[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 15 (Monday, January 26, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 4346-4353]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-1211]


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 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
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  Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 15 / Monday, January 26, 2009 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 4346]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2007-0016; PRM-50-87]


Raymond A. Crandall; Denial of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Denial of petition for rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying the 
petition for rulemaking (PRM) filed by Mr. Raymond A. Crandall on May 
17, 2007, and docketed on June 22, 2007 (Docket No. PRM-50-87). In his 
petition, the petitioner requested that the NRC amend the regulations 
that govern domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities 
to eliminate the specific criteria related to the radiological doses 
for control room habitability at nuclear power plants. The petitioner 
stated that the current deterministic radiological dose requirements 
for control room habitability have resulted in several negative safety 
consequences, including an increased risk to public safety. He 
requested that the NRC delete the 5 rem whole body dose limit and the 
0.05 sievert (Sv) (5 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) limit 
specified in the current regulations.

DATES: The docket for PRM-50-87 is closed as of January 26, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Publicly available documents related to this petition, 
including the PRM and the NRC's letter of denial to the petitioner may 
be viewed using the following methods:
    Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents related to this PRM filed under docket ID NRC-
2007-0016.
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine publicly 
available documents and have them copied for a fee at the NRC's PDR, 
Public File Area O-1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS): 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically via the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the 
public can gain entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files 
of the NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or 
have any problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact 
the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or by 
e-mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Jason Lising, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone: (301) 415-3220, or toll-free: 800-368-5642; e-
mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background
II. Petitioner's Requests
III. Reasons for Denial
IV. Public Comments
V. Denial of Petitions

I. Background

    On May 17, 2007, the NRC received a PRM from Raymond A. Crandall 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071490250); the PRM was docketed by the NRC as 
PRM-50-87. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend Title 10 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), ``Domestic 
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities'' to remove the 
specific criteria related to the radiological doses for control room 
habitability at nuclear power plants from 10 CFR 50.67, ``Accident 
source term,'' and General Design Criterion (GDC) 19, ``Control room,'' 
in Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 
10 CFR Part 50. The NRC published a notice of receipt and request for 
public comment in the Federal Register on July 12, 2007 (72 FR 38030). 
The 75-day public comment period ended on September 25, 2007.
    The petitioner noted that the current regulations provide specific 
dose criteria for demonstrating the acceptability of the control room 
design during radiological release events. These criteria are based on 
deterministic radiological dose analyses performed by the licensee and 
reviewed by the NRC. NRC regulatory guides and standard review plans 
provide acceptable methodologies that can be used by licensees to 
perform dose analyses, which are then incorporated, as appropriate, 
into the licensing basis for the licensee's facility. The petitioner 
stated that the deterministic dose analysis methodology and associated 
regulatory process result in several negative safety consequences:
    (1) Current Designs Not Optimum
    ``Control room designs that are not optimum for ensuring continued 
control room habitability. Current designs required in order to meet 
the current dose methodology criteria may actually increase the 
probability of having to evacuate the control room compared to 
establishing the design based on good engineering principles.''
    (2) Procedures Not Optimized
    ``Site procedures for mitigation of the dose consequences to 
control room personnel that are not optimum for ensuring control room 
habitability. The procedures designed to ensure consistency with the 
dose analysis assumptions are inconsistent with more effective 
mitigation strategies.''
    (3) Challenges to Safety Systems
    ``Unnecessary challenges to safety systems, such as increased 
challenges to the Emergency Diesel Generators if control room 
ventilation system fans are loaded on the diesels early in the accident 
to meet analysis assumptions.''
    (4) Inappropriate Technical Specification (TS) Action Statements
    ``Technical Specifications Action Statement requirements that 
result in a net increase in the risk to the public. This specifically 
refers to Technical Specifications that require a plant shutdown for 
failure to meet a control room dose analysis input assumption.''
    (5) Unjustified Technical Specification Surveillances
    ``Technical Specifications Surveillance requirements that cannot be 
cost-justified based on the risk-significance. This results in the 
required expenditure of resources that could be used on risk-
significant improvements.''
    The petitioner suggested amendments that would eliminate the 
specific radiological dose acceptance criteria and, thereby, the need 
for deterministic dose analyses and the associated regulatory 
processes, including the need for applicable TSs. He stated that the

[[Page 4347]]

proposed changes would not eliminate the requirement for the control 
room to be designed to ensure safe conditions under accident 
conditions, but it would address his safety concerns with the current 
regulations.

II. Petitioner's Request

    In PRM-50-87 the petitioner requested that the NRC take the 
following actions:
    1. Revise the regulations related to control room habitability at 
nuclear power plants by deleting the following sentences from GDC 19:
    ``Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access 
and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without 
personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body, 
or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the 
accident. Applicants for and holders of construction permits and 
operating licenses under this part who apply on or after January 10, 
1997, applicants for design certifications under part 52 of this 
chapter who apply on or after January 10, 1997, applicants for and 
holders of combined licenses under part 52 of this chapter who do not 
reference a standard design certification, or holders of operating 
licenses using an alternative source term under Sec.  50.67, shall meet 
the requirements of this criterion, except that with regard to control 
room access and occupancy, adequate radiation protection shall be 
provided to ensure that radiation exposures shall not exceed 0.05 Sv (5 
rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) as defined in Sec.  50.2 
for the duration of the accident.''
    2. Revise the regulations related to control room habitability at 
nuclear power plants to delete from paragraph (b)(2)(iii) in 10 CFR 
50.67 this language:
    ``Adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access to and 
occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without 
personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) 
total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the 
accident.''

III. Reasons for Denial

1. General

    The NRC has reviewed Mr. Raymond Crandall's petition and has 
determined that it does not provide adequate justification to remove 
the control room radiological dose acceptance criteria from NRC 
regulations. The NRC does not agree with the petitioner's assertion 
that the control room radiological dose acceptance criteria have 
resulted in negative safety consequences.
    Performance-based regulations, such as Sec.  50.67 and Appendix A 
to 10 CFR Part 50, do not provide prescriptive requirements and, 
therefore, do not require licensees to use specific designs or 
methodologies to comply with the regulations. The NRC, however, does 
provide regulatory guidance to licensees that includes acceptable 
designs and methodologies for demonstrating compliance with the 
regulations. The use of the guidance is optional, and licensees are 
free to propose alternative means of complying with the NRC's 
regulations.
    Design-basis dose consequence analyses are intentionally based upon 
conservative assumptions and are intended to model the potential 
hazards that would result from any credible accident, not necessarily 
the most probable accident. As stated in footnotes to 10 CFR 100.11, 
``Determination of exclusion area, low population zone, and population 
center distance,'' and 10 CFR 50.67, ``Accident source term,'' ``[t]he 
fission product release assumed for these calculations should be based 
upon a major accident, hypothesized for purposes of site analysis or 
postulated from considerations of possible accidental events, that 
would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any 
accident considered credible. Such accidents have generally been 
assumed to result in substantial meltdown of the core with subsequent 
release of appreciable quantities of fission products.''
    The performance-based control room dose criterion is designed to 
maintain an acceptable level of control room habitability even under 
the maximum credible accident scenario. The NRC has determined that 
providing an acceptable level of control room habitability for design-
basis events is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the 
control room will continue to be effectively manned and operated to 
mitigate the effects of the accident and protect public health and 
safety. Meeting or exceeding the design-basis control room dose limit 
would not impose an immediate evacuation requirement on the control 
room operators. Moreover, by removing the 5 rem acceptance criterion, a 
regulatory basis for the acceptance of the radiological protection 
aspects of control room designs would no longer exist and would not 
support the Commission's policy regarding performance-based 
regulations.
    The conservative assumptions used in design-basis dose consequence 
analyses need not and should not form the basis for restricting actions 
described in emergency operating procedures. These procedures are 
designed to ensure that during an accident all available means are used 
to assess actual radiological conditions and to maintain emergency 
worker doses As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), as required by 10 
CFR Part 20, ``Standards For Protection Against Radiation.'' 
Additionally, no NRC regulations, including 10 CFR Part 20, ``Standards 
for Protection Against Radiation,'' require evacuation of the control 
room when the design-basis control room dose limit is exceeded. 
Emergency operating procedures include guidance for controlling doses 
to workers under emergency conditions. This guidance would be 
applicable in the unlikely event that control room doses were projected 
to exceed the design-basis dose limit during an actual emergency.

2. NRC Staff Responses to the Petitioner's Assertions

A. Current Designs Are Not Optimum
    1. The petitioner stated that because the primary objective of 
control room habitability is to ensure continuous occupancy, the 
primary focus should be on minimizing whole body doses from noble 
gases. He stated that some common control room designs, such as the 
filtered air intake pressurization design, focus on compliance with 
existing dose criteria. He concluded that the current requirements and 
operational criteria focus on minimizing the thyroid dose at the 
expense of increasing the whole body dose from noble gases which 
increases the probability that the control room will require 
evacuation.
    The NRC reviewed the petitioner's concern regarding the increase in 
whole body dose from noble gases, which he believes results from the 
intentional intake of filtered air into the control room under design-
basis accident (DBA) conditions. The NRC agrees that a relatively small 
increase in whole body dose due to noble gases may result from the 
intake of filtered air into the control room. However, this small 
increase in dose would not increase the probability of a control room 
evacuation. Therefore, operators would be able to monitor plant 
indications and take appropriate accident mitigating actions from the 
control room, and there would be no increase in risk to public health 
and safety. The NRC's conclusion is based on a review of several 
existing DBA control room dose analyses that determined the impact on 
whole body dose resulting from filtered air intake pressurization to 
the control room. The NRC performed parametric evaluations and 
determined that while filtered air

[[Page 4348]]

intake pressurization may result in a small addition to the control 
room whole body dose from noble gases, the increase is more than offset 
by the reduction in thyroid dose and TEDE from inhalation of 
radioactive particulates, such as iodine.
    Based upon its analyses, the NRC does not agree with the 
petitioner's assertion regarding the negative safety impact of 
providing filtered intake flow into the control room. The NRC's 
performance-based criterion in GDC 19 requires that an applicant 
provide a control room habitability design that meets the specified 
dose criterion. Although NRC regulatory guidance provides examples of 
acceptable design approaches, the approach used to meet the criterion 
is largely under the control of an applicant. In order to meet this 
requirement, many licensees have chosen to incorporate filtered air 
intake pressurization into their control room emergency ventilation 
designs to reduce the cumulative dose to operators during a DBA. The 
purpose of providing filtered air intake pressurization flow is to 
establish positive pressure in the control room relative to the 
adjacent areas, thereby reducing the quantity of unfiltered air 
inleakage. Limiting unfiltered inleakage significantly reduces the 
thyroid dose from inhalation.
    2. The petitioner also stated that the current regulation is 
inconsistent with the goal of allowing operators to remain in the 
control room in order to mitigate accident consequences. He stated that 
common designs, such as a filtered air intake pressurization system, 
which focus on compliance with existing criteria, increase the 
probability that the control room will have to be evacuated.
    The 5 rem control room design criterion is not a maximum integrated 
dose above which control room evacuation is mandated during an 
accident. Rather, the criterion provides a design basis to ensure that 
the control room will maintain a habitable environment for operators to 
control the plant during a DBA.
    The petitioner based his assertion on the assumption that 
filterable activity is not likely to be a significant contributor to 
dose in a reactor accident. As an example, the petitioner used the 
March 1979 Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. Since the accident, the 
NRC has expended considerable resources to better define the expected 
quantity and distribution of activity that could be released during a 
major reactor accident. As a result of this research, the NRC 
promulgated 10 CFR 50.67 on December 23, 1999 (64 FR 72001). Under 10 
CFR 50.67, a licensee can apply for a license amendment to adopt an 
alternative source term (AST) that reflects a more realistic assessment 
of the timing of the release and the quantity and distribution of 
activity that could be released during a major accident hypothesized 
for purposes of design analyses. Many licensees have used this approach 
to comply with NRC regulations governing control room dose.
    In addition, 10 CFR 50.67 revised the control room dose criterion 
from a 5 rem whole body dose, or its equivalent to any organ, to a 5 
rem TEDE. The relatively low thyroid organ weighting factor, as defined 
in 10 CFR 20.1003, ``Definitions,'' and used in the calculation of 
TEDE, allows for a significant reduction in the controlling aspects of 
the thyroid dose, which normally governed compliance with control room 
dose guidelines. The NRC has significantly improved the accuracy of the 
source term and dose methodology used in design-basis dose consequence 
analyses. The updated source term and dose methodology address the 
petitioner's concerns regarding the emphasis on thyroid dose in control 
room habitability analyses.
    3. The petitioner noted that the dose from increased iodine 
concentration can be mitigated by use of potassium iodide (KI) or 
respiratory protection, but the current regulations do not permit these 
mitigation measures to be used in design analyses.
    The NRC agrees that KI or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatuses 
(SCBAs) do have merit as short-term compensatory measures. However, the 
potential medical complications of KI and the potential adverse impacts 
to human performance of SCBAs make these measures unsuitable for long-
term use. Further, the NRC's policy of ensuring that process or other 
engineering controls are in place instead of relying on the use of 
personal protective equipment is clearly set forth in 10 CFR 20.1701, 
``Use of process or other engineering controls'' and 10 CFR 20.1702, 
``Use of other controls.'' This policy is consistent with the 
recommendations of international and national radiation protection 
committees as described in Paragraph 167 of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 26.
    Paragraph 167 of ICRP Publication 26 recommends that ``[a]s far as 
is reasonably practicable, the arrangements for restricting 
occupational exposure should be applied to the source of radiation and 
to features of the workplace. The use of personal protective equipment 
should in general be supplementary to these more fundamental 
provisions. The emphasis should thus be on intrinsic safety in the 
workplace and only secondarily on protection that depends on the 
worker's own actions,'' such as the ingestion of KI or use of 
respiratory equipment. Further, the use of respiratory equipment by 
control room personnel during an emergency condition would impede the 
performance of functions necessary for the protection of public health 
and safety. Therefore, the NRC has not permitted licensees to rely on 
either KI or respiratory protection as a permanent solution to 
demonstrate compliance with the control room radiological dose 
guidelines, although such measures are available if the fundamental 
dose design provisions are less effective than anticipated.
    4. The petitioner stated that it is inconsistent to provide credit 
for respiratory protection in control room habitability toxic gas 
release evaluations, but not for design analyses.
    The NRC does not agree with the petitioner. In the case of toxic 
gas releases, continued plant operation or a normal plant shutdown 
would be required. In the case of a major reactor accident involving 
radiological releases, control room personnel must implement extensive 
emergency operation procedures to ensure public health and safety. 
Wearing respiratory protection during normal operations or even during 
an orderly shutdown, should it be necessary as a result of a toxic gas 
release, would not be expected to present significant challenges to 
control room personnel equivalent to those present during a reactor 
accident. The NRC is reluctant to place any more of a burden than is 
absolutely necessary on control room personnel, who would already be 
significantly tasked ensuring that all emergency procedures are carried 
out without error.

B. Procedures Are Not Optimized

    The petitioner stated that control room dose mitigation procedures 
must be consistent with the licensing basis and may not be the optimum 
mitigation strategy for more likely conditions. For example, he stated 
that control room dose models do not model dispersion as a period 
during the day with higher concentrations while the plume is blowing 
towards the control room and then a period of zero concentration for 
the rest of the day. Instead, analysis methods simplify this effect by 
assuming that a lower concentration is present continuously. The 
petitioner claimed that if procedures were revised to include a control 
room purge mode

[[Page 4349]]

strategy, a ``calculated increase in consequences in the simplistic 
design basis analysis'' would result.
    The NRC disagrees with the petitioner. The NRC's regulations do not 
require that procedures be limited to the most limiting licensing-basis 
assumptions. Further, the NRC expects licensees to develop procedures 
that address the full-scope review of design-basis events and 
conditions.
    With respect to the petitioner's example, procedures to operate the 
control room in its design-basis mode must be provided. These 
procedures do not preclude licensees from creating additional 
procedures to purge the control room if warranted by plant conditions. 
Licensees are permitted to develop and implement such procedures under 
existing NRC regulations.
    The NRC agrees that control room purging may be a reasonable action 
during a reactor accident when the level of outside airborne 
concentration of radioactive material is less than the level inside the 
control room. However, the conditions favorable for control room 
purging cannot be predicted, and the NRC cannot credit control room 
purging in the DBA analysis unless the timing of the release can be 
accurately established. For accidents where NRC regulatory guidance has 
established the release duration, the NRC has accepted credit for 
control room purging after the release has ended. As a design 
criterion, GDC 19 does not supplant the radiation protection standards 
of 10 CFR Part 20, which treat the radiation exposure of control room 
operators as occupational exposure. Therefore, the NRC expects 
licensees to maintain the accumulated dose of their radiation workers 
ALARA. During an accident, health physics personnel would monitor the 
radiological conditions in the control room and other emergency 
response facilities. These health physicists are responsible for making 
appropriate recommendations to plant personnel on actions that can be 
taken to maintain the dose to emergency responders ALARA.

C. Challenges to Safety Systems

    The petitioner stated that the current design requirements, which 
are usually imposed to ensure the assumptions of the dose analysis are 
met, may not be optimum from an overall risk perspective. As an 
example, he stated that a common design requirement specifies that the 
normal control room ventilation must isolate on receipt of a safety 
injection or containment isolation signal during an assumed loss-of-
coolant accident. The petitioner stated that it is more logical to 
delay control room isolation until radioactivity is detected in the 
control room or it is known that a radioactive plume is blowing towards 
the control room. The petitioner suggested that mitigating design 
strategies should be based on overall risk reduction designed for more 
likely conditions, not on one unlikely set of fixed hypothetical 
conditions.
    The NRC does not agree with the petitioner. Contrary to the 
petitioner's assertion, the NRC's regulations do not require immediate 
control room isolation or immediate appearance at the control room 
intake of the radioactive plume assumed in design-basis dose 
consequence analyses. The NRC has approved, in accordance with its 
regulations, plant designs that do not immediately isolate the control 
room ventilation system. Further, design bases that include the 
immediate startup of control room ventilation systems and loading of 
electrical buses and diesel generators with this equipment do not 
require operation of plant systems beyond their design capabilities; 
the diesels are specifically designed and sized to accommodate these 
safety loads. Therefore, the performance of these systems should not be 
impacted, and there is no increased risk to public health and safety.

D. Inappropriate Technical Specification Action Statements

    The petitioner stated that the conservative nature of the current 
radiological dose mitigation analyses also results in inappropriate TS 
action statements. He stated that ``there is insignificant safety 
significance to the TS associated with control room habitability and 
yet there are shutdown requirements.'' The petitioner believes that in 
order to evaluate the net public safety risk associated with these TS 
shutdown requirements, small but quantifiable public risks associated 
with the shutdown of a nuclear power plant must be considered, 
including but not limited to the following:
    1. Risk associated with bringing the plant through a transient and 
another thermal cycle;
    2. Airborne pollutants released by the fossil units required to 
operate to make up for lost power; and
    3. Potential for challenging electric power grid stability with the 
public risk associated with the possibility of rolling blackouts or 
brownouts or, under the worst conditions of grid instability, the 
potential for a loss of offsite power at multiple nuclear power 
facilities.
    The petitioner claimed that the shutdown requirement increases the 
net public risk and should be eliminated because it is only imposed as 
a ``matter of compliance.''
    The NRC disagrees with the petitioner. The NRC has approved license 
amendments to replace TS requirements for an immediate shutdown for an 
inoperable control room envelope boundary with requirements for 
immediate mitigating actions and restoration of the control room 
envelope to operable status within 90 days.
    The NRC has determined that none of the regulations proposed to be 
changed by the petitioner directly require a plant shutdown in response 
to control room habitability issues. Existing NRC regulations permit a 
licensee to propose alternative TS action requirements to its plant 
shutdown requirements. The NRC notes that even if the petitioner's 
proposed regulatory changes were made, licensees would still need to 
submit a license amendment to justify changes to their TSs for NRC 
approval.
    A controlled shutdown and cooldown of a plant is a safe evolution 
within the design capability of the plant and would not result in undue 
risk to public safety. In the event of unusual circumstances associated 
with adverse electrical power grid instability or other complicating 
issues that would be associated with a plant shutdown, there are 
processes available for a licensee to obtain regulatory relief to 
safely continue plant operation (e.g., emergency/exigent technical 
specification change, enforcement discretion).

E. Unjustified Technical Specification Surveillances

    The petitioner stated that ``individual input assumptions for 
radiological dose analyses have no significance in predicting reality 
or the acceptability of results. Even if actual conditions were such 
that one of the assumptions was non-conservative by a couple orders of 
magnitude, the ultimate result (in this case habitability of the 
control room) would still be acceptable due to the significant 
conservatisms in the other assumptions and the simplicity of effective 
mitigating actions such as the use of KI.'' He stated that although 
most control room habitability surveillances can be performed with 
minimal resources, licensees have been required to demonstrate the 
accuracy of the assumption regarding unfiltered inleakage using an 
unjustified tracer gas testing method that costs approximately $100,000 
per test. The petitioner stated these tests have demonstrated that 
although inleakage values assumed in the analyses were nonconservative, 
there was no safety significance and continued operation was justified. 
The

[[Page 4350]]

petitioner concluded that the expenditure for tracer gas testing could 
be better used for improvements that would likely be more beneficial to 
plant safety; therefore, the required performance of this test could 
have a net negative safety consequence. The petitioner stated that 
previous surveillances, such as a pressurization test, combined with 
lessons learned from tracer gas testing result in an effective 
preventative maintenance program.
    The NRC does not agree with the petitioner's assertion that 
individual input assumptions for radiological dose analyses have no 
significance in predicting reality or the acceptability of results. The 
NRC places a high priority on operator safety; the requirements 
contained in GDC 19 should be retained because they provide physical 
and psychological protection for operators and ultimately for the 
general public. Therefore, the data used in the analyses to determine 
operator safety should be accurate, and when data are uncertain, 
appropriate conservatisms are applied.
    The NRC does not agree with the petitioner's statement that the 
expenditure for tracer gas testing could be better used for 
improvements that would likely be more beneficial to plant safety nor 
does the NRC agree that the performance of tracer gas testing could 
have a net negative safety consequence. The potential dose to the 
operator must be quantified in order to ensure that the requirements of 
GDC 19 are met; the specific measurement of inleakage is one of the 
inputs to the analyses used to quantify the potential dose to the 
operator. Prior to the use of tracer gas to measure inleakage, the 
quantity of inleakage was assumed rather than measured and subsequently 
found to be nonconservative. Tracer gas testing is justified because it 
ensures operator safety. Other methods of measuring inleakage have not 
been successfully demonstrated.

F. Petitioner's Proposed Alternatives to Current NRC Guidance

    The NRC has decided to deny this petition for rulemaking and would 
normally not discuss the petitioner's proposed guidance in this 
document. However, in order to clarify the NRC's decision to maintain 
the current radiological dose requirements, the following discussion is 
provided.
    Under Commission policy, the NRC's regulations for control room 
habitability provide performance-based requirements to ensure that 
plant personnel are adequately protected. The NRC has concluded that 
prescriptive requirements or guidance, such as that proposed by the 
petitioner, may unnecessarily restrict a licensee's options for 
complying with the NRC's regulations.
    The petitioner proposed revisions to the NRC's regulatory guidance 
to help implement his proposed rule change. NRC regulatory guidance is 
not an appropriate subject for a PRM and the NRC will not generally 
consider such requests through this process. Further, current NRC 
regulatory guidance provides one acceptable mechanism for licensees and 
applicants to meet the requirements of the NRC's regulations. 
Applicants and licensees may propose alternative means of complying 
with the NRC's regulations, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff on 
a case-by-case basis.
    1. The petitioner recommended that the control room ventilation 
system should isolate on the detection of high radiation or toxic 
intake. The NRC disagrees with the petitioner. All control rooms are 
required by TSs to take appropriate action upon detection of radiation 
or toxic gas. Appropriate action may differ from plant to plant 
depending on location, design, and TSs. Because plants are unique, 
licensees can demonstrate compliance with the control room design 
criteria by taking different approaches. The petitioner's suggestion 
does not address the long-term release situations that would be 
expected under a worst case accident scenario. Control room isolation 
alone would not be an acceptable solution because it does not 
adequately consider the long term breathing air requirements necessary 
to provide a safe working environment in the control room. After a 
relatively short period of time, an intake of air into the control room 
would be necessary. Licensees include these considerations in their 
site-specific control room habitability analyses. Therefore, the NRC 
concludes that changing guidance to recommend control room isolation on 
detection of high radiation or toxic gas is an unnecessarily 
prescriptive recommendation in comparison to the existing performance-
based dose criterion.
    2. The petitioner recommended that the control room have a minimum 
of one foot of concrete shielding (or equivalent) on all surfaces. The 
NRC disagrees with the petitioner. The NRC believes that control rooms 
are adequately protected from the effects of direct radiation because 
current regulations require that either a 5 rem whole body or a 5 rem 
TEDE acceptance criterion be met under DBA conditions. Licensees 
include the effects of direct radiation from all potential sources in 
their control room dose consequence analyses. Typically these sources 
include the following:
     Contamination of the control room atmosphere by the intake 
and infiltration of the radioactive material contained in the 
radioactive plume released from the facility;
     Direct shine from the external radioactive plume released 
from the facility with credit for control room structural shielding;
     Direct shine from radioactive material in the containment 
with credit for both the containment and control room structural 
shielding; and
     Radiation shine from radioactive material in systems and 
components inside or external to the control room envelope, including 
radioactive material buildup on the control room ventilation filters.
    Many control rooms already have one foot or more of concrete 
shielding on all surfaces. One foot of concrete shielding does not 
guarantee adequate protection from radiation. For example, surfaces 
with 1 foot of concrete with penetrations for various equipment, such 
as electrical wiring and ventilation ducts, may not provide any more 
protection than non-concrete surfaces or surfaces with less than 1 foot 
of concrete. To show compliance with the current control room dose 
criterion, licensees provide detailed radiological calculations to 
ensure that under DBA conditions control room personnel will be 
adequately protected. Licensees have demonstrated compliance with the 
regulations crediting many different design approaches. The NRC 
concludes that recommending that the control rooms have one foot of 
concrete shielding is an unnecessarily prescriptive recommendation.
    3. The petitioner recommended that because of the low risk 
significance of being outside the control room habitability program 
guidelines, a plant shutdown should not be required in this condition. 
Rather, the petitioner recommended that the program could specify that 
timely actions should be taken to return the plant to within the 
guidelines. If not complete within 30 days, the petitioner suggested 
that a special report would be sent to the NRC with a justification for 
continued operations and a proposed schedule for meeting the 
guidelines. The NRC disagrees with the petitioner that a regulatory 
change is required to permit these changes to plant TSs. The NRC allows 
deviations from the integrity of the control room envelope without 
requiring an immediate plant shutdown.
    4. The petitioner recommended that as an alternative to the total 
removal of

[[Page 4351]]

dose guidelines from the regulations, most of his concerns could be 
resolved if the dose criteria were based solely on the whole body dose 
from noble gases. The NRC does not agree with the proposition that the 
dose criteria should be based solely on the whole body dose from noble 
gases. The control room dose criterion of 5 rem whole body or its 
equivalent to any organ imposes two requirements on licensees: 
Satisfaction of the whole body dose criterion, which is generally 
dominated by the dose from noble gases; and satisfaction of the organ-
specific dose guidelines, which are generally dominated by the thyroid 
dose from the inhalation of iodine. In most cases, demonstrating 
compliance with thyroid dose guidelines poses a significantly greater 
challenge to licensees than does compliance with the whole body dose 
criterion.
    The 1999 amendment to 10 CFR 50.67 (64 FR 12117), revised the 
control room dose limit to allow licensees to show compliance with 
either the existing limits, using the traditional Technical Information 
Document (TID)-14844 source term assumptions, or a revised single 
control room dose criterion of 5 rem TEDE,\1\ if the licensee adopts 
the AST. With the ability to reassess a maximum credible radiological 
release using the AST, many licensees have shown compliance with the 
Sec.  50.67 single control room dose criterion of 5 rem TEDE. Licensees 
have accomplished this while achieving an enhanced degree of 
operational flexibility not realized using the traditional TID-14844 
source term with the associated whole body dose criterion and organ 
dose guidelines. Because compliance with Sec.  50.67 is demonstrated by 
calculating the TEDE, the relative contribution of the thyroid dose to 
the demonstration of compliance with the control room criterion has 
been substantially and appropriately reduced. In addition, many 
licensees that continue to use the traditional TID-14844 source term 
have incorporated the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.195, 
``Methods and Assumptions for Evaluating Radiological Consequences for 
Design-Basis Accidents at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors'' 
(ML031490640) to achieve operational flexibility. Following the 
guidance in RG 1.195, licensees are able to evaluate control room 
habitability using a 50 rem thyroid dose guideline. This represents a 
significant relaxation from the 30 rem thyroid dose guideline that was 
incorporated into previous guidance documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ As defined in 10 CFR 20.1003, ``Total Effective Dose 
Equivalent (TEDE) means the sum of the effective dose equivalent 
(for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent 
(for internal exposures).'' The effective dose equivalent for 
external exposures includes the whole body dose from noble gases. 
The committed effective dose equivalent for internal exposure 
includes the thyroid dose from inhalation of iodine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The petitioner also stated that the whole body dose from noble 
gases is likely to be the only possible dose impact that may result in 
control room evacuation. The NRC does not accept the premise that any 
maximum credible radiological release would result in the necessity for 
a control room evacuation. As stated previously, the 5 rem control room 
design criterion is not intended to be a maximum integrated dose level 
at which control room evacuation would be mandated during an accident. 
Rather, the criterion is used as a design basis to ensure that the 
control room, by design, will provide a habitable environment for the 
control of the plant under the maximum credible radiological release 
conditions, and as such will provide reasonable assurance of adequate 
protection.
    The petitioner stated that most of his concerns would be resolved 
if credit for SCBAs or KI was allowed in the analysis of the dose from 
iodines and particulates. The NRC does not agree with the option of 
replacing engineering controls for radiological protection with credit 
for personal protective equipment. As discussed previously, the option 
of allowing credit for SCBAs or KI to show compliance with the control 
room performance-based design criterion is inimical to the NRC design 
philosophy incorporated into 10 CFR Part 20, as well as international 
standards for radiological protection as set forth in ICRP Publication 
26.

IV. Public Comments

1. Overview of Public Comments

    The NRC's notice of receipt and request for public comment invited 
interested persons to submit comments. The comment period for PRM-50-87 
closed on September 25, 2007. The NRC reviewed and considered the 
comments in its decision to deny the petition. The NRC received two 
public comments, one from Mr. Walston Chubb (ML072681072), and one from 
Mr. James H. Riley on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 
(ML072690232).

2. Mr. Walston Chubb Comment

    Comment: Mr. Chubb recommended that operators be required to remain 
on duty until they are relieved or their short-time doses are between 
100 and 200 rem.
    NRC Response: The primary objective of GDC 19 is to ensure that the 
design of the control room and its habitability systems provide a 
``shirt-sleeved'' environment for operators during both normal and 
accident conditions. This environment facilitates operator response to 
normal and accident conditions while minimizing errors of omission or 
commission. Another objective is to ensure that the radiation dose 
levels in the control room would make it the safest location on site, 
thereby allowing the operators to remain in the control room. Any 
reduction in operator accident response capabilities may negatively 
impact public health and safety.
    The NRC's decision to apply the 5 rem whole body dose criterion was 
based on the following:
     A whole body radiation exposure of 5 rem is considered 
unlikely to cause increased anxiety that would result in operator 
impairment, since the criterion is comparable to the occupational dose 
limits.
     A whole body radiation exposure of 5 rem would not result 
in any somatic response that could result in operator impairment. 
Generally, the onset of clinically observable somatic effects occurs 
between 25 and 50 rem.
     GDC 19, as a design criterion, does not supplant the 
radiation protection standards of 10 CFR Part 20. The radiation 
exposure of control room operators is controlled, as for any radiation 
worker at the facility, as occupational exposure under 10 CFR Part 20. 
In the statements of consideration for the 10 CFR Part 20 rulemaking 
(56 FR 23365; May 21, 1991), the NRC stated that the dose limits for 
normal operation should remain the primary guidelines for an emergency.
    The statement of considerations in the proposed and final rule 
amending 10 CFR 50.67 and GDC 19 (64 FR 12117, March 31, 1999; and 64 
FR 71990, December 23, 1999, respectively) included the NRC's basis for 
establishing the 5 rem TEDE as the GDC 19 numeric criterion for 
licensees applying for amendment under 10 CFR 50.67. It also reaffirmed 
the position that the criteria in GDC 19 and the final rule are based 
on occupational exposure limits.
    The 5 rem control room design criterion is not intended to be a 
maximum integrated dose above which control room evacuation would be 
mandated during an accident. Rather, the 5 rem design criterion ensures 
that the control room, by design, will provide a habitable environment 
for the

[[Page 4352]]

control of the plant under all DBA conditions.
    Providing a safe working environment for the highly skilled 
professionals needed to operate a nuclear power plant is a primary 
objective of NRC regulations related to occupational and accident dose, 
and it is a paramount goal throughout the entire nuclear power 
industry. The NRC concludes that the proposal to set the control room 
design criterion at 100 rem, which is well above the level at which the 
onset of clinically observable somatic effects would occur, is 
antithetical to the fundamental principle of protecting public health 
and safety and is not acceptable.

3. NEI Comments

    NEI provided the following comments:
    Comment: ``It is not so much the value of the exposure limits that 
is the problem. The NRC should be more open to other methods of 
analysis proposed by licensees. Every Regulatory Guide states that the 
guidance is one method acceptable to the staff and that other methods 
proposed by licensees will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
However, in practice it is often difficult to justify different 
approaches.''
    NRC Response: To the extent that the comment implicitly criticizes 
the NRC for allegedly failing to consider alternatives for compliance 
with GDC 19 and 10 CFR 50.67 in a manner other than that suggested in a 
regulatory guide, that concern is beyond the scope of this petition for 
rulemaking. Further, the commenter presented no basis for this implicit 
criticism--the NRC routinely considers licensee and applicant-proposed 
alternatives to methods set forth in a Regulatory Guide. However, the 
NRC expects licensees and applicants to provide technically sufficient 
basis for the use of an alternative for compliance with an NRC 
regulation, which is also consistent with the regulatory policies of 
the NRC. That a licensee or applicant may find it difficult to provide 
sufficient basis justifying the use of an alternative approach, 
however, would not appear to present a valid regulatory concern.
    Comment: Existing emergency filtration systems should be maintained 
to practical performance criteria. NEI stated that this area has a lot 
of potential for improvement and gave the following examples:
     The current practice (i.e., RG 1.52, ``Design, Inspection, 
and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-
Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-
Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants'') (ML011710176) is to apply a safety 
factor of 2 for laboratory testing of charcoal beds. The actual 
efficiencies are typically much higher than those allowed by RGs.
     Some plants have an 8-inch charcoal bed, for which only 4 
inches is allowed to be credited.
     Other plants have filtration systems in series, for which 
only one composite filter can be credited.
    NRC Response: The NRC's position on existing emergency filtration 
systems is outlined in RG 1.52, Revision 3, issued June 2001. The 
previous revision of the RG included a safety factor as great as 7 
whereas Revision 3 includes a safety factor of 2 to account for 
degradation of the system between test periods. A safety factor 
represents margin in the capability of the adsorbent (carbon) installed 
in the system to perform the required safety function. Because carbon 
can degrade between test periods, a safety factor provides confidence 
that the anticipated degradation will not be beyond the minimum level 
necessary to perform its required safety function.
    RG 1.52, Revision 3, indicates that a 4-inch carbon bed in U.S. 
nuclear power plants is 99 percent efficient, with a safety factor of 2 
and a penetration (as defined in American Society for Testing and 
Materials D 3803-89) of less than or equal to 0.5 percent. The NRC 
believes that a 4-inch carbon bed thickness is sufficient to provide 
adequate protection, and that the 4 inches, as reflected in the RG, is 
not intended to be an upper limit on bed thickness. It is acceptable to 
provide additional carbon that may include 6 inches, 8 inches, or even 
greater bed thickness. The NRC also believes there are benefits 
provided by carbon bed thicknesses greater than 4 inches that are not 
reflected in the RG. The benefits may include longer bed life 
contributing to lower overall cost.
    With respect to filtration systems in series, they are treated as a 
composite (i.e., the sum of individual filters in series). For example, 
the efficiency of two 2-inch beds in series is the same as one 4-inch 
bed.
    Comment: In response to the petitioner's statement that current TS 
for system performance should be eliminated and that the administrative 
portion of the TS could include a requirement to have a control room 
habitability program, NEI commented, ``This recommendation is covered 
by TSTF-448 and GL 2003-01.''
    Response: NRC agrees with the comment. NRC prepared and made 
available a model safety evaluation (SE) and a model no-significant-
hazards-consideration (NSHC) determination relating to the modification 
of technical specification (TS) requirements regarding the habitability 
of the control room envelope (CRE) for referencing in license amendment 
requests (LARs). NRC also made available an associated model LAR for 
use by licensees to prepare such LARs. The TS modification is based on 
NRC staff approved changes to the improved standard technical 
specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434, available on NRC's public Web 
site at www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspec/current-approved-sts.html) that were proposed by the pressurized and boiling 
water reactor owners groups' Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) 
on behalf of the commercial nuclear electrical power generation 
industry, in STS change traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3 (ML063460558). 
NRC published a Notice of Availability of the SER in the Federal 
Register on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). Generic Letter (GL) 2003-01, 
dated June 12, 2003, is available on ADAMS (ML031620248).
    Comment: In response to the petitioner's proposed guidance, NEI 
provided the following comments:
     The control room ventilation system should isolate on the 
detection of high radiation or toxic gas intake. NEI commented, ``A 
good many control rooms in the industry already operate in this manner. 
Conversely, there are some plants that do not have automatic initiation 
of the emergency mode. Making this a requirement could result in an 
undue (and expensive) modification/backfit. For those plants 
susceptible to toxic gas intrusion, automatic initiation is typically 
the case (although not specifically implemented in all cases). If 
required, this also could result in undue (and expensive) 
modifications.''
     The control room should have a minimum of one foot of 
concrete shielding (or equivalent) on all surfaces. NEI commented, ``It 
is unlikely that all control rooms have one foot of concrete shielding 
on all surfaces. This requirement could result in undue (and expensive) 
modifications. A similar concern applies to the technical support 
center, which may also be affected by this requirement.''
     SCBAs and KI tablets should be readily available for 
operator use. Operators should maintain training in SCBAs. NEI 
commented, ``The use of these methods has merit, but additional 
evaluation of their effects is necessary. The medical complications of 
ingesting KI would have to be evaluated for all CR personnel. The use 
of SCBA credit would require specific training for which operators will 
need to demonstrate the ability to conduct their

[[Page 4353]]

safety-related functions while wearing a SCBA for several hours.''
     Procedures should be developed to ensure control room 
purging is considered when the outside concentration is less than the 
inside concentration. NEI commented, ``Although this appears to be a 
good practice, it can't be credited in the operator dose analysis. The 
timing of purging could be critical based on the timing of the release 
and the release pathway. Therefore, this recommendation may not have 
any practical merit.''
    The petitioner stated that because of the low risk significance of 
being outside the control room habitability program guidelines, a plant 
shutdown would not be required in this condition; rather, the program 
could specify that timely actions should be taken to return the plant 
within the guidelines. If not complete within 30 days, a special report 
would be sent to the NRC with a justification for continued operation 
and a proposed schedule for meeting the guidelines. NEI commented, 
``This is a valid point that the industry supports.''
    The petitioner stated that as an alternative to total removal of 
dose guidelines from the regulations, most of his concerns could be 
resolved if the dose criteria were based solely on the whole body dose 
from noble gases that he believes is the only possible dose impact that 
may result in control room evacuation. NEI commented, ``It is not clear 
that the noble gas contribution would be limiting in all cases. 
However, this may be the case if KI were allowed to be credited.''
    Response: These comments have been addressed in Section III of this 
document.

V. Denial of Petition

    Based upon review of the petition and comments received, the NRC 
has determined that the conclusions upon which the petitioner relies do 
not substantiate a basis to eliminate the control room radiological 
dose acceptance criteria from current regulations as requested. For the 
reasons discussed previously, the Commission denies PRM-50-87.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of January 2009.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E9-1211 Filed 1-23-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P