[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 19 (Friday, January 30, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 5609-5618]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-2047]


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FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

12 CFR Part 1252

RIN 2590-AA22


Portfolio Holdings

AGENCY: Federal Housing Finance Agency.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Housing Finance Agency is issuing an interim final 
regulation to govern the portfolio holdings of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Comments on the issues and questions set 
forth in the preamble are requested, and the agency will amend the rule 
as appropriate after considering comments.

DATES: Effective Date: January 30, 2009.
    Comment Date: Written comments must be submitted on or before June 
1, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments, identified by ``Portfolio 
Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' by any of the following methods:
     U.S. Mail, United Parcel Post, Federal Express, or Other 
Mail Service: The mailing address for submitting comments is: Alfred M. 
Pollard, General Counsel, Attention: Comments ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/
RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fourth Floor, 
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: The hand delivery address for 
submitting comments is: Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel, Attention: 
Comments ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22],'' Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, 
DC 20552. The package should be logged at the Guard Desk, First Floor, 
on business days between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
     E-mail: Comments may be submitted via electronic mail at 
[email protected] addressed to Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel. 
Please include ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 2590-AA22]'' in the 
subject line of the message.
     Federal eRulemaking: Instructions on comment submission 
are also available on the eRulemaking portal at http://www.regulations.gov.
    The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) requests that comments 
submitted in hard copy also be accompanied by the electronic version in 
Microsoft Word or in a portable document format (PDF) on 3.5'' disk or 
CD-ROM, and identify the comments as pertaining to the Portfolio 
Holdings Interim Final Rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ming-Yuen Meyer-Fong, Office of the 
General Counsel, (202) 414-3798, or Valerie Smith, Office of Policy 
Analysis and Research, (202) 414-3770, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552. The telephone number for the 
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf is (800) 877-8339. For more 
information on this Interim Final Regulation, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Comments and Access

    Instructions: FHFA requests that comments submitted in hard copy 
also be accompanied by the electronic version in Microsoft[supreg] Word 
or in a portable document format (PDF) on 3.5'' disk or CD-ROM, and 
identify that comments pertain to ``Portfolio Holdings IFR/RFC, [RIN 
2590-AA22].''
    Statement of Availability: This Interim Final Regulation as well as 
any comments posted may be accessed via the internet. Users can access 
the FHFA web page at http://www.fhfa.gov; select Supervision and 
Regulations Tab; select Regulations, Notices and Public Comments; then, 
select the link titled ``Portfolio Holdings'' or via the worldwide 
eRulemaking portal at http://www.regulations.gov. User can also access 
Exhibits A to F referenced in this interim rule document. Specifically, 
Exhibit A (Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase

[[Page 5610]]

Agreement for Fannie Mae) may be accessed at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfnm1.pdf, 
and Exhibit B (Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement for Freddie Mac) at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfrea.pdf. Also, Exhibit C 
(Certificate of Designation of Terms of Variable Liquidation Preference 
Senior Preferred Stock, Series 2008-2 for Fannie Mae) may be accessed 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/certificatefnm2.pdf, and 
Exhibit D (Certificate of Terms and Conditions of Variable Liquidation 
Preference Senior Preferred Stock for Freddie Mac) may be accessed at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/certificatefreb.pdf. 
Finally, Exhibit E (Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of Fannie Mae) may 
be accessed at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/warrantfnm3.pdf, and Exhibit F (Warrant to Purchase Common Stock of 
Freddie Mac) may be accessed at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/warrantfrec.pdf. In addition, copies of all comments received 
will be available for examination by the public on business days 
between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m., at the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, Fourth Floor, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552. To make 
an appointment to inspect comments, please call the Office of General 
Counsel (FHFA) at (202) 414-6924.

II. Background

A. Establishment of the Federal Housing Finance Agency

    On July 30, 2008, the President signed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (Act) (Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2564). Among other 
things, the Act established a new independent executive branch agency 
known as the Federal Housing Finance Agency and transferred the 
supervisory and oversight responsibilities for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac (the Enterprises) from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO). The Enterprises are government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) chartered by Congress for the purposes of establishing secondary 
market facilities for residential mortgages. 12 U.S.C. 1716 et seq. 
(Fannie Mae Charter Act) and 12 U.S.C. 1451, et seq. (Freddie Mac 
Corporation Act). Specifically, Congress established the Enterprises to 
provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages, 
respond appropriately to the private capital market, provide ongoing 
assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages, and 
promote access to mortgage credit throughout the country. Id.
    The Act amended the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety 
and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) (Pub. L. 102-550, 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.). Among other things, the Act 
required FHFA to establish criteria by regulation governing the 
portfolio holdings of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 4624. The purpose of 
such regulation is to ensure that the portfolio holdings are backed by 
sufficient capital and consistent with the mission and the safe and 
sound operations of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). Further, the 
Act directed that FHFA consider the ability of the Enterprises to 
provide a liquid secondary market through securitization activities, 
the portfolio holdings in relation to the overall mortgage market, and 
adherence to standards of prudential management and operations 
established by FHFA in accordance with section 1313B of the Act. 12 
U.S.C. 4624. The Act also required that any criteria governing 
Enterprise portfolio holdings ensure that such holdings are consistent 
with the Enterprises' mission, which includes facilitating the 
financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families 
in a manner consistent with their overall public purposes. 12 U.S.C. 
4624(a); 12 U.S.C. 4501(7).

B. Discussion and Analysis of Interim Rule

    The FHFA is issuing this regulation as an interim final rule, with 
an effective date of January 30, 2009. The name of the newly 
established part 1252 will read ``Portfolio Holdings,'' which will 
contain the rules governing Enterprise portfolio holdings. The 
provisions of this regulation are adopted on an interim final basis and 
will remain in effect until amended. A 120-day comment period is 
provided on the interim final rule and on the topics and questions 
raised in the Request for Comments section.
    In accordance with section 1109(b) of the Act, FHFA is required to 
issue regulations establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio 
holdings. The criteria should ensure that Enterprise portfolio holdings 
are backed by sufficient capital and consistent with the mission as 
well as the safe and sound operations of the Enterprises. 12 U.S.C. 
4624(a).
    The Act authorizes the Director to order temporary adjustments to 
the established criteria for an Enterprise or both Enterprises, 
including during times of economic distress or market disruption. 12 
U.S.C. 4624(b). In addition, the Act provides that the Director monitor 
the portfolio of each Enterprise and authorizes the Director to order 
an Enterprise to dispose of or acquire any asset under terms and 
conditions to be determined by the Director, if the Director determines 
that such action is consistent with the purposes of the Safety and 
Soundness Act or the authorizing statute of the Enterprise. 12 U.S.C. 
4624(c).

C. Enterprise Conservatorships and Senior Preferred Stock Agreements 
With the Department of the Treasury

    On September 6, 2008, FHFA, with the concurrence of the Secretary 
of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship. By board approval, both Enterprises consented to the 
appointment of a conservator. FHFA's goals in placing the Enterprises 
into conservatorship included enhancing their capacity to fulfill their 
mission of providing liquidity and stability to the mortgage markets 
and mitigating the systemic risk posed by the Enterprises, which had 
contributed to instability in mortgage and broader financial markets. 
Upon a determination by the Director of FHFA that either Enterprise has 
returned to a safe and solvent condition and the systemic risks 
contributing to the conservatorship decision have been addressed 
adequately, the Director will issue an order terminating the 
conservatorship of that Enterprise. There is no exact time frame as to 
when the conservatorship of either Enterprise may end.
    In order to prevent Enterprise capital from being exhausted, FHFA, 
upon appointing itself conservator for the Enterprises and on behalf of 
each Enterprise, entered into separate Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (Stock Purchase Agreements) with the Department of the 
Treasury. See Exhibits A & B (Stock Purchase Agreements for Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac). Under the Stock Purchase Agreements, each 
Enterprise's capacity to issue new guarantees of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and to maintain and grow its mortgage portfolio 
holdings was fortified through a commitment by the Department of the 
Treasury to acquire up to $100 billion of senior preferred stock in 
that Enterprise as necessary to ensure that the Enterprise avoid a 
negative net worth. In exchange for that commitment, each of the 
Enterprises granted to the Department of the Treasury shares of Senior 
Preferred Stock with an initial liquidation

[[Page 5611]]

preference of $1 billion (and which value would increase with each 
investment by the Department of the Treasury up to Treasury's 
commitment of $100 billion for each Enterprise, as well as with any 
unpaid commitment fees or dividends owed). Id.; see also Exhibits C & D 
(Certificates of Designation of Terms of Variable Liquidation 
Preference Senior Preferred Stock, Series 2008-2 for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac). The Enterprises also granted to the Department of the 
Treasury warrants for shares of common stock. See Exhibits E & F 
(Warrants to Purchase Common Stock of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). In 
conjunction with enhancing the Enterprises' capacity to engage in new 
business and to maintain and grow their mortgage portfolio holdings, 
the Stock Purchase Agreements also established criteria governing those 
holdings.
    Under the portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock 
Purchase Agreements, each Enterprise may, through December 31, 2009, 
increase its mortgage assets to a level not to exceed $850 billion, 
thereby allowing each Enterprise to provide additional liquidity during 
this period of mortgage market stress. After December 31, 2009, the 
portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements 
require the reduction of each Enterprise's mortgage assets at the rate 
of 10 percent per year until they reach a size of $250 billion, which 
would be around the year 2020. That reduction is expected to be 
achieved largely through natural run-off. The portfolio holdings 
criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements do not address 
Enterprise holdings of non-mortgage assets.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1252.1

    Section 1252.1 adopts the portfolio holdings criteria established 
by the Stock Purchase Agreements, as they may be amended from time to 
time, as the standards for this rule. Under the current Stock Purchase 
Agreements, which currently have the same portfolio holdings criteria 
for both Enterprises, an Enterprise may grow its mortgage assets up to 
$850 billion on December 31, 2009. Starting on December 31, 2010, the 
Enterprise must hold 10 percent less mortgage assets in its portfolio 
than at the end of the preceding year until those assets reach a level 
of $250 billion, at which point, no further decrease is currently 
required. Adjustments could be made to those criteria by amendment of 
the Stock Purchase Agreements.
    FHFA's establishment of criteria governing Enterprise portfolio 
holdings in the Stock Purchase Agreements represents an exercise of 
authority consistent with the authority granted by Congress under 
section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act. FHFA's goals for the 
conservatorship include fortifying Enterprise capacity to support the 
secondary mortgage market. The criteria for Enterprise portfolio 
holdings established in the Stock Purchase Agreements allow the 
Enterprises immediate capacity to provide stability and liquidity to 
the secondary mortgage market, while mitigating systemic risk, and 
facilitating Enterprise efforts to achieve a balance between their 
mission and safe and sound operations in the intermediate term. Given 
the severe deterioration in mortgage market conditions and findings by 
FHFA that the Enterprises were unable to raise capital, immediate, 
coordinated government action was required to reinforce Enterprise 
capacity to provide liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. 
Establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings was an 
essential part of that action.

Section 1252.2

    Section 1252.2 addresses the effective duration of the interim 
rule. FHFA expects these regulations to be effective until any 
amendment or until the Enterprises are no longer subject to the terms 
and obligations of the Stock Purchase Agreements.

IV. Regulatory Requirements

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The interim rule does not contain any information collection 
requirement to require the approval of OMB under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Therefore, the requirements of 
the Paperwork Reduction Act do not apply.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires that 
a regulation that has a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, small businesses, or small organizations must 
include an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing the 
regulation's impact on small entities. Such an analysis need not be 
undertaken if the agency has certified that the regulation does not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. 5 U.S.C. 605(b). FHFA has considered the impact of the 
interim final rule under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The General 
Counsel of FHFA certifies that the interim final rule is not likely to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
business entities because the regulation is applicable only to the 
Enterprises, which are not small entities for purposes of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act.

C. Good Cause for Issuance of Interim Final Rule

    An agency may issue an interim final rule when the agency for good 
cause finds that notice and public procedure thereon are 
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' 5 
U.S.C. 553(b). The interim final rule issued herein meets the Act's 
requirement for issuance of regulations establishing portfolio holdings 
pursuant to section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. 
4501 et seq., as amended, as well as the requirements for good cause 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b).
    HERA requires the Director to issue regulations establishing the 
portfolio holding standards for the Enterprises within 180 days of 
enactment. In addition, this interim final rule adopts criteria 
governing the portfolio holdings of the Enterprises that have been in 
place and currently govern the actions of the Enterprises. Given these 
facts, the Director has determined that prior notice and comment 
procedures are impractical and contrary to public interest.
    Further, given that the Enterprises received notice of the 
portfolio holdings criteria set forth in the Stock Purchase Agreements, 
and consented to the portfolio holdings criteria through their 
conservator, opportunity for further comment by the Enterprises is 
unnecessary. The issuance of this interim final rule and publication in 
the Federal Register serve to comply with the formal requirement in the 
Act that FHFA issue regulations within 180 days of enactment. See 
section 1109(b) of the Act.

V. Request for Comments

A. Interim Final Rule (Sec. Sec.  1252.1 and 1252.2)

    FHFA is interested in receiving comments on all aspects of the 
Interim Final Rule, and all relevant comments will be considered. FHFA 
will amend the interim final rule as appropriate after reviewing 
comments received.
    FHFA also requests comments on the issues and questions set forth 
herein to give the public an opportunity to comment on criteria 
governing Enterprise portfolio holdings that will apply when the 
Enterprises are no longer subject to Stock Purchase Agreements that 
establish holdings

[[Page 5612]]

criteria. When addressing a specific question contained in this interim 
final rule, FHFA asks that commenters specifically note, by number, 
which question is being addressed. In particular, the FHFA is seeking 
comments in the areas and on the issues discussed below. Comments 
should be identified as pertaining to the Portfolio Holdings IFR and 
should be submitted as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this 
preamble.

B. Request for Comments

    FHFA as conservator is working to restore each Enterprise to a safe 
and sound condition. FHFA anticipates that, once housing and mortgage 
markets stabilize, the Enterprises may return to profitability. While 
many--including, for example, then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. 
Paulson \1\--have suggested major changes in the structure or roles of 
the Enterprises, until Congress acts to make changes to their charters, 
FHFA must implement current law in the best way possible. Accordingly, 
FHFA plans to develop a regulation establishing criteria that will 
govern their portfolio holdings at such time as the Enterprises are no 
longer subject to Stock Purchase Agreements that establish portfolio 
holdings criteria.
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    \1\ Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., ``The 
Role of the GSEs in Supporting the Housing Recovery,'' before the 
Economic Club of Washington (January 7, 2009).
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1. Public Policy Objectives of the Regulation
    Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act specifies two public 
policy objectives that guide FHFA's development of a regulation 
establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings. The 
first objective is ensuring that portfolio holdings are backed by 
sufficient capital. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). The Enterprises are subject to 
capital regulations as set forth in 12 CFR part 1750. As initially 
enacted, in 1992, the Safety and Soundness Act established fixed 
minimum capital requirements in statute, directed OFHEO to establish 
risk-based capital requirements for the Enterprises as prescribed in 
statute, and greatly limited the agency's flexibility with respect to 
adjusting those risk-based capital requirements. Capital regulations 
issued in accordance with those authorities allowed the Enterprises to 
operate with considerable leverage relative to their risks and relative 
to other regulated financial institutions, regardless of economic 
conditions or the phase of the mortgage credit cycle. Each Enterprise's 
core capital--comparable to Tier 1 capital for banks--consistently 
represented less than 2 percent of the sum of its mortgage assets and 
guaranteed MBS. High leverage relative to their risks contributed 
significantly to the systemic risk posed by the Enterprises and their 
inability to continue to perform their mission and operate in a safe 
and sound manner as they incurred losses in 2007 and 2008.
    Under the Act, OFHEO's capital regulations remain in effect for the 
Enterprises until modified or replaced. The Act amended the Safety and 
Soundness Act to provide FHFA with broad authorities with respect to 
capital regulation comparable to those possessed by the federal bank 
regulatory agencies. Accordingly, FHFA has begun to develop a new and 
more rigorous capital regime that will be applicable to the Enterprises 
after the conservatorships are terminated. FHFA intends that any new 
risk-based capital regulation and any amendment to an existing minimum 
capital regulation ensure that the Enterprises' portfolio holdings are 
backed by sufficient capital, consistent with the requirements of 
section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act.
    FHFA has determined that it is prudent and in the best interests of 
the secondary mortgage market to suspend capital classifications of the 
Enterprises, during the conservatorships, in light of the Senior 
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements. FHFA continues to closely monitor 
Enterprise capital levels, but the existing statutory and FHFA-directed 
regulatory capital requirements are not binding during the 
conservatorships.
    The second public policy objective that guides FHFA's development 
of a regulation is ensuring that the Enterprises' portfolio holdings 
are consistent with their mission and safe and sound operations. The 
statutory mission of the Enterprises is to provide stability in the 
secondary market for residential mortgages, respond appropriately to 
the private capital market, provide ongoing assistance to the secondary 
market for residential mortgages by increasing the liquidity of 
mortgage investments and improving the distribution of capital 
available for residential mortgage lending, promote access to mortgage 
credit throughout the country, and support financing for housing 
affordable by low- and moderate-income households and in underserved 
areas. The mission is most challenging and most important during the 
part of the mortgage credit cycle when market conditions are weakest. 
Thus, the Enterprises, as a matter of public policy, must maintain 
sufficient financial strength to make business decisions throughout 
that cycle that are relatively unconstrained by solvency or liquidity 
problems. To do so, the Enterprises must limit their risk exposures and 
build sufficient capital, relative to their risks, in periods of 
housing and mortgage market expansion, to be able to absorb losses and 
maintain sufficient capital to comply with regulatory capital 
requirements and perform their mission during contractions in the 
housing sector or the broader economy. In addition, to fulfill their 
mission to provide stability and ongoing assistance to the secondary 
mortgage market, the Enterprises should not themselves present 
unnecessary systemic risk to the secondary market or the broader 
mortgage finance or financial markets. FHFA intends that a regulation 
establishing criteria governing Enterprise portfolio holdings, in 
combination with a revised capital regime for the Enterprises, will 
give them incentives that will promote their ability to perform their 
mission at all points in the mortgage credit cycle.
2. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Standards Governing 
Portfolio Holdings of Mortgage Assets
    The Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings have long been a 
source of debate by lawmakers, policy makers, researchers, and others, 
principally because of the size of those holdings. Recent events that 
eventually caused FHFA to place the Enterprises in conservatorship 
highlight the risks posed by their large mortgage portfolio holdings 
and the failure of the Enterprises to hold capital commensurate with 
the risks posed by those holdings. In mid-2006, the Enterprises agreed 
to cap the growth of their mortgage portfolio holdings due to their 
accounting, internal control, and risk management weaknesses. Recent 
events also underscore the need to establish criteria governing the 
holdings that will allow the Enterprises to carry out their mission in 
a safe and sound manner.
    Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act makes clear that 
Congress considered the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings 
necessary for them to carry out their mission, at least in some 
circumstances. Accordingly, Congress granted FHFA authority to complete 
determine the appropriate size and composition of the mortgage 
portfolio holdings going forward, and whether the Enterprises should 
and how they can be encouraged

[[Page 5613]]

to operate in a more counter-cyclical \2\ fashion so that they can 
respond appropriately when the secondary mortgage market is under 
stress. FHFA invites public comments on those and related issues. 
Separate questions are posed about Enterprise purchases of mortgage 
assets for portfolio and about portfolio holdings of those assets, 
since those activities raise distinct issues.
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    \2\ Financial institutions and markets experience periodic 
lending booms and busts that amplify the business cycle, making 
economic activity more volatile than it would otherwise be. Counter-
cyclical behavior by the Enterprises--building up capital relative 
to their risks in periods of housing and mortgage market expansion 
and using that capital to absorb losses and increase their activity 
during contractions--might reduce the volatility of mortgage 
lending, housing activity, and overall economic activity.
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    i. Benefits of Enterprise Purchases of Mortgage Assets for 
Portfolio.
    The Enterprises provide liquidity--ready access to funds on 
reasonable terms--to the thousands of banks, thrifts, and mortgage 
companies that make loans to housing in the U.S. The Enterprises do so 
primarily by transforming individual mortgages into MBS backed by 
Enterprise guarantees of timely payment of principal and interest. 
Lenders provide the Enterprises with the individual mortgages used to 
create Enterprise MBS and use the cash raised to engage in further 
lending. Securitization helps provide a continuous, stable supply of 
funds to finance purchases of homes by individuals and families and 
apartment buildings and other multifamily dwellings by investors.
    In some circumstances, the Enterprises provide additional liquidity 
and stability to the secondary mortgage market by buying whole loans 
from lenders, and by purchasing MBS that they or the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) have guaranteed, or private-
label MBS issued by large lenders or Wall Street firms. The Enterprises 
hold those mortgage assets in portfolio and finance them with debt. By 
standing ready to purchase MBS they have guaranteed when the market 
yields of those securities are high relative to the yields of 
alternative investments, the Enterprises enhance the liquidity of the 
MBS. Enterprise purchases of selected tranches of private-label MBS may 
also enhance the liquidity and reduce the yields of those securities.
    The economic benefits provided by Enterprise purchases of mortgage 
assets for their portfolios during periods when the secondary mortgage 
market is generally liquid and stable are uncertain. Research at the 
Federal Reserve Board, using data from a period of relative market 
stability, found that purchases for the Enterprises' portfolios appear 
to have no material effect on the cost or availability of mortgage 
credit.\3\ Studies conducted by other researchers have found that the 
Enterprises' purchases of whole loans and MBS for their portfolios 
reduce mortgage interest rates and mortgage rate volatility, increase 
the volume of mortgage lending and refinancing, and increase liquidity 
in the secondary mortgage market.\4\
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    \3\ Andrea Lehnert, S. Wayne Passmore, and Shane Sherland, 
``GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and Secondary Market Activities.'' (April 
2008) Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 36(3), 343-363.
    \4\ See the studies cited in James C. Miller, III, and James E. 
Pearce, Revisiting the Net Benefits of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (a 
study prepared for Freddie Mac, November 2006).
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    A large portion of the mortgage assets purchased for portfolio by 
the Enterprises finance dwelling units that are affordable to low- and 
moderate-income households, or are located in geographic areas 
designated as underserved. Those and other loans may have 
characteristics that make them difficult or uneconomical to securitize. 
Enterprise purchases of such loans may enhance the liquidity and lower 
the interest rates that lenders require on those assets. The 
Enterprises' acquisition of those assets for portfolio may increase the 
availability and reduce the cost of such financing more than 
securitization alone.\5\
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    \5\ Bernanke, Ben S., ``GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and 
Affordable Housing,'' Speech before the Independent Community 
Bankers of America's Annual Convention and Techworld, Honolulu, 
Hawaii (March 6, 2007).
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    Further, the Enterprises can support mortgage markets and the 
housing sector and reduce market yields of MBS by purchasing those 
securities during periods of severe stress or turmoil in mortgage 
markets or the broader financial system. In the recent period of 
mortgage market stress, Enterprise purchases of MBS appear to have had 
some impact on the secondary market pricing and liquidity of mortgage 
securities of those securities. When such conditions ease, the 
Enterprises may be able to sell such mortgage assets in an orderly 
manner, rather than holding them indefinitely in portfolio.
    Question 1: What additional benefits are provided to the secondary 
mortgage market and the housing sector by Enterprise purchases for 
portfolio of mortgage loans and MBS, beyond the benefits provided by 
their securitization activities? What is the magnitude of those 
additional benefits?
    Question 2: Is it possible for the Enterprises to fulfill their 
mission of providing stability and liquidity to the secondary mortgage 
market without purchasing mortgage assets for portfolio? If so, how? If 
not, what types of mortgage assets should they be allowed to purchase 
for portfolio, and in what amounts?
    Question 3: Could the U.S. government better ensure the liquidity 
and stability of the secondary mortgage market other than through 
Enterprise purchases of mortgage assets for portfolio--for example, 
through the activities of the Federal Reserve System, mortgage asset 
purchases by the Department of the Treasury, or the provision of an 
explicit government guarantee of MBS securitized by the Enterprises?
    Question 4: Should the Enterprises' purchases of mortgage assets 
vary over the mortgage credit cycle or with conditions in the secondary 
mortgage market? If so, how?
    Question 5: If the Enterprises purchase large volumes of mortgage 
assets during periods of stress or turmoil in the secondary mortgage 
market, should they be required to sell those assets once that market 
stabilizes? If so, when and how should the Enterprises conduct such 
sales?
    ii. Benefits of Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    The Enterprises' portfolio holdings of mortgage assets grew rapidly 
beginning in the 1990s and extending through the early part of the 
current decade. The pace of that growth greatly exceeded the growth of 
the mortgage market as a whole, as measured by residential mortgage 
debt outstanding (RMDO). The Enterprises' combined holdings of mortgage 
assets increased from $135 billion, or 4.7 percent of RMDO, at the end 
of 1990, to $1,410 billion, or 20.4 percent of RMDO, at the end of 
2002. In the years that ensued, the Enterprises were plagued by 
accounting scandals related to the hedging of their mortgage 
portfolios, internal control problems, and other issues that led to the 
imposition of supervisory restrictions on the growth of their mortgage 
assets and capital surcharges. Between 2004 and 2007, the mortgage 
portfolios of the Enterprises shrunk or grew significantly more slowly 
than RMDO. At the end of June 2008, their combined holdings of mortgage 
assets totaled $1,541 billion, or 12.7 percent of RMDO.
    Historically, key beneficiaries of the Enterprises' large mortgage 
portfolio holdings were their shareholders, who profited from the 
Enterprises' low funding costs. Some types of mortgage assets acquired 
for the portfolio may have contributed to the Enterprises' mission 
objectives. Such assets may have included whole loans that finance 
affordable housing that are not easily

[[Page 5614]]

securitized because of non-standard features and small volumes, as well 
as mortgage securities that are backed by affordable housing loans and 
that are not traded in markets with the broad appeal and liquidity of 
Enterprise MBS. The mortgage portfolios have also been used to support 
the Enterprises' securitization activities, to provide liquidity and 
stability to the secondary mortgage market, and to support the 
liquidity of the Enterprises' own MBS.
    Question 6: Could the benefits of the Enterprises' mortgage 
portfolio holdings be achieved if the levels of those holdings were 
substantially lower than current levels? Could the Enterprises carry 
out their mission of providing stability and liquidity to the secondary 
mortgage market and of supporting affordable housing without 
maintaining portfolios of mortgage assets? If so, explain how.
    iii. Additional Risks to the Enterprises Posed by Their Mortgage 
Portfolio Holdings.
    The Enterprises' securitization activities and portfolio holdings 
of whole loans expose them to mortgage credit risk--the risk of losses 
if borrowers do not make their payments due or default on their loans. 
The recent credit crisis demonstrates that broad-based and sizable 
losses from exposure to mortgage credit risk can occur. Securitization 
and portfolio investment in whole loans also expose the Enterprises to 
the risk that lenders, mortgage servicers, and mortgage insurers may 
not fulfill their contractual obligations, with significant 
consequences during a systemic event.
    The mortgage portfolios of the Enterprises expose them to risks 
beyond those posed by their securitization activities. The principal 
additional risks are interest rate risk, derivatives counterparty 
credit risk, the risk of declines in the fair values of MBS holdings 
due to increased credit and market liquidity risks, funding and basis 
risks, and operational risks. Their exposure to interest rate risk 
arises primarily from the long-term, fixed-rate mortgages that they 
hold, directly or through MBS. Because borrowers can prepay their 
mortgages at any time, a mismatch of the durations of Enterprise 
mortgage assets and liabilities can result. The Enterprises use various 
techniques, including hedging with derivatives, to manage the risk 
resulting from this mismatch. Using derivatives to hedge that risk 
exposes the Enterprises to derivatives counterparty credit risk. The 
Enterprises' holdings of private-label MBS pose additional credit risk 
and significant risk of asset price declines due to declines in market 
liquidity. Funding risk is the risk that a firm will be unable to 
obtain funds at a reasonable cost or at all when its existing debt 
matures or its payments are due. Basis risk is the risk that the 
interest rates in different financial markets will not move in the same 
direction or amount at the same time.
    Operational risk can manifest itself in a number of ways, most 
commonly through the breakdown of internal controls, ineffective 
corporate governance, inadequate policies and procedures, employee 
behavior, and external events. The Enterprises face operational risks 
due to technology failures, business disruptions, internal or external 
fraud, processing errors, and weaknesses in internal policies and 
procedures. For example, the accounting scandals at both Enterprises in 
the early part of the decade were partially due to irregularities in 
the implementation of complex derivatives accounting principles.
    Section 1369E of the Safety and Soundness Act requires that in 
establishing criteria governing the Enterprises' portfolio holdings, 
the Director shall consider the Enterprises' adherence to prudent 
management and operations standards established under section 1313B of 
the Act. 12 U.S.C. 4624(a). Those standards must address many issues 
related to managing risks posed by the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio 
holdings, including management of interest rate risk exposure, 
management of market risk, adequacy and maintenance of liquidity and 
reserves, management of asset and investment portfolio growth, overall 
risk management processes, management of credit and counterparty risk, 
and management of operational risks.
    Question 7: Aside from reducing the volume or altering the 
composition of mortgage assets held by the Enterprises, are there other 
ways in which FHFA can use criteria governing their mortgage portfolio 
holdings to reduce their exposure to or improve their management of 
interest rate, credit, operational, and other risks? If so, what 
approaches should FHFA take?
    Question 8: How can FHFA best use criteria governing mortgage 
portfolio holdings, in conjunction with capital regulations and other 
supervisory tools, such as prudent management and operations standards 
established in accordance with section 1313B of the Safety and 
Soundness Act, to address the Enterprises' exposure to the additional 
risks posed by such holdings?
    iv. Systemic Risk Posed by Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    There is broad agreement among policymakers and economists that the 
Enterprises pose substantial systemic risk to mortgage markets and the 
broader financial system.\6\ As the Treasury Department recently 
stated, ``[t]he systemic importance of these two enterprises, and the 
systemic impact of a collapse of either, cannot be overstated.'' \7\ 
The Enterprises' systemic risk arises from four sources:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See, among many other studies, Bernanke, Ben S., ``GSE 
Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Affordable Housing,'' Speech before 
the Independent Community Bankers of America's Annual Convention and 
Techworld, Honolulu, Hawaii (March 6, 2007); Eisenbeis, Robert A, W. 
Scott Frame, and Larry D. Wall, ``An Analysis of the Systemic Risks 
Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation of the Policy 
Options for Reducing Those Risks,'' Journal of Financial Services 
Research (Vol. 31, Nos. 2-3, June 2007), 75-99; Greenspan, Alan, 
``Government-Sponsored Enterprises,'' Remarks Delivered at the 
Conference on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the Macroeconomy, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (May 19, 2005); Mankiw, N. Gregory, 
Remarks at the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Banking 
Summit and Leadership Conference (November 6, 2003); Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Role of OFHEO (Washington, DC: February 2003); 
and Poole, William. ``Housing in the Macroeconomy,'' Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (May/June 2003), 1-8.
    \7\ Department of the Treasury, Responses to Questions of the 
First Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic 
Stabilization (December 31, 2008), 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     High leverage increases the risk of Enterprise failure and 
of the adverse consequences for mortgage lending and housing activity 
attendant on such failure.
     The Enterprises' combined mortgage assets totaled nearly 
$1.6 trillion as of November 30, 2008. If either Enterprise had to 
shrink its portfolio holdings rapidly, the market values of the 
mortgage assets held by many other financial institutions would be 
adversely affected, exacerbating solvency and liquidity problems.
     Mortgage lender dependence on the Enterprises, already 
high since the mid-1980s, has increased substantially since the 
collapse of the secondary market for private-label MBS in the third 
quarter of 2007. If either Enterprise greatly reduced or sharply 
curtailed its mortgage purchases, mortgage rates would increase, which 
would reduce new mortgage lending, depress the market values of 
mortgage assets held throughout the industry, and tend to weaken 
housing and the broader economy.
     Outstanding Enterprise debt--over $1.6 trillion at the end 
of November 2008--is widely held by commercial banks in the U.S., 
institutional investors, foreign central banks, and other foreign 
investors. If Enterprise

[[Page 5615]]

solvency or liquidity problems led to large declines in the market 
value of that debt, there could be serious adverse effects on banks and 
other investors. The Enterprises are also among the largest end-users 
of over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives. Uncertainty about 
how counterparties would replace their OTC derivatives with one or both 
Enterprises, if either failed, could adversely affect those 
institutions and the OTC derivatives markets.
    As noted above, a key objective of placing the Enterprises in 
conservatorship and executing the Stock Purchase Agreements was to 
limit the systemic risk they posed, which had risen sharply in 2007 and 
the first half of 2008, as they reported financial losses and their 
leverage and borrowing costs increased, and to avoid adverse 
consequences for the housing sector and economy. If the mortgage 
portfolio holdings of the Enterprises were reduced in order to limit 
the systemic risk they pose, the overall effect on financial stability 
would depend on what other entities acquired the assets, how they 
funded the assets and managed the associated risks, and how much 
capital they held against those risks.
    Question 9: Should FHFA use criteria governing the Enterprises' 
mortgage portfolio holdings to mitigate the systemic risk posed by the 
Enterprises? If so, how? If the mortgage portfolio holdings of the 
Enterprises were reduced in an effort to mitigate the systemic risk 
posed by the Enterprises, how would the stability of the mortgage 
markets and the broader financial system be affected? What steps could 
the federal government take to maximize any improvement in stability?
    v. Criteria Governing Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    a. Size of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    Under the portfolio holdings criteria established in the Stock 
Purchase Agreements, the mortgage assets of each Enterprise will 
decline by 10 percent each year starting in 2010 and each year 
thereafter until the holdings of each Enterprise reached $250 billion. 
FHFA projects that would occur in 2020, at the end of which each 
Enterprise's mortgage portfolio holdings would represent about 2.0 
percent of projected RMDO. (Chart 1).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.000

    Another approach could establish criteria that, rather than 
specifying dollar amounts, specified maximum ratios between each 
Enterprise's mortgage assets and some indicator of the size of the 
mortgage market such as RMDO. For example, the criteria could require 
each Enterprise's mortgage assets to decline as required by the Stock 
Purchase Agreements until each Enterprise's mortgage portfolio 
represented no more than, say, 2.1 percent of RMDO--the share that $250 
billion represented as of mid-2008--and limit each portfolio's future 
growth so as to maintain its ratio to RMDO at 2.1 percent thereafter. 
FHFA projects that would occur in 2016, at the end of which each 
Enterprise's mortgage assets would be about $400 billion (Chart 2). 
Under any such approach, increases in the mortgage assets of an 
Enterprise or both Enterprises could be permitted on a temporary basis 
in times of economic distress or market disruption, consistent with 12 
U.S.C. 4624(b).

[[Page 5616]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.001

    Other criteria could be devised to internalize at the Enterprises 
some of the potential costs of large portfolio holdings, in order to 
create an incentive for the Enterprises to restrain those holdings 
below a desired level. Thus, the criteria could impose a firm limit on 
the mortgage assets of each Enterprise, but create a range below that 
limit within which holdings would be increasingly discouraged. For 
example, that range could begin at their combined share of RMDO at the 
end of 1991 (5 percent--2.5 percent per Enterprise) and go as high as 
their combined market share at the end of 1994, the mid-point of the 
seven-year period 1991 through 1997 (or 8.3 percent--4.1 percent per 
Enterprise). A sliding scale minimum capital surcharge could apply if 
an Enterprise chose to hold more than the lower amount of the range. 
The surcharge would increase as the holdings moved toward the limit, 
with a maximum surcharge of, perhaps, an additional two percent of 
mortgage assets.
    Yet another approach could establish criteria that would allow the 
mortgage portfolio holdings of each Enterprise to expand and contract 
with its mortgage credit book of business--the sum of those holdings 
plus its guaranteed MBS held by other investors.
    Question 10: Should the size of the Enterprises' mortgage portfolio 
holdings be limited to a fixed dollar amount, be linked to a market 
indicator, or be linked to the size of their MBS outstanding?
    Question 11: Should the permissible size of the Enterprises' 
holdings of mortgage assets vary in a manner related to the phase of 
the mortgage credit cycle or conditions in the secondary mortgage 
market? If so, how should FHFA monitor that cycle or secondary mortgage 
market conditions, and how should the permissible size of those 
holdings vary?
    Question 12: How could decreases in the Enterprises' mortgage 
portfolio holdings affect their operational infrastructures? How would 
changes in their operational infrastructures affect their ability to 
expand their purchases of mortgage assets for portfolio during times of 
stress in the secondary mortgage market? Does each Enterprise need a 
minimum level of mortgage portfolio holdings to maintain the 
infrastructure needed to expand its purchases under such conditions?
    Question 13: Should each Enterprise's minimum capital requirement 
increase with the size or composition of its mortgage portfolio 
holdings? If so, how should such increase be imposed? Should a capital 
surcharge be imposed on each Enterprise if its mortgage portfolio 
holdings exceed some level? If so, how should such surcharge be 
imposed?
    b. Composition of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    Criteria regarding the Enterprises' mortgage portfolios could limit 
their holdings of certain types of assets, while encouraging them to 
hold more of mortgage products that make a greater contribution to 
specific elements of their mission.
    Question 14: Should FHFA restrict the types of mortgage assets the 
Enterprises are allowed to hold to those that are strictly related to 
specific elements of their mission? If so, how should those assets be 
defined? For example, should FHFA prohibit or place a limit on each 
Enterprise's holdings of mortgage-related securities guaranteed by the 
other Enterprise or Ginnie Mae or its holdings of private-label MBS?
     Question 15: Should FHFA require that assets purchased for the 
portfolio each year comply with affordable housing goals and sub-goals 
established for that year?
     Question 16: Should FHFA allow the Enterprises to hold, without 
limit, either whole loans (or securities backed by them) that finance 
affordable housing not easily securitized because of non-standard 
features and small volumes or mortgage securities backed by loans that 
finance affordable housing, where markets for those securities are 
small or thin? Please provide examples of such loans or securities. 
Alternatively, should FHFA place a limit on the amount of such loans or 
securities that an Enterprise can hold? If so, what is an appropriate 
level?

[[Page 5617]]

    c. Funding of Mortgage Portfolio Holdings.
    The Enterprises fund their portfolios of mortgage assets largely by 
issuing debt. The Enterprises are also highly leveraged--historically, 
each Enterprise's core capital represented less than 2 percent of the 
sum of its mortgage assets and guaranteed MBS. The Enterprises have 
relied heavily on short-term debt to fund their mortgage portfolio 
holdings, used financial derivatives to alter synthetically the 
maturity of that debt, and depended on their ability to roll over debt 
and enter into new derivatives contracts in all market conditions. 
Because of the favorable funding costs enjoyed by the Enterprises, they 
benefitted from attractive spreads between the yields on the assets 
comprising their mortgage portfolio holdings and their cost of funds. 
FHFA will address issues related to the funding of Enterprise mortgage 
assets through promulgation of risk management standards, the agency's 
examination process, and by a new risk-based capital standard.
     Question 17: Should FHFA establish criteria governing the 
Enterprises' mortgage portfolio holdings that specify that the 
Enterprises adhere to a specific maximum ratio of short-term debt to 
mortgage assets or minimum ratio of callable debt to long-term, fixed-
rate mortgage assets or to total long-term debt?
     Question 18: Should FHFA specify criteria that condition 
Enterprise mortgage portfolio holdings above a certain amount on 
maintaining measures of the risks--e.g., duration and convexity--
associated with those portfolios within specified levels? Should 
adherence to appropriate limits on such risks be addressed through of 
prudential management and operations standards in accordance with 
section 1313B of the Act and FHFA's examination process?
    d. Counter-Cyclical Changes in Enterprise Mortgage Portfolio 
Holdings.
    FHFA could establish criteria that limit the rate of growth of each 
Enterprise's mortgage assets once the Enterprise complied with criteria 
related to the size of those holdings. The growth limit could be tied 
to the average growth rate of the mortgage market over a long period, 
which would allow each Enterprise's portfolio holdings to grow more 
slowly (or rapidly) than the overall market during periods in which the 
market was expanding more rapidly (or slowly) than on average. That 
type of growth limit would require the Enterprises to vary the rate of 
growth of their mortgage portfolio holdings in a counter-cyclical 
manner. One way of achieving this could be to require that growth in 
each Enterprise's portfolio holdings be limited to the preceding 10-
year rolling annual average growth rate of RMDO (Chart 3).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR30JA09.002

     Question 19: Should FHFA create incentives for the Enterprises to 
behave in a counter-cyclical manner through criteria governing their 
portfolio holdings of mortgage and non-mortgage assets, regulatory 
capital requirements, or both? If so, how? What are the implications of 
specifying such criteria for the Enterprises' mission?
3. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Standards Governing 
Enterprise Holdings of Non-Mortgage Assets
    i. Benefits and Risks of Enterprises Holdings of Non-Mortgage 
Assets.
    The Enterprises need to maintain adequate levels of liquidity so 
that they can carry out their day-to-day operating activities. 
Maintaining adequate levels of liquidity can help strengthen the 
Enterprises' ability to meet their statutory mission of providing 
stability and liquidity to the secondary mortgage market, during good 
times and during periods of market stress, without incurring 
extraordinary financing costs.
    The risk of not maintaining a portfolio of highly liquid non-
mortgage assets was illustrated in the recent market disruption. The 
quick reversal in market conditions illustrates how fast liquidity can 
disappear and how a prolonged period of market illiquidity can affect 
firms such as the Enterprises and their counterparties. Indeed, during 
that period, spreads between the yields of Enterprise debt and U.S. 
Treasury securities reached all time highs. In addition, the 
Enterprises' large holdings of mortgage assets were not useful sources 
of cash as the MBS repurchase agreement market shriveled, and sales of 
MBS would have only exacerbated problems in the market.
    There is an opportunity cost associated with holding a sizable 
volume of generally low-yielding assets

[[Page 5618]]

in an effort to ensure adequate liquidity in a financial crisis. 
However, up to a point that cost is offset by the potential benefit of 
the Enterprises being prepared to maintain funding for their long-term 
assets and to respond in an appropriate and meaningful way to a market 
disruption.
     Question 20: What risks and costs are associated with requiring 
the Enterprises to maintain a portfolio of liquid, non-mortgage assets?
     Question 21: Is it appropriate to require the Enterprises to hold 
a large portfolio of highly liquid assets even during periods of market 
tranquility? If so, why? Should the Enterprises be compensated for 
holding ``excess'' levels of non-mortgage assets during periods of 
market tranquility? If so, what are appropriate incentives?
    ii. Standards Governing Enterprise Non-Mortgage Assets.
    The rationale for establishing standards governing the size and 
composition of the Enterprises' non-mortgage assets is to ensure that 
they maintain sufficient liquidity to meet their obligations and engage 
in new business during market distress and to ensure that the 
Enterprises do not hold amounts of those assets beyond those needed to 
achieve their mission. That can be best achieved by requiring that the 
Enterprises maintain portfolios of marketable, highly liquid non-
mortgage assets at prescribed levels. Those assets would be easily 
converted into cash, without loss of value and disruption to financial 
markets. Indeed, during a market crisis such as that experienced in the 
recent past, a portfolio of highly liquid non-mortgage assets would 
better enable the Enterprises to perform their mission of providing 
liquidity and stability to the secondary mortgage market.
    a. Size of the Non-Mortgage Portfolios.
    FHFA could establish criteria governing the size of the 
Enterprises' holding of non-mortgage assets. For example, the criteria 
could require that each Enterprise maintain a minimum balance of 
marketable, highly liquid non-mortgage assets equal to 30 days of 
expected net cash needs and totaling at least $30 billion at all times.
     Question 22: Should the Enterprises be required to maintain a 
specific minimum dollar amount of highly liquid non-mortgage assets at 
all times? If so, what is an appropriate dollar amount? Alternatively, 
should the level of non-mortgage assets be set at a percentage of an 
Enterprise's total assets or a specified number of days of liquidity? 
If so, what is an appropriate percentage factor or number of days?
     Question 23: Should the Enterprises' non-mortgage portfolios grow 
with the phases of the mortgage credit cycle or counter to that cycle? 
Should the Enterprises be given incentives for holding large volumes of 
liquid non-mortgage assets during periods of ample market liquidity? If 
so, how should such incentives be provided? For instance, after 
criteria governing holdings of non-mortgage assets are established, 
FHFA could reduce each Enterprise's minimum capital requirement by, for 
example, 75 percent of the amount of non-mortgage assets held to comply 
with those criteria.
    b. Composition of the Non-Mortgage Portfolios.
    In establishing criteria governing the composition of the 
Enterprises' non-mortgage portfolios, FHFA could require that U.S. 
Treasury securities with maturities of 30 days or less represent a 
specified percentage of each Enterprise's total non-mortgage assets 
(for example, 50 percent). The balance of each Enterprise's portfolio 
could include other marketable, liquid, highly-rated securities, with 
maturities of one year or less, such as the following--
     Commercial paper (rated A1/P1);
     Short-term Eurodollar time deposits;
     Short-term money market accounts; and
     Short-term municipal securities.
     Question 24: Should the criteria enumerate the specific types of 
investments the Enterprises should hold in the non-mortgage portfolios. 
If so, what type assets should be included? Should U.S. Treasury 
securities represent a specific share of the non-mortgage portfolios? 
If so, what is an appropriate percentage or dollar amount?
     Question 25: What is an appropriate maturity range for securities 
comprising the non-mortgage portfolios? How should holdings be 
distributed according to that range?
4. Questions Requesting Public Comment Regarding Temporary Adjustment 
of Criteria Governing Portfolio Holdings
    The Act authorizes the Director to order temporary adjustments to 
the established criteria governing the portfolio holdings of an 
Enterprise or both Enterprises, including during times of economic 
distress or market dislocation. 12 U.S.C. 4624(b).
     Question 26: Should FHFA attempt to specify in advance how it 
might adjust criteria governing Enterprise mortgage or non-mortgage 
portfolio holdings in specific circumstances?

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 1252

    Government-sponsored enterprises, Portfolio holdings, Mortgages.

Authority and Issuance

0
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble, under the 
authority of 12 U.S.C. 4624, the Federal Housing Finance Agency hereby 
amends Title 12, Chapter XII, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

CHAPTER XII--FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

Subchapter C--Enterprises

0
1. Add Subchapter C consisting of part 1252 to read as follows:

PART 1252--PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS

Sec.
1252.1 Enterprise portfolio holdings criteria.
1252.2 Effective duration.

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4624.


Sec.  1252.1  Enterprise portfolio holding criteria.

    The Enterprises are required to comply with the portfolio holdings 
criteria set forth in their respective Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements with the Department of the Treasury, as they may be amended 
from time to time.


Sec.  1252.2  Effective duration.

    This part shall be in effect for each Enterprise so long as--
    (a) This part has not been superseded through amendment, and
    (b) The Enterprise remains subject to the terms and obligations of 
the respective Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement.

    Dated: January 16, 2009.
James B. Lockhart III,
Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency.
[FR Doc. E9-2047 Filed 1-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8070-01-P