review and approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate
offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel
physically and actively take part in testing their integrated
capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a
commercial nuclear power plant. ``Full participation'' includes
testing major observable portions of the onsite and offsite
emergency plans and mobilization of state, local and licensee
personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the
capability to respond to the accident scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this
chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full
participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests
the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one
year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This
exercise need not have State or local government participation. If
FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite
emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation
exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency
preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency, the provisions of Sec. 50.54(gg) apply.
(iii) For a combined licensee issued under part 52 of this
chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the
site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,\6\ shall be
conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This
exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of
Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one
or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness
as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the
Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the
provisions of Sec. 50.54(gg) apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Partial participation when used in conjunction with
emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means
appropriate offset authorities shall actively take part in the
exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e.,
(a) protective action decision making related to emergency action
levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and
local authorities and the licensee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent
exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power
plant licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec. 50.4 for
prior NRC review and approval. The exercise may be included in the
full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of
this section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary
to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are
maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by
conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a
combination of some of the principal functional areas of the
licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal
functional areas of emergency response include activities such as
management and coordination of emergency response, accident
assessment, event classification, notification of offsite
authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of
radiological releases, protective action recommendation development,
protective action decision making, and plant system repair and
corrective actions. During these drills, activation of all of the
licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center
(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF)) would not be necessary, licensees would have the
opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised
instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating
facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success
paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may
focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.
* * * * *
[[Page 23286]]
f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that
NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to emergency
response. The extent of State and local participation in remedial
exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective
measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not
properly tested in the previous exercises.
g. All training, including exercises, shall provide for formal
critiques in order to identify weak or deficient areas that need
correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified
during training evolutions, exercises, or drills must be corrected.
* * * * *
i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result
from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear
power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 must include a
wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile
action events. Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must
emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response
organizations.
j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by
nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 must
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in
the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas
of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section.
Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to
demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the
control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center.
Additionally, in each six calendar year exercise planning cycle,
nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 shall vary
the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph
2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to
demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to
the following scenario elements: Hostile action directed at the
plant site (at an exercise frequency of at least once every 8
years), no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological
release that does not require public protective actions, an initial
classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or
General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and
guidance developed under Sec. 50.54(hh), and integration of offsite
resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record
of exercises conducted during each six-year exercise planning cycle
that documents the contents of scenarios used to comply with the
requirements of this paragraph.
k. A licensee under this part or Part 52 shall implement the
requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. no later
than its first biennial exercise conducted at the site more than one
year after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
* * * * *
I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action Events.
For nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52, a
range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during
hostile action events must be developed to ensure the continued
ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform
the functions of the licensee's emergency plan.
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
5. The authority citation for Part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat.
936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs.
201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246, as amended (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504
note).
6. In Section 52.79, paragraph (a)(17) is revised to read as
follows:
Sec. 52.79 Contents of applications; technical information in final
safety analysis report.
(a) * * *
(17) The information with respect to compliance with technically
relevant positions of the Three Mile Island requirements in Sec.
50.34(f) of this chapter, with the exception of Sec. Sec.
50.34(f)(1)(xii), (f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), and (f)(3)(v);
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of May 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E9-10947 Filed 5-15-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P