[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 70 (Thursday, April 10, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19443-19450]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-7582]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2008-0019]
RIN 3150-AG63


Power Reactor Security Requirements; Supplemental Proposed Rule

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Supplemental proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to add 
new provisions regarding licensee procedures for responding to 
notifications of potential aircraft threat and for the mitigation of 
the loss of large areas of their facilities due to large fires or 
explosions. These provisions were previously noticed for public comment 
in the October 26, 2006 (71 FR 62664) proposed power reactor security 
rulemaking. The NRC is publishing this supplemental proposed rule 
notice to obtain additional stakeholder feedback on the additional 
regulatory text that has been added to these provisions since the 
original proposed rule was published for comment.

DATES: Submit comments on this proposed rule by May 12, 2008. Submit 
comments on the information collection aspects on this proposed rule by 
May 12, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include the following number RIN 3150-AG63 in the subject line 
of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in 
electronic form will be made available to the public in their entirety. 
Personal information, such as your name, address, telephone number, e-
mail address, etc., will not be removed from your submission.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: [email protected] If you do not 
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, 
contact us directly at 301-415-1677. You may also submit comments via 
the Federal eRulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone 
301-415-1677).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
301-415-1101.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction

[[Page 19444]]

contractor will copy documents for a fee.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into ADAMS, which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 
or by e-mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Bonnie Schnetzler, Office of 
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 301-415-7883; e-mail: 
[email protected], or Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone 301-415-1462; e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction
II. Comments on the Proposed Rule
III. Section-by-Section Analysis for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)
IV. Relationship of Proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) to Aircraft Impact 
Assessment Proposed Rule
V. Guidance Supporting Sec.  50.54(hh)
VI. Specific Request for Comments
VII. Availability of Documents
VIII. Plain Language
IX. Voluntary Consensus Standards
X. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XI. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XII. Regulatory Analysis
XIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XIV. Backfit Analysis

I. Introduction

    The NRC published the proposed rulemaking on power reactor security 
for public comment in the Federal Register on October 26, 2006 (71 FR 
62664). The proposed rule contained a large number of proposed 
requirements, including proposed requirements regarding licensee 
procedures for responding to notifications of potential aircraft 
threats and for the mitigation of the loss of large areas of their 
facilities due to large fires or explosions. Those provisions described 
proposed requirements that were similar to those previously imposed 
under section B.5 of ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,'' 
dated February 25, 2002 (EA-02-026, March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792) 
(Safeguards Information); specifically, the ``B.5.a provision'' and the 
``B.5.b provision.'' Proposed section II(k)(1) of Appendix C to Part 73 
(the B.5.a or ``potential aircraft threats'' provision) stated that 
``Licensees shall implement a `Threat Warning System' which identifies 
specific graduated protective measures and actions to be taken to 
increase licensee preparedness against a heightened or imminent threat 
of attack.'' Proposed section II(j) of Appendix C to Part 73 (the B.5.b 
or ``mitigative measures'' provision) stated that the licensee 
``Integrated Response Plan'' must ``Include specific procedures, 
guidance, and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, 
containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or 
readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be 
effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of 
large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires.''
    During development of the power reactor security final rule, the 
NRC determined that several significant changes to the proposed rule 
language would be needed to adequately address stakeholder comments and 
associated implementation concerns. External stakeholders commented 
that locating these provisions in Appendix C to Part 73 was not 
appropriate, given that the actions taken to address these order 
requirements were not specific to a licensee's security organization 
but instead encompassed a much broader range of actions across the 
facility. Although these comments were focused specifically on the 
mitigative measures provision that was in proposed section II(j) of 
Appendix C to Part 73, the NRC recognized that the same issues applied 
equally to the potential aircraft threats provision contained in 
proposed section II(k)(1) of Appendix C to Part 73. The NRC agrees with 
the stakeholders comments and is proposing to re-locate the provisions 
from Part 73 to 10 CFR Part 50. Specifically these provisions would be 
located in a new paragraph (hh) that would be added to Sec.  50.54 as a 
condition of the license. This approach was chosen to ensure 
consistency with the method by which the B.5.b requirements have been 
implemented for currently operating reactors. (See ``Orders Modifying 
Licenses,'' 71 FR 36554, June 27, 2006.)
    In the process of evaluating these comments, the NRC also 
considered whether it was appropriate to add additional details and 
make editorial changes to the rule language. The NRC wants to ensure 
that the potential aircraft threats and mitigative measures provisions 
are consistent with the work that was done with licensees over the last 
six years during implementation of the ICM requirements. In addition, 
the NRC was concerned that the lack of specific language would lead to 
confusion about the NRC's expectations. Therefore, the NRC determined 
that more detailed rule language would better meet the Commission's 
regulatory objectives.
    While the NRC has clarified the language in these provisions, these 
clarifications merely reflect the current ICM order requirements as 
intended by the Commission. In fact, it is the NRC's view that current 
Part 50 licensees would already be in compliance with these proposed 
requirements if they were to be codified in a final rule. As such, the 
language provided in this supplemental proposed rule does not describe 
``new requirements'' using the existing post-9-11 security orders as 
the baseline of ``current requirements.'' Rather, the NRC views these 
language changes as improving the specificity of the original proposed 
requirements. However, because this is a significant change to the 
proposed rule language on which external stakeholders did not have an 
opportunity to comment, the NRC concludes that obtaining stakeholder 
feedback on these re-located provisions through the use of a 
supplemental proposed rule is appropriate.

II. Comments on the Proposed Rule

    As previously discussed, the NRC received several comments on the 
proposed 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C provisions (i.e., proposed section 
II(j) and proposed section II(k)(1)) that were contained in the larger 
proposed power reactor security rulemaking, and that would now be re-
located to proposed Sec.  50.54(hh). These comments are discussed in 
detail in the following paragraphs.

II.1. Comments on Proposed Section II(j) of Appendix C to Part 73

    Comment: Stakeholders commented that, for existing licensees, the 
NRC is already employing a different and more appropriate regulatory 
scheme for addressing ICM B.5.b conditions. Commenters noted that the 
B.5.b requirement is being controlled with a performance-based license 
condition that is satisfied by voluntary licensee commitments to B.5.b 
Phase 2 and Phase 3 mitigating strategies. Other commenters noted that 
these strategies are generally operations procedures that work in 
conjunction with Emergency Operating Procedures, Severe Accident 
Mitigation Guidelines, and Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines for 
beyond design base conditions. It was argued that this is an 
inappropriate

[[Page 19445]]

expansion of the security role or the roles of security programs in the 
hierarchy of plant procedures and processes and that putting specific 
detail regarding mitigating strategies into the security contingency 
response plan limits the effectiveness of licensee strategies for 
dealing with unpredictable plant events. It was commented that the NRC 
should retain the existing regulatory approach and language.
    Response: The NRC agrees that the requirements were not 
appropriately located in Appendix C to Part 73. The proposed 
requirements described in that section pertain to a licensee's 
obligation to protect against design basis threat-related security 
events. The B.5.b. requirements have always been associated with 
beyond-design basis events. They do not specifically describe the 
actions that would have to be taken by security force personnel.
    The NRC also agrees that the mitigating strategies requirements 
should be consistent with the actions that were taken by the NRC to 
close the B.5.b ICM order issue both in terms of the specific actions 
required and in regard to the general regulatory approach (i.e., 
through the use of license conditions). These efforts were reflected in 
the issuance of orders on June 20, 2006, requiring implementation of 
key radiological protection mitigation strategies. (See ``Orders 
Modifying Licenses,'' 71 FR 36554; June 27, 2006). Thus, to address the 
necessary relocation of these requirements and to reflect consistency 
with the B.5.b. implementation experience, the NRC proposes that a more 
appropriate location for the mitigating strategies requirements would 
be in Part 50. It is the NRC's view that Sec.  50.54 is the appropriate 
location for these proposed requirements because it describes 
``Conditions of Licensees.''
    Comment: Another commenter stated that proposed Part 73, Appendix C 
does not specify what types of fires or explosions the licensee must 
prepare for, nor does it specify what areas of the plant are considered 
particularly susceptible to damage or destruction by fire or explosion. 
The commenter stated that the provision also does not adequately 
describe whether, or to what degree, the licensee would rely on off-
site first responders, such as local fire departments, to aid in either 
fighting the fire or maintaining cooling of the core or spent fuel 
pools in the event of containment loss or breach of a pool. The 
commenter stated that if this proposed revision is intended to address 
the potential effects of an aircraft attack on an operating nuclear 
plant, then the final rule must contain specific provisions addressing 
the effects of jet fuel fires on vital areas of the plant, such as the 
containment dome, spent fuel pool building and control room building. 
In addition, the commenter said the NRC should require the licensee to 
demonstrate its ability to deal with significant aircraft debris, such 
as jet engines, impacting these same vital areas. The commenter stated 
that one simple solution would be to require licensees to harden the 
spent fuel pool buildings and control room building so that they are 
more resistant to an aircraft impact.
    Response: As part of the issuance of the ICM order of 2002, the 
Commission made a determination as to the level of requirements needed 
to address beyond-design basis scenarios in section B.5.b. The 
Commission did not intend to limit beyond-design basis scenarios to 
aircraft attacks but, instead called for the development of mitigation 
measures to generally deal with the situation in which large areas of 
the plant were lost due to fires and explosions, whatever the beyond-
design basis initiator. This supplemental proposed rule would codify 
generically applicable requirements similar to those that have 
previously been required by the ICM order. Accordingly, as with the 
original section B.5.b requirements, this proposed rule would apply 
only performance-based criteria so that individual licensees would have 
to determine the most appropriate site-specific measures that would 
meet the general performance criteria. Further, the NRC has provided 
licensees guidance describing parameters that could be used as aids in 
determining the scope of their site-specific mitigating strategies. 
Because the Commission has found this approach to be successful, and 
the proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) requirements reflect consistency with the 
implementation of the 2002 ICM order requirements to address loss of 
large areas of the plant due to fire or explosions, the NRC does not 
believe it is necessary, or even practical, that the prescription 
suggested by the stakeholder be incorporated into supplemental proposed 
Sec.  50.54(hh).
    Comment: Another commenter noted the draft final Part 52 rule [Note 
that it is now a final rule: 72 FR 49352] includes requirements for 
design certification applicants to include a description and evaluation 
of the design features or strategies for the prevention and mitigation 
of a specific set of severe accidents. The commenter acknowledged that 
action should be taken to prevent or mitigate certain specific beyond 
design bases events including those resulting from large fires and 
explosions. To improve regulatory coherency and consistency, the 
commenter stated that the NRC should address large fires and explosions 
in the same regulation and in the same manner as other similar beyond 
design bases events that are already being addressed in the 
regulations. The commenter noted that the evaluations of the features 
and strategies that could mitigate or prevent beyond design bases 
accidents that result from large fires and explosions are performed by 
engineering and operational groups and NRC reviews are performed by 
engineering and operations inspectors. Therefore, the commenter stated 
that it is more appropriate for these matters to be addressed in Part 
52 as opposed to Part 73.
    Response: The NRC does not agree that the issues that would be 
addressed by this proposed rule are design-related matters. As 
explained below, the proposed requirements of Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) would 
require licensees to develop guidance and strategies to address beyond 
design basis events. They would not, however, require licensees or 
designers to make design changes. To the extent that some beyond design 
basis events such as aircraft impacts could be addressed through the 
design of the facility, the Commission intends that such requirements 
would be addressed in the proposed aircraft impact assessment 
rulemaking also discussed below. Therefore, the NRC believes that the 
best location for these proposed requirements is with other technical 
requirements in Part 50.

II.2. Comments on Proposed Appendix C, Section II(k)

    Comment: One commenter stated that this is a significant expansion 
of the integrated response plan required by the Orders. The commenter 
also stated that this requirement is the subject of other existing 
regulatory requirements. Thus, the commenter recommended that the NRC 
delete this provision from the final rule.
    Response: The NRC believes that most external stakeholders did not 
recognize that the potential aircraft threat requirements were co-
located in proposed Appendix C to Part 73, section II(k) with the 
proposed threat warning requirements. The proposed section II(k) 
requirements (now the proposed 50.54(hh)(1) requirements) were 
inappropriately located in Appendix C, particularly within the proposed 
integrated response plan requirements. Further, the language of the 
proposed rule failed to capture the proposed requirements that the 
Commission

[[Page 19446]]

intended. As with the proposed section II(j) requirements, the NRC 
concludes that these proposed provisions need additional clarification 
and re-location to a more suitable regulation.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)

Proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(1)

    The proposed language for Sec.  50.54(hh)(1) would establish the 
necessary regulatory framework and clarify current expectations to 
facilitate consistent application of Commission requirements for 
preparatory actions to be taken in the event of a potential aircraft 
threat to a nuclear power reactor facility. Because aircraft threats 
are significant, rapidly evolving events, and licensees may only 
receive threat notifications a short time before potential onsite 
impacts, the NRC has determined that it is not prudent for licensees to 
attempt to identify and accomplish ad hoc mitigative actions in the 
midst of such circumstances and that such an impromptu approach would 
unnecessarily limit the effectiveness of onsite and offsite responses. 
To cope effectively with potential aircraft threats, the proposed rule 
would require licensees to develop specific procedures, whether in a 
single procedure or among several procedures that describe the 
licensee's pre-identified actions to be taken with little or no 
hesitation when provided with pre-event notification. These pre-event 
preparations would provide the most effective responses possible to 
aircraft threats and demonstrate systematic onsite and offsite 
planning, coordination, communication, and testing.
    The proposed rule would require licensees to develop, maintain, and 
implement procedures for verifying, to the extent possible, the 
authenticity of aircraft threat notifications to avoid taking actions 
in response to hoaxes that may adversely impact licensees or the health 
and safety of the public. Depending on the source of a threat 
notification, licensees may or may not be able to establish contact 
with appropriate entities to confirm the accuracy of the threat 
information received. Consequently, the NRC expects licensees, at a 
minimum, to contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center for 
assistance with verifying callers' identities or the veracity of threat 
information.
    The national protocol for dealing with aircraft threats is designed 
to be proactive with respect to threat identifications and 
notifications. However, threat information sources may not be able to 
identify specific targets, and given the dynamic nature of potential 
aircraft threats, any associated notifications to licensees may 
necessarily be reactive in nature. Additionally, licensees must rely on 
sources which are external to their control rooms for potential 
aircraft threat notifications, and updates, when available. As a 
result, the proposed rule would require licensees to develop, maintain, 
and implement procedures for the maintenance of continuous 
communication with threat notification sources because it is imperative 
that licensees establish and maintain this capability throughout the 
duration of the pre-event notification period. With such a capability, 
licensees will be able to receive accurate and timely threat 
information upon which to base decisions concerning the most effective 
actions that need to be taken.
    The proposed rule would also require that licensees develop, 
maintain, and implement procedures for notifying all onsite personnel 
and appropriate offsite response organizations (e.g., fire departments, 
ambulance services, emergency operations centers) in a timely manner 
following the receipt of potential aircraft threat notifications. These 
notifications would ensure that onsite personnel have as much time as 
possible to execute established procedures and provide offsite response 
organizations the opportunity to:
     Initiate mutual aid assistance agreements based on the 
perceived threat;
     Commence the near-site mustering of offsite fire-fighting 
and medical assistance for sites where these organizations are not 
proximately located; or
     Mobilize personnel for volunteer organizations or hospital 
staffs.
    During the pre-event notification period, the proposed rule would 
require licensees to develop procedures to assess plant conditions 
continuously and take effective actions to mitigate the consequences of 
an aircraft impact. Examples include maximizing makeup water source 
inventories, isolating appropriate plant areas and systems, ceasing 
fuel handling operations and equipment testing, starting appropriate 
electrical generation equipment, and charging fire-service piping 
headers. By taking these actions, licensees can better position their 
sites to minimize the effect on public health and safety.
    The proposed rule would also require licensees to develop and 
implement procedures for making site-specific determinations of the 
amount of lighting required to be extinguished, if any, to prevent or 
reduce visual discrimination of sites relative to their immediate 
surroundings and distinction of individual buildings within protected 
areas. For example, it may make sense to turn off all the lights at an 
isolated site, but not for a site situated in an industrial area, where 
ambient lighting from surrounding industries is sufficient for target 
discrimination. Licensees would use centralized lighting controls or 
develop prioritized routes that allow personnel to turn off different 
sets of lights depending on available time, when appropriate.
    The safety of licensee personnel and contractors is paramount to 
the successful response and implementation of mitigating measures after 
an onsite aircraft impact. To the maximum extent possible after a 
potential aircraft threat notification, the proposed rule would also 
require licensees to develop and implement procedures for pre-staging 
appropriate personnel and equipment at locations throughout their 
sites. Such actions would increase the chance that critical personnel 
and equipment will be available to address the consequences of an 
onsite aircraft impact and reduce the need to make improvised decisions 
during the pre-event notification period. The decision whether to 
shelter the remaining personnel in-place or evacuate them in response 
to a potential aircraft threat should be based on the physical layout 
of the site and the time available to conduct an effective evacuation. 
Licensees would need to:
     Determine how much time is necessary to evacuate their 
protected areas,
     Validate the accuracy of that determination using no-
notice drills, and
     Incorporate the lessons learned from those drills into 
their site-specific procedures.
    Licensees would also be required to develop procedures to 
facilitate the rapid re-entry of these personnel and offsite responders 
into their protected areas to deal with the consequences of an aircraft 
impact.
    Because even the most well-considered plans and procedures do not 
guarantee that critical on-shift personnel will survive an aircraft 
impact, the proposed rule would require licensees to develop and 
implement procedures for an effective recall process for appropriate 
off-shift personnel. Those procedures would describe the licensee's 
process for initiating off-shift recalls during the pre-event 
notification period and for directing responding licensee personnel to 
pre-identified assembly area outside the site protected areas. When 
possible, the assembly area

[[Page 19447]]

locations should be coordinated with offsite response organizations to 
facilitate offsite response plans, as well as ensure off-shift licensee 
personnel will not be unnecessarily prevented from arriving onsite when 
needed.

Proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2)

    The proposed language for Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) would require 
licensees to develop guidance and strategies for addressing the loss of 
large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires from a beyond-
design basis event through the use of readily available resources and 
by identifying potential practicable areas for the use of beyond-
readily-available resources. These strategies would address licensee 
response to events that are beyond the design basis of the facility. 
These proposed requirements originated in the ICM order of 2002. 
Ultimately, these mitigation strategies were further developed and 
refined through extensive interactions with licensees and industry. The 
NRC recognizes that these mitigation strategies will be beneficial for 
the mitigation of all beyond-design basis events that result in the 
loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires. Current 
reactor licensees comply with these requirements through the use of the 
following 14 strategies that have been required through an operating 
license condition. These strategies fall into the three general areas 
identified by proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). These 
strategies are:
    Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
    1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance.
    2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets.
    3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials.
    4. Command and control.
    5. Training of response personnel.
    Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:
    1. Protection and use of personnel assets.
    2. Communications.
    3. Minimizing fire spread.
    4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy.
    5. Identification of readily-available, pre-staged equipment.
    6. Training on integrated fire response strategy.
    7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures.
    Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
    1. Water spray scrubbing.
    2. Dose to onsite responders.
    The NRC considered specifically including these 14 strategies in 
the text of proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2). However, the NRC decided that 
the more general performance-based language in proposed Sec.  
50.54(hh)(2) was a better approach to account for future reactor 
facility designs that may contain features that preclude the need for 
some of these strategies. New reactor licensees would also be required 
to employ similar strategies to address core cooling, spent fuel pool 
cooling, and fission product barrier integrity. The strategies would 
need to account for, as appropriate, the specific features of the plant 
design, or any design changes made as a result of an aircraft 
assessment performed per proposed Sec.  52.500 (aircraft impact 
assessment proposed rule, 72 FR 56287; October 3, 2007).
    The Commission issued guidance (Safeguards Information) to current 
reactor licensees on February 25, 2005, and additionally endorsed NEI 
06-12, Revision 2, by letter dated December 22, 2006. These two sources 
of guidance provide an acceptable means for developing and implementing 
the above strategies. The Commission is currently developing a draft 
Regulatory Guide that consolidates this guidance and addresses new 
reactor designs.

IV. Relationship of Proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) to Aircraft Impact 
Assessment Proposed Rule

    The proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) would be applicable to both current 
reactor licensees and new applicants for and holders of reactor 
operating licenses under either part 50 or part 52. Current reactor 
licensees have already developed and implemented procedures that would 
comply with the proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) requirements, and would not 
require any additional action to comply with these proposed rule 
provisions. New applicants for and new holders of operating licenses 
under part 50 and combined licenses under part 52 would be required to 
develop and implement procedures that would employ mitigating 
strategies similar to those now employed by current licensees to 
maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool 
cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of 
large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. The requirements 
described in the proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) relate to the development of 
procedures for addressing certain events that are the cause of large 
fires and explosions that affect a substantial portion of the nuclear 
power plant, and are not limited or directly linked to an aircraft 
impact. The rule contemplates that the initiating event for such large 
fires and explosions could be any number of design basis threat or 
beyond design basis threat events. In addition, the NRC regards the 
proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) as necessary for reasonable assurance of 
adequate protection to public health and safety and common defense and 
security; this is consistent with the NRC's designation of the orders 
on which Sec.  50.54(hh) is based as being necessary for reasonable 
assurance of adequate protection.
    In a separate rulemaking, the NRC has proposed to require designers 
of new nuclear power plants (e.g., applicants for standard design 
certification under part 52, and applicants for combined licenses under 
part 52) to conduct an assessment of the effects of the impact of a 
large commercial aircraft on the nuclear power plant. (72 FR 56287, 
October 3, 2007). Based upon the insights gained from this assessment, 
the applicant must include a description and evaluation of design 
features and functional capabilities to avoid or mitigate, to the 
extent practical and with reduced reliance upon operator actions, the 
effects of the aircraft impact. New reactor applicants would be subject 
to both the proposed requirements of the aircraft impact rule, and the 
proposed requirements Sec.  50.54(hh). The overall objective of the NRC 
is to enhance a nuclear power plant's capabilities to withstand the 
effects of a large fire or explosion, whether caused by an aircraft 
impact or other event, from the standpoints of both design and 
operation. The impact of a large aircraft on the nuclear power plant 
would be regarded as a beyond design basis event. In light of the NRC's 
view that effective mitigation of the effects of events causing large 
fires and explosions (including the impact of a large commercial 
aircraft) should be provided through operational actions, the NRC 
believes that the mitigation of the effects of such impacts through 
design should be regarded as a safety enhancement which is not 
necessary for adequate protection. Therefore, the aircraft impact 
rule--unlike the proposed Sec.  50.54(hh)--would be regarded as a 
safety enhancement which is not necessary for adequate protection.
    The NRC regards the two rulemakings to be complementary in scope 
and objectives. The aircraft impact rule focuses on enhancing the 
design of future nuclear power plants to withstand large commercial 
aircraft impacts, with reduced reliance on human activities (including 
operator actions). Proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) focuses on ensuring that 
the nuclear power plant's licensees will be able to implement effective 
mitigation measures for large fires and explosions

[[Page 19448]]

including (but not explicitly limited to) those caused by the impacts 
of large, commercial aircraft. Thus, these revisions to the NRC's 
regulatory framework for future nuclear power plants will provide more 
regulatory certainty, stability, and increased public confidence.

V. Guidance Supporting Sec.  50.54(hh)

    The NRC staff is preparing new regulatory guidance on the 
requirements in proposed Sec.  50.54(hh). This guidance is intended to 
provide an acceptable method by which current Part 50 licensees, and 
future Part 50 and Part 52 applicants and licensees, would be able to 
implement and comply with the requirements of proposed Sec.  50.54(hh). 
The regulatory guidance will be issued in draft form for comment 
following publication of this supplemental proposed rule.
    Regarding the guidance supporting Sec.  50.54(hh)(2), the NRC 
issued Phase 1 guidance (SGI) to current reactor licensees on February 
25, 2005, and additionally endorsed NEI 06-12, Revision 2, by letter 
dated December 22, 2006, with regard to Phase 2 and 3 guidance. These 
two sources of guidance would provide an acceptable means for 
developing and implementing the mitigation strategies. The Commission 
is currently developing a draft Regulatory Guide that consolidates this 
guidance and is written with a focus on new reactor designs.

VI. Specific Request for Comments

    In addition to the general invitation to submit comments on the 
proposed rule, the NRC also requests comments on the following 
questions:
    1. The NRC recognizes that the actions that would be required by 
Sec.  50.54(hh) would address beyond-design basis events that in some 
cases cannot be bounded (as is typically done for design basis events) 
in terms of the event conditions. As a result, the proposed Sec.  
50.54(hh) required actions, though beneficial in many cases, may not be 
effective for some situations. Given this, the NRC requests specific 
comments on whether there should be additional language added to the 
proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) requirements that would limit the scope of the 
regulation (i.e., language that would constrain the requirements to a 
subset of beyond-design basis events such as beyond-design basis 
security events).
    2. Under the proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) requirements, the NRC would 
review applicants' procedures, guidance and strategies related to the 
proposed Sec.  50.54(hh) as part of its licensing processes, inspection 
processes, or combination thereof, but these proposed requirements 
would not be included as part of a new application for a license under 
Part 50 or 52. The NRC is considering, however, whether it is also 
necessary or appropriate to also require inclusion of the Sec.  
50.54(hh)-related activities within the NRC staff's review of a 
combined operating license application or operating license 
application. This would be accomplished by requiring such materials to 
be submitted as part of the applicant's application as required by 
Sec.  50.34 or Sec.  52.80, as applicable. The NRC requests specific 
comments on what would be the most effective and efficient process to 
review the applicants' and licensees' procedures, guidance and 
strategies developed and maintained in accordance with Sec.  
50.54(hh)(1) and Sec.  50.54(hh)(2).

VII. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.
    Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC Public Document Room is located 
at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
    Regulations.gov (Web). These documents may be viewed and downloaded 
electronically through the Federal eRulemaking Portal http://
www.Regulations.gov, Dockets NRC-2006-0016 and NRC-2008-0019.
    NRC's Electronic Reading Room (ERR). The NRC's public electronic 
reading room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html html.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Document                            PDR         Web                ERR (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed power reactor security rulemaking notice....          X           X   ML062000122
Proposed power reactor security rulemaking regulatory          X           X   ML061920112
 analysis and supporting appendices.                                           ML061380796
                                                                               ML061440013
Proposed power reactor security rulemaking OMB                 X           X   ML062830016
 information collection analysis.
Proposed power reactor security rulemaking                     X           X   ML061920093
 environmental assessment.
EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM)               X           X   ML020520754
 Order'' (67 FR 9792).
EA-06-0137, ``Orders Modifying Licenses'' (71 FR               X           X   ML061600023
 36554).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Plain Language

    The Presidential memorandum ``Plain Language in Government 
Writing'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the 
Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC 
requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the 
clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent 
to the NRC as explained in the ADDRESSES caption of this notice.

IX. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that 
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless 
using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is 
otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any voluntary consensus 
standard that could be used instead of the proposed Government-unique 
standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary consensus standard 
if an appropriate standard is identified.

X. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The NRC has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 
10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major 
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not 
required.
    The determination of this environmental assessment is that there 
will be no significant offsite impact to the public from this action. 
This determination was made as part of the proposed power reactor 
security rulemaking (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006), and it remains 
applicable to this supplemental proposed rulemaking.

[[Page 19449]]

XI. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    The proposed rule published on October 26, 2006 (71 FR 62664) 
imposed new or amended information collection requirements contained in 
10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73 that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These new or amended information 
collection requirements were submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review. The existing requirements were approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0011, 3150-0132 
and 3150-0002.
    This supplemental proposed rule does not contain new or amended 
information collection requirements, but relocate information 
collections addressed in the proposed rule published October 26, 2006 
(71 FR 62664) from 10 CFR part 73 (3150-0002) to 10 CFR part 50 (3150-
0011). The burden estimated for the relocated information collections 
will be included in the revised OMB clearance package prepared for the 
final rule.
    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on 
the potential impact of the information collections contained in this 
supplemental proposed rule and on the following issues:
    1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the 
information will have practical utility?
    2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, 
including the use of automated collection techniques?
    Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information 
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the 
above issues, by May 12, 2008 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services 
Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to [email protected] and 
to the Desk Officer, Nathan J. Frey, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011; 0132; 0002), Office of 
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance 
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date. 
You may also e-mail comments to [email protected] or comment 
by telephone at 202-395-7345.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

XII. Regulatory Analysis

    The NRC has not prepared a separate regulatory analysis for this 
supplemental proposed rule. The regulatory analysis that was prepared 
to support the proposed power reactor security rulemaking (71 FR 62664; 
October 26, 2006) remains applicable to these provisions.

XIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule will not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing and 
operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants 
do not fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' 
set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards 
established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).

XIV. Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that the proposed additions are not backfits 
as defined by 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), and therefore a backfit analysis is 
unnecessary for this supplemental proposed rule. Section 50.109(a)(1) 
defines backfitting as ``the modification or addition to systems, 
structures, components or design of a facility * * * or the procedures 
or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; 
any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the 
Commission rules * * *.'' The supplemental proposed rule contains 
proposed requirements regarding licensee procedures for responding to 
notifications of potential aircraft threats and for the mitigation of 
the loss of large areas of their facilities due to large fires or 
explosions. Though more specific detail is provided in these proposed 
rules, these provisions would impose requirements on current licensees 
requirements that are substantially similar to those previously imposed 
under section B.5 of ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,'' 
dated February 25, 2002 (EA-02-026, March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792) 
(Safeguards Information); specifically, the ``B.5.a provision'' and the 
``B.5.b provision.'' Further, the proposed requirements are consistent 
with the implementing guidance that has been issued to licensees 
subsequent to the order. Therefore, these proposed requirements would 
not constitute backfits as defined by the rule, and no backfit analysis 
has been prepared.

List of Subjects for 10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

    1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 
83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); 
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); sec. 651(e), Pub. 
L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 806-810 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2021, 2021b, 2111).
    Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 
U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 
Stat. 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 
50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued 
under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 
50.55a and appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 
Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued 
under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 
50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 
U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 
(42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 
68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued 
under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).

    2. In Sec.  50.54, paragraph (hh) is added to read as follows:

[[Page 19450]]

Sec.  50.54  Conditions of licenses.

* * * * *
    (hh)(1) Each licensee shall develop, maintain and implement 
procedures that describe how the licensee will address the following 
areas if the licensee is notified of a potential aircraft threat:
    (i) Verification of the authenticity of threat notifications;
    (ii) Maintenance of continuous communication with applicable 
entities;
    (iii) Notifications to all onsite personnel and applicable offsite 
response organizations;
    (iv) Onsite protective actions to enhance the capability of the 
facility to mitigate the consequences of an aircraft impact;
    (v) Measures to reduce visual discrimination of the site relative 
to its surroundings or individual buildings within the protected area;
    (vi) Pre-staging and dispersal of equipment and personnel, as well 
as rapid reentry of onsite personnel and offsite responders into site 
protected areas; and
    (vii) Recall of site personnel.
    (2) Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and 
strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, 
and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances 
associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or 
fire, to include strategies in the following areas:
    (i) Fire fighting;
    (ii) Operations to mitigate fuel damage; and
    (iii) Actions to minimize radiological release.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of April 2008.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E8-7582 Filed 4-9-08; 8:45 am]
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