[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 239 (Thursday, December 11, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75386-75390]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-29181]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Action Affecting Export Privileges; Galaxy Aviation Trade Company 
Ltd; Hooshang Seddigh; Hamid Shakeri Hendi; Hussein Jahan Payma; Iran 
Air; Dunyaya Bakis Hava Tasimaciligi A.S.; Yavuz Cizmeci; Sam David 
Mahjoobi; Intelligent Aviation Services Ltd.

    In the Matter of:

Galaxy Aviation Trade Company Ltd., 15 Moreland Court, Lyndale 
Avenue, Finchley Road, London, UK NW2 2PJ;
Hooshang Seddigh, 15 Moreland Court, Lyndale Avenue, Finchley Road, 
London, UK, NW2 2PJ;
Hamid Shaken Hendi, 5th Floor, 23 Nafisi Avenue, Shabrak Ekbatan, 
Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran;
Hossein Jahan Peyma, 2/1 Makran Cross, Heravi Square, Moghan Ave, 
Pasdaran Cross, Tehran, Iran;
Iran Air, Second Floor, No. 23 Nafisi Avenue, Ekbatan, Tehran, Iran;
Dunyaya Bakis Hava Tasimaciligi A.S., a/k/a Dunyaya Bakis Air 
Transportation Inc. d/b/a Ankair, Yesilkoy Asfalti Istanbul No. 13/
4, Florya, Istanbul, Turkey TR-34810; Respondents; and
Yavuz Cizmeci, Chief Executive Officer, Ankair, Yesilkoy Asfalti 
Istanbul No. 13/4, Florya, Istanbul, Turkey TR-34810.
Sam David Mahjoobi, 5 Jupiter House, Calleva Park Aldermaston, 
Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom RG7 8NN.
Intelligent Aviation Services Ltd., 5 Jupiter House, Calleva Park 
Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom RG7 8NN; Related 
Persons; Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges 
and also Making that Temporary Denial of Export Privileges 
Applicable to Related Persons.

    Pursuant to sections 766.24 of the Export Administration 
Regulations, 15 CFR Parts 730-774 (2008) (``EAR'' or the 
``Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Bureau of Industry 
and Security (``BIS'') to renew for 180 days the Order Temporarily 
Denying the Export Privileges (``TDO'') of Respondents Galaxy Aviation 
Trade Company Ltd., Hooshang Seddigh, Hamid Shaken Hendi, Hossein Jahan 
Peyma, Iran Air, and Ankair.\1\ Based on the record, I find that BIS 
has met its burden under Section 766.24 and that renewal of the TDO is 
necessary and in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation 
of the EAR.
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    \1\ Evidence presented by Ankair shows that its legal corporate 
name is Dunyaya Bakis Hava Tasimaciligi AS., a/k/a Dunyaya Bakis Air 
Transportation Inc. (``DBHT''). DBHT is doing business as Ankair and 
therefore this order modifies Ankair's listing to properly reflect 
this information.
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    Additionally, after having been given notice and an opportunity to 
respond in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations, I find it 
necessary to add the following entities as Related Persons:

Yavuz Cizmeci, Chief Executive Officer, Ankair, Yesilkoy Asfalti 
Istanbul No. 13/4, Florya, Istanbul, Turkey TR-34810.
Sam David Mahjoobi, 5 Jupiter House, Calleva Park Aldermaston, Reading, 
Berkshire, United Kingdom RG7 8NN.
Intelligent Aviation Services Ltd., 5 Jupiter House, Calleva Park 
Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom RG7 8NN.

I. Factual Background

    Based upon evidence submitted by BIS through its Office of Export 
Enforcement (``OEE''), I issued an Order on June 6, 2008, which was 
effective immediately and temporarily denied for 180 days the export 
privileges of the Galaxy Aviation Trade Company Ltd. (``Galaxy 
Aviation''), Hooshang Seddigh, Hamid Shaken Hendi, Hossein Jahan Peyma, 
as well as of Iran Air of Tehran, Iran, and Ankair of Istanbul, Turkey. 
Based on additional evidence submitted by BIS, on July 10, 2008, I 
issued a modified Order expanding the scope of the denial as to 
Respondent Ankair.\2\ The TDO and modified TDO were published in the 
Federal Register on, respectively, June 17 and July 22, 2008.\3\
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    \2\ The original order only denied Ankair's export privileges 
involving Boeing 747, tail number TC-AKZ and manufacturer's serial 
number 24134. The modified Order expanded the scope of Ankair's 
denial to include all items subject to the Regulations.
    \3\ 73 FR 34,249 (June 17, 2008); 73 FR 42,544 (July 22, 2008). 
On June 7, 2008, a copy of the TDO was provided to the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for service on Ankair. An additional 
copy was sent to Ankair by Federal Express on June 10, 2008.
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    On July 22, 2008, BIS notified Yavuz Cizmeci, that it intended to 
add him as a Related Person to the TDO based on his position as Chief 
Executive Officer and a shareholder of Ankair in accordance with 
Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Mr. Cizmeci submitted a response 
through counsel opposing his addition to the TDO as a Related Person.
    On August 27, 2008, Respondent Galaxy Aviation, along with 
Respondents Hooshang Seddigh, Hamid Shaken Hendi, and Hossein Jahan 
Peyma, filed an appeal of the TDO with an administrative law judge 
(``AU'') pursuant to Section 766.24(e)(1)(i). In a one-page, unsworn 
letter, Galaxy Aviation and its shareholders claimed not to be involved 
in the reexport of the Boeing 747 as alleged by BIS. In a recommended 
decision dated September 16, 2008, the AU recommended that Respondents' 
motion be denied and that the TDO remain in effect in order to prevent 
future

[[Page 75387]]

violations of the Regulations. The Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Industry and Security affirmed the AU's recommended decision, thereby 
keeping the TDO in full effect, in an Order dated September 19, 2008, 
in accordance with Section 766.24(e)(5). See 73 FR 59,599 (October 9, 
2008).
    On November 6, 2008, Sam David Mahjoobi and Intelligent Aviation 
Services Ltd. (``Intelligent Aviation'') were sent letters in 
accordance with 766.23 notifying them of BIS's intent to add them as 
related persons to the TDO based on their relationship to Galaxy 
Aviation and involvement in the sale and reexport of the Boeing 747 at 
issue in this matter.
    Neither Mahjoobi nor Intelligent Aviation submitted any opposition 
to their proposed addition to the TDO.
    On November 13, 2008, BIS, through OEE, filed a written request for 
renewal of the TDO against the Respondents for an additional 180 days 
and served a copy of its request on each of the Respondents. BIS's 
renewal request is part of the record here and requests that the TDO be 
renewed based on evidence that renewal of the TDO is necessary in the 
public interest to prevent imminent violations, as demonstrated, in 
sum, by past unlicensed reexports of U.S.-origin aircraft by Ankair 
(then doing business as World Focus Airlines) to Iran Air Tours, the 
re-export to Iran in violation of the TDO and the Regulations of the 
U.S.-origin Boeing 747, tail number TC-AKZ and manufacturer's serial 
number 24134, identified in the TDO on June 6, 2008, and Ankair's 
possession or control of two additional U.S.-origin MD-80 aircraft that 
had or were about to be diverted via re-export to Fars Air Qeshm, an 
Iranian airline.
    Respondent Ankair filed a written submission dated November 26, 
2008, opposing renewal of the TDO and requesting a hearing pursuant to 
Section 766.24(3).\4\ I granted Ankair's request and held a hearing on 
December 2, 2008, which consisted of oral arguments by Ankair and BIS, 
including responses by counsel for Ankair and BIS to questions that I 
posed during the hearing. Respondent's written submission, which also 
is of record here, focused on three main arguments: (1) Documents it 
presented which purport to show a sales agreement for the Boeing 747 
identified in the TDO between Ankair and Sam David Mahjoobi, along with 
delivery and acceptance certificates provided by Ankair and Mahjoobi, 
dated prior to the issuance of the TDO on June 6, 2008; (2) arguments 
that Ankair understood that the 747 would be re-exported to Pakistan, 
rather than Iran, and that BIS had not presented evidence that it had 
re-exported the aircraft to Iran; and (3) one of the MD-80 aircraft of 
concern to BIS has already been sold and was no longer in Ankair's 
possession or control and the second MD-80 has been grounded in Turkey 
and according to Ankair will remain there.
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    \4\ Ankair's submission apparently was filed in an untimely 
fashion. See Section 766.5(e) of the Regulations (under Part 766, 
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded 
from the computation when the period allowed is seven days or less). 
Nonetheless, I have considered in full Ankair's opposition and issue 
this order based on the merits of BIS's renewal request and Ankair's 
opposition.
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II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

    Pursuant to section 766.24(d)(3) of the EAR, the sole issue to be 
considered in determining whether to continue a TDO is whether the TDO 
should be renewed to prevent an imminent violation of the EAR as the 
term ``imminent'' violation is defined in section 766.24.
    With regard to whether a violation may be ``imminent,'' the 
Regulations provide that:
    A violation may be `imminent' either in time or in degree of 
likelihood. To establish grounds for the temporary denial order, BIS 
may show either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general 
circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal 
or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future 
violations. To indicate the likelihood of future violations, BIS may 
show that the violation under investigation or charges is significant, 
deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical 
or negligent, and that it is appropriate to give notice to companies in 
the United States and abroad to cease dealing with the person in U.S.-
origin items in order to reduce the likelihood that a person under 
investigation or charges continues to export or acquire abroad such 
items, risking subsequent disposition contrary to export control 
requirements. Lack of information establishing the precise time a 
violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is 
imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the 
likelihood of a violation.

Id.

    Thus, a violation may be imminent either in proximity of time or 
degree of likelihood, and the time of a future violation need not be 
established; rather, imminence may be established if there is evidence 
indicating that there is sufficient reason to believe that a future 
violation or violations are likely to occur. BIS may therefore show 
that a violation is about to occur or that the facts and circumstances 
of the matter under investigation demonstrate a reasonable belief in 
the likelihood of future violations.\5\ Consequently, TDO may be issued 
and maintained in force, when, as in this case, matter is still under 
investigation by BIS.
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    \5\ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3).
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B. Analysis and Findings

    BIS submitted evidence with its renewal request, as it had 
previously in connection with the issuance of the TDO and the 
modification of the TDO as to Ankair, as well as in response to Galaxy 
Aviation's appeal, which shows (absent rebuttal) that the TDO is and 
remains necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent 
violation of the EAA, the EAR, or any order, license or authorization 
issued thereunder.\6\ Ankair's opposition, as filed on November 26, 
2008, and as supplemented through its counsel at the hearing on 
December 2, 2008, fails to rebut BIS's showing. In fact, BIS's showing 
has, if anything, become even more compelling as its investigation has 
continued.
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    \6\ Ankair was not a party to the appeal of the Galaxy Aviation 
Respondents, but the evidence discussed there by OEE, the AU, and 
the Under Secretary for Industry and Security by necessity included 
evidence relating to Ankair's conduct.
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    Ankair's efforts to rebut BIS's renewal request relies first and 
foremost on contractual documents proffered in an effort to establish 
an alternative ``timeline'' that Ankair asserts shows that the sale of 
the Boeing 747 occurred by May 30, 2008, pursuant to a contract dated 
May 20, 2008, that is, occurred by or on a date prior to the issuance 
of the TDO on June 6, 2008. However, Ankair's ``timeline'' and related 
contentions are not supported by any declarations or affidavits or the 
surrounding chain of events and circumstances. The contract upon which 
Ankair relies (Exhibit 1 to Ankair's Submission) provided that the 
delivery period for the plane was June 20-27, 2008. It also is 
undisputed here that Ankair did not submit a deregistration request to 
the Turkish Government regarding the 747 until June 26, 2008, nearly 
three weeks after issuance of the TDO, that the deregistration 
certificate and the airworthiness certificate were not issued by the 
Turkish Government until July 27, 2008, and that these actions were 
necessary steps in the transaction and the re-export of the plane. See 
Ankair's Submission, Exhibit 1 at section 5.4 (requiring Ankair to 
deliver a certificate of airworthiness for export and a deregistration 
certificate from the

[[Page 75388]]

Turkish Government at the time of delivery).
    Moreover, it also appears beyond genuine dispute that the 747 was 
photographed at Tehran airport on June 27, 2008. See BIS Renewal 
Request Exhibit 12. In addition, Mr. Cizmeci, Ankair's CEO (as well as 
CEO of at least ACT Airlines), stated on June 6, 2008--to HBK Capital 
Management, a U.S. company that is a substantial owner of ACT Airlines, 
which immediately forwarded this statement to BIS--that the 747 was 
going to be sold to Galaxy. Ankair's contention that a statement that 
the aircraft was going to be sold to Galaxy did not indicate any 
present or future intention is without substance or merit, see Ankair's 
Submission at 12. This evidence standing alone would call into serious 
question Ankair's alternative timeline. Ankair asserts that this 
statement may have been miscommunicated or misinterpreted by HBK (and 
thus not accurately provided to BIS), but Ankair does not substantiate 
its argument through a rebuttal declaration from Mr. Cizmeci or any 
other evidence. Ankair notably does not assert that Mr. Cizmeci 
informed HBK in words or substance on June 6, 2008, that Ankair had 
sold the 747 to Mr. Mahjoobi and had done so at least a week before, no 
later than May 30, 2008. If that sale had occurred as asserted by 
Ankair, then it is difficult to imagine why Mr. Cizmeci would have 
provided any other response, and clearly the vast differences between a 
statement that the plane was going to be sold to Galaxy and a statement 
that it had been sold to Mr. Mahjoobi at least a week or more before 
cannot be explained by Ankair's posited suggestions of miscommunication 
or misinterpretation. Furthermore, the statement has additional indicia 
of reliability as discussed by BIS in its renewal request.
    Ankair contends that it sold the plane to an individual named Sam 
David Mahjoobi. Ankair contended in its submission and (at least 
initially) at the hearing that Mahjoobi acted individually and not on 
behalf of Galaxy Aviation. Mr. Mahjoobi is identified at one point in 
the contract as a ``Director,'' but Ankair asserts that this is simply 
the inapplicable contract form language and highlights information 
indicating that Mahjoobi is a director of other U.K. companies, 
including a U.K. company called Intelligent Aviation Services. Ankair 
argued that it was entitled to rely on representations of its customer, 
at least in the absence of red flags, and during the hearing Ankair's 
counsel referenced Mahjoobi as being a middleman and a possible 
``principal'' unknown to Ankair and asserted that such an arrangement 
would not be unusual, apparently in spite of the fact that the 
purported transaction involved a jet aircraft with a multi-million 
dollar value. Most concretely, however, Ankair's counsel indicated at 
the hearing that Mahjoobi had mentioned Intelligent Aviation to Ankair 
(rather than mentioning, presumably, Galaxy Aviation). This 
representation further undermines Ankair's asserted timeline, because 
Intelligent Aviation did not exist as of a May 30, 2008, and in fact 
was not formed until June 11, 2008. See Ankair's Submission, at 10. 
Moreover, as noted by BIS, Mr. Mahjoobi is the one person listed on 
Galaxy's Aviation's corporate records who was not individually named as 
a Respondent in the TDO when it issued on June 6, 2008. If as suggested 
by Mr. Cizmeci's June 6, 2008 statement, the sale had not occurred as 
of that date, listing any of the Galaxy Aviation Respondents as the 
counterparty to the sale would have represented a patent violation of 
the TDO, readily detectable by any government that learned the identity 
of the parties involved.
    In addition, in response to Ankair's submission, BIS presented 
evidence at the hearing indicating that Ankair did not acquire 
ownership of the 747 until May 27, 2008, a week after the May 20, 2008 
date that Ankair asserts it already had contracted to sell the 747 to 
Mr. Mahjoobi. Moreover, Ankair's purported final bill of sale to 
Mahjoobi dated May 30, 2008, would have resulted in a loss to Ankair of 
more than $5 million on an asset that it would have owned for no more 
than three days. See Hearing Exhibits 3-4.\7\ These documents further 
call into question Ankair's assertions that this sale was an arms-
length transaction that occurred prior to issuance of the TDO.
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    \7\ At the conclusion of the hearing, Ankair requested leave to 
amend its submission in light of these exhibits. I took that request 
under advisement and hereby deny it. The exhibits can be considered 
to be in the nature of rebuttal or impeachment material. They also 
relate to events known to Ankair and documents or information in 
Ankair's possession, custody, or control. In addition, having 
asserted in its submission that it sold the 747 in late May 2008, 
prior to the issuance of the TDO, and given the record and issues 
under consideration here, Ankair reasonably could have anticipated 
that BIS would not only seek to respond to this assertion, but 
potentially do so with regard to the timing and other details of 
Ankair's acquisition of the aircraft.
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    At the hearing, Ankair's counsel acknowledged that BIS has 
legitimate questions and concerns about the transaction. Both parties 
agreed at the hearing that after the issuance of the TDO on June 6, 
2008, and after receiving actual and constructive notice of the TDO, 
that Ankair took actions that enabled the 747 to be re-exported from 
Turkey. Ankair claims that it believed that the aircraft was destined 
for Pakistan and that reasonable minds can differ whether its post-TDO 
conduct constitutes a violation. But the TDO specifically prohibited 
Ankair from directly or indirectly participating in any way in any 
transaction involving the 747, a U.S.-origin aircraft that is subject 
to the Regulations. Thus, even if I were to disregard all of the BIS's 
evidence that Ankair questions or disputes, the record would show that 
Ankair knowingly violated the TDO (and thus the Regulations) and 
provide a sufficient basis to conclude that Ankair is likely to commit 
future violations absent continuation of the TDO.
    I have also considered the evidence and arguments regarding the two 
MD-80 Aircraft of concern to BIS. The record apparently indicates that 
one of the aircraft (Tail Number TCAKL) may no longer be in Ankair's 
control or possession. Assuming this to be true, the remaining MD-80 
(tail number TC-AKM) continues to present an imminent risk of diversion 
via re-export to Iran. In this regard, the suspension of Ankair's 
operating license by the Turkish authorities increases the likelihood 
that Ankair will seek to dispose of its interest in this aircraft, as 
it cannot operate the aircraft, yet must still bear the costs of 
storing and maintaining it. Ankair's past conduct, including leasing 
U.S.-origin aircraft to Iran Air Tours in violations of the Regulations 
and its actions regarding the re-export of the 747, increase the 
likelihood that this aircraft will be re-exported contrary to U.S. 
export controls.
    In conclusion, I find that BIS has met its burden under Section 
766.24 of the Regulations and that it is necessary to renew the TDO 
against each of the Respondents named in the TDO to prevent further 
imminent violations of the Regulations. The Order will provide 
continued notice to companies in the United States and abroad to cease 
dealing with the Respondents in U.S.-origin items in order to reduce 
the likelihood that the Respondents, who are still under investigation, 
will continue to export or acquire such items contrary to export 
control requirements.

III. Addition of Related Persons

A. Legal Standard

    Section 766.23 of the Regulations provides that ``[i]n order to 
prevent evasion, certain types of orders under this part may be made 
applicable not only to the respondent, but also to other persons then 
or thereafter related to the

[[Page 75389]]

respondent by ownership, control, position of responsibility, 
affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business. 
Orders that may be made applicable to related persons include those 
that deny or affect export privileges, including temporary denial 
orders. * * *'' 15 CFR 766.23(a).

B. Analysis and Findings

    Yavuz Cizmeci does not argue he is not a related person to Ankair, 
but instead that his addition is not necessary to prevent evasion of 
the TDO since he cannot unilaterally make decisions on behalf of 
Ankair. I find this argument unpersuasive as Yavuz Cizmeci is not only 
the Chief Executive Officer and a shareholder of Ankair but he had 
personal knowledge of and involvement in the sales and/or leases of 
both the 747 and MD-80 aircraft at issue in this case. His role in the 
conduct of business by Ankair satisfies the requirement of section 
766.23 and therefore will be added a Related Person.
    On November 6, 2008, Sam David Mahjoobi and Intelligent Aviation 
Services Ltd. were sent letters in accordance with 766.23 informing 
them of BIS's intent to add them as related persons to Respondent 
Galaxy Aviation. Galaxy Aviations' corporate records list Sam David 
Mahjoobi as a Corporate Officer at all times relevant to this 
investigation. Additionally, evidence submitted by Ankair indicates 
that Sam David Mahjoobi signed the contract with Ankair for the 747 at 
issue in this case. The U.K. corporate records show that Sam David 
Mahjoobi is also the director of Intelligent Aviation Design, a company 
formed after the issuance of the initial TDO, and one of the addresses 
listed on Intelligent Aviation's corporate documents is the same as 
Galaxy Aviation's London address. Neither Mr. Mahjoobi nor Intelligent 
Aviation Services submitted a response opposing inclusion as Related 
Persons. I find based on the record before me that Sam David Mahjoobi 
and Intelligent Aviation meet the criteria established in section 
766.23 and shall be added to this Order as Related Persons.
    It is therefore ordered: First, that, Galaxy Aviation Trade Company 
Ltd., 15 Moreland Court, Lyndale Avenue, Finchley Road, London, UK, NW2 
2PJ; Hooshang Seddigh, 15 Moreland Court, Lyndale Avenue, Finchley 
Road, London, UK, NW2 2PJ; Hamid Shaken Hendi, 5th Floor, 23 Nafisi 
Avenue, Shahrak Ekbatan, Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran; Hossein 
Jahan Peyma, 2/1 Markran Cross, Heravi Square, Moghan Ave, Pasdaran 
Cross, Tehran, Iran; fran Air, Second Floor, No. 23, Nafisi Avenue, 
Ekbatan, Tehran, Iran; Dunyaya Bakis Hava Tasimaciligi A.S. a/k/a 
Dunyaya Bakis Air Transportation Inc. d/b/a Ankair, Yesilkoy Asfalti 
Istanbul No. 13/4, Florya, Istanbul, Turkey TR-34810; and Fars Air 
Qeshm, Bahonar Bulv, Qeshm Island, Iran and No. 7, 4th Alley, 2nd Bimeh 
Street, Karaj Road, Tehran, Iran each a ``Denied Person'' and 
collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, 
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, 
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is 
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license 
exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of any Denied Person any item 
subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by any Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or 
control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be 
exported from the United States, including financing or other support 
activities related to a transaction whereby any Denied Person acquires 
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from any Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from any Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by any Denied Person, or service any 
item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by any 
Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States. For 
purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, 
repair, modification or testing.
    Third, that having been provided notice and opportunity for comment 
as provided in Section 766.23 of the Regulations Yavuz Cizmeci, Chief 
Executive Officer, Ankair, Yesilkoy Asfalti Istanbul No. 13/4, Florya, 
Istanbul, Turkey TR-34810; Sam David Mahjoobi, 5 Jupiter House, Calleva 
Park Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, RG7 8NIN; and 
Intelligent Aviation Services Ltd., 5 Jupiter House, Calleva Park 
Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, RG7 8NN, (each a 
``Related Person'' and collectively the ``Related Persons''), have been 
determined to be related to Respondents Ankair of Istanbul, Turkey and 
Galaxy Aviation Trade Company Ltd. of the United Kingdom by 
affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the 
conduct of trade or related services, and it has been deemed necessary 
to make the Order temporarily denying the export privileges of the 
Respondents applicable to these Related Persons in order to prevent 
evasion of the Order.
    Fourth, that the denial of export privileges described in this 
Order shall be made applicable to each Related Person, as follows:
    I. The Related Person, its successors or assigns, and when acting 
for or on behalf of the Related Person, its officers, representatives, 
agents, or employees (collectively, ``Denied Person'') may not 
participate, directly or indirectly, in any way in any transaction 
involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from 
the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other 
activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License 
Exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any

[[Page 75390]]

other activity subject to the Regulations; or
    C. Benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations.
    II. No person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item 
subject to the Regulations;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or 
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be 
exported from the United States, including financing or other support 
activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires 
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to 
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the 
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the 
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States 
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or 
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or 
controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any 
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from 
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means 
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
    Fifth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, re-export, or 
other transaction subject to the Regulations where the only items 
involved that are subject to the Regulations are the foreign-produced 
direct product of U.S.-origin technology.
    Sixth, that in accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) 
and 766.23(c) of the Regulations, the Respondents or Related Persons 
may, at any time, make an appeal related to this Order by filing a full 
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the 
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard AU Docketing Center, 40 
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
    This Order shall be published in the Federal Register and a copy 
provided to each Respondent and Related Person.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 
180 days, unless renewed in accordance with the Regulations.

    Entered this 3rd day of December 2008.
Darryl W. Jackson,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
 [FR Doc. E8-29181 Filed 12-10-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P