[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 188 (Friday, September 26, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55833-55840]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22678]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Record of Decision: Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for 
Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM

AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of Decision 
(ROD) for the continued operation of the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico. This ROD is based on information and 
analyses contained in the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Continued Operation of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, DOE/EIS-0380 (Final SWEIS or 2008 
SWEIS) issued on May 16, 2008; comments on the SWEIS; and other 
factors, including costs, security considerations and the missions of 
NNSA.
    In the 2008 SWEIS, NNSA assessed three alternatives for the 
continued operation of LANL: (1) No Action, (2) Reduced Operations, and 
(3) Expanded Operations. The No Action Alternative analyzed in this 
SWEIS consists of NNSA and LANL continuing to implement earlier 
decisions based on previous National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
reviews, including the 1999 LANL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0238) and its ROD (64 
FR 50797, Sept. 20, 1999). The 2008 SWEIS identified the Expanded 
Operations Alternative as NNSA's Preferred Alternative. The SWEIS 
includes a classified appendix that assesses the potential 
environmental

[[Page 55834]]

impacts of a representative set of credible terrorist scenarios.
    Because NNSA is continuing to evaluate significant technical and 
national security issues that could affect the operation and missions 
of LANL, NNSA is making only a few decisions at this time regarding the 
continued operation of the laboratory. NNSA will not make any decisions 
regarding nuclear weapons production and other actions analyzed in the 
Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) (Complex Transformation SPEIS or SPEIS) 
prior to the completion of the SPEIS. However, NNSA must make some 
decisions now regarding LANL to support the safe and successful 
execution of the laboratory's current missions. It is likely that NNSA 
will issue other RODs regarding the continued operation of LANL based 
on the 2008 SWEIS, the SPEIS and other NEPA analyses.
    NNSA has decided to continue to implement the No Action Alternative 
with the addition of some elements of the Expanded Operations 
Alternative. These elements include increases in operation of some 
existing facilities and new facility projects needed for ongoing 
programs and protection of workers and the environment. For the most 
part, NNSA will continue the missions conducted at LANL at current 
levels at this time. NNSA will also continue to implement actions 
necessary to comply with the March 2005 Compliance Order on Consent 
(Consent Order), which requires investigation and remediation of 
environmental contamination at LANL. NNSA will not change pit 
production at LANL at this time; the 1999 ROD set pit production at 
LANL at 20 per year.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 2008 
LANL SWEIS or this ROD, or to receive a copy of this SWEIS or ROD, 
contact: Ms. Elizabeth Withers, Document Manager, U.S. Department of 
Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center, Post 
Office Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM 87185, (505) 845-4984. Questions about 
the SWEIS, ROD and other issues regarding the Los Alamos Site Office's 
NEPA compliance program may also be addressed to Mr. George J. Rael, 
Assistant Manager Environmental Operations, NEPA Compliance Officer, 
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Los Alamos Site Office, 3747 West Jemez Road, Los Alamos, NM 87544. Mr. 
Rael may be contacted by telephone at (505) 665-0308, or by e-mail at: 
[email protected]. For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: 
Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance 
(GC-20), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756. Additional information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access 
to many DOE NEPA documents are available on the Internet through the 
DOE NEPA Web site at: http://www.gc.energy.gov/nepa/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    NNSA prepared this ROD pursuant to the regulations of the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 
1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). 
DOE last issued a SWEIS and ROD for the continued operation of LANL in 
1999. DOE's NEPA regulations require that the Department evaluate site-
wide NEPA analyses every five years to determine their continued 
applicability; NNSA initiated such an evaluation of the 1999 SWEIS in 
2004. It subsequently decided to prepare a new SWEIS. NNSA issued a 
Draft SWEIS in July 2006 for public review and comment during a 75-day 
period. It considered the comments received on the Draft SWEIS in 
preparing the Final SWEIS, which it issued on May 16, 2008.
    LANL is a multidisciplinary, multipurpose research institution in 
north-central New Mexico, about 60 miles (97 kilometers) north-
northeast of Albuquerque, and about 25 miles (40 kilometers) northwest 
of Santa Fe. LANL occupies approximately 25,600 acres (10,360 
hectares), or 40 square miles (104 square kilometers). About 2,000 
structures, with a total of approximately 8.6 million square feet under 
roof, house LANL operations and activities, with about one half of the 
area used as laboratory or production space, and the remainder used for 
administrative, storage, services, and other purposes.
    LANL is one of NNSA's three national security laboratories. 
Facilities and expertise at LANL are used to perform science and 
engineering research; the laboratory also manufactures some nuclear 
weapons components such as plutonium pits. In addition to weapons 
component manufacturing, LANL performs weapons testing, stockpile 
assurance, component replacement, surveillance, and maintenance. LANL's 
research and development activities include high explosives processing, 
chemical research, nuclear physics research, materials science 
research, systems analysis and engineering, human genome mapping, 
biotechnology applications, and remote sensing technologies. The main 
role of LANL in the fulfillment of NNSA and DOE missions is scientific 
and technological work that supports nuclear materials handling, 
processing, and fabrication; stockpile management; materials and 
manufacturing technologies; nonproliferation programs; and waste 
management activities. Work at LANL is also conducted for other Federal 
agencies such as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, as 
well as universities, institutions, and private entities.

Alternatives Considered

    The alternatives NNSA evaluated in the SWEIS span a range of 
operations from minimum levels that would maintain essential mission 
capabilities (Reduced Operations Alternative) through the highest 
reasonably foreseeable levels that could be supported by current or new 
facilities (Expanded Operations Alternative). The No Action Alternative 
evaluated in the SWEIS consists of the continued implementation of 
decisions announced in the 1999 SWEIS ROD and decisions based on other 
completed NEPA reviews. The Reduced Operations Alternative assumes a 
reduction in the levels of certain operations and activities from the 
levels evaluated in the No Action Alternative. The Expanded Operations 
Alternative includes activities evaluated in the No Action Alternative, 
increases in overall operational levels, and new projects that fall 
into three categories: (1) Projects to maintain existing operations and 
capabilities (such as projects to replace aging structures with modern 
ones, and projects to consolidate operations and eliminate unneeded 
structures); (2) projects that support environmental remediation at 
LANL and compliance with the Consent Order, including demolition of 
excess buildings; and (3) projects that add new infrastructure and 
expand existing capabilities.

Compliance With the Consent Order

    NNSA and LANL will continue to implement actions necessary to 
comply with the Consent Order, which requires the investigation and 
remediation of environmental contamination at LANL, regardless of the 
alternative it selects for the continued operation of the laboratory. 
The 2008 SWEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of actions

[[Page 55835]]

required under the Consent Order,\1\ and actions proposed by NNSA to 
facilitate its compliance with the Order (such as replacement of waste 
management structures, and establishment of waste examination and 
staging areas) under the Expanded Operations Alternative so that the 
impacts of these actions can be distinguished from the impacts of other 
proposed actions.
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    \1\ The Consent Order was issued by the New Mexico Environment 
Department (NMED). As NMED makes the decisions regarding the 
requirements of the Order, these decisions are not subject to NEPA 
because they are not ``federal actions.''
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Preferred Alternative

    The preferred alternative is the alternative that NNSA believes 
would best fulfill its statutory mission responsibilities while giving 
consideration to economic, budget, environmental, schedule, policy, 
technical and other information. In both the Draft and the Final SWEIS, 
NNSA identified the Expanded Operations Alternative as its preferred 
alternative.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    NEPA's Section 101 (42 U.S.C. 4331) establishes a policy of federal 
agencies having a continuing responsibility to improve and coordinate 
their plans, functions, programs and resources so that, among other 
goals, the nation may fulfill its responsibilities as a trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations. The Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's 
NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, Feb. 23, 1981), defines the 
``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that 
will promote the national environmental policy expressed in NEPA's 
Section 101.''
    The analyses in the SWEIS of the environmental impacts associated 
with operating LANL identified only minor differences among the three 
alternatives across natural and cultural resource areas. Within each of 
the alternatives there are actions that could result in negative 
impacts, as well as those that would produce positive environmental 
effects. Considering the many environmental facets of the alternatives 
analyzed in the SWEIS, and looking out over the long term, NNSA 
believes that implementation of the Expanded Operations Alternative 
would allow it to best achieve its environmental trustee 
responsibilities under Section 101 of NEPA. Facilitating the cleanup of 
the site with new or expanded waste management facilities, and 
replacing older laboratory and production facilities with new buildings 
that incorporate modern safety, security and efficiency standards, 
would improve LANL's ability to protect human health and the 
environment while allowing LANL to continue to fulfill its national 
security missions. Increasing operational levels and performing various 
demolition activities would use additional resources and generate 
additional waste, but NNSA would also undertake actions to modernize 
and replace older facilities with more energy efficient and 
environmentally-protective facilities and to implement waste control 
and environmental practices to minimize impacts. Many of these types of 
actions are not feasible with the outdated infrastructure currently at 
LANL. Under this alternative, NNSA would be better positioned to 
minimize the use of electricity and water, streamline operations 
through consolidation, reduce the ``footprint'' of LANL as a whole, and 
allow some areas to return to a natural state.

NNSA's Responsibilities to Tribal Governments

    NNSA recognizes that the operation of LANL over the last 65 years 
has affected the people of neighboring communities in northern New 
Mexico, including Tribal communities. These effects, which vary in 
nature across communities, include alterations of lifestyles, 
community, and individual practices. With respect to Tribal 
communities, NNSA adheres to federal statutes such as the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the Archaeological 
Resources Protection Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 
and the National Historic Preservation Act. NNSA follows Executive 
Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments; Executive Order 13007, Indian Sacred Sites; Executive 
Order 13021, Tribal Colleges and Universities; and Executive Order 
12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority 
Populations and Low-Income Populations. NNSA also follows the 2004 
Presidential Memorandum regarding Government-to-Government 
Relationships with Native American Tribal Governments, DOE's American 
Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Government Policy, DOE Order 1230.2 and 
DOE Notice 144.1, which establish principles and policies for the 
Department's relations with Tribes. NNSA has established cooperative 
agreements with Tribal nations that are located near NNSA sites to 
enhance their involvement in environmental restoration while protecting 
Tribal rights and resources.
    Four Pueblo governments in the vicinity of LANL have signed 
individual Accord Agreements with NNSA (Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, 
Cochiti, and Jemez). The Accord Agreements, together with the recently 
established Environmental Management/NNSA tribal framework, provide a 
basis for conducting government-to-government relations and serve as a 
foundation for addressing issues of mutual concern between the 
Department and the Pueblos. In furtherance of these Accord Agreements, 
and specifically to address concerns and issues raised by the Santa 
Clara Pueblo, the implementation of the decisions in this ROD will be 
undertaken in conjunction with a Mitigation Action Plan (MAP), which 
will be updated as needed to address specific concerns and issues 
raised by the Santa Clara and other Tribal communities.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    NNSA analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on land 
use; visual resources; site infrastructure; air quality; noise; geology 
and soils; surface and groundwater quality; ecological resources; 
cultural and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health 
impacts; environmental justice; and waste management and pollution 
prevention. NNSA also evaluated the impacts of each alternative as to 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources, and the 
relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. In addition, it 
evaluated impacts of potential accidents at LANL on workers and 
surrounding populations. In a classified appendix, NNSA also evaluated 
the potential impacts of intentional destructive acts that might occur 
at LANL.
    The 2008 SWEIS's impact analyses for normal operations (i.e., 
operations without accidents or intentional destructive acts) 
identified the most notable differences in potential environmental 
impacts among the alternatives in the following resource areas: geology 
and soils; radiological air quality; human health; site infrastructure 
(electric power use, natural gas demand, potable water demand, and 
waste management demands); and transportation. It also identified minor 
differences in potential environmental impacts among the alternatives 
under normal operations for: land use; visual environment; surface 
water resources; groundwater resources; non-radiological air quality; 
noise levels; ecological resources; cultural resources; and 
socioeconomics.

[[Page 55836]]

These findings are described in the Summary and Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
SWEIS.
    Environmental justice was an impact area of particular concern 
among those who commented on the SWEIS. NNSA recognizes that the 
operation of LANL over the last 65 years has affected the people of 
neighboring communities, including minority and low-income households. 
These effects, which vary in nature across communities, include 
alterations of lifestyles, community, and individual practices. 
Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, requires every 
Federal agency to analyze whether its proposed actions and alternatives 
would have disproportionately high and adverse impacts on minority or 
low-income populations. Based on the impacts analysis, NNSA expects no 
disproportionately high and adverse impacts on minority or low-income 
populations from the continued operation of LANL under any of the 
alternatives. From the analysis conducted of the alternatives, the 
radiological dose from emissions from normal operations are slightly 
lower for members of Hispanic, Native American, total minority, and 
low-income populations than for members of the population that are not 
in these groups, mainly because of the locations of these populations 
relative to the operations at LANL that produce these emissions. The 
maximum annual dose for the average member of any of the minority or 
low-income populations is estimated to be 0.092 millirem compared to a 
dose of 0.10 millirem for a member of the general population, and a 
dose of 0.11 millirem for a member of the population that does not 
belong to a minority or low-income group.
    NNSA also analyzed human health impacts from exposure through 
special pathways, including subsistence consumption of native 
vegetation (pi[ntilde]on nuts and Indian Tea [Cota]), locally grown 
produce and farm products, groundwater, surface waters, fish (game and 
nongame), game animals, other foodstuffs and incidental consumption of 
soils and sediments (on produce, in surface water, and from ingestion 
of inhaled dust). These special pathways can be important to the 
environmental justice analyses because some of them may be more 
important or prevalent as to the traditional and cultural practices of 
members of minority populations in the area. The analyses conducted for 
the 2008 SWEIS, however, show that the health impacts associated with 
these special pathways do not result in disproportionately high and 
adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations.
    The SWEIS analyzed potential accidents at LANL. Bounding accidents 
for both nuclear materials handling and waste management operations and 
for chemical handling and waste management operations, were identified 
as those with the highest potential consequences to the offsite 
population under median site meteorological conditions. Chemicals of 
concern were selected from a database based on quantities, chemical 
properties, and human health effects. In making the decisions announced 
in this ROD, NNSA considered the potential accidents analyzed in the 
SWEIS for each of the three alternative levels of LANL operations. For 
the most part, there are few differences among the alternatives for the 
maximum potential wildfire, seismic, or facility operational accident 
at LANL because actions under each alternative do not, for the most 
part, affect the location, frequency, or material at risk of the 
analyzed accident scenarios. Potential accidents that could occur under 
the No Action Alternative could also occur under both the Reduced 
Operations and the Expanded Operations Alternatives. In general, TA-54 
waste management operations dominate the potential radiological 
accident risks and consequences at LANL under all three alternatives.
    Under both the No Action and the Reduced Operations Alternatives, 
the accident with the highest estimated consequences to offsite 
populations involving radioactive material or wastes is a lightning-
initiated fire at the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility in 
TA-54. Such an accident could result in up to 6 additional latent 
cancer fatalities (LCFs) in the offsite population. A fire at the 
Plutonium Facility's material staging area located within TA-55 could 
result in up to 5 additional LCFs in the offsite population. The 
potential accident expected to result in the highest estimated 
consequences to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual (MEI) and 
a non-involved nearby worker would be a fire in a waste storage dome at 
TA-54. If that accident were to occur, a single LCF to a noninvolved 
worker located 110 yards (100 meters) away from the site of the 
accident would be likely, and there could also be a 1 in 2 likelihood 
(0.50) of a LCF to the MEI, who is assumed to be located at the nearest 
site boundary for the duration of the accident. The lightning-initiated 
fire accident at the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility 
could also result in a single LCF to a noninvolved worker located 110 
yards (100 meters) away from the site of the accident, and could also 
result in about the same 1 in 2 likelihood (0.49) of a LCF to the MEI 
assumed to be located at the nearest boundary for the duration of the 
accident.
    Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, there is a potential for 
a radiological accident unique to this alternative. The radiological 
accident most likely to result in the highest estimated consequences to 
the offsite population is a building fire involving radioactive sealed 
sources stored at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. Such 
an accident could result in up to 7 additional LCFs in the offsite 
population. The potential accident expected to result in the highest 
estimated consequences to the hypothetical MEI and a non-involved 
nearby worker would be the same as for the No Action Alternative, 
namely, a fire in a waste storage dome at TA-54.
    DOE evaluates the exposure risks associated with chemicals of 
concern and the requirements for crisis response personnel to use 
personal protection to avoid potentially dangerous exposures through 
its system of Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG). Chemicals 
of concern in the analyzed accidents at LANL under both the No Action 
and Reduced Operations Alternatives include selenium hexafluoride and 
sulfur dioxide, both from waste cylinder storage at TA-54, and chlorine 
and helium gases located at TA-55. Annual risks of worker and public 
exposure in the event of chemical releases are greatest from chlorine 
and helium gases. The annual risk is estimated to be about one chance 
in 15 years for workers within 1,181 yards (1,080 meters) of the 
facility receiving exposures in excess of the ERPG limits for chlorine 
gas, with the nearest public access located at 1,111 yards (1,016 
meters). The annual risk is estimated to be about one chance in 15 
years for workers within 203 yards (186 meters) of the facility 
receiving exposures in excess of ERPG limits for helium gas, with the 
nearest public access at 1,146 yards (1,048 meters).
    Cleanup activities of Material Disposal Areas (MDAs) are analyzed 
under the Expanded Operations Alternative. These activities pose a risk 
of accidental releases of toxic chemicals, as there is a degree of 
uncertainty about how much and what chemicals were disposed of in the 
MDAs. MDA B is the closest disposal area to the boundary of LANL that 
will require remediation; remediation by waste removal was assumed for 
the analysis of a bounding accidental chemical release. Sulfur

[[Page 55837]]

dioxide gas and beryllium powder were chosen as the bounding chemicals 
of concern for this area based on their ERPG values. If present at MDA 
B in the quantities assumed, both of these chemicals would likely 
dissipate to safe levels very close to the point of their release. 
However, there is a potential risk to the public due to the short 
distance between MDA B and the nearest point where a member of the 
public might be.

Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement

    NNSA distributed more than 1,030 copies of the Final SWEIS to 
Congressional members and committees, the State of New Mexico, Tribal 
governments and organizations, local governments, other Federal 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. NNSA 
received comments on the Final SWEIS from the Santa Clara Indian 
Pueblo; the Members and Residents of Santa Clara Pueblo; Concerned 
Citizens for Nuclear Safety, together with Robert H. Gilkeson and the 
Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group; Citizen Action New 
Mexico; Nuclear Watch New Mexico; Citizens for Alternatives to 
Radioactive Dumping, and from nearby farmers.
    Comments on the Final SWEIS included issues already raised during 
the comment period for the Draft SWEIS. Volume 3 of the Final SWEIS 
contains all comments received on the Draft SWEIS and NNSA's responses 
to them; this chapter also describes how these comments resulted in 
changes to the SWEIS.
    The Santa Clara Indian Pueblo identified three main areas of 
concern: (1) Government-to-government consultation should have taken 
place before the issuance of the Final SWEIS; (2) environmental justice 
issues (including cumulative impacts) were not analyzed properly in the 
Final SWEIS; and (3) going forward with an increase in plutonium pit 
production at this time would be premature and violate NEPA. In a 
letter signed by 226 individuals, the Members and Residents of the 
Santa Clara Pueblo stated their support for comments on the SWEIS 
submitted by the tribal leaders. They also stated their opposition to 
increased plutonium pit production and specifically asked ``that (1) 
proper analysis of environmental justice and accumulative impacts be 
completed and circulated to the public for comments; (2) that NNSA/DOE 
honor government-to-government consultation and the process as a trust 
to Indian Tribes (Santa Clara Pueblo); and (3) that no decision about 
increasing plutonium pit production be made until review of this issue 
mandated in a new law (the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008) is completed.''
    To the extent that Santa Clara Pueblo perceived NNSA's action in 
delaying government-to-government consultation until after the issuance 
of the Final SWEIS and before the issuance of this ROD to be 
inconsistent with appropriate protocol for such consultations, this was 
not intended. NNSA believes that it followed the requirements of DOE 
Order 1230.2, U.S. Department of Energy American Indian and Alaska 
Native Tribal Government Policy, in consulting through the formal 
government-to-government process with Santa Clara Pueblo prior to 
making the decisions announced in this ROD. However, given the two-year 
time period between the issuance of the Draft SWEIS in 2006 and the 
issuance of the Final SWEIS in 2008, NNSA acknowledges that it could 
have been more prompt in engaging in government-to-government 
consultation with the Santa Clara Pueblo. NNSA will work to improve its 
consultation process.
    With regard to the impact analysis of environmental justice issues 
(including cumulative impacts) in the Final SWEIS, NNSA believes that 
it appropriately analyzed the potential for disproportionately high and 
adverse impacts to minority and low-income populations located within a 
50-mile radius of LANL under all alternatives, and that it also 
appropriately analyzed cumulative impacts to the extent that future 
actions are known or foreseeable. However, NNSA recognizes that many of 
the concerns the Santa Clara expressed are rooted in protected cultural 
and religious practices of its people. With this in mind, NNSA will 
undertake implementation of the decisions announced in this ROD in 
conjunction with a MAP. The MAP will be updated as the need arises to 
identify actions that would address specific concerns and issues raised 
by the Santa Clara as well as those of other tribal entities in the 
area of LANL.
    NNSA agrees that decisions at this time on proposed actions 
analyzed in the Complex Transformation SPEIS, including decisions 
regarding the number of plutonium pits LANL will produce, would be 
premature. NNSA will not make any decisions on pit production until 
after it completes the SPEIS.
    Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, together with Robert H. 
Gilkeson and the Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group, raised 
several concerns with the Final SWEIS: issuance of the Final SWEIS is 
premature because there could be a future Congressional change in the 
purpose and need to operate LANL; there is an uncertain seismic hazard 
at LANL; the Final SWEIS does not comply with NEPA because it omitted 
an analysis of prime farmland; LANL does not have a reliable network of 
monitoring wells; radionuclides have been found in the drinking water 
wells of Los Alamos County, San Ildefonso Pueblo, and Santa Fe; and 
storm flow and sediment transport are primary mechanisms for potential 
contaminant transport beyond LANL's boundaries.
    NNSA does not agree that issuance of the Final SWEIS and a ROD is 
premature. Should Congress or the President direct changes regarding 
the purpose and need to operate LANL, NNSA may need to conduct 
additional NEPA reviews or amend this ROD. Federal agencies always face 
the possibility that in the future the Congress or the President may 
direct changes in their missions and responsibilities. At this time, 
NNSA is making only a limited set of decisions regarding actions that 
need to be implemented now. These decisions do not limit or prejudice 
the decisions NNSA may make regarding the programmatic alternatives it 
is evaluating in the Complex Transformation SPEIS.
    New information about seismic risks at LANL (set forth in the 
report Update of the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis and 
Development of Seismic Design Ground Motions at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, 2007, LA-UR-07-3965) may change how hazardous materials are 
stored, operations are conducted, and facilities are constructed or 
renovated. NNSA is conducting a systematic review of LANL structures 
and operations in light of this information. This review, expected to 
be completed in about one year, will identify any necessary changes to 
address the new seismic information. NNSA will then implement the 
necessary changes to LANL facilities and operations based on the 
review's recommendations.
    NNSA contacted the U.S. Department of Agriculture regarding prime 
farmland designations in northern New Mexico and included that 
information in Chapter 4 of the Final SWEIS. No farmland designated by 
that agency as ``prime farmland'' is located within Los Alamos or Santa 
Fe Counties, and only a limited amount of prime farmland is located 
within a 50-mile radius of LANL in Sandoval and Rio Arriba Counties. 
The Farmland Protection Policy Act requires that projects receiving 
Federal funds that would result in the

[[Page 55838]]

permanent conversion of prime farmland to non-farmland (or remove its 
prime rating) must develop and consider alternatives that would not 
result in the conversion. None of the proposed actions at LANL under 
any of the alternatives would result in changes to any designated prime 
farmland or cause it to be re-designated as non-prime farmland.
    Information about the network of monitoring wells, including 
existing and planned wells, is provided in Chapter 4 of the Final 
SWEIS. NNSA acknowledges that past well installation practices have not 
produced the desired network, and will continue to install and 
refurbish wells until adequate information is obtained regarding 
groundwater conditions and contaminant transport within the aquifers in 
the LANL area. Contaminants identified in various drinking water wells 
are being monitored, and drinking water production from these wells may 
be adjusted or discontinued in compliance with health protection 
standards. Additional study of aquifer conditions and contaminant 
transport is needed before long-term corrective actions can be 
identified and implemented. Contaminant transport via surface water 
flow and sediment transport is recognized as the primary mechanisms for 
off-site transport, especially after storms. As the watershed recovers 
from the effects of the Cerro Grande Fire in 2000, the volumes of storm 
water runoff are expected to decrease.
    Citizen Action New Mexico stated its opposition to the Expanded 
Operations Alternative, especially expanded nuclear weapons research 
and production, and asserted that the Final SWEIS did not consider the 
increased impact of plutonium production on children in compliance with 
Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health 
Risks and Safety Risks.
    NNSA believes it has complied with this Executive Order in the 
Final SWEIS. NNSA now uses a more conservative dose-to-risk conversion 
factor in assessing risks of radiation exposures as a result of this 
Order. Use of the new dose-to-risk conversion factor is one of the 
changes noted in NNSA's NEPA process since the issuance of the 1999 
SWEIS (Chapter 6 and Appendix C of the SWEIS). As noted previously, 
NNSA is not making any decisions at this time that would result in 
expansion of nuclear weapons production.
    In comments on the Final SWEIS, Nuclear Watch New Mexico (NWNM) 
stated that: Expanded plutonium pit production is not necessary; 
potential impacts of the proposed Radiological Science Institute are 
not adequately analyzed in the Final SWEIS and that a project-specific 
EIS is necessary for the institute; waste volumes identified in the 
Final SWEIS do not reconcile with those in NNSA's Draft Complex 
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic EIS; there is confusion about 
whether the proposed Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility, which is the subject 
of another DOE programmatic EIS, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
Programmatic EIS (the GNEP PEIS), would be used for research and 
development or for full-scale reprocessing (and the number of 
associated facilities that could be located at LANL); and the Los 
Alamos Science Complex should be funded through the traditional 
Congressional budgetary authorization and appropriation process.
    NNSA believes that it appropriately analyzed the potential impacts 
of the Radiological Science Institute in the Final SWEIS to the extent 
possible at this stage of the project planning process, and 
acknowledged in the Final SWEIS that additional NEPA analyses may be 
necessary if NNSA decides to continue with this proposal. NNSA will 
reconcile and update waste volumes in the Final Complex Transformation 
SPEIS. DOE has decided to eliminate the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility 
from consideration in the GNEP PEIS (for more information, please 
visit: http://www.gnep.energy.gov). NNSA is considering the use of 
alternative financing for the Los Alamos Science Complex; this is an 
appropriate financing approach in certain situations although it has 
been rarely used at LANL.
    NWNM also asked for additional clarification of some of NNSA's 
responses to its comments on the Draft SWEIS and provided additional 
information regarding some of their previous comments. Specifically, 
NWNM asked if all current tests using plutonium at the Dual Axis 
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) are conducted inside 
vessels.
    At present, NNSA is not conducting any tests at DARHT that use 
plutonium, and future tests using plutonium at this facility would be 
conducted inside vessels.
    NWNM asked if the Rendija Canyon Fault is the closest fault to the 
proposed location of the Radiological Science Institute.
    As discussed in the Final SWEIS, it is the closest known fault to 
that location.
    NWNM also requested an unclassified appendix that discusses 
intentional destructive acts at LANL; asserted there should be a 
citation to information compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce's 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; and asked that the Area G Performance 
Assessment and Composite Analysis and the geotechnical report recently 
prepared by LANL be posted on the Internet.
    NNSA considered the preparation of an unclassified discussion of 
the potential environmental impacts of intentional destructive acts at 
LANL, but concluded that such a discussion posed unacceptable security 
risks. Information used to prepare the economic impacts analysis was 
not contained within a discrete study, so a citation is not appropriate 
in this instance. Unclassified documents prepared by LANL are generally 
placed on its Internet site when completed and approved for 
distribution. NWNM may access the LANL Internet site for these specific 
references.
    NWNM correctly pointed out that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) had designated the Espa[ntilde]ola Basin as a Sole Source Aquifer 
in early 2008.
    Once EPA designates a sole source aquifer under its Sole Source 
Aquifer Protection Program, the agency can review proposed projects 
that are to receive Federal funds and that have a potential to 
contaminate the aquifer. Under this review, EPA can request changes to 
a Federally-funded project if it poses a threat to public health by 
contaminating an aquifer to the point where a safe drinking water 
standard could be violated. Projects conducted entirely by Federal 
agencies, or their contractors, at sole source aquifer locations are 
not subject to EPA's review process. NNSA is not proposing any new 
projects that would cause the Espa[ntilde]ola Basin aquifer to exceed a 
safe drinking water standard.
    Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping also commented on 
the Final SWEIS. It asserted that expanded pit production is not 
necessary; that contamination has been found in produce samples; that 
there is prime farm land in the Embudo Valley; that there are 
radionuclides in the Rio Grande, which is a threat to its use as 
drinking water by the city of Santa Fe; and that radioactive cesium has 
been found in soils at the Trampas Lakes, which drain into the Rio 
Grande.
    As NNSA noted in its response to other comments on the Draft SWEIS, 
a single ``false positive'' result was returned from a laboratory 
analyzing fruit specimens grown near LANL. No uptake of radioactive 
contamination

[[Page 55839]]

attributed to LANL operations has been found in produce samples 
obtained from the Embudo Valley. Drinking water supplies for Santa Fe 
must meet Safe Drinking Water Act and other state and municipal 
requirements. Elevated radionuclide concentrations in the soils of 
alpine lake basins within the Rocky Mountain range have been attributed 
to global fallout concentrated through snowfall and specific geomorphic 
conditions.

Decisions

    With limited additions, NNSA has decided to continue operation of 
Los Alamos National Laboratory pursuant to the No Action Alternative 
analyzed in the 2008 SWEIS. The parameters of this alternative are set 
by the 1999 ROD and other decisions that NNSA has made previously 
regarding the continued operation of LANL. The additions to the No 
Action Alternative NNSA has decided to implement at this time consist 
of elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative. These elements are 
of two types: (1) Changes in the level of operations for on-going 
activities within existing facilities, and (2) new facility projects. 
The changes in operational levels NNSA has decided to implement at this 
time are:
     Supporting the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Off-
Site Sources Recovery Project by broadening the types and quantities of 
radioactive sealed sources (Co-60, Ir-192, Cf-252, Ra-226) that LANL 
can manage and store prior to their disposal;
     Expanding the capabilities and operational level of the 
Nicholas C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation to support 
the Roadrunner Super Computer platform;
     Performing research to improve beryllium detection and to 
develop mitigation methods for beryllium dispersion to support 
industrial health and safety initiatives for beryllium workers; and
     Retrieval and disposition of legacy transuranic waste 
(approximately 3,100 cubic yards of contact-handled and 130 cubic yards 
of remote-handled) from belowground storage.
    New facility projects involve the design, construction, or 
renovation of facilities and were analyzed as part of the Expanded 
Operations Alternative. The facility projects that NNSA has decided to 
pursue at this time are:
     Planning, design, construction and operation of the Waste 
Management Facilities Transition projects to facilitate actions 
required by the Consent Order;
     Repair and replacement of mission critical cooling system 
components for buildings in TA-55 to enable the continued operation of 
these buildings and to comply with current environmental standards; and
     Final design of a new Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment 
Facility, and design and construction of the Zero Liquid Discharge 
Facility component of this new treatment facility to enable LANL to 
continue to treat radioactive liquid wastes.
    These projects and actions are needed on an immediate basis to 
maintain existing capabilities, support existing programs, and provide 
a safe and environmentally protective work environment at LANL. The 
need for these increases in operations and new facility projects exists 
regardless of any decisions NNSA may make regarding the programmatic 
and project-specific alternatives analyzed in the Complex 
Transformation SPEIS.
    In addition, NNSA will continue to implement actions required by 
the Consent Order, as noted above, these decisions are not subject to 
NEPA.

Basis for Decision

    NNSA's decisions are based on its mission responsibilities and its 
need to sustain LANL's ability to operate in a manner that allows it to 
fulfill its existing responsibilities in an environmentally sound, 
timely and fiscally prudent manner.
    National security policies require NNSA to maintain the nation's 
nuclear weapons stockpile as well as its core competencies in nuclear 
weapons. Since completion in 1996 of the Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) 
and associated ROD, NNSA and its predecessor, DOE's Office of Defense 
Programs, has implemented these policies through the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program (SSP). The SSP emphasizes development and 
application of improved scientific and technical capabilities to assess 
the safety, security, and reliability of existing nuclear warheads 
without the use of nuclear testing. LANL's operations support a wide 
range of scientific and technological capabilities for NNSA's national 
security missions, including the SSP. Most of NNSA's missions require 
research and development capabilities that currently reside at the LANL 
site. The nuclear facilities in LANL's TA-55 must maintain the nation's 
nuclear stockpile. Programmatic risks would be unacceptable if LANL did 
not continue to operate, or if it failed to implement the new decisions 
set forth above.
    NNSA believes that, at this time, existing national security 
requirements can be met by continuing to conduct operations at current 
levels with only a limited number of increases in levels of operations 
and new facility projects. These increases in operations and new 
projects are needed because of changes in the SSP program and NNSA's 
nuclear non-proliferation program. They are also needed to meet new 
responsibilities that have arisen as a result of changes in our 
national security requirements since 1999. One of the new facility 
projects is needed to facilitate NNSA's compliance with the Consent 
Order. The specific rationales for NNSA's decisions to implement seven 
elements of the Expanded Operations Alternative are:
    1. Supporting the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Off-Site 
Sources Recovery Project by broadening the types and quantities of 
radioactive sealed sources (Co-60, Ir-192, Cf-252, Ra-226) that LANL 
can manage and store prior to their disposal--This decision will allow 
NNSA to retrieve and store more of these sources, which, if not 
adequately secured, could be used in a radiation dispersion device (a 
``dirty bomb'').
    2. Expanding the capabilities and operational level of the Nicholas 
C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation to support the 
Roadrunner Super Computer platform--This decision will allow NNSA to 
perform calculations that improve its ability to certify that the 
nuclear weapons stockpile is reliable without conducting underground 
nuclear tests. It will also allow LANL to conduct research on global 
energy challenges and other scientific issues.
    3. Performing research to improve detection and mitigation methods 
for beryllium--This research will support the continued development of 
methods to capture and sequester beryllium and to expedite sample 
analysis needed to implement exposure controls to ensure worker safety.
    4. Retrieval and disposition of legacy transuranic waste 
(approximately 3,100 cubic yards of contact-handled and 130 cubic yards 
of remote-handled) from belowground storage--Retrieving and 
dispositioning this waste will allow LANL to complete closure and 
remediation of TA-54 Material Disposal Area G under the Consent Order. 
This action will reduce risk by removing approximately 105,000 
plutonium-239 equivalent curies from LANL.
    5. Planning, design, construction and operation of the Waste 
Management Facilities Transition projects--These projects will replace 
LANL's existing facilities for solid waste management. The existing 
facilities at TA-54 for transuranic waste, low-level waste, mixed low-
level waste and hazardous/

[[Page 55840]]

chemical waste are scheduled for closure and remediation under the 
Consent Order.
    6. Repair and replacement of mission critical cooling system 
components for buildings in TA-55--This decision will allow these 
facilities to continue to operate and for NNSA to install a new cooling 
system that meets current standards regarding the phase-out of Class 1 
ozone-depleting substances.
    7. Final design of a new Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment 
Facility, and design and construction of the Zero Liquid Discharge 
Facility component of this new treatment facility--This decision will 
allow LANL to continue to treat radioactive liquid wastes by replacing 
a facility that does not meet current standards and that cannot be 
acceptably renovated. Regardless of any decisions NNSA may make about 
complex transformation and LANL's role in it, the laboratory will need 
to treat liquid radioactive wastes for the foreseeable future.

Mitigation Measures

    As described in the SWEIS, LANL operates under environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies within a framework of contractual 
requirements; many of these requirements mandate actions intended to 
control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. Examples 
include the Environment, Safety, and Health Manual, emergency plans, 
Integrated Safety Management System, pollution prevention and waste 
minimization programs, protected species programs, and energy and 
conservation programs. A Mitigation Action Plan for this ROD will be 
issued that includes: Specific habitat conservation measures 
recommended by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for mitigating 
effects to potential habitat areas; site- and action-specific 
commitments related to the Consent Order once the State of New Mexico 
decides on specific environmental remediation for LANL MDAs; and 
traffic flow improvements that could involve such measures as 
installing turn lanes, installing and coordinating traffic lights, and 
installing new signage. A summary of all prior mitigation commitments 
for LANL that are either underway or that have yet to be initiated will 
be included in the MAP. These prior commitments include such actions as 
continued forest management efforts, continued trail management 
measures, and implementation of a variety of sampling and monitoring 
measures, as well as additional measures to reduce potable water use 
and conserve resources.
    In addition, with respect to the concerns raised by the Santa Clara 
Pueblo, NNSA will continue its efforts to support the Pueblo and other 
tribal entities in matters of human health, and will participate in 
various intergovernmental cooperative efforts to protect indigenous 
practices and locations of concern. NNSA will conduct government-to-
government consultation with the Pueblo and other tribal entities to 
incorporate these matters into the MAP.

    Issued at Washington, DC, this 19th day of September 2008.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
 [FR Doc. E8-22678 Filed 9-25-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P