[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 31 (Wednesday, February 18, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7549-7552]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-3020]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD; 
Amendment 39-15813; AD 2009-04-07]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series 
Airplanes, and Airbus Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 Series 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing 
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of 
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an 
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down 
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an 
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1 
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
    Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air 
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part

[[Page 7550]]

of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference Unit] was providing erroneous 
and temporary wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal 
behaviour of the ADR1 led to several consequences such as 
unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude 
information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM 
warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of 
Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control computers 
commanded a sudden nose down aircraft movement, which constitutes an 
unsafe condition. * * *
* * * * *
    These anomalies could result in high pilot workload, deviation from 
the intended flight path, and possible loss of control of the airplane. 
This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe 
condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: This AD becomes effective March 5, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications, listed in the AD as of March 5, 
2009.
    We must receive comments on this AD by March 20, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0012-E, dated January 15, 2009 
(referred to after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe 
condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

    An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down 
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an 
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1 
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
    Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air 
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference 
Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary wrong parameters in a 
random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to several 
consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss 
of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and 
several ECAM warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided 
Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control 
computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down aircraft 
movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of 
the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that 
ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event. Due 
to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted by this 
issue.
    In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to 
other aircraft systems, EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated 
November 19, 2008] was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial 
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by 
accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) 
operational procedure.
    Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was 
issued, it has been reported that the ``OFF'' light did not 
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons 
to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed 
sometimes affected by another failure control.
    To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been 
updated to instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the 
``OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting the IR and ADR 
pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-E 
[dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD 
2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of 
the updated AFM operational procedure.
    Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E, 
dated December 18, 2008], a new service event has been reported 
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the ``OFF'' 
light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR 
pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to 
other systems.
    In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing 
the affected ADIRU must be done by setting the IR mode rotary 
selector to OFF. Consequently, this AD, which supersedes AD 2008-
0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], requires accomplishment of the 
updated AFM operational procedure.

The anomalies described above could result in high pilot workload, 
deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss of control 
of the airplane. You may obtain further information by examining the 
MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

    Airbus has issued A330 Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, 
dated January 13, 2009, to the A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual; and A340 
Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009, to the 
A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual. The actions described in this service 
information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in 
the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a Note within the AD.

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date

    An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of 
this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to

[[Page 7551]]

the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to 
adoption of this rule to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data 
to other aircraft systems, which could result in high pilot workload, 
deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss of control 
of the airplane. Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity 
for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and that 
good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30 
days.

Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight 
safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public 
comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under 
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate 
Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We 
specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, 
environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all 
comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of 
those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2009-04-07 Airbus: Amendment 39-15813. Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; 
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 5, 
2009.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-200 and -300; and A340-
200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes, certificated in any 
category, as listed in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
    (1) A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -
322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes, all serial numbers, 
equipped with Northrop-Grumman (formerly Litton) Air Data Inertial 
Reference Units (ADIRUs), part number (P/N) 465020-0303-03ZZ (with 
ZZ from 09 up to 16 inclusive).
    (2) A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, -313, -541, and -642 
airplanes, all serial numbers, equipped with Northrop-Grumman 
(formerly Litton) ADIRUs, P/N 465020-0303-03ZZ (with ZZ from 09 up 
to 16 inclusive).

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34: 
Navigation.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down 
order [event] while in cruise. This order was preceded by an 
automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of the ``NAV IR1 
FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution.
    Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air 
Data Reference 1 (ADR) part of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference 
Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary wrong parameters in a 
random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to several 
consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss 
of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and 
several ECAM warnings. Among the abnormal parameters, the provided 
Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such that the flight control 
computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down aircraft 
movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of 
the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that 
ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event. Due 
to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted by this 
issue.
    In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to 
other aircraft systems, EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated 
November 19, 2008] was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial 
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by 
accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) 
operational procedure.
    Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was 
issued, it has been reported that the ``OFF'' light did not 
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons 
to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed 
sometimes affected by another failure control.
    To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been 
updated to instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the 
``OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting the IR and ADR 
pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-E 
[dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD 
2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of 
the updated AFM operational procedure.
    Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E, 
dated December 18, 2008], a new service event has been reported 
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the ``OFF'' 
light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR 
pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to 
other systems.
    In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing 
the affected ADIRU must

[[Page 7552]]

be done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, 
this AD, which supersedes AD 2008-0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], 
requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational procedure.
    The anomalies described above could result in high pilot 
workload, deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss 
of control of the airplane.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done: Within 14 days after the effective date 
of this AD, revise the applicable section of the A330 or A340 
(Airbus) Flight Manual (FM) by inserting a copy of A330 (Airbus) 
Temporary Revision (TR) 4.02.00/46, or A340 (Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54, 
both Issue 3, both dated January 13, 2009, as applicable. 
Thereafter, operate the airplane according to the limitations and 
procedures in the TRs. When information identical to that in the TR 
has been included in the general revisions of the FM, the general 
revisions may be inserted in the FM, and the TR may be removed.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: 
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a 
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information 
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Emergency 
Airworthiness Directive 2009-0012-E, dated January 15, 2009; A330 
(Airbus) TR 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; and A340 
(Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; for related 
information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use A330 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46, 
Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009, to the A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual; 
or A340 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated 
January 13, 2009, to the A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual; as applicable; 
to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 
otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Airbus SAS--Airworthiness Office--EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice 
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; e-mail 
[email protected]; Internet http://www.airbus.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information that is 
incorporated by reference at the FAA, Transport Airplane 
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For 
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information at the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information 
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or 
go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 23, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-3020 Filed 2-17-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P