[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 235 (Friday, December 5, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 74202-74210]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-28850]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Relocate Surveillance 
Frequencies to Licensee Control--Risk-Informed Technical Specification 
Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5b, Technical Specification Task Force--
425, Revision 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a 
model license amendment request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), 
and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination. 
These are related to changes to standard technical specifications (STS) 
for Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)--425, Rev. 2, ``Relocate 
Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF Initiative 5b,'' 
(Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. 
ML080280275). The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to 
efficiently process amendments that propose to relocate TS surveillance 
frequencies. Licensees of nuclear power reactors could then request 
amendments, confirming the applicability of the safety evaluation and 
NSHC determination to their reactors. The NRC staff is requesting 
comment on the model safety evaluation and model NSHC determination 
prior to announcing their availability for referencing in license 
amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires January 5, 2009. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so. 
However, the Commission can only ensure consideration for comments 
received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Please submit comments either electronically or through U.S. 
mail. E-mail comments to [email protected]. Mail comments to the Chief, 
Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative 
Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand-deliver comments 
to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 
on Federal workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the 
NRC's Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O-1F21), 
Rockville, MD. You can submit comments electronically to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Elliott, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection & Regional 
Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-8585.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    This notice provides an opportunity for the public to comment on 
proposed changes to the STS after a preliminary assessment and finding 
by the NRC staff that the NRC will likely offer the change for adoption 
by licensees. This notice solicits comment on a proposed change to the 
STS that modify surveillance frequencies. NRC staff will evaluate any 
comments received for the proposed change to the STS and reconsider the 
change or announce the availability of the change for adoption by 
licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this change are responsible 
for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable 
technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific 
information. The NRC will process and note each amendment application 
responding to the notice of availability according to applicable NRC 
rules and procedures.
    This notice involves the relocation of most time-based surveillance 
frequencies to a licensee-controlled program, the Surveillance 
Frequency Control Program (SFCP), and provides a reference to the SFCP 
in the administrative controls section of TS. Exceptions to 
surveillance frequency relocation are those surveillances frequencies 
that are event driven, event driven with a time component, reference 
another established licensee program, or condition-based surveillance 
frequencies. Revision 2 of TSTF-425 addresses all four reactor vendor 
types. The owners groups participants proposed this change for 
incorporation into the standard technical specifications in the 
technical specification task force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-425, 
Rev. 2. TSTF-425, Rev. 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080280275), can be 
viewed on the NRC's Web page at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Applicability

    TSTF-425, Rev 2, is applicable to all nuclear power reactors and 
requires the application of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10, 
Rev. 1, ``Risk-informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, Risk-
Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML071360456). The NRC staff reviewed and approved NEI 04-
10, Revision 1 (Rev. 1), by letter dated September 19, 2007 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML072570267). To efficiently process the incoming license 
amendment applications, the NRC staff requests that each licensee 
applying for the changes proposed in TSTF-425 include documentation 
regarding the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technical adequacy 
consistent with the requirements of Section 4.2 Regulatory Guide (RG) 
1.200, ``An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities'' 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001). Applicants proposing to use PRA 
models for which NRC-endorsed standards do not exist must submit 
documentation that identifies characteristics of those models 
consistent with Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of RG-1.200 or identify and 
justify the methods to be applied for assessing the risk contribution 
for those sources of risk not addressed by PRA models.
    The proposed change to adopt TSTF-425 does not prevent licensees 
from requesting an alternate approach or proposing changes other than 
those proposed in TSTF-425, Rev. 2. Significant deviations from the 
approach recommended in this notice, or inclusion of additional changes 
to the license, however, require additional review by the NRC staff. 
This may increase the time and resources needed for the review or 
result in staff rejection of the LAR. Licensees desiring significant 
deviations or additional changes should instead submit a license 
amendment request that does not claim to adopt TSTF-425, Rev 2.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
After evaluating the comments received as a result of this notice, the 
NRC staff will either reconsider the proposed change or announce the 
availability of the change in a subsequent notice (with possible 
changes to the safety evaluation or the proposed no significant hazards

[[Page 74203]]

consideration determination as a result of public comments). If NRC 
staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements.
    For each application the NRC staff will publish a notice of 
consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, 
a proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and a 
notice of opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a 
notice of issuance of an amendment to the operating license to announce 
the relocation of surveillance frequencies to licensee-controlled 
document for each plant that receives the requested change.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 24th day of November 2008.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert Elliott,
Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and 
Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE OF AN APPLICATION WAS PREPARED BY THE NRC 
STAFF. THE MODEL PROVIDES THE EXPECTED LEVEL OF DETAIL AND CONTENT FOR 
AN APPLICATION TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING RISK-
INFORMED JUSTIFICATION FOR RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC TS SURVEILLANCE 
FREQUENCIES TO A LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM CHANGE. LICENSEES REMAIN 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT THEIR ACTUAL APPLICATION FULFILLS THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS NRC REGULATIONS.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: PLANT NAME
DOCKET NO. 50--APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING 
RISK-INFORMED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE 
FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS TO A LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM
    Dear Sir or Madam:
    In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50.90), ``Application for Amendment 
License Construction Permit at Request of Holder,'' [LICENSEE] is 
submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications 
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed amendment would modify [LICENSEE] technical 
specifications by relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a 
licensee-controlled program with the implementation of Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI) 04-10, ``Risk-Informed Technical Specification 
Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance 
Frequencies.''
    Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the 
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific 
verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to 
show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS 
pages. Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments 
made in this submittal. Attachment 5 provides the proposed TS Bases 
changes.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ``Notice for Public Comment; State 
Consultation,'' a copy of this application, with attachments, is being 
provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that 
the foregoing is correct and true. Executed on [Date] [Signature]
    If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER].
     Sincerely,
     [Name, Title]
Attachments:
1. Description and Assessment
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
3. Revised Technical Specification Pages
4. Regulatory Commitments
5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Regional Office
    NRC Resident Inspector

Attachment 1--Description and Assessment

1.0 Description

    The proposed amendment would modify technical specifications by 
relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled 
program with the adoption of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-
425, Revision 2, ``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 
Control--Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) 
Initiative 5.'' Additionally, the change would add a new program, the 
Surveillance Frequency Control Program, to TS Section [5], 
Administrative Controls.
    The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry/TSTF STS 
change TSTF-425, Revision 2, (Rev. 2) (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML080280275). The Federal Register notice published on [DATE] announced 
the availability of this TS improvement.

2.0 Assessment

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE]. This 
review included a review of the NRC staff's evaluation, the supporting 
information provided to support TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and the requirements 
specified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No. ML071360456).
    1. [LICENSEE] LAR submittal includes documentation with regards to 
PRA technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of RG 1.200 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001) Section 4.2., and
    2. [LICENSEE] proposes to use PRA models without NRC-endorsed 
standards. The licensee has submitted documentation which identifies 
the quality characteristics of those models, as described in RG 1.200 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001).
    [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications presented in the 
TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are 
applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment to 
incorporate the changes to the [PLANT] TS.
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
    [LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the 
TS changes described in TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and the NRC staff's model 
safety evaluation dated [DATE].

3.0 Regulatory Analysis

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register. 
[LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the 
Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT] and has found it 
acceptable to incorporate into the amendment request that satisfies the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

[[Page 74204]]

Attachment 2--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)

Attachment 3--Proposed Technical Specification Pages

Attachment 4--List of Regulatory Commitments

    The following table identifies the [LICENSEE] commitments in this 
document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for 
information purposes and are not considered regulatory commitments. 
Please direct questions regarding these commitments to [CONTACT NAME].

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Regulatory commitments                      Due date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] commits to implement NEI 04-10,   [Complete, implemented with
 Revision 1, as identified by reference in    amendment OR within X days
 new TS Administrative Control,               of implementation of
 ``Surveillance Frequency Control Program     amendment].
 (SFCP)''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The change requests the adoption 
of an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) 
for [Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants (NUREG-1430), Westinghouse Plants 
(NUREG-1431), Combustion Engineering Plants (NUREG-1432), General 
Electric Plants, BWR/4 (NUREG-1433), and General Electric Plants, BWR/6 
(NUREG-1334)], to allow relocation of specific TS surveillance 
frequencies to a licensee-controlled program. The proposed change is 
described in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-
425, Revision 2 (Rev. 2) (ADAMS Accession No. ML080280275) related to 
the Relocation of Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF 
Initiative 5b and was described in the Notice of Availability published 
in the Federal Register on [Date] ([xx FR xxxxx]).
    The proposed changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry/
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-425, Rev. 2, 
``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF 
Initiative 5b.'' The proposed change relocates surveillance frequencies 
to a licensee-controlled program, the Surveillance Frequency Control 
Program (SFCP). This change is applicable to licensees using 
probabilistic risk guidelines contained in NRC-approved NEI 04-10, 
``Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed 
Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
071360456).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the [LICENSEE] analysis 
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented 
below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change relocates the specified frequencies for 
periodic surveillance requirements to licensee control under a new 
Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Surveillance frequencies are 
not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, 
the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not 
significantly increased. The systems and components required by the 
technical specifications for which the surveillance frequencies are 
relocated are still required to be operable, meet the acceptance 
criteria for the surveillance requirements, and be capable of 
performing any mitigation function assumed in the accident analysis. 
As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated 
are not significantly increased.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed 
change. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be 
installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or 
different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in 
the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the 
safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in 
the margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria 
for systems, structures, and components (SSCs), specified in 
applicable codes and standards (or alternatives approved for use by 
the NRC) will continue to be met as described in the plant licensing 
basis (including the final safety analysis report and bases to TS), 
since these are not affected by changes to the surveillance 
frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact to safety analysis 
acceptance criteria as described in the plant licensing basis. To 
evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency, 
[LICENSEE] performed a probabilistic risk evaluation using the 
guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1. NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1 methodology provides reasonable acceptance guidelines and 
methods for evaluating the risk increase of proposed changes to 
surveillance frequencies consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.177.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a significant hazards consideration as set forth in 10 CFR 
50.92(c), Issuance of Amendment,'' and therefore, [LICENSEE] finding of 
``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-425
Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control

1.0 Introduction

    By letter dated [--------, 20----], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) 
proposed changes to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. 
The requested change is the adoption of NRC-approved TSTF-425, Revision 
2, ``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control--RITSTF 
Initiative 5b'' (Reference 1). When implemented, TSTF-425, Revision 2 
(Rev. 2) relocates most periodic frequencies of technical 
specifications (TS) surveillances to a licensee controlled program, the

[[Page 74205]]

Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP), and provides 
requirements for the new program in the administrative controls section 
of TS. All surveillance frequencies can be relocated except:
     Frequencies that reference other approved programs for the 
specific interval (such as the Inservice Testing Program or the Primary 
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program),
     Frequencies that are purely event driven (e.g., ``Each 
time the control rod is withdrawn to the `full out' position'').
     Frequencies that are event-driven but have a time 
component for performing the surveillance on a one-time basis once the 
event occurs (e.g., ``within 24 hours after thermal power reaching 
[gteqt] 95% RTP'')
     Frequencies that are related to specific conditions (e.g., 
battery degradation, age, and capacity) or conditions for the 
performance of a surveillance requirement (e.g., ``drywell to 
suppression chamber differential pressure decrease'').
    The definition of ``Staggered Test Basis'' in TS Section 1.1, 
``Definitions,'' is placed in brackets. Plants that adopt TSTF-425, 
Rev. 2, and no longer use this defined term in the technical 
specifications may remove it from Section 1.1. A new Administrative 
Controls Program is added to TS section 5 as [Specification 5.5.15 
(NUREG-1433 and -1434) or Specification 5.5.18 (NUREG-1430, 1431, and 
1432)]. The new program is called the Surveillance Frequency Control 
Program (SFCP) and describes the requirements for the program to 
control changes to the relocated surveillance frequencies. The TS Bases 
for each affected surveillance is revised to state that the frequency 
is set in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. 
Various editorial changes may be made to the Bases as needed to 
facilitate the addition of the Bases changes. Some surveillance Bases 
do not contain a discussion of the frequency. In these cases, Bases 
describing the current frequency were added to maintain consistency 
with the Bases for similar surveillances. These instances are noted in 
the markup along with the source of the text. The proposed changes to 
the administrative controls of TS to incorporate the SFCP includes a 
specific reference to NEI 04-10, ``Risk-Informed Technical 
Specifications Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed Method for Control of 
Surveillance Frequencies,'' Revision 1 (Rev. 1), (Reference 2) as the 
basis for making any changes to the surveillance frequencies once they 
are relocated out of TS.
    In a letter dated September 19, 2007, the NRC staff approved 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) 04-10, Rev. 1, 
``Risk-Informed Technical Specification initiative 5B, Risk Informed 
Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
072570267), as acceptable for referencing in licensing actions to the 
extent specified and under the limitations delineated in NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1, and the final acceptance SE providing the basis for NRC 
acceptance of NEI 04-10, Rev 1.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    In the ``Final Policy Statement: Technical Specifications for 
Nuclear Power Plants'' published in the Federal Register (FR) (58 FR 
39132, 7/22/93) the NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA, currently referred to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis or 
PRA) in STS. In this 1993 FR publication, the NRC states, in part, 
``The Commission believes that it would be inappropriate at this time 
to allow requirements which meet one or more of the first three 
criteria [of 10 CFR 50.36] to be deleted from technical specifications 
based solely on PSA (Criterion 4). However, if the results of PSA 
indicate that technical specifications can be relaxed or removed, a 
deterministic review will be performed.'' Additionally, the NRC states 
in this publication, ``The Commission Policy in this regard is 
consistent with its Policy Statement on `Safety Goals for the operation 
of Nuclear Power Plants,' 51 FR 30028, published on August 21, 1986. 
The Policy Statement on Safety Goals states in part, * * * 
probabilistic results should also be reasonably balanced and supported 
through use of deterministic arguments. In this way, judgments can be 
made * * * about the degree of confidence to be given these 
[probabilistic] estimates and assumptions. This is a key part of the 
process for determining the degree of regulatory conservatism that may 
be warranted for particular decisions. This `defense-in-depth' approach 
is expected to continue to ensure the protection of public health and 
safety.'' The NRC further states in the 1993 publication, ``The 
Commission will continue to use PSA, consistent with its policy on 
Safety Goals, as a tool in evaluating specific line-item improvements 
to Technical Specifications, new requirements, and industry proposals 
for risk-based Technical Specification changes.''
    Approximately two years later the NRC provided additional detail 
concerning the use of PRA in the ``Final Policy Statement: Use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Nuclear Regulatory Activities'' 
published in the Federal Register (FR) (60 FR 42622, August 16, 1995) 
the NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In this FR 
publication, the NRC'S opening statement states, in-part, ``The 
Commission believes that an overall policy on the use of PRA methods in 
nuclear regulatory activities should be established so that the many 
potential applications of PRA can be implemented in a consistent and 
predictable manner that would promote regulatory stability and 
efficiency. In addition, the Commission believes that the use of PRA 
technology in NRC regulatory activities should be increased to the 
extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in 
a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach.''
    The following excerpts are taken, in part, from the 1995 Commission 
Policy Statement: ``PRA addresses a broad spectrum of initiating events 
by assessing the event frequency. Mitigating system reliability is then 
assessed, including the potential for multiple and common-cause 
failures. The treatment, therefore, goes beyond the single failure 
requirements in the deterministic approach. The probabilistic approach 
to regulation is, therefore, considered an extension and enhancement of 
traditional regulation by considering risk in a more coherent and 
complete manner.
    ``Therefore, the Commission believes that an overall policy on the 
use of PRA in nuclear regulatory activities should be established so 
that the many potential applications of PRA can be implemented in a 
consistent and predictable manner that promotes regulatory stability 
and efficiency. This policy statement sets forth the Commission's 
intention to encourage the use of PRA and to expand the scope of PRA 
applications in all nuclear regulatory matters to the extent supported 
by the state-of-the-art in terms of methods and data.
    `Therefore, the Commission adopts the following policy statement 
regarding the expanded NRC use of PRA:
    (1) The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory 
matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods 
and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic 
approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth 
philosophy.
    (2) PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, 
uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in 
regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-

[[Page 74206]]

of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current 
regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license commitments, and 
staff practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be used to support the 
proposal for additional regulatory requirements in accordance with 10 
CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule). Appropriate procedures for including PRA in 
the process should be developed and followed. It is, of course, 
understood that the intent of this policy is that existing rules and 
regulations shall be complied with unless these rules and regulations 
are revised.
    (3) PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as 
realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should be 
publicly available for review.
    (4) The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and 
subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate 
consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the 
need for proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on nuclear 
power plant licensees.''
    In 10 CFR 50.36, the NRC established its regulatory requirements 
related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required 
to include items in the following five specific categories related to 
station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, 
and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; 
(3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) 
administrative controls. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), 
``Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, 
calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of 
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be 
within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation 
will be met.'' The surveillance requirements are required by 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(3) to reside in TS and will remain in TS. The new TS SFCP will 
provide the necessary surveillance frequency programmatic controls and 
is located in the TS Administrative Controls Section (STS Section 5.0).
    Changes to surveillance frequencies in the SFCP are made using the 
methodology contained in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, including qualitative 
considerations, results of risk analyses, sensitivity studies and any 
bounding analyses, and recommended monitoring of SSCs, are required to 
be documented. Changes to frequencies are subject to regulatory review 
and oversight of the SFCP implementation through the rigorous NRC 
review of safety related SSC performance provided by the reactor 
oversight program (ROP).
    [LICENSEE] SFCP ensures that surveillance requirements specified in 
the TS are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the above 
regulatory requirements are met. Existing regulatory requirements, such 
as 10 CFR 50.65, ``Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of 
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants'' and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 
(corrective action program), require licensee monitoring of 
surveillance test failures and implementing corrective actions to 
address such failures. One of these actions may be to consider 
increasing the frequency at which a surveillance test is performed. In 
addition, the SFCP implementation guidance in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, 
requires monitoring of the performance of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) for which surveillance frequencies are decreased to 
assure reduced testing does not adversely impact the SSCs.
    This change is analogous with other NRC-approved TS changes in 
which the surveillance requirements are retained in technical 
specifications but the related surveillance frequencies are relocated 
to licensee-controlled documents, such as surveillances performed in 
accordance with the In-Service Testing Program and the Primary 
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Thus, this proposed change 
complies with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) by retaining the requirements relating 
to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary 
quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility 
operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting 
conditions for operation will be met and meets the first key safety 
principle articulated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177 (Reference 3) for 
plant-specific, risk-informed TS changes by complying with current 
regulations.
    Licensees are required by TS to perform surveillance test, 
calibration, or inspection on specific safety related system equipment 
such as reactivity control, power distribution, electrical, 
instrumentation, and others to verify system operability. Surveillance 
frequencies, currently identified in TS, are based primarily upon 
deterministic methods such as engineering judgment, operating 
experience, and manufacturer's recommendations. The licensee's use of 
NRC-approved PRA methodologies identified in NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, 
provides a way to establish risk-informed Surveillance frequencies that 
complements the deterministic approach and supports the NRC's 
traditional defense-in-Depth philosophy.
    These regulatory requirements, and the monitoring required by NEI 
04-10, Rev. 1, ensure that surveillance frequencies are sufficient to 
assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 are satisfied and that any 
performance deficiencies will be identified and appropriate corrective 
actions taken.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF-425, Rev. 2, provides for 
administrative relocation of applicable surveillance frequencies, and 
provides for the addition of the SFCP to the administrative controls of 
TS. TSTF-425, Rev. 2, also requires the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 
1, for any changes to surveillance frequencies within the SFCP. The 
licensee's application for the changes proposed in TSTF-425, Rev 2, 
included documentation regarding the probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) technical adequacy consistent with the requirements of Regulatory 
Guide 1.200 (RG-1.200) (Reference 4), ``An Approach for Determining the 
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-
Informed Activities'', Section 4.2. In accordance with NEI 04-10, Rev. 
1, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods are used, in combination 
with plant performance data and other considerations, to identify and 
justify modifications to the surveillance frequencies of equipment at 
nuclear power plants. This is in accordance with guidance provided in 
RG 1.174 (Reference 5) and RG 1.177 in support of changes to 
surveillance test intervals.
    RG 1.177 identifies five key safety principles required for risk-
informed changes to TS. Each of these principles is addressed by the 
industry methodology document, NEI 04-10, Rev. 1. Four of the five 
principles, which relate to the technical aspects of the proposed 
change, are discussed below in Sections 3.1 through 3.4.
3.1 The Proposed Change Is Consistent With the Defense-in-Depth 
Philosophy
    Consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained if:
     A reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core 
damage, prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation.
     Over-reliance on programmatic activities to compensate for 
weaknesses in plant design is avoided.
     System redundancy, independence, and diversity are 
preserved commensurate with the expected frequency, consequences of 
challenges to the system, and uncertainties (e.g., no

[[Page 74207]]

risk outliers). Because the scope of the proposed methodology is 
limited to revision of surveillance frequencies, the redundancy, 
independence, and diversity of plant systems are not impacted.
     Defenses against potential common cause failures are 
preserved, and the potential for the introduction of new common cause 
failure mechanisms is assessed.
     Independence of barriers is not degraded.
     Defenses against human errors are preserved.
     The intent of the General Design Criteria in 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix A, is maintained.
    TSTF-425, Rev. 2, requires the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, 
for any changes to surveillance frequencies within the SFCP. NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1, uses both the core damage frequency (CDF) and the large early 
release frequency (LERF) metrics to evaluate the impact of proposed 
changes to surveillance frequencies. The guidance of RG 1.174 and RG 
1.177 for changes to CDF and LERF is achieved by evaluation using a 
comprehensive risk analysis, which assesses the impact of proposed 
changes including contributions from human errors and common cause 
failures. Defense-in-depth is also included in the methodology 
explicitly as a qualitative consideration outside of the risk analysis, 
as is the potential impact on detection of component degradation that 
could lead to increased likelihood of common cause failures. Both the 
quantitative risk analysis and the qualitative considerations assure a 
reasonable balance of defense-in-depth is maintained to ensure 
protection of public health and safety, satisfying the second key 
safety principle of RG 1.177.
3.2 The Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margins
    The engineering evaluation conducted by the licensee assessed the 
impact of the proposed TS change with the principle that sufficient 
safety margins are maintained. The guidelines used for making that 
assessment included ensuring the proposed TS Surveillance test 
frequency change is not in conflict with approved industry codes and 
standards or adversely affects any assumptions or inputs to the safety 
analysis, or, if such inputs are affected, justification is provided to 
ensure sufficient safety margin will continue to exist.
    The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria for 
SSCs, specified in applicable codes and standards (or alternatives 
approved for use by the NRC) will continue to be met as described in 
the plant licensing basis (including the Final Safety Analysis Report 
and bases to TS), since these are not affected by changes to the 
surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact to safety 
analysis acceptance criteria as described in the plant licensing basis.
    Thus, safety margins are maintained by the proposed methodology, 
and the third key safety principle of RG 1.177 is satisfied.
3.3 When Proposed Changes Result in an Increase in Core Damage 
Frequency or Risk, the Increases Should Be Small and Consistent With 
the Intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement
    RG 1.177 provides a framework for risk evaluation of proposed 
changes to surveillance frequencies, which requires identification of 
the risk contribution from impacted surveillances, determination of the 
risk impact from the change to the proposed surveillance frequency, and 
performance of sensitivity and uncertainty evaluations. TSTF-425, Rev. 
2, requires application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1, satisfies the intent of RG 1.177 requirements for evaluation of 
the change in risk, and for assuring that such changes are small by 
providing the technical methodology to support risk informed technical 
specifications for control of surveillance frequencies.
3.4.1 Quality of the PRA
    The quality of the [LICENSEE] PRA is compatible with the safety 
implications of the proposed TS change and the role the PRA plays in 
justifying the change. That is, the more the potential change in risk 
or the greater the uncertainty in that risk from the requested TS 
change, or both, the more rigor that must go into ensuring the quality 
of the PRA.
    [LICENSEE] used RG 1.200 to address the plant PRA technical 
adequacy. RG 1.200 is NRC developed regulatory guidance, which 
addresses the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) RA-Sb-2005, Addenda to ASME RA-S-2002 Standard for Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Reference 6), and 
the NEI peer review process NEI 00-02, PRA Peer Review Process Guidance 
(Reference 7). The licensee has performed an assessment of the PRA 
models used to support the SFCP against the requirements of RG 1.200 to 
assure that the PRA models are capable of determining the change in 
risk due to changes to surveillance frequencies of SSCs, using plant 
specific data and models. Capability category II of ASME RA-Sb-2005 is 
applied as the standard, and any identified deficiencies to those 
requirements are assessed further in sensitivity studies to determine 
any impacts to proposed decreases to surveillance frequencies. This 
level of PRA quality, combined with the proposed sensitivity studies, 
is sufficient to support the evaluation of changes proposed to 
surveillance frequencies within the SFCP, and is consistent with 
regulatory position 2.3.1 of RG 1.177.
3.4.2 Scope of the PRA
    [LICENSEE] is required to evaluate each proposed change to a 
relocated surveillance frequency using the guidance contained in NEI 
04-10, Rev. 1, to determine its potential impact on risk, due to 
impacts from internal events, fires, seismic, other external events, 
and from shutdown conditions. Consideration is made of both CDF and 
LERF metrics. In cases where a PRA of sufficient scope or where 
quantitative risk models were unavailable, [LICENSEE] uses bounding 
analyses, or other conservative quantitative evaluations. A qualitative 
screening analysis may be used when the surveillance frequency impact 
on plant risk is shown to be negligible or zero. The licensee's 
evaluation methodology is sufficient to ensure the scope of the risk 
contribution of each surveillance frequency change is properly 
identified for evaluation, and is consistent with regulatory position 
2.3.2 of RG 1.177.
3.4.3 PRA Modeling
    The [LICENSEE] determines whether the SSCs affected by a proposed 
change to a surveillance frequency are modeled in the PRA. Where the 
SSC is directly or implicitly modeled, a quantitative evaluation of the 
risk impact may be carried out. The methodology adjusts the failure 
probability of the impacted SSCs, including any impacted common cause 
failure modes, based on the proposed change to the surveillance 
frequency. Where the SSC is not modeled in the PRA, bounding analyses 
are performed to characterize the impact of the proposed change to 
surveillance frequency. Potential impacts on the risk analyses due to 
screening criteria and truncation levels are addressed by the 
requirements for PRA technical adequacy consistent with guidance 
contained in RG 1.200, and by sensitivity studies identified in NEI 04-
10, Rev. 1.
    The licensee performs quantitative evaluations of the impact of 
selected testing strategy (i.e., staggered testing or sequential 
testing) consistent with the

[[Page 74208]]

guidance of NUREG/CR-6141 and NUREG/CR-5497, as discussed in NEI 04-10 
Rev. 1.
    Thus, through the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, the [LICENSEE] 
PRA modeling is sufficient to ensure an acceptable evaluation of risk 
for the proposed changes in surveillance frequency, and is consistent 
with regulatory position 2.3.3 of RG 1.177.
3.4.4 Assumptions for Time Related Failure Contributions
    The failure probabilities of SSCs modeled in the [LICENSEE] PRA 
[include] a standby time-related contribution and a cyclic demand-
related contribution. NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, criteria adjust the time-
related failure contribution of SSCs affected by the proposed change to 
surveillance frequency. This is consistent with RG 1.177 Section 2.3.3 
which permits separation of the failure rate contributions into demand 
and standby for evaluation of surveillance requirements. If the 
available data do not support distinguishing between the time-related 
failures and demand failures, then the change to surveillance frequency 
is conservatively assumed to impact the total failure probability of 
the SSC, including both standby and demand contributions. The SSC 
failure rate (per unit time) is assumed to be unaffected by the change 
in test frequency, and will be confirmed by the required monitoring and 
feedback implemented after the change in surveillance frequency is 
implemented. The process requires consideration of qualitative sources 
of information with regards to potential impacts of test frequency on 
SSC performance, including industry and plant-specific operating 
experience, vendor recommendations, industry standards, and code-
specified test intervals. Thus the process is not reliant upon risk 
analyses as the sole basis for the proposed changes.
    The potential beneficial risk impacts of reduced surveillance 
frequency, including reduced downtime, lesser potential for restoration 
errors, reduction of potential for test caused transients, and reduced 
test-caused wear of equipment, are identified qualitatively, but are 
conservatively not required to be quantitatively assessed. Thus, 
through the application of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, [LICENSEE] has employed 
reasonable assumptions with regard to extensions of surveillance test 
intervals, and is consistent with regulatory position 2.3.4 of RG 
1.177.
3.4.5 Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analyses
    NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, requires sensitivity studies to assess the 
impact of uncertainties from key assumptions of the PRA, uncertainty in 
the failure probabilities of the affected SSCs, impact to the frequency 
of initiating events, and of any identified deviations from capability 
category II of ASME PRA Standard (ASME RA-Sb-2005) (Reference 4). Where 
the sensitivity analyses identify a potential impact on the proposed 
change, revised surveillance frequencies are considered, along with any 
qualitative considerations that may bear on the results of such 
sensitivity studies. Required monitoring and feedback of SSC 
performance once the revised surveillance frequencies are implemented 
will also be performed. Thus, through the application of NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1, [LICENSEE] has appropriately considered the possible impact of 
PRA model uncertainty and sensitivity to key assumptions and model 
limitations, consistent with regulatory position 2.3.5 of RG 1.177.
3.4.6 Acceptance Guidelines
    [LICENSEE] quantitatively evaluates the change in total risk 
(including internal and external events contributions) in terms of core 
damage frequency (CDF) and large early release fraction (LERF) for both 
the individual risk impact of a proposed change in surveillance 
frequency and the cumulative impact from all individual changes to 
surveillance frequencies. Each individual change to surveillance 
frequency must show a risk impact below 1E-6 per year for change to 
CDF, and below 1E-7 per year for change to LERF. These are consistent 
with the limits of RG 1.174 for very small changes in risk. Where the 
RG 1.174 limits are not met, the process either considers revised 
surveillance frequencies which are consistent with RG 1.174, or the 
process terminates without permitting the proposed changes. Where 
quantitative results are unavailable to permit comparison to acceptance 
guidelines, appropriate qualitative analyses are required to 
demonstrate that the associated risk impact of a proposed change to 
surveillance frequency is negligible or zero. Otherwise, bounding 
quantitative analyses are required which demonstrate the risk impact is 
at least one order of magnitude lower than the RG 1.174 acceptance 
guidelines for very small changes in risk. In addition to assessing 
each individual SSC surveillance frequency change, the cumulative 
impact of all changes must result in a risk impact below 1E-5 per year 
for change to CDF, and below 1E-6 per year for change to LERF, and the 
total CDF and total LERF must be reasonably shown to be less than 1E-4 
per year and 1E-5 per year, respectively. These are consistent with the 
limits of RG 1.174 for acceptable changes in risk, as referenced by RG 
1.177 for changes to surveillance frequencies. The staff interprets 
this assessment of cumulative risk as a requirement to calculate the 
change in risk from a baseline model utilizing failure probabilities 
based on the surveillance frequencies prior to implementation of the 
SFCP, compared to a revised model with failure probabilities based on 
changed surveillance frequencies. The staff further notes that 
[LICENSEE] includes a provision to exclude the contribution to 
cumulative risk from individual changes to surveillance frequencies 
associated with small risk increases (less than 5E-8 CDF and 5E-9 LERF) 
once the baseline PRA models are updated to include the effects of the 
revised surveillance frequencies.
    The quantitative acceptance guidance of RG 1.174 is necessary but 
not sufficient to accept decreases in surveillance frequencies. The 
process also considers qualitative information to evaluate the proposed 
changes to surveillance frequencies, including industry and plant-
specific operating experience, vendor recommendations, industry 
standards, the results of sensitivity studies, and SSC performance data 
and test history.
    The final acceptability of the proposed change is based on all of 
these considerations and not solely on the PRA results compared to 
numerical acceptance guidelines. Post implementation performance 
monitoring and feedback are also required to assure continued 
reliability of the components. The licensee's application of NEI 04-10, 
Rev. 1, provides reasonable acceptance guidelines and methods for 
evaluating the risk increase of proposed changes to surveillance 
frequencies, consistent with Regulatory Position 2.4 of RG 1.177. 
Therefore, the proposed [LICENSEE] methodology satisfies the fourth key 
safety principle of RG 1.177 by assuring any increase in risk is small 
consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy 
Statement.
3.4.7 The Impact of the Proposed Change Should Be Monitored Using 
Performance Measurement Strategies
    [LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF-425, Rev. 2, requires application of 
NEI 04-

[[Page 74209]]

10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, requires performance 
monitoring of SSCs whose surveillance frequency has been revised as 
part of a feedback process to assure that the change in test frequency 
has not resulted in degradation of equipment performance and 
operational safety. The monitoring and feedback includes consideration 
of maintenance rule monitoring of equipment performance. In the event 
of degradation of SSC performance, the surveillance frequency will be 
reassessed in accordance with the methodology, in addition to any 
corrective actions which may apply as part of the maintenance rule 
requirements. The performance monitoring and feedback specified in NEI 
04-10, Rev. 1, is sufficient to reasonably assure acceptable SSC 
performance and is consistent with regulatory position 3.2 of RG 1.177. 
Thus, the fifth key safety principle of RG 1.177 is satisfied.
3.4.8 Addition of Surveillance Frequency Control Program to TS Section 
5
    [LICENSEE] has included the SFCP and specific requirements into TS 
Section [5.5.15 or 5.5.18], administrative controls, as follows:
    This program provides controls for surveillance frequencies. The 
program ensures that surveillance requirements specified in the 
technical specifications are performed at intervals (frequencies) 
sufficient to assure that the associated limiting conditions for 
operation are met.
    a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program contains a list of 
frequencies of those surveillance requirements for which the frequency 
is controlled by the program.
    b. Changes to the frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency 
Control Program shall be made in accordance with NEI 04-10, ``Risk-
Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' Revision 1.
    c. The provisions of surveillance requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are 
applicable to the frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency 
Control Program.
Summary and Conclusions
    The staff has reviewed the [LICENSEE] proposed relocation of 
surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled document, and 
controlling changes to surveillance frequencies in accordance with a 
new program, the SFCP, identified in the administrative controls of TS. 
The SFCP and TS Section [5.5.15, 5.5.18] references NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, 
which provides a risk-informed methodology using plant-specific risk 
insights and performance data to revise surveillance frequencies within 
the SFCP. This methodology supports relocating surveillance frequencies 
from TS to a licensee-controlled document, provided those frequencies 
are changed in accordance with NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, as referenced in the 
administrative controls of the TS.
    The proposed [LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF-425, Rev. 2, and risk-
informed methodology of NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, as referenced in the 
administrative controls of TS, satisfies the key principles of risk-
informed decision making applied to changes to TS as delineated in RG 
1.177 and RG 1.174, in that:
     The proposed change meets current regulations;
     The proposed change is consistent with defense-in-depth 
philosophy;
     The proposed change maintains sufficient safety margins;
     Increases in risk resulting from the proposed change are 
small and consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy 
Statement; and
     The impact of the proposed change is monitored with 
performance measurement strategies.
    10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states ``Technical specifications will include 
items in the following categories: Surveillance Requirements. 
Surveillance Requirements are requirements relating to test, 
calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of 
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be 
within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation 
will be met.'' The NRC staff finds that with the proposed relocation of 
surveillance frequencies to an owner-controlled document and 
administratively controlled in accordance with the TS SFCP, [LICENSEE] 
continues to meet the regulatory requirement of 10 CFR 50.36, and 
specifically, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), surveillance requirements.
    The NRC has concluded, on the basis of the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the NRC's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will 
not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the NRC's regulations, the [ ] State official 
was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State 
official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment[s] change[s] a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves 
no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in 
the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that 
there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative 
occupational radiation exposure. The NRC has previously issued a 
proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards 
consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding 
published [DATE] ([] FR []). Accordingly, the amendment meets the 
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 References

1. TSTF-425, Revision 2, ``Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to 
Licensee Control--RITSTF Initiative 5b,'' January 17, 2008 (ADAMS 
Accession Number: ML080280275).
2. NEI 04-10, ``Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 
5B, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' 
April 2007 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML071360456).
3. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decision-making: Technical Specifications,'' August 1998 
(ADAMS Accession Number: ML003740176).
4. Regulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 1 ``An Approach for Determining the 
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for 
Risk-Informed Activities,'' Revision 1, January 2007 (ADAMS 
Accession Number: ML070240001).
5. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes 
to the Licensing Basis,'' NRC, August 1998 (ADAMS Accession Number: 
ML003740133).
6. ASME PRA Standard ASME RA-Sb-2005, Addenda to ASME RA-S-2002, 
``Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 
Application.''
7. NEI 00-02, Rev. 1 ``Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer 
Review Process Guidance, Rev. 1, May 2006 (ADAMS

[[Page 74210]]

Accession Number: ML061510621).

[FR Doc. E8-28850 Filed 12-4-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P