[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 7, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15779-15783]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-7807]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-289; NRC-2009-0154]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station, Unit No. 1; Exemption
1.0 Background
The Exelon Generation Company (Exelon, the licensee, formerly
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC) is the holder of Facility Operating
License No. DPR-50 which authorizes operation of the Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1). The license provides, among other
things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission)
now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) located
in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
2.0 Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), part 50,
Section 50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed
before January 1, 1979, must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR part
50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire protection of safe shutdown
capability.'' TMI-1 was licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979.
As such, the licensee's Fire Protection Program (FPP) must satisfy the
established fire protection features of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2006-10,
``Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2, Operator
Manual Actions,'' noted that NRC inspections identified that some
licensees had relied upon operator manual actions, instead of the
options specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
(III.G.2) as a permanent solution to resolve issues related to Thermo-
Lag 330-1 fire barriers.
In a letter dated February 4, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML080350369), supplemented
by letter dated January 28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number ML090280577),
the licensee identified one operator manual action that was previously
included in correspondence with the NRC and found acceptable in a fire
protection-related Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 7, 1988
(ADAMS Accession Number ML082060262). However, RIS 2006-10 identifies
that an exemption under 10 CFR 50.12 is necessary for the use of
operator manual actions in lieu of the requirements of III.G.2 even if
the NRC previously issued an SE that found the manual actions
acceptable.
The licensee also identified a second operator manual action that
was previously permitted for use in a fire area covered by 10 CFR part
50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 (III.G.3). As such, an exemption was
not required because the action was found acceptable as part of a
safety evaluation for alternate shutdown. However, since the fire area
of origin requiring this manual action was reclassified as a III.G.2
area, the manual action requires approval for use in a III.G.2 area.
Since III.G.2 is a separate part of the rule and this action is not
considered previously approved for III.G.2, the NRC has preformed a new
[[Page 15780]]
review of this action in accordance with the NRC's current review
standard, NUREG-1852, ``Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability
of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire.'' Since both operator
manual actions require an exemption from III.G.2, the staff has
reviewed the request and determined that both operator manual actions
are acceptable. This exemption provides the formal vehicle for NRC
approval for the use of the two specified operator manual actions in
lieu of the requirements specified in III.G.2 for TMI-1.
In summary, by letter dated February 4, 2008, supplemented by
letter dated January 28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Numbers ML080350369 and
ML090280577, respectively), Exelon submitted a request for exemption
from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire Protection of
Safe Shutdown Capability,'' for the use of one operator manual action
in lieu of the requirements specified in III.G.2 for one previously
approved operator manual action and one new review of an operator
manual action that was previously approved as part of a III.G.3 review.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR PART 50 when: (1) The exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present. One of these special
circumstances, described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not
serve the underlying purpose of the rule, or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire
damage in the event of a fire. Section III.G.2 provides the following
means to ensure that a redundant train of safe shutdown cables and
equipment is free of fire damage, where redundant trains are located in
the same fire area outside of primary containment:
a. Separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-
hour rating;
b. Separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of
more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards and
with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed
in the fire area; or
c. Enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a
fire barrier having a 1-hour rating and with fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area.
Exelon indicated that the operator manual actions listed in their
February 4, 2008, exemption request are those that were previously
included in correspondence with the NRC and were found acceptable in a
Fire Protection SE dated September 7, 1988. The first operator manual
action included in this exemption is the tripping of all four reactor
coolant pumps (RCPs) locally at the 1A and 1B switchgear for a fire in
Fire Area CB-FA-1, which is located in the Control Building Health
Physics Lab (Lab). The second operator manual action included in this
exemption is the transferring of Nuclear Service River Water Pump 1B
(NR-P-1B) to its alternate power supply for a fire in Fire Area CB-FA-
2b, which is located in the Control Building 1S Switchgear Room
(Switchgear Room). This action was described in the January 28, 2009,
letter as not previously approved as part of III.G.2. Section 2.1,
titled ``Fire Hazards Analysis Report Revision 9'', of the September 7,
1988, SE states,
By letter dated October 27, 1987, GPU [General Public Utilities]
Nuclear, the licensee, submitted Revision 9 to the Fire Hazards
Analysis Report (FHAR) for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
1. This revision includes a number of modifications which have
resulted from an extensive design verification effort by the
licensee. As stated by the licensee, Revision 9 represents the ``as-
built condition of TMI-1''. Also, Revision 9 includes a number of
modifications involving the addition of references to GPUN and NRC
correspondence concerning the justification and subsequent
acceptance of exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R and deviations
from Appendix A to [Branch Technical Position] APCSB 9.5-1. In
addition, the FHAR has been modified to specify where certain fire
barriers may not be completely rated or contain some non-rated
feature but have been analyzed to provide adequate protection. This
type of analysis is allowed by Generic Letter 86-10 and the non-
rated features included in Revision 9 have generally been evaluated
in previous NRC Safety Evaluation Reports.
The FHAR has been reviewed by Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) under contract to the NRC, and has been found to
be in compliance with NRC guidelines. The details of the review are
discussed in Enclosure 2, which is the Technical Evaluation Report
(TER) prepared by SAIC. The staff concurs with the TER findings and
concludes that the changes to the fire protection program identified
by the licensee in Revision 9 are acceptable.
The two operator manual actions in question are listed in
attachments 3-0 and 3-3Q of the FHAR where a brief description of the
action to be performed and its location is also included. In the
January 28, 2009, letter, responding to a request for additional
information from the NRC staff, Exelon included a detailed discussion
and justification of the two manual actions that describe how defense-
in-depth is maintained during the scenarios where these manual actions
would be necessary. The licensee outlined the approach that was taken
to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the operator manual actions
and provided a justification for why the operator manual actions are
appropriate for maintaining equivalency and consistency with the intent
of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation in support of the
subject exemption request for the use of operator manual actions in
lieu of the requirements specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R,
and concluded that given the existing fire protection features in the
affected fire zones in conjunction with the use of the two operator
manual actions, in specific instances, Exelon continues to demonstrate
equivalence to the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2 for TMI-1. The following technical evaluation provides
the basis for this conclusion.
3.1 Operator Manual Action To Trip RCPs
3.1.1 Fire Prevention
The Lab area has limited or low combustible fuel loading
(equivalent fire severity of less than 45 minutes). The combustible
fuel loads consist primarily of stored and transient materials, cable
insulation, and Thermo-Lag. Thermo-Lag is a fire barrier material used
for the protection of cable raceways that is considered combustible.
The primary sources of ignition in the areas are limited to cabling and
electrical equipment. The licensee has indicated that in most cases,
the cable insulation is qualified to the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineering, Inc. (IEEE) 383 flame test, thereby the growth
and spread of cable insulation fires would be slow. The redundant
cables in this area that are required for safe shutdown are located
greater than 25 feet apart, thus providing physical separation.
Additionally, the Lab area is of a large volume (90,000 cubic feet) to
potentially disperse and stratify heat and smoke within the space to
prevent wide area
[[Page 15781]]
damage due to a damaging hot gas layer forming in the area.
The NRC staff finds that the limited fuel load combined with the
number of ignition sources, and spatial characteristics in the Lab
area, results in a low likelihood of a fire occurring and spreading
within the fire area.
3.1.2 Detection, Control and Suppression
The NRC staff evaluated the fire detection, control and suppression
systems in the Lab area. The Lab area has an automatic ionization smoke
detection system installed that sends an alarm to the Control Room upon
activation of the fire/smoke detections systems.
The area is enclosed by 3-hour rated walls, floors and ceilings to
prevent fire from spreading to or from the area and the structural
frame is also protected with 3-hour fireproofing material. In addition,
all doors, penetrations and ventilation dampers through the fire area
boundaries are provided with 3-hour rated fire protection assemblies.
The Lab area also has a wet-pipe fire sprinkler system installed
below the suspended ceiling in the area. In this fire area, rated
Thermo-Lag fire barriers, with ratings ranging from 39 to 50 minutes,
are also provided for circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment.\1\
The active fire suppression systems listed above are supplemented by
handheld fire extinguishers and hose lines staged at locations directly
outside the fire area. Additionally, fire brigade response time has
been estimated to be within 15 minutes.
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\1\ NRC letter dated April 20, 1999, (ADAMS Legacy Library
Accession Number 9905040102) approved the exemption request on these
barriers from the requirements of Section III.G.2.c for 1-hour fire
barriers where circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment in the
same fire area are enclosed in a 1-hour fire barrier.
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The NRC staff finds that the fire barriers, fire detection, control
and suppression systems are adequate to mitigate and contain the fire
hazards in this area.
3.1.3 Feasibility and Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability
The NRC staff has evaluated the feasibility review provided by the
licensee in the January 28, 2009, letter responding to a request for
additional information from the NRC staff. The feasibility review
documents that procedures are in place, in the form of abnormal
operating procedures (AOPs), to ensure that clear and accessible
instructions on how to perform the manual action are available to the
operators. The instructions outline the number of fully trained,
dedicated operators that are required and the procedures they are to
follow to perform the action including any tools or equipment necessary
to complete the action. Several potential environmental concerns were
also evaluated, such as radiation levels, temperature/humidity
conditions, ventilation configuration and fire effects that the
operators may encounter during certain emergency scenarios, and were
determined not to have a material effect on the performance of the
manual action. The licensee's feasibility review shows that the
operator manual action is feasible because the operators performing the
manual actions would not be exposed to adverse or untenable conditions
during the operator manual action procedure or during the time needed
to perform the procedure, primarily because the manual actions are
located in fire areas that are completely separated from the
originating fire area. The NRC staff has evaluated the licensee's
feasibility review and determined that the operator manual actions can
be reasonably completed in time to support the needed mitigative
functions. Training, equipment, and procedures are maintained to
support the specified actions.
Given the procedures and conditions described above, the NRC staff
finds that this operator manual action is feasible and that the
operator will be provided with adequate access and egress to the area
such that environmental conditions will not preclude completion of the
action or result in harm to the operator.
3.1.4 Time To Ensure Reliability
The NRC staff reviewed the time necessary to complete the manual
action versus the time before the action becomes critical to safely
shutting down the unit as presented in the feasibility analyses. This
manual action must be completed within 10 minutes. The action is
identified in the AOPs as OP-TM-AOP-001-C01 and requires an operator to
travel from the control room to a location in the turbine building,
where the 1A and 1B 6900V feeder breakers are located, to trip the
reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The combined time to complete the travel
and specified action requires a total of 8 minutes, leaving a 2 minute
margin of safety. While a 2 minute margin of safety is considered
small, this action is only needed when both of the cables located in
the fire area are affected by fire. Based on the protection and spatial
separation between the cables, it is highly unlikely that both DC
control power cables would be lost before the control room operator
could trip the RCPs. Based on information provided by the licensee,
this manual operator action will commence immediately upon detection/
confirmation of a fire in CB-FA-1 (Lab) and/or failure to trip the RCPs
from the control room. The licensee has indicated that the manual
operator action was verified via walkdowns with different operators to
verify the reliability of the manual action.
In addition, the fire area where the redundant equipment trains
reside is located in a separate building from the fire area where the
manual action occurs, with the exception of the portion of travel in
the control tower stairwell (to trip the RCPs), which is separated from
the control building by 3-hour assemblies. This helps to ensure that
operators do not encounter untenable or fire-affected conditions during
the operator manual action procedure.
The NRC staff finds that the margin available to perform the action
is small. Based on the low likelihood of the damage occurring to both
DC control power cables, as well as the procedural controls and
walkdowns described, the NRC staff concludes that the small margin is
acceptable due to the low likelihood of a fire that impacts both DC
control power cables.
3.2 Operator Manual Action To Transfer Nuclear Service River Water to
Alternate Power
3.2.1 Fire Prevention
The Switchgear Room has limited or low combustible fuel loading
(equivalent fire severity of less than 45 minutes). The combustible
fuel loads consist primarily of minor transient materials, cable
insulation, Thermo-Lag and electrical equipment. The primary sources of
ignition in the area are limited to cabling and electrical equipment.
The licensee has indicated that in most cases, the cable insulation is
qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test, thereby the growth and spread of
cable insulation fires would be slow.
The NRC staff finds that the limited fuel load, combined with the
number of ignition sources, results in a low likelihood of a fire
occurring and spreading within the fire.
3.2.2 Detection, Control and Suppression
The NRC staff evaluated the fire detection, control and suppression
systems in the Switchgear Room. There is an incipient fire detection
system,\2\ as
[[Page 15782]]
well as an HVAC duct smoke detection system installed in the space that
sends an alarm to the Control Room upon activation of the fire/smoke
detections systems.
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\2\ An incipient fire detection system is a fire detection
system designed to provide more rapid detection than conventional
smoke detection systems.
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The Switchgear Room is enclosed by 3-hour rated walls, floors and
ceilings to prevent fire from spreading to or from the area and the
structural frame is also protected with 3-hour fire proofing material.
In addition, all doors, penetrations and ventilation dampers through
the fire area boundaries are provided with 3-hour rated fire protection
assemblies.
The Switchgear Room does not have a fire suppression system
installed but does have 1-hour rated fire barriers provided for
circuits of redundant safe shutdown equipment. A 1-hour rated fire
barrier is not provided for the transfer of nuclear service water to
alternate power cables. Manual suppression capability can be provided
by operators and fire brigade by using the handheld fire extinguishers
and hose lines staged at locations directly outside of the fire area.
Additionally, fire brigade response time has been estimated to be
within 15 minutes for this fire area. The NRC approved an exemption on
July 11, 1997, (ADAMS Accession No. ML003765666) exempting this area
from the requirement to have an automatic suppression system.
The NRC staff finds that the fire barriers, fire detection system
and the manual suppression capability, in conjunction with the passive
means of protection, is adequate to mitigate and contain the fire
hazards in this area.
3.2.3 Feasibility and Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability
The NRC staff evaluated the feasibility review provided by the
licensee in the January 28, 2009, letter, responding to a request for
additional information from the NRC staff. The feasibility review
documents that procedures are in place, in the form of AOPs, to ensure
that clear and accessible instructions on how to perform the manual
action are available to the operators. The instructions outline the
number of fully trained, dedicated operators that are required and the
procedures they are to follow to perform the action including any tools
or equipment necessary to complete the action. Several potential
environmental concerns were also evaluated, such as radiation levels,
temperature/humidity conditions, ventilation configuration and fire
effects that the operators may encounter during certain emergency
scenarios, and determined not to have a material effect on the
performance of the manual action. The NRC staff has evaluated the
licensee's feasibility review and determined that the operator manual
actions can be reasonably completed in time to support the needed
mitigative functions. Training, equipment, and procedures are
maintained to support the specified actions.
In addition, the fire area where the redundant equipment trains
reside is located in a separate building from the fire area where the
manual actions occur. This helps to ensure that operators do not
encounter untenable or fire-affected conditions during the operator
manual action procedure.
Given the procedures and conditions described above, the NRC staff
finds that this operator manual action is feasible and that the
operator will be provided with adequate access and egress to the area
such that environmental conditions will not preclude completion of the
action or result in harm to the operator.
3.2.4 Time To Ensure Reliability
The NRC staff also reviewed the time necessary to complete the
manual action versus the time before the action becomes critical to
safely shutting down the unit as presented in the feasibility analyses.
The action must be completed within 4 hours. This action is identified
in the AOPs as OP-TM-AOP-001-C2B, which states that AOP OP-TN-541-443
(``Swap NR-P-1B to Alternate Power Supply''), should be performed and
instructs an operator to travel from the control room to the intake
screen and pump house (ISPH), which is outside the plant protected
area. The operator must first pass through a security access gate
before traveling to Fire Areas ISPH-FZ-1 and ISPH-FZ-2 where they will
energize nuclear service river water pump, NR-P-1B, at the 1R 480V
switchgear to provide nuclear river (NR) water flow and support letdown
for a fire in Fire Area CB-FA-2b (Switchgear Room). In order to swap
the NR pump power supply, the operator manual action entails racking
out the NR-P-1B breaker on the 1T 480V bus and racking in the NR-P-1B
breaker on the 1R 480V bus. The combined time to complete the travel,
including the time required for security to open the access gate, and
the specified actions is less than 30 minutes. Additionally, this
action is only necessary if the pressurizer heaters are unavailable and
is of low complexity with a time margin of 3\1/2\ hours.
The NRC staff finds that there is a sufficient amount of time
available to complete this proposed operator manual action and that
adequate conditions exist for it to be performed efficiently and
reliably.
3.3 Evaluation
As stated in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section II:
The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-
depth to fire protection with the following objectives:
1. To prevent fires from starting,
2. To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires
that do occur, and
3. To provide protection for structures, systems, and components
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by
the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of
the plant.
The NRC staff has evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used
for fire protection at TMI-1, applicable to the fire zones under
review. Based upon consideration of the limited fire ignition sources
and fire hazards in the affected areas, and the existing fire
protection measures at TMI-1, the NRC staff concludes that objective
one of defense-in-depth is adequately met.
Based on the evaluation of fire detection and suppression systems
provided in the affected fire zones, the NRC staff determined that any
postulated fire is expected to be promptly detected by the available
automatic fire detection systems in the associated fire areas. The
available fire detection and suppression equipment in these fire areas
ensure that a postulated fire will not be left unchallenged. In
addition, all fire areas are separated from adjacent fire areas by
fire-rated barriers and penetrations to provide a level of
compartmentalization between the fire areas and buildings. This
compartmentalization helps to ensure that fires will not spread to
adjacent fire areas and that any fire damage will be limited to the
fire area of origin. In addition, when fires are contained in the fire
area of origin, the licensee has demonstrated that the manual actions
are feasible and reliable. Based on this information, the NRC staff
concludes that objectives 2 and 3 of defense-in-depth are adequately
met.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the requested exemption to
use operator manual actions in combination with the other installed
fire protection features in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the rule and the defense-in-depth concepts necessary at nuclear
power plants and will maintain an equivalent level of protection for
post-fire safe-shutdown capability at TMI-1.
[[Page 15783]]
3.4 Authorized by Law
This exemption would allow TMI-1 the use of operator manual actions
in lieu of meeting the requirements specified in 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix R, Section III.G.2. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The
NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
3.5 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire
damage in the event of a fire. Based on the existing fire barriers,
fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression equipment, and
the absence of significant combustible loads and ignition sources in
the fire areas associated with this exemption, the NRC staff has
concluded that granting of this involves no undue risk to public health
and safety.
The NRC staff has determined that this exemption also does not
increase the probability or consequences of previously evaluated
accidents. This determination is based on the NRC staff finding that
the operator manual actions are not the sole form of protection relied
upon due to the other fire protection features and procedures in place
and the manual actions are considered feasible and reliable to ensure
safe shutdown capability following a fire. The combination of the
operator manual actions in conjunction with all of the measures and
systems discussed above, results in an adequate level of protection. No
new accident initiators are created by allowing the use of operator
manual actions in the fire areas identified in this exemption and the
probability of postulated accidents is not increased. Similarly, the
consequences of postulated accidents are not increased. Therefore,
there is no undue risk to public health and safety.
3.6 Consistent With Common Defense and Security
This exemption would allow TMI-1 to credit the use of specific
operator manual actions and installed fire protection features in lieu
of meeting the requirements specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2. This change, to the operation of the plant, has no
relation to security issues nor does it diminish the level of safety
from what was intended by the requirements contained in Section
III.G.2. Therefore, the common defense and security is not impacted by
this exemption.
3.7 Special Circumstances
One of the special circumstances described in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) is that the application of the regulation is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying
purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is to ensure
that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire.
For the fire areas specified in this exemption, the NRC staff finds
that the operator manual actions are feasible, can be reliably
performed and that the fire protection features installed in the areas
are effective at preventing and suppressing fires. Therefore, the
conditions described herein will ensure that a redundant train
necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the plant will
remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire in these fire areas.
The staff concludes that combination of the operator manual actions, in
conjunction with all of the measures and systems discussed above,
results in an equivalent level of protection to that intended by
III.G.2. Since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G is achieved, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix R, Section III.G.2 exist.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present such that
application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from the requirements of
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of 10 CFR part 50, to TMI-1 for the two
operator manual actions discussed above.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (74 FR 9437).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of March 2009.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E9-7807 Filed 4-6-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P