[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 24 (Friday, February 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6265-6267]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-2540]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Action Affecting Export Privileges; Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines; Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center and 
Icarus Marine (Pty) Ltd.

    In the Matter of: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, No. 
37, Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 
19395-1311, Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad 
Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, 
Iran; Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center, First 
Floor, No. 25, Shahid Siadat Boulevard, North Zanjan Street, Yadegar 
Emam Highway, Tehran, Iran; Icarus Marine (Pty) Ltd., 1 River 
Street, Rosebank, Cape Town, South Africa; Respondents.

Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

    Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations 
(``EAR'' or ``Regulations''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and Security 
(``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export 
Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested that I issue an Order temporarily 
denying for 180 days the export privileges under the EAR of:
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    \1\ The EAR is currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774 
(2008), as amended. The EAR issued under the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420 (2000)) (``EAA''). 
Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the President, 
through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 
783 (2002)), as extended most recently by the Notice of July 23, 
2008 (73 FR 43,603 (July 25, 2008)), has continued the Regulations 
in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701-1706 (2000)).
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    (1) Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, No. 37 Aseman Tower, 
Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, 
Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, Sayad Shirazi Square, After 
Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran (hereinafter referred to 
as ``IRISL'').
    (2) Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center, First 
Floor, No. 25, Shahid Siadat Boulevard, North Zanjan Street, Yadegar 
Emam Highway, Tehran, Iran (hereinafter referred to as ``TSS'').
    (3) Icarus Marine (Pty) Ltd, 1 River Street, Rosebank, Cape Town, 
South Africa (hereinafter referred to as ``Icarus Marine'').
    (IRISL, TSS, and Icarus Marine are hereinafter collectively 
referred to as ``Respondents'').
    Pursuant to Section 766.24(b) of the EAR, the Assistant Secretary 
may issue a TDO upon a showing by BIS that the order is necessary in 
the public interest to prevent an ``imminent violation'' of the EAR. 15 
CFR 766.24(b)(1). ``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or in 
degree of likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that 
a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the 
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative 
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that ``the violation 
under investigation or charges is significant, deliberate, covert and/
or likely to occur again, rather than technical and negligent[.]'' Id. 
A ``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.
    In its request, BIS has presented evidence that the Respondents are 
about to engage in conduct prohibited by the EAR by re-exporting U.S.-
origin items, which are subject to the Regulations and classified as 
Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 8A992.f and .g, from 
South Africa to a Specially Designated National (``SDN'')

[[Page 6266]]

located in Iran using a specially designated blocked vessel, owned by a 
Specially Designated National, to complete the transaction. 
Specifically, BIS has reason to believe that TSS has been attempting to 
procure a Bladerunner 51 powerboat, a vessel known as the ``Bradstone 
Challenger,'' for use by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(``IRGC''), specifically the IRGC Navy, to be transported to Iran on an 
IRISL vessel.
    The Bradstone Challenger will imminently be re-exported from South 
Africa on an IRISL vessel called the M/V ``Diplomat,'' also known as 
the ``Iran Diplomat,'' with a vessel registration identification number 
IMO 8309701. IRISL and its entire fleet, including the Diplomat, is 
also listed in the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals list as is the IRGC, 
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 and as identified by OFAC in Appendix 
A to 31 CFR Chapter V. The designation identifies those parties 
determined to be weapons of mass destruction proliferators or their 
supporters as well as blocked vessels.
    Under Section 744.8(a) of the Regulations,\2\ no person may export 
or re-export an item subject to the Regulations to any person 
designated pursuant to that Executive Order without a license from BIS. 
The Bradstone Challenger is powered with two U.S.-origin Caterpillar 
C18 engines and two Arneson surface drives, items subject to the 
Regulations and classified under Export Control Classification Number 
(ECCN) 8A992.g. Because it contains greater than a 10 percent de 
minimis of U.S.-origin items, the Bradstone Challenger is also subject 
to the Regulations if proposed for export or re-export to Iran and is 
classified as ECCN 8A992.f. According to publicly available sources, 
the Bladerunner 51 has top speeds from 55 knots to in excess of 65 
knots (or 74 miles per hour). No license was obtained from BIS for 
export or re-export of the U.S.-origin parts contained within the 
powerboat, nor the vessel itself.
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    \2\ On January 15, 2009, Part 744 of the Regulations was amended 
to impose a license requirement on certain parties designated 
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) as Specially 
Designated Nationals. 74 FR 2355 (Jan. 15, 2009).
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    Nonetheless, BIS has produced evidence that TSS is purchasing the 
powerboat, which is intended to be sent from Durban, South Africa. 
Icarus Marine is attempting to send the Bradstone Challenger to Iran. 
TSS is believed to be purchasing the Bradstone Challenger for use by 
the IRGC Navy. There is publicly available evidence of prior dealings 
between the two entities. The TSS Web site, under its ``About Us'' 
section, lists an affiliate of Icarus Marine as a company with whom TSS 
has had ``prosperous cooperation.'' In this transaction, Icarus Marine 
is attempting to send the Bradstone Challenger from the port in Durban 
to Iran on the IRISL vessel Diplomat, with the end-user to be the IRGC 
Navy.
    Multiple public sources indicate that Iran and its military have 
invested substantially in developing its naval forces. The IRGC Navy 
has been involved in enhancing its asymmetric naval warfare 
capabilities. These capabilities include exploiting enemy 
vulnerabilities through the use of ``swarming'' tactics by well-armed 
small boats and fast-attack craft, to mount surprise attacks at 
unexpected times and places. Accordingly, BIS has a significant concern 
that the vessel will be utilized by the IRGC as a fast attack craft. 
According to published reports, similar vessels have been armed with 
torpedoes, rocket launchers, and anti-ship missiles.
    I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that 
violation of the EAR is imminent in terms of proximity of time, as well 
as in degree of likelihood. The conduct here is, inter alia, 
significant, deliberate, and likely to occur again absent issuance of a 
TDO. As such, a TDO issued on an ex parte basis is necessary in the 
public interest to prevent imminent violation of the EAR, and needed to 
give persons and companies in the United States and abroad notice that 
they should cease dealing with the Respondents in export and re-export 
transactions involving items subject to the EAR.
    Accordingly, I find that a TDO naming is necessary, in the public 
interest, to prevent an imminent violation of the EAR. This Order is 
issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing based upon BIS's showing 
of an imminent violation.
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that the Respondents, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines, No. 37 Aseman Tower, Sayyade Shirazee Square, Pasdaran Avenue, 
P.O. Box 19395-1311, Tehran, Iran; No. 37, Corner of 7th Narenjestan, 
Sayad Shirazi Square, After Noboyand Square, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, 
Iran; Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center, First Floor, 
No. 25, Shahid Siadat Boulevard, North Zanjan Street, Yadegar Emam 
Highway, Tehran, Iran; and Icarus Marine (Pty) Ltd, 1 River Street, 
Rosebank, Cape Town, South Africa (each a ``Denied Person'' and 
collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, 
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, 
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is 
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license 
exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of any Denied Person any item 
subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by any Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or 
control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be 
exported from the United States, including financing or other support 
activities related to a transaction whereby any Denied Person acquires 
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from any Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from any Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by any Denied Person, or service any 
item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by any 
Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States. For 
purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, 
repair, modification or testing.
    Third, that after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in 
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other

[[Page 6267]]

person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to any of 
the Respondents by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of 
responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be 
made subject to the provisions of this Order.
    Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or 
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that 
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
the Respondents may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full 
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the 
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. The Respondents may 
oppose a request to renew this Order by filing a written submission 
with the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, which must be 
received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the 
Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be served on the Respondents and shall 
be published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective upon issuance and shall remain in effect 
for 180 days.

    Entered this 22nd day of January 2009.
Kevin A. Delli-Colli,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E9-2540 Filed 2-5-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P