[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 104 (Thursday, May 29, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30919-30938]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-12013]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[AU Docket No. 08-46; Report No. AUC-08-78-B (Auction 78); DA 08-1090]


Auction of AWS-1 and Broadband PCS Licenses Rescheduled for 
August 13, 2008; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, 
Upfront Payments and Other Procedures for Auction 78

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening 
bids for the upcoming auction of AWS-1 and Broadband PCS Licenses 
(Auction 78). This document is intended to familiarize prospective 
bidders with the procedures and minimum opening bids for the auction.

DATES: This auction has been rescheduled from July 29, 2008, to August 
13, 2008. Short-form Applications to participate in Auction 78 must be 
filed before 6:00 p.m. ET on June 19, 2008. The upfront payments 
deadline for Auction 78 is July 17, 2008, 6:00 p.m. ET. Bidding for 
Auction No. 78 is scheduled to begin on August 13, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions Spectrum and Access 
Division

    For legal questions: Scott Mackoul or Stephen Johnson at (202) 418-
0660. For general auction questions: Barbara Sibert at (717) 338-2868.

Mobility Division

    For Broadband PCS service rule questions: Erin McGrath (legal), 
Keith Harper (engineering) and Denise Walter (licensing) at (202) 418-
0620.

Broadband Division

    For AWS-1 service rule questions: John Spencer at (202) 418-2487. 
To request materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print, 
electronic files or audio format) for people with disabilities, send an 
e-mail to [email protected] or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs 
Bureau at

[[Page 30920]]

(202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 78 
Procedures Public Notice which was released on May 16, 2008. The 
complete texts of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice including 
attachments, as well as related Commission documents, are available for 
public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET Monday 
through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC 
Reference Information Center, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, 
Washington, DC 20554. The Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice and 
related Commission documents may also be purchased from the 
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or Web site: 
http://www.BCPIWEB.com. The Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice and 
related documents are also available on the Internet at the 
Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/78/.

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) announced the 
procedures and minimum opening bid amounts for the upcoming auction of 
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) and broadband Personal Communications 
Service (PCS) licenses. This auction, which is designated as Auction 
78, is rescheduled and will start on August 13, 2008. Auction 78 will 
offer 55 licenses: 35 licenses in the AWS 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 
MHz bands (AWS-1) and 20 broadband PCS licenses.
 i. Background of Proceeding
    2. The spectrum associated with licenses to be auctioned in Auction 
78 has been either previously licensed and returned to the Commission 
as a result of license cancellation or termination or offered 
previously in other auctions but remained unsold.
    3. On April 4, 2008, in accordance with Section 309(j)(3) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Bureau released a public 
notice seeking comment on competitive bidding procedures to be used in 
Auction 78. Interested parties submitted one comment and one reply 
comment in response to the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, 73 FR 
20664, April 16, 2008.
ii. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 78
    4. A complete list of licenses available for Auction 78 is included 
as Attachment A of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice. In 
addition, Attachment B of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice 
provides a map for the broadband PCS E block license in the Walla 
Walla, WA-Pendleton, OR Basic Trading Area (BTA) market (BTA460) that 
is available in Auction 78.

B. License Descriptions

 i. AWS-1 Licenses
    5. Auction 78 will offer 35 AWS-1 licenses for which there were no 
winning bids in Auction 66. These licenses consist of six Regional 
Economic Area Grouping (REAG) licenses, seven Economic Area (EA) 
licenses, and 22 Cellular Market Area (CMA) licenses shown in Table 1 
of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice.
 ii. Broadband PCS Licenses
    6. Auction 78 includes 20 broadband PCS licenses in the C, D, E and 
F frequency blocks in full or partial BTA markets.
    7. Certain C block licenses are subject to an eligibility 
restriction making them available only to entrepreneurs in closed 
bidding. In order for a bidder to qualify as an entrepreneur, it, along 
with its attributable investors and affiliates, must have had gross 
revenues of less than $125 million in each of the last two years and 
must have less than $500 million in total assets.
    8. The Commission adopted this eligibility restriction when it 
originally established the framework for broadband PCS auctions in the 
Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 59 FR 37566, July 22, 1994. 
Specifically, it reserved all C and F block licenses in broadband PCS 
as set-aside licenses for which eligibility would be limited to 
entrepreneurs.
    9. The Commission amended the entrepreneur eligibility restrictions 
in 2000. Specifically, it reconfigured the license size for the C 
block, creating three 10 megahertz licenses out of each 30 megahertz C 
block license, and divided BTAs into two categories based on 
population: Tier 1 markets are those BTAs with populations equal to or 
greater than 2.5 million and Tier 2 markets are the BTAs with 
populations below 2.5 million. The Commission then adopted open bidding 
(i.e., bidding open to both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs) for 
two of the three newly reconfigured 10 megahertz C block licenses in 
Tier 1 markets, and for one of the three newly reconfigured 10 
megahertz C block licenses in Tier 2 markets. The remaining 10 
megahertz C block licenses in Tier 1 and 2 were reserved for 
entrepreneurs. For 15 megahertz C block licenses, the Commission 
eliminated the entrepreneur eligibility requirements in Tier 1 markets, 
but maintained them in Tier 2 markets. The Commission also removed the 
eligibility restriction on all F block licenses regardless of market. 
The Commission stated that these rules would apply to any subsequent 
auctions of C or F block licenses, including any spectrum made 
available or reclaimed from bankruptcy proceedings in the future.
    10. Table 2 of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice cross-
references the general rules regarding block/eligibility status/
frequencies of broadband PCS licenses in the C, D, E, and F blocks.
    11. As indicated in Table 2 of the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice, C1, C2, C3, and C4 block licenses in Tier 2 marked with an 
asterisk are generally available only to entrepreneurs at auction in 
closed bidding. However, when the Commission amended the entrepreneur 
eligibility restrictions in 2000, it also decided to no longer apply 
this eligibility restriction to any of these licenses that have been 
previously made available through closed bidding, but not won, in any 
auction beginning on or after March 23, 1999. Such licenses are instead 
to be offered in open bidding. As a result, of the 20 broadband PCS 
licenses available in Auction 78, 11 are open to all bidders and 9 are 
available only to entrepreneurs in closed bidding.
    12. A commenter argues that the Commission should reconsider this 
eligibility restriction and should make all broadband PCS licenses in 
Auction 78 available without restriction. The commenter contends that 
circumstances have changed dramatically since the Commission amended 
the C block eligibility rules in 2000 and offers a number of policy-
based arguments in support of its position.
    13. The changes requested by the commenter, however, would require 
modification of the Commission's rules on entrepreneur eligibility and 
are therefore outside the scope of this proceeding to establish 
procedures for conducting Auction 78. Moreover, the arguments put forth 
by the commenter resemble those considered and rejected by the 
Commission in 2004 prior to Auction 58. Absent further Commission 
action, the C block eligibility rules will continue to apply for 
Auction 78, as they did for licenses offered in Auction 71 last year.

[[Page 30921]]

    14. Therefore, the entrepreneur eligibility requirements for the C 
block licenses in Auction 78 that are closed remain in effect. 
Consequently, the specific broadband PCS licenses to be offered in 
Auction 78 are described in Table 3 of the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice.
    15. Because of the history of licenses for broadband PCS spectrum, 
some licenses available in Auction 78 cover less bandwidth and fewer 
frequencies than noted in Table 3. In addition, in some cases, licenses 
are available for only part of a market. Attachments A and B of the 
Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice provide more details about the 
broadband PCS licenses that will be offered in Auction 78.

C. Rules and Disclaimers

 i. Relevant Authority
    16. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in 47 
CFR, part 1, Subpart Q including all amendments and clarifications; 
rules relating to the Advanced Wireless Services and emerging 
technologies contained in 47 CFR, parts 27 and 101; rules relating to 
broadband PCS, contained in 47 CFR, part 24; and rules relating to 
applications, environment, practice and procedure contained in 47 CFR, 
part 1. Prospective applicants must also be thoroughly familiar with 
the procedures, terms and conditions (collectively, terms) contained in 
the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice and the Commission's decisions 
in proceedings regarding competitive bidding procedures, application 
requirements, and obligations of Commission licensees.
    17. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, 
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or 
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time, 
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental 
information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all applicants 
to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices 
pertaining to this auction.
 ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance With Antitrust Laws
    18. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) prohibits auction applicants for licenses in any of the same 
geographic license areas from communicating with each other about bids, 
bidding strategies, or settlements unless such applicants have 
identified each other on their short-form applications (FCC Form 175) 
as parties with whom they have entered into agreements pursuant to 47 
CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
 a. Entities Subject to Anti-Collusion Rule
    19. The anti-collusion rule will apply to any applicants that 
submit short-form applications seeking to participate in a Commission 
auction and select licenses in the same or overlapping markets (i.e., 
CMAs, EAs, REAGs or BTAs), regardless of the service. Therefore, in 
Auction 78, for example, the rule would prohibit an applicant bidding 
for an AWS-1 EA license and another applicant bidding for a PCS BTA 
license within that EA from communicating absent an agreement.
    20. Under the terms of the rule, applicants that have applied for 
licenses covering the same or overlapping markets--unless they have 
identified each other on their short form applications as parties with 
whom they have entered into agreements under 47 CFR 
1.2105(a)(2)(viii)--must affirmatively avoid all communications with or 
disclosures to each other that affect or have the potential to affect 
bids or bidding strategy, which may include communications regarding 
the post-auction market structure. This prohibition applies to all 
applicants regardless of whether such applicants become qualified 
bidders or actually bid.
    21. For purposes of this prohibition, 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(7)(i) 
defines applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity 
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all 
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of 
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest 
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or 
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form 
application.
    22. Information concerning applicants' license selections will not 
be available to the public. Therefore, the Commission will inform each 
applicant by letter of the identity of each of the other applicants 
that has applied for licenses covering any of the same or overlapping 
geographic areas as the licenses that it has selected in its short-form 
application.
    23. Entities and parties subject to the anti-collusion rule should 
take special care in circumstances where their employees may receive 
information directly or indirectly from a competing applicant relating 
to any competing applicant's bids or bidding strategies. In situations 
where the anti-collusion rule views the same person as the applicant 
with respect to two different entities filing competing applications, 
under Bureau precedent the bids and bidding strategies of one applicant 
are necessarily conveyed to the other and, absent a disclosed bidding 
agreement, an apparent violation of the anti-collusion rule occurs. The 
Bureau has not addressed situations where employees who do not qualify 
as the applicant (e.g., are not officers or directors) receive 
information regarding a competing applicant's bids or bidding 
strategies and whether that information might be deemed to be 
necessarily conveyed to the applicant. The Bureau notes that the 
exception to the anti-collusion rule providing that non-controlling 
interest holders may have interests in more than one competing bidder 
without violating the anti-collusion rule, provided specified 
conditions are met (including a certification that no prohibited 
communications have occurred or will occur), does not extend to 
controlling interest holders.
b. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
    24. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)'s anti-collusion prohibition begins at the 
short-form application filing deadline and ends at the down payment 
deadline after the auction.
    25. A commenter recommends modifying and/or clarifying the 
application of the anti-collusion rule and anonymous bidding procedures 
after the close of bidding. The commenter proposes that the anti-
collusion rule be modified to remain in effect only until the 
Commission issues the public notice identifying the winning bidders and 
the high bid amounts. This request seeks amendment of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) 
and is therefore outside of the scope of this proceeding. The 
Commission has observed that prohibiting such communications between 
applicants during the proscribed auction period protects a valid 
governmental interest without infringing unduly on the First Amendment 
rights of auction participants.
    26. The commenter also requests, in the alternative, that the 
Commission make clear that applicants can disclose bidding-related 
information that the Commission has already made public after the close 
of the auction but before the down-payment deadline. Information 
contained in a public notice announcing the winning bidders would be 
public upon release. It is difficult to envision a case in which 
communication of the bare facts contained in such public information by

[[Page 30922]]

an applicant could result in violation of the anti-collusion rule. The 
Bureau notes, however, that it is the substance and timing of specific 
communications that are key in determining whether there has been a 
violation of 47 CFR 1.2105(c). In the absence of such factual context, 
and given the importance of the anti-collusion rules, the Bureau 
declines to make further clarification.
    27. The Bureau continues to strongly caution applicants that the 
communication of information that has been made public by the 
Commission could violate the anti-collusion rule, even if its 
disclosure might not infringe its limited information procedures. 
Therefore, applicants should consider the potential consequences of any 
disclosures. In this regard, the Bureau notes that, upon the release of 
information after the close of an auction, the applicants in an auction 
conducted under anonymous bidding procedures are in the same position 
with regard to the application of the anti-collusion rule as the 
applicants in an auction conducted without such procedures.
c. Prohibited Communications
    28. Applicants for the upcoming Auction 78 and other parties that 
may be engaged in discussion with such applicants are cautioned of the 
need to comply with the Commission's anti-collusion rule, 47 CFR 
1.2105(c). The anti-collusion rule prohibits not only a communication 
about an applicant's own bids or bidding strategy, but also a 
communication of another applicant's bids or bidding strategy. While 
the anti-collusion rule provisions do not prohibit business 
negotiations among auction applicants, applicants must remain vigilant 
so as not to communicate directly or indirectly information that 
affects, or could affect, bids or bidding strategy, or the negotiation 
of settlement agreements.
    29. The Commission remains vigilant about prohibited communications 
taking place in other situations. For example, the Commission has 
warned that prohibited communications concerning bids and bidding 
strategies may include communications regarding capital calls or 
requests for additional funds in support of bids or bidding strategies 
to the extent such communications convey information concerning the 
bids and bidding strategies directly or indirectly.
    30. Applicants are hereby placed on notice that public disclosure 
of information relating to bidder interests and bidder identities that 
is confidential at the time of disclosure may violate the anti-
collusion rule. This is so even though similar types of information 
were revealed prior to and during other Commission auctions subject to 
different information procedures. Bidders should use caution in their 
dealings with other parties, such as members of the press, financial 
analysts, or others who might become a conduit for the communication of 
prohibited bidding information. For example, where limited information 
disclosure procedures are in place, as for Auction 78, a qualified 
bidder's statement to the press that it has lost bidding eligibility 
and stopped bidding in the auction could give rise to a finding of an 
anti-collusion rule violation. Similarly, an applicant's public 
statement of intent not to participate in Auction 78 bidding could also 
violate the rule.
    31. Applicants for licenses for any of the same or overlapping 
geographic license areas must not communicate directly or indirectly 
about bids or bidding strategy. Accordingly, such applicants are 
encouraged not to use the same individual as an authorized bidder. A 
violation of the anti-collusion rule could occur if an individual acts 
as the authorized bidder for two or more competing applicants, and 
conveys information concerning the substance of bids or bidding 
strategies between such applicants. Also, if the authorized bidders are 
different individuals employed by the same organization (e.g., law firm 
or engineering firm or consulting firm), a violation similarly could 
occur. In such a case, at a minimum, applicants should certify on their 
applications that precautionary steps have been taken to prevent 
communication between authorized bidders and that applicants and their 
bidding agents will comply with the anti-collusion rule.
    32. A violation of the anti-collusion rule could occur in other 
contexts, such as an individual serving as an officer for two or more 
applicants. Moreover, the Commission has found a violation of the anti-
collusion rule where a bidder used the Commission's bidding system to 
disclose its bidding strategy in a manner that explicitly invited other 
auction participants to cooperate and collaborate in specific markets, 
and has placed auction participants on notice that the use of its 
bidding system to disclose market information to competitors will not 
be tolerated and will subject bidders to sanctions.
    33. In addition, when completing short-form applications, 
applicants should avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate 
the Commission's anti-collusion rule, particularly in light of the 
limited information procedures in effect for Auction 78. Specifically, 
applicants should avoid including any information in their short-form 
applications that might convey information regarding their license 
selection, such as using applicant names that refer to licenses being 
offered, referring to certain licenses or markets in describing bidding 
agreements, or including any information in attachments that may 
otherwise disclose applicants' license selections.
d. Disclosure of Bidding Agreements and Arrangements
    34. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering 
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form 
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the 
agreement(s) in their short-form applications. If parties agree in 
principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing 
deadline, each party to the agreement must identify the other party or 
parties to the agreement on its short-form application under 47 CFR 
1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not been reduced to writing. If 
the parties have not agreed in principle by the short-form filing 
deadline, they should not include the names of parties to discussions 
on their applications, and they may not continue negotiations, 
discussions or communications with any other applicants for licenses 
covering any of the same or overlapping geographic areas after the 
short-form filing deadline.
e. Anti-Collusion Certification
    35. By electronically submitting a short-form application following 
the electronic filing procedures set forth in Attachment C of the 
Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice, each applicant certifies its 
compliance with 47 CFR 1.2105(c). However, the Bureau cautions that 
merely filing a certifying statement as part of an application will not 
outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior has occurred, nor 
will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted. The 
Commission has stated that it intends to scrutinize carefully any 
instances in which bidding patterns suggest that collusion may be 
occurring. Any applicant found to have violated the anti-collusion rule 
may be subject to sanctions.
f. Antitrust Laws
    36. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance 
with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws, 
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the 
marketplace. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the

[[Page 30923]]

Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from 
enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, a violation of the 
antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well before any 
party submits a short-form application. The Commission has cited a 
number of examples of potentially anticompetitive actions that would be 
prohibited under antitrust laws: for example, actual or potential 
competitors may not agree to divide territories horizontally in order 
to minimize competition, regardless of whether they split a market in 
which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market 
for one and another for the other. Similarly, the Bureau has long 
reminded potential applicants and others that even where the applicant 
discloses parties with whom it has reached an agreement on the short-
form application, thereby permitting discussions with those parties, 
the applicant is nevertheless subject to existing antitrust laws. To 
the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific allegations that 
suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws may have 
occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the United 
States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant is 
found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules in 
connection with its participation in the competitive bidding process, 
it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment, 
or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in future 
auctions, among other sanctions.
g. Duty To Report Prohibited Communications; Reporting Procedure
    37. If an applicant makes or receives a communication that appears 
to violate the anti-collusion rule, it must report such communication 
in writing to the Commission immediately and in no case later than five 
business days after the communication occurs. The Commission recently 
clarified that each applicant's obligation to report any such 
communication continues beyond the five-day period after the 
communication is made, even if the report is not made within the five-
day period.
    38. 47 CFR 1.65 requires an applicant to maintain the accuracy and 
completeness of information furnished in its pending application and to 
notify the Commission within 30 days of any substantial change that may 
be of decisional significance to that application. Thus, 47 CFR 1.65 
requires an auction applicant to notify the Commission of any 
substantial change to the information or certifications included in its 
pending short-form application. Applicants are therefore required by 47 
CFR 1.65 to report to the Commission any communications they have made 
to or received from another applicant after the short-form filing 
deadline that affect or have the potential to affect bids or bidding 
strategy unless such communications are made to or received from 
parties to agreements identified under 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
    39. Parties reporting communications pursuant to 47 CFR 
1.2105(a)(2) must take care to ensure that any such reports of 
prohibited communications do not themselves give rise to a violation of 
the anti-collusion rule. For example, a party's report of a prohibited 
communication could violate the rule by communicating prohibited 
information to other applicants through the use of Commission filing 
procedures that would allow such materials to be made available for 
public inspection. A party seeking to report such prohibited 
communications should consider submitting its report with a request 
that the report or portions of the submission be withheld from public 
inspection. Such parties are also encouraged to consult with the 
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division staff if they have any questions 
about the procedures for submitting such reports. The Auction 78 
Procedures Public Notice provides additional guidance on procedures for 
submitting application-related information.
    40. Applicants must be aware that failure to comply with the 
Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.
h. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
    41. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to 
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms, 
conditions, and parties involved in any bidding consortia, joint 
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to 
the competitive bidding process.
i. Additional Information Concerning Anti-Collusion Rule
    42. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the 
Bureau addressing the application of the anti-collusion rule may be 
found in Attachment F of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Incumbency Issues
a. AWS-1
    43. The AWS-1 bands are now being used for a variety of government 
and non-government services. The 1710-1755 MHz band is currently a 
government band, which is in the process of transitioning to a 
commercial band. The incumbents in the 2110-2150 MHz band are private 
services (including state and local governmental public safety 
services) and common carrier fixed microwave services. The 2150-2155 
MHz band contains incumbents in the Broadband Radio Service (BRS). The 
Commission previously provided information on incumbency issues for the 
AWS-1 bands in the Auction 66 Procedures Public Notice, 71 FR 20672, 
April 21, 2006.
    44. Spectrum Relocation Fund. The Commission established a reserve 
amount in Auction 66 in order to comply with a statutory requirement 
aimed at funding the relocation of federal government entities that 
currently operate in the 1710-1755 MHz band. In order for Auction 66 to 
close in compliance with the statute, the total winning bids in that 
auction, net of bidding credits applicable at the close of bidding, 
were required to equal or exceed a reserve amount of approximately 
$2.059 billion. At the close of Auction 66, the net total winning bids 
far exceeded the reserve amount. The Bureau proposes to not establish 
reserve prices for the 35 AWS-1 licenses being offered in Auction 78.
    45. Relocation of Government Incumbents. The Commission also issued 
guidance, along with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, to assist AWS-1 licensees to begin implementing service 
during the transition of federal operations from the band while 
providing interference protection to incumbent federal government 
operations until they have been relocated to other frequency bands or 
technologies.
    46. Relocation of Non-Government Incumbents. On the same day it 
released the Auction 66 Procedures Public Notice, the Commission, among 
other things, adopted relocation procedures that AWS-1 licensees will 
follow when relocating incumbent BRS licensees from the 2150-2160/62 
MHz portion of the band.
b. Broadband PCS
    47. While most of the private and common carrier fixed microwave 
services (FMS) formerly operating in the 1850-1990 MHz band (and other 
bands) have been relocated to available frequencies in higher bands or 
to other media, some FMS licensees may still be operating in the band. 
Any remaining FMS entities operating in the 1850-1990 MHz band, 
however, are secondary to PCS operations. FMS licensees, absent

[[Page 30924]]

an agreement with the applicable PCS entities or an extension pursuant 
to 47 CFR 101.79(b) of the Commission's rules, must turn in their 
authorizations six months following written notice from a PCS entity 
that such entity intends to turn on a system within the interference 
range of the incumbent FMS licensee. Further, broadband PCS licensees 
are no longer responsible for costs associated with relocating an 
incumbent FMS operation.
c. International Coordination
    48. AWS-1 and broadband PCS licensees must not cause harmful 
interference across the borders with Mexico and Canada. Potential 
bidders seeking licenses in Auction 78 for geographic areas that are 
near the Canadian or Mexican borders are encouraged to consult all 
international agreements with Canada and Mexico. If agreements between 
the United States, Mexico and Canada have not yet become effective, the 
same technical restrictions at the border that are adopted for 
operation between geographic service areas will apply, to the extent 
they are not in violation of current bilateral agreements and 
arrangements. When interim arrangements or agreements between the 
United States, Mexico and Canada are final and become effective, 
licensees must comply with these agreements. If these agreements are 
modified in the future, licensees must likewise comply with these 
modifications.
d. Quiet Zones
    49. All licensees must protect the radio quiet zones set forth in 
the Commission's rules. Licensees are cautioned that they must receive 
the appropriate approvals directly from the relevant quiet zone entity 
prior to operating within the areas described in the Commission's 
rules.
 iv. Due Diligence
    50. The Bureau cautions potential applicants formulating their 
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which 
these frequencies are occupied. Potential bidders are reminded that 
they are solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all 
technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value 
of the licenses being offered in Auction 78. Applicants should perform 
their individual due diligence before proceeding as they would with any 
new business venture.
    51. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own 
research prior to the beginning of bidding in Auction 78 in order to 
determine the existence of any pending legislative, administrative or 
judicial proceedings that might affect their decision regarding 
participation in the auction.
    52. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future 
proceedings, including rulemaking proceedings or petitions for 
rulemaking, applications (including those for modification), requests 
for special temporary authority, waiver requests, petitions to deny, 
petitions for reconsideration, informal oppositions, and applications 
for review, before the Commission may relate to particular applicants 
or incumbent licensees or the licenses available in Auction 78. Pending 
and future judicial proceedings may also relate to particular 
applicants or incumbent licensees, or the licenses available in Auction 
78. Prospective bidders are responsible for assessing the likelihood of 
the various possible outcomes, and considering their potential impact 
on spectrum licenses available in this auction.
    53. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and 
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being 
auctioned and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum 
for Auction 78. In addition, although the Commission may continue to 
act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions, 
and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not 
be resolved by the beginning of bidding in the auction.
    54. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of licenses being offered.
    55. Applicants may obtain information about licenses available in 
Auction 78, including non-Federal Government incumbent licenses that 
may have an effect on availability of the AWS-1 licenses, through the 
Bureau's online licensing databases at http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls. 
Applicants should direct questions regarding the ULS search 
capabilities to the FCC ULS Technical Support hotline at (877) 480-
3201, option two. The hotline is available to assist with questions 
Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. In order to 
provide better service to the public, all calls to the hotline are 
recorded.
    56. In addition, to further assist potential bidders in determining 
the scope of the new AWS entrants' relocation obligations in the 2150-
2155 MHz band, the Commission ordered BRS licensees in the 2150-2160/62 
MHz band to submit information on the locations and operating 
characteristics of BRS systems in that band. That information may also 
be found on ULS at http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls.
    57. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding 
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any 
third party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems. 
To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all 
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants 
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or 
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. 
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees 
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been 
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
    58. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically 
inspect any prospective sites located in, or near, the geographic area 
for which they plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the 
environmental review obligations.
v. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
    59. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding 
system to allow bidders to participate in Auction 78 over the Internet 
using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS or FCC 
Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty whatsoever with 
respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall the Commission, or 
any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable for any damages 
whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of business profits, 
business interruption, loss of business information, or any other loss) 
arising out of or relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning or 
use of the FCC Auction System that is accessible to qualified bidders 
in connection with this auction. Moreover, no obligation or liability 
will arise out of the Commission's technical, programming or other 
advice or service provided in connection with the FCC Auction System.
vi. Fraud Alert
    60. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, 
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction 78 to 
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Information about deceptive 
telemarketing investment schemes is available from the Commission as 
well

[[Page 30925]]

as the FTC and SEC. Additional sources of information for potential 
bidders and investors may be obtained from: (1) the FCC by going to 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/csinfo/#fraud or by telephone at (888) 225-5322 
(FCC's Consumer Call Center); (2) the FTC by telephone at (877) FTC-
HELP ((877) 382-4357); and (3) the SEC by telephone at (202) 942-7040. 
Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment schemes 
should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud 
Information Center at (800) 876-7060.
vii. Environmental Review Requirements
    61. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding 
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and other 
federal environmental statutes. The construction of a wireless antenna 
facility is a federal action and the licensee must comply with the 
Commission's environmental rules for each such facility. The 
Commission's environmental rules require, among other things, that the 
licensee consult with expert agencies having environmental 
responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
State Historic Preservation Office, the Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (through the local authority with 
jurisdiction over floodplains). In assessing the effect of facilities 
construction on historic properties, the licensee must follow the 
provisions of the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the 
Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process. The 
licensee must prepare environmental assessments for facilities that may 
have a significant impact in or on wilderness areas, wildlife 
preserves, threatened or endangered species or designated critical 
habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites, 
floodplains, and surface features. The licensee also must prepare 
environmental assessments for facilities that include high intensity 
white lights in residential neighborhoods or excessive radio frequency 
emission.

D. Auction Specifics

i. Auction Start Date
    62. Bidding in Auction 78 will begin on Wednesday, August 13, 2008.
    63. Commenters request that the Bureau postpone the start of 
bidding in Auction 78. A commenter suggests delaying the start of 
Auction 78 by four or five weeks, i.e., until September 2008. A 
commenter contends that participation in an FCC auction presents 
resource challenges for small and medium-sized companies and notes that 
conducting bidding during August is difficult when businesses are 
thinly staffed due to employee vacation schedules. The commenter also 
asserts that potential bidders need more time to finance licenses won 
in the recently-concluded 700 MHz auction (Auction 73) and resume 
business. A commenter supports postponing the auction, noting that a 
brief delay will afford potential bidders, including small and mid-
sized bidders, more time to prepare.
    64. The Bureau is not persuaded by the commenters' arguments that a 
four-or five-week postponement is warranted. Interested parties were 
able to begin preparations for this auction when the auction was first 
announced on April 4, 2008, with the release of the Auction 78 Comment 
Public Notice. Nevertheless, the Bureau finds that providing an 
additional two weeks prior to the start of Auction 78 will promote 
efficient administration of the auction and provide prospective 
applicants with additional time for planning and preparation.
    65. The initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public 
notice at least one week before the start of the auction. Moreover, 
unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be conducted 
on each business day until bidding has stopped on all licenses.
ii. Bidding Methodology
    66. The bidding methodology for Auction 78 will be simultaneous 
multiple round (SMR) bidding. The Commission will conduct this auction 
over the Internet using the FCC Auction System, and telephonic bidding 
will be available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid 
electronically via the Internet or by telephone.
iii. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
    67. The following dates and deadlines apply:

Auction Seminar--June 10, 2008
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
    Filing Window Opens--June 10, 2008; 12:00 noon ET
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
    Filing Window Deadline--June 19, 2008; prior to 6:00 p.m. ET
    Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)--July 17, 2008; 6:00 p.m. ET
    Mock Auction--August 11, 2008
    Auction Begins--August 13, 2008
iv. Requirements for Participation
    68. Those wishing to participate in this auction must: (1) Submit a 
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. 
ET, June 19, 2008, following the electronic filing procedures set forth 
in Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice; (2) submit 
a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC 
Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET, July 17, 2008, following the procedures and 
instructions set forth in Attachment D of the Auction 78 Procedures 
Public Notice; (3) comply with all provisions outlined in the Public 
Notice and applicable Commission rules.

II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements

A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications

    69. An application to participate in an FCC auction, referred to as 
a short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information used in 
determining whether the applicant is legally, technically, and 
financially qualified to participate in Commission auctions for 
licenses or permits. The short-form application is the first part of 
the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the first 
phase of this process, parties desiring to participate in the auction 
must file streamlined, short-form applications in which they certify 
under penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. Eligibility to 
participate in bidding is based on the applicants' short-form 
applications and certifications as well as their upfront payments. In 
the second phase of the process, winning bidders must file a more 
comprehensive long-form application (FCC Form 601) and have a complete 
and accurate ownership disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) on 
file with the Commission.
    70. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction 78 must file a 
short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System prior 
to 6:00 p.m. ET on June 19, 2008, following the procedures prescribed 
in Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice. Applicants 
filing a short-form application are subject to the Commission's anti-
collusion rules beginning on the deadline for filing. The information 
provided in its short-form application will be used in determining, 
among other things, if the applicant is eligible for entrepreneur 
status and/or for a bidding credit.
    71. Applicants bear full responsibility for submitting accurate, 
complete and timely short-form applications. All applicants must 
certify on their short-form applications under penalty of perjury that 
they are legally, technically,

[[Page 30926]]

financially and otherwise qualified to hold a license. Applicants 
should read the instructions set forth in Attachment C of the Auction 
78 Procedures Public Notice carefully and should consult the 
Commission's rules to ensure that, in addition to the materials 
described herein, all the information that is required under the 
Commission's rules is included with their short-form applications.
    72. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application 
for a single auction. If a party submits multiple short-form 
applications, only one application may become qualified to bid.
    73. Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form 
application (and any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation 
by the certifying official that he or she is an authorized 
representative of the applicant, that he or she has read the form's 
instructions and certifications, and that the contents of the 
application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and 
correct. An applicant cannot change the certifying official to its 
application. Submission of a false certification to the Commission may 
result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license 
forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or 
criminal prosecution.

B. License Selection

    74. An applicant must select the licenses on which it wants to bid 
from the Eligible Licenses list on its short-form application. To 
assist applicants in identifying licenses of interest that will be 
available in Auction 78, the FCC Auction System includes a filtering 
mechanism that allows an applicant to filter the Eligible Licenses 
list. The applicant will make selections for one or more of the filter 
criteria and the system will produce a list of licenses satisfying the 
specified criteria. The applicant may select all the licenses in the 
customized list or select individual licenses from the list. Applicants 
also will be able to select licenses from one customized list and then 
create additional customized lists to select additional licenses.
    75. Applicants will not be able to change their license selections 
after the short-form application filing deadline. Applicants interested 
in participating in Auction 78 must have selected license(s) available 
in the respective auction by the short-form application deadline. 
Applicants must confirm their license selections before the deadline 
for submitting short-form applications. The FCC Auction System will not 
accept bids from an applicant on licenses that the applicant has not 
selected on its short-form application.

C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements

    76. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form 
application all parties with whom they have entered into any 
agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the 
licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-
auction market structure.
    77. Applicants also will be required to certify under penalty of 
perjury in their short-form applications that they have not entered and 
will not enter into any explicit or implicit agreements, arrangements 
or understandings of any kind with any parties, other than those 
identified in the application, regarding the amount of their bids, 
bidding strategies, or the particular licenses on which they will or 
will not bid. If an applicant has had discussions, but has not reached 
an agreement by the short-form application filing deadline, it would 
not include the names of parties to the discussions on its application 
and may not continue such discussions with any applicants after the 
deadline.
    78. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's 
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable 
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or 
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants, 
provided that: (1) The attributable interest holder certifies that it 
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or 
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds 
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint 
bidding arrangement; and (2) the arrangements do not result in a change 
in control of any of the applicants. While the anti-collusion rules do 
not prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among auction 
applicants, applicants are reminded that certain discussions or 
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they 
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Further 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Commission's anti-
collusion rule will not insulate a party from enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    79. All applicants must comply with the uniform part 1 ownership 
disclosure standards and provide information required by 47 CFR 1.2105 
and 1.2112. Specifically, in completing the short-form application, 
applicants will be required to fully disclose information on the real 
party or parties-in-interest and ownership structure of the applicant. 
The ownership disclosure standards for the short-form application are 
prescribed in 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2112. Each applicant is responsible 
for information submitted in its short-form application being complete 
and accurate.
    80. An applicant's most current ownership information on file with 
the Commission, if in an electronic format compatible with the short-
form application (FCC Form 175) (such as information submitted with an 
ownership disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) or in a short-
form application (FCC Form 175) filed for a previous auction using 
ISAS) will automatically be entered into the applicant's short-form 
application. An applicant is responsible for ensuring that the 
information submitted in its short-form application for Auction 78 is 
complete and accurate. Accordingly, applicants should carefully review 
any information automatically entered to confirm that it is complete 
and accurate as of the Auction 78 deadline for filing the short-form 
application. If any information that was entered automatically needs to 
be changed, applicants must do so directly in the short-form 
application.

E. Designated Entity Provisions

    81. Eligible applicants in Auction 78 may claim designated entity 
status, as an entrepreneur eligible to bid on closed C block broadband 
licenses and/or as a small or very small business eligible for bidding 
credits. Applicants should review carefully the Commission's recent 
decisions regarding the designated entity provisions.
i. Entrepreneur Eligibility for Closed Bidding
    82. Nine broadband PCS C block licenses available in Auction 78 
(i.e., certain C1, C3, and C4 block licenses) are restricted to 
entities that qualify as entrepreneurs.
a. Entrepreneur Eligibility Criteria
    83. In determining if an entity qualifies as an entrepreneur, the 
Commission considers both the total assets and gross revenues of the 
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, the affiliates of 
its controlling interests, and the entities with which it has an 
attributable material relationship. Specifically, as of the short-form 
application filing deadline, the applicant and its attributable 
interests must have combined total assets of less than $500 million and 
must have had combined gross revenues of less than

[[Page 30927]]

$125 million in each of the last two years.
b. Asset and Revenue Disclosure on Short-Form Application
    84. An entity applying to bid on closed licenses must disclose on 
its short-form application the total assets and gross revenues for the 
preceding two years for each of the following: (1) The applicant; (2) 
its affiliates; (3) its controlling interests; (4) the affiliates of 
its controlling interests; and (5) the entities with which it has an 
attributable material relationship. Certification that the gross 
revenues for each of the preceding two years or the total assets do not 
exceed the applicable limit is not sufficient.
    85. Applicants for closed bidding in Auction 78 should not include 
existing broadband PCS C and F block licenses in their calculations of 
total assets; all other Commission licenses, however, must be included 
in such calculations. Additionally, if an applicant is applying as a 
consortium of small businesses or very small businesses, this 
information must be provided for each consortium member.
ii. Bidding Credits for Small and Very Small Businesses
    86. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's 
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction 78, bidding credits will be 
available to small businesses and very small businesses, and consortia 
thereof, for all 35 AWS-1 licenses and six broadband PCS licenses--the 
three C block licenses available in open bidding and the three F block 
licenses.
a. Bidding Credit Eligibility Criteria
    87. The level of bidding credit is determined as follows: (1) A 
bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 
million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years 
(small business) will receive a 15 percent discount on its winning bid; 
and (2) a bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do 
not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years (very small 
business) will receive a 25 percent discount on its winning bid.
    88. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant 
receives either the 15 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its 
winning bid, but not both.
    89. Bidding credits for applicants that qualify as small or very 
small businesses will be available for those C block licenses that are 
available in open bidding and for all F block licenses. Bidding credits 
are not available for C block licenses subject to closed bidding or for 
broadband PCS licenses in the D or E blocks.
b. Revenue Disclosure on Short-Form Application
    90. An entity applying as a small or very small business must 
provide gross revenues for the preceding three years for each of the 
following: (1) The applicant; (2) its affiliates; (3) its controlling 
interests; (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests; and (5) the 
entities with which it has an attributable material relationship. 
Certification that the average annual gross revenues of such entities 
and individuals for the preceding three years do not exceed the 
applicable limit is not sufficient. Additionally, if an applicant is 
applying as a consortium of small businesses or very small businesses, 
this information must be provided for each consortium member.
iii. Attributable Interests
a. Controlling Interests
    91. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and 
entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant. 
Typically, ownership of greater than 50 percent of an entity's voting 
stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The following are some common indicia of de facto 
control: (1) The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of 
the board of directors or management committee; (2) the entity has 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that 
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and (3) the entity 
plays an integral role in management decisions.
    92. Applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2) of the 
Commission's rules and Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice to understand how certain interests are calculated in 
determining control. For example, pursuant to 47 CFR 
1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F), officers and directors of an applicant are 
considered to have controlling interest in the applicant.
b. Affiliates
    93. Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an 
individual or entity that: (1) directly or indirectly controls or has 
the power to control the applicant; (2) is directly or indirectly 
controlled by the applicant; (3) is directly or indirectly controlled 
by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the 
applicant; or (4) has an identity of interest with the applicant. The 
Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant encompasses 
both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates of 
controlling interests of the applicant. For more information regarding 
affiliates, applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5) and 
Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice.
c. Material Relationships
    94. The Commission requires the consideration of certain leasing 
and resale (including wholesale) relationships--referred to as material 
relationships--in determining designated entity eligibility, i.e., for 
bidding credits and entrepreneur status. Material relationships fall 
into two categories: impermissible and attributable.
    95. An applicant or licensee has an impermissible material 
relationship when it has agreements with one or more other entities for 
the lease or resale (including under a wholesale agreement) of, on a 
cumulative basis, more than 50 percent of the spectrum capacity of any 
of its licenses. If an applicant or a licensee has an impermissible 
material relationship, it is, as a result, (1) ineligible for the award 
of designated entity benefits, and (2) subject to unjust enrichment on 
a license-by-license basis.
    96. An applicant or licensee has an attributable material 
relationship when it has one or more agreements with any individual 
entity for the lease or resale (including under a wholesale agreement) 
of, on a cumulative basis, more than 25 percent of the spectrum 
capacity of any individual license held by the applicant or licensee. 
The attributable material relationship will cause the gross revenues 
and, if applicable, total assets of that entity and its attributable 
interest holders to be attributed to the applicant or licensee for the 
purposes of determining the applicant's or licensee's (1) eligibility 
for designated entity benefits and (2) liability for unjust enrichment 
on a license-by-license basis.
    97. The Commission grandfathered material relationships in 
existence before the release of the Designated Entity Second Report and 
Order, 71 FR 26245, May 5, 2006, meaning that those preexisting 
relationships alone would not cause the Commission to examine a 
designated entity's ongoing eligibility for benefits or its liability 
for unjust enrichment. The Commission did not, however, grandfather 
preexisting material relationships for determinations of an applicant's 
or licensee's designated entity eligibility for future auctions or in 
the context of future assignments, transfers of control,

[[Page 30928]]

spectrum leases, or other reportable eligibility events. Rather, the 
occurrence of any of those eligibility events after the release date of 
the Designated Entity Second Report and Order triggers a reexamination 
of the applicant's or licensee's designated entity eligibility, taking 
into account all existing material relationships, including those 
previously grandfathered.
d. Gross Revenue Exceptions
    98. In recent years the Commission has also made other 
modifications to its rules governing the attribution of gross revenues 
for purposes of determining designated entity eligibility. For example, 
the Commission has clarified that, in calculating an applicant's gross 
revenues under the controlling interest standard, it will not attribute 
the personal net worth, including personal income, of its officers and 
directors to the applicant.
    99. The Commission has also exempted, from attribution to the 
applicant, the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone 
cooperative's officers and directors if certain conditions specified in 
47 CFR 1.2110(b)(3)(iii) of the Commission's rules are met. An 
applicant claiming this exemption must provide in an attachment an 
affirmative statement that the applicant, affiliate and/or controlling 
interest is an eligible rural telephone cooperative within the meaning 
of 47 CFR 1.2110(b)(3)(iii) and supply any additional information as 
may be required to demonstrate eligibility for the exemption from the 
attribution rule. Applicants seeking to claim this exemption must meet 
all of the conditions. Additional guidance on claiming this exemption 
may be found in Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice.
e. Bidding Consortia
    100. A consortium of small businesses, very small businesses, or 
entrepreneurs is a conglomerate organization composed of two or more 
entities, each of which individually satisfies the definition of a 
small business, very small business, or entrepreneur. Thus, each member 
of a consortium of small businesses, very small businesses, or 
entrepreneurs that applies to participate in Auction 78 must 
individually meet the criteria for small businesses, very small 
businesses, or entrepreneurs. Each consortium member must disclose its 
gross revenues along with those of its affiliates, its controlling 
interests, the affiliates of its controlling interests, and any 
entities having an attributable material relationship with the member. 
Although the gross revenues of the consortium members will not be 
aggregated for purposes of determining the consortium's eligibility as 
a small business or very small business, this information must be 
provided to ensure that each individual consortium member qualifies for 
any bidding credit awarded to the consortium.

F. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    101. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally 
recognized tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands 
bidding credit. Applicants do not provide information regarding tribal 
lands bidding credits on their short-form applications. Instead, 
winning bidders may apply for the tribal lands bidding credit after the 
auction when they file their more detailed, long-form applications.

G. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    102. Current defaulters are not eligible to participate in Auction 
78, but former defaulters can participate so long as they are otherwise 
qualified and make upfront payments that are fifty percent more than 
the normal upfront payment amounts. An applicant is considered a 
current defaulter when it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, 
or the affiliates of its controlling interests, are in default on any 
payment for any Commission licenses (including down payments) or are 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the 
filing deadline for short-form applications. An applicant is considered 
a former defaulter when it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, 
or the affiliates of its controlling interests, have defaulted on any 
Commission licenses or been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any 
Federal agency, but have since remedied all such defaults and cured all 
of the outstanding non-tax delinquencies.
    103. On the short-form application, an applicant must certify under 
penalty of perjury that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, 
and the affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 
1.2110 of the Commission's rules, are not in default on any payment for 
Commission licenses (including down payments) and that they are not 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Each 
applicant must also state under penalty of perjury whether or not it, 
its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests, have ever been in default on any Commission 
licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any 
Federal agency. Prospective applicants are reminded that submission of 
a false certification to the Commission is a serious matter that may 
result in severe penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license 
revocations, exclusion from participation in future auctions, and/or 
criminal prosecution. These statements and certifications are 
prerequisites to submitting an application to participate in an FCC 
auction.
    104. Applicants are encouraged to review the Bureau's previous 
guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the 
context of the short-form application process. For example, it has been 
determined that to the extent that Commission rules permit late payment 
of regulatory or application fees accompanied by late fees, such debts 
will become delinquent for purposes of 47 CFR 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) 
only after the expiration of a final payment deadline. Therefore, with 
respect to regulatory or application fees, the provisions of 47 CFR 
1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding default and delinquency in connection 
with competitive bidding are limited to circumstances in which the 
relevant party has not complied with a final Commission payment 
deadline. Parties are also encouraged to coordinate with the 
Commission's Office of Managing Director or the Bureau's Auctions and 
Spectrum Access Division staff if they have any questions about default 
and delinquency disclosure requirements.
    105. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United 
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The 
Commission adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the red 
light rule, that implement the Commission's obligations under the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of 
claims owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, the 
Commission will not process applications and other requests for 
benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the 
Commission. In the same rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly 
declared, however, that the Commission's competitive bidding rules are 
not affected by the red light rule. As a consequence, the Commission's 
adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any 
of the Commission's competitive bidding rules, including the provisions 
and certifications of 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to current 
and former defaults or delinquencies.
    106. Applicants are reminded, however, that the Commission's Red

[[Page 30929]]

Light Display System, which provides information regarding debts owed 
to the Commission, may not be determinative of an auction applicant's 
ability to comply with the default and delinquency disclosure 
requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105. Thus, while the red light rule 
ultimately may prevent the processing of long-form applications by 
auction winners, an auction applicant's red light status is not 
necessarily determinative of its eligibility to participate in an 
auction or of its upfront payment obligation.

H. Optional Applicant Status Identification

    107. Applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women, 
as defined in 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(3), and rural telephone companies, as 
defined in 1.2110(c)(4), may identify themselves in filling out their 
short-form applications regarding this status. This applicant status 
information is collected for statistical purposes only and assists the 
Commission in monitoring the participation of designated entities in 
its auctions.

I. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications

    108. Applicants are not permitted to make major modifications to 
their short-form applications (e.g., change their license selections, 
change control of the applicant, change the certifying official, or 
change their size to claim eligibility for a higher bidding credit) 
after the short-form application deadline. Thus, any change in control 
of an applicant, resulting from a merger for example, will be 
considered a major modification to the applicant's short-form 
application, which will consequently be dismissed.
    109. Applicants are, however, permitted to make only minor changes 
to their short-form applications after the filing deadline. Permissible 
minor changes include, for example, deletion and addition of authorized 
bidders (to a maximum of three) and revision of addresses and telephone 
numbers of the applicants and their contact persons.
    110. If an applicant wishes to make permissible minor changes to 
its short-form application, such changes should be made electronically 
to its short-form application using the FCC Auction System whenever 
possible.
    111. An applicant cannot update its short-form application using 
the FCC Auction System outside of the initial and resubmission filing 
windows. In that case, the applicant must submit a letter briefly 
summarizing the changes and subsequently update its short-form 
applications in ISAS as soon as possible. Moreover, after the filing 
window has closed, ISAS will not permit applicants to make certain 
changes, such as legal classification and bidding credit.
    112. Any letter describing changes to an applicant's short-form 
application should be submitted by e-mail to the following address: 
[email protected].
    113. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). 
Parties submitting information related to their applications should use 
caution to ensure that information contained in their submissions does 
not contain confidential information or communicate information that 
would violate the Commission's anti-collusion rule or limited 
information procedures adopted for Auction 78. A party seeking to 
submit information that might reflect non-public information, such as 
an applicant's license selections, upfront payment amount or bidding 
eligibility, should consider submitting any such information along with 
a request that the filing or portions of the filing be withheld from 
public inspection until the end of the anti-collusion period.

J. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications

    114. 47 CFR 1.65 requires an applicant to maintain the accuracy and 
completeness of information furnished in its pending application and to 
notify the Commission within 30 days of any substantial change that may 
be of decisional significance to that application. Changes that cause a 
loss of or reduction in eligibility for a bidding credit must be 
reported immediately. If an amendment reporting substantial changes is 
a major amendment, as defined by 47 CFR 1.2105, the major amendment 
will not be accepted and may result in the dismissal of the short-form 
application.
    115. After the short-form filing deadline, applicants may make only 
minor changes to their short-form applications. In addition, applicants 
must submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by e-mail at the 
following address: [email protected]. The e-mail summarizing the 
changes must include a subject or caption referring to Auction 78 and 
the name of the applicant.

III. Pre-Auction Procedures

A. Auction Seminar--June 10, 2008

    116. On Tuesday, June 10, 2008, the Commission will conduct a 
seminar for parties interested in participating in Auction 78 at FCC 
headquarters, located at 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC. The 
seminar will also provide an opportunity for prospective bidders to ask 
questions of FCC staff concerning the auction, auction procedures, 
filing requirements, and other matters related to this auction. To 
register, please provide the information listed on Attachment G of the 
Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice by fax, e-mail or telephone to the 
FCC by Friday, June 6, 2008.

B. Short-Form Applications--Due Prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on June 19, 2008

    117. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants 
must first follow the procedures set forth in Attachment C of the 
Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice to submit a short-form application 
(FCC Form 175) electronically via the FCC Auction System. This 
application must be received at the Commission prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on 
June 19, 2008. Late applications will not be accepted. There is no 
application fee required when filing a FCC Form 175, but an applicant 
must submit an upfront payment to be eligible to bid.
    118. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at 
noon ET on June 10, 2008, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. 
ET on June 19, 2008. Applicants are strongly encouraged to file early 
and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their 
applications. Applicants may update or amend their applications 
multiple times until the filing deadline on June 19, 2008.
    119. An applicant must always click on the SUBMIT button on the 
Certify & Submit screen to successfully submit its short-form 
application and any modifications, otherwise the application or changes 
to the application will not be reviewed. Additional information about 
accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is included in 
Attachment C of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice. FCC Auctions 
Technical Support is available at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202) 
414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (text telephone (TTY)).

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections

    120. After the deadline for filing short-form applications, the 
Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine 
which are complete, and subsequently will issue a public notice 
identifying: (1) Those applications that are complete; (2) those 
applications rejected; and (3) those applications that are incomplete 
because of minor defects that may be

[[Page 30930]]

corrected. The public notice will include the deadline for resubmitting 
corrected applications.
    121. After the June 19, 2008, short-form filing deadline, 
applicants may make only minor corrections to their applications. 
Applicants will not be permitted to make major modifications to their 
applications (e.g., change their license selections, change control of 
the applicant, change certifying official, or change their size to 
claim eligibility for a higher bidding credit).
    122. Applicants should be aware the Commission staff will 
communicate only with an applicant's contact person or certifying 
official, as designated on the applicant's short-form application, 
unless the applicant's certifying official or contact person notifies 
the Commission in writing that applicant's counsel or other 
representative is authorized to speak on its behalf. Authorizations may 
be submitted by e-mail at the following address: [email protected].

D. Upfront Payments--Due July 17, 2008

    123. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants 
must submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice 
Form (FCC Form 159). After completing its short-form application, an 
applicant will have access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 
that can be printed and sent by fax to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. 
All upfront payments must be received in the proper account at Mellon 
Bank by 6 p.m. ET on July 17, 2008.
 i. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer
    124. Wire transfer payments must be received by 6:00 p.m. ET on 
July 17, 2008. No other payment method is acceptable. To avoid untimely 
payments, applicants should discuss arrangements (including bank 
closing schedules) with their banker several days before they plan to 
make the wire transfer, and allow sufficient time for the transfer to 
be initiated and completed before the deadline.
    125. An applicant must fax a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 7/05) 
to Mellon Bank at (412) 209-6045 at least one hour before placing the 
order for the wire transfer (but on the same business day). On the fax 
cover sheet, applicants should write Wire Transfer--Auction Payment for 
Auction 78. In order to meet the Commission's upfront payment deadline, 
an applicant's payment must be credited to the Commission's account 
before the deadline. The applicant is responsible for obtaining 
confirmation from its financial institution that Mellon Bank has timely 
received its upfront payment and deposited it in the proper account.
    126. Please note that: (1) All payments must be made in U.S. 
dollars; (2) all payments must be made by wire transfer; (3) upfront 
payments for Auction 78 go to a lockbox number different from the 
lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and different from the lockbox 
number to be used for post-auction payments; and (4) failure to deliver 
the upfront payment as instructed by the July 17, 2008 deadline will 
result in dismissal of the application and disqualification from 
participation in the auction.
 ii. FCC Form 159
    127. A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 
7/05) must be faxed to Mellon Bank to accompany each upfront payment. 
Proper completion of FCC Form 159 is critical to ensuring correct 
crediting of upfront payments. Detailed instructions for completion of 
FCC Form 159 are included in Attachment D of the Auction 78 Procedures 
Public Notice. An electronic pre-filled version of the FCC Form 159 is 
available after submitting the short-form application. Payors using the 
pre-filled FCC Form 159 are responsible for ensuring that all of the 
information on the form, including payment amounts, is accurate. The 
FCC Form 159 can be completed electronically, but must be filed with 
Mellon Bank by fax.
 iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    128. The Commission has delegated to the Bureau the authority and 
discretion to determine appropriate upfront payments for each auction. 
Upfront payments help deter frivolous or insincere bidding, and provide 
the Commission with a source of funds in the event that the bidder 
incurs liability during the auction.
    129. Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront 
payments 50 percent greater than non-former defaulters. For purposes of 
this calculation, the applicant includes the applicant itself, its 
affiliates, its controlling interests, and affiliates of its 
controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 1.2110.
    130. Applicants must make upfront payments sufficient to obtain 
bidding eligibility on the licenses on which they will bid. The Bureau 
proposed, in the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, that the amount of 
the upfront payment would determine a bidder's initial bidding 
eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may 
place bids. Under the Bureau's proposal, in order to bid on a 
particular license, a qualified bidder must have selected the 
license(s) on its short-form application and must have a current 
eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of bidding units 
assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an applicant's total 
upfront payment must be enough to establish eligibility to bid on at 
least one of the licenses selected on its short-form application, or 
else the applicant will not be eligible to participate in the auction. 
An applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover all 
licenses the applicant selected on its short-form application, but only 
enough to cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated 
with licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold 
provisionally winning bids at any given time.
    131. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to calculate upfront payments for Auction 78 on a license-by-license 
basis using the following formulas based on bandwidth and license area 
population, with a minimum of $500 per license. The Bureau also 
proposed to use upfront payment formulas similar to those used in the 
most recent auctions for AWS-1 licenses (Auction 66) and broadband PCS 
licenses (Auction 71).
a. AWS-1
    132. For AWS-1 licenses offered in Auction 78, the Bureau proposed 
upfront payments as follows: (1) for licenses covering CMAs or EAs in 
the 50 states, upfront payment amounts will be calculated as $0.03 per 
MHz per population (MHz-pop); (2) for the REAG that covers the Gulf of 
Mexico, the upfront payment amount will be $20,000; and (3) for all 
remaining licenses, upfront payment amounts will be calculated as 
$0.01/MHz-pop.
b. Broadband PCS
    133. For broadband PCS licenses offered in Auction 78, the Bureau 
proposed upfront payments as follows: (1) for licenses covering BTAs in 
the 50 states, upfront payment amounts will be calculated as $0.03/MHz-
pop; and (2) for all remaining licenses, upfront payment amounts will 
be calculated as $0.01/MHz-pop.
    134. The Bureau set forth the specific proposed upfront payments 
and bidding units for each license in Attachment A of the Auction 78 
Comment Public Notice and sought comment on this proposal. The Bureau 
did not receive any comments in response to the proposed upfront 
payments, or on its proposal that the upfront payment

[[Page 30931]]

amount would determine a bidder's initial bidding eligibility. 
Therefore, the Bureau adopts the upfront payments and bidding units it 
proposed for each license in Auction 78, which are set forth in 
Attachment A of the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice.
    135. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should 
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to 
be active (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any single 
round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number of 
bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should 
add together the upfront payments for all licenses on which it seeks to 
be active in any given round. Applicants should check their 
calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a 
bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.
    136. If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its 
upfront payment for all licenses by multiplying the number of bidding 
units on which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the 
number of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission 
will divide the upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up 
to the nearest bidding unit.
iv. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of 
Upfront Payments
    137. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an 
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent 
information listed in the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice be 
supplied. Applicants can provide the information electronically during 
the initial short-form application filing window after the form has 
been submitted.

E. Auction Registration

    138. Approximately ten days before the auction, the Bureau will 
issue a public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. 
Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted short-form 
applications that are deemed complete and upfront payments that are 
sufficient to make them eligible to bid.
    139. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the 
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the 
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact 
person at the contact address listed in the short-form application and 
will include the SecurID(r) tokens that will be required to place bids, 
the Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide, and the 
Auction Bidder Line phone number.
    140. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration 
mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified 
bidder that has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, August 
7, 2008, should call (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration 
mailing is critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant 
is responsible for ensuring it has received all of the registration 
material.

F. Remote Electronic Bidding

    141. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, 
and telephonic bidding will be available as well. Only qualified 
bidders are permitted to bid. Each applicant should indicate its 
bidding preference--electronic or telephonic--on its short-form 
application. In either case, each authorized bidder must have its own 
SecurID(r) token, which the Commission will provide at no charge.

G. Mock Auction--August 11, 2008

    142. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a 
mock auction on Monday, August 11, 2008. The mock auction will enable 
applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the 
auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended. Details 
will be announced by public notice.



IV. Auction Event

    143. The first round of bidding for Auction 78 will begin on 
Wednesday, August 13, 2008. The initial bidding schedule will be 
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is to 
be released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.

A. Auction Structure

i. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
    144. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to auction all licenses in Auction 78 in a single auction using the 
Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction format. 
This type of auction offers every license for bid at the same time and 
consists of successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may 
place bids on individual licenses. A bidder may bid on, and potentially 
win, any number of licenses. Typically, bidding remains open on all 
licenses until bidding stops on every license.
    145. The Bureau also sought comment on using some form of package 
bidding design for Auction 78. A commenter supported the Bureau's 
recommendation to not employ package bidding for this auction, arguing 
that the Auction 78 licenses have no readily identifiable inter-
relationships or inter-dependencies with each other. The Bureau agrees 
and continues to believe that a package bidding design is not likely to 
offer significant advantages to bidders in Auction 78. Given the nature 
of the auction inventory, the Bureau concludes that the standard SMR 
auction format will best meet the needs of bidders in Auction 78. 
Therefore, the Bureau adopts its proposal to use a SMR auction format 
without package bidding. Unless otherwise announced, bids will be 
accepted on all licenses in each round of the auction until bidding 
stops on every license, allowing bidders to take advantage of synergies 
that exist among licenses.
ii. Information Available to Bidders Before and During the Auction
    146. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to withhold, until after the close of bidding, public release of (1) 
bidders' license selections on their short-form applications, (2) the 
amounts of bidders' upfront payments and bidding eligibility, and (3) 
information that may reveal the identities of bidders placing bids and 
taking other bidding-related actions. The Bureau proposed to withhold 
this information irrespective of any pre-auction measurement of likely 
auction competition.
    147. Commenters urge the Commission to not adopt anonymous bidding 
for Auction 78. The commenters assert that anonymous bidding deprives 
small to mid-size bidders of valuable information, which in turn 
reduces the level of participation in the auction and ultimately 
depresses revenues. A commenter argues that knowing who is bidding 
during an auction helps bidders determine the value of the licenses, 
assess whether or not equipment for build-out will be available, and 
estimate the potential for negotiating roaming agreements--all of which 
can help small to mid-size bidders acquire favorable financing. A 
commenter also adds that disclosure of bids and bidders during an 
auction can help bidders estimate possible signal interference.
    148. The Bureau disagrees with the commenters that the results of 
Auction 73 demonstrate the harms of withholding bidding information 
were significant to the point where the balance has shifted in favor of

[[Page 30932]]

disclosing bidder information in Auction 78. While the Commission has 
previously acknowledged that revealing bidder identities may provide 
useful information to some bidders, there is no evidence apart from the 
commenter's statement that any class of bidders in Auction 73 suffered 
a competitive disadvantage due to the use of limited information 
procedures. The Bureau believes that the overall competitive benefits 
of limited information procedures in Auction 73--from reduced 
opportunities for bid signaling, retaliatory bidding, or other anti-
competitive strategic bidding--far outweigh the disadvantages.
    149. The Bureau also notes that the commenter's allegations 
regarding Auction 73 would not necessarily apply to Auction 78, given 
the differences between the two auctions. The licenses being offered in 
Auction 78 are very different from those offered in Auction 73 in terms 
of the numbers of licenses, amount of spectrum, adjacencies, and the 
nature of the services. Auction 78 is offering licenses in discrete 
locations for which adjacent neighbors are already known. In many 
cases, information on the technologies and services in adjacent license 
areas may also be available. The Bureau concludes that the pro-
competitive benefits of using limited information procedures far 
outweigh the potential value of revealing bidder identities during this 
auction of PCS and AWS licenses.
    150. More generally, while well-prepared FCC auction participants 
likely will utilize all information available to them when calculating 
license values, including, in some cases, information revealed during 
the auction, the Bureau does not believe that knowing bidder identities 
and other bidder-related information during the auction process is an 
essential prerequisite to confident bidding and successful auction 
participation. The Bureau notes in the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice, and other auction public notices, that the Bureau expects 
bidders to conduct careful pre-auction due diligence before bidding on 
a license. There is an increasing amount of external market data 
available on spectrum license values, as more and more licenses have 
been auctioned and others traded in secondary transactions, which 
should help auction participants and their financial backers determine 
their willingness to pay for licenses.
    Hence, the Bureau is not persuaded that disclosure of bidder 
identity information during the auction is necessary to facilitate 
bidder license evaluation in Auction 78.
    151. Therefore, the Bureau adopts the limited information 
procedures proposed in the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice. Thus, 
after the conclusion of each round, the Bureau will disclose all 
relevant information about the bids placed and/or withdrawn except the 
identities of the bidders performing the actions and the net amounts of 
the bids placed or withdrawn. As in past auctions conducted with 
limited information procedures, the Bureau will indicate, for each 
license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for the next round and 
whether the license has a provisionally winning bid. After each round, 
the Bureau will also release, for each license, the number of bidders 
that placed a bid on the license. Furthermore, the Bureau will indicate 
whether any proactive waivers were submitted in each round, and will 
release the stage transition percentage--the percentages of licenses 
(as measured in bidding units) on which there were new bids--for the 
round. In addition, bidders can log in to the FCC Auction System to 
see, after each round, whether their own bids are provisionally 
winning. The Bureau will provide descriptions and/or samples of 
publicly-available and bidder-specific (non-public) results files prior 
to the start of the auction.
    152. Other Issues. Information disclosure procedures established 
for this auction will not interfere with the administration of or 
compliance with the Commission's anti-collusion rule. 47 CFR 
1.2105(c)(1) provides that after the short-form application filing 
deadline, all applicants for licenses in any of the same or overlapping 
geographic license areas are prohibited from disclosing to each other 
in any manner the substance of bids or bidding strategies until after 
the down payment deadline, subject to specified exceptions.
    153. In Auction 78, the Commission will not disclose information 
regarding license selection or the amounts of bidders' upfront payments 
and bidding eligibility. As in the past, the Commission will disclose 
the other portions of applicants' short-form applications through its 
online database, and certain application-based information through 
public notices.
    154. To assist applicants in identifying other parties subject to 
the anti-collusion rule, the Bureau will notify separately each 
applicant that has filed a short-form application to participate in a 
pending auction whether applicants in Auction 78 have applied for 
licenses in any of the same or overlapping geographic areas as the 
applicant. Specifically, after the Bureau conducts its initial review 
of applications to participate in Auction 78, it will send to each 
applicant in Auction 78 a letter that lists the other applicants that 
have pending short-form applications for licenses in any of the same or 
overlapping geographic areas. The list will identify the other 
applicants by name but will not list their license selections. As in 
past auctions, additional information regarding other applicants that 
is needed to comply with 47 CFR 1.2105(c)--such as the identities of 
other applicants' controlling interests and entities with a greater 
than ten percent ownership interest--will be available through the 
publicly accessible online short-form application database.
    155. When completing short-form applications, applicants should 
avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate the Commission's 
anti-collusion rule, particularly in light of the Commission's 
procedures regarding the availability of certain information in Auction 
78. While applicants' license selection will not be disclosed until 
after Auction 78 closes, the Commission will disclose other portions of 
short-form applications through its online database and public notices. 
Accordingly, applicants should avoid including any information in their 
short-form applications that might convey information regarding license 
selections. For example, applicants should avoid using applicant names 
that refer to licenses being offered, referring to certain licenses or 
markets in describing bidding agreements, or including any information 
in attachments that may otherwise disclose applicants' license 
selections.
    156. If an applicant is found to have violated the Commission's 
rules or antitrust laws in connection with its participation in the 
competitive bidding process, the applicant may be subject to various 
sanctions, including forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment, 
or full bid amount and prohibition from participating in future 
auctions. A commenter advocates a safe-harbor for auction-related 
statements made by bidders in filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The commenter suggests that creating this 
safe harbor would avoid a potential conflict between a bidder's attempt 
to comply with the Commission's anonymous bidding procedures and SEC 
disclosure regulations.
    157. The Bureau declines to create blanket immunity for statements 
filed with the SEC because that would violate the intent of the limited 
information

[[Page 30933]]

procedures that the Bureau adopted for Auction 78. The commenter has 
not persuaded us that the Commission's anonymous bidding procedures are 
irreconcilable with SEC reporting requirements. The Bureau continues to 
believe that premature disclosure of the identities of successful 
bidders in Auction 78, whether to financial institutions, vendors, or 
others, would undermine the purposes of the Bureau's limited 
information procedures. Therefore, the Bureau declines to create an 
exception to its limited information procedures. The Bureau hereby 
warns applicants that the direct or indirect communication to other 
applicants or the public disclosure of non-public information, (e.g., 
bid withdrawals, proactive waivers submitted, reductions in 
eligibility) could violate the Commission's anonymous bidding 
procedures and the anti-collusion rule. To the extent an applicant 
believes that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, 
including regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Bureau strongly urges that the applicant consult with the 
Commission before making such disclosure.
iii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
    158. The Bureau will use upfront payments to determine initial 
eligibility for Auction 78. The amount of the upfront payment submitted 
by a bidder determines initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number 
of bidding units on which a bidder may be active. Each license is 
assigned a specific number of bidding units listed in Attachment A of 
the Auction 78 Procedures Public Notice. Bidding units for a given 
license do not change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's 
upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a 
bidder may place bids on any of the licenses selected on its short-form 
application as long as the total number of bidding units associated 
with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only remain 
the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, 
an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units it may 
wish to bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on in any single 
round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number 
of bidding units. At a minimum, an applicant's upfront payment must 
cover the bidding units for at least one of the licenses it selected on 
its short-form application. The total upfront payment does not affect 
the total dollar amount a bidder may bid on any given license.
    159. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
minimum percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each 
round of the auction.
    160. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding 
units associated with any licenses covered by new and provisionally 
winning bids. A bidder is considered active on a license in the current 
round if it is either the provisionally winning bidder at the end of 
the previous bidding round and does not withdraw the provisionally 
winning bid in the current round, or if it submits a bid in the current 
round.
    161. The minimum required activity is expressed as a percentage of 
the bidder's current eligibility, and increases by stage as the auction 
progresses. Because these procedures have proven successful in 
maintaining the pace of previous auctions, the Commission adopts them 
for Auction 78. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will 
result in the use of an activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a 
reduction in the bidder's eligibility, possibly curtailing or 
eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids in the 
auction.
iv. Auction Stages
    162. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity rule. Under 
the Bureau's proposal a bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding 
eligibility would be required to be active on licenses representing at 
least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility, during each round 
of Stage One, and at least 95 percent of its current bidding 
eligibility in Stage Two. The Commission received no comments on this 
proposal.
    163. The Bureau has the discretion to further alter the activity 
requirements before and/or during the auction as circumstances warrant, 
and also has other mechanisms by which it may influence the speed of an 
auction. The Bureau finds that two stages for an activity requirement 
adequately balances the desire to conclude the auction quickly with 
giving sufficient time for bidders to consider the status of the 
bidding and to place bids. Therefore, the Bureau adopts the two stages.
    164. Stage One: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required 
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its 
current bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain 
the required activity level will result in the use of an activity rule 
waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining, a 
reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round. During 
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding 
units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the 
current round) by five-fourths (5/4).
    165. Stage Two: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be 
active on 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to 
maintain the required activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers 
remaining, a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next 
round. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be 
calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum 
of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids 
during the current round) by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
    CAUTION: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two, bidders 
must carefully check their activity during the first round following a 
stage transition to ensure that they are meeting the increased activity 
requirement. This is especially critical for bidders that have 
provisionally winning bids and do not plan to submit new bids. In past 
auctions, some bidders have inadvertently lost bidding eligibility or 
used an activity rule waiver because they did not re-verify their 
activity status at stage transitions. Bidders may check their activity 
against the required activity level by logging into the FCC Auction 
System. [GPO end indent]

    166. Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in 
maintaining the proper pace in previous auctions, the Bureau adopts 
them for Auction 78.
 v. Stage Transitions
    167. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that it would advance the auction to the next stage (i.e., from Stage 
One to Stage Two) after considering a variety of measures of auction 
activity, including, but not limited to, the percentages of licenses 
(as measured in bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number 
of new

[[Page 30934]]

bids, and the increase in revenue. The Bureau further proposed that it 
would retain the discretion to change the activity requirements during 
the auction. For example, the Bureau could decide not to transition to 
Stage Two if it believes the auction is progressing satisfactorily 
under the Stage One activity requirement, or to transition to Stage Two 
with an activity requirement that is higher or lower than the 95 
percent. The Bureau proposed to alert bidders of stage advancements by 
announcement during the auction. The Bureau received no comments on 
this issue.
    168. The Bureau adopts its proposal for stage transitions. Thus, 
the auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau will regulate the pace 
of the auction by announcement. The Bureau retains the discretion to 
transition the auction to Stage Two, to add an additional stage with a 
higher activity requirement, not to transition to Stage Two, and to 
transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is higher or 
lower than 95 percent. This determination will be based on a variety of 
measures of auction activity, including, but not limited to, the number 
of new bids and the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding 
units) on which there are new bids.
 vi. Activity Rule Waivers
    169. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that each bidder in the auction be provided with three activity rule 
waivers.
    170. The Bureau adopts its proposal to provide bidders with three 
activity rule waivers.
 vii. Auction Stopping Rules
    171. For Auction 78, the Bureau proposed to employ a simultaneous 
stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means that all 
licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses. More specifically, bidding will close 
simultaneously on all licenses after the first round in which no bidder 
submits any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any 
provisionally winning bids.
    172. The Bureau also sought comment on alternative versions of the 
simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 78:

    Option 1. The auction would close for all licenses after the first 
round in which no bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally 
winning bid, or places any new bids on any license on which it is not 
the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding 
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the 
provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule.
    Option 2. The auction would end after a specified number of 
additional rounds. If the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it 
will accept bids in the specified final round(s) and the auction will 
close.
    Option 3. The auction would remain open even if no bidder places 
any new bids, applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning 
bids. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had 
applied a waiver. Thus, the activity rule will apply as usual, and a 
bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility 
or use a waiver.

    173. The Bureau proposed to exercise these options only in 
circumstances such as where the auction is proceeding unusually slowly 
or quickly, where there is minimal overall bidding activity, or where 
it appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable 
period of time or will close prematurely. The Bureau noted that before 
exercising these options, it is likely to attempt to change the pace of 
the auction by, for example, changing the number of bidding rounds per 
day and/or changing minimum acceptable bids.
 viii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    174. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, it may 
delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, 
technical obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an 
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other 
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive 
bidding. The Bureau received no comment on this issue. The Bureau 
adopts its proposed rules regarding auction delay, suspension, or 
cancellation.

B. Bidding Procedures

 i. Round Structure
    175. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in 
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released 
approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding 
round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding 
rounds may be conducted in a given day. Details regarding round results 
formats and locations will also be included in the qualified bidders 
public notice.
    176. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of 
rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors.
 ii. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids
    177. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable 
reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established 
when applications for FCC licenses are subject to auction (i.e., 
because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines 
that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the public 
interest.
a. Reserve Prices
    178. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
recommended that no reserve price be imposed in Auction 78, noting that 
when the PCS licenses were offered initially there was no reserve price 
and that the reserve price for AWS licenses was met in Auction 66. The 
Bureau adopts its proposal not to establish a reserve price in Auction 
78.
b. Minimum Opening Bids
    179. The Bureau proposed in the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice to 
establish minimum opening bids for each license, while retaining 
discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. Specifically, for Auction 
78, the Bureau proposed to calculate minimum opening bids on a license-
by-license basis.
(i) AWS-1
    180. For AWS-1 licenses offered in Auction 78, the Bureau proposed 
minimum opening bids as follows: (1) For licenses covering CMAs or EAs 
in the 50 states, minimum opening bid amounts will be calculated as 
$0.03/MHz-pop; (2) for the REAG that covers the Gulf of Mexico, the 
minimum opening bid amount will be $20,000; and (3) for all remaining 
licenses, minimum opening bid amounts will be calculated as $0.01/MHz-
pop.
(ii) Broadband PCS
    181. For broadband PCS licenses offered in Auction 78, the Bureau

[[Page 30935]]

proposed minimum opening bids as follows: (1) For licenses covering 
BTAs in the 50 states, minimum opening bid amounts will be calculated 
as $0.03/MHz-pop; and (2) for all remaining licenses, minimum opening 
bid amounts will be calculated as $0.01/MHz-pop.
    182. For all licenses, the results of these calculations are 
subject to a minimum of $500 per license and are rounded using the 
Bureau's standard rounding procedure. The Bureau sought comment on this 
proposal and, in the alternative, on whether, consistent with Section 
309(j), the public interest would be served by having no minimum 
opening bids.
    183. The Commission did not receive any comments addressing the 
proposed minimum opening bid amounts or the formula proposed to 
calculate them. Accordingly, the Bureau adopts the proposed minimum 
opening bids and formulas, with a minimum of $500 per license.
    184. The Commission did not receive any comments addressing the 
proposal that the Bureau retains the discretion to reduce minimum 
opening bid amounts. The Bureau therefore adopts this proposal, noting 
that the Bureau retains the discretion to reduce the minimum opening 
bid amounts. The Bureau emphasizes, however, that such discretion will 
be exercised, if at all, sparingly and early in the auction, i.e., 
before bidders lose all activity waivers. During the course of the 
auction, the Bureau will not entertain requests to reduce the minimum 
opening bid amount on specific licenses.
    185. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license 
available in Auction 78 calculated pursuant to the procedure described 
herein are set forth in Attachment A of the Auction 78 Procedures 
Public Notice.
 iii. Bid Amounts
    186. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
that in each round, eligible bidders be able to place a bid on a given 
license using one or more pre-defined bid amounts. Under the proposal, 
the FCC Auction System interface will list the acceptable bid amounts 
for each license. The Commission received no comment on this issue. 
Based on the Commission's experience in prior auctions, the Bureau 
adopts the proposals for Auction 78.
a. Minimum Acceptable Bids
    187. Under the Bureau's proposed procedures, the first of the 
acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The 
minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal to its 
minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning bid 
on the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid for a 
license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will be 
equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus a percentage 
of that bid amount calculated using the formula. In general, the 
percentage will be higher for a license receiving many bids than for a 
license receiving few bids. In the case of a license for which the 
provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 
bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the license.
    188. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to 
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount (the additional percentage) 
is calculated at the end of each round, based on an activity index. The 
activity index is a weighted average of (a) the number of distinct 
bidders placing a bid on the license, and (b) the activity index from 
the prior round. Specifically, the activity index is equal to a 
weighting factor times the number of bidders placing a bid on the 
license in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting 
factor times the activity index from the prior round. The additional 
percentage is determined by adding one to the activity index, and 
multiplying that sum by a minimum percentage, with the result not to 
exceed a maximum percentage. The additional percentage is then 
multiplied by the provisionally winning bid amount to obtain the 
minimum acceptable bid for the next round.
    189. The Bureau proposed initially to set the weighting factor at 
0.5, the minimum percentage (floor) at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum 
percentage (ceiling) at 0.2 (20%). At these initial settings, the 
minimum acceptable bid for a license will generally be between ten 
percent and twenty percent higher than the provisionally winning bid, 
depending upon the bidding activity for the license. Equations and 
examples are shown in Attachment E of the Auction 78 Procedures Public 
Notice.
b. Additional Bid Amounts
    190. Any additional bid amounts are calculated using the minimum 
acceptable bid amount and a bid increment percentage--more 
specifically, by multiplying the minimum acceptable bid by one plus 
successively higher multiples of the bid increment percentage. If, for 
example, the bid increment percentage is five percent, the calculation 
of the first additional acceptable bid amount is (minimum acceptable 
bid amount) * (1 + 0.05), or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05; 
the second additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum 
acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid increment 
percentage, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.1, etc. The Bureau 
will round the results of these calculations and the minimum acceptable 
bid calculations using the Bureau's standard rounding procedures.
    191. For Auction 78, the Bureau proposed to set the bid increment 
percentage at 0.05, so that any additional bid amounts above the 
minimum acceptable bid would each be 5 percent higher. The Bureau 
received no comments on this proposal and therefore adopts its proposal 
to begin the auction with a bid increment percentage of 0.05.
    192. The Bureau sought comment on whether it should start Auction 
78 with no additional bid amounts or eight additional bid amounts (for 
a total of nine bid amounts) per license. A commenter recommends 
starting with eight additional bid amounts, arguing that this would 
allow bidders to bid closer to their valuation of the spectrum, which, 
in turn, increases the chance that the licenses will be awarded to 
those who value them the most.
    193. Auction 78 will begin with eight additional bid amounts per 
license. The Bureau is not persuaded that these additional bid amounts 
are necessary to provide bidders with adequate ability to express their 
valuations. The Bureau's experience with past auctions conducted 
without anonymous bidding procedures indicates that bidders rarely use 
multiple increment bids as the commenters suggest--to express their 
final valuations more precisely--but more frequently use jump bids as a 
means of signaling other bidders. However, given the limited nature of 
the inventory of licenses offered in Auction 78 and the use of 
anonymous bidding, the Bureau is not particularly concerned that the 
additional bid amounts will effectively be used for signaling in this 
auction.
c. Cap on Increases in Bid Amounts
    194. The Bureau also sought comment on whether it should cap (a) 
the amount by which a minimum acceptable bid for a license may increase 
compared with the corresponding provisionally winning bid, and (b) the 
amount by which an additional bid amount may increase compared with the 
immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. No commenters addressed 
this question.
    195. The Bureau will start the auction with a cap of $1 million. 
This will limit

[[Page 30936]]

the amount by which minimum acceptable bids and additional bid amounts 
may increase. Given the inventory of Auction 78, the Bureau believes 
that this cap may be useful in preventing very rapid price increases on 
some licenses, which could potentially discourage bidder participation, 
inhibit price discovery, and create bid approval issues for bidders.
    196. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the additional bid amounts, the cap on bid 
amounts, the number of acceptable bid amounts, and the parameters of 
the formulas used to calculate minimum acceptable bid amounts and 
additional bid amounts if it determines that circumstances so dictate. 
Further, the Bureau retains the discretion to do so on a license-by-
license basis.
 iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
    197. At the end of each bidding round, a provisionally winning bid 
will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for each 
license. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same license at the 
close of a subsequent round. Provisionally winning bids at the end of 
the auction become the winning bids. Bidders are reminded that 
provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the 
activity rule.
    198. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to use a random number generator to select a single provisionally 
winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts being submitted 
on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids). No comments were 
received on this proposal.
    199. Hence, the Bureau adopts the proposal. The FCC Auction System 
will assign a random number to each bid upon submission. The tied bid 
with the highest random number wins the tiebreaker, and becomes the 
provisionally winning bid. Bidders, regardless of whether they hold a 
provisionally winning bid, can submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. 
However, if the auction were to end with no other bids being placed, 
the winning bidder would be the one that placed the provisionally 
winning bid.
    200. All bidding will take place remotely either through the FCC 
Auction System or by telephonic bidding. There will be no on-site 
bidding during Auction 78.
    201. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses is determined 
by two factors: (1) The licenses selected on the bidder's short-form 
application and (2) the bidder's eligibility. The bid submission 
screens will allow bidders to submit bids on only those licenses the 
bidder selected on its short-form application.
    202. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on 
a given license in one or more pre-defined bid amounts. For each 
license, the FCC Auction System will list the acceptable bid amounts in 
a drop-down box. Bidders use the drop-down box to select from among the 
acceptable bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also includes an upload 
function that allows bidders to upload text files containing bid 
information.
    203. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount. Once there are bids on a license, minimum 
acceptable bids for a license will be determined.
    204. During a round, an eligible bidder may submit bids for as many 
licenses as it wishes, remove bids placed in the current bidding round, 
withdraw provisionally winning bids from previous rounds, or 
permanently reduce eligibility. If a bidder submits multiple bids for 
the same license in the same round--multiple bids on the exact same 
license, the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder's bid for 
the round. Bidders should note that the bidding units associated with 
licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn its bid do not 
count towards the bidder's current activity.
    205. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts 
carefully because bidders that withdraw a provisionally winning bid 
from a previous round, even if the bid was mistakenly or erroneously 
made, are subject to bid withdrawal payments.
 v. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    206. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the Commission 
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. The Bureau sought 
comment on permitting a bidder to remove a bid before the close of the 
round in which the bid was placed. With respect to bid withdrawals, the 
Commission proposed limiting each bidder to withdrawals of 
provisionally winning bids on licenses in no more than one round during 
the course of the auction. The round in which withdrawals are used 
would be at each bidder's discretion.
    207. A commenter recommends allowing each bidder to withdraw an 
unlimited number of bids in a single round, as proposed in the Auction 
78 Comment Public Notice, or up to three bids in more than one round. 
The commenter characterizes the limitation of one bid withdrawal round 
as ``severe restrictions'' that may have seemed to be necessary in 
Auction 73 where combinatorial bidding was used for some licenses.
    208. The Bureau is not convinced by this line of reasoning. The 
Commission has conducted some past auctions--particularly those with 
limited opportunities for license aggregation--with one or no 
withdrawal rounds. Therefore, the Bureau adopts its proposal.
    209. Bid Removal. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has 
the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the 
remove bids function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may 
effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal 
payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity for the round 
in which it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed does not count 
toward bidding activity.
    210. Bid Withdrawal. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer 
remove a bid. However, in a later round, a bidder may withdraw 
provisionally winning bids from previous rounds for licenses using the 
withdraw bids function in the FCC Auction System. A provisionally 
winning bidder that withdraws its provisionally winning bid from a 
previous round during the auction is subject to the bid withdrawal 
payments specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). Once a withdrawal is submitted 
during a round, that withdrawal cannot be unsubmitted even if the round 
has not yet ended.
    211. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid 
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of 
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. The Commission 
will serve as a ``place holder'' provisionally winning bidder on the 
license until a new bid is submitted on that license.
    212. These procedures will permit bidder flexibility during the 
auction, and therefore the Bureau adopts them for Auction 78.
    213. Calculation of Bid Withdrawal Payment. Generally, the 
Commission imposes payments on bidders that withdraw high bids during 
the course of an auction. If a bidder withdraws its bid and there is no 
higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s), the bidder that 
withdrew its bid is responsible for the difference between its 
withdrawn bid and the provisionally winning bid in the same or 
subsequent auction(s). If a bid

[[Page 30937]]

is withdrawn on a license and no subsequent higher bid is placed and/or 
the license is not won in the same auction, the payment for each bid 
withdrawal will be calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals 
and the amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a 
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or any subsequent 
intervening withdrawn bid, in either the same or subsequent 
auctions(s), equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that 
withdraws a bid will not be responsible for any final withdrawal 
payment if there is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent 
auction(s).
    214. 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules sets forth the payment 
obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid on a license during 
the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of interim 
bid withdrawal payments. In the Auction 78 Comment Public Notice, the 
Bureau proposed to establish the percentage at fifteen percent (15%) 
for Auction 78 and sought comment on the proposal.
    215. The Bureau received no comments on this issue and adopts its 
proposal. The Commission will assess an interim withdrawal payment 
equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the withdrawn bids. The 
fifteen percent (15%) interim payment will be applied toward any final 
bid withdrawal payment that will be assessed after subsequent auction 
of the license. Assessing an interim bid withdrawal payment ensures 
that the Commission receives a minimal withdrawal payment pending 
assessment of any final withdrawal payment. 47 CFR 1.2104(g) provides 
specific examples showing application of the bid withdrawal payment 
rule.
 vi. Round Results
    216. Limited information about the results of a round will be made 
public after the conclusion of the round. Specifically, after a round 
closes, the Bureau will make available for each license, its current 
provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum acceptable bid amount for 
the following round, the amounts of all bids placed on the license 
during the round, and whether the license is FCC held. The system will 
also provide an entire license history detailing all activity that has 
taken place on a license with the ability to sort by round number. The 
reports will be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the auction, the 
Bureau will make available complete reports of all bids placed during 
each round of the auction, including bidder identities.
 vii. Auction Announcements
    217. The Commission will use auction announcements to announce 
items such as schedule changes and stage transitions. All auction 
announcements will be available by clicking a link in the FCC Auction 
System.



V. Post-Auction Procedures

    218. Shortly after bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a 
public notice declaring the auction closed, identifying the winning 
bidders, and establishing the deadlines for submitting down payments, 
the long-form application (FCC Form 601), the ownership disclosure 
information report (FCC Form 602), and final payments.

A. Down Payments

    219. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition 
to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit 
with the Commission for Auction 78 to 20 percent of the net amount of 
its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable small business or very 
small business bidding credits).



B. Final Payments

    220. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of 
the net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the 
applicable deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    221. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed 
long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the license(s) they won 
through Auction 78. Winning bidders that are entrepreneurs and/or small 
businesses or very small businesses must demonstrate their 
qualifications to be considered an entrepreneur and/or their 
eligibility for a small business or very small business bidding credit. 
Further filing instructions will be provided to winning bidders in the 
auction closing notice.
    222. Winning bidders organized as bidding consortia must comply 
with the long-form application procedures established in the CSEA/Part 
1 Report and Order, 71 FR 6992, February 10, 2006. Specifically, each 
member (or group of members) of a winning consortium seeking separate 
licenses will be required to file a separate long-form application for 
its respective license(s). If the license is to be partitioned or 
disaggregated, the member (or group) filing the long-form application 
must provide the relevant partitioning or disaggregation agreement in 
its long-form application. In addition, if two or more consortium 
members wish to be licensed together, they must first form a legal 
business entity, and any such entity must meet the applicable 
designated entity criteria.

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    223. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, each winning bidder must also comply with the ownership 
reporting requirements in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 by submitting 
an ownership disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) with its 
long-form application.
    224. If an applicant already has a complete and accurate FCC Form 
602 on file in ULS, it is not necessary to file a new report, but 
applicants must verify that the information on file with the Commission 
is complete and accurate. If the applicant does not have an FCC Form 
602 on file, or if it is not complete and accurate, the applicant must 
submit one.
    225. When an applicant submits a short-form application, ULS 
automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC 
Form 602, but may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the 
ownership information submitted on the applicant's short-form 
application. Applicants must review the pre-filled information and 
confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of the 
long-form application before certifying and submitting the FCC Form 
602. Further instructions will be provided to winning bidders in the 
auction closing notice.

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    226. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy 
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands 
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a 
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to 
receive a tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 
1.2110(f). A tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and 
separate from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may 
qualify.
    227. Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to the 
auction, a winning bidder applies for the tribal lands bidding credit 
after winning the auction when it files its long-form

[[Page 30938]]

application (FCC Form 601). When initially filing the long-form 
application, the winning bidder will be required to advise the 
Commission whether it intends to seek a tribal lands bidding credit, 
for each license won in the auction, by checking the designated 
box(es). After stating its intent to seek a tribal lands bidding 
credit, the applicant will have 180 days from the close of the long-
form filing window to amend its application to select the specific 
tribal lands to be served and provide the required tribal government 
certifications. Licensees receiving a tribal lands bidding credit are 
subject to performance criteria as set forth in 47 CFR 
1.2110(f)(3)(vi).

F. Default and Disqualification

    228. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(2). The payments include both a deficiency payment, equal to 
the difference between the amount of the bidder's bid and the amount of 
the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is 
won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of 
the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is 
less.
    229. The percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an 
additional payment for defaults in a particular auction is established 
in advance of the auction. Accordingly, in the Auction 78 Comment 
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to set the additional default 
payment for this auction at ten percent of the applicable bid, 
consistent with Auctions 66 and 71. The Bureau received no comments on 
this proposal, and therefore, adopts the proposal.
    230. Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission may re-
auction the license or offer it to the next highest bidder (in 
descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a default or 
disqualification involves gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad 
faith by an applicant, the Commission may declare the applicant and its 
principals ineligible to bid in future auctions, and may take any other 
action that it deems necessary, including institution of proceedings to 
revoke any existing licenses held by the applicant.

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    231. All applicants that submit upfront payments but after the 
close of the auction are not winning bidders for a license in Auction 
78 may be entitled to a refund of their remaining upfront payment 
balance after the conclusion of the auction. All refunds will be 
returned to the payer of record, as identified on the FCC Form 159, 
unless the payer submits written authorization instructing otherwise.
    232. Refunds will not be made until after the conclusion of bidding 
because providing refunds could disclose the activity of particular 
applicants which would be inconsistent with the anonymous bidding 
procedures applicable to Auction 78. For these reasons, applicants 
should not request refunds until after the close of the auction.

    Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. E8-12013 Filed 5-28-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P