[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 25 (Monday, February 9, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6423-6430]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-2615]



[[Page 6423]]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278; NRC-2009-0033]


Exelon Generation Company, LLC and PSEG Nuclear, LLC Peach Bottom 
Atomic Power Station Unit Nos. 2 and 3; Exemption

1.0 Background

    The Exelon Generation Company (Exelon, the licensee in addition to 
PSEG Nuclear, LLC) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-44 and DPR-56 which authorize operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic 
Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3. The licenses provide, among other 
things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) 
now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of two boiling-water reactors located in York 
and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 
Section 50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed 
before January 1, 1979, must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire protection of safe shutdown 
capability.'' PBAPS Units 2 and 3 were licensed to operate prior to 
January 1, 1979. As such, the licensee's Fire Protection Program (FPP) 
must satisfy the established fire protection features of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 
2006-10, ``Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2, 
Operator Manual Actions,'' noted that NRC inspections identified that 
some licensees had relied upon operator manual actions, instead of the 
options specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 as a 
permanent solution to resolve issues related to Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire 
barriers.
    In a letter dated October 5, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML072820129), the licensee 
identified 25 operator manual actions that were previously included in 
correspondence with the NRC and found acceptable in a fire protection-
related Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 16, 1993 (ADAMS 
Accession Number ML081690220). However, RIS 2006-10 identifies that an 
exemption under 10 CFR 50.12 is necessary for use of the manual actions 
in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2 even if the NRC previously issued an SE that found the manual 
actions acceptable. This exemption provides the formal vehicle for NRC 
approval for the use of the specified operator manual actions instead 
of the options specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 
for PBAPS Units 2 and 3.
    In summary, by letter dated October 5, 2007, and supplemental 
letters dated May 1, 2008, and December 11, 2008 (ADAMS Accession 
Numbers ML081220873 and ML083470170) responding to the NRC staff's 
request for additional information, Exelon submitted a request for 
exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire 
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability,'' for the use of 25 operator 
manual actions as described in Table 1 in lieu of the requirements 
specified in Section III.G.2.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. One of these special 
circumstances, described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the 
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not 
serve the underlying purpose of the rule, or is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage in the event of a fire. Section III.G.2 provides the following 
means to ensure that a redundant train of safe shutdown cables and 
equipment is free of fire damage, where redundant trains are located in 
the same fire area outside of primary containment:
    a. Separation of cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3-
hour rating;
    b. Separation of cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of 
more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards and 
with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system installed 
in the fire area; or
    c. Enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a 
fire barrier having a 1-hour rating and with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system installed in the fire area.
    Exelon indicated that the operator manual actions listed in their 
October 5, 2007, exemption request are those that were previously 
included in correspondence with the NRC and were found acceptable in a 
Fire Protection SE dated September 16, 1993 (ADAMS Accession Number 
ML081690220). The introductory letter to this SE states, in part,

    The NRC staff has completed a review of the ``Fire Protection 
Program'' document through Revision 4 as well as certain other 
documents related to the implementation of Appendix R requirements. 
The enclosed safety evaluation (SE) concludes that the safe shutdown 
capability at Peach Bottom, as described in the PBAPS Fire 
Protection Program, with approved exemptions, satisfies the 
requirements of Section III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 
50.

    Section 2.6 titled ``Manual Operations,'' of the September 16, 
1993, SE states, in part,

    Each of the four shutdown methods identified by the licensee in 
the FPP, (Methods A, B, C, and D), require that manual actions be 
performed outside of the control room to achieve shutdown following 
fires in certain fire areas. Table A-4 of the FPP describes the 
manual operations that may be required and the fire areas that may 
require manual actions. [* * *] Based on the review conducted as 
part of Inspection Report 87-30 and the closure of Open Item 87-30-
02, the NRC staff finds the manual operations described in the FPP 
acceptable.

    A cross reference between Table A-4 of the PBAPS Units 2 and 3 FPP, 
Revision 3, titled ``Operations that may be Required to be Performed 
Outside the Control Room,'' and the operator manual actions identified 
in the October 5, 2007, Request for Exemption was provided in table 
format in the May 1, 2008, Response to Request for Additional 
Information. This information is provided in Table 1 of this exemption 
titled, ``Cross-Reference Between Peach Bottom Fire Protection Program, 
Revision 3, Table A-4 and Operator Manual Actions.'' There are a total 
of 25 operator manual actions listed in the exemption that occur in 11 
different fire areas.
    Exelon indicated in the May 1, 2008, Response to Request for 
Additional Information that in several cases, certain individual 
operator manual actions that were approved in the SE are divided into 
separate tasks for clarity as part of the exemption request. Also, in 
several cases, additional tasks are specified. The additional tasks are 
listed when the tasks are performed in a different room from the main 
action. Exelon states that this was done to clearly identify the

[[Page 6424]]

areas in which the manual actions are performed and are not new actions 
that did not previously exist.
    In the December 11, 2008, Response to Request for Additional 
Information, the licensee outlined the approach that was taken to 
evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the operator manual actions 
included in the request. The cross-reference information provided in 
Table 1 provides an explanation for where each operator manual action 
is located and the role of the actions in achieving safe shutdown. The 
response also contains a discussion and justification for why the 
operator manual actions are appropriate for maintaining consistency 
with the intent of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation in support of the 
subject exemption request for the use of operator manual actions in 
lieu of the requirements specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, 
and concluded that given the existing fire protection features in the 
affected fire zones, Exelon continues to meet the underlying purpose of 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 for the PBAPS Units 2 and 3 
fire areas described in Table 1. The following technical evaluation 
provides the basis for this conclusion.

3.1 Fire Prevention

    Fire areas 2, 6S, 13N, 13S, 26, 38, 54 and 57 all have limited or 
low combustible fuel loading (equivalent fire severity of less than 45 
minutes) and fire areas 4, 50 and 58 have low to moderate combustible 
fuel loading (equivalent fire severity of less than 105 minutes). Fire 
area 50 also contains some individual rooms, such as the lube oil 
rooms, that include high combustible fuel loading (equivalent fire 
severity of greater than 105 minutes). Areas with moderate or greater 
fuel loading have adequate detection and suppression systems 
appropriate for the hazard as described below.
    The primary fixed ignition sources in the areas are limited to 
cables and electrical equipment. It is noted that in all areas where a 
postulated fire included an electrical cable fire, all exposed cables 
have fire retardant insulation material and that the use of wood is 
restricted to fire retardant wood (except for large cribbing).
    The NRC staff finds that for all of the areas related to this 
exemption, the level of fire protection combined with the limited fuel 
load and minimal ignition sources in the fire areas associated with 
this exemption results in a low likelihood of a fire occurring and 
spreading to adjacent fire areas or equipment.

3.2 Detection, Control and Suppression

    The NRC staff evaluated the fire detection, control and suppression 
systems associated with the areas related to this exemption. All fire 
areas included in this exemption have smoke detection systems 
installed. Fire areas 4, 13S, 26, 38, 54, 57 and 58 have full-area 
smoke detection coverage. Fire area 2 is provided with smoke or heat 
detection in most rooms with the exception of some of the radwaste pump 
and tank rooms that are locked high radiation areas. Fire areas 6S and 
13N have smoke detection coverage on each elevation except the 
refueling floor, where there are no cables associated with safe 
shutdown. Fire area 50 has smoke and/or heat detection systems 
installed in certain individual rooms within the turbine building to 
address specific fire hazards.
    Fire areas 2, 4, 38, 57 and 58 also have full-area automatic fire 
suppression systems installed to mitigate any specific or elevated fire 
hazards in those areas. An example of a specific or elevated fire 
hazard would be the cable insulation, lube oil, charcoal filters or 
trash/paper noted as being postulated fires in fire area 2. These fire 
hazards are mitigated by the installation of carbon dioxide systems in 
each High Pressure Coolant lnjection pump room, pre-action sprinklers 
over the motor generator set lube oil pumps, wet pipe sprinklers in the 
radwaste trash area and water spray for the charcoal filters that are 
part of the standby gas treatment system. Fire Area 57 is equipped with 
a pre-action sprinkler system to protect the corridor that passes 
between the 4kV bus rooms and the radwaste building.
    Fire area 50 has fire detection and local automatic fire 
suppression systems installed in specific areas to suppress fires that 
may occur at the specific hazard source or to protect access through 
the area. For example, the licensee noted in the December 11, 2008, 
Response to Request for Additional Information, that some high 
combustible fuel load areas, such as the lube oil, moisture separator, 
feed pump rooms, turbine bearings and the common hatch area, are 
located in fire area 50 and that these spaces were equipped with wet-
pipe sprinkler systems. The licensee also noted that the hydrogen seal 
skid on each unit is equipped with an automatic deluge system and that 
a pre-action sprinkler system is installed over the 13kV switchgear 
cabinets in fire area 50.
    The NRC staff finds that for the areas described in the request for 
exemption, the fire detection, control and suppression systems are 
adequate to mitigate any specific or elevated fire hazards in those 
areas.

3.3 Preservation of Safe Shutdown Capability

    The NRC staff has evaluated the feasibility review provided by the 
licensee in the December 11, 2008, Response to Request for Additional 
Information. The feasibility review documents that procedures are in 
place, in the form of Transient Response Implementing Plan procedures, 
to ensure that clear and accessible instructions on how to perform the 
manual actions are available to the operators. Several potential 
environmental concerns are also evaluated, such as radiation levels, 
temperature/humidity conditions and the ventilation configuration and 
fire effects that the operators may encounter during certain emergency 
scenarios. The licensee's feasibility review concluded that the 
operator manual actions were feasible because the operators performing 
the manual actions would not be exposed to adverse or untenable 
conditions during any particular operator manual action procedure or 
during the time to perform the procedure.
    The NRC staff reviewed the required operator manual action 
completion time limits versus the time before the action becomes 
critical to safely shutting down the unit as presented in the 
feasibility analyses. In one case the action must be completed within 
30 minutes. This action is identified in Table 1 as 30S546 and requires 
an operator to travel from the control room to the cable spreading room 
and perform the action of operating a key switch. The combined time to 
complete the travel and specified action requires a total of 5 minutes. 
Given the low complexity of this action the NRC staff finds that this 
action is feasible. In addition, the fire areas described in this 
exemption are separated from adjacent fire areas by fire-rated barriers 
or water curtains to provide a level of compartmentalization between 
the fire areas and/or buildings. This compartmentalization helps to 
ensure that fires will not spread to adjacent fire areas and that any 
fire damage will be limited to the fire area of origin. The NRC staff 
finds that there is a sufficient amount of time available to complete 
the proposed operator manual actions specified in Table 1 of this 
exemption.

3.4 Evaluation

    As stated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section II:


[[Page 6425]]


    The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-
in-depth to fire protection with the following objectives:
    1. To prevent fires from starting,
    2. To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those 
fires that do occur, and
    3. To provide protection for structures, systems, and components 
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished 
by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe 
shutdown of the plant.

    The NRC staff has evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used 
for fire protection at PBAPS, applicable to the fire zones under 
review. Based upon consideration of the limited fire ignition sources 
and fire hazards in the affected areas, and the existing fire 
protection measures at PBAPS, the NRC staff concludes that objective 
one of defense-in-depth is adequately met.
    Based on the evaluation of fire detection and suppression systems 
provided in the affected fire zones, the NRC staff determined that any 
postulated fire is expected to be promptly detected by the available 
automatic fire detection systems in the associated fire areas. The 
available fire detection and suppression equipment in these fire areas 
ensure that a postulated fire will not be left unchallenged. In 
addition, all fire areas are separated from adjacent fire areas by 
fire-rated barriers or water curtains to provide a level of 
compartmentalization between the fire areas and/or buildings. This 
compartmentalization helps to ensure that fires will not spread to 
adjacent fire areas and that any fire damage will be limited to the 
fire area of origin. In addition, when fires are contained in the fire 
area of origin, the licensee has demonstrated that the manual actions 
are feasible. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that objectives 2 and 
3 of defense-in-depth are adequately met.
    Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the requested exemption to 
use operator manual actions in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is consistent with the defense-in-depth 
methodology necessary at nuclear power plants and will not impact PBAPS 
post-fire safe-shutdown capability.

3.5 Authorized by Law

    This exemption would allow PBAPS the use of operator manual actions 
in lieu of meeting the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the 
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The 
NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations because special 
circumstances exist that warrant the use of the operator manual actions 
to achieve safe shutdown. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by 
law.

3.6 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G.2 is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage in the event of a fire. Based on the existing fire barriers, 
fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression equipment, fire 
protection requirements, and the absence of significant combustible 
loads and ignition sources in the fire areas associated with this 
exemption, the NRC staff has concluded that application of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 for these fire areas is not necessary 
to achieve the underlying purpose of this regulation.
    The NRC staff has determined that the exemption to allow PBAPS the 
use of operator manual actions in lieu of the requirements specified in 
10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 does not increase the 
probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents. This 
determination is based on the NRC staff finding that the operator 
manual actions are not the sole form of protection relied upon due to 
the other fire protection features in place and the manual actions are 
considered feasible and provide safe shutdown capability following a 
fire. The combination of the operator manual actions, in conjunction 
with all of the measures and systems discussed above, results in an 
adequate level of protection. No new accident initiators are created by 
allowing use of operator manual actions in the fire areas identified in 
the exemption and the probability of postulated accidents is not 
increased. Similarly, the consequences of postulated accidents are not 
increased. Therefore, there is no undue risk (since risk is probability 
multiplied by consequences) to public health and safety.

3.7 Consistent With Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would allow PBAPS the use of specific 
operator manual actions in lieu of meeting the requirements specified 
in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. This change, to the 
operation of the plant, has no relation to security issues nor does it 
diminish the level of safety from what was intended by the requirements 
contained in Section III.G.2. Therefore, the common defense and 
security is not impacted by this exemption.

3.8 Special Circumstances

    One of the special circumstances described in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) is that the application of the regulation is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying 
purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is to ensure 
that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire. 
For the fire areas specified in Table 1 of this exemption, the NRC 
staff finds that the operator manual actions are feasible and can be 
reliably performed and the existing configuration described herein will 
ensure that a redundant train necessary to achieve and maintain safe 
shutdown of the plant will remain free of fire damage in the event of a 
fire in these fire zones. Since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix R, Section III.G is achieved, the special circumstances 
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an exemption 
from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 exist.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present such that 
application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from the requirements of 
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of 10 CFR Part 50, to PBAPS Units 2 and 3 
for the 25 operator manual actions specified in Table 1.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (74 FR 5191).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of January 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

[[Page 6426]]



                Table 1--Cross-Reference Between Peach Bottom Fire Protection Program, Revision 3, Table A-4 and Operator Manual Actions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fire affected
 Operator  manual   Table A-4  cross        Purpose             component       Initiating  fire        Actions         Action  locations       Notes
  action  number       reference                               information         area  (FA)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................  2AP35............  Defeat 2A residual   External wiring      2, 57...........  Install U3 plug-in   Cable Spreading      Note 1
                                       heat removal (RHR)   (located in the                        test switch 3-10A-   Room, Rm 302, FA    Note 2
                                       pump (2AP35) trip    initiating fire                        J1B at Panel 30C33.  25.
                                       signal generated     areas) to the Unit
                                       by fire damage to    3 RHR logic in
                                       Unit 3 RHR Logic.    panel 30C33
                                                            (located in Room
                                                            (Rm) 302, FA 25).
2................  2BS456...........  Transfer 125 VDC     Loss of power (due   2, 4, 6S, 57....  1. Verify Breaker    1. E-23 Bus Room,    Note 1
                                       Battery Charger      to fire damage in                      52-6011 at E234-T-   Rm 263, FA 35.      Note 4
                                       2BD003 from normal   initiating fire                        B is closed prior
                                       source (E224-T-B)    areas) to 125 VDC                      to operating
                                       to its alternate     Battery Charger                        switch 2BS456.
                                       source (E234-T-B)    2BD003 (located in
                                       due to fire damage.  Rm 226, FA 36).
                                                                                                  2. Operate switch    2. E-42 Bus Room,    ............
                                                                                                   2BS456 to restore    Rm 226, FA 36.
                                                                                                   power for Battery
                                                                                                   Charger 2BD003
                                                                                                   from an alternate
                                                                                                   power source.
3................  2DS456...........  Transfer 125 VDC     Loss of power (due   2, 6S, 38, 57...  1. Verify Breaker    1. E-23 Bus Room,    Note 1
                                       Battery Charger      to fire damage in                      52-6022 at E234-T-   Rm 263, FA 35.      Note 4
                                       2DD003 from normal   initiating fire                        B is closed prior                        Note 5
                                       source (E424-W-A)    areas) to 125 VDC                      to operating
                                       to its alternate     Battery Charger                        switch 2DS456.
                                       source (E234-T-B)    2DD003 (located in
                                       due to fire damage.  Rm 226, FA 36).
                                                                                                  2. Operate switch    2. E-42 Bus Room,
                                                                                                   2DS456 to restore    Rm 226, FA 36.
                                                                                                   power for Battery
                                                                                                   Charger 2DD003
                                                                                                   from an alternate
                                                                                                   power source.
4................  3BP35............  Defeat 3B RHR pump   External wiring      2, 57...........  Install U2 plug-in   Cable Spreading      Note 1
                                       (3BP35) trip         (located in                            test switch into     Room, Rm 302, FA    Note 2
                                       signal generated     initiating fire                        test jack 2-10A-     25.
                                       by fire damage to    areas) to the Unit                     J1A at panel 20C32.
                                       Unit 2 RHR logic.    2 RHR logic in
                                                            panel 20C32
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            302, FA 25).
5................  30S546...........  Transfer instrument  Loss of power (due   13N.............  Operate key switch   Cable Spreading
                                       power supplies       to fire in                             30S546 to restore    Room, Rm 302, FA
                                       from normal source   initiating fire                        power to             25.
                                       (panel 30Y050) to    area) to                               instrument panel
                                       alternate power      instrument power                       from 20Y033.
                                       source (panel        supply panel
                                       20Y033) due to       30Y050 (located in
                                       fire damage.         Rm 302, FA 25).
6................  3AS456...........  Transfer 125 VDC     Loss of power (due   13N.............  1. Verify Breaker    1. E-12 Bus Room,    Note 4
                                       Battery Charger      to fire damage in                      52-5934 at E124-T-   Rm 227, FA 39.
                                       3AD003 from its      initiating fire                        B is closed prior
                                       normal power         area) to 125 VDC                       to operating
                                       source (E134-T-B)    Battery Charger                        switch 3AS456.
                                       to its alternate     3AD003 (located in
                                       power source (E124-  Rm 261, FA 32).
                                       T-B) due to fire
                                       damage.
                                                                                                  2. Operate switch    2. E-33 Bus Room,
                                                                                                   3AS456 to restore    Rm 261, FA 32.
                                                                                                   power for Battery
                                                                                                   Charger 3AD003
                                                                                                   from an alternate
                                                                                                   power source.

[[Page 6427]]

 
7................  3CS456...........  Transfer 125 VDC     Loss of power (due   13N, 13S, 26,     1. Verify Breaker    1. E-12 Bus Room,    Note 1
                                       Battery Charger      to fire damage in    57, 58.           52-5911 at E124-T-   Rm 227, FA 39.      Note 3
                                       3CD003 from its      initiating fire                        B is closed prior                        Note 4
                                       normal power         areas) to 125 VDC                      to operating                             Note 6
                                       source (E334-R-B)    Battery Charger                        switch 3CS456.
                                       to its alternate     3CD003 (located in
                                       power source (E124-  Rm 261, FA 32).
                                       T-B) due to fire
                                       damage.
                                                                                                  2. Operate switch    2. E-33 Bus Room,
                                                                                                   3CS456 to restore    Rm 261, FA 32.
                                                                                                   power for Battery
                                                                                                   Charger 3CD003
                                                                                                   from an alternate
                                                                                                   power source.
8................  MO3-10-89A.......  Manually operate MO- Loss of power (due   13N.............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 RBCCW Room,
                                       3-10-089A if         to fire damage in                      3623 at E134-W-A.    Rm 162, FA 2.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-3-
                                       capability is lost   10-089A, 3A RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Heat Exchanger
                                                            High Pressure
                                                            Service Water Heat
                                                            Outlet (located in
                                                            Rm 156, FA 2).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 RHR Pump
                                                                                                   3-10-089A.           Room, Rm 156, FA 2.
9................  MO-2486..........  Manually operate     Loss of power (due   50, 54..........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. E2 Diesel         Note 7
                                       valve MO-2486 upon   to fire damage in                      5442 at E234-D-A.    Generator Room, Rm
                                       loss of electrical   the initiating                                              817, FA 45.
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability due to    2486, High
                                       fire damage.         Pressure Service
                                                            Water Normal
                                                            Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            815, FA 54).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. Cardox Room, Rm
                                                                                                   2486.                815, FA 54.
10...............  MO-2486..........  Locally operate MO-  Loss of power (due   4, 38, 57.......  1. Open breaker 52-  1 and 2. E2 Diesel   Note 1
                                       2486 from the MCC    to fire damage in                      5442 at E234-D-A.    Generator Room, Rm
                                       if the fire has      the initiating                                              817, FA 45.
                                       caused loss of       fire areas) to MO-
                                       remote operating     2486, High
                                       capability.          Pressure Service
                                                            Water Normal
                                                            Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            815, FA 54).
                                                                                                  2. Open valve using
                                                                                                   contactor at MCC.
11...............  MO-3486..........  Manually operate     Loss of power (due   50, 54..........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. E2 Diesel         Note 7
                                       valve MO-3486 upon   to fire damage in                      5441 at E234-D-A.    Generator Room, Rm
                                       loss of electrical   the initiating                                              817, FA 45.
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability due to    3486, High
                                       fire damage.         Pressure Service
                                                            Water Normal
                                                            Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            815, FA 54).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. Cardox Room, Rm
                                                                                                   3486.                815, FA 54.

[[Page 6428]]

 
12...............  MO-3486..........  Locally operate MO-  Loss of power (due   57, 58..........  1. Open breaker 52-  1 and 2. E2 Diesel   Note 1
                                       3486 from the        to fire damage in                      5441 at E234-D-A.    Generator Room, Rm  Note 3
                                       motor control        the initiating                                              817, FA 45.
                                       center (MCC) if      fire areas) to MO-
                                       the fire has         3486, High
                                       caused loss of       Pressure Service
                                       remote operating     Water Normal
                                       capability.          Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            815, FA 54).
                                                                                                  2. Open valve using
                                                                                                   contactor at MCC.
13...............  MO2-10-034A......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   4, 57...........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 Reactor Bldg,  Note 1
                                       MO-2-10-034A if      to fire damage in                      3832 at E324-R-B.    Rm 212, FA 6S.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   2-10-34A, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  A Full Flow Test
                                                            Valve (located in
                                                            Rm 1, FA 5).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   2-10-034A.           Rm 1, FA 5.
14...............  MO2-10-039A......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   4, 57...........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 Reactor Bldg,  Note 1
                                       MO-2-10-039A if      to fire damage in                      3831 at E324-R-B.    Rm 212, FA 6S.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   2-10-039A, RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Loop A Torus
                                                            Header Valve
                                                            (located in Rm 1,
                                                            FA 5).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   2-10-039A.           Rm 1, FA 5.
15...............  MO3-10-034A......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   13N, 26.........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,
                                       MO-3-10-034A if      to fire damage in                      3832 at E334-R-B.    Rm 257, FA 13S.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   3-10-34A, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  A Full Flow Test
                                                            Valve (located in
                                                            Rm 37, FA 12).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   3-10-034A.           Rm 37, FA 12.
16...............  MO3-10-039A......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   13N, 26.........  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,
                                       MO-3-10-039A if      to fire damage in                      3831 at E334-R-B.    Rm 257, FA 13S.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   3-10-039A, RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Loop A Torus
                                                            Header Valve
                                                            (located in Rm 37,
                                                            FA 12).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   3-10-039A.           Rm 37, FA 12.
17...............  MO2-10-034B......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   6S..............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 RBCCW Room,
                                       MO-2-10-034B if      to fire damage in                      3933 at E424-W-A.    Rm 105, FA 2.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-2-
                                       capability is lost   10-034B, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  B Full Flow Test
                                                            Valve (located in
                                                            Rm 1, FA 5).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   2-10-34B.            Rm 1, FA 5.

[[Page 6429]]

 
18...............  MO2-10-039B......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   6S..............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 RBCCW Room,
                                       MO-2-10-039B if      to fire damage in                      3942 at E424-W-A.    Rm 105, FA 2.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-2-
                                       capability is lost   10-039B, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  B Torus Header
                                                            Valve, (located in
                                                            Rm 1, FA 5).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   2-10-39B.            Rm 1, FA 5.
19...............  MO2-10-89D.......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   6S..............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 RBCCW Room,
                                       MO-2-10-089D if      to fire damage in                      3931 at E424-W-A.    Rm 105, FA 2.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-2-
                                       capability is lost   10-089D, 2D RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Heat Exchanger
                                                            High Pressure
                                                            Service Water
                                                            Outlet Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            104, FA 2).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 RHR Pump
                                                                                                   2-10-89D.            Room, Rm 104, FA 2.
20...............  MO3-10-034B......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   2, 57, 58.......  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,  Note 1
                                       MO-3-10-034B if      to fire damage in                      3933 at E434-R-B.    Rm 250, FA 13N.     Note 3
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   3-10-034B, RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Loop B Full Flow
                                                            Test Valve
                                                            (located in Rm 37,
                                                            FA 12).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   3-10-34B.            Rm 37, FA 12.
21...............  MO3-10-039B......  Manually open valve  Loss of power (due   2, 57, 58.......  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,  Note 1
                                       MO-3-10-039B if      to fire damage in                      3942 at E434-R-B.    Rm 250, FA 13N.     Note 3
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire areas) to MO-
                                       capability is lost   3-10-039B, RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Loop B Torus
                                                            Header Valve
                                                            (located in Rm 37,
                                                            FA 12).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 Torus Room,
                                                                                                   3-10-39B.            Rm 37, FA 12.
22...............  MO3-10-89D.......  Manually operate MO- Loss of power (due   58..............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,  Note 3
                                       3-10-089D if         to fire damage in                      3931 at E434-R-B.    Rm 250, FA 13N.
                                       electrical           the initiating
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-3-
                                       capability is lost   10-089D, 3D RHR
                                       due to fire damage.  Heat Exchanger
                                                            High Pressure
                                                            Service Water
                                                            Outlet Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            159, FA 10).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U3 RHR Pump
                                                                                                   3-10-089D.           Room, Rm 159, FA
                                                                                                                        10.
23...............  MO2-10-25B.......  Manually operate MO- Loss of power (due   6S..............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U2 Reactor Bldg,
                                       2-10-025B if         to fire damage in                      25B02 at N210025B,   Rm 205, FA 6N.
                                       electrical           the initiating                         LPCI Swing Bus B.
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-2-
                                       capability is lost   10-025B, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  B Inboard
                                                            Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            204, FA 6N).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open MO- 2. U2 Reactor Bldg,
                                                                                                   2-10-025B.           Rm 204, FA 6N.

[[Page 6430]]

 
24...............  MO3-10-25A.......  Manually operate MO- Loss of power (due   13N.............  1. Open breaker 52-  1. U3 Reactor Bldg,
                                       3-10-025A if         to fire damage in                      25A02 at N310025A,   Rm 257, FA 13S.
                                       electrical           the initiating                         LPCI Swing Bus A.
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-3-
                                       capability is lost   10-25A RHR Loop A
                                       due to fire damage.  Inboard Discharge
                                                            Valve (located in
                                                            Rm 248, FA 13S).
                                                                                                  2. Manually open     2. U3 Reactor Bldg,
                                                                                                   valve MO-3-10-025A.  Rm 248, FA 13S.
25...............  MO3-10-25B.......  Manually operate MO- Loss of power (due   13S.............  1. Open breaker 52-  1 and 2. U3 Reactor
                                       3-10-025B if         to fire damage in                      25B02 at N310025B    Bldg, Rm 250, FA
                                       electrical           the initiating                         LPCI Swing Bus B.    13N.
                                       operating            fire area) to MO-3-
                                       capability is lost   10-025B, RHR Loop
                                       due to fire damage.  B Inboard
                                                            Discharge Valve
                                                            (located in Rm
                                                            249, FA 13N).
                                                                                                  2. Open MO-3-10-
                                                                                                   025B from MCC
                                                                                                   Contactor.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table Notes:
Note 1: Fire Area 57 was originally part of Fire Area 2 and was subsequently made a separate Fire Area.
Note 2: This action has been slightly modified from that described in the original submittal to make the action simpler to perform, but the action
  location, timing and outcome are the same. The original action was to reach inside the logic cabinet and physically manipulate a relay. A plug-in
  switch was fabricated so the operator would not have to handle an energized relay. The outcome is the same (the relay is actuated).
Note 3: Fire Area 58 was originally part of Fire Area 2 and was subsequently made a separate Fire Area.
Note 4: When the station procedures were developed, an initial step of verification of the breaker position (closed) of the alternate power source was
  added. Appendix R permits the assumption that equipment that is not fire affected will be in its expected position. So verification of this breaker
  position is not required for Appendix R compliance. Operations determined that they wanted to add a step to verify the position of the breaker as a
  precaution. This extra step was added to this Table since the action is performed in a different fire area than the steps associated with operating
  the switch. It is important to show that all actions taken by the operators are not in the same fire area where the fire is postulated.
Note 5: Fire Area 2 was omitted from the table in Revision 4. Fire Area 2 is listed in the revision 0, 1 and 2 tables. Fire Area 2 (which subsequently
  was split into Fire Area 2, 57 and 58) fire guide has always contained the attachment to transfer 125 VDC battery charger 2DD003 from the normal to
  the backup source.
Note 6: Fire Area 4 no longer credits use of this manual action.
Note 7: The action to manually open MO-2486 and MO-3486 (physically open the valve at the valve itself) is performed in the same fire area as the
  initiating fire area. There is 150 minutes (2.5 hours) between the start of the event and when the valve is to be opened. A fire in the Cardox Room
  will be extinguished and the smoke vented from the area long before the action needs to be performed. The operators will not have any delay or need
  Self Contained Breathing Apparatus to perform this action.
General Note: Table A-4 Revision 4 was a summary of information that was in the Peach Bottom Cable/Raceway analysis. This program deleted a ``zero''
  that padded many component numbers, and some hyphens. The component number provided in the above table uses the correct nomenclature that is also used
  in the post-fire shutdown fire guides, safe shutdown calculations and plant labels.

[FR Doc. E9-2615 Filed 2-6-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P