[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 94 (Monday, May 18, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23253-23286]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10947]



[[Page 23253]]

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Part II





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52



Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed 
Rules

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52

RIN 3150-AI10
[NRC-2008-0122]


Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is 
proposing to amend certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in 
its regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and 
utilization facilities. A conforming provision would also be added in 
the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for 
new nuclear power plants. The proposed amendments would codify certain 
voluntary protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, 
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based 
Events,'' and other generically applicable requirements similar to 
those previously imposed by Commission orders. They would also amend 
other licensee emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive 
review of the NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The proposed 
requirements would enhance the ability of licensees in preparing to 
take and taking certain emergency preparedness and protective measures 
in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part, security 
issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; 
clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan implementation 
among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to be more 
effective and efficient.

DATES: Submit comments on the proposed rule by August 3, 2009. Submit 
comments on the information collection aspects of this proposed rule by 
June 17, 2009. Comments received after the above dates will be 
considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration 
cannot be given to comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made 
available for public inspection. Because your comments will not be 
edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC 
cautions you against including any information in your submission that 
you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
    Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID [NRC-2008-0122]. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone (301) 492-
3668; e-mail [email protected].
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not 
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, 
contact us directly at (301) 415-1677.
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 492-3446.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document using the following methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public 
File Area O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Qui[ntilde]ones, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2007, e-mail 
[email protected]; or Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security 
and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2966, e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Proposed Rule
IV. Specific Request for Comments
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Plain Language
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis

I. Background

    After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP 
programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued 
adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications 
were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim 
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026), 
dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license 
holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United 
States. This order required licensees to implement interim compensatory 
measures (ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and 
take actions such as:
    (1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility 
between the plans;
    (2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response 
facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations 
facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting 
emergency response;
    (3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification 
(including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees), 
activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response 
organizations (OROs);
    (4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties 
are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency 
response; and
    (5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to 
provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.

Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted 
inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear 
power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and 
the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.
    Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the 
changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear 
Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis

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Adequacy in the Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22, 
2003 (not publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission 
that the EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing 
issues. However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events 
differ from accident events due to the planned action to maximize 
damage and loss of life and that the EP response to such events also 
differed. The NRC staff noted several EP issues that required further 
action to better respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat 
environment.
    On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP 
program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the 
Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP 
regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the 
Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B, 
``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m., 
Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White 
Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated 
December 20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a 
schedule of activities for the completion of the comprehensive review. 
The NRC staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of 
Emergency Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/
11 Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available), 
requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for 
enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005 
(not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide 
the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance. 
The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to 
proceed with enhancements to EP issues as described in SECY-05-0010. As 
a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated 
July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that licensees could 
integrate into EP programs at power reactors. BL-05-02 also sought to 
obtain information from licensees on their actions taken to implement 
Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP programs to adjust to the 
current threat environment. Based on the results of the post BL-05-02 
inspections, meetings with members of the nuclear power industry, and 
licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC determined that licensees 
were implementing strategies to satisfy Order EA-02-026 and enhance 
their programs to address the changed threat environment.
    As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff 
conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure, 
including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of 
this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders 
through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the 
elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and 
guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public 
and other stakeholder meetings.
    On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its 
review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of 
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance''. In that paper, the 
NRC staff discussed the activities it had conducted to complete the 
review and provided its recommendation to pursue rulemaking for 
enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff explained that the 
comprehensive review of the EP program identified several areas where 
the implementation of EP regulations and guidance, recent technological 
advances, and lessons learned from actual events, drills, and exercises 
had revealed to the NRC areas for potential improvement and increased 
clarity for the EP program. The staff divided the potential 
enhancements into two categories: hostile action-based EP issues and 
other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and assigned it a 
priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of the issue's 
relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC strategic 
goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.
    The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and 
analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority, 
including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In 
SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential 
enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these 
issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and 
resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that 
the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient 
means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an 
opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.
    In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission 
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and 
guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007, 
the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission via a 
memorandum. During the development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed 
the issues identified in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of 
conducting rulemaking and updating guidance on all issues. The staff 
determined that the best course of action was to conduct rulemaking on 
the 12 issues identified in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and 
to reassess the remaining issues at a later date. The decision to 
conduct rulemaking on the highest priority issues would allow a more 
timely rulemaking effort to occur and would enable the staff to more 
completely assess the remaining lower priority issues. Due to the 
similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking plan as 
``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,'' these 
issues have been partially combined in this proposed rule. The NRC is 
considering non-rulemaking options for some of the elements of shift 
staffing and is also requesting stakeholder comments in Section V of 
this document. Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in 
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency 
Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 
2, 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North, 
Rockville, Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006, 
to coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop 
emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills 
and exercises were challenging and did not precondition participant 
responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue 
regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it 
was so closely related.
    In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that is transparent and open 
to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through 
various means during the development of this proposed rule. The NRC 
discussed the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance 
at several conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007 
Regulatory Information Conference and the 2008 National Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Conference. These

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meetings are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.
    The NRC posted draft rule language on the e-rulemaking Web site, 
http://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited 
stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the 
draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule. 
This is discussed further in Section IV of this document. The NRC 
continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open 
communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March 
5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC 
staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking 
on enhancements to emergency preparedness regulations and guidance and 
answered stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8, 
2008 meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft 
preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders' questions on how 
these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.

II. Discussion

    The proposed amendments would require 10 CFR Part 50 licensees that 
are currently subject to the EP requirements, and applicants for 
operating licenses under Part 50 or combined licenses under Part 52 
that would be subject to the proposed EP requirements to ensure that 
their EP programs meet the amended EP requirements. The proposed 
amendments would similarly apply to applicants for construction permits 
under Part 50 with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for 
coping with emergencies (Sec.  50.34(a)(10)), and to applicants for 
early site permits under Part 52 that choose to propose either major 
features of an, or a complete and integrated, emergency plan (Sec.  
52.17(b)(2)).
    The 16 planning standards in Sec.  50.47(b) apply to both onsite 
and offsite plans because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC 
looks at the application (or the licensee's activities in the case of 
existing facilities), the current State and local government emergency 
plans, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) 
recommendation, which is based on the content of the State and local 
plans. FEMA's regulations in 44 CFR Part 350 also contain these 16 
planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on the 
adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local governments 
to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only offsite 
(State and local government) plans. The changes that are proposed by 
the NRC in this rulemaking are designed to affect the onsite plans, not 
the offsite plans. The proposed changes have been written in a way that 
is expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA 
regulations.
    An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating 
event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident. EP 
cannot affect the probability of the initiating event, but a high level 
of EP increases the probability of accident mitigation if the 
initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial operator actions. 
As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is not normally 
quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the level of EP 
does affect the outcome of an accident in that the accident may be 
mitigated by the actions of the ERO or in the worst case, consequences 
to the public are reduced through the effective use of protective 
actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this manner enhance 
protection of public health and safety through improvements in the 
response to unlikely initiating events that could lead to severe 
accidents without mitigative response.
    The discussion of the proposed amendments is divided into two 
sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section II.B 
for non-security-related EP issues. The security-related issues are 
topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in Order 
EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related issues 
are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive review of 
EP regulations and guidance.

A. Security-Related Issues

    The NRC is proposing amendments to enhance its EP regulations by 
clearly addressing EP actions for a hostile action event. Some of these 
proposed changes are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was 
issued to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety 
and common defense and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026, 
however, the Commission took several additional steps to ensure 
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense 
and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access 
Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 
1643); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification 
Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 
FR 24514); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' 
issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517); the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) final rule (March 19, 2007; 72 FR 12705); and the Power 
Reactor Security Requirements final rule (March 27, 2009; 74 FR 13926). 
As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission 
has determined that the proposed EP changes that are based on the 
requirements of Order EA-02-026 would no longer be necessary to ensure 
adequate protection during a hostile action event. Therefore, because 
the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate protection of the 
public health and safety and common defense and security, the NRC has 
determined that, in the current threat environment, the following 
proposed amendments would not be necessary to ensure adequate 
protection during a hostile action event. These amendments are 
considered enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, these 
enhancements would result in a substantial increase in emergency 
preparedness and the protection of public health and safety.
1. On-Shift Multiple Responsibilities
    The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned 
to emergency plan implementation functions may have multiple 
responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of their 
assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift 
responsibilities are addressed in Sec.  50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV.A. Currently, these regulations do not 
specifically require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan 
implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without 
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from 
performing their primary emergency plan tasks. NRC regulations and 
guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some 
flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to 
emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate 
completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event. 
The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to 
problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for 
emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:
     A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the 
licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel 
(communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and 
perform numerous response actions

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required by the event resulted in a heavy workload for the shift staff.
     A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another 
plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event, 
notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating 
procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff 
contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of 
Unusual Event.
    The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise 
On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective 
implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering 
expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a 
shift technical advisor (STA) on shift to provide engineering and 
accident assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned 
additional response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire 
brigade member, which could result in overburdening the control room 
staff during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as 
fire brigade leader which could hinder the STA from performing the 
primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering 
expertise.
    After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated 
that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued. 
The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift 
staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results 
of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several 
observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could 
be a large workload for radiological support personnel during 
emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant 
staffing practices for performing response activities during two 
accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with 
complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation 
and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included 
the following:
     Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for 
establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.
     Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant-
specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by 
licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.
     Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed 
personnel to staff the fire brigade.
     Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and 
non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed 
operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.
     Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the 
licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.
    Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for 
regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to 
on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee 
revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and 
assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As 
previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to 
provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC 
determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in 
effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q). In 
April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the 
assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech) as the 
interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented 
ERO responder. The HP Tech had assigned emergency plan tasks including 
in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid. 
The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and 
assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency 
plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q).
    These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to 
explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these 
emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency 
event. Assigning additional duties, such as fire brigade member could 
result in on-shift responders being overburdened, resulting in 
inadequate or untimely response.
    The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff 
responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient 
number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan 
and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some 
licensees were utilizing security personnel to implement the emergency 
plan when many of these responders would likely not be available due to 
a hostile action.
    The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One 
option was to take no action, but this alternative would not subject 
new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's requirement of 
an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated security plan and 
emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the shift staffing study 
referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees surveyed did not use a 
systematic process for establishing shift staffing levels and 
additional tasks, not required by regulation, were assigned to the 
licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice could result in 
operators being overburdened during an emergency. A second option was 
to allow licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift 
staffing. However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to 
reduce on-shift staffing levels and the NRC expects this practice to 
continue. This could increase the risk of over-burdening on-shift 
responders and result in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore, 
both of these options were considered unacceptable. Instead, the NRC is 
proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A. to address this 
issue, as discussed in Section V of this document.
2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action Events
    Section 50.47(b)(4) currently stipulates that emergency plans must 
include a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. 
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., currently specifies that emergency 
plans shall include EALs that are to be used as criteria for 
determining the need for notification of State and local agencies, and 
participation of those agencies in emergency response. However, NRC 
regulations do not require EALs for hostile action events and do not 
address the issue of anticipatory response to hostile action events. 
Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02 addressed these issues, those 
improvements to the EAL requirements to address hostile action events 
are only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC cannot ensure consistent 
and effective implementation of these enhancements among existing and 
future licensees.
    Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least an Unusual 
Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In 2005, the NRC 
issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples for hostile 
action events up to the General Emergency level. BL-05-02 provided 
examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be 
implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear

[[Page 23258]]

Power Plants,'' NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of 
Emergency Action Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, 
``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also 
pointed out that because of improvements in Federal agencies' 
information-sharing and assessment capabilities, hostile action 
emergency declarations can be accomplished in a more anticipatory 
manner, based on a credible threat, than the current method of making 
declarations for accidental events. This would enable earlier 
implementation of emergency response actions.
    Although all licensees have implemented both the credible threat 
EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL enhancements specified in 
BL-05-02, there is no requirement to maintain the enhancements 
identified in the bulletin. This could result in inconsistent EAL 
implementation among licensees for response to hostile action events. 
Also, future licensees would not be required to include these 
enhancements in their emergency plans. This rulemaking would serve to 
establish consistent EALs across the nuclear power industry for hostile 
action events. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided enhancements to EAL 
schemes which would allow event declarations to be accomplished in a 
more anticipatory manner. This is of the utmost importance because EALs 
are used as criteria for determining the need for notification and 
participation of State and local agencies. The NRC believes that these 
enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile action events 
should be codified by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., as 
discussed in Section V of this document.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these 
issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by 
licensees. These options were rejected since there would continue to be 
no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to 
incorporate EALs for hostile action events in their emergency plans, 
nor would there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that 
the NRC had determined to be adequate.
3. Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation and Alternative 
Facilities
    Currently, Sec.  50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E. 
require licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff 
within a short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to 
assist in mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members 
typically staff an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) which relieves 
the Control Room (CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff 
to focus on reactor safety. ERO members also staff an onsite 
Operational Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage 
repair teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in 
close proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation 
and coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal 
point of information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities 
involved in the response.
    However, the regulations at Sec.  50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix 
E, Section IV.E. do not require licensees to identify alternative 
facilities to support ERO augmentation during hostile action events. 
During a hostile action event, ERO members would likely not have access 
to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if it is 
located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless these 
events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can travel 
quickly to the site.
    Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of 
staffing plans at emergency response facilities during a hostile action 
event, assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify 
alternative facilities capable of supporting event response. These 
facilities would function as staging areas for augmentation staff until 
the site was secured, which would minimize delays in overall site 
response by permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the 
danger of hostile action. NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the 
identification and staffing of alternative emergency response 
facilities.
    BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite emergency 
response facilities support EP functions during a hostile action event. 
It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner that 
supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the 
potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that 
some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during a 
hostile action event until the site was secured. However, the NRC 
considers it prudent to fully activate ERO members for off-normal 
working hour hostile action events to promptly staff alternative 
facilities, in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Even 
during normal working hours, licensees should consider deployment of 
onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility near the site during a 
hostile action event.
    To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory 
action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as 
a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue 
Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute 
Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile 
Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action were taken, there would 
continue to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding the actions 
necessary during hostile action events for the ERO to staff an 
alternative facility. ERO members would likely not have access to the 
site during a hostile action event, but timely augmentation would still 
be necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may 
result in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines, 
and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using 
a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those 
developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, do not provide 
a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed enhancements for 
hostile action events. The use of voluntary programs does not ensure 
long-term continuity of the enhancements for both licensees and 
applicants. Thus, the NRC believes that the ICM requirement and the 
enhancement examples described in BL-05-02 concerning ERO augmentation 
to alternative facilities during hostile action events should be 
codified in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E. to maximize the 
effectiveness of the site response. These proposed changes are 
discussed in Section V of this document.
4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During 
Hostile Action Events
    The NRC believes that a unique challenge posed by a hostile action 
event at a nuclear power plant is the increased demand on local law 
enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that are expected to implement portions of 
ORO emergency plans, as well as respond to the plant. Currently, Sec.  
50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to Part 50 do not explicitly require 
licensees to coordinate with OROs to ensure that personnel are 
available to carry out preplanned actions, such as traffic control and 
route alerting by LLEAs, during a hostile action event directed at the 
plant.
    Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency 
response as well as demonstrate that various ORO

[[Page 23259]]

capabilities exist through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and 
OROs have successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years. 
However, the NRC recognized that hostile action events may challenge 
OROs in ways unforeseen at the time the current regulations were 
developed. For example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned 
both evacuation plan and armed response duties during a hostile action 
event. The NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-
026 and included provisions that licensees address coordination with 
OROs for hostile action events. Specifically, the order required that 
licensees develop plans, procedures, and training regarding 
coordination between the site and OROs and directed licensees to review 
emergency plans to ensure sufficient numbers of personnel would be 
available in a hostile action event.
    The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and 
communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure 
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during a 
hostile action event. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and 
OROs through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,'' 
dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based 
on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF) 
exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills 
conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005. 
In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that 
conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every 
nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource 
planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile 
action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the 
NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees 
concerning effective coordination with OROs to ensure that adequate 
resources are available to respond to a hostile action event at a 
nuclear power plant.
    Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to 
respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the 
licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered 
encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program; 
however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 
means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. The NRC believes that a voluntary approach 
would not ensure consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM 
requirements and there would be no requirement for new licensees to 
incorporate the changes into their emergency plans.
    The NRC is proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. 
to require licensees to ensure that ORO personnel assigned emergency 
plan implementation duties would be available to do so during hostile 
action events. These proposed changes are discussed in Section V of 
this document.
5. Protection for Onsite Personnel
    NRC regulations at Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 do 
not currently require specific emergency plan provisions to protect 
onsite emergency responders, and other onsite personnel, in emergencies 
resulting from hostile action events at nuclear power plants. Licensees 
are required to provide radiological protection for emergency workers 
and the public in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone 
(EPZ), including actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for 
evacuation and accountability of individuals, and providing for 
protective clothing and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these 
personnel are required by the site emergency plan that the licensee 
must follow and maintain. The emergency plan requires responders with 
specific assignments to be available on-shift 24 hours a day to 
minimize the impact of radiological emergencies and provide for the 
protection of public health and safety. However, in analyses performed 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff 
determined that a lack of protection for emergency responders who are 
expected to implement the emergency plan could result in the loss of 
those responders and thus an inability to effectively implement the 
emergency plan.
    The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site 
evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite 
emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance 
because these actions may place at risk the response personnel 
necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action. 
BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those normally 
prescribed may be more appropriate during a hostile action, 
particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as 
evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and 
accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise 
actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the 
location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures 
would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely 
and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue. 
The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying 
upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being 
implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. The NRC believes that 
taking no action could result in the vulnerability of onsite personnel 
during a hostile action event. Action is necessary to ensure effective 
coordination to enable licensees to more effectively implement their 
pre-planned actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, 
NRC-approved means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the 
implementation of voluntary actions does not ensure that these measures 
would be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.
    The NRC is proposing to revise Appendix E by creating a new Section 
IV.I. to address this issue, as discussed in Section V of this 
document.
6. Challenging Drills and Exercises
    A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises 
to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise 
programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance 
that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health 
and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency. 
Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance 
of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear 
plant site.
    In the unlikely event that a licensee faces a hostile action event, 
the response organization will encounter challenges that differ 
significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise 
programs because these programs have not included hostile action event 
scenarios. The NRC regulations addressing this issue are general in 
nature and do not explicitly require licensees to include hostile 
action event scenarios in drills and exercises, nor do they directly 
allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC believes 
that its regulations should be revised to do so.
    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
conducted

[[Page 23260]]

a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed threat 
environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains valid. The 
NRC observed licensee performance during hostile-action EP tabletop 
drills at four sites, a drill at one site, and an exercise at one site, 
as well as several security FOF exercise evaluations. The NRC also 
discussed security-based EP issues with licensees and Federal, State, 
and local EP professionals and advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to 
collect information from licensees on the enhancements to drill and 
exercise programs to address the hostile action contingency.
    Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that although EP measures 
are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile 
action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO 
drills and exercises, such as:
     Extensive coordination between operations, security, and 
EP;
     Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for 
activation of the ERO;
     Execution of initial response actions in a hostile 
environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);
     The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or 
aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during 
radiological emergencies;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site 
conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security 
measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities with large 
areas of the plant damaged or on fire;
     Rescue of and medical attention to significant numbers of 
personnel; and
     Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to 
secure access to plant areas for repairs.
    In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear plant licensees stated that 
they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise 
program. Program elements are captured in a guidance document developed 
by NEI, NEI 06-04, Rev. 1, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based 
Emergency Response Drill.'' The NRC endorsed this document for use in a 
pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear 
Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a Hostile 
Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19, 2008. 
However, implementation of these enhancements is voluntary, and the NRC 
cannot require licensees to maintain these enhancements, absent 
issuance of an order or a regulation. Issuance of orders is resource 
intensive and an inefficient approach to address a generic problem.
    The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise 
scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises 
and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed 
many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations. 
Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local 
agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that 
facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable 
and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency 
classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release. 
Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor 
accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent 
containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used 
by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as 
a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However, 
certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise 
scenarios, including the following:
     The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident 
before a release occurs;
     The release will occur after a General Emergency is 
declared;
     The release will be terminated before the exercise ends; 
and
     The exercise will escalate sequentially through the 
emergency classes.
    In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences 
that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically 
face.
    In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the 
NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as 
follows:
    The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency planning 
exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory responses 
associated with preconditioning of participants by incorporating a wide 
spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no release to a large 
release) and events, including security-based events. These scenarios 
should emphasize the expected interfaces and coordination between key 
decision-makers based on realistic postulated events. The staff should 
share experiences of preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.
    As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed 
to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The 
working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA 
regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios 
and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these 
regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport 
with proposed changes to NRC regulations to address preconditioning and 
the incorporation of hostile action exercise scenarios.
    FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to discuss 
potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC supported 
these meetings to facilitate questions as they may relate to the EP 
rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example, 
stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development 
and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification 
levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs 
can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could 
vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more 
realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the several 
different focus groups will inform the update to the REP Program 
Manual. The NRC also considered stakeholder views as they relate to 
this proposed rule and enhancements to EP guidance, although some 
comments were received after the deadline to be considered in this 
proposed rule.
    The NRC believes that a regulatory change would be necessary to 
enhance scenario content to include hostile action scenarios and reduce 
preconditioning through a wide spectrum of challenges. This change 
would improve licensee ERO capability to protect public health and 
safety under all accident scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward 
preconditioning.
    The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations, 
but rejected that option because it would not ensure correction of the 
issues discussed above. The NRC also discussed the use of voluntary 
programs and although this option could be successful, the NRC could 
not require that changes made would be permanent and consistent across 
all sites.
    The NRC is proposing to revise Appendix E, Section IV.F. to address 
these issues, as discussed in Section V of this document.

B. Non-Security Related Issues

    The remaining proposed changes would be new or amended requirements

[[Page 23261]]

that would result in a substantial increase to public health and safety 
because they would maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to 
effectively implement their emergency plans.
1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
    The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS) 
capabilities are found in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.D.3. and require licensees to establish the capability to 
promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event 
while meeting certain ANS design objectives. NRC regulations do not 
currently require backup power for sirens or other backup ANS alerting 
capabilities when a major portion of the primary alerting means is 
unavailable. The regulations also do not address backup notification 
capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's ANS is unavailable and 
no backup exists, then the public may not be promptly alerted of an 
event at the facility and the protective actions to be taken, which 
could affect the public's response to the event.
    An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case 
of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions 
may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear 
power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to 
provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such 
as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or 
supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives 
information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency 
alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile 
loudspeakers.
    In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major 
portion of the alert function of an ANS for various reasons, such as 
damage to ANS components caused by severe weather, loss of offsite 
alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of ANS activation 
equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS hardware/software 
modifications. In other situations, the notification capability has 
been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert radios which are 
used to provide both an alert signal and notification function).
    The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when 
ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to 
Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and 
Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 
2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System 
Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28, 
``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated 
December 22, 2006. IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert Radios to 
Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated April 2, 
1996, addressed the inability to activate some tone alert radios 
because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS 
implementation. Without the ability to warn the population, the 
effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced. 
Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of 
the primary ANS.
    Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread 
loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren-based systems, 
such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern 
United States and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station Blackout'' (August 1988), 
although the likelihood of failure of the onsite AC power system 
coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout 
events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some 
plants.
    The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification 
systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and 
encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Report 107-
740, FEMA was directed to update its guidance on outdoor warning and 
mass notification systems and require all warning systems to be 
operable in the absence of an AC power supply. The House Appropriations 
Committee also urged FEMA to consult with other relevant agencies and 
revise the national standard for outdoor warning and mass notification 
to reflect state-of-the-art technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 directed the Commission to require backup power for the 
emergency notification system, including siren systems, for nuclear 
power plants located where there is a permanent population, as 
determined by the 2000 decennial census, in excess of 15,000,000 within 
a 50-mile radius of the power plant. Therefore, it is appropriate that 
the NRC also consider changes to its existing regulations and guidance 
regarding warning systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.
    The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this 
issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related 
guidance documents to address ANS backup means. Several NRC and FEMA 
guidance documents, such as NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated November 1985, and FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1, 
``FEMA Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10,'' dated April 21, 1987, contain 
detailed information on ANS capabilities and design review methodology. 
Additional information on ANS backup capabilities could be provided in 
revisions to these documents. As guidance, a provision for an ANS 
backup means would not be considered a requirement and its 
applicability to existing approved ANS designs would be considered 
optional. As noted previously in this discussion, FEMA was also 
directed to update its guidance to require all warning systems to be 
operable in the absence of an alternating current power supply. 
However, guidance changes limited to backup power requirements for the 
alerting function would not address backup capabilities for other types 
of alerting devices or the ANS notification function. In summary, this 
option does not provide a regulatory resolution to ensure that nuclear 
power plant ANS designs include a backup method to the primary means 
for both alerting and notification, and thus the NRC considered this 
option to be unacceptable.
    Use of a voluntary approach for ANS backup means was also 
considered. Some current nuclear power plant ANS designs address one or 
more aspects of backup ANS capabilities, such as providing backup power 
in the event primary power to sirens is lost, using backup route 
alerting when sirens are inoperable, or designating multiple EAS 
broadcast stations to ensure that instructional messages can be 
transmitted. A voluntary approach may be appropriate because State and 
local authorities can usually compensate for the temporary loss of some 
ANS capabilities. However, allowing licensees or applicants to 
voluntarily install backup ANS capabilities will not ensure that both 
the alerting and notification functions are addressed, or that new 
sites will have warning systems designed with comprehensive backup ANS 
capabilities. Given the importance of ANS to alert the public of an 
event at a facility and the protective actions to be taken, and without 
any voluntary industry commitment that

[[Page 23262]]

existing or new warning systems will have a backup means available, the 
NRC considered a voluntary approach to be inappropriate and found this 
option unacceptable.
    The NRC believes that nuclear power reactor licensees should be 
required to have backup ANS methods and therefore is proposing 
rulemaking to address backup capabilities for both the alert and 
notification functions. Three alternatives for addressing this issue in 
rulemaking were considered.
    The first alternative would add a regulatory requirement for ANS 
backup power. The most common warning system used at U.S. nuclear power 
plants is based on sirens that are powered directly, or indirectly 
through batteries, by an AC power source. As noted previously in this 
discussion, the loss of power is not the only failure mode that can 
impact warning systems. Causes of past ANS inoperability problems have 
included the inability to detect siren failures, the inability to 
activate sirens, the failure to test and maintain personal home 
alerting devices, the use of telephone call-inhibiting devices, and the 
failure to provide and maintain distribution lists of tone alert 
radios. Thus, a regulatory requirement addressing only backup ANS power 
would not eliminate any of these other failure modes. This approach 
would prescribe one specific method as a backup means, precluding 
licensees (or applicants) and offsite officials from considering 
alternative methods, such as route alerting or newer communications 
technology, that may be more suitable for certain nuclear power plant 
sites. In summary, it would address only one of several ANS failure 
modes (i.e., loss of AC power) for one alerting method (i.e., sirens). 
It would not address backup methods for other types of alerting devices 
or any part of the notification process. Therefore, the NRC considered 
this approach to be unacceptable.
    The second alternative would require that the primary ANS be 
designed so there would be no common single failure mode for the 
system; therefore, a backup system would not be needed. This approach 
would ensure that the entire ANS is designed and built to a very high 
level of reliability. Any equipment necessary for ANS activation and 
operation (e.g., computers, radio transmitters and radio towers, plus 
the actual alerting devices and notification means) would have 
redundant components and power sources as necessary to eliminate any 
common single failure mode, such as a widespread power outage affecting 
a siren-based system. However, ensuring that all ANS common single 
failure vulnerabilities have been identified and adequately addressed 
would be difficult. Even after extensive analysis and testing of a 
warning system, a common failure mechanism may not become evident until 
the system is to be activated for an emergency event. For a siren-based 
system, several additional sirens (with backup power capabilities) may 
need to be installed to provide overlapping acoustic coverage in the 
event clusters of sirens fail and thus may discourage licensees at 
future nuclear power plant sites from using these systems due to the 
increased cost for installing additional sirens. This approach may not 
be applicable to non-electronic primary warning systems based on other 
methods, such as route alerting. For these reasons, the NRC considered 
this approach to be unacceptable. Rejecting this approach does not mean 
that the issue of backup power for warning systems will be left 
unaddressed. As discussed previously, the House Committee on 
Appropriations has directed FEMA to require all outdoor warning systems 
to be operable in the absence of AC power.
    The third alternative was selected for rulemaking and would revise 
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. to require backup measures that 
would be implemented when the primary means of alerting and 
notification are unavailable. These proposed changes are discussed in 
Section V of this document.
2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness
    In its oversight of licensee EP programs, the NRC has observed a 
few licensees whose responses in performing emergency declarations were 
inappropriately delayed. This situation may be a result of a lack of a 
specific regulatory timeliness requirement. Emergency declaration is 
the process by which a licensee determines whether an off-normal plant 
condition warrants declaration as an emergency and, if so, which of the 
four emergency classes--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area 
Emergency, or General Emergency--is to be declared.
    These declarations are fundamental to the licensee's EP program in 
that onsite and offsite emergency response activities are implemented 
in a staged, proportional manner, based upon the level of the declared 
emergency. If an emergency declaration is delayed, the subsequent 
emergency response actions may not be timely. Emergency response 
personnel, facilities, and equipment may not be in position should it 
become necessary to implement measures to protect public health and 
safety.
    The NRC has issued generic communications to alert licensees of 
these concerns and to advise them of the NRC's expectation that 
emergency classifications \3\ would be made in a prompt manner. In 
1985, the NRC published IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency 
Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency 
Notifications,'' to alert licensees of two instances in which 
declarations and/or notifications of an actual emergency condition were 
significantly delayed and to express the NRC expectation of timely 
emergency declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it necessary to publish 
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-2, ``Emergency Preparedness 
Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency 
Conditions,'' to provide guidance to NRC staff in evaluating licensee 
performance in the area of timely classification. The NRC cited 
classification delays in actual events and exercises as the reason for 
issuing the guidance. EPPOS-2 provided the NRC expectation that the 
classification should be made promptly following indications that 
conditions have reached an EAL threshold and that 15 minutes would be a 
reasonable goal for completing the classification once indications are 
available to the control room operators. The NRC based that conclusion 
on the belief that 15 minutes is a reasonable period of time for 
assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available 
to cognizant personnel, and that a delay in classification for up to 15 
minutes would have a minimal impact upon the overall emergency response 
and protection of the public health and safety. The NRC noted that 
emergency classification schemes have reached a level of maturity in 
which the classification of emergencies can be accomplished in a 
relatively short period of time once the abnormal condition and 
associated plant parameters are known by cognizant licensee personnel. 
EPPOS-2 stated that the 15-minute period was not to be viewed as a 
grace period in which a licensee could resolve a condition that had 
already exceeded an EAL threshold to avoid a declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Early NRC generic communications routinely used the phrase 
``emergency classification'' to denote the outcome of the process to 
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition. This document 
uses the phrase ``emergency declaration'' in place of ``emergency 
classification'' except when summarizing an earlier document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This 15-minute goal was not a regulatory requirement but was rather 
a

[[Page 23263]]

guideline for staff evaluation of a licensee's performance in 
responding to an actual radiological emergency. This goal was 
subsequently incorporated as a criterion in the industry-proposed and 
NRC-approved Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone performance 
indicators (PIs). Although the reported classification performance 
during drills and exercises remains high, there have been a few 
instances, during actual events, in which classifications were 
inappropriately delayed. Although these few actual events did not 
warrant public protective measures, this may not always be the case.
    The NRC considered the following options for addressing this 
regulatory problem. The first option, take no action, was rejected 
because it would not address the regulatory problem. The second option, 
continue to rely on the industry's voluntary PI, was rejected because 
the existence of the PI has not prevented untimely classifications 
during actual emergencies. Although these occurrences were associated 
with Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed weaknesses could also have 
occurred under different circumstances in which the potential impact to 
the public could have been greater. The third option, issue regulatory 
guidance, was rejected because although regulatory guidance is an 
appropriate mechanism for identifying acceptable means for complying 
with broadly worded regulatory requirements, there is currently no 
regulatory requirement, broad or otherwise, that emergency declarations 
meet any particular timeliness criterion. The NRC believes that the 
fourth option, an amendment of the regulations, would be the best 
course of action to ensure that licensees are aware that they are 
responsible for completing emergency declarations in a timely manner in 
the event of a radiological emergency.
    Placing a declaration timeliness criterion into the regulations 
would clearly establish the NRC's expectations, as well as provide a 
regulatory framework to consistently enforce these expectations. The 
NRC considered amending Sec.  50.47(b)(4), Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.B., IV.C., or IV.D., or a combination of all of them. The NRC opted 
not to amend Sec.  50.47(b)(4) because it is applicable to both onsite 
and offsite emergency plans, whereas Appendix E is applicable to an 
applicant or licensee--the entity responsible for making emergency 
declarations.
    The NRC also considered providing either a performance criterion or 
a capability criterion. Similar to the notification timeliness 
criterion in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which the NRC requires 
licensees to be capable of notifying responsible State and local 
governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency, 
the NRC opted to propose a capability criterion, rather than an 
inflexible performance criterion. This would allow licensees some 
degree of flexibility during an actual radiological emergency in 
addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise when an emergency 
declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant 
operations that are more urgently needed to protect public health and 
safety. These delays would be found acceptable if they did not deny 
State and local authorities the opportunity to implement actions to 
protect the public health or safety under their emergency plans and the 
cause of the delay was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to 
foresee and prevent. Based upon these considerations, the NRC is 
proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C. to address this 
issue by providing a capability criterion. These proposed changes are 
discussed in Section V of this document.
3. Emergency Operations Facility--Performance-Based Approach
    Several nuclear power plant licensees have submitted requests for 
NRC approval to combine EOFs for plants they operate within a State or 
in multiple States into a consolidated EOF. In some instances, the 
consolidated EOF is located at a substantial distance from one or more 
of the plant sites and is no longer considered a ``near-site'' 
facility, as required by Sec. Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv), 50.47(b)(3), 
50.47(d)(1), 50.54(gg)(1)(i), and Appendix E, Sections IV.E.8., 
IV.E.9.c., and IV.E.9.d. Guidance documents, including NUREG-0696, 
``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,'' and NUREG-
0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,'' Supplement 1, 
``Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,'' that provide 
criteria for establishing and locating emergency response facilities 
also refer to the EOF as a near-site facility. However, the regulations 
and guidance do not explicitly define the term ``near-site.'' This 
regulatory structure has resulted in confusion for licensees with 
reasonable technical bases for moving or consolidating EOFs that would 
no longer be considered ``near-site'' and led to requests for 
exceptions to NRC guidance and exemptions from NRC regulations to move 
or consolidate their EOFs.
    In addition, neither regulations nor guidance documents address the 
capabilities and functional requirements for a consolidated EOF, such 
as capabilities for handling simultaneous events at two or more sites, 
or having provisions for the NRC and offsite officials to relocate to a 
facility nearer the site if they desire. Thus, licensees have been 
uncertain about when they need to submit requests for exceptions or 
exemptions, which alternative approaches to existing EOF distance and 
other facility criteria may be acceptable, and what additional 
capabilities they need to address for a consolidated EOF. A regulatory 
mechanism (Sec.  50.54(q)) is already in place that allows licensees to 
make changes to their emergency plans without prior Commission approval 
when certain conditions are met. This mechanism could be applied to 
consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria were established. In the 
absence of clear criteria, several recent licensee requests to 
consolidate EOFs have been evaluated by the NRC staff and reviewed by 
the Commission on a case-by-case basis.
    Each nuclear power plant site is required to have an EOF where the 
licensee provides overall management of its resources in response to an 
emergency and coordinates emergency response activities with Federal, 
State, local, and tribal agencies. The original EOF siting criteria 
called for the facility to be located near the nuclear power reactor 
site and imposed a 20-mile upper limit (later modified by the 
Commission to 25 miles) for the distance between the site and the EOF. 
This upper limit was generally considered to be the maximum distance 
from the nuclear power reactor site within which face-to-face 
communications between the licensee, offsite officials, and NRC staff 
could be facilitated, and which also permitted the timely briefing and 
debriefing of personnel going to and from the site. However, advances 
in computer and communication technology after the original EOF siting 
criteria were established now allow EOF functions to be effectively 
performed independent of distance from the site. Computer-based systems 
allow plant parameter, meteorological data, and radiological 
information for multiple sites to be collected, analyzed, trended, and 
displayed in a remotely located facility. Data and voice communications 
between the EOF and other onsite/offsite emergency response facilities 
can be addressed through a variety of independent systems, such as 
microwave, telephone, internet,

[[Page 23264]]

intranet, and radio, which provide a high degree of availability and 
reliability.
    Furthermore, nuclear utility consolidation has resulted in 
initiatives to standardize fleet emergency plans, use consolidated 
EOFs, and staff EOFs by designated corporate personnel. Standardized 
plans, implementing procedures, and accident assessment tools, such as 
a common dose projection model, allow emergency responders in a 
consolidated facility to effectively perform their functions for 
multiple sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site facility. 
Consolidated facilities eliminate the need to duplicate work space, 
displays, communication networks, and other capabilities for each site. 
Consolidated facilities can also be located at or near corporate 
offices where nuclear support personnel designated to fill EOF 
positions can respond more quickly.
    The Commission, in the SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company's Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating 
Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005, 
directed the NRC staff to consider resolving these issues through 
rulemaking. In that SRM, the Commission approved the proposal for a 
consolidated EOF for three nuclear power reactor sites operated by 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company at the company's corporate 
headquarters. The Commission also instructed the NRC staff to consider 
making ``the requirements for EOFs more performance-based to allow 
other multi-plant licensees to consolidate their EOFs, if those 
licensees can demonstrate their emergency response strategies will 
adequately cope with an emergency at any one of the associated 
plants.''
    To address the EOF ``near-site'' and consolidation issues, the NRC 
considered maintaining EOF distance criteria as guidance only and to 
specify other EOF criteria in guidance rather than in the regulations. 
However, providing these criteria as guidance only would not ensure 
that future applicants would follow the criteria. Thus, an EOF could be 
located within 10 miles of a site with no backup facility provided, or 
could be located beyond 25 miles of a site without providing a facility 
closer to a site for NRC site team and offsite response personnel. An 
EOF could be implemented without meeting the proposed performance-based 
criteria. A licensee could relocate or consolidate an existing approved 
facility without meeting all or some of the criteria and without prior 
NRC approval as long as the licensee determined that the provisions of 
Sec.  50.54(q) were met. Under these circumstances, an EOF could be 
implemented that may not provide all of the capabilities that the NRC 
believes are necessary for such a facility to be fully effective. 
Therefore, the NRC determined that this option would not be 
appropriate.
    The NRC also considered revising the regulations (and providing 
associated performance-based criteria) to allow an EOF to be located 
more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site without prior NRC 
approval only in situations involving the consolidation of EOFs for 
multiple sites operated by the same licensee. However, the NRC 
determined that excluding licensees from the ability to locate an EOF 
for a single site, or to co-locate an EOF for two or more nuclear power 
plants operated by different licensees, at distances beyond 25 miles 
from a site without prior NRC approval would be unnecessarily 
restrictive. The capability of existing EOFs located more than 25 miles 
from a site to function as effective emergency response facilities has 
been demonstrated in numerous exercises and several actual events, 
indicating that the distance between the EOF and a site is not a 
critical factor in determining the overall effectiveness of the 
facility. The siting of a single-site or co-located EOF at greater 
distances from a nuclear power plant may also offer benefits to 
licensees and offsite officials in terms of increased staffing 
flexibility and reduced response times. Licensees may be able to use 
additional employees as EOF emergency responders (who would otherwise 
be unavailable due to long response times) when the EOF is located 
closer to their workplace, such as a corporate office, or areas where 
these employees reside. Offsite officials that report to the EOF may 
have shorter response times when the EOF can be located in the vicinity 
of government facilities, or they may be able to co-locate their 
emergency operations at the EOF. For these reasons, the NRC believes 
that the options for EOF locations should be available to all licensees 
as long as the EOF would meet the applicable functional requirements 
associated with consolidated EOFs previously approved by the NRC and 
licensees would provide a facility closer to the site in situations 
where the EOF is more than 25 miles from a site. This approach would 
ensure that an EOF would have the capabilities necessary to be fully 
effective regardless of its location with respect to the nuclear power 
plant site, and that provisions would be in place for a facility closer 
to the site for use by NRC site team and offsite responders. Therefore, 
the NRC is proposing changes to NRC regulations (and associated 
guidance) so the criteria for all EOFs would reflect a performance-
based approach. The NRC is also proposing revisions to regulations (and 
guidance) to remove the references to an EOF as a ``near-site'' 
facility and to incorporate specific EOF distance criteria into the 
regulations, as discussed in Section V of this document.
    In a conforming change, Sec.  52.79(a)(17) would be revised to make 
clear that combined license applications need not address the 
requirement governing TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv). 
Instead, the requirements in Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) would 
apply. That section would accurately reflect the need for the combined 
license application to address an EOF; by contrast Sec.  
50.34(f)(2)(xxv) only requires construction permits (and not combined 
licenses) to address an EOF. The NRC considered, as an alternative to 
modifying Sec.  52.79(a)(17), correcting Sec.  50.34(f)(xxv) to remove 
the language limiting the requirement to address an EOF to construction 
permit applications. The NRC decided not to propose that approach, but 
instead have the general requirements for EP, including Appendix E, 
apply to combined license applications by virtue of Sec.  52.79(a)(21).
4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating
    EP regulations at Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E, 
Sections II.G., III., and IV. currently require nuclear power plant 
operating license applicants to provide evacuation time estimates 
(ETEs) for the public located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These 
ETEs are used in the planning process to identify potential challenges 
to efficient evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event 
of an accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response 
managers in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of 
the public. The current regulations do not require any review or 
revision of ETEs following the initial licensing of the plant. Although 
some licensees do revise ETEs based on updated census data, the use of 
ETEs in evacuation planning is inconsistent and they currently do not 
affect the development of public protective action strategies.
    Nuclear power plant operating license applicants are responsible 
for developing the ETE analysis for their respective sites. They submit 
the analysis to the NRC in support of their emergency plans, usually as 
a stand-

[[Page 23265]]

alone document. Applicants include the results of the ETE analysis in 
the onsite emergency plan, typically in the emergency plan implementing 
procedures for protective action recommendations. The ETEs are also in 
the offsite emergency plans for the State and local governments within 
the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The NRC has traditionally taken the 
lead in reviewing the ETE analyses with the assistance of a traffic 
expert contractor, especially for contested licensing cases involving 
ETE contentions.
    In NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3, 
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' 
the NRC presented the results of a study of its protective action 
recommendation guidance. The NRC concluded in the study that ETE 
information is important in developing public protective action 
strategies and should be used to identify improvements to evacuation 
plans. The effectiveness of protective action recommendation strategies 
is sensitive to the ETE, and therefore, it is important to reduce the 
uncertainties associated with ETEs. Improving the accuracy and quality 
of ETE values would help licensees recommend and offsite officials 
determine the most appropriate protective action. For instance, in the 
study, the NRC determined that for some scenarios sheltering may be 
more protective than immediate evacuation if the evacuation time is 
longer than a few hours, depending on site-specific factors. Further, 
the NRC concluded that the effect of population change upon evacuation 
times should be understood by OROs and incorporated into protective 
action strategies.
    To address this issue, the NRC considered amending the current 
regulations to require licensees to assess changes to the EPZ 
infrastructure and population. The NRC believed that changes in 
infrastructure, or addition of a large subdivision to the EPZ, could 
also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted with Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL), who are experts in emergency evacuations and have 
researched and drafted several NRC studies related to evacuation (e.g., 
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear 
Power Plants,'' NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors 
Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' and NUREG/CR-6953). Based upon their 
expert opinion, SNL confirmed that the major contributor to changes in 
ETE is changes in population. Although changes in infrastructure can 
impact the ETE, population is the more important factor.
    The planning and budget cycle for infrastructure projects is 
measured in years, as indicated in GAO-03-764T, ``Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies, 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, `Federal Aid 
Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge Projects--
Issues and Options.' '' Within the years it takes to plan, budget, and 
construct highway infrastructure, the opportunity exists to include 
such improvements in the ETE as planned or constructed, based on the 
timing of the infrastructure, whereas significant population changes 
can occur over shorter periods of time. Therefore, with population 
changes as the major contributor and infrastructure changes as an 
enveloped contributor, the NRC determined that simplifying the 
regulations to explicitly require assessment of ETEs based on 
population changes was adequate for updates to ETEs. In the case of an 
infrastructure change due to a catastrophic event, the NRC already has 
regulations in place to ensure that licensees consult with OROs to 
consider the impact of offsite events on evacuation routes and ETEs.
    The NRC also considered using guidance as a means to solve the 
problem of the lack of specificity in regulations directing applicants 
and licensees on the periodicity for updating ETEs. Although the 
availability of more detailed guidance would provide applicants and 
licensees with the tools to better update their ETEs, this option would 
not provide the regulatory means for enforcing the desired frequency of 
ETE updates and consistency of ETE determinations.
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV. to require the periodic review of ETEs. The NRC 
considered codifying that all population changes result in updates to 
ETEs, but determined that population changes of less than 10 percent 
would not significantly impact the ETE. The basis for establishing a 
requirement to update ETEs when the population has changed by at least 
10 percent is derived from the U.S. Department of Transportation 
``Highway Capacity Manual'' (HCM), which contains analysis techniques 
for determining the capacity of a roadway, (i.e., Level of Service 
(LOS)). The analysis applies a series of curves called the ``Speed Flow 
Curves and LOS for Basic Freeway Segments'' to roadways and determines 
the LOS for a given traffic volume. The analysis shows that traffic 
volume is a direct indicator of the population involved in an 
evacuation given the roadway system in the area of concern. The HCM 
analysis shows that an increase in 10 percent of vehicles on roadways 
that are near capacity (such as would be the case in an evacuation) 
likely creates a decrease of one level of roadway service (i.e., from 
Level D to Level E). This decrease in roadway service results in slower 
moving traffic and longer ETEs. The decrease in LOS is not apparent for 
a vehicle, or population, increase of less than 10 percent.
    Additionally, the NRC believes that the 10 percent threshold would 
balance potential inadequacies and burdens. Based on the HCM analysis, 
SNL research, and NRC experience, not requiring licensees to assess 
their ETEs until the population changes by more than 15 percent or 20 
percent would allow too large a population change before assessing the 
impact on ETEs, thereby potentially reducing the effectiveness of the 
ETEs. At the same time, requiring an assessment of licensee ETEs for a 
change in population of less than 10 percent would require licensees to 
make assessments when the change in population would not likely have a 
meaningful impact on the ETEs. Thus the NRC believes that a population 
change of 10 percent is the adequate threshold for requiring an 
assessment of licensees' ETEs.
5. Amended Emergency Plan Change Process
    Applicants for operating licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power 
reactors, research reactors, and certain fuel facilities, and early 
site permits (as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52 for 
nuclear power plants, are required by regulation to develop emergency 
plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 and, for 
nuclear power reactor license applicants, the standards of Sec.  
50.47(b). After the facility license is issued, the holder of the 
license is required by Sec.  50.54(q) to follow and maintain in effect 
emergency plans which meet the requirements of Appendix E and, for 
nuclear power reactor licensees, the standards of Sec.  50.47(b). 
Currently, Sec.  50.54(q) also provides a process under which a 
licensee may make changes to its approved emergency plans without prior 
NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the effectiveness 
of the emergency plans as approved and the plans, as modified, would 
continue to meet applicable regulations. However, the NRC has 
determined that the language of Sec.  50.54(q) does not clearly 
describe the requirements the NRC intended to impose on licensees, 
leading to

[[Page 23266]]

confusion and inefficiencies in implementation.
    A licensee must follow and maintain in effect its emergency plan if 
the NRC is to continue to find that there is reasonable assurance that 
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency as stipulated by Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(ii). The EP 
regulations generally refer to the onsite emergency plan as a stand-
alone document. However, emergency plans rely upon facility 
capabilities, equipment, and resources that are typically outside of 
the control of the licensee's emergency planning organization. The NRC 
has identified several occurrences in which licensee personnel outside 
of the emergency planning group have changed the status of capabilities 
and resources under their cognizance without considering the impact on 
the effectiveness of the emergency plan or without alerting the 
emergency planning group.
    Several enforcement actions in the past few years have been 
associated with EALs being rendered ineffective by configuration 
changes made to instruments referenced in an EAL without the change 
being reflected in the EAL, or without a compensatory action being put 
into place. Examples include modifications to installed seismic 
instruments that eliminated the direct readout of acceleration needed 
for classifying a seismic event and changes in reactor vessel level 
criteria (in a boiling water reactor) being made without a conforming 
change being made to the EAL. In another finding, concrete barriers 
installed in a security-initiated change blocked a site access road 
required by the emergency plan to be used for site evacuation. Another 
licensee failed to provide adequate oversight on utility (external to 
the plant) personnel maintaining the site's ANS, resulting in 
degradation of that system and subsequent enforcement actions. Based on 
its experience in reviewing root cause analyses and corrective actions 
associated with inspection findings, the NRC believes that an 
underlying cause of these occurrences is often that the licensees' 
configuration control programs may not adequately consider the impact 
of configuration changes on the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
    The NRC has determined that the phrase ``maintain in effect'' in 
Sec.  50.54(q) is not adequately clear in conveying the NRC expectation 
that an effective emergency plan also requires maintaining the various 
capabilities and resources relied on in the plan. The phrase ``maintain 
in effect,'' as applied to emergency plans in Sec.  50.54(q), has two 
senses: the first is that the plans are in force; the second is that 
the plans can achieve the desired result of providing reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency. Accordingly, the NRC is 
proposing to amend Sec.  50.54(q) to clarify that the regulatory intent 
is the latter sense by requiring licensees to follow and ``maintain the 
effectiveness'' of their approved emergency plans.
    Currently, Sec.  50.54(q) also provides a process under which a 
licensee may make changes to its approved emergency plan without prior 
NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the effectiveness 
of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as modified, would 
continue to meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC approval is required 
for any change that could decrease the effectiveness of the emergency 
plan. The NRC and licensees have experienced significant difficulties 
in implementing this portion of Sec.  50.54(q) because the current rule 
language does not define what constitutes a decrease in effectiveness 
of an emergency plan nor does it identify the type of changes that 
would constitute a decrease in effectiveness of the plan. The lack of 
clear evaluation criteria has resulted in regulatory inefficiencies, 
such as licensees submitting for review changes that do not rise to the 
level requiring prior NRC approval and enforcement actions due to 
licensees failing to submit changes that were later deemed to warrant 
such a review. A large fraction of the enforcement actions in the EP 
Cornerstone are attributable to these findings.
    The NRC has attempted to resolve this issue through the publication 
of regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC issued EPPOS-4, ``Emergency 
Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' to provide guidance to NRC 
inspectors regarding their review of licensees' emergency plan changes. 
In 2004, the NEI submitted two white papers proposing a definition of 
``decrease in effectiveness'' for NRC consideration. The NRC could not 
reach consensus with NEI and thus, did not endorse the NEI guidance. In 
2005, the NRC withdrew EPPOS-4 and issued RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the 
Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005, 
to (1) clarify the meaning of ``decrease in effectiveness,'' (2) 
clarify the process for making changes to emergency plans, and (3) 
provide some examples of changes that are not decreases in 
effectiveness. Although RIS 2005-02 provides useful guidance, the NRC 
and NEI have continued to discuss ways to improve the Sec.  50.54(q) 
change process, including the use of a regulatory framework parallel to 
that of Sec.  50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance programs, Sec.  
50.54(p)(2) for safeguards plans, and Sec.  50.59, ``Changes, Tests, 
and Experiments.''
    During the development of the proposed rule language, a concern was 
raised regarding the process to be used by the NRC for reviewing 
proposed emergency plan changes. Section 50.54(q) directs the licensee 
to submit such changes under the provisions of Sec.  50.4, which 
provides the procedures for making certain submissions to the NRC. Some 
confusion exists as to whether all proposed emergency plan changes 
submitted under Sec.  50.4 would result in a reduction in effectiveness 
and whether Commission review of such submissions is necessary. The NRC 
proposes to clarify that the license amendment process is the correct 
process to use when reviewing submittals involving a proposed emergency 
plan change that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in 
effectiveness of the plan. The proposed rule language addresses this 
clarification. (See Section V of this document for further discussion.)
    The NRC also considered other options for addressing the Sec.  
50.54(q) problems. Using a voluntary industry initiative was rejected 
because the NRC and NEI have yet to agree on the best approach to 
resolve the problems. Issuing more regulatory guidance was rejected 
because that approach has been tried but has not resolved the problems. 
The NRC believes that an amendment to the regulations, supplemented as 
necessary by regulatory guidance, would be the best course of action 
and would ensure that (1) the effectiveness of the emergency plans 
would be maintained, (2) changes to the approved emergency plan would 
be properly evaluated, and (3) any change that reduces the 
effectiveness of the plan would be reviewed by the NRC prior to 
implementation. The NRC proposes to issue regulatory guidance 
concurrently with the implementation of the amended rule language and 
would consider stakeholder-developed and -proposed guidance as an 
alternative to NRC-developed guidance.
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.54(q) to replace the 
existing language. Conforming changes have been proposed in Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV.B. The NRC also believes that the proposed rule 
changes would promote consistent and predictable implementation and 
enforcement, while

[[Page 23267]]

minimizing inefficient and ineffective use of licensee and NRC staff 
resources.
6. Removal of Completed One-Time Requirements
    The NRC is proposing to eliminate several regulatory provisions 
that required holders of licenses to take certain one-time actions to 
improve the state of EP following the Three Mile Island incident in 
1979. These actions are complete and the requirements are no longer 
binding on any current licensee. Corresponding requirements for license 
applicants are provided in Sec. Sec.  50.33 and 50.34.
    The requirements proposed to be removed are:
    (1) Section 50.54(r), which requires licensees of research or test 
reactors to submit emergency plans to the NRC for approval by September 
7, 1982, and, for the facilities with an authorized power level of less 
than 2 MW thermal, by November 3, 1982. There is no longer a need for 
this provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes 
to delete this requirement and designate the section as ``reserved.''
    (2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which requires nuclear power plant 
licensees to submit State and local governmental emergency plans within 
60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective date of the rule that added 
Sec.  50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that date has elapsed. However, that 
portion of Sec.  50.54(s)(1) that discusses the size of the EPZs would 
be retained. There is no longer a need for this provision because this 
requirement has expired. However, the rule language regarding EPZ size 
and footnotes 1 and 2 regarding those EPZs remain applicable. The NRC 
proposes to delete the obsolete text while retaining the current 
language regarding EPZs and footnotes 1 and 2.
    (3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which requires the nuclear power plant 
licensee, State, and local emergency response plans be implemented by 
April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need for this provision because 
this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes to delete Sec.  
50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section as ``reserved.''
    (4) Section 50.54(u), which requires nuclear power reactor 
licensees to submit, within 60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective 
date of the rule that added Sec.  50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC plans 
for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in Sec.  50.47(b) 
and the requirements of Appendix E. There is no longer a need for this 
provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC proposes to 
delete this requirement and designate the section as ``reserved.''
    The NRC is proposing to eliminate these completed one-time 
requirements in the interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these 
requirements would not relax any currently effective regulatory 
requirement and would cause no regulatory burden on any current or 
future licensee or applicant.

III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Proposed Rule

A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings

    As part of its comprehensive assessment of the NRC's EP regulations 
and guidance and development of this proposed rule, the NRC staff met 
with internal and external stakeholders, including FEMA management, on 
numerous occasions including the following:
    1. Meeting with NRC regional EP inspectors in January 2005 and 
January 2006;
    2. Meetings with State, local, and Tribal governments and nuclear 
power industry representatives at the National Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (NREP) Conference on April 11-14, 2005, March 27-30, 2006, 
and April 7-10, 2008;
    3. Public meeting with interested stakeholders on August 31 and 
September 1, 2005;
    4. Public meeting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on May 
19, 2006;
    5. Public meeting with the NEI/nuclear power industry 
representatives on July 19, 2006;
    6. Regional meetings with State and local representatives and 
nuclear power industry working groups that started in 2007;
    7. Regulatory Information Conference on March 16, 2007;
    8. Public meeting with external stakeholders on March 5, 2008;
    9. Meeting with nuclear power industry representatives at the 2008 
NEI EP and Communications Forum; and
    10. Public meeting with external stakeholders on July 8, 2008.

The NRC also met routinely with representatives of FEMA to coordinate 
issues of mutual interest and to keep them informed of NRC EP 
activities. These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA to collaborate on 
rulemaking and guidance issues, and to ensure alignment and regulatory 
consistency. In addition, FEMA attended the NRC public meetings 
regarding the NRC's EP rulemaking.

B. Public and Stakeholder Comments Received

    At the April 11, 2005, NREP Conference, the NRC and FEMA conducted 
a workshop with stakeholders. The workshop covered a broad range of EP 
topics. Unanswered stakeholder comments and questions were recorded by 
NRC staff, and the NRC and FEMA responded to those questions and 
comments in ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items.''
    The NRC conducted a public meeting on August 31-September 1, 2005, 
to obtain input regarding EP requirements and guidance for commercial 
nuclear power plants. The first day of meetings involved a roundtable 
discussion of topics related to the review of EP regulations and 
guidance. During the second day, the NRC staff and stakeholders 
addressed the ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items'' from the April 
2005 NREP conference and other stakeholder comments and questions. The 
NRC requested comments in writing before the August 31-September 1, 
2005, meeting and also received comments at the meeting. In addition to 
comments transcribed from the 2-day public meeting, the NRC accepted 
written comment submissions until October 31, 2005.
    The NRC and FEMA responded to generic comments from the August 31-
September 1, 2005, meeting and comments received thereafter in 
``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and 
October 31, 2005).'' Site-specific comments from the public meeting 
were addressed in ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments 
(Received Between August 31 and October 31, 2005).''
    The NRC also received comments on the review of the EP regulations 
and guidance for nuclear power plants at public meetings with 
stakeholders on May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The May 19, 2006, 
meeting was transcribed. The NRC staff informed the meeting 
participants that their comments would be presented to the Commission 
in a September 2006 SECY paper. These comments were provided to the 
Commission in an attachment to SECY-06-0200 and, like the stakeholder 
comments from 2005, were used to inform the staff's recommendations to 
the Commission in SECY-06-0200.
    The NRC received three comment letters that focused on the draft 
preliminary rule language posted for comment on http://www.regulations.gov on February 29, 2008. One comment letter was 
submitted by the State of Pennsylvania, one was submitted by NEI, and 
one was submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists on behalf of 
several NGOs. A detailed discussion of the public comments and the 
Commission's responses is contained in

[[Page 23268]]

a separate document (see Section IX of this document). The NRC also 
received comments on issues that are outside the scope of this proposed 
rule and on regulatory provisions that are not proposed to be revised 
in this proposed rule. The NRC determined that these comments did not 
support changing the scope of the proposed rule.

IV. Specific Request for Comments

    In addition to the general invitation to submit comments on the 
proposed rule, the NRC also requests comments on the following 
questions:
    1. Inclusion of National Incident Management System/Incident 
Command System in EP programs. The NRC is considering the need to 
integrate the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and more 
specifically, the Incident Command System (ICS), into licensee EP 
programs. On February 28, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which directed DHS to develop and 
administer a NIMS. NIMS/ICS provides a consistent nationwide template 
to enable all government, private-sector, and NGOs to work together 
during domestic incidents. HSPD-5 requires Federal departments and 
agencies to make the adoption of NIMS by State and local organizations 
a condition for Federal preparedness assistance. Non-government 
entities, such as nuclear power plant licensees, are not required to 
adopt NIMS. More information about NIMS and ICS may be found at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm.
    The NRC has observed coordination challenges during hostile action 
drills and observed discussions in some of the focus groups discussing 
the FEMA REP Program Manual with respect to the use of the ICS between 
onsite and offsite responders. It is likely that these issues will be 
addressed through lessons learned in drills and other training, but 
consistency across all nuclear plant sites may be an issue. The NRC is 
seeking comments on whether the NRC should issue regulations requiring 
that licensees train responders and implement the ICS to improve 
interface with offsite response organizations.
    2. Shift staffing and augmentation. Licensees are required by Sec.  
50.47(b)(2) and Appendix E to Part 50 to maintain an ERO comprising 
both an on-shift emergency organization and an organization capable of 
augmenting the shift in a timely manner. However, the regulations state 
that this shift staffing for emergency response must be ``adequate'' 
without providing a definition of ``adequate'' and are silent with 
regard to what constitutes a timely augmentation. NUREG-0654 defines 
the measure of adequacy and divides the ERO augmentation into 30-minute 
and 60-minute responders. However, the guidance is not succinct, 
resulting in inconsistencies in ERO shift staffing and augmentation 
strategies among nuclear power reactor licensees.
    In SECY-06-0200, the NRC staff identified shift staffing as an area 
of concern, noting the challenge in evaluating the adequacy of licensee 
shift staffing because of the lack of clarity regarding the functional 
requirements for emergency response. To address this issue, the NRC 
considered a revision to its regulations to establish functional 
requirements for the emergency responders instead of focusing on 
specific emergency responder positions. The NRC also realized that the 
functional requirements may be dependant upon site- and scenario-
specific parameters. Consequently, the NRC attempted to design a 
performance-based system for identifying shift staffing needs and 
intended to include it in the development of a broader EP performance-
based regulatory regimen. As a result, the shift staffing element was 
no longer considered in this rulemaking effort.
    However, some stakeholders continue to express concern regarding 
emergency response organization staffing. The NRC recognizes that there 
is merit in enhancing the regulations to provide clear direction 
regarding adequate staffing, such as achieving regulatory stability 
through industry consistency and accommodating technological 
advancements. Toward that end, the NRC requests comments on whether the 
NRC should enhance its current regulations to be more explicit in the 
number of ERO staff necessary for nuclear power plant emergencies. When 
responding to this question, please consider the following draft 
staffing table. The table provides proposed staff functions and minimum 
staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting emergency response 
organization. The table modifies the original guidance of NUREG-0654, 
Table B-1 with lessons learned from several years of EP program 
inspections by the NRC.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Augment w/in 60       Augment w/in 90
        On-shift \1\                 min.\1\             min.\1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Director (1)        Emergency Director    Emergency Director
 (Shift Manager):              (1) (TSC):            (1) (EOF):
     Responsible for                   
     overall ERO Command &        Responsible for       Responsible for
     Control until relieved.      overall ERO           overall ERO
                                  Command &             Command &
                                  Control until         Control.
                                  relieved.
     Responsible for                   
     approving event              Responsible for       Responsible for
     classifications and          approving event       approving PARs.
     PARs until relieved.         classifications
                                  and PARs until
                                  relieved.
Communicator (1):             Communicator (1)      Communicator (1)
 Responsible for       (TSC) [In addition    (EOF):
 communicating event           to the one already    Assumes
 classifications and PARs to   on-shift]:            responsibility for
 offsite agencies, including   Assume        communicating PARs,
 the NRC.                      responsibility for    as well as plant
                               either ORO or NRC     updates, to the NRC
                               communications from   (HPN).
                               on-shift
                               Communicator.
Qualified Health Physics      Site Radiation        Site Radiation
 Personnel (2): \3\            Protection            Protection Director
 Responsible for       Coordinator (SRPC)    (SRPD) (1) (EOF):
 providing Health Physics      (1) (TSC):            Responsible
 coverage to the on-shift      Responsible   for evaluating and
 staff.                        for evaluating and    assessing plant and
                               assessing plant and   offsite data in the
                               offsite data in the   development of
                               development of        offsite PARs.
                               onsite protective     Responsible
                               actions and offsite   for recommending
                               PARs.                 offsite PARs to the
                               Responsible   Emergency Director.
                               for recommending      Responsible
                               onsite and offsite    for Field Team
                               PARs to the           direction.
                               Emergency Director.
                               Responsible
                               for all Radiation
                               Protection
                               activities,
                               including Field
                               Team direction.

[[Page 23269]]

 
Dose Projections (1):         Additional Qualified  Additional Qualified
 Responsible for       Health Physics        Health Physics
 providing dose projections    Technicians [In       Technicians [In
 to the Emergency Director     addition to the       addition to the
 for PAR determinations,       personnel already     personnel already
 until relieved.               on-shift] (OSC):      on-site] (OSC):
                               (4)           (2)
                               Responsible for       Responsible for
                               providing Health      providing health
                               Physics coverage      physics support for
                               for OSC personnel     the emergency
                               in the plant.         response
                               (2)           organization.
                               Responsible for
                               plant surveys.
                                  (1)
                                  Responsible for
                                  controlling
                                  dosimetry
                                  issuance and
                                  maintaining
                                  plant access
                                  control for
                                  radiologically
                                  controlled
                                  areas.
EAL Classifications/PARs      Dose Projections (1)  Dose Projections (1)
 (1): \4\                      (TSC):                (EOF):
     Responsible for                   
     evaluating plant             Responsible for       Responsible for
     conditions and dose          providing dose        providing dose
     projections and              projections to        projections to
     recommending event           the SRPC for PAR      the SRPD for PAR
     classifications and          determinations.       determinations.
     PARs to the Emergency
     Director, until
     relieved.
Core/Thermal Hydraulics Eng   Event                 Off-Site Field Team
 (1): \4\                      Classifications (1)   B:
 Responsible for       (TSC):                (1)
 evaluating reactor            Responsible   Qualified Radiation
 conditions and providing      for evaluating        Monitor responsible
 input to the Emergency        plant conditions      for assessing
 Director until relieved.      and recommending      environ radiation/
                               event                 contamination and
                               classifications to    providing input to
                               the Emergency         SRPC. Also
                               Director.             responsible for
                                                     providing Health
                                                     Physics coverage
                                                     for team.
                                                     (1) Driver
                                                     responsible for
                                                     transportation.
Fire Brigade as Defined by    Core/Thermal          OSC Supervisors (4):
 Tech Specs:                   Hydraulics/PRA        (1)
The Fire Brigade is            Engineer (1) (TSC):   Electrical:
 controlled by the site-       Responsible   Responsible for
 specific Technical            for evaluating        supervising OSC
 Specifications.               reactor conditions    activities related
                               and providing input   to electrical
                               to the Emergency      equipment.
                               Director.             (1)
                               Responsible   Mechanical:
                               for evaluating        Responsible for
                               plant system status   supervising OSC
                               and providing PRA     activities related
                               input to the          to mechanical
                               Emergency Director.   equipment.
                                                     (1) I&C:
                                                     Responsible for
                                                     supervising OSC
                                                     activities related
                                                     to IC equipment.
                                                     (1) HP:
                                                     Responsible for
                                                     supervising OSC
                                                     activities related
                                                     to radiation
                                                     protection.
Ops Crew as Defined by Tech   Maintenance (OSC) (1  IT Lead (1) (TSC):
 Specs:                        electrician, 1        For sites
Number of Operators on-shift   mechanic; 1 I&C):     with digital I&C:
 is controlled by the site-    (1)           Responsible for
 specific Technical            Electrician:          assisting in
 Specifications.               Responsible for       ensuring that the
                               providing             digital I&C
                               electrical support    equipment operates
                               for ECCS equipment,   properly.
                               event mitigation,
                               and equipment
                               repair.
                                  (1)
                                  Mechanic:
                                  Responsible for
                                  providing
                                  mechanical
                                  support for ECCS
                                  equipment, event
                                  mitigation, and
                                  equipment
                                  repair.
                                  (1) I&C
                                  Technician:
                                  Responsible for
                                  providing assist
                                  with logic
                                  manipulation,
                                  for providing
                                  I&C support for
                                  event mitigation
                                  and equipment
                                  repair, and for
                                  support of
                                  digital I&C if
                                  applicable.
                              On-Site Field Team    Joint Information
                               (1 qualified          Center Manager
                               radiation monitor     (JIC):
                               and 1 driver):        (1)
                               (1)           Responsible for
                               Radiation Monitor     managing and
                               responsible for       coordinating media
                               assessing environ     information related
                               radiation/            to the event.
                               contamination and
                               providing input to
                               SRPC. Also
                               responsible for
                               providing Health
                               Physics coverage
                               for team.
                                  (1)
                                  Driver
                                  responsible for
                                  transportation.
                              Off-Site Field Team
                               A:
                                  (1)
                                  Qualified
                                  Radiation
                                  Monitor
                                  responsible for
                                  assessing
                                  environmental
                                  radiation/
                                  contamination
                                  and providing
                                  input to SRPC.
                                  Also responsible
                                  for providing
                                  Health Physics
                                  coverage for
                                  team.
                                  (1)
                                  Driver
                                  responsible for
                                  transportation.
                              TSC Engineering:
                                  (1)
                                  Electrical/I&C:
                                  Responsible for
                                  providing
                                  engineering
                                  coverage for the
                                  ERO related to
                                  electrical or
                                  I&C equipment.
                                  (1)
                                  Mechanical:
                                  Responsible for
                                  providing
                                  engineering
                                  coverage for the
                                  ERO related to
                                  mechanical
                                  equipment.

[[Page 23270]]

 
                              Lead OSC Supervisor
                               (1):
                                 
                                  Responsible for
                                  OSC activities
                                  as directed by
                                  Emergency
                                  Director.
                              Security Supervisor
                               (1) (TSC):
                                 
                                  Responsible for
                                  coordinating
                                  security-related
                                  activities and
                                  information with
                                  the Emergency
                                  Director.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. No collateral duties are assigned to an individual that are beyond
  the capability of that individual to perform at any given time.
2. Specified TSC/OSC personnel must be performing their required
  functions within 60 (90) minutes of an Alert or higher event
  classification. Specified EOF/JIC personnel must be performing their
  required functions within 90 minutes of a Site Area Emergency or
  higher event classification.
3. Two qualified Health Physics personnel for a single-unit site, or one
  per unit for a multi-unit site.
4. Could be the STA if justification for collateral duties supports
  additional responsibilities.

    3. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for 
detailed analyses demonstrating timely performance of emergency 
response functions by on-shift personnel. The NRC is proposing to 
require nuclear power reactor licensees to demonstrate through detailed 
analyses that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned emergency 
plan implementation functions without having competing responsibilities 
that could prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. 
The NRC is seeking comments on whether it is necessary to add a 
requirement for non-power reactor licensees (i.e., research and test 
reactor licensees) to include in their emergency plans detailed 
analyses demonstrating that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned 
emergency plan implementation functions in a timely manner without 
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from 
performing their emergency plan functions.
    4. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for the 
capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition 
within 15 minutes and a requirement to promptly declare an emergency 
condition. The NRC proposes to require nuclear power reactor licensees 
to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and 
declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability 
of indications to plant operators that an EAL has been exceeded, and to 
also require that an emergency condition be promptly declared as soon 
as possible following a determination that an EAL has been exceeded. 
The NRC is considering whether it is necessary to add the emergency 
declaration timeliness criteria for non-power reactor licensees. The 
NRC is seeking comments on whether to issue regulations requiring that 
non-power reactor licensees meet these criteria.
    5. Expanding to non-power reactor licensees a requirement for 
hostile action event EALs. The NRC is proposing that EALs for nuclear 
power plants must address hostile action events. The proposed rule 
regarding EALs would not apply to non-power reactors because the EALs 
for these reactors are generally based on projected or actual offsite 
dose and not an initiating event. However, hostile action directed 
toward a non-power reactor is an initiating event that could 
conceivably cause an offsite dose. The NRC is seeking comments on 
whether the NRC should issue regulations requiring that non-power 
reactor licensees include hostile action event EALs in their emergency 
plans.
    6. Effective date. As proposed, the effective date of this rule 
would be 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal 
Register, with an option for a licensee or applicant to defer 
implementation until 180 days after publication of the final rule in 
the Federal Register (with certain exceptions). The NRC is concerned 
that combined license (COL) and early site permit (ESP) applicants 
would need to submit timely revisions to docketed applications, to 
avoid schedule impacts to application reviews, in order to comply with 
the proposed amendments should they become final before the staff's 
licensing review is complete. The NRC is seeking comments on how COL 
and ESP applicants would implement this rule as proposed, including any 
impacts to the process and schedule for the applicant to submit and the 
NRC to review those revisions to COL or ESP applications.
    7. Implementation Schedule. As proposed, each element of the 
proposed rule would be implemented on a schedule that may vary from 
approximately 30 days to 3 years. The wide variance in the proposed 
implementation schedule is a result of the varying degree of difficulty 
and scheduling problems for some elements including the need for 
analysis, development of processes, procurement of equipment/
facilities, and/or coordination with offsite response organizations. 
The NRC is concerned that the proposed implementation schedule may not 
be appropriate for some offsite response organizations and licensees. 
The NRC is seeking comments regarding the appropriateness of the 
proposed implementation schedule.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

    The Commission is proposing to amend portions of Sec.  50.47, 
``Emergency plans,'' Sec.  50.54, ``Conditions of licenses;'' Part 50, 
Appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and 
Utilization Facilities;'' and Sec.  52.79, ``Contents of applications; 
technical information in final safety analysis report.''

Section 50.47 Emergency Plans

    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.47(b)(3) to remove the 
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be 
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance 
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach 
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section 
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 
of this document.)
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.47(b)(10) to require 
licensees to review and update their ETEs periodically and submit them 
to the NRC for review and approval. Proposed changes to Appendix E to 
Part 50 would provide the required frequency and details of the ETE 
updates and submissions. Although requirements for ETEs are found in 
both Sec.  50.47(b) and in Appendix E to Part 50, the level of

[[Page 23271]]

detail between them greatly differs. Section 50.47(b) establishes the 
EP planning standards that licensees must meet, whereas Appendix E sets 
forth more detailed implementation requirements. (A discussion of this 
issue is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
    This new requirement would ensure that ETEs are reviewed 
periodically to determine whether population changes have caused 
significant changes in the ETE. NRC review of ETE updates would ensure 
they are performed routinely, are consistent across the industry, and 
are technically sound. NRC guidance would provide more details of NRC 
expectations for development of an adequate ETE, as well as provide NRC 
reviewers with guidance on the review of ETE updates. The NRC would 
expect that the updated ETEs would be shared with OROs to be 
incorporated into protective action strategies.
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.47(d)(1) to remove the 
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be 
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance 
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach 
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section 
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 
of this document.)

Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses

    The NRC proposes to revise Sec.  50.54(q) in its entirety. Proposed 
Sec.  50.54(q)(1) would define four terms whose meanings would be 
limited to application within the proposed Sec.  50.54(q). Proposed 
Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(i) would define a ``change'' to the emergency plan as 
an action that results in modification or addition to, or removal from, 
the licensee's emergency plan or the resources, capabilities, and 
methods identified in the emergency plan. Thus, a change to the 
emergency plan would not be limited to revisions to the document 
labeled ``emergency plan.'' For example, a proposed plant configuration 
change that removes a seismic instrument relied upon in the emergency 
plan as an EAL threshold would be encompassed by this definition. The 
last sentence in this definition calls attention to the possibility 
that other regulatory change processes may be applicable. In the 
example above, the plant configuration change would likely be subject 
to the requirements of Sec.  50.59 and a technical specification change 
may also be involved. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.B.5 of this document.)
    The proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(ii) definition of ``Emergency plan'' 
would encompass any document that describes the programmatic methods 
that the licensee uses to maintain and perform emergency planning 
functions and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b). Under the proposed Sec.  50.54(q), sub-tier documents, 
such as emergency plan implementing procedures, would not ordinarily be 
subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process because these procedures 
generally only provide instructions in performing the programmatic 
methods identified and described in the emergency plan. This would be 
consistent with the current Sec.  50.54(q) requirements. However, if a 
license were to relocate a programmatic description to another 
document, that description would remain subject to the proposed Sec.  
50.54(q) change process. For example, if a licensee were to relocate 
the details of its emergency classification scheme from the emergency 
plan to a wall chart posted in the control room, the wall chart would 
be subject to the proposed Sec.  50.54(q) change process. The 
definition would also emphasize, by incorporation, the role of the 
licensee's original emergency plan approved by the NRC in minimizing 
the likelihood that a series of incremental changes over time will 
constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the original approved 
emergency plan.
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iii) would define the term ``emergency 
planning function'' in terms of a capability or resource necessary to 
prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency. During the 
development of the EP Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP subject 
matter experts, including NRC staff and nuclear power industry 
stakeholders, with input from the public, developed a series of 
planning standard functions that would be used in determining the 
significance of inspection findings. These planning standard functions 
are paraphrases of the broadly worded Sec.  50.47(b) planning standards 
and the corresponding requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 in terms of 
the significant functions that need to be accomplished, or the 
capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of 
a licensee's emergency plan and emergency response capability. Within 
the EP Cornerstone, the significance of inspection findings depends on 
whether the planning standards can be accomplished (i.e., loss of 
planning standard function) or can be accomplished only in a degraded 
manner (i.e., degraded planning standard function). The 
characterization of a reduction in effectiveness in the proposed rule 
would capitalize on this earlier effort in that any degradation or loss 
of a planning standard function would be deemed to constitute a 
reduction in effectiveness. The NRC is proposing to use the phrase 
``emergency planning function'' in lieu of ``planning standard 
function'' as used in the ROP to allow the definition to be applicable 
to licensed facilities that are subject to Appendix E, but are not 
subject to the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). The emergency 
planning functions would be established in regulatory guidance along 
with examples of typical emergency plan changes that would be expected 
to constitute a reduction in effectiveness and examples of changes that 
would not.
    The emergency planning functions would not replace or supplement 
the regulations upon which they would be based and as such, compliance 
with these functions would not be required. They would be only used to 
differentiate between changes that the licensee would be allowed to 
make without prior NRC approval and those that would require prior NRC 
approval. The NRC would not establish these emergency planning 
functions in regulations because the underlying regulations already 
exist, and the expression of the emergency planning functions would 
differ between nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, and fuel 
facilities licensed under Part 50 or Part 52. A draft regulatory guide 
that discusses these emergency planning functions for nuclear power 
reactors has been prepared and will be made available for public 
comment in conjunction with this proposed rule.
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) would define the term ``reduction in 
effectiveness'' as a change to the emergency plan that results in a 
reduction of the licensee's capability to perform an emergency planning 
function in the event of a radiological emergency. The phrase 
``reduction in effectiveness'' would be an evaluation concept that 
would be used in proposed Sec.  50.54(q) to differentiate between 
changes that the licensee would be allowed to make without prior NRC 
approval and those that would require prior NRC approval. A 
determination that a change may result in a reduction in effectiveness 
does not imply that the licensee could no longer implement its

[[Page 23272]]

plan and provide adequate measures for the protection of the public. 
The NRC may approve a proposed emergency plan change that the licensee 
determined to be a reduction in effectiveness, if the NRC can find that 
the emergency plan, as modified, would continue to meet the 
requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, 
the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), and would continue to provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 
taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ``Radiological 
emergency'' as used in the proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv), would mean 
any condition that would result in the declaration of any emergency 
classification level and the implementation of the licensee's emergency 
plan. A nuclear power reactor licensee evaluating whether a particular 
emergency plan change would constitute a reduction in effectiveness 
would be expected to consider the spectrum of accidents addressed in 
the planning basis described in NUREG-0654. In making this 
determination, licensees of non-power reactors and fuel facilities 
licensed under Part 50 would base their evaluations on the planning 
bases for their respective facilities.
    Current regulations in Parts 50 and 52 require applicants for 
licenses to develop emergency plans that meet the requirements of 
Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, Sec.  50.47(b), as 
applicable, during facility licensing. A holder of a license under Part 
50 or a combined license under Part 52 after the Commission makes the 
finding under Sec.  52.103(g) would be required by proposed Sec.  
50.54(q)(2) to follow and maintain the effectiveness of its emergency 
plan, as originally approved. The proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(2) references 
to Appendix E and Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable, would extend the 
applicability of these requirements as a condition of the facility 
license (as does the current language in Sec.  50.54(q)). The NRC would 
expect licensees to identify conditions and situations which could 
reduce the effectiveness of its emergency plan, and to take corrective 
and/or compensatory actions to restore and maintain the requisite 
effectiveness.
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(3) would grant authority to the holder of a 
license to make changes to its emergency plan without prior NRC 
approval only if an analysis demonstrates that the changes do not 
reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed, 
continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for nuclear power 
reactor licensees, Sec.  50.47(b). The reference to Appendix E and 
Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable, in this paragraph, would serve to 
exclude any change for which the licensee must request an exemption 
from requirements under Sec.  50.12.
    The NRC would expect a licensee considering a change under this 
section to perform an evaluation of the change to a level of rigor and 
thoroughness consistent with the scope of the proposed change. A 
licensee's analysis of the impact of a change on the effectiveness of 
the plan would need to consider the accidents included in the emergency 
planning basis, the licensing basis of the particular emergency plan, 
and any emergency plan elements implemented to address site-specific 
emergency response constraints (e.g., delay in staff augmentation 
associated with a remote site, commitments to State or local 
governments, existence of significant external hazards, etc.).
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(4) would define the process by which a 
licensee would request prior approval of a change to the emergency plan 
that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in 
effectiveness of the plan. Licensees pursuing these changes would be 
required to apply for an amendment to the license as provided in Sec.  
50.90. Courts have found that Commission actions that expand licensees' 
authority under their licenses without formally amending the licenses 
constitute license amendments and should be processed through the 
Commission's license amendment procedures. (See Citizens Awareness 
Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 651 
F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459 
U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re Three Mile Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729 
(3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). See also Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-
13, 44 NRC 315 (1996)). A proposed emergency plan change that would 
reduce the effectiveness of the plan would give the licensee a 
capability to operate at a level of effectiveness that was not 
previously authorized by the NRC. In this situation, the licensee's 
operating authority would be expanded beyond the authority granted by 
the NRC as reflected in the emergency plan without the proposed change. 
Thus, an emergency plan change that would reduce the effectiveness of 
the plan would expand the licensee's operating authority under its 
license. A change expanding the licensee's operating authority is, 
according to the courts, a license amendment and must be accomplished 
through a license amendment process.
    In addition to satisfying the filing requirements for a license 
amendment request in Sec.  50.90 and Sec.  50.91, the proposed Sec.  
50.54(q)(4) request would include all emergency plan pages affected by 
the change, a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason for 
the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's emergency 
plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements of Appendix E, 
and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b). The NRC would review the amendment application to make 
its no significant hazards consideration determination and to determine 
if the emergency plan, as modified, is a reduction in effectiveness 
under Sec.  50.54(q) and continues to meet the requirements in Appendix 
E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  
50.47(b).
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(5) would apply to all licensees subject to 
Sec.  50.54(q) and require that licensees retain a record of all 
changes to the emergency plans made without prior NRC approval for a 
period of three years from the date of change. The section would also 
require the licensee to submit, as specified under Sec.  50.4, a report 
of each such change, including its evaluation, within 30 days of the 
change. The NRC expects that the record of changes would include 
documentation of the evaluation that determined the change not to be a 
reduction in effectiveness. The NRC would use this record of changes 
during inspection oversight of the licensee's implementation of 
proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(2).
    Proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(6) would require a licensee of a nuclear 
power reactor to retain the emergency plan and each change for which 
prior NRC approval was obtained under proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(4) as a 
record until the Commission terminates the license.
    The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (r) of Sec.  50.54. Section 
50.54(r) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) 
to require then-existing licensees authorized to possess and/or operate 
a research or test reactor facility to submit emergency plans complying 
with Appendix E to Part 50 to the NRC for approval within one year or 
two years, as applicable, from the effective date of the rule (November 
3, 1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section 
II.B.6 of this document.)
    The NRC proposes to amend Sec.  50.54 by revising Sec.  50.54(s)(1) 
to remove language addressing a one-time requirement that has now been 
completed. Section 50.54(s)(1) was published as a final rule on August 
19,

[[Page 23273]]

1980 (45 FR 55402). This provision required existing nuclear power 
reactor licensees to submit to the NRC within 60 days after the 
effective date of the rule (November 3, 1980), the radiological 
response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United 
States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway 
EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially 
within an ingestion pathway EPZ. Section 50.54(s)(1) continued to 
further establish the size of the two EPZs. (A discussion of this issue 
is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this document.)
    The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (s)(2)(i) from Sec.  50.54. 
Section 50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a final rule on August 
19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) as a single paragraph. The rule was amended on 
May 29, 1981 (46 FR 28838), resulting in Sec.  50.54(s)(2) being split 
into two paragraphs, Sec. Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The 
rule language in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) requires that the licensee, 
State, and local emergency plans for all operating power reactors be 
implemented by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3. of 
Appendix E to Part 50. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.B.6 of this document.)
    The NRC proposes to remove paragraph (u) from Sec.  50.54. Section 
50.54(u) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) 
to require then-existing nuclear power reactor licensees to submit to 
the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in 
Sec.  50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 within 60 
days after the effective date of the rule (November 3, 1980). (A 
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this 
document.)
    The NRC is proposing to revise paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of 
Sec.  50.54 to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains 
within DHS, the responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power plants 
is with FEMA. FEMA has requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather than 
``DHS'' for clarity of communication with stakeholders.
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sec.  50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the 
reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria would be 
provided in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF distance 
from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based approach 
for EOFs, specifying that these facilities would need to meet certain 
functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located 
within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is 
discussed in the section on proposed changes to Appendix E, Section 
IV.E.8. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 
of this document.)

Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities

    The NRC is proposing to amend several paragraphs within Section IV. 
of Appendix E to Part 50 that would apply to licensees and applicants 
for licenses under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, as applicable. 
The NRC would amend the first paragraph of Section IV. by adding 
language to require nuclear power reactor licensees and license 
applicants to revise their ETEs when the decennial census data is 
available. The proposed regulation would require that within 180 days 
of the issuance of the 2010 decennial census data (expected to be 
available in 2011), ETE revisions be submitted to the NRC under Sec.  
50.4 for review and approval. The NRC would establish a schedule for 
review and approval of the updated ETEs. Thereafter, nuclear power 
reactor licensees and license applicants would be required to annually 
review changes in the population of their EPZ and most populous 
Emergency Response Planning Area (ERPA). ERPAs are local areas, 
typically defined by geographic or political boundaries that are used 
to communicate protective actions to members of the public in familiar 
geographic terms. When the new population, including permanent 
residents and transient populations, in either the EPZ or most populous 
ERPA would be less than 90 percent or greater than 110 percent of the 
population that formed the basis for the currently approved ETE, the 
licensee or applicant would be required to update the ETE to reflect 
the impact of this population change. The licensee or applicant would 
be required to submit the updated ETE to the NRC under the procedures 
of Sec.  50.4 within 180 days of the availability of the population 
data used in the update. (A discussion of this issue is also provided 
in Section II.B.4 of this document.)
    The NRC proposes to require licensees and applicants to review 
changes in the population of the EPZ and the most populous ERPA because 
population density in an EPZ is generally not homogeneous and EPZ 
evacuation times are significantly influenced by the ERPA with the 
largest population. The NRC considered requiring review of all ERPAs or 
the review of individual counties and States in addition to the whole 
EPZ. Review of the ERPA with the largest population was considered to 
be a reasonable balance between the burden on licensees and applicants 
and the need to ensure that the ETE is accurate because the ERPA with 
the largest population is generally the one with the most impact on 
evacuation times.
    The proposed requirement for nuclear power reactor licensees to 
evaluate a population change impact on the ETE during the period 
between decennial censuses would balance the burden on licensees and 
the expected rates of change among the relevant populations. The U.S. 
Census Bureau currently projects population growth at approximately one 
percent per year in the United States. However, certain areas 
experience much greater growth. The population of Maricopa County, 
Arizona, for example, experienced approximately 6.4 percent growth in 
the two-year period from 2005 to 2007. The Palo Verde Nuclear 
Generating Station is located in Maricopa County. St. Lucie County in 
Florida, where the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant is located, experienced 
approximately 9.7 percent population growth in the same period. A 
nuclear plant's EPZ population may not grow at the same rate as the 
corresponding county(ies) population, but a review of population growth 
would be appropriate, as discussed in Section II.B.4 of this document. 
The review would consist of analysis of population growth based on 
either U.S. Census Bureau data (e.g., Subcounty Population Datasets for 
population estimates) or State/local government estimates and would 
examine the whole EPZ as well as the most populous emergency planning 
area within the EPZ. If an ETE revision were necessary, it would be 
submitted to the NRC under the provisions of Sec.  50.4 for review and 
approval. The NRC would review the ETEs to ensure they were consistent 
with NRC guidance on the development of ETEs that would be expected to 
be issued with the final rule.
    The updated ETEs would allow for more effective development of 
public protective action strategies and review of evacuation planning. 
Sites with little population change would be minimally impacted by the 
proposed requirement, while those sites with a greater rate of 
population change would be required to perform more frequent updates. 
Licensees would also be expected to identify and analyze potential 
enhancements to improve evacuation times and document whether 
implementation was appropriate.
    The NRC is also proposing to revise the first paragraph of Section 
IV. to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide 
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.'' It is also 
clarifying in this paragraph that

[[Page 23274]]

the requirements for the submittal of emergency response plans apply to 
not only applicants for nuclear power reactor operating license 
applicants under Part 50, but also to applicants for early site permits 
(as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52. This clarification 
was intended for but inadvertently omitted from a rulemaking to update 
Part 52 (72 FR 49517, dated August 28, 2007).
    The NRC is proposing to make two editorial revisions to Appendix E 
to Part 50, Section IV.A.2. One change would be to include the 
abbreviation of emergency response organization, ``ERO,'' in paragraph 
2 of Section IV.A. The second revision would clarify that paragraph 
2.c. should read as follows: ``Authorities, responsibilities, and 
duties of an onsite emergency coordinator. * * *''
    The NRC is proposing to amend Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. 
to require licensees to confirm that ORO resources, such as local law 
enforcement, firefighting, and medical services, are available to 
respond to an emergency, including a hostile action event, at the plant 
site. Currently, the regulations do not explicitly require the licensee 
to take action to ensure that OROs are capable of adequately responding 
to the site during a hostile action event. This new requirement would 
require licensee coordination with the OROs to ensure that licensees 
and OROs are able to effectively implement their pre-planned actions 
for any contingency, including hostile action events as required by 
Order EA-02-026. This requirement would be enforced through routine 
inspection and observation of emergency exercises. (A discussion of 
this issue is also provided in Section II.A.4 of this document.)
    The proposed requirement would also contain a new footnote, which 
would define ``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a nuclear 
power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to 
destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to 
achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, 
explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver 
destructive force.
    The NRC is proposing to add a new paragraph A.9. in Section IV. of 
Appendix E to Part 50. This new paragraph would require nuclear power 
plant licensees under this part and Part 52 to provide a detailed 
analysis to show that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan 
implementation functions are not assigned any responsibilities that 
would prevent them from performing their assigned emergency plan 
functions when needed. This proposed amendment would constitute a new 
requirement. The proposed rule would not specify, by position or 
function, which responsibilities must be assigned, but would allow 
licensees the flexibility to determine the limit of assigned 
responsibilities for effective emergency plan implementation on a site-
specific basis. This would allow licensees to take credit for new 
technologies that could potentially affect the number of on-shift staff 
that would be needed. However, licensees would need to ensure that the 
duties assigned to on-shift staff were reasonable for one person to 
perform and would not be so burdensome as to negatively impact 
emergency response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.1 of this document.)
    The licensees would have to perform a detailed analysis, such as a 
job task analysis (JTA) or a time motion analysis, to demonstrate that 
on-shift personnel could implement the plan effectively without having 
competing responsibilities that could prevent them from performing 
their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC would expect the analysis 
to identify all the tasks which must be performed by available staff 
during an evolution such as response to an emergency.
    Licensees would first need to identify the spectrum of accidents 
defined in their licensing bases (i.e., design basis accidents (DBAs), 
as well as the DBT, as applicable), for which there must be emergency 
planning. The analysis would identify all tasks which must be completed 
for each DBA and the DBT, as applicable, and the responders responsible 
for the performance of those tasks. Then licensees would ensure that 
there would be sufficient on-shift staff to perform all necessary tasks 
until augmentation staff arrives to provide assistance. Enhancing the 
regulations to require licensees to ensure that multiple 
responsibilities assigned to on-shift staff would not detract from 
adequate emergency plan implementation would establish a regulatory 
framework that more clearly codifies the NRC's shift staffing 
expectations for effective emergency response.
    The NRC proposes to amend Section IV.B. of Appendix E to Part 50 to 
add a requirement that nuclear power reactor licensees and license 
applicants would take hostile action events, which may adversely affect 
the plant (e.g., cause personnel harm and/or equipment damage), into 
account in their EAL schemes. It would also serve to establish 
consistent EALs for hostile action events among existing and future 
nuclear power reactor licensees and allow the licensees to make hostile 
action emergency declarations based on a credible threat. (A discussion 
of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.2 of this document.)
    The proposed language would also make changes to conform to 
proposed changes to Sec.  50.54(q), which address the issue described 
in Section II.B.5 of this document. The current requirement in 
paragraph (1) in Section IV.B. of Appendix E that licensees obtain 
prior NRC approval via Sec.  50.4 for changes to an EAL scheme from 
NUREG-0654 to one based on NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01 would be 
retained, but the paragraph numbering would be removed. Paragraphs (2) 
and (3) would be deleted and replaced with a new requirement that all 
other EAL changes would be required to be made under the proposed 
amended Sec.  50.54(q) change process, as discussed earlier in Section 
V of this document. The two remaining paragraphs in this section would 
be designated B.1. and B.2.
    The NRC proposes to retain the existing language of Section IV.C. 
of Appendix E to Part 50, redesignate that language as paragraph C.1., 
and add a new paragraph C.2. Proposed paragraph C.2.would require that 
nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this part and Part 
52 have and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an 
emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of 
indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been 
exceeded and will promptly declare the emergency condition upon 
determining that an emergency action level has been exceeded. The NRC 
believes that the amended language would emphasize the NRC's 
expectations regarding the timeliness of emergency declarations while 
retaining sufficient operational flexibility to respond to extenuating 
circumstances necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC 
would consider the 15-minute criterion to commence when plant 
instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal 
reports that correspond to an EAL become available to cognizant 
personnel within the control room, or in another emergency facility in 
which emergency declarations are performed. On receipt of such 
information, the licensee personnel would assess the data for validity 
and compare the indications to the EALs in the licensee's emergency 
classification scheme. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.B.2 of this document.)
    This 15-minute criterion would end as soon as the licensee 
determines that

[[Page 23275]]

an EAL has been exceeded and the licensee makes the emergency 
declaration. The proposed rule would also require the licensee to 
promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as the licensee 
determined that an EAL had been exceeded. Because the NRC would require 
emergency declarations to be made promptly, the proposed rule states 
that the 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace period 
in which a licensee may attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid 
declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. If the EAL threshold 
specifies a duration (e.g., ``fire lasting for greater than 10 minutes 
from detection''), the NRC would expect the licensee to assess and 
classify the event concurrently with the specified condition duration. 
The licensee would then be required to promptly declare the emergency 
condition as soon as the specified duration has been exceeded. The 
licensee would be expected, but not required, to declare the emergency 
condition once it has been determined that the condition cannot be 
corrected before the specified duration is exceeded.
    The NRC is proposing a capability criterion, rather than an 
inflexible performance criterion, to allow licensees some degree of 
flexibility in addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise 
during an actual emergency. For example, an emergency declaration may 
need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant operations that 
are urgently needed to protect public health and safety. These delays 
would be found acceptable if they did not deny State and local 
authorities the opportunity to implement actions to protect the public 
health or safety under their emergency plans and the cause of the delay 
was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and 
prevent.
    The NRC is proposing to add language to Section IV.D.3. of Appendix 
E to require licensees and applicants to have backup ANS methods for 
both the alert and notification functions without specifying which 
backup measures should be used. This approach would allow flexibility 
in the selection of the method best suited for each site and would also 
allow the use of newer technologies or other alternative methods. 
Available backup ANS methods would enhance the public's ability to be 
promptly alerted of an event at a facility and of possible protective 
actions. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.1 
of this document.)
    Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E currently acknowledges that, for the 
events more likely to warrant use of the alert and notification 
capability, State and local officials will have substantial time 
available to make a judgment regarding activation of the warning system 
to alert and notify the public. Accordingly, the proposed amendment 
would not impose specific time requirements for using a backup method. 
The alerting function could involve one or more methods that are 
already used as a backup means at several sites, such as multiple, 
independent siren activation points in conjunction with siren backup 
power, route alerting, reverse call-out systems or newer technologies, 
such as intelligent notification and communication systems for 
notifying targeted populations. The notification function could involve 
the designation of multiple EAS broadcast stations or use of weather 
alert radios or newer technologies, such as advanced messaging systems. 
Guidance would be provided for determining the acceptability of the 
backup methods based on the alerting and notification capabilities of 
the methods selected, administrative provisions for implementing and 
maintaining backup methods, identification of resources to implement 
backup methods, and periodic demonstration of the backup methods. 
Guidance would also be provided to licensees and offsite officials 
regarding the need to ensure that the backup methods could alert and 
notify the public in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ, that the 
personnel and resources required to implement the backup methods would 
be available during any type of emergency (including hostile action 
events), and that designated personnel know how to implement backup 
methods.
    The backup method of alerting and notification would be capable of 
providing warning signals and instructional messages to the population 
in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ when the primary ANS is 
unavailable during an emergency (i.e., the primary ANS cannot alert or 
notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population). 
The backup means could be designed so that it can be implemented using 
a phased approach in which the populations most at risk are alerted and 
notified first, followed by alerting and notification of people in less 
immediately affected areas. The backup method may have the additional 
capability of being employed only in the specific areas impacted when a 
portion of the primary ANS, such as a single siren or sirens within a 
community, fails and the extent of the affected area and population can 
be determined.
    The new requirement for a backup method would apply to both the 
alerting function and notification function of the FEMA-approved ANS. 
However, the NRC recognizes that some backup methods would not be 
capable of meeting the timeframes that are part of the primary ANS 
design objectives. The intent of the proposed amendment would not be to 
have a duplicate primary ANS, but to have a means of backup alerting 
and notification in place so the public could be alerted in sufficient 
time to allow offsite officials to consider a range of protective 
actions for the public to take in the event of a severe accident with 
potential offsite radiological consequences. Guidance would be provided 
to clarify the design objectives and other criteria for ANS backup 
methods.
    For nuclear power plant sites with no backup measures currently in 
place, backup provisions would need to be identified, incorporated into 
the site's ANS design, and submitted for FEMA approval as specified in 
FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification 
Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.'' For nuclear power plant sites that 
already have provisions for ANS backup means in FEMA-approved ANS 
designs, licensees and offsite officials would need to confirm that the 
backup methods meet the proposed requirements and submit revised ANS 
designs for FEMA approval if changes were deemed necessary. Timeframes 
for submitting and approving ANS designs, along with implementation of 
the backup methods, could vary considerably depending on the level of 
ANS backup measures already in place. Therefore, backup methods must be 
ready for demonstration no later than its first biennial exercise 
conducted more than one year after the effective date of the rule, 
which would result in a maximum of approximately 3 years for 
implementation across the industry.
    Additional changes to Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. are being 
proposed to more clearly distinguish between the alerting and 
notification functions of the ANS (including clarification of how the 
15-minute design objective applies to these functions), to use 
consistent terminology when referring to the officials responsible for 
ANS activation, and to update language regarding demonstration of ANS 
capabilities and correction of deficiencies. References to the alerting 
function would be added to Section IV.D.3. to clearly indicate that the 
requirements for the primary and backup ANS apply to both the alerting

[[Page 23276]]

and notification functions. The wording of the primary ANS design 
objective would be revised to clarify that the 15-minute criterion 
applies to the completion of the initial alerting and start of the 
initial notification of the public (See Public Service Company of New 
Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-935, 32 NRC 57, 68 
(1990)). The phrase ``appropriate governmental authorities'' would be 
used in place of ``State and local officials'' when referring to ANS 
activation to encompass site-specific variations in the assignment of 
the responsibility for this function according to each offsite 
emergency plan and established ANS activation protocols. This 
responsibility may be assigned to a single State or local organization, 
or to multiple organizations among various State, county, local, and 
other governmental agencies. The use of ``appropriate governmental 
authorities'' addresses all of these combinations. The current language 
in Section IV.D.3. refers to the February 1, 1982, date for then-
existing nuclear power reactor licensees to have demonstrated ANS 
capabilities for their sites. The NRC is proposing to remove the 
reference to the February 1, 1982 date and require that ANS 
capabilities to alert the public and provide instructions promptly must 
be demonstrated before exceeding 5 percent rated thermal power of the 
first reactor at each site, consistent with the requirements of Sec.  
50.47(d). It is also important that licensees promptly correct 
deficiencies found during initial ANS installation and testing, as well 
as deficiencies identified thereafter, as required by Sec.  
50.54(s)(2). However, the requirement for correction of ANS 
deficiencies is clearly stated in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not 
need to be repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
    The NRC is also proposing to add language to Section IV.D.3. of 
Appendix E to require licensees under this part and Part 52 to 
implement the requirements for a backup means of alerting and 
notification under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. no 
later than its first biennial exercise conducted more than one year 
after the effective date of the rule.
    Note that no changes are proposed to the basic requirement in Sec.  
50.47(b)(5) for nuclear power plant licensees or applicants to ensure 
that the means to provide early notification and clear instruction 
(i.e., alerting and notification) to the populace in the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ have been established. It is not necessary to address 
backup methods in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) because the current provision 
establishes the overall requirement for alerting and notification.
    The NRC is also proposing to revise Section IV.E.5. of Appendix E 
to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide 
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency''; and the 
existing language of Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. to redesignate the 
revised language as Section IV.E.8.a.; and add new Sections IV.E.8.b., 
IV.E.8.c., IV.E.8.d., and IV.E.8.e.
    Proposed Section IV.E.8.a. would remove the reference to the EOF as 
a ``near-site'' facility and add the requirement that nuclear power 
plant licensees and applicants under this part and Part 52 must provide 
an OSC. In a conforming change, Sec.  52.79(a)(17) would be revised to 
make it clear that combined license applications would not be subject 
to the TMI action requirements in Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv), which address 
the need for an onsite TSC, an onsite OSC, and for an EOF. Instead, the 
requirements governing the need for such facilities in Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) would apply to combined license 
applications. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section 
II.B.3 of this document.)
    Proposed Section IV.E.8.b. would incorporate EOF distance criteria 
currently found in NRC guidance and specify that an EOF must be located 
within 10 to 25 miles of each nuclear power reactor site that the 
facility serves or, if the EOF is located less than 10 miles from a 
nuclear power reactor site, then a backup facility must be provided 
within 10 to 25 miles of a site. The distance between the EOF and a 
site would be determined by the straight-line distance from the site's 
TSC to the EOF, which would be consistent with the approach described 
in NUREG-0696, Table 2, ``Relation of EOF Location to Habitability 
Criteria.'' An exception to the 25-mile limit would be made for an EOF 
as long as provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to 
that nuclear power reactor site are made so they can interact face-to-
face with personnel going to and leaving the site for briefings and 
debriefings. During an event, NRC and offsite agency staff may wish to 
relocate from a remotely located EOF to another facility closer to the 
nuclear power plant site. Suitable space near the site would be 
available so NRC and offsite agency staff could coordinate their 
actions efficiently, communicate with responders in other onsite and 
offsite emergency response facilities, and interface directly with 
responders at the site as needed. This space would allow NRC site team 
and offsite response personnel, including Federal, State, and local 
responders, to conduct briefings and debriefings with emergency 
response personnel entering and leaving the site, communicate with 
responders at other emergency response facilities, maintain awareness 
of conditions at the site, and share information with other emergency 
response organizations via computer links, such as the Internet.
    Proposed Section IV.E.8.c. would provide performance-based criteria 
applicable to all EOFs. The functions that an EOF would have to address 
include the capability to obtain and display plant data and 
radiological information for each reactor unit or plant that the 
facility serves. In some cases, an EOF could serve units or plants 
involving more than one type of reactor technology, such as pressurized 
water reactors and boiling water reactors, or more than one design of 
the same reactor type. The EOF staff would need to be capable of 
understanding conditions for each type of reactor and translating 
technical information into a useful form for offsite officials and 
media relations staff. A co-located or consolidated facility would also 
need to be capable of supporting effective response to events at more 
than one site simultaneously, because widespread events affecting 
multiple sites can and have occurred, such as the electrical blackout 
in several areas of the northeastern U.S. and portions of Canada in 
August 2003. The ability to simultaneously display information for 
multiple plants would also enhance effective response to events 
occurring at more than one site.
    By codifying EOF distance requirements in Section IV.E.8.b. of 
Appendix E and providing specific criteria for EOFs in Section 
IV.E.8.c., the proposed language would obviate the need for licensees 
to seek NRC approval at either the staff or Commission level to locate 
an EOF or consolidate EOFs meeting certain performance-based 
requirements and having provisions for NRC site team and offsite agency 
responders closer to a site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles 
from a site. Licensees could then implement a relocated or consolidated 
facility as part of their emergency response plans under the provisions 
of Sec.  50.54(q) without prior NRC approval. The proposed language 
would also address Commission direction provided in the SRM to SECY-04-
0236, as discussed in Section II.B.3 of this document. During exercises 
and actual events, EOFs located more than 25 miles from a site that 
have been previously approved by the NRC have functioned as effective

[[Page 23277]]

emergency response facilities and demonstrated that a near-site EOF is 
not necessary to adequately protect public health and safety.
    Although not included in the proposed rule language of Sections 
IV.E.8.b. or IV.E.8.c. as a requirement, the NRC believes it is 
important for licensees or applicants to consult with offsite agencies 
that send representatives to the EOF prior to relocating or 
consolidating such facilities. This consultation is particularly 
important when a licensee or applicant intends to use an EOF located 
more than 25 miles from a site to ensure that response times to the 
facility would be acceptable to offsite responders, adequate 
communications with offsite responders at other locations would be 
available, and there would be no jurisdictional concerns with the EOF 
location (e.g., when the EOF is located in a different State than a 
nuclear power plant). Additional criteria regarding EOF habitability, 
size, staffing, and other characteristics would remain as guidance.
    Proposed Section IV.E.8.d. would require nuclear power plant 
licensees and applicants under this part and Part 52, to identify 
alternative facilities to function as staging areas for augmentation of 
ERO staff during hostile action events to minimize delays in emergency 
response and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response. To 
accomplish this, the alternative facility would be required to have the 
following characteristics: Accessibility even if the site is under 
threat or actual attack; communication links with the EOF, Control 
Room, and plant security; the capability to notify offsite agencies if 
the EOF is not performing this action; and the capability for 
engineering assessment activities, including damage control team 
planning and preparation. The alternative facility should also be 
equipped with general plant drawings and procedures, telephones, and 
computer links to the site to ensure that the ERO is aware of 
conditions at the site and prepared to return when personnel are 
allowed to re-enter the site. This would enable rapid staffing of 
onsite emergency response facilities and implementation of mitigation 
actions when ERO personnel enter the protected area. However, 
alternative facilities would not be required to reproduce the full 
documentation present at primary emergency response facilities. (A 
discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.3 of this 
document.)
    The NRC also proposes to add a new Section IV.E.8.e. to permit a 
nuclear power reactor licensee, that, on the day the final rule becomes 
effective, has an approved EOF that does not meet the distance criteria 
for a primary or backup EOF, or does not have provisions for a facility 
closer to the site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles from a 
nuclear power reactor site, to not be subject to the requirements of 
Section IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already received approval from 
the Commission for variances from existing requirements (and guidance) 
regarding EOF locations, backup EOF facilities, or other EOF 
characteristics. (Also refer to the discussion of this issue in Section 
II.B.3 of this document.)
    The NRC is proposing to amend Sections IV.E.9.c. and IV.E.9.d. to 
remove references to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria 
would be provided in Section IV.E.8. of Appendix E, regarding EOF 
distance from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance-based 
approach for EOFs. The criteria would specify that these facilities 
would need to meet certain functional requirements rather than 
requiring that they be located within a certain distance of the plant. 
The intent of this change is discussed in the proposed changes to 
Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E. (A discussion of this issue is also 
provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)
    The NRC is proposing to revise paragraph F.1.a. of Section IV. to 
remove the word ``radiation'' because the advent of hostile action-
based scenarios renders usage of the word as too limiting in describing 
potential emergencies. This change would provide consistent use of the 
term ``emergency plan.'' The NRC is also proposing to revise paragraph 
F.1.b. to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide 
consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''
    The NRC proposes to add a new requirement to Section IV.F.2.a. to 
require licensees to submit, for NRC review and approval, scenarios for 
full participation exercises required by Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 
This proposed requirement would enable the NRC to ensure that licensee 
exercise scenarios implement the proposed requirements of Sections 
IV.F.2.i. and IV.F.2.j. of Appendix E, including hostile action events 
and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of respondents. 
The NRC also proposes to insert the word ``initial'' in paragraph 
F.2.a. to distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and 
F.2.b. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.6 
of this document.)
    The NRC is proposing to revise paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and 
F.2.a.(iii) of Appendix E, Section IV. to replace ``DHS'' with 
``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains within DHS, the responsibility for 
offsite EP for nuclear power plants is with FEMA. FEMA has requested 
that ``FEMA'' be used rather than ``DHS'' for clarity of communication 
with stakeholders.
    The NRC is proposing several revisions to Section IV.F.2.b. to 
require licensees to submit, for NRC review and approval, scenarios for 
their onsite biennial exercises. This proposed requirement would enable 
the NRC to ensure licensee exercise scenarios implement the proposed 
requirements of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i. and IV.F.2.j., including 
hostile action events and a variety of challenges to reduce 
preconditioning of respondents. The NRC also proposes to insert the 
word ``subsequent'' in paragraph F.2.b. of Section IV. to distinguish 
between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and F.2.b.
    The current language in Section IV.F.2.b. requires that licensees 
ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained to 
address several principal emergency response functional areas. The NRC 
is proposing to expand the list of principal functional areas of 
emergency response in paragraph F.2.b. to include event classification, 
notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the impact of onsite 
and offsite radiological releases, and development of protective action 
recommendations. These additional functional areas are associated with 
the planning standards in Sec.  50.47(b) that have a significant impact 
on determining the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to 
protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency (i.e., 
Sec.  50.47(b)(4) regarding event classification, Sec.  50.47(b)(5) 
regarding notification of offsite authorities, Sec.  50.47(b)(9) 
regarding assessment of radiological releases, and Sec.  50.47(b)(10) 
regarding protective actions).
    The NRC proposes to amend the last sentence of Section IV.F.2.b. to 
add ``in all participating facilities'' after ``operating staff'' to 
clarify that the operating staff from all facilities need not 
participate in the drill. The NRC also proposes to change ``the drills 
could focus on onsite training objectives'' to ``the drills may focus 
on the onsite exercise training objectives'' to make the permissive 
intent of the regulatory language more explicit.
    The NRC is proposing to amend Section IV.F.2.f. to add a second 
situation when remedial exercises would be required. The proposed 
amendment would explain that

[[Page 23278]]

remedial exercises would be required if the emergency plan is not 
satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC, 
in consultation with FEMA, could not find reasonable assurance that 
adequate protective measures could be taken in response to an emergency 
or determine that key ERO skills had been maintained. This change would 
demonstrate the NRC's intent to invoke this requirement for exercises 
where the scope of the exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
maintenance of key ERO skills. In the past, some exercises have not 
provided such a demonstration due to the use of simplistic scenarios. 
The proposed rule change is intended to prevent this trend in the 
future. The key skills necessary to implement the emergency plan vary 
among ERO members, emergency response facilities, and licensees. In 
general, key skills include the ability to implement emergency response 
procedures specific to the duties of the ERO member. Key skills include 
specific response capabilities that may be assigned in a site-specific 
manner such as:
     Timely classification of events;
     Timely notification of offsite authorities;
     Assessment of radiological releases onsite and offsite;
     Development of protective action recommendations;
     Dissemination of information to the public via media 
channels;
     Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and 
repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions;
     Protection of workers during emergency response, including 
medical care;
     Response to operational transients while implementing the 
emergency plan; and
     Coordination with offsite response organizations.
    The NRC also proposes to revise Section IV.F.2.g. to require 
licensees to correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified during 
training evolutions, exercises, or drills. This change would explicitly 
state the regulatory intent that training evolutions, drills, and 
exercises are included in the requirement for critique and correction 
of weaknesses or deficiencies.
    The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.i. to Appendix E 
to require all nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 
52 to include hostile action events in biennial evaluated exercises. 
The proposed rule would also ensure that scenarios would be 
sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of 
radiological releases and events, to properly train responders in 
response to more realistic events than currently used in training and 
avoid preconditioning the responders to success with inappropriate 
anticipatory responses. Licensees would also be required to emphasize 
coordination in their drills and exercises among onsite and offsite 
response organizations to strengthen the capabilities of the OROs to 
adequately respond to an emergency at the plant that would require 
offsite response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.6 of this document.)
    The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.j. to Appendix E 
to require that nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 
52 conduct exercises that provide ERO members the opportunity to 
demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the 
principal emergency response functional areas identified in Section 
IV.F.2.b. Each exercise would also be required to provide ERO members 
the opportunity to demonstrate key skills specific to the emergency 
response duties in each emergency response facility. Each exercise 
planning cycle would consist of six successive (i.e., non-rolling) 
calendar years. During each exercise planning cycle, licensees would be 
required to vary the content of exercise scenarios to provide ERO 
members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills 
necessary to respond to several specific scenario elements, including 
hostile action directed at the plant site; no radiological release or 
an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public 
protective actions; an initial classification of or rapid escalation to 
a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency; implementation of 
strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.  50.54(hh); 
and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. In addition 
to occurring every exercise planning cycle, the proposed rule would 
also require that the frequency of exercises involving response to a 
hostile action event not exceed 8 years. This proposed amendment would 
prescribe the minimum exercise scenario elements necessary for 
licensees to meet NRC expectations for challenging and varied scenario 
content in biennial exercises.
    Proposed Section IV.F.2.j. would require that licensees maintain a 
record of exercises that documents the contents of scenario elements 
used for each exercise during an exercise planning cycle to comply with 
the requirements of paragraph F.2.j. The documentation would include, 
but not be limited to, the following items for each scenario: sequence 
and timeline of events; extent of ERO participation and objectives to 
be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO demonstration of classification, 
notification, and development of protective action recommendations; 
expected radiological release conditions and demonstration of dose 
assessment, including dose projection results; and expected onsite/
offsite radiological survey activities and results.
    The NRC is proposing to add a new Section IV.F.2.k. to Appendix E, 
to require a licensee under this part or Part 52 to implement the 
requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. no 
later than its first biennial exercise conducted more than one year 
after the effective date of the final rule.
    The NRC proposes to add a new Section IV.I. to Appendix E that 
would require nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 
to provide an expanded range of protective measures for onsite 
personnel that would be appropriate for protection against a hostile 
action event. These measures would be site-specific and consider issues 
such as the location of workers in relation to potential targets, which 
would dictate if sheltering and/or evacuation would be appropriate to 
adequately protect the workers. Such measures are prudent to protect 
personnel necessary to safely shut down the reactor and emergency 
responders who would be necessary to implement the licensee's emergency 
plan. By specifying such measures for personnel designated to carry out 
site emergency actions, other onsite workers would also be protected 
because the onsite protective measures that were deemed appropriate to 
protect against a hostile action event would be provided via plant page 
announcements or at the direction of site security personnel to the 
site as a whole and would not be directed to any particular group of 
workers. The new requirement would not direct any specific actions, but 
would allow licensees flexibility to determine the most effective 
protective measures for onsite personnel protection on a site-specific 
basis. It also would allow licensees to take advantage of new 
technologies or other innovations that could further enhance the 
protection of workers. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in 
Section II.A.5 of this document.)
    If this proposed rule becomes final, the NRC proposes to make it 
effective 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal 
Register. Licensees and applicants, as applicable, would be permitted 
to defer implementation of the final rule until 180 days after 
publication of the final rule in the

[[Page 23279]]

Federal Register, except for the following proposed rule changes:
    (1) The requirements under proposed Sec.  50.54(q) (emergency plan 
change process), which would become effective 30 days after publication 
of the final rule in the Federal Register;
    (2) The requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.F.2. (challenging drills and exercises), which each applicable 
licensee would be required to implement no later than its first 
biennial exercise conducted more than one year after the effective date 
of the rule. Also, the implementation schedule for the proposed changes 
in Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. would allow licensees to complete 
biennial exercises that would already be in the planning process when 
the final rule becomes effective, without having to consider the new 
requirements of the final rule. This schedule also would have the 
general effect of allowing exercises which meet the new requirements to 
be conducted over a two-year period, following the effective date of 
the final rule, thereby allowing licensees and the NRC to gain 
experience during initial implementation. Consideration will be given 
to States with multiple reactor sites for the implementation schedule 
of the exercise requirement under Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.; and
    (3) The requirements under proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.D.3. (backup means for alert and notification systems), which each 
applicable licensee would be required to implement no later than its 
first biennial exercise conducted more than one year after the 
effective date of the rule. The implementation schedule for the 
proposed changes in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. would provide licensees 
a maximum of approximately 3 years for implementation across the 
industry.

VI. Guidance

    The NRC proposes to revise existing guidance and provide new 
guidance for the new requirements in this proposed rule. This guidance 
is intended to provide an acceptable method of how licensees and 
applicants can meet the requirements of the proposed rule. Final 
guidance would be published concurrently with publication of the final 
rule.

VII. Criminal Penalties

    Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), 
provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted 
violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under 
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. For the purposes of Section 
223 of the AEA, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR Parts 50 
and 52 and Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 161b, 161i, and 161o of 
the AEA.

VIII. Agreement State Compatibility

    Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20, 
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility 
is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program 
elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of 
regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of this 
chapter. Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements 
reserved to the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain 
requirements by a mechanism that is consistent with the particular 
States administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do 
not confer regulatory authority on the State.

IX. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.
    Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC Public Document Room is located 
at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
    Regulations.gov (Web). These documents may be viewed and downloaded 
electronically through the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov, Docket number NRC-2008-0122.
    NRC's Electronic Reading Room (ERR). The NRC's public electronic 
reading room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Document                       PDR           Web                      ERR (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim            X   ............  ML020510635
 Safeguards and Security Compensatory
 Measures,'' issued February 25, 2002.
SRM-M041214B--``Briefing on Emergency               X   ............  ML043550354
 Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1:00
 p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004,
 Commissioners' Conference Room, One
 White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland
 (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated
 December 20, 2004.
Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency            X   ............  ML051990027
 Preparedness and Response Actions for
 Security[dash]Based Events,'' dated
 July 18, 2005.
SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of            X   ............  ML061910707
 Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
 Guidance,'' dated September 20, 2006.
SRM to SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the               X   ............  ML070080411
 Review of Emergency Preparedness
 Regulations and Guidance'' dated
 January 8, 2007.
Memorandum to the Commission,                       X   ............  ML070440148
 ``Rulemaking Plan for Enhancements to
 Emergency Preparedness Regulations and
 Guidance,'' dated April 17, 2007.
SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--                 X   ............  ML061810014
 Briefing on Status of Emergency
 Planning Activities, (Two sessions)
 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2,
 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room,
 One White Flint North, Rockville,
 Maryland (Open to public attendance)''
 dated June 29, 2006.
``Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to               X             X   ML080940227
 Discuss Emergency Preparedness Draft
 Preliminary Rule Language,'' dated
 April 3, 2008.
Draft Preliminary Rule Language,                    X             X   ML080370069
 Emergency Preparedness Rulemaking,
 February, 2008.
``Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to                X             X   ML082180005
 Discuss Comments on Emergency
 Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule
 Language,'' dated August 6, 2008.
Order EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization             X   ............  ML030060360
 Order,'' issued January 7, 2003
 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel               X   ............  ML030910625
 Training and Qualification Requirements
 (Training) Order,'' issued April 29,
 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24514).
Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis             X   ............  ML030740002
 Threat Order,'' issued April 29, 2003
 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).

[[Page 23280]]

 
Federal Register Notice--Final Rule to              X   ............  ML070520692
 Amend 10 CFR 73.1: Design Basis Threat
 (March 19, 2007; 72 FR 12705).
Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift              X   ............  ML031190405
 Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants,''
 dated November 26, 1991.
IN 93-81, ``Implementation of                       X   ............  ML031070314
 Engineering Expertise On-Shift,'' dated
 October 12, 1993.
IN 95-48, ``Results of Shift Staffing               X   ............  ML031060170
 Study,'' dated October 10, 1995.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for               X   ............  ML040420012
 Preparation and Evaluation of
 Radiological Emergency Response Plans
 and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
 Power Plants,'' dated November 1980.
NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2,                        X   ............  ML041120174
 ``Methodology for Development of
 Emergency Action Levels,'' dated
 January 1992.
NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for            X   ............  ML073330643
 Development of Emergency Action
 Level,'' dated September 2007.
Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15,                   X   ............  Non-Publicly Available.
 ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/
 11,'' dated October 18, 2004.
NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-           X   ............  ML073100460
 Based Emergency Response Drill,'' Rev.
 1, dated October 30, 2007.
RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1            X   ............  ML080110116
 to Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance
 Document NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a
 Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response
 Drill,'' dated March 19, 2008.
IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to Licensees'              X   ............  ML022380474
 Ability to Provide Prompt Public
 Notification and Information During an
 Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated
 August 26, 2002.
IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert             X   ............  ML050680335
 and Notification System Tone Alert
 Radio Capability,'' dated March 30,
 2005.
IN 2006-28, ``Siren System Failures Due             X   ............  ML062790341
 to Erroneous Siren System Signal,''
 dated December 22, 2006.
IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert                 X   ............  ML031060187
 Radios to Activate When Receiving a
 Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated
 April 2, 1996.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station              X   ............  ML003740034
 Blackout,'' issued August 1988.
IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an                X   ............  ML031180307
 Emergency Class, Implementation of an
 Emergency Plan, and Emergency
 Notifications,'' dated October 15, 1985.
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-            X   ............  ML023040462
 2, ``Emergency Preparedness Position
 (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification
 of Emergency Conditions,'' dated August
 1, 1995.
NUREG/CR-6953 Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-            X   ............  ML080360602
 0654 Supplement 3, Criteria for
 Protective Action Recommendations for
 Severe Accidents,'' dated December 2007.
NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of                     X   ............  ML050250240
 Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear
 Power Plants,'' dated January 2005.
NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and                 X   ............  ML050250245
 Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency
 Evacuations,'' dated January 2005.
Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness                X   ............  ML050800537
 Position (EPPOS) 4, ``Emergency Plan
 and Implementing Procedure Changes,''
 dated November 19, 1998.
RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the Process               X   ............  ML042580404
 for Making Emergency Plan Changes,''
 dated February 14, 2005.
``Summary of the Public Meeting to                  X   ............  ML052650446
 Discuss Selected Topics for the Review
 of Emergency Preparedness Regulations
 and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear
 Power Plants,'' dated September 27,
 2005.
``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot'                  X   ............  ML052000263
 Items,'' dated August 11, 2005.
Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and                 X   ............  ML052620366
 September 1, 2005 Portion of the
 Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting.
``Summary and Analysis of Comments                  X   ............  ML060450376
 (Received Between August 31 and October
 31, 2005),'' dated February 28, 2006.
``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific             X   ............  ML060860401
 Comments (Received Between August 31
 and October 31, 2005),'' dated March
 31, 2006.
Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow   ............  ............  ML061590186
 Up Discussions of Selected Topics for
 the Review of Emergency Preparedness
 Regulations and Guidance for Commercial
 Nuclear Power Plants, held May 19, 2006.
NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for               X   ............  ML051390358
 Emergency Response Facilities,'' dated
 February 1981.
SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear             X   ............  ML050550131
 Operating Company's Proposal to
 Establish a Common Emergency Operating
 Facility at Its Corporate
 Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005.
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI                  X   ............  ML051390367
 Action Plan Requirements,'' Supplement
 1, ``Requirements for Emergency
 Response Capabilities,'' dated January
 1983.
Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy                X             X   ML081690809
 Institute on EP draft preliminary rule
 language (Letter identifier for
 comments: NEI1-X).
Comments submitted by Union of Concerned            X             X   ML081840067
 Scientists on EP draft preliminary rule
 language (Letter identifier for
 comments: NGO1-X).
Comments submitted by PA Bureau of                  X             X   ML081690778
 Radiation Protection on EP draft
 preliminary rule language (Letter
 identifier for comments: SPA1-X).
EP proposed rule Regulatory Analysis and            X             X   ML091180228
 Backfit Analysis.
EP proposed rule Environmental                      X             X   ML091180223
 Assessment.
EP Paperwork Burden Analysis............            X             X   ML091180224

[[Page 23281]]

 
NRC comment responses for EP draft                  X             X   ML091180198
 preliminary rule language.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. Plain Language

    The Presidential memorandum ``Plain Language in Government 
Writing'' published on June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the 
Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC 
requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the 
clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent 
to the NRC as explained in the ADDRESSES heading of this document.

XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical 
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with 
applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any 
voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed 
Government-unique standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary 
consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified.

XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A, ``National Environmental Policy Act; Regulations 
Implementing Section 102(2),'' of 10 CFR Part 51, ``Environmental 
Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory 
Functions,'' that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment 
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
    The determination of this environmental assessment is that there 
will be no significant offsite impact to the public from this action. 
However, the general public should note that the NRC is seeking public 
participation and the environmental assessment is available as 
indicated in Section IX of this document. Comments on any aspect of the 
environmental assessment may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under 
the ADDRESSES heading of this document.
    The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this 
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their 
comments on the environmental assessment.

XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    The proposed rule contains new or amended information collection 
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office 
of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information 
collection requirements.
    Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
    The title of the information collection: 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic 
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.''
    The form number if applicable: Not applicable.
    How often the collection is required: One-time, on occasion and 
annually
    Who will be required or asked to report: Operating nuclear power 
reactors.
    An estimate of the number of annual responses: 987.
    The estimated number of annual respondents: 97.
    An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to 
complete the requirement or request: 177,242 hours.
    Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations 
in 10 CFR 50.34, 50.47, 50.54, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E prescribe 
requirements for emergency preparedness plans and coordination in 
protecting nuclear power reactors, non-power reactors, and the 
surrounding community against consequences resulting from accidents and 
sabotage. The proposed rule contains reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, including those for third parties, which are necessary to 
help ensure that an adequate level of emergency preparedness is 
attained by nuclear power reactor licensees, non-power reactors, and 
the surrounding community. This revision addresses changes in 
information collections contained in the proposed rule, ``Enhancements 
to Emergency Preparedness Regulations.'' Specifically, the draft 
proposed rule results in changes to information collection requirements 
in Sec.  50.47, Sec.  50.54, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
    The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the 
information collections contained in this proposed rule and on the 
following issues:
    1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the 
information will have practical utility?
    2. Estimate of burden?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, 
including the use of automated collection techniques?
    A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at 
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, Room O-1F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and 
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the 
signature date of this notice.
    Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information 
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the 
above issues, by June 17, 2009 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services 
Branch (T-5F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, or by e-mail to [email protected] and to the 
Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 
(3150-0011), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. 
Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical 
to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments 
received after this date. You may also e-mail comments to 
[email protected] or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4638.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability

    The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this 
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of 
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The Commission requests 
public comments

[[Page 23282]]

on the draft regulatory analysis. Availability of the regulatory 
analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document. Comments on the 
draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the 
ADDRESSES heading.

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 
Commission certifies that this rule would not, if promulgated, have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
This proposed rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear 
power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within 
the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC 
(10 CFR 2.810).

XVI. Backfit Analysis

    As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a 
backfit analysis for the proposed rule. The Commission finds that the 
backfits contained in the proposed rule, when considered in the 
aggregate, would constitute a substantial increase in emergency 
preparedness and would be justified in view of this increased 
protection of the public health and safety. Availability of the backfit 
analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 52

    Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, 
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees, 
Inspections, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting 
criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Standard design, Standard design certification.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Part 52.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

    1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 
68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 
234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 
2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 
206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 
5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 
185, 68 Stat. 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. 
L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
    Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 
108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 
50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 
U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued 
under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). 
Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 
(42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under 
Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also 
issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80 
and 50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 
(42 U.S.C. 2237).

    2. Section 50.47 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10) 
and (d)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.47  Emergency plans.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance 
resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local 
staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, 
and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have 
been identified.
* * * * *
    (10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume 
exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In 
developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to 
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic 
use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates 
have been developed by applicants and licensees and must be updated on 
a periodic basis. Evacuation time estimates and updates must be 
submitted by applicants and licensees to the NRC for review and 
approval. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an 
emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in 
place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ 
appropriate to the locale have been developed.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite 
assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State 
and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have 
been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned 
onsite response have been identified.
* * * * *
    3. Section 50.54 is amended as follows:
    a. Revise paragraphs (q), (s)(1), (gg)(1), (gg)(1)(i), and (gg)(2);
    b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), (s)(2)(i), and (u).


Sec.  50.54  Conditions of licenses.

* * * * *
    (q) Emergency Plans. (1) Definitions for the purpose of this 
section:
    (i) Change means an action that results in modification or addition 
to, or removal from, the licensee's emergency plan or the resources, 
capabilities, and methods identified in the plan. All such changes are 
subject to the provisions of this section except where the applicable 
regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a particular 
change.
    (ii) Emergency plan means the document(s), prepared and maintained 
by the licensee, that identify and describe the licensee's methods for 
maintaining and performing emergency planning functions. An emergency 
plan includes the plans as originally approved by the NRC and all 
subsequent changes made by the licensee with, and without, prior NRC 
review and approval under Sec.  50.54(q).
    (iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource 
necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, as 
set forth in the elements of section IV. of appendix E to this part 
and, for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  
50.47(b).
    (iv) Reduction in effectiveness means a change in an emergency plan 
that results in reducing the licensee's capability to perform an 
emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.
    (2) A holder of a license under this part, or a combined license 
under part

[[Page 23283]]

52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding under Sec.  
52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the effectiveness 
of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E to this 
part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards 
of Sec.  50.47(b).
    (3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC 
approval only if the licensee can demonstrate through analysis that the 
changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as 
changed, continues to meet the requirements in appendix E to this part 
and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of 
Sec.  50.47(b).
    (4) The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the 
effectiveness of the plans as defined in Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) may not 
be implemented without prior approval by the NRC. A licensee desiring 
to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to 
its license. In addition to the filing requirements of Sec. Sec.  50.90 
and 50.91, the request must include all emergency plan pages affected 
by that change and must be accompanied by a forwarding letter 
identifying the change, the reason for the change, and the basis for 
concluding that the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will 
continue to meet the requirements in appendix E to this part and, for 
nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of Sec.  
50.47(b).
    (5) The licensee shall retain a record of each change to the 
emergency plan made without prior NRC approval for a period of three 
years from the date of the change and shall submit, as specified in 
Sec.  50.4, a report of each such change, including its analysis, 
within 30 days after the change is made.
    (6) The nuclear power reactor licensee shall retain the emergency 
plan and each change for which prior NRC approval was obtained pursuant 
to Sec.  50.54(q)(4) as a record until the Commission terminates the 
license for the nuclear power reactor.
* * * * *
    (r) [Reserved]
* * * * *
    (s)(1) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power 
reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and 
the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 
km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs for a 
particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to 
local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by 
such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access 
routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be 
determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and 
for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. 
The plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ shall focus on such actions as 
are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
* * * * *
    (2)(i) Reserved.
* * * * *
    (u) [Reserved]
* * * * *
    (gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 52.103, if following the conduct of 
the exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a of appendix E to part 50 of 
this chapter, FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of 
offsite emergency preparedness, the holder of a combined license under 
10 CFR part 52 may operate at up to 5 percent of rated thermal power 
only if the Commission finds that the state of onsite emergency 
preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective 
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the 
applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in 
Sec.  50.47 and appendix E to this part. Review of the applicant's 
emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite 
aspects:
    (i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite 
assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and 
local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been 
made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite 
response have been identified.
* * * * *
    (2) The condition in this paragraph, regarding operation at up to 5 
percent power, ceases to apply 30 days after FEMA informs the NRC that 
the offsite deficiencies have been corrected, unless the NRC notifies 
the combined license holder before the expiration of the 30-day period 
that the Commission finds under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this 
section that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 
taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
* * * * *
    4. In Appendix E to Part 50, Section IV. is amended as follows:
    a. Revise the introductory text to the section, paragraphs A., 
A.2.c., A.7., B.1., B.2., C.1., C.2., D.3., E.5., E.8., E.9.c., E.9.d., 
F.1., F.2.a., F.2.a(ii), F.2.a(iii), F.2.b., F.2.f., F.2.g.;
    b. Redesignate E.8. as E.8.a.; add new paragraphs E.8.b., E.8.c., 
E.8.d., and E.8.e.; and
    c. Add new paragraphs A.9., F.2.i., F.2.j., F.2.k., and I.,, 
redesignate footnotes 3 through 11, as footnotes 4 through 12 and add a 
new footnote 3 to paragraph IV.A.7.

Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities

* * * * *

IV. Content of Emergency Plans

    The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not 
necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate 
compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for 
coping with radiological emergencies, assessment action, activation 
of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency 
facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency 
preparedness, and recovery. In addition, the emergency response 
plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor 
operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as 
applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain 
information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards 
described in Sec.  50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against 
those standards. The applicant shall also provide an analysis of the 
time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions 
for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway 
EPZ for transient and permanent populations. NRC-approved evacuation 
time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs shall be used by 
licensees in the formulation of protective action recommendations 
and must be provided to State and local governmental authorities for 
use in developing protective action strategies. Within 180 days of 
issuance of the decennial census data by the U.S. Census Bureau, 
nuclear power reactor licensees and license applicants shall develop 
an ETE and submit it to the NRC for review and approval under Sec.  
50.4. During the years between decennial censuses, licensees shall 
estimate permanent resident population changes at least annually 
using U.S. Census Bureau data and/or State/local government 
population estimates. Licensees shall maintain these estimates so 
that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between 
censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any 
updated ETEs. If at any time during the decennial period, the 
population of either the EPZ or the most populous Emergency Response 
Planning Area increases or decreases by more than 10 percent from 
the population that formed the basis for the licensee's currently 
approved ETE, the ETE must be updated to reflect the impact of that 
population change. This updated ETE must be submitted to the NRC for 
review and approval under Sec.  50.4 no later than 180 days after 
the licensee's determination that a

[[Page 23284]]

population change of more than 10 percent has occurred.

A. Organization

    The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall 
be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, 
and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency 
organization and the means for notification of such individuals in 
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be 
included:
* * * * *
    2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization 
(ERO) with a detailed discussion of:
* * * * *
    c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite 
emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of 
information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating 
and implementing offsite emergency measures.
* * * * *
    7. Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate 
State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping 
with emergencies. Nuclear power plant licensees shall ensure that 
offsite response organization resources (e.g., local law 
enforcement, firefighting, medical assistance) are available to 
respond to an emergency including a hostile action \3\ event at the 
nuclear power plant site.
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    \3\ A hostile action is an act directed toward a nuclear power 
plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to 
destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to 
achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using 
guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to 
deliver destructive force.
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* * * * *
    9. Nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 
must provide a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift 
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not 
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent the timely 
performance of their assigned functions as specified in the 
emergency plan.

B. Assessment Actions

* * * * *
    1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and 
for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive 
materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that 
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification 
and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and 
other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to 
be used for determining when and what type of protective measures 
should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect 
health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-
plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and 
offsite monitoring. These action levels must include hostile action 
events that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. These 
initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by 
the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental 
authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action 
levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental 
authorities on an annual basis.
    2. A revision to an emergency action level scheme must be 
submitted as specified in Sec.  50.4 for NRC approval before 
implementation if the licensee is changing from an emergency action 
level scheme based upon NUREG-0654 to another emergency action level 
scheme based upon NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01. The licensee shall 
follow the change process in Sec.  50.54(q) for all other emergency 
action level changes.
* * * * *

C. Activation of Emergency Organization

    1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the 
alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total 
emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps 
to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each 
class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels 
(based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring 
information but also on readings from a number of sensors that 
indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment 
and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for 
notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, 
but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be 
noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall 
include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site 
area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further 
discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.
    2. Nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this part 
and Part 52 shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, 
classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after 
the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency 
action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the 
emergency condition as soon as possible following a determination 
that an emergency action level has been exceeded. These criteria 
must not be construed as a grace period to attempt to restore plant 
conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an EAL that 
has been exceeded. These criteria must not be construed as 
preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee 
to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that 
any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local 
authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to 
protect the public health and safety.

D. Notification Procedures

* * * * *
    3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible 
State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after 
declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the 
appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a 
public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed 
by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial 
operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first 
reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall 
demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been 
established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the 
public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective 
of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have 
the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and 
initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and 
notification capability will range from immediate alerting and 
notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State 
and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring 
urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial 
time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make 
a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and 
notification system. The licensee shall identify and demonstrate 
that the appropriate governmental authorities have both the 
administrative and physical means for a backup method of public 
alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the 
primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an 
emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability 
to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway 
EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute design objective for 
the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there 
is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the 
appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to 
activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or 
in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating 
such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the 
appropriate governmental authorities.
    A licensee under this part or Part 52 shall implement the 
requirements for a backup method of public alerting and notification 
under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 no later than the first 
biennial exercise conducted at the site more than one year after 
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].

E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment

* * * * *
    5. Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical 
personnel qualified to handle radiological emergencies on-site;
* * * * *
    8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an 
emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be 
given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency; 
(ii) For nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this 
part and Part 52, a licensee onsite operational support center;
    b. For the emergency operations facility required by paragraph 
8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 
25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility 
located less than 10

[[Page 23285]]

miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility 
located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor 
site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one 
nuclear power reactor site. An emergency operations facility may be 
located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site as long 
as provisions are made for locating NRC and offsite responders 
closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite 
responders could interact face-to-face with emergency response 
personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. 
Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a 
nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the 
emergency operations facility shall include the following: (1) Space 
for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local 
responders; (2) additional space for conducting briefings with 
emergency response personnel; (3) communication links with other 
licensee and offsite emergency response facilities; (4) computer 
links to the site with Internet access; and (5) access to copying 
equipment and office supplies;
    c. For the emergency operations facility required by paragraph 
8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities: 
(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and 
radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor 
site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility 
serves, (2) the capability to analyze plant technical information 
and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to 
licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a 
nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site 
that the facility serves, and (3) the capability to support response 
to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power 
reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than 
one site;
    d. For nuclear power plant licensees and applicants under this 
part and Part 52, an alternative facility (or facilities) to 
function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response 
staff and having the following characteristics: Accessibility even 
if the site is under threat or actual attack; communication links 
with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant 
security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the 
capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage 
control team planning and preparation; for use when onsite emergency 
facilities cannot be safely accessed during a hostile action event. 
The alternative facility will also be equipped with general plant 
drawings and procedures, telephones, and computer links to the site;
    e. A licensee with an approved emergency operations facility on 
[INSERT THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE] shall not be subject 
to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section;
    9. * * *
* * * * *
    c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor 
control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency 
operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal 
State and local emergency operations centers, and the field 
assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested 
annually.
    d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC 
Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations 
Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite 
technical support center, and the emergency operations facility. 
Such communications shall be tested monthly.

F. Training

    1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and 
exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that 
employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency 
response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and 
drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event 
of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a 
description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining 
programs to be provided to each of the following categories of 
emergency personnel:
* * * * *
    2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of 
emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test 
the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and 
methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test 
the public notification system, and ensure that emergency 
organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable 
for any exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. An initial full participation \5\ exercise which tests as 
much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is 
reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall 
be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located. 
Nuclear power plant licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under 
Sec.  50.4 for prior NRC review and approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency 
preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate 
offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel 
physically and actively take part in testing their integrated 
capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a 
commercial nuclear power plant. ``Full participation'' includes 
testing major observable portions of the onsite and offsite 
emergency plans and mobilization of state, local and licensee 
personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the 
capability to respond to the accident scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this 
chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the 
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full 
participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the 
scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests 
the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one 
year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This 
exercise need not have State or local government participation. If 
FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite 
emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation 
exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency 
preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate 
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency, the provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply.
    (iii) For a combined licensee issued under part 52 of this 
chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the 
site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,\6\ shall be 
conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This 
exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of 
Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one 
or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness 
as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the 
Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not 
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can 
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the 
provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Partial participation when used in conjunction with 
emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means 
appropriate offset authorities shall actively take part in the 
exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e., 
(a) protective action decision making related to emergency action 
levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and 
local authorities and the licensee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent 
exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power 
plant licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec.  50.4 for 
prior NRC review and approval. The exercise may be included in the 
full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of 
this section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary 
to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are 
maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by 
conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a 
combination of some of the principal functional areas of the 
licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal 
functional areas of emergency response include activities such as 
management and coordination of emergency response, accident 
assessment, event classification, notification of offsite 
authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of 
radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, 
protective action decision making, and plant system repair and 
corrective actions. During these drills, activation of all of the 
licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center 
(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations 
Facility (EOF)) would not be necessary, licensees would have the 
opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised 
instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating 
facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success 
paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may 
focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.
* * * * *

[[Page 23286]]

    f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is 
not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that 
NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance 
that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency Response 
Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to emergency 
response. The extent of State and local participation in remedial 
exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective 
measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not 
properly tested in the previous exercises.
    g. All training, including exercises, shall provide for formal 
critiques in order to identify weak or deficient areas that need 
correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified 
during training evolutions, exercises, or drills must be corrected.
* * * * *
    i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide 
reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result 
from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear 
power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 must include a 
wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile 
action events. Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must 
emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response 
organizations.
    j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by 
nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 must 
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in 
the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas 
of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. 
Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to 
demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the 
control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center. 
Additionally, in each six calendar year exercise planning cycle, 
nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52 shall vary 
the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph 
2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to 
demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to 
the following scenario elements: Hostile action directed at the 
plant site (at an exercise frequency of at least once every 8 
years), no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological 
release that does not require public protective actions, an initial 
classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or 
General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and 
guidance developed under Sec.  50.54(hh), and integration of offsite 
resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record 
of exercises conducted during each six-year exercise planning cycle 
that documents the contents of scenarios used to comply with the 
requirements of this paragraph.
    k. A licensee under this part or Part 52 shall implement the 
requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. no later 
than its first biennial exercise conducted at the site more than one 
year after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
* * * * *
    I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action Events.
    For nuclear power plant licensees under this part and Part 52, a 
range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during 
hostile action events must be developed to ensure the continued 
ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform 
the functions of the licensee's emergency plan.

PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS

    5. The authority citation for Part 52 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 
936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 
201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 
note).

    6. In Section 52.79, paragraph (a)(17) is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  52.79  Contents of applications; technical information in final 
safety analysis report.

    (a) * * *
    (17) The information with respect to compliance with technically 
relevant positions of the Three Mile Island requirements in Sec.  
50.34(f) of this chapter, with the exception of Sec. Sec.  
50.34(f)(1)(xii), (f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), and (f)(3)(v);
* * * * *

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of May 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E9-10947 Filed 5-15-09; 8:45 am]
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