[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 149 (Friday, August 1, 2008)]
[Pages 45029-45048]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-17645]



Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Docket ID FEMA-2004-0004]
[Z-RIN 1660-ZA02]

Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of final guidance.


SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is issuing final 
guidance entitled, ``Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery 
Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear 
Device (IND) Incidents'' (the Guidance). This Guidance is intended for 
Federal agencies, State and local governments, emergency management 
officials, and the general public who should find it useful in 
developing plans for responding to an RDD or IND incident. The Guidance 
recommends ``protective action guides'' (PAGs) to support decisions 
about actions that should be taken to protect the public and emergency 
workers when responding to or recovering from an RDD or IND incident. 
The Guidance outlines a process to implement the recommendations, 
discusses existing operational guidelines that should be useful in the 
implementation of the PAGs and other response actions, and encourages 
federal, state and local emergency response officials to use these 
guidelines to develop specific operational plans and response protocols 
for protection of emergency workers responding to catastrophic 
incidents involving high levels of radiation and/or radioactive 

DATES: This notice is effective August 1, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Craig Conklin, Director Sector 
Specific Agency Executive Management Office, Office of Infrastructure 

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Department of Homeland Security at 703-235-2850 (phone), or 
[email protected] (e-mail), or, John MacKinney, Deputy Director, 
Nuclear/Radiological/Chemical Threats and Science and Technology 
Policy, Office of Policy, Department of Homeland Security, at (202) 
447-3885 (phone), or [email protected] (e-mail).


Table of Contents

    (a) Introduction
    (b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
    (1) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
    (2) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
    (3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents
    (c) Phases of Response
    (1) Early Phase
    (2) Intermediate Phase
    (3) Late Phase
    (d) Guidance for RDD and IND Incidents
    (1) Protective Actions
    (2) Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
    (3) Early and Intermediate Phase Protective Action Guides for 
RDD and IND Incidents
    (A) Early Phase PAGs
    (B) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    (4) Late Phase Guidance
    (5) Emergency Worker Guidance
    (e) Operational Guidelines for Early and Intermediate PAGs
    (1) Derived Response Levels (DRLs)
    (2) Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for Food
    (3) Radiation Levels for Control of Access to Radiation Areas
Appendix 1. Planning for Protection of Emergency Workers Responding 
to RDD and IND Incidents
    (a) Guidelines for Emergency Workers in Responding to RDD and 
IND Incidents
    (b) Controlling Occupational Exposures and Doses to Emergency 
    (c) Understanding Radiation Risks
    (d) Preparedness
Appendix 2. Risk Management Framework for RDD and IND Incident 
    (a) The Stages of the Risk Management Framework for Responding 
to RDD and IND Incidents
    (1) Define the Problems and Put Them in Context
    (2) Analyze the Risks
    (3) Examine the Options
    (4) Make a Decision
    (5) Take Action To Implement Decision
    (6) Evaluate the Results
    (b) Technical Advisory Committee
Appendix 3. Federal Cleanup Implementation Cleanup Activities 
    (a) General Management Structure
    (1) Technical Working Group
    (2) Stakeholder Working Group
    (b) Activities
    (1) Optimization and Recommendation
    (2) Public Review of Decision
    (3) Execute Cleanup
Appendix 4. Operational Guidelines for Implementation of Protective 
Action Guides and Other Activities in RDD or IND Incidents
    (a) Group A: Access Control During Emergency Response Operations
    (b) Group B: Early Phase Protective Action (Evacuation or 
    (c) Group C: Relocation and Critical Infrastructure Utilization 
in Affected Areas
    (d) Group D: Temporary Access to Relocation Areas for Essential 
    (e) Group E: Transportation and Access Routes
    (f) Group F: Release of Property From Radiologically Controlled 
    (g) Group G: Food Consumption
    (h) Derivation of Operational Guidelines
Appendix 5. References
Appendix 6. Acronyms/Glossary


    This Guidance was developed to address the critical issues of 
protective actions and protective action guides (PAGs) to protect human 
health and to mitigate the effects caused by terrorists' use of a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). 
This document provides guidance for site cleanup and recovery following 
an RDD or IND incident, and affirms the applicability of existing 1992 
EPA PAGs for radiological emergencies.
    The development of this Guidance was directed by the White House, 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, through the National Science 
and Technology Council, Committee on Homeland and National Security, 
Subcommittee on Standards (SoS). In 2003, the SoS convened a senior 
level Federal working group, chaired by DHS, to develop guidance for 
response and recovery following a radiological dispersal device (RDD) 
or improvised nuclear device (IND) incident. The working group 
consisted of senior subject matter experts in radiological/nuclear 
emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and incident management. 
The following Federal departments and agencies were represented on the 
working group: DHS, EPA, Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of 
Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Labor (DOL), 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC).
    On January 3, 2006, DHS issued the ``Preparedness Directorate; 
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; Notice'' (71 FR 174, Jan. 3, 
2006), and requested public comments on this interim Guidance. Some 
changes to the Guidance were made as a result of these comments. A 
summary of the comments on the interim Guidance document and responses 
are available at Docket ID No. FEMA-2004-0004 at http://www.regulations.gov.
    In addition to the issuance of this Guidance, in response to 
interagency working group discussions and public comments, further 
guidance will be provided for the consequences that would be unique to 
an IND attack. This Guidance was not written to provide specific 
recommendations for a nuclear detonation (IND), but to consider the 
applicability of existing PAGs to RDDs and INDs. In particular, it does 
not consider very high doses or dose rate zones expected following a 
nuclear weapon detonation and other complicating impacts that can 
significantly affect life-saving outcomes, such as severely damaged 
infrastructure, loss of communications, water pressure, and 
electricity, and the prevalence of secondary hazards. Scientifically 
sound recommendations for responders are a critical component of post-
incident life-saving activities, including implementing protective 
orders, evacuation implementation, safe responder entry and operations, 
and urban search and rescue and victim extraction. In the interim, this 
Guidance should be used until the IND guidance is developed.
    The intended audience of this document are Federal, State, and 
local radiological emergency response and incident management 
officials. This Guidance is not intended to impact site cleanups 
occurring under other statutory authorities such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund program, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's (NRC) decommissioning program, or other Federal and State 
cleanup programs. In addition, the scope of this Guidance does not 
include situations involving U.S. nuclear weapons accidents.
    In addition to the issuance of this Guidance, further guidance is 
being planned for the devastating consequences that would be unique to 
INDs. In the interim, the present document will provide general RDD and 
IND guidance.
    By agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Guidance being published today is final and its substance will be 
incorporated without change into the revision of the 1992 EPA Manual of 
Protective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 
(the PAG Manual). This notice of final guidance will therefore sunset 
upon publication of the new EPA PAG Manual (see, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html). The reader will then be directed to the

[[Page 45031]]

new EPA PAG Manual, where these provisions may be found.

(a) Introduction

    For the early and intermediate phases of response, this document 
presents levels of projected radiation dose at which the Federal 
Government recommends that actions be considered to avoid or reduce 
adverse public health consequences from an RDD or IND incident. This 
document incorporates guidance and regulations published by the EPA, 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA). For the late phase of the response, this 
Guidance presents a process for establishing appropriate exposure 
levels based on site-specific circumstances. This Guidance addresses 
key radiological protection questions at each stage of an RDD or IND 
incident (early, intermediate, and late) and constitutes advice by the 
Federal government to Federal, State, and local decision makers.
    The objective of the Guidance is to aid decision makers in 
protecting the public, first responders, and other emergency workers 
from the effects of radiation, and cleaning up the affected area, while 
balancing the adverse social and economic impacts following an RDD or 
IND incident. Restoring the normal operation of critical 
infrastructure, services, industries, business, and public activities 
as soon as possible can minimize adverse social and economic impacts.
    This Guidance for RDD and IND incidents is not a set of absolute 
standards. The guides are not intended to define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' 
levels of exposure or contamination; rather they represent the 
approximate levels at which the associated protective actions are 
justified. The Guidance provides Federal, State and local decision 
makers the flexibility to be more or less restrictive, as deemed 
appropriate based on the unique characteristics of the incident and 
local considerations.
    This RDD/IND Guidance can be used to select actions to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from the adverse effects that may exist during 
any phase of a terrorist incident--the early (emergency) phase, the 
intermediate phase, or the late phase. There may be an urgent need to 
evacuate people; there may also be an urgent need to restore the 
services of critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail lines, airports, 
electric power, water, sewage, medical facilities, and businesses) in 
the hours and days following the incident--thus, some response 
decisions must be made quickly. If the decisions affecting the recovery 
of critical infrastructure are not made quickly, the disruption and 
harm caused by the incident could be inadvertently and unnecessarily 
increased. Failure to restore important services rapidly could result 
in additional adverse public health and welfare impacts that could be 
more significant than the direct radiological impacts.

(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents

    A radiological incident is defined as an event or series of events, 
deliberate or accidental, leading to the release, or potential release, 
into the environment of radioactive material in sufficient quantity to 
warrant consideration of protective actions. Use of an RDD or IND is an 
act of terror that results in a radiological incident.
(1) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
    An RDD poses a threat to public health and safety through the 
malicious spread of radioactive material by some means of dispersion. 
The mode of dispersal typically conceived as an RDD is an explosive 
device coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an 
immediate threat to human life and property. Other means of dispersal, 
both passive and active, may be employed.
    There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result from 
an RDD, depending on the type and size of the device and how dispersal 
is achieved. The consequences of an RDD may range from a small, 
localized area, such as a single building or city block, to large 
areas, conceivably several square miles. However, most experts agree 
that the likelihood of impacting a very large area is low. In most 
plausible scenarios, the radioactive material would not result in 
acutely harmful radiation doses, and the primary public health concern 
from those materials would be increased risk of cancer to exposed 
individuals. Hazards from fire, smoke, shock (physical, electrical, or 
thermal), shrapnel (from an explosion), hazardous materials, and other 
chemical or biological agents may also be present.
(2) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
    An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise 
originating from a nuclear State, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist 
group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that 
produces a nuclear explosion. The nuclear yield achieved by an IND 
produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt radiation that 
would be acutely lethal for a significant distance. It also produces 
radioactive fallout, which may spread and deposit over very large 
areas. If a nuclear yield is not achieved, the result would likely 
resemble an RDD in which fissile weapons material was utilized.
(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents
    Most radiological emergency planning has been conducted to respond 
to potential nuclear power plant accidents. RDD and IND incidents 
differ from a nuclear power plant accident in several ways, and 
response planning should take these differences into account. First, 
the severity of an IND incident would be dramatically greater than any 
nuclear power plant accident. An IND would have grave consequences for 
the human population and create a large radius of severe damage from 
blast and fires, which could not occur in a nuclear power plant 
    Second, the radiological release from an RDD or IND may start 
without any advance warning and would likely have a relatively short 
duration. In a major nuclear power plant accident, there is likely to 
be several hours or days of warning before the release starts, and the 
release is likely to be drawn out over many hours. This difference 
means that most early phase, and some intermediate phase, protective 
action decisions, which may be made in a timely fashion during power 
plant incidents, must be made much more quickly (and with less 
information) in an RDD or IND incident if they are to be effective.
    Third, an RDD or IND incident is more likely to occur in a major 
city center with a large population. Because of the rural setting in 
which many nuclear facilities are located, the lower number and density 
of people affected by a nuclear plant incident would be less, making 
evacuations much more manageable, and the amount of critical 
infrastructure impacted is also likely to be smaller.
    Fourth, large nuclear facilities have detailed emergency plans 
developed over years that are periodically exercised including 
specified protective actions, evacuation routes, and methods to quickly 
alert the public of the actions to take. This would not be the case for 
an RDD or IND incident. This level of radiological emergency planning 
typically does not exist in most cities and towns without nearby 
nuclear facilities.
    Fifth, the radioactive material releases from a nuclear power plant 
incident would be well known in advance based on reactor operational 

[[Page 45032]]

whereas releases associated with an RDD or IND would not.
    Sixth, in an act of terrorism, the incident scene becomes a crime 
scene. As such, the crime scene must be preserved for forensic 
investigation. This may impact emergency responders during the early 
and intermediate phases of response. It should be noted that other 
personnel responding to the incident (i.e., law enforcement, security 
personnel) will be involved in addition to emergency responders.

(c) Phases of Response

    Typically, the response to an RDD or IND incident can be divided 
into three time phases--the early phase, the intermediate phase, and 
the late phase--that are generally accepted as being common to all 
radiological incidents. The phases represent time periods in which 
response officials would be making public health protection decisions. 
Although these phases cannot be represented by precise time periods, 
and may overlap, they provide a useful framework for the considerations 
involved in emergency response planning.
(1) Early Phase
    The early phase (or emergency phase) is the period at the beginning 
of the incident when immediate decisions for effective protective 
actions are required, and when actual field measurement data generally 
are not available. Exposure to the radioactive plume, short-term 
exposure to deposited radioactive materials, and inhalation of 
radioactive material are generally taken into account when considering 
protective actions for the early phase. The response during the early 
phase includes initial emergency response actions to protect public 
health and welfare in the short term, considering a time period for 
protective actions of hours to a few days. Priority should be given to 
lifesaving and first-aid actions. In general, early phase protective 
actions should be taken very quickly, and the protective action 
decisions can be modified later as more information becomes available. 
If an explosive RDD is deployed without warning, however, there may be 
no time to take protective actions to significantly reduce plume 
exposure. Also, in the event of a covert dispersal, discovery or 
detection may not occur for days or weeks, allowing contamination to be 
dispersed broadly by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain, or other 
    If an IND explodes, there may only be time to make early phase 
protective action recommendations (e.g., evacuation, or shelter-in-
place) many miles from the explosion to protect areas against exposure 
to fallout. Areas close to the explosion will be devastated, and 
communications and access will be extremely limited. Assistance will 
likely not be forthcoming or even possible for some hours. Self-guided 
protective actions are likely to be the best recourse for most 
survivors (e.g., evacuation perpendicular to the plume movement if it 
can be achieved quickly, or sheltering in a basement or large building 
for a day or more after the incident \1\). Due to the lack of 
communication and access, outside guidance and assistance to these 
areas can be expected to be delayed. Therefore, response planning and 
public outreach programs are critical measures to meet IND preparedness 

    \1\ Additional protective action guides and recommendations are 
needed for the close-in zones after an IND. A follow-on Federal 
effort is underway to address this critical need.

(2) Intermediate Phase
    The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase 
response within as little as a few hours. The intermediate phase of the 
response is usually assumed to begin after the incident source and 
releases have been brought under control and protective action 
decisions can be made based on measurements of exposure and radioactive 
materials that have been deposited as a result of the incident. 
Activities in this phase typically overlap with early and late phase 
activities, and may continue for weeks to many months, until protective 
actions can be terminated.
    During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on the 
initial actions needed to recover from the incident, reopen critical 
infrastructure, and return to a state of relatively normal activity. In 
general, intermediate phase decisions should consider late phase 
response objectives. However, some intermediate phase decisions will 
need to be made quickly (i.e., within hours) and should not be delayed 
by discussions on what the more desirable permanent decisions will be. 
Local officials must weigh public health and welfare concerns, 
potential economic effects, and many other factors when making 
decisions. For example, it can be expected that hospitals and their 
access roads will need to remain open or be reopened quickly. These 
interim decisions can often be made with the acknowledgement that 
further work may be needed as time progresses.
(3) Late Phase
    The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions 
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable 
levels are commenced. This phase ends when all the remediation actions 
have been completed. With additional time and increased understanding 
of the situation, there will be opportunities to involve key 
stakeholders in providing sound, cost-effective cleanup recommendations 
that are protective of human health and the environment. Generally, 
early (or emergency) phase decisions will be made directly by elected 
public officials, or their designees, with limited stakeholder 
involvement due to the need to act within a short timeframe. Long-term 
decisions should be made with stakeholder involvement, and can also 
include incident-specific technical working groups to provide expert 
advice to decision makers on alternatives, costs, and impacts. The 
relationship between typical protective actions and the phases of the 
incident response are outlined in Figure 1. There is overlap between 
the phases; this framework should be used to inform planning and 

[[Page 45033]]



[[Page 45034]]

(d) Guidance for RDD and IND Incidents

    This section defines protective actions and protective action 
guides, and provides guidance for their implementation in RDD and IND 
incidents. In addition, this section provides guidance for protection 
of emergency workers, and a strategy for devising cleanup plans, 
criteria, and options.
(1) Protective Actions
    Protective actions are activities that should be conducted in 
response to an RDD or IND incident in order to reduce or eliminate 
exposure of the public to radiation or other hazards. These actions are 
generic and are applicable to RDDs and INDs. The principal protective 
action decisions for consideration in the early and intermediate phases 
of an emergency are whether to shelter-in-place, evacuate, or relocate 
affected or potentially affected populations. Secondary actions include 
administration of medical countermeasures, decontamination (including 
decontamination of persons evacuated from the affected area), use of 
access restrictions, and use of restrictions on food and water. In some 
situations, only one protective action needs to be implemented, while 
in others, numerous protective actions should be implemented. Many 
factors should be considered when deciding whether or not to order a 
protective action based on the projected dose to a population. For 
example, evacuation of a population is much more difficult and costly 
as the size of the population increases.
(2) Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
    A PAG is the projected dose to a reference individual, from an 
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, at which a 
specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. 
Thus, protective actions are designed to be taken before the 
anticipated dose is realized.
    The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has published PAGs in the 
``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear 
Incidents'' (EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992), in coordination with the 
Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC). The 
PAGs presented in this manual, hereafter referred to as the 1992 EPA 
PAGs, are non-regulatory. They are designed to provide a flexible basis 
for decisions under varying emergency circumstances. The 1992 EPA PAGs 
meet the following principal criteria and goals: (1) Prevent acute 
effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects, and (3) require 
optimization to balance protection with other important factors and 
ensure that actions taken result in more benefit than harm.
    The 1992 EPA PAG Manual, however, was not developed to address 
response actions following radiological or nuclear terrorist incidents 
and does not address long-term cleanup. The 1992 EPA PAG Manual was 
written to address the kinds of nuclear or radiological incidents 
deemed likely to occur. While intended to be applicable to any 
radiological release, the 1992 EPA PAGs were designed principally to 
address the impacts of commercial NPP accidents, the worst type of 
incident under consideration at that time. This is important for two 
reasons: Commercial nuclear power plant accidents are almost always 
signaled by preceding events, giving plant managers time to make 
decisions, and giving local emergency managers time to communicate with 
the public and initiate evacuations if necessary. In addition, the 
suite of radionuclides present at nuclear power plants is well-known, 
and is dominated by relatively short-lived isotopes.
    The 1992 EPA PAG Manual provides a significant part of the basis of 
this document and should be referred to for additional details. In 
deriving the recommendations contained in this Guidance, new types of 
incidents and scenarios that could lead to environmental radiological 
contamination were considered. The interagency working group determined 
that the 1992 EPA PAGs for the early and intermediate phases, including 
emergency responder guidelines, are also appropriate for use in RDD and 
IND incidents. This Guidance is intended to supplement the 1992 EPA PAG 
Manual for application to RDD and IND incidents, including providing 
new late phase guidance.
    The RDD/IND Guidance provides generic criteria based on balancing 
public health and welfare with the risk of various protective actions 
applied in each of the phases of an RDD or IND incident. The RDD/IND 
Guidance is specific to radiation and radioactive materials, and must 
be considered in the context of other chemical or biological hazards 
that may also be present. Though the early and intermediate PAGs in 
this Guidance are values of dose to be avoided, published dose 
conversion factors and derived response levels may be utilized in 
estimating doses, and for choosing and implementing protective actions. 
Other quantitative measures and derived concentration values may be 
useful in emergency situations; for example, for the release of goods 
and property from contaminated zones, and to control access into and 
out of contaminated areas.
    Because of the short time frames required for emergency response 
decisions in the early and intermediate phases, it is likely there will 
not be opportunities for local decision makers to consult with a 
variety of stakeholders before taking actions. Therefore, this Guidance 
incorporates the significant body of work done in the general context 
of radiological emergency response planning from the development of the 
1992 EPA PAGs, and represents the results of scientific analysis, 
public comment, drills, exercises, and a consensus at the Federal level 
for appropriate emergency action.
    In order to use the early and intermediate phase PAGs to make 
decisions about appropriate protective actions, decision makers will 
need information on suspected radionuclides; projected plume movement, 
and radioactive depositions; and/or actual measurement data or, during 
the period initially following the release, expert advice in the 
absence of good information. Sources of such information include on-
scene responders, as well as monitoring, assessment, and modeling 
(3) Early and Intermediate Phase Protective Action Guides for RDD and 
IND Incidents
    The early and intermediate phase RDD/IND PAGs are generally based 
on the following sources: The 1992 EPA PAGs developed by EPA in 
coordination with other Federal agencies through the Federal 
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee; guidance developed by 
the FDA for food and food products and the distribution of potassium 
iodide. Table 1 provides a summary of the early and intermediate phase 
PAGs for protection of the general public in an RDD or IND incident and 
key protective actions.

[[Page 45035]]

                           Table 1--Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
                                          Protective action
               Phase                        recommendation                    Protective action guide
Early..............................  Sheltering-in-place or       1 to 5 rem (0.01-0.05 Sv) projected dose.\b\
                                      evacuation of the
                                     Administration of            5 rem (0.05 Sv) projected dose to child
                                      prophylactic drugs--         thyroid.\c,e\
                                      potassium iodide\c,e\
                                      Administration of other
                                      prophylactic or
                                      decorporation agents\d\.
Intermediate.......................  Relocation of the public...  2 rem (0.02 Sv) projected dose first year.
                                                                   Subsequent years, 0.5 rem/y (0.005 Sv/y)
                                                                   projected dose.\b\
                                     Food interdiction..........  0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose, or 5 rem
                                                                   (0.05 Sv) to any individual organ or tissue
                                                                   in the first year, whichever is limiting.
                                     Drinking water interdiction  0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose in the first
\a\ Should normally begin at 1 rem (0.01 Sv); take whichever action (or combination of actions) that results in
  the lowest exposure for the majority of the population. Sheltering may begin at lower levels if advantageous.
\b\ Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE)--the sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation
  exposure and the committed effective dose equivalent from inhaled radioactive material.
\c\ Provides thyroid protection from radioactive iodine only.
\d\ For other information on other radiological prophylactics and medical countermeasures, refer to http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm, http:/www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation, or http://www.orau.gov/reacts.
\e\ Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE). FDA understands that a KI administration program that sets different
  projected thyroid radioactive dose thresholds for treatment of different population groups may be logistically
  impractical to implement during a radiological emergency. If emergency planners reach this conclusion, FDA
  recommends that KI be administered to both children and adults at the lowest intervention threshold (i.e., >5
  rem (0.05 Sv) projected internal thyroid dose in children) (FDA 2001).

    In the early and intermediate phases of an RDD or IND incident 
there may not be adequate information to determine radiation levels or 
make dose projections because there may be little or no advance notice 
of an attack, the characteristics of the RDD or IND may not be 
immediately known, monitoring equipment may not be available to make 
measurements, or there may not be time to do measurements or 
projections before emergency response actions need to be initiated. 
Therefore, to use this guide to determine whether protective action is 
needed in a particular situation, it may be necessary to compare the 
PAGs to results of a dose projection. In general, it should be 
emphasized that realistic assumptions, based on incident-specific 
information, should be used when making radiation dose projections so 
that the final results are representative of actual conditions rather 
than overly conservative exposures. It is very important that local 
officials responsible for carrying out emergency response actions 
conduct advance planning to ensure that they are adequately prepared if 
such an incident were to occur.
(A) Early Phase PAGs
    For the early phase, the 1992 EPA PAGs for evacuation and 
sheltering-in-place are appropriate for RDD and IND incidents (see 
Table 1). Early phase protective action decisions in an RDD or IND must 
be made quickly, and with very little confirmatory data. While 
sheltering-in-place should be carried out at 1 rem (0.01 Sv) 
sheltering-in-place can begin at any projected dose level.
    FDA guidance on the administration of stable iodine is also 
considered appropriate (useful primarily for NPP incident involving 
radioiodine release). The administration of other medical 
countermeasures should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and depend 
on the nature of the event and radionuclides involved.
    The initial zone should be established and controlled around the 
incident site, as is the case for other crime scenes and hazards. This 
Guidance allows for the refinement of that area if the radiation 
exposure levels warrant such action. Advance planning by local 
officials for messaging, communications, and actions in the event of an 
RDD or IND are strongly encouraged.
(B) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    The decisions in the intermediate phase will focus on the return of 
key infrastructure and services, and the rapid return to normal 
activities. This will include decisions on allowing use of roads, 
ports, waterways, transportation systems (including subways, trains, 
and airports), hospitals, businesses, and residences. It will also 
include responses to questions about acceptable use and release of real 
and personal property such as cars, clothes, or equipment that may have 
been impacted by the RDD or IND incident. Many of the activities will 
be concerned with materials and areas that were not affected, but for 
which members of the public may have concern. Thus, the RDD/IND 
Guidance serves to guide decisions on returning to impacted areas, 
leaving impacted areas, and providing assurance that an area was not 
impacted. The intermediate phase is also the period during which 
planning for long-term site cleanup and remediation should be 
    For the intermediate phase, relocation of the population is a 
protective action that can be used to reduce dose. Relocation is the 
removal or continued exclusion of people (households) from contaminated 
areas in order to avoid chronic radiation exposure, and it is meant to 
protect the general public. For the intermediate phase, the existing 
relocation PAGs of 2 rem (0.02 Sv) in the first year and 0.5 rem (0.005 
Sv) in any subsequent year are considered appropriate for RDD and IND 
incidents. However, for IND incidents, the area impacted and the number 
of people that might be subject to relocation could potentially be very 
large and could exceed the resources and infrastructure available. For 
example, in making relocation decisions, the availability of adequate 
accommodations for relocated people should be considered. Decision 
makers may need to consider limiting action to those areas most 
severely affected, phasing relocation implementation based on the 
resources available.
    The relocation PAGs apply principally to personal residences, but 
may impact other locations as well. For example, these PAGs could 
impact work locations, hospitals, and park lands, as well as the use of 
highways and other transportation facilities. For each type of 
facility, the individual occupancy time should be taken into account to 
determine the criteria for using a facility or area. It might be 
necessary to avoid continuous use of homes in an area

[[Page 45036]]

because radiation levels are too high; however, a factory or office 
building in the same area could be used because occupancy times are 
shorter. Similarly, a highway could be used at higher contamination 
levels because the exposure time of highway users would be considerably 
less than the time spent by residents in a home.
    The intermediate phase PAG for the interdiction of food is set at 
0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose in the first year, and the 
intermediate phase PAG for the interdiction of drinking water is set at 
0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose for the first year for RDD and IND 
incidents. These values are consistent with those now used or being 
considered as PAGs for other types of nuclear/radiological incidents.
    The use of simple dose reduction techniques is recommended for 
personal property and all potentially contaminated areas that continue 
to be occupied. This technique is also consistent with the 1992 EPA 
PAGs developed for other types of nuclear/radiological incidents. 
Examples of simple dose reduction techniques would be washing all 
transportation vehicles (e.g., automobiles, trains, ships, and 
aircraft), personal clothing, eating utensils, food preparation 
surfaces, and other personal property before next use, as practicable 
and appropriate.
(4) Late Phase Guidance
    The late phase involves the final cleanup of areas and property at 
which radioactive material is present. Unlike the early and 
intermediate phases of an RDD or IND incident, decision makers will 
have more time and information during the late phase to allow for 
better data collection, stakeholder involvement, and options analysis. 
In this respect, the late phase is no longer a response to an 
``emergency situation,'' and is better viewed in terms of the 
objectives of cleanup and site recovery.
    Because of the extremely broad range of potential impacts that may 
occur from RDDs and INDs (e.g., light contamination of one building to 
widespread destruction of a major metropolitan area), a pre-established 
numeric cleanup guideline is not recommended as best serving the needs 
of decision makers in the late phase. Rather, a process should be used 
to determine the societal objectives for expected land uses and the 
options and approaches available, in order to select the most 
acceptable criteria. For example, if the incident is an RDD of limited 
size and the impacted area is small, it might reasonably be expected 
that a complete return to normal conditions can be achieved within a 
short period of time. However, if the impacted area is large, achieving 
low cleanup levels for remediation of the entire area, and/or 
maintaining existing land uses, may not be practicable.
    It should be noted that an intermediate phase PAG is not equivalent 
to a starting point for development of the late phase cleanup process. 
However, contamination and radiation levels existing after an incident 
(e.g., concentrations, or dose rates), as well as actions already 
taken, provide practical starting points for further action and 
cleanup. The goal of cleanup is to reduce those levels as low as is 
reasonable. It is possible that final criteria for reoccupation at a 
given incident site may be either below or above the intermediate phase 
PAG dose value, since no dose or risk cap for the late phase is 
explicitly recommended under this Guidance.
    Late phase cleanup criteria should be derived through a site-
specific optimization process, which should include potential future 
land uses, technical feasibility, costs, cost-effectiveness, and public 
acceptability. Optimization is a concept that is common to many State, 
Federal, and international risk management programs that address 
radionuclides and chemicals, although it is not always referred to as 
such. The Risk Management Framework described in Appendix 2 provides 
such a process and helps assure the protection of public health and 
welfare. Decisions should take health, safety, technical, economic, and 
public policy factors into account. Appendix 3 utilizes the framework 
as a basis for RDD and IND site cleanup planning.
    Broadly speaking, optimization is a flexible, multi-attribute 
decision process that seeks to weigh many factors. Optimization 
analyses are quantitative and qualitative assessments applied at each 
stage of site recovery decision-making, from evaluation of remedial 
options to implementation of the chosen alternative. The evaluation of 
cleanup alternatives, for example, should factor in all relevant 
variables, including areas impacted (e.g., size and location relative 
to population), types of contamination (chemical, biological, and/or 
radioactive), human health, public welfare, technical feasibility, 
costs, and available resources to implement and maintain remedial 
options, short-term effectiveness, long-term effectiveness, timeliness, 
public acceptability, and economic effects (e.g., on residents, 
tourism, and business, and industry).
    Various Federal, and State agencies, along with other organizations 
(e.g., national and international advisory organizations), already have 
guidance and tools that may be used to help establish cleanup levels. 
The optimization process allows local decision makers to draw on the 
thought processes used to develop the dose and/or risk benchmarks used 
by these State, Federal, or other sources. These benchmarks, though 
developed within different contexts, may be useful for analysis of 
cleanup options. Decision makers might reasonably determine that it is 
appropriate to move up or down from these benchmarks, depending on the 
site-specific circumstances and balancing of other relevant factors.
    In developing this Guidance, the Federal Government recognized that 
experience from existing programs, such as the EPA's Superfund program, 
the NRC's standards for decommissioning and decontamination to 
terminate a plant license, and other national and international 
recommendations, may be useful in planning the cleanup and recovery 
efforts following an RDD or IND incident. This Guidance allows the 
consideration and incorporation, as appropriate, of any or all of the 
existing environmental program elements.
    The site-specific optimization process includes quantitative and 
qualitative assessments applied at each stage of site cleanup decision 
making, from initial scoping and stakeholder outreach, to evaluation of 
cleanup options, to implementation of the chosen alternative. The 
evaluation of options for the late phase of recovery after an RDD or 
IND incident should consider all of the relevant factors, including:
     Areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to 
     Types of contamination (chemical, biological, and 
     Other hazards present.
     Human health risk.
     Public welfare.
     Ecological risks.
     Actions already taken during the early and intermediate 
     Projected land uses.
     Preservation or destruction of places of historical, 
national, or regional significance.
     Technical feasibility.
     Wastes generated and disposal options and costs.
     Costs and available resources to implement and maintain 
remedial options.
     Potential adverse impacts (e.g., to human health, the 
environment, and the economy) of remedial options.
     Short-term effectiveness.
     Long-term effectiveness.
     Public acceptability, including local cultural 

[[Page 45037]]

     Economic effects (e.g., on employment, tourism, and 
     Intergenerational equity.
    The site-specific optimization process provides the best 
opportunity for decision makers to gain public confidence through the 
involvement of stakeholders. This process should begin during, and 
proceed independently of, intermediate phase protective action 
    Appendix 3 provides additional details on a process that may be 
used to implement this Guidance, describing the role of the Federal 
Government and how it could integrate its activities with State and 
local governments and the public. For some radiological terror 
incidents, States may take the primary leadership role in cleanup and 
contribute significant resources toward recovery of the site.
    As explained in Appendix 3, the Incident Command or Unified Command 
should develop a schedule with milestones for conducting the 
optimization process as soon as practicable following the incident. 
While the goal should be to complete the initial optimization process 
as soon as possible following an incident (depending on the size of the 
incident), the schedule must take into consideration incident-specific 
factors that would affect successful implementation. This schedule may 
need to reflect a phased approach to cleanup and is subject to change 
as the cleanup progresses.
(5) Emergency Worker Guidelines
    The response during the early phase includes initial emergency 
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the short 
term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid actions. 
Following an IND detonation in particular, the highest priority 
missions should also include actions such as suppression of fires that 
could result in further loss of life.
    For the purposes of this Guidance, ``emergency worker'' is defined 
as any worker who performs an early or intermediate phase work action. 
Table 2 shows the emergency worker guidelines for early phase emergency 
response actions. In intermediate and late phase actions (i.e., cleanup 
and recovery), standard worker protections, including the 5 rem (0.05 
Sv) occupational dose limit, apply.

                           Table 2--Emergency Worker Guidelines in the Early Phase \2\
  Total effective dose equivalent
        (TEDE) \a\ guideline                   Activity                              Condition
5 rem (0.05 Sv)....................  All occupational exposures.  All reasonably achievable actions have been
                                                                   taken to minimize dose.
10 rem (0.1 Sv)....................  Protecting valuable           All appropriate actions and controls
                                      property necessary for       have been implemented; however, exceeding 5
                                      public welfare (e.g., a      rem (0.05 Sv) is unavoidable.
                                      power plant).
                                                                   Responders have been fully informed
                                                                   of the risks of exposures they may
                                                                   Dose >5 rem (0.05 Sv) is on a
                                                                   voluntary basis.
                                                                   Appropriate respiratory protection
                                                                   and other personal protection is provided and
                                                                   Monitoring available to project or
                                                                   measure dose.
25 rem (0.25 Sv) \b\...............  Lifesaving or protection of   All appropriate actions and controls
                                      large populations. It is     have been implemented; however, exceeding 5
                                      highly unlikely that doses   rem (0.05 Sv) is unavoidable.
                                      would reach this level in    Responders have been fully informed
                                      an RDD incident; however,    of the risks of exposures they may
                                      worker doses higher than     experience.
                                      25 rem (0.25 Sv) are         Dose >5 rem (0.05 Sv) is on a
                                      conceivable in a             voluntarily basis.
                                      catastrophic incident such   Appropriate respiratory protection
                                      as an IND incident.          and other personal protection is provided and
                                                                   Monitoring available to project or
                                                                   measure dose.
a The projected sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation exposure and committed effective
  dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure.
b EPA's 1992 PAG Manual states that ``Situations may also rarely occur in which a dose in excess of 25 rem for
  emergency exposure would be unavoidable in order to carry out a lifesaving operation or avoid extensive
  exposure of large populations.'' Similarly, the NCRP and ICRP raise the possibility that emergency responders
  might receive an equivalent dose that approaches or exceeds 50 rem (0.5 Sv) to a large portion of the body in
  a short time (Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, National Council on Radiation Protection and
  Measures, NCRP Report 116 (1993a). If lifesaving emergency responder doses approach or exceed 50 rem (0.5 Sv)
  emergency responders must be made fully aware of both the acute and the chronic (cancer) risks of such

    This Guidance document and the emergency worker guidelines were 
developed for a wide range of possible radiological scenarios, from a 
small RDD that may impact a single building to an IND that could 
potentially impact a large geographic region. Therefore, the 5, 10 and 
25 rem guidelines (Table 2) should not be viewed as inflexible limits 
applicable to the range of early phase emergency actions covered by 
this Guidance. Because of the range of impacts and case-specific 
information needed, it is impossible to develop a single turn-back dose 
level for all responders to use in all events, especially those that 
involve lifesaving operations. Indeed, with proper preparedness 
measures (training, personal protective equipment, etc.) many 
radiological emergencies addressed by this document, even lifesaving 
operations, may be manageable within the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) occupational 
limit. Moreover, Incident Commanders should make every effort to employ 
the ``as low as reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) principle after an 
incident. Still, in some incidents medically significant doses above 
the annual occupational 5 rem (0.05 Sv) dose limit may be unavoidable. 
For instance, in the case of a catastrophic incident, such as an IND, 
Incident Commanders may need to consider raising the lifesaving and 
valuable property (i.e., necessary for public welfare) emergency worker 
guidelines in order to prevent further loss of life and prevent the 
spread of massive destruction. Ensuring that emergency workers have 
full knowledge of the

[[Page 45038]]

associated risks prior to initiating emergency action and medical 
evaluation of emergency workers after such exposure is essential. (See 
Appendix 1 for additional discussion of ALARA.)

    \2\ In the intermediate and late phases, standard worker 
protections, including the 5 rem occupational dose limit, would 
normally apply.

    Ideally, the Incident Commanders should define and enforce the 
emergency dose limits in accordance with the immediate risk situation 
and the type of emergency action being performed (see Table 2). 
However, in the case of an attack it may not be possible to conduct 
dose measurements or projections before initiating emergency response 
activities. Therefore, it is crucial that officials responsible for 
carrying out emergency response actions in the early phase conduct 
thorough advance planning to ensure that they are adequately prepared 
if such an incident occurs. Planning should include evaluating data and 
information on possible or anticipated radiation exposures in RDD or 
IND incidents, developing procedures for reducing and controlling 
emergency responder exposures to allowable dose limits (Table 2), 
obtaining appropriate personal protective equipment (e.g., respirators, 
clothing) for protecting emergency responders who enter contaminated 
areas, and developing appropriate decision-making criteria for 
responding to catastrophic incidents that may involve high radiation 
exposure levels. Planning should also include informing and educating 
emergency workers about emergency response procedures and controls as 
well as the acute and chronic (cancer) risks of exposure, particularly 
at higher dose levels. Effective advance planning will help to ensure 
that the emergency worker guidelines are correctly applied and that 
emergency workers are not exposed to radiation levels that are higher 
than necessary in the specific emergency action.
    In addition, as part of advance planning, officials should develop 
a process for assessing hazards and for determining appropriate actions 
in incidents that may involve high radiation doses. Decisions regarding 
emergency response actions in incidents involving high radiation 
exposures require careful consideration of the benefits to be achieved 
by the ``rescue'' or response action (e.g., the significance of the 
outcome to individuals, large populations, general welfare, or valuable 
property necessary for public welfare), and the potential health 
impacts (i.e., acute and chronic) to emergency workers. The planning 
for a potential high radiation exposure incident should consider how to 
weigh the potential for and significance of the success of the 
emergency response/rescue operation against the potential for and 
significance of the health and safety risks to the emergency workers. 
Federal, state and local emergency response officials should use these 
guidelines to develop specific operational plans and response protocols 
for protection of emergency response workers.

(e) Operational Guidelines for Early and Intermediate PAGs

    Implementation of the early and intermediate PAGs may be supported 
by operational guidelines that can be readily used by decision makers 
and responders in the field. Operational guidelines are levels of 
radiation or concentrations of radionuclides that can be accurately 
measured by radiation detection and monitoring equipment, and then 
related or compared to the PAGs to quickly determine whether actions 
need to be implemented. Federal agencies are continuing development of 
operational guidelines to support the application of this Guidance, and 
other site-level decisions; therefore, they are provided here in 
overview only.
    Some values already exist that could potentially serve as 
operational guidelines for RDD and IND response and recovery 
operations, and there are various tools available to help derive 
operational guidelines for response planning. Appendix 4 presents a 
summary of the types of operational guidelines for RDD and IND response 
operations currently under development.
    Additional tools and assessment methodologies to aid in planning 
and development of operational guidelines for use with PAGs for a wide 
range of situations are available from the Federal Radiological 
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). These tools and methods are 
written to support FRMAC operations during radiological and nuclear 
emergency responses. The FRMAC manuals provide detailed methods for 
computing Derived Response Levels (DRLs) and doses based on measurement 
or modeling results and suggest input parameters for various 

    \3\ These materials and additional information on the FRMAC can 
be obtained at http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac.

    Some examples of existing values that can be used as operational 
guidelines for RDD and IND response operations and tools that could be 
used to establish site-specific operational guidelines include, derived 
response levels, derived intervention levels for food, and radiation 
levels for control of access to radiation areas.
(1) Derived Response Levels (DRLs)
    The 1992 EPA PAG Manual contains guidance and Derived Response 
Levels (DRLs) for various potential exposure pathways, including 
external exposure, inhalation, submersion, ground shine, and drinking 
water, for application in the early and intermediate phases. These 
values serve as, or can be adapted to serve as, operational guidelines 
to readily determine if protective actions need to be implemented. The 
summed ratios of radionuclide concentrations obtained through field 
measurements can be compared to the DRLs to determine whether the PAGs 
are likely to be exceeded. If concentrations of radionuclides obtained 
through field measurements are less than the DRLs, the PAGs are not 
likely to be exceeded and, thus, a protective action may not need to be 
(2) Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for Food
    The FDA has developed Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for 
implementation of the early and intermediate PAGs for food. These DILs 
establish levels of contamination that can exist on crops and in food 
products and still maintain dose levels below the food PAGs, and could 
therefore be used as operational guidelines for RDD and IND incidents. 
More information on DILs can be found in ``Accidental Radioactive 
Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State 
and Local Agencies'' (U.S. Department of Health And Human Services, 
Food and Drug Administration, August 13, 1998).
(3) Radiation Levels for Control of Access to Radiation Areas
    Additional operational guidelines for use in the early and 
intermediate phases of response are being developed for issues such as 
clearance of personal and real property, land and facility access, and 
for response actions. A DOE project supported by an interagency effort 
is developing needed tools and operational guidelines that address 
continued use, or necessary control for personal property (e.g., 
vehicles, equipment, personal items, debris) and real property (e.g., 
buildings, roads, bridges, residential and commercial areas, national 
monuments and icons) that may be impacted by an RDD or IND incident. 
The effort includes consideration of short and long term use

[[Page 45039]]

or access to areas. A DOE report \4\ is available for review, and use 
as appropriate. The report includes proposed operational guidelines and 
their technical derivation, and provides tools such as the computer 
model RESRAD-RDD \5\ for calculating incident-specific guidelines and 
worker stay-time tables for access control, and dose-based soil and 
building contamination levels to assist in the site-specific 
optimization process. The goal of the DOE report is to provide 
sufficient information to assist decision makers and responders in 
executing their responsibilities in a safe way. Appendix 4 of this 
Guidance provides a more detailed overview of the operational 
guidelines contained in the DOE draft report and their intended 

    \4\ Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for 
Use in Emergency Preparedness and Response to a Radiological 
Dispersal Device Incident, DOE/HS-0001. The report and associated 
material will be available at http://www.ogcms.energy.gov.
    \5\ RESRAD-RDD is derived from RESRAD, which is a computer model 
designed to estimate radiation doses and risks from residual 
radioactive materials. The RESRAD model has been applied to 
determine the risk to human health posed at over 300 sites in the 
United States and abroad that have been contaminated with radiation.

Appendix 1--Planning for Protection of Emergency Workers Responding to 
RDD and IND Incidents

    The purpose of this appendix is to provide Federal, state, and 
local decision makers with information on how to prepare for, and 
implement emergency worker guidance in RDD and IND incidents. 
Because there may not be adequate information or time for 
determining radiation levels or making dose projections in the early 
phase of an RDD or IND incident, it is very important that emergency 
management officials conduct worker health and safety planning and 
training in advance to ensure they are adequately prepared if such 
an incident occurs.
    Planning should include evaluating data and information on 
possible or anticipated radiation exposures in RDD and IND incidents 
and on acute and chronic risks of radiation exposures, developing 
procedures for reducing and controlling emergency worker exposures, 
obtaining appropriate personal protective equipment (e.g., 
respirators, protective clothing) to help protect emergency workers 
who enter exposure areas, and developing appropriate decisionmaking 
criteria for responding in catastrophic incidents, such as an IND, 
that may involve high exposure levels. Planning should also include 
training and educating emergency workers about emergency response 
procedures in radiological environments, radiation exposure controls 
and the risks of exposure, particularly at higher levels. Effective 
planning and training will help to ensure that exposures to 
emergency workers are kept to the lowest radiation levels necessary 
for the particular emergency response action.
    This appendix provides information to assist local, State, and 
Federal authorities, and emergency workers in planning for 
radiological emergencies, in particular those related to terrorist 
attacks using RDDs and INDs. The appendix is not intended to provide 
comprehensive training guidance. Other information useful in the 
planning process may be available from the following organizations:
     The National Council on Radiation Protection and 
     the International Commission on Radiological 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency,
     the American Nuclear Society,
     the Health Physics Society, and
     the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors.

(a) Guidelines for Emergency Workers in Responding to RDD and IND 

    Table 2 in Section (d)(5) of the Guidance shows the emergency 
worker guidelines for the early phase. In the intermediate and late 
phases, standard OSHA and other worker health and safety standards 
apply. The DOE and NRC also have standards that govern worker health 
and safety for normal operations at their owned or licensed 
facilities. OSHA's occupational radiation dose limit (1.25 rem 
(0.0125 Sv) per annual quarter, or 5 rem (0.05 Sv) total in one 
year) minimizes risk to workers consistent with the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
    In many radiological incidents, particularly RDD situations, the 
actual dose to emergency workers may be controlled to less than 5 
rem (0.05 Sv). However, in other radiological incidents precautions 
may not be sufficient or effective to keep emergency worker doses at 
or below 5 rem (0.05 Sv), because of the magnitude of the incident 
and because certain measures typically used to control exposures in 
normal operations may not be applicable. For example, one of the 
major radiation protection controls used in normal radiological 
operations is containment of the radioactive material. Another is to 
keep people away from the source material. During emergency response 
to an RDD or IND incident use of these controls may not be possible 
due to the nature of the incident and the urgency of response 
actions. As a result, high radiation exposures for emergency 
responders may be unavoidable and have the potential to exceed 
regulatory limits used for normal operations. Therefore, the 5, 10 
and 25 rem guidelines found in Table 2 should not be viewed as 
absolute standards applicable to the full range of incidents covered 
by this guidance, but rather serve as decision points for making 
worker protection decisions during emergencies.
    Emergency response actions in catastrophic incidents that 
involve high exposure levels require careful consideration of both 
the benefits to be achieved by the ``rescue'' or response action 
(e.g., the significance of the benefit to individuals, populations, 
valuable property necessary for general welfare), and the potential 
for acute and chronic health impacts to individuals conducting the 
emergency response operation. That is, in making an emergency 
response decision, the potential for the success of the response/
rescue operation and the significance of its benefits to the 
community should be weighed against the potential for, and 
significance of, the health and safety risks to workers.

(b) Controlling Occupational Exposures and Doses to Emergency 

    Appropriate measures should be taken to minimize radiation dose 
to emergency workers responding to an RDD or IND incident. With 
proper preparedness measures (e.g., training, personal protective 
equipment), many emergencies that this document addresses, including 
lifesaving actions, may be possible to manage within the 5 rem (0.05 
Sv) occupational limit. Emergency management officials responsible 
for an incident should take steps to keep all doses to emergency 
workers ``as low as reasonable achievable'' (ALARA). Protocols for 
maintaining ALARA should include the following health physics and 
industrial hygiene practices:
     Minimizing the time spent in the contaminated area 
(e.g., rotation of emergency responders);
     Maintaining distance from sources of radiation;
     Shielding of the radiation source;
     Using hazard controls that are applicable to the work 
     Properly selecting and using respirators and other 
personal protective equipment (PPE), to minimize exposure to 
internally deposited radioactive materials (e.g., alpha and beta 
emitters); and
     Using prophylactic medications, when appropriate, that 
either block the uptake or reduce the retention time of radioactive 
material in the body.
    To minimize the risks from exposure to ionizing radiation, all 
emergency responders should be trained and instructed to follow 
emergency response plans and protocols and be advised on how to keep 
exposures as low as reasonably achievable. Health physics and 
industrial hygiene practices should include the use of dosimetry for 
monitoring of individual exposure with real-time readings (i.e., 
real-time electronic dosimeters) and permanent records (e.g., film 
badges, optically stimulated luminescent [OSL], or thermoluminescent 
dosimeters [TLDs]). Also, employers should (1) develop procedures 
and training that relate measurements to dose and risk, (2) 
understand and practice ALARA procedures with workers, and (3) 
address other issues related to performing response in a 
radiological environment.

(c) Understanding Radiation Risks

    If there is the possibility that emergency workers would receive 
a radiation dose higher than the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) guideline, 
emergency workers should be trained to understand the risk 
associated with such doses, including a thorough explanation of the 
latent risks associated with receiving doses greater than 5 rem 
(0.05 Sv), and acute risks at higher doses. Emergency workers should 
be fully aware of both the projected acute and chronic risks 
(cancer) they may

[[Page 45040]]

incur in an emergency response action. Furthermore, emergency 
workers cannot be forced to perform a rescue action involving 
radiation doses above regulatory limits, and they should be given 
reasonable assurance that normal controls cannot be utilized to 
reduce doses to less than 5 rem (0.05 Sv). After the event, it is 
essential that emergency workers be provided with medical follow up.
    The estimated risk of fatal cancer \6\ for healthy workers who 
receive a dose of 10 rem (0.10 Sv) is about 0.46 percent over the 
worker's lifetime (i.e., 4-5 fatal cancers per 1000 people, or 0.4-
0.5 percent). The risk scales linearly. For workers who receive a 
dose of 25 rem (0.25 Sv), the risk is about 1.1 percent. The risk is 
believed to be greater for those who are younger at the time of 
exposure. For example, for 20-30 year olds the estimated risk of 
fatal cancer at 25 rem (1.75 percent) is about twice as large as the 
risk for 40-50 year olds (0.8 percent).

    \6\ Risk per dose of a fatal cancer for members of the general 
public is assumed to be about 6 x 10-\4\ per rem. Cancer 
incidence is assumed to be about 8 x 10-\4\ per rem (see 
Federal Guidance Report No. 13). Occupational risk coefficients are 
slightly higher.

    Above 50 rem (0.5 Sv) acute effects are possible. Where 
lifesaving actions may result in doses that approach or exceed 50 
rem (0.50 Sv), such as in an IND incident, emergency workers need to 
have a full understanding of the potential acute effects of the 
expected radiation exposure, in addition to the risk of chronic 
effects. The decision to take these lifesaving actions must be based 
on the estimation that the human health benefits of the action 
exceed the safety and health risks to the emergency workers.
    It is important to note that the approach used to translate dose 
to risk in this discussion is a simplistic approach for developing 
rough estimates of risks for comparative purposes. Other more 
realistic and accurate approaches are often used in assessing risks 
for risk management decisions (other than for emergencies) when more 
complete information about the contaminants and the potential for 
human exposure is available. These approaches rely on radionuclide-
specific risk factors (e.g., found in Federal Guidance Report No. 13 
and EPA Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables), and are typically 
used in long-term assessments, such as environmental cleanup.

(d) Preparedness

    To prepare for large radiological disasters, local officials and 
Incident Commanders will need to have a decision-making process 
already developed and ready to implement when they can no longer use 
standard occupational dose limits or when there is the possibility 
that they may face decisions involving exposures approaching or 
exceeding 25 rem (0.25 Sv) for lifesaving operations. Preparedness 
entails investigating the nature of the RDD and IND incident for 
which local officials must be prepared, having appropriate worker 
health and safety plans and protocols for such incidents, and 
training and exercises to assure a level of readiness among 
officials and responders.
    Incident Commanders and emergency responders should thoroughly 
understand the emergency worker guidelines for radiological 
emergency response, including specific emergency responder health 
and safety procedures and ALARA principles. The reader is referred 
to the EPA PAG Manual (May 1992), the FRMAC Radiological Emergency 
Response Health and Safety Manual (May 2001), and the Hazardous 
Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) regulations. The 
EPA has a Worker Protection (40 CFR part 311) standard that applies 
the HAZWOPER standard to State and local workers in States that do 
not have their own occupational safety and health program.
    The HAZWOPER regulations, found in 29 CFR 1910.120 and 1926.65, 
were promulgated to protect personnel working at a hazardous waste 
site, or a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, or performing 
emergency response. This standard also covers employers whose 
employees are engaged in emergency response without regard to the 
location of the hazard (unless specifically exempted or where a more 
protective safety and health standard applies). If an employer 
anticipates that their employees will respond to a potential hazard, 
HAZWOPER requires such actions as (1) the development of an 
emergency response plan (including personnel roles, lines of 
authority, training, communication, personal protective equipment, 
and emergency equipment), (2) procedures for handling a response, 
(3) specific training requirements based on the anticipated roles of 
the responder, and (4) medical surveillance. For specific 
interpretations regarding HAZWOPER and/or other occupational safety 
and health standards, employers should consult the appropriate 
implementing agency (e.g., appropriate Federal agencies, State 
Occupational Safety and Health Programs, or State Radiation Control 

Appendix 2--Risk Management Framework for RDD and IND Incident Planning

    This appendix contains a description of a risk management 
framework for making decisions to protect public health and welfare 
in the context of cleanup and site recovery following an RDD or IND 
incident. The framework is based on the report, ``Framework for 
Environmental Health Risk Management,'' mandated by the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments published by the Commission on Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management in 1997. This appendix provides specific 
material for RDD and IND incidents, and reference to the report is 
encouraged for the details of the general framework. A plan for 
implementing this framework for RDD and IND incidents is provided in 
Appendix 4.
    The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' is 
considered generally suitable for addressing the long-term cleanup 
issues for RDDs and INDs. Given the time frames following an RDD or 
IND incident there is generally not sufficient time in the early 
phase to conduct a full risk assessment and get stakeholder 
involvement. In order for the framework to be most useful it must be 
used in planning and preparing for a radiological or nuclear 
incident. Many of the basic risk management principles were also 
used in development of the 1992 EPA PAGs.
    The framework is designed to help decision makers make good risk 
management decisions. The level of effort and resources invested in 
using the framework should be commensurate with the significance of 
the problem, the potential severity and economic impact, the level 
of controversy surrounding the problem, and resource constraints. 
The health and environmental hazards that must be considered are 
radiation hazards, and potentially chemical or biological hazards. 
Other factors to be considered include the continued disruption in 
normal activities, loss of, or limited access to critical 
infrastructure and health care and general economic damage.
    The framework relies on the three key principles of (1) broad 
context, (2) stakeholder participation, and (3) iteration. Broad 
context refers to placing all of the health and environmental issues 
in the full range of impacts and recovery factors following an RDD 
or IND incident, and is intended to assure that all aspects of 
public welfare are taken into account. Stakeholder participation is 
critical to making and successfully implementing sound, cost-
effective, risk-informed decisions. Iteration is the process of 
continuing to refine the analysis base on information available, and 
improve the decisions and actions that can be taken at any point in 
time. Together these principles outline a fair, responsive approach 
to making the decisions necessary to effectively respond to the 
impacts of an RDD or IND incident.
    Risk management is the process of identifying, evaluating, 
selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to public health 
and the environment. The goal of risk management is scientifically 
sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that reduce or prevent 
public health impacts while taking into account social, cultural, 
ethical, public policy, and legal considerations. In order to 
accomplish this goal, information will be needed on the nature and 
magnitude of the hazard present as a result of the incident, the 
options for reducing risks, and the effectiveness and costs of those 
options. Decision makers also compare the economic, social, 
cultural, ethical, legal, and public policy implications associated 
with each option, as well as the unique safety and health hazards 
facing emergency responders and ecological hazards the cleanup 
actions themselves may cause. Often a stakeholder working group can 
provide input needed to consider all of the relevant information.
    Stakeholders can provide valuable input to decision makers 
during the long-term cleanup effort, and the key decision makers 
should establish a process that provides for appropriate stakeholder 
input. Identifying which stakeholders need to be involved in the 
process depends on the situation. In the case of a site contaminated 
as a result of an RDD or IND incident, stakeholders may include 
individuals whose health, economic well-being, and quality of life 
are currently affected or would be affected by the cleanup and the 
site's subsequent use, or nonprofit organizations representing such 
individuals. They may also include those who have

[[Page 45041]]

regulatory responsibility, and those who may speak on behalf the 
environment generally, business and economics, or future 
    Stakeholder input should be considered throughout all stages of 
the framework as appropriate, including analyzing the risks, 
identifying potential cleanup options, evaluating options, selecting 
an approach, and evaluating the effectiveness of the action 
afterwards. Their input will assist decision makers in providing a 
reasoned basis for actions to be taken. Further information on the 
importance and selection of stakeholders can be found in the 
Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management.
    Decision makers can also benefit from the use of working groups 
that provide expert technical advice regarding the decisions that 
need to be made during the long-term recovery process. Further 
information on how to incorporate the use of technical working 
groups is provided later in this appendix.

(a) The Stages of the Risk Management Framework for Responding to 
RDD and IND Incidents

    The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' has 
six stages:
    1. Define the problem and put it in context.
    2. Analyze the risks associated with the problem in context.
    3. Examine options for addressing the risks.
    4. Make decisions about which options to implement.
    5. Take actions to implement the decisions.
    6. Evaluate results of the actions taken.
    Risk management decisions under this framework should do the 
     Clearly articulate all of the problems in their public 
health and ecological contexts, not just those associated with 
     Emerge from a decision-making process that elicits the 
views of those affected by the decision.
     Be based on the best available scientific, economic, 
and other technical evidence.
     Be implemented with stakeholder support in a manner 
that is effective, expeditious, and flexible.
     Be shown to have a significant impact on the risks of 
     Be revised and changed when significant new information 
becomes available.
     Account for their multi-source, multimedia, multi-
chemical, and multi-risk contexts.
     Be feasible, with benefits reasonably related to their 
     Give priority to preventing risks, not just controlling 
     Be sensitive to political, social, legal, and cultural 

(1) Define the Problems and Put Them in Context

    In the case of RDDs, the initial problem is caused by the 
dispersal of radioactive material. The incident may also result in 
the release of other types of contaminants (chemical or biological) 
or create other types of public health hazards. Individuals exposed 
may include emergency workers and members of the public, and there 
may be different associated assumptions; for example, how long the 
individuals will be exposed in the future.
    The potential for future radiation exposure of the public from 
the site must be considered within the context of the societal 
objectives to be achieved, and must examine cleanup options in the 
context of other risks members of the community face. There may also 
be broader public health or environmental issues that local 
governments and public health agencies have to confront and 
    The goals of the cleanup effort will extend well beyond the 
reduction of potential delayed radiation health effects, and may 
     Public health protection goals, including mitigating 
acute hazards and long-term chronic issues, and protecting children 
and other sensitive populations.
     Social and economic goals, such as minimizing 
disruption to communities and businesses, maintaining property 
values, and protecting historical or cultural landmarks or 
     National security goals, such as maintaining and 
normalizing use of critical highways, airports, or seaports for mass 
transit; maintaining energy production; and providing for critical 
     Public welfare goals, including maintaining hospital 
capacity, water treatment works, and sewage systems for protection 
of community health; assuring adequate food, fuel, power, and other 
essential resources; and providing for the protection or recovery of 
personal property.

(2) Analyze the Risks

    To make effective risk management decisions, decision makers and 
other stakeholders need to know what potential harm a situation 
poses and how great the likelihood is that people or the environment 
will be harmed. The nature, extent, and focus of a risk analysis 
should be guided by the risk management goals. The results of a risk 
analysis--along with information about public values, statutory 
requirements, court decisions, equity considerations, benefits, and 
costs--are used to decide whether and how to manage the risks.
    Risk analyses can be controversial, reflecting the important 
role that both science and judgment play in drawing conclusions 
about the likelihood of effects on public health and the 
environment. It is important that risk assessors respect both the 
scientific foundation of risks and the procedures for making 
inferences about risks in the absence of adequate data. Risk 
assessors should provide decision makers and other stakeholders with 
plausible conclusions about risk that can be made on the basis of 
the available information. They should also provide decision makers 
with evaluations of the scientific support for their conclusions, 
descriptions of major sources of uncertainty, and alternative views.
    Stakeholders' perception of a risk can vary substantially 
depending on such factors as the extent to which the stakeholders 
are directly affected, whether they have voluntarily assumed the 
risk or had the risk imposed on them, and the nature of their 
connection with the cause of the risk. For this reason, risk 
analyses should characterize the scientific aspects of a risk and 
note its subjective, cultural, and comparative dimensions. 
Stakeholders play an important role in providing information that 
should be used in risk analyses and in identifying specific health 
and ecological concerns.

(3) Examine the Options

    This stage of the risk management process involves identifying 
potential cleanup options and evaluating their effectiveness, 
feasibility, costs, benefits, cultural or social impacts, and 
unintended consequences. This process can begin whenever 
appropriate, after defining the problem and considering the context. 
It does not have to wait until the risk analysis is completed, 
although a risk analysis often will provide important information 
for identifying and evaluating risk management options. In some 
cases, examining risk management options may help refine a risk 
analysis. Risk management goals may be redefined after decision 
makers and stakeholders gain some appreciation for what is feasible, 
what the costs and benefits are, and how the process of reducing 
exposures and risks can improve human and ecological health.
    Once potential options have been identified, the effectiveness, 
feasibility, benefits, detriments, and costs of each option must be 
assessed to provide input into selecting the best option. Key 
questions include determining (1) the expected benefits and costs, 
(2) distribution of benefits and costs across the impacted 
community, (3) the feasibility of the option given the available 
time, resources, and any legal, political, statutory, and technology 
limitations, and (4) whether the option increases certain risks 
while reducing others. Other adverse consequences may be cultural, 
political, social, or economic. Adverse economic consequences may 
include impacts on a community, such as reduced property values or 
loss of jobs, environmental justice issues, and harming the social 
fabric of a town or tribe by relocating the people away from an 
    Many risk management options may be unfeasible for social, 
political, cultural, legal, or economic reasons--or because they do 
not reduce risks to the extent necessary. For example, removing all 
the soil from an entire valley that is contaminated with radioactive 
material may be infeasible. On the other hand, the costs of cleaning 
up an elementary school may be considered justified by their 
benefits: Protecting children and returning to daily activities and 
a sense of normalcy. Of course, the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of an option may change in the future.

(4) Make a Decision

    A productive stakeholder involvement process can generate 
important guidance for decision makers. Thus, decisions may reflect 
negotiation and compromise, as long as risk management goals and 
intentions are met. In some cases, win-win solutions that allow 
stakeholders with divergent views to achieve their primary goals are 
possible. Decision makers should allow the opportunity for public 
comment on proposed decisions.
    Decision makers must weigh the value of obtaining additional 
information against the need for a decision, however uncertain the

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decision may be. Sometimes a decision must be made primarily on a 
precautionary basis. When sufficient information is available to 
make a risk management decision, or when additional information or 
analysis would not contribute significantly to the quality of the 
decision, the decision should not be postponed.

(5) Take Action To Implement the Decision

    When options have been evaluated and decisions made, a plan for 
action should be developed and implemented. The issuance of 
protective action recommendations is the responsibility of local 
officials to protect the public and the environment during 
emergencies: Long-term cleanup decisions have the same basic risk 
management framework, but entail substantially more analysis and 
stakeholder involvement. When government officials and stakeholders 
have agreed on a strategy, cleanup activities should commence. It 
may take considerable time for these actions to be completed, and 
additional decisions may often be necessary as the actions proceed.

(6) Evaluate the Results

    Decision makers and other stakeholders must continue to review 
what risk management actions have been implemented and how effective 
these actions have been. Evaluating effectiveness involves 
monitoring and measuring, as well as comparing actual benefits and 
costs to estimates made in the decision-making stage. The 
effectiveness of the process leading to implementation should also 
be evaluated at this stage. Evaluation provides important 
information about the following: Whether the actions were 
successful; whether they accomplished what was intended; whether the 
predicted benefits and costs were accurate; whether any 
modifications are needed to the risk management plan to improve 
success; whether any critical information gaps hindered success; 
whether any new information has emerged which indicates that a 
decision or stage of the framework should be revisited; whether 
unintended consequences have emerged; how stakeholder involvement 
contributed to the outcome; and what lessons can be learned to guide 
future risk management decisions, or to improve the decision-making 
    Evaluation is critical to accountability and to ensure efficient 
use of valuable but limited resources. Tools for evaluation include 
environmental and health monitoring, research, analyses of costs and 
benefits, and discussions with stakeholders.

(b) Technical Advisory Committee

    Making decisions on the appropriate cleanup approaches and 
levels following an RDD or IND incident will undoubtedly be a 
challenging task for decision makers. As already noted, the 
technical issues may be complex. Many potentially competing factors 
will need to be carefully weighed and decision makers should expect 
public anxiety in the face of a terrorist act involving radioactive 
materials. Different regulatory authorities and organizations 
historically have taken different cleanup approaches for 
radioactively contaminated industrial sites. Given this context, 
decision makers will need to determine how best to obtain the 
necessary technical input to support these decisions and demonstrate 
to the public that the final decisions are credible and sound.
    There are a variety of ways to approach this situation, and 
decision makers will need to tailor the process to particular site 
circumstances. This section describes one approach that is available 
to decision makers, which is based on the ``ad hoc'' mechanisms used 
for coordinating interagency expertise and assessing the 
effectiveness in general of the cleanup in response to the 2001 
anthrax attacks in Washington, DC. For significant decontamination 
efforts, the key decision makers may choose to convene an 
independent committee of technical experts to conduct a deliberative 
and comprehensive post-decontamination review. The committee would 
evaluate the effectiveness of the decontamination process and make 
recommendations on whether the decontaminated areas or items may be 
reoccupied or reused. It is important to note that although this 
review may enhance the scientific credibility of the final outcome, 
final cleanup decisions rest with decision makers.
    The committee may consist of experts from Federal agencies, 
State and tribal public health and environmental agencies, 
universities and private industries, the local health department, 
and possibly representatives of local workers and the community. To 
maximize objectivity, the committee should be an independent group 
that will provide input to the decision makers, not be a part of the 
decision-making team.
    The scientific expertise in the committee should reflect the 
needs of the decision makers in all aspects of the decontamination 
process (e.g., environmental sampling, epidemiology, risk 
assessment, industrial hygiene, statistics, health physics, and 
engineering). Agencies on the committee may also have 
representatives on the technical working group, but in order to 
preserve the objectivity of the committee, it is best to designate 
different experts to serve on each group. The chair and co-chair of 
the committee should not be a part of the decision-making group at 
the site.
    The decision makers should develop a charter for the committee 
that specifies the tasks committee members are intended to perform, 
the issues they are to consider, and the process they will use in 
arriving at conclusions and recommendations. The charter should also 
specify whether the individual members are expected to represent the 
views of their respective agencies, or just their own opinions as 
independent scientific experts. Consensus among committee members is 
desirable, but may not be possible. If consensus cannot be achieved, 
the charter should specify how decision makers expect the full range 
of opinions to be reflected in the final committee report.
    In general, the technical peer review committee would evaluate 
pre- and post-decontamination sampling data, the decontamination 
plan, and any other information key to assessing the effectiveness 
of the cleanup. Based on this evaluation, the committee would make 
recommendations to the decision makers on whether cleanup has 
reduced contamination to acceptable levels, or whether further 
actions are needed before re-occupancy.

Appendix 3--Federal Cleanup Implementation

    This appendix provides a federally-recommended approach for 
environmental cleanup after an RDD or IND incident to accompany the 
risk management principles outlined in Appendix 2. This approach 
describes how State and local governments may coordinate with 
Federal agencies, and the public, consistent with the National 
Response Framework (NRF). The approach does not attempt to provide 
detailed descriptions of State and local roles and expertise. It is 
assumed those details will be provided in State and local level 
planning documents that address radiological/nuclear terrorism 
    This site cleanup approach is intended to function under the NRF 
with Federal agencies performing work consistent with their 
established roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. Agencies 
should be tasked to perform work under the appropriate Emergency 
Support Function, as a primary or support agency, as described in 
the NRF. This plan is also designed to be compatible with the 
Incident Command/Unified Command (IC/UC) structure embodied in the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS).
    The functional descriptions and processes in this approach are 
provided to address the specific needs and wide range of potential 
impacts of an RDD or IND incident. During the intermediate phase, 
site cleanup planners should begin the process described below, 
under the direction of the on-site IC/UC, and in close coordination 
with Federal, State and local officials. After early and 
intermediate phase activities have come to conclusion and only long-
term cleanup activities are ongoing, the IC/UC structure may 
continue to support planning and decision-making for the long-term 
cleanup. The IC/UC may make personnel changes and structural 
adaptations to suit the needs of a lengthy, multifaceted and highly 
visible remediation process. For example, a less formal and 
structured command, more focused on technical analysis and 
stakeholder involvement, may be preferable for extended site cleanup 
than what is required under emergency circumstances.
    Radiological and nuclear terrorism incidents cover a broad range 
of potential scenarios and impacts. This appendix assumes that the 
Federal Government is a primary funding agent for site cleanup. In 
particular, the process described for the late phase in section 
(d)(4) of this document assumes an incident of relatively large 
size. For smaller incidents, all of the elements in this section may 
not be warranted. The process should be tailored to the 
circumstances of the particular incident. Decision makers should 
recognize that for some radiological/nuclear terrorist incidents, 
states will take the primary leadership role and contribute 
significant resources toward cleanup of the site. This section does 

[[Page 45043]]

address such a scenario, but states may choose to use the process 
described here.
    This implementation plan does not address law enforcement 
coordination during terrorism incident responses, including how the 
FBI will manage on-scene activities immediately following an act of 
terror. Agencies' roles and responsibilities will be implemented 
according to the NRF and supporting documents. Also, victim triage 
and other medical response procedures are beyond the scope of this 
Guidance. The plan presented in this appendix is not intended to 
impact site cleanups occurring under other statutory authorities 
such as EPA's Superfund program, the NRC's decommissioning program, 
or State-administered cleanup programs.

Cleanup Activities Overview

    As described earlier in the document, radiological/nuclear 
emergency responses are often divided roughly into three phases: (1) 
The early phase, when the plume is active and field data are lacking 
or not reliable; (2) the intermediate phase, when the plume has 
passed and field data are available for assessment and analysis; and 
(3) the late phase, when long-term issues are addressed, such as 
cleanup of the site. For purposes of this appendix, the response to 
a radiological or nuclear terrorism incident is divided into two 
separate, but interrelated and overlapping, processes. The first is 
comprised of the early and intermediate phases of response, which 
consists of the immediate and near-term on-scene actions of State, 
local, and Federal emergency responders under the IC/UC. On-scene 
actions include incident stabilization, lifesaving activities, dose 
reduction actions for members of the public and emergency 
responders, access control and security, emergency decontamination 
of persons and property, ``hot spot'' removal actions, and 
resumption of basic infrastructure functions.
    The second process pertains to environmental cleanup, which is 
initiated soon after the incident (during the intermediate phase) 
and continues into the late phase. The process starts with convening 
stakeholders and technical subject matter experts to begin 
identifying and evaluating options for the cleanup of the site. The 
environmental cleanup process overlaps the intermediate phase 
activities described above and should be coordinated with those 
activities. This process is interrelated with the ongoing 
intermediate phase activities, and the intermediate phase protective 
actions continue to apply through the late phase until cleanup is 
    Cleanup planning and discussions should begin as soon as 
practicable after an incident to allow for selection of key 
stakeholders and subject matter experts, planning, analyses, 
contractual processes, and cleanup activities. States may choose to 
pre-select stakeholders for major incident recovery coordination. 
These activities should proceed in parallel with ongoing 
intermediate phase activities, and coordination between these 
activities should be maintained. Preliminary remediation activities 
during the intermediate phase--such as emergency removals, 
decontamination, resumption of basic infrastructure function, and 
some return to normalcy in accordance with intermediate phase PAGs--
should not be delayed for the final site remediation decision.
    A process for addressing environmental contamination that 
applies an optimization process for site cleanup is presented below. 
As described in this document, optimization is a flexible process in 
which numerous factors are considered to achieve an end result that 
considers local needs and desires, health risks, costs, technical 
feasibility, and other factors. The general process outlined below 
provides decision makers with input from both technical experts and 
stakeholder representatives, and also provides an opportunity for 
public comment. The extent and complexity of the process for an 
actual incident should be tailored to the needs of the specific 
incident; for smaller incidents, the workgroups discussed below may 
not be necessary.
    The goals of the process described below are: (1) Transparency--
the basis for cleanup decisions should be available to stakeholder 
representatives, and to the public at large; (2) inclusiveness--
representative stakeholders should be involved in decision-making 
activities; (3) effectiveness--technical subject matter experts 
should analyze remediation options, consider established dose and 
risk benchmarks, and assess various technologies in order to assist 
in identifying a final solution that is optimal for the incident; 
and (4) shared accountability--the final decision to proceed will be 
made jointly by Federal, State, and local officials.
    Under the NRF, FEMA may issue mission assignments to the 
involved Federal agencies, as appropriate, to assist in response and 
recovery. Additional funding may be provided to State/local 
governments to perform response/recovery activities through other 
mechanisms. The components of the process are as follows:

(a) General Management Structure

    Planning for the long-term cleanup should begin during the 
intermediate phase, and at that time, a traditional NIMS response 
structure should still be in place. However, NIMS was developed 
specifically for emergency management and may not be the most 
efficient response structure for long-term cleanup. If the cleanup 
will extend for years, the IC/UC may decide to transition at some 
point to a different long-term project management structure.
    Under the NRF and NIMS, incidents are managed at the lowest 
possible jurisdictional level. In most cases, this will be at the 
level of the Incident Command or Unified Command (IC/UC). The IC/UC 
directs on-scene tactical operations. Responding local, State, and 
Federal agencies are represented in the IC/UC and Incident Command 
Post in accordance with NIMS principles regarding jurisdictional 
authorities, functional responsibilities, and resources provided. 
For INDs, and large RDDs, multiple Incident Command Posts (ICPs) may 
be established to manage the incident with an Area Command or 
Unified Area Command supporting the ICPs and prioritizing resources 
and activities among them. If the RDD/IND incident happens on a 
Federal facility or involves Federal materials, the representatives 
in the UC may change appropriately and the response will be 
conducted according to the applicable Federal procedures.
    Issues that cannot be resolved at the IC/UC or Unified Area 
Command level may be raised with the JFO and JFO Unified 
Coordination Group for resolution. The JFO coordinates and 
prioritizes Federal resources, and when applicable, issues mission 
assignments to Federal agencies under the Stafford Act. Issues that 
cannot be resolved at the JFO level may be raised to the DHS NOC, 
senior-level interagency management groups, and the White House 
Homeland Security Council.
    Day-to-day tactical management, planning, and operations for the 
RDD/IND cleanup process will be managed at the IC/UC level, but for 
large-scale cleanups, it is expected that the JFO Unified 
Coordination Group will review proposed cleanup plans and provide 
strategic and policy direction. The agency(s) with primary 
responsibility for site cleanup should be represented in the JFO 
Unified Coordination Group. The IC/UC will need to establish 
appropriate briefing venues as the cleanup process proceeds, 
including the affected mayor(s) and Governor(s).
    The discussion below assumes a traditional NIMS IC/UC structure; 
if the IC/UC transitions later to a different management structure 
for a longer-term cleanup, the IC/UC would need to determine the 
appropriate way to incorporate the workgroups described below into 
that structure.
    Appendix 2 presented the general steps in the cleanup process: 
Analyze the risks, examine the options, make and implement a 
decision, evaluate the results. This process will be managed by the 
IC/UC, who ultimately determines the structure and organization of 
the Incident Command Post, but the discussion below provides one 
recommended approach for managing the cleanup process within a NIMS 
ICS response structure. The Incident Command Post Planning Section 
has the lead for response planning activities, working in 
conjunction with other sections, and would have the lead for 
development of the optimization analysis, working closely with the 
Operations Section. The NIMS describes the units that make up the 
Planning Section, and allows for additional units to be added 
depending on site-specific needs. NIMS states that for incidents 
involving the need to coordinate and manage large amounts of 
environmental sampling and analytical data from multiple sources, an 
Environmental Unit may be established within the Planning Section to 
facilitate interagency environmental data management, monitoring, 
sampling, analysis, assessment, and site cleanup and waste disposal 
planning. RDD/IND incidents would involve the collection of not only 
large amounts of radiological data, but also data related to other 
environmental and health and safety hazards, and would therefore 
likely warrant the establishment of an Environmental Unit in the 
Planning Section. Planning for FRMAC radiological sampling and 
monitoring activities will be integrated into the Planning Section, 
and coordinated with other Situation and Environmental Unit data 
management activities.

[[Page 45044]]

    The IC/UC would assign the responsibility for coordinating and 
development of the optimization analysis to a specific unit. For 
incidents in which the contaminated area is small and the analysis 
is straightforward, the IC/UC may choose to assign such 
responsibilities to the Environmental Unit. On the other hand, for 
large incidents requiring more complicated tradeoffs or the 
evaluation of cleanup goals with broad implications, the IC/UC may 
choose to establish a separate unit in the Planning Section (for 
example, a Cleanup Planning Unit) to coordinate the development of 
the optimization analysis. The IC/UC may then convene a technical 
working group and a stakeholder working group, managed by the 
Environmental or Cleanup Planning Unit, to analyze cleanup options 
and develop recommendations. The Environmental or Cleanup Planning 
Unit would coordinate working group processes and interactions and 
report the results of the optimization analysis and workgroup 
efforts to the IC/UC through the Planning Section Chief.
    The development and completion of the optimization analysis is 
expected to be an iterative process, and for large incidents, the 
cleanup will likely proceed in phases, most likely from the 
``outside in'' toward the most contaminated areas. The extent of the 
analysis and process used to develop it would be tailored to the 
needs of the specific incident, but the following working groups may 
be convened by the IC/UC to assist decision makers in the 
optimization process, particularly for large or complex cleanups.

(1) Technical Working Group

    A technical working group should be convened as soon as 
practicable, normally within days or weeks of the incident. The 
technical working group would be managed by the Planning Section 
Unit that is assigned responsibility for the optimization analysis. 
The technical working group may or may not be physically located at 
the ICP. The group may review data and documents, provide input 
electronically, and meet with incident management officials. The 
group may also be asked to participate in meetings with the JFO 
Unified Coordination Group if needed.
    Function: The technical working group provides multi-agency, 
multi-disciplinary expert input on the optimization analysis, 
including advice on technical issues, analysis of relevant 
regulatory requirements and guidelines, risk analyses, and 
development of cleanup options. The technical working group would 
provide expert technical input to the IC/UC; it would not be a 
decision-making body.
    Makeup: The technical working group should include selected 
Federal, State, local, and private sector subject matter experts in 
such fields as environmental fate and transport modeling, risk 
analysis, technical remediation options analysis, cost, risk and 
benefit analysis, health physics/radiation protection, construction 
remediation practices, and relevant regulatory requirements. The 
exact selection and balance of subject matter experts is incident-
specific. The Advisory Team for the Environment, Food, and Health is 
comprised of Federal radiological experts in various fields who may 
warrant representation on the technical working group.

(2) Stakeholder Working Group

    The stakeholder working group should be convened as soon as 
practicable, normally within days or weeks of the incident. The 
stakeholder working group would be managed by the Planning Section 
Unit that is assigned responsibility for the optimization analysis. 
The IC/UC may direct the Public Information Officer (who would 
coordinate with the JIC) to work with the group, including 
establishing a process for the group to report out its 
recommendations. How and where the stakeholder working group would 
meet to review information and provide its input would need to be 
determined in conjunction with the group members. The stakeholder 
working group may also be asked to participate in meetings with the 
JFO Unified Coordination Group if needed.
    Makeup: The stakeholder working group should include selected 
Federal, State, and local representatives; local non-governmental 
representatives; and local/regional business stakeholders. The exact 
selection and balance of stakeholders is incident specific.
    Function: The function of the stakeholder working group is to 
provide input to the IC/UC concerning local needs and desires for 
site recovery, proposed cleanup options, and other recommendations. 
The group should present local goals for the use of the site, 
prioritizing current and future potential land uses and functions, 
such as utilities and infrastructure, light industrial, downtown 
business, and residential land uses. The stakeholder working group 
would not be a decision-making body.

(b) Activities

(1) Optimization and Recommendations

    The IC/UC directs the management of the optimization analysis 
through the Planning Section. Technical and stakeholder working 
groups assist in performing analyses and developing cleanup options 
and provide input to the IC/UC, and may be asked to participate in 
meetings with the JFO Unified Coordination Group if needed. The IC/
UC reviews the options described in the optimization analysis and 
selects a proposed approach for site cleanup, in close coordination 
with Federal, State and local officials. Again, depending on the 
incident size, it may be necessary to conduct the cleanup in phases. 
Thus, decisions on cleanup approaches may also be made in phases. As 
appropriate for the magnitude of the cleanup task, the IC/UC would 
brief relevant Federal, State, and local government officials on 
proposed cleanup plans for approval. This may involve the office of 
the affected mayor and Governor. At the Federal level, it may 
involve the JFO Unified Coordination Group and higher-level 

(2) Public Review of Decision

    The IC/UC should work with the POI and JIC to publish a summary 
of the process, the options analyzed, and the recommendations for 
public comments. Public meetings should also be convened at 
appropriate times. Public comments should be considered and 
incorporated as appropriate. A reconvening of the stakeholder and/or 
technical working groups may be useful for resolving some issues.

(3) Execute Cleanup

    Cleanup activities should commence as quickly as practicable, 
and allow for incremental reoccupation of areas as cleanup proceeds. 
For significant decontamination efforts, the IC/UC may choose to 
employ a technical peer review advisory committee to conduct a 
review of the effectiveness of the cleanup. The technical peer 
review advisory committee is discussed in more detail in Appendix 2.

Appendix 4--Operational Guidelines for Implementation of Protective 
Action Guides and Other Activities in RDD or IND Incidents

    During all phases of an incident, many decisions will need to be 
made at the field-level, such as making protective action decisions, 
opening critical infrastructure, limited re-entry of citizens to 
homes or businesses, release of personal property, and others. This 
appendix presents operational guidelines being developed to assist 
decision makers and emergency responders in implementing protective 
actions and making other on-site decisions.\7\ Operational 
guidelines are levels of radiation or concentrations of 
radionuclides that can be accurately measured by radiation detection 
and monitoring equipment that can then be compared to PAGs, or 
field-level radiation dose decision points (such as for the release 
of personal property) to quickly determine what action should be 
taken. In most situations, the operational guidelines will be given 
in terms of external gamma rates or media-specific (e.g., surfaces, 
soil, or water) radionuclide concentration units. Both external and 
internal exposure potential were considered in the development of 
the operational guidelines.

    \7\ For purposes of this appendix, ``relocation area'' refers to 
an area that local officials have determined is not safe for 
prolonged occupation by the public, based on the intermediate phase 
PAGs, and have recommended that the public be relocated.

    This appendix discusses the operational guidelines qualitatively 
and does not provide actual numeric values. The operational 
guidelines are being developed to provide reasonable assurance that 
field-level radiation dose decision points and the PAGs recommended 
in this document can be met under different circumstances. The 
operational guidelines also address, to some extent, the impact of 
protective actions, such as controlling wash water after rinsing 
vehicles to remove contamination. Actual conditions may warrant 
development of incident-specific guidelines. To support this need, 
the RESRAD-RDD \8\ software tool was developed to allow for easy and 
timely calculation of site-specific operational

[[Page 45045]]

guidelines that can be tailored to the specific emergency and the 
required response.

    \8\ RESRAD-RDD is a computer modeling tool developed by the U.S. 
Department of Energy for calculating radiation concentrations on 
different media, and doses and dose rates following an RDD incident.

    The operational guidelines are organized into seven groups that 
are generally categorized by the phase of emergency response in 
which they would be implemented or used for planning purposes. 
Individual groups are further categorized into subgroups as 
appropriate. Table 3 summarizes operational guideline groups and 
subgroups. A summary description of these groups and subgroups is 
provided below. Detailed descriptions of the operational guidelines, 
to include their technical derivation, intended application, and 
tools to assist in their application, are provided in the 
Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for Use in 
Emergency Preparedness and Response to a Radiological Dispersal 
Device Incidents (DOE/HS-0001, available at http://www.ogcms.energy.gov).

                              Table 3--Operational Guidelines: Groups and Subgroups
                  Groups                                                  Subgroups
A. Access control during emergency          1. Life and property-saving measures.
 response operations.
                                            2. Emergency worker demarcation.
B. Early-phase protective action..........  1. Evacuation.
                                            2. Sheltering.
C. Relocation from different areas and      1. Residential areas.
 critical infrastructure utilization in
 relocation areas.
                                            2. Commercial and industrial areas.
                                            3. Other areas, such as parks and monuments.
                                            4. Hospitals and other health care facilities.
                                            5. Critical transport facilities.
                                            6. Water and sewer facilities.
                                            7. Power and fuel facilities.
D. Temporary access to relocation areas     1. Worker access to businesses for essential actions.
 for essential activities.
                                            2. Public access to residences for retrieval of property, pets,
E. Transportation and access routes.......  1. Bridges.
                                            2. Streets and thoroughfares.
                                            3. Sidewalks and walkways.
F. Release of property from radiologically  1. Personal property, except wastes.
 controlled areas.
                                            2. Waste.
                                            3. Hazardous waste.
                                            4. Real property, such as lands and buildings.
G. Food consumption.......................  1. Early-phase food guidelines.
                                            2. Early-phase soil guidelines.
                                            3. Intermediate-phase soil guidelines.
                                            4. Intermediate- to late-phase soil guidelines.

(a) Group A: Access Control During Emergency Response Operations

    These operational guidelines are designed to assist responders 
in decision making for worker health and safety in the early to 
intermediate phases of response when the situation has not been 
fully stabilized or characterized. They are designed to guide 
responders in establishing radiological control zones or boundaries 
for the areas directly impacted by the RDD or IND incident where 
first responders and emergency response personnel are working. They 
are not intended to restrict emergency worker access, but rather to 
inform workers of potential radiological hazards that exist in the 
area and to provide tools to those responsible for radiation 
protection during response activities. These operational guidelines 
may be used to restrict the access of nonessential personnel and 
members of the public to specific areas. Examples of operational 
guidelines developed in this group include life- and property-saving 
measures and emergency worker zone demarcation.
    Group A operational guidelines are expressed as a series of 
reference ``stay time'' tables for responders who may have only 
limited health physics information and personal protective equipment 
at the time of the response. For example, the health physics 
information available to them could include or be limited to 
measurements of the external exposure rate, gross alpha surface 
contamination, beta/gamma surface contamination, and/or air 
concentration. Radionuclide-specific correction factors as well as 
radionuclide-specific and respiratory protection-specific tables are 
also provided. Stay times are provided for a range of doses (i.e., 
0.1 rem (.001 Sv), 0.5 rem (.005 Sv), 1 rem (.01 Sv), 2 rem (.02 
Sv), 5 rem (.05 Sv), 10 rem (.10 Sv), 25 rem (.25 Sv), 100 rem (1 
Sv), many of which correspond to guidelines used for workers and the 

(b) Group B: Early-Phase Protective Action (Evacuation or 

    Group B operational guidelines are designed to help decision 
makers make timely protective action decisions, such as whether to 
evacuate or shelter the general public in the early phase. These 
operational guidelines are similar to values presented in the FRMAC 
Assessment Manual for evacuation and sheltering. Group B operational 
guidelines are typically expressed as limiting concentrations of 
radioactivity in surface soil.

(c) Group C: Relocation and Critical Infrastructure Utilization in 
Affected Areas

    These operational guidelines are intended for early-to 
intermediate-phase protective actions. They are designed for use in 
deciding whether to relocate the public from affected areas for a 
protracted period of time. Screening values are provided to 
delineate areas that exceed the relocation PAGs. These areas include 
residential areas, commercial/industrial areas, and other areas such 
as parks, cemeteries, and monuments. Group C operational guidelines 
also assist in efforts to ensure that facilities critical to the 
public welfare can continue to operate, if needed. These facilities 
include hospitals, airports, railroads and ports, water and sewer 
facilities, and power and fuel facilities. These operational 
guidelines are typically expressed as soil, building, or street-
surface contamination concentrations (e.g., pCi/m2).

(d) Group D: Temporary Access to Relocation Areas for Essential 

    Group D operational guidelines pertain to intermediate phase 
protective actions. They are designed to assist in determining 
constraints necessary to allow for temporary access to restricted 
(relocation) areas. For example, the public, or owners/employees of 
businesses, may need temporary access to residences, or commercial, 
agricultural, or industrial facilities in order to retrieve 
essential records, conduct maintenance to protect facilities, 
prevent environmental damage, attend to animals, or retrieve pets. 
These operational guidelines describe the level and timeframes at 
which these actions can be taken without supervision or radiological 
protections. The public or employees may occasionally (e.g., a few 
days per month) access areas that do not exceed these guidelines. 
Temporary access to

[[Page 45046]]

relocation areas that exceed these levels should be permitted only 
under the supervision, or with the permission of, radiation 
protection personnel. The guidelines are typically expressed in 
terms of stay-times during which the public or employees may access 
the areas without receiving a predetermined dose.

(e) Group E: Transportation and Access Routes

    These operational guidelines apply to intermediate phase 
actions. They are designed to assist in determining whether 
transportation routes (e.g., bridges, highways, streets) or access 
ways (e.g., sidewalks and walkways) may be accessed by the public 
for general, limited, or restricted use. The relocation PAGs serve 
as the basis for these operational guidelines. For example, 
operational guidelines may be defined for industrial or commercial 
use of various roads, bridges, or access ways. These may be 
necessary to allow for access between non-relocation areas via a 
highway that passes through a relocation area or for access to 
recovery areas in the immediate area of an incident. These 
operational guidelines assume regular or periodic use and are not 
appropriate for one-time events, such as evacuation or relocation 
actions. They are typically expressed as surface contamination 
concentrations (e.g., pCi/m2).

(f) Group F: Release of Property From Radiologically Controlled 

    Group F operational guidelines are intended for intermediate to 
long-term recovery-phase protective actions. During response and 
recovery operations, property and wastes must be cleared from 
radiologically controlled areas (relocation areas). Property 
includes personal property, debris and non-radiological wastes, 
hazardous waste, and real property (e.g., buildings and lands). 
These operational guidelines support such actions. Because 
subsequent retrieval of cleared, or released, properties will be 
difficult, these levels should be consistent with late-phase cleanup 
goals wherever practicable. For this reason, they should not be 
applied to property that will continue to be used within controlled 
areas. These operational guidelines should also be used for 
screening property that was located outside the controlled area for 
possible contamination. In general, the operational guidelines in 
this group provide reasonable assurance that the cleared property is 
acceptable for long-term, unrestricted use (or appropriate 
disposition, in the case of wastes) without further radiological 
reassessment or control.
    For personal property such as vehicles and equipment, the 
operational guideline values were derived using the ANSI N13.12 
standard clearance screening levels.\9\ These draft operational 
guidelines are available for review and use as appropriate at http://www.ogcms.energy.gov. The guidelines establish three property 
categories: at greater than 200 times ANSI N13.12 screening levels, 
monitored remediation or control is recommended; at levels between 
10 and 200 times the levels, self-remediation (conventional washing) 
of the property is recommended as soon as practical; and below the 
self-remediation levels, no control or protective action is 

    \9\ The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) produces 
consensus based national standards. ANSI standard N13.12, Surface 
and Volume Radioactivity Standards for Clearance, can be found at 

    Operational guidelines for real property (buildings and lands) 
are designed to assist on-scene decision-making, and in development 
of the cleanup options described in section (d)(4), Late Phase 
Guidance, of this document. Section (d)(4) on long-term cleanup 
incorporates the principle of site-specific optimization, and 
highlights stakeholder involvement and shared accountability. The 
guidelines for real property are unique in that there is no one 
specific, predefined numeric criterion (i.e., expressed in terms of 
concentration, dose, or risk) on which to base decisions. These 
guidelines are intended to be utilized in the optimization process, 
which will likely consider the magnitude and extent of the 
contamination and the radionuclide(s) involved, the proposed long-
term land and building use in the affected areas, the need for 
expedited recovery, public welfare issues, the cost impacts for each 
proposed cleanup option, the ecological considerations, and other 
factors. Real property operational guidelines are provided as 
reference values (e.g., soil and building-surface concentrations or 
risks) that can be used as a starting point for evaluating options 
and impacts relative to a range of dose or risk-based benchmarks 
(e.g., 500, 100, 25, or 4 millirem per year; lifetime risk ranges, 
and others) that could be considered as part of cleanup options 
analysis. Thus, they are not regulatory dose limits or criteria, but 
serve as concentration values that provide support to the 
optimization analyses.

(g) Group G: Food Consumption

    Group G operational guidelines apply to early through long-term 
recovery phase protective actions, as needed. They are designed to 
aid in decision making about the need for placing restrictions on 
consumption of contaminated foods or on agricultural products during 
and following an RDD or IND incident. Four subgroups were developed 
(Subgroups G.1-G.4; see Table 4A), which are intended for use in 
conjunction with the operational guidelines in other groups. 
Subgroup G.1 guidelines pertain to food consumption in the early 
response phase immediately after an incident. These guidelines can 
be used to screen against measured concentrations taken from 
previously harvested food or from animal products exposed during the 
incident. Subgroup G.1 guidelines also can be used to determine the 
need for a food embargo, or restrictions on consumption of 
contaminated foods. Subgroup G.2 guidelines, soil guidelines, also 
apply to the early phase of response, but they are intended for use 
in evaluating crops or animal products exposed during the RDD 
incident (e.g., after the plume has passed). They serve as a 
comparison with measured concentrations taken from surface soil in 
which plant foods and fodder had been growing during the incident. 
Subgroups G.3 and G.4 are intended for use of soil in the 
intermediate to long-term recovery phases and can be used for 
placing land use restrictions on agricultural activities after an 
RDD incident. They can be used to determine if crops can be grown on 
residually contaminated soil to produce a harvest that would be 
acceptable for public consumption.

(h) Derivation of Operational Guidelines

    Operational guidelines for each group are being derived through 
a systematic approach in which, (1) applicable release/exposure 
scenarios for each group were defined, (2) appropriate human 
receptors for each scenario were identified, and (3) the receptor 
doses from applicable exposure pathways were estimated. Operational 
guidelines (Groups A-G; see Table 4A), which correspond to specific 
PAGs, were derived for 11 potential RDD radionuclides:\10\ Am-241, 
Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-
226, and Sr-90. The concepts and overarching methodology used to 
derive operational guidelines for RDD-related radionuclides could 
also be generally applied, with modifications, to radionuclides 
associated with an IND.

    \10\ These radionuclides were determined by a joint DOE and NRC 
study to be the most likely sources available for potential 
terrorist use in an RDD (Interagency Working Group on Radiological 
Dispersal Devices, May 2003) (DOE/NRC 2003).

    Additional RDD or IND incident scenarios were analyzed to 
support the derivation of the operational guideline groups and 
subgroups described above. Two of these additional scenarios involve 
the use of water to flush streets and clean vehicles. Accordingly, 
operational guidelines for street flushing and cleaning contaminated 
vehicles are also provided. The operational guidelines will be 
submitted in the Federal Register for comment prior to finalization.

Appendix 5--References and Resources

``Access to Employee and Medical Records.'' Occupational Safety and 
Heath Standards. 29 CFR part 1910.1020.
``Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal 
Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local Agencies'', U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug 
Administration, August 13, 1998.
``Developing Radiation Emergency Plans for Academic, Medical or 
Industrial Facilities.'' National Council on Radiation Protection 
and Measurement (NCRP). NCRP Report No. 111 (1991).
``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management.'' Commission 
on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (1997).
``FRMAC Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety Manual'' 
(May 2001), see, http://www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htm.
``Guidance: Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in 
Radiation Emergencies.'' Food and Drug Administration, 66 FR 64046, 
Dec. 11, 2001.
``Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response.'' Occupational

[[Page 45047]]

Safety and Health Standards. 29 CFR part 1910.120.
``Health Effects Summary Tables,'' Environmental Protection Agency, 
``Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 
BEIR VII Phase 2.'' National Research Council of The National 
Academies (2006).
``Ionizing Radiation.'' Occupational Safety and Health Standards. 29 
CFR part 1910.1096.
``Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and 
Radiological Terrorism.'' National Council on Radiation Protection 
and Measurements (NCRP). NCRP Commentary No. 19 (2005).
``Management of Equipment Contaminated with Depleted Uranium or 
Radioactive Commodities.'' Army Regulation 700-48 (2002).
``Management Of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material.'' 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). 
NCRP Report No. 138 (2001).
``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for 
Nuclear Incidents'' (1992 EPA PAG Manual). EPA 400-R-92-001 (1992).
National Response Framework, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
National Incident Management System, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (2007).
``National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan.'' 40 CFR part 300.
``Occupational Radiation Protection.'' Department of Energy. 10 CFR 
part 835.
``Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines Developed for Use in 
Emergency Preparedness and Response to a Radiological Dispersal 
Device Incident.'' DOE/HS-0001. http://www.ogcms.energy.gov.
``Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 
and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; Notice.'' 71 FR 174, 
Jan. 3, 2006.
``Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for Occupational 
Exposure.'' Presidential Directive. 52 FR 2822, Jan. 27, 1987.
``Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify 
Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to their 
Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition.'' DOE/NRC Interagency Working 
Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices, Report to the NRC and the 
Secretary of Energy (2003).
``Reporting and Recording Occupational Injuries and Illnesses.'' 
U.S. Department of Energy Occupational Safety and Health Standards. 
29 CFR part 1904.
``Risks from Low-Level Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides,'' 
Federal Guidance Report 13, Environmental Protection Agency, January 
1998, EPA 402-R-97-014.
``Standards for Cleanup Of Land and Buildings Contaminated with 
Residual Radioactive Materials from Inactive Uranium Processing 
Sites.'' Health and Environmental Protection Standards for Uranium 
and Thorium Mill Tailings. 40 CFR part 192.10-12.
``Standards for Protection Against Radiation.'' Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 10 CFR part 20.
``Surface and Volume Radioactivity Standards for Clearance.'' 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), N13.12 (1999).

Appendix 6--Acronyms/Glossary

AMS Aerial Measuring System--A DOE technical asset consisting of 
both fixed wing and helicopter systems for measuring radiation on 
the ground; a deployable asset of the NIRT.
ALARA As low as reasonably achievable--A process to control or 
manage radiation exposure to individuals and releases of radioactive 
material to the environment so that doses are as low as social, 
technical, economic, practical, and public welfare considerations 
ANSI American National Standards Institute.
ARS Acute Radiation Syndrome.
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, commonly known as Superfund. This legislation was 
enacted by Congress in 1980 to protect households and communities 
from abandoned toxic waste sites.
CFR Code of Federal Regulations.
CMS Consequence Management Site Restoration, Cleanup and 
Decontamination Subgroup.
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team--A technical advisory team 
designed to pre-deploy and assist the FBI Special Agent in Charge. 
The DEST may deploy after an incident to assist the FBI.
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
DIL Derived Intervention Level--The concentration of a radionuclide 
in food expressed in Becquerel/kg which, if present throughout the 
relevant period of time (with no intervention), could lead to an 
individual receiving a radiation dose equal to the PAG.
DOD U.S. Department of Defense.
DOE U.S. Department of Energy.
DRL Derived Response Level--A level of radioactivity in an 
environmental medium that would be expected to produce a dose equal 
to its corresponding PAG.
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse--Electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear 
EMS Emergency Medical Service.
EOC Emergency Operations Center--A response entity's central command 
and control center for carrying out emergency management functions.
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
ESF Emergency Support Function--The ESFs provide the structure for 
coordinating Federal interagency support for domestic incident 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer--Appointed by the Director of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to 
coordinate federal assistance to a state affected by a disaster or 
FDA Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center--A 
coordinating center for Federal, State, and local field personnel 
performing radiological monitoring and assessment--specifically, 
providing data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and 
finished products to decision makers. The FRMAC is a deployable 
asset of the NIRT administered by DOE. For more information, see 
FRN Federal Register Notice.
Gy One gray is equal to an absorbed dose (mean energy imparted to a 
unit of matter mass) of 1 joule/kilogram. 1 gray (Gy) = 10,000 erg/g 
= 100 rad.
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard 
(29 CFR 1910.120).
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive--Executive Order 
issued to the Federal agencies by the President on matters 
pertaining to Homeland Security.
IC/UC Incident Command/Unified Command--A system to integrate 
various necessary functions to respond to emergencies. The system is 
widely used by local responders. Under Unified Command, multiple 
jurisdictional authorities are integrated.
ICP Incident Command Post--The field location where the primary 
functions are performed. The ICP may be co-located with the incident 
base or other incident facilities.
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICS Incident Command System--A standardized, on-scene, all-hazard 
incident management concept. ICS is based upon a flexible, scalable 
response organization providing a common framework within which 
people can work together effectively.
IND Improvised Nuclear Device--An illicit nuclear weapon that is 
bought, stolen, or otherwise obtained from a nuclear State, or a 
weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained 
fissile nuclear weapons material and produces a nuclear explosion.
JFO Joint Field Office--The operations of the various Federal 
entities participating in a response at the local level should be 
collocated in a Joint Field Office whenever possible, to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Federal incident management 
JFO Unified Coordination Group JFO structure is organized, staffed 
and managed in a manner consistent with NIMS principles and is led 
by the Unified Coordination Group. Personnel from Federal and State 
departments and agencies, other jurisdictional entities and private 
sector businesses and NGOs may be requested to staff various levels 
of the JFO, depending on the requirements of the incident.
JIC Joint Information Center--A focal point for the coordination and 
provision of

[[Page 45048]]

information to the public and media concerning the Federal response 
to the emergency.
JOC Joint Operations Center--The focal point for management and 
coordination of local, State and Federal investigative/law 
enforcement activities.
KI Potassium Iodide.
LNT or LNT model--Linear no-threshold dose-response for which any 
dose greater than zero has a positive probability of producing an 
effect (e.g. , mutation or cancer). The probability is calculated 
either from the slope of a linear (L) model or from the limiting 
slope, as the dose approaches zero, of a linear-quadratic (LQ) 
MERRT Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team--Provides direct 
patient treatment, assists and trains local health care providers in 
managing, handling, and treatment of radiation exposed and 
contaminated casualties, assesses the impact on human health, and 
provides consultation and technical advice to local, State, and 
Federal authorities.
NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(40 CFR part 300)--The Plan provides the organizational structure 
and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil 
and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.
NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.
NIEHS National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences.
NIMS National Incident Management System--The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and HPSD-5 directed the DHS to develop NIMS. The purpose of 
the NIMS is to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, 
State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic 
NIRT Nuclear Incident Response Team--Created by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, the NIRT consists of radiological emergency 
response assets of the DOE and the EPA. When called upon by the 
Secretary for Homeland Security for actual or threatened 
radiological incidents, these assets come under the ``authority, 
direction, and control'' of the Secretary.
NOC National Operations Center.
NPP Nuclear Power Plant.
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NRF National Response Framework--The successor to the National 
Response Plan. The Framework presents the doctrine, principles, and 
architecture by which our nation prepares for and responds to all-
hazard disasters across all levels of government and all sectors of 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department 
of Labor.
PAG Protective Action Guide--The projected dose to a reference 
individual, from an accidental or deliberate release of radioactive 
material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid 
that dose is recommended.
PFO Principal Federal Official--The PFO will act as the Secretary of 
Homeland Security's local representative, and will oversee and 
coordinate Federal activities for the incident.
PIO Public Information Officer--The PIO acts as the communications 
coordinator or spokesperson within the Incident Command System.
PPE Personal protective equipment.
R Roentgen--Measure of exposure in air.
Rad Radiation absorbed dose. One rad is equal to an absorbed dose of 
100 erg/gram or 0.01 joule/kilogram. 1 rad = 0.01 gray (Gy).
RAP Radiological Assistance Program--A DOE emergency response asset 
that can rapid deploy at the request of State or local governments 
for technical assistance in radiological incidents. RAP teams are a 
deployable asset of the NIRT.
RDD Radiological Dispersal Device--Any device that causes the 
purposeful dissemination of radioactive material, across an area 
with the intent to cause harm, without a nuclear detonation 
REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site--A DOE 
asset located in Oak Ridge, TN, with technical expertise in medical 
and health assessment concerning internal and external exposure to 
radioactive materials. REAC/TS is a deployable asset of the NIRT.
Rem Roentgen Equivalent Man; the conventional unit of radiation dose 
equivalent. 1 rem = 0.01 sievert (Sv).
REMM Radiation Event Medical Management--A Web-based algorithm 
providing just-in-time information for medical responders. It is 
also useful for education and training. Developed by the Office of 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and the National 
Library of Medicine. Available at http://www.remm.nlm.gov.
RERT Radiological Emergency Response Team--An EPA team trained to do 
environmental sampling and analysis of radionuclides. RERT provides 
assistance during responses and takes over operation of the FRMAC 
from DOE at a point in time after the emergency phase. RERT is a 
deployable asset of the NIRT.
Shelter-in-Place The use of a structure for radiation protection 
from an airborne plume and/or deposited radioactive materials.
SI International System of Units.
Stakeholder A stakeholder is anybody with an interest (a `stake') in 
a problem and its solution. The involvement of stakeholders (i.e., 
parties who have interests in and concern about a situation) is seen 
as an important input to the optimization process. It is a proven 
means to achieve incorporation of values into the decision-making 
process, improvement of the substantive quality of decisions, 
resolution of conflicts among competing interests, building of 
shared understanding with both workers and the public, and building 
of trust in institutions. Furthermore, involving all concerned 
parties reinforces the safety culture, and introduces the necessary 
flexibility in the management of the radiological risk that is 
necessary to achieve more effective and sustainable decisions.
Sv Sievert; the SI unit of radiation dose equivalent. 1 Sv = 100 
TEDE Total effective dose equivalent--The sum of the effective dose 
equivalent from external radiation exposure and the committed 
effective dose equivalent from internal exposure.

    Dated: July 18, 2008.
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. E8-17645 Filed 7-31-08; 8:45 am]