[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 12, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13087-13093]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-4267]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-27611; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-024-AD; 
Amendment 39-15408; AD 2008-05-14]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. Models Navion 
(L-17A), Navion A (L-17B), (L-17C), Navion B, Navion D, Navion E, 
Navion F, Navion G, and Navion H Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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[[Page 13088]]

SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 
Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. (formerly Navion Aircraft LLC) Models Navion 
(L-17A), Navion A (L-17B), (L-17C), Navion B, Navion D, Navion E, 
Navion F, Navion G, and Navion H airplanes. This AD requires you to do 
a one-time inspection of the entire fuel system and repetitive 
functional tests of certain fuel selector valves. This AD results from 
reports of airplane accidents associated with leaking or improperly 
operating fuel selector valves. We are issuing this AD to detect and 
correct fuel system leaks or improperly operating fuel selector valves, 
which could result in the disruption of fuel flow to the engine. This 
failure could lead to engine power loss.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on April 16, 2008.
    On April 16, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved 
the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this 
AD.

ADDRESSES: To get the service information identified in this AD, 
contact the following:

--For Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. service information contact: Sierra Hotel 
Aero, 1690 Aeronca Lane, South St. Paul, MN 55075; phone: (651) 306-
1456; fax: (612) 677-3171; Internet: http://www.navion.com/servicebulletins.html; e-mail: [email protected].
--For American Navion Society (ANS) service information contact: 
American Navion Society, Ltd., PMB 335, 16420 SE McGillivray 
103, Vancouver, WA 98683-3461; telephone: (360) 833-9921; fax: 
(360) 833-1074; e-mail: [email protected].

    To view the AD docket, go to U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, or on the Internet at 
http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number is FAA-2007-27611; 
Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-024-AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Smyth, Aerospace Engineer, Chicago 
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 2300 East Devon Avenue, Room 107, 
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018; telephone: (847) 294-7132; fax: (847) 294-
7834.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    On April 6, 2007, we issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that 
would apply to all Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. Models Navion (L-17A), 
Navion A (L-17B), (L-17C), Navion B, Navion D, Navion E, Navion F, 
Navion G, and Navion H airplanes. This proposal was published in the 
Federal Register as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on April 12, 
2007 (72 FR 18413). The NPRM proposed to detect and correct fuel system 
leaks or improperly operating fuel selector valves, which could result 
in the disruption of fuel flow to the engine.

Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The FAA has reviewed 111 public comments submitted to the 
docket pertaining to the proposed rulemaking activity which would 
impose a mandatory airworthiness inspection on all Navion airplane fuel 
systems. This proposed action includes testing of the fuel system 
selector valve for proper operation and replacement with a serviceable 
unit if necessary. The public responded to this published notice with 
significant personal and technical information. The FAA appreciates the 
detailed technical information submitted for consideration in 
addressing this important airworthiness issue. Many commenters spent a 
considerable amount of time researching and organizing extensive data 
to support their positions and to help the FAA address this unsafe 
condition. In addition, several commenters provided their Navion 
airplane system knowledge and expertise by proposing alternative 
corrective actions that will benefit all Navion owners and operators. 
This is one of the benefits of the rulemaking process.
    It became clear that the majority of commenters were presenting 
similar points or positions. Because of this, we have grouped and 
categorized similar statements or positions. A total of 19 categories 
have been developed with a statement that summarizes the viewpoints, 
information, or position(s) submitted by the commenters. The FAA has 
addressed each summarized statement below.
    The following presents the comments received on the proposal and 
FAA's response to each comment:

Comment Issue No. 1: Data Does Not Support Issuance of an AD

    Richard W. Crapse and 38 other commenters believe the accident 
database information and other service difficulty reporting data does 
not support the issuance of an AD and requests the NPRM be withdrawn.
    The FAA does not agree. There have been a number of Navion accident 
investigations where it has been determined that the fuel selector 
valve condition contributed to the cause of the accident. The overall 
number of accidents is small (nine accidents generally related to the 
fuel system with three of those reported accidents directly citing the 
fuel valve in the preliminary NTSB reports as a potential cause in the 
accidents). However, these reports have highlighted the fact that some 
selector valves may be reaching the limit of their serviceable life 
(many over 50 years old) and require additional inspections, checks, 
maintenance, or replacement to help address continued airworthiness.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 2: The Corrective Action Could Create Safety Problems

    John B. Conklin and 18 other commenters state the proposed service 
information corrective action could create more safety problems than it 
would solve. We infer that they think the corrective actions should be 
modified to eliminate potential problems the current proposed 
corrective actions would cause.
    The FAA partially agrees. The FAA is always cognizant that 
inspections, checks, or modifications can potentially create 
maintenance induced errors that can affect continued airworthiness. 
However, the FAA believes the procedures in the service information 
minimize this potential concern. We believe this action addresses the 
unsafe condition for these airplanes while minimizing the risk of 
introducing new safety hazards.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 3: There Are Other Fuel System Related Safety Issues

    Ripley Quinby and 12 other commenters cite that there are 
potentially more fuel system related safety issues than just the 
selector valve (e.g., engine primer system, gascolator, flexible fuel 
lines, etc.). We infer the commenters believe we should take additional 
AD action.
    Based on the submitted comments and data, it has been shown that a 
comprehensive fuel system inspection or check would enhance the 
continued airworthiness of the Navion airplane. The FAA appreciates the 
commenter's input regarding other potential safety issues and will 
monitor the continued airworthiness of the Navion airplanes. The FAA 
may take additional rulemaking action on these airplanes.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

[[Page 13089]]

Comment Issue No. 4: The Vacuum Test Is Too Severe

    William Wade and 17 other commenters state the proposed 24 inches 
of mercury vacuum test is too severe and will potentially fail good 
fuel selector valves. The type certificate (TC) holder's published 
procedure does not have a calibration standard to ensure accurate 
testing results and at high altitude locations 24 inches of mercury 
vacuum may be impossible to obtain. The commenters request we decrease 
the mercury vacuum test to less than the 24 inches required in the TC 
holder's service bulletin.
    The FAA partially agrees. The FAA accepted the TC holder's 24 
inches of mercury vacuum test as the proper value to ensure fuel 
selector integrity. Because of the rigorous standard cited by the TC 
holder, it is not necessary to have a calibration standard procedure to 
compare against. The published service bulletin procedure is 
conservative enough to account for some deviation in the testing 
procedure and still address the continued airworthiness of the fuel 
selector valve.
    In regards to high altitude vacuum testing, we have changed the AD 
to allow for a 1 inch of mercury reduction from the 24 inches of 
mercury standard for every 1,000 feet of pressure altitude over sea 
level testing conditions. We have also added the ANS Field Service 
Bulletin No. 1001, dated April 30, 2007, as an option to comply with 
this AD. The public stated and FAA recognizes that the Navion fuel 
system actually creates a fuel system vacuum of less than 10 inches of 
mercury. The FAA will consider an alternative method of compliance 
(AMOC) to this requirement. The public is encouraged to submit 
substantiating data to support an alternative approach.

Comment Issue No. 5: Add AMOCs

    Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and ANS along with 49 
other commenters request that the FAA consider AMOCs to the published 
service documentation cited in the NPRM.
    The FAA agrees. The FAA has reviewed the ANS Field Service Bulletin 
No. 1001, dated April 30, 2007, and has added this option to the AD. In 
addition, several commenters submitted documentation showing that 
certain manufactured fuel selector valves can be serviced in the field 
by airframe and powerplant (A&P) mechanics or other appropriately rated 
facilities. Finally, several commenters cite other airplane 
manufacturer (TC holder) service information that describes simplified 
testing methods to ascertain the continued airworthiness of the entire 
fuel system. If the commenters formalize and tailor these methods for 
the Navion airplane, the FAA will review and consider all AMOC requests 
we receive provided they follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19 and this 
AD.
    We are changing the final rule AD action by adding ANS Field 
Service Bulletin No. 1001, dated April 30, 2007, as an option to comply 
with this AD.

Comment Issue No. 6: The Replacement Fuel Selector Valve Orifice Is 
Undersized

    Richard E. Holmes and 11 other commenters question the replacement 
fuel selector valve orifice size to provide adequate fuel flow for 
larger engine installations. They question whether the required fuel 
selector outlet orifice size needs to be larger than what is currently 
specified in the TC holder's service documentation.
    The FAA researched this issue and found that the replacement fuel 
selector valve that is specified in the AD provides adequate flow 
requirements for the larger engine installations and satisfies 14 CFR 
part 23 fuel flow compliance requirements. Several commenters also 
submitted extensive service experience showing acceptable fuel flow 
rates for the valves installed in Navion airplanes.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 7: Delron Parts

    Richard B. Olwin and four other commenters question the TC holder's 
position that Delron (``Plastic'') parts in certain fuel selector valve 
designs cause a safety issue. They request that the FAA allow the use 
of fuel selector valves that have plastic parts.
    The FAA agrees with this comment. We have looked into this issue 
and found that FAA-approved parts manufacturer approval (PMA) fuel 
selector valves with plastic parts in their design exist. No service 
difficulty reports directly related to this issue were found. We will 
continue to monitor these parts, but at this time we find no unsafe 
condition.
    The fuel selector valves required in the service information for 
this AD do not contain plastic parts. If someone wants to use a fuel 
selector valve with plastic parts, the FAA will review and consider all 
AMOC requests we receive provided they follow the procedures in 14 CFR 
39.19 and this AD.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 8: Navion Fuel System Is An Unsafe Condition

    Richard E. Holmes cites a Navion Fuel system accumulator tank 
issue, and he thinks we infer that this tank needs replacing. He 
requests that we clarify whether this issue is part of our AD actions.
    We agree that the accumulator tank is part of the fuel system, and 
we require a one-time inspection of the entire fuel system. However, 
this AD action is not focused on the accumulator tank but on the fuel 
selector valve. Although the fuel system accumulator tank is outside 
the scope of this rulemaking effort, we researched this issue and found 
no service difficulty data to show this to be an unsafe condition.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 9: Reference Documents

    Richard E. Holmes requests we provide the referenced documentation 
cited in the NPRM.
    This information is available in the AD docket file and can be 
accessed by the public. The street address for the Docket Office 
(telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. In addition, 
the TC holder has this information available at their Web site http://www.sierrahotelaero.com.

Comment Issue No. 10: Lack of Proper Maintenance

    Andrew B. Woodside and eight other commenters believe the fuel 
system problems can be traced back to lack of proper maintenance. They 
request the AD action be withdrawn.
    The FAA agrees that maintenance has contributed to the unsafe 
condition. If proper maintenance is being performed, the likelihood of 
having air introduced into the engine, which may cause loss of power, 
is minimized. In one instance, the owner had maintenance performed on 
his fuel selector valve to fix a leaking problem, but it appears this 
repair caused a power loss on takeoff. However, because of the actual 
reported accidents and their associated cause, the FAA has determined 
that the existing continued airworthiness instructions are inadequate 
and additional fuel system inspections and corrective actions are 
needed to help maintain the continued airworthiness of the Navion 
airplanes.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 11: Unclear AD

    Matt Hunsaker and six other commenters state the AD is not well 
thought out. They request we withdraw the proposed AD action.

[[Page 13090]]

    The FAA disagrees. Service history and the NPRM published on April 
12, 2007, substantiate why we should take corrective action to address 
this unsafe condition. The TC holder has developed and published what 
they believe is the proper corrective action to address the unsafe 
condition.
    We have changed the final rule AD action to include another 
compliance action as an option based on the response to the NPRM. 
Moreover, the public may always propose AMOCs to show compliance to the 
corrective action requirements cited in the AD. The FAA will review and 
consider all AMOC requests we receive provided they follow the 
procedures in 14 CFR 39.19 and this AD.

Comment Issue No. 12: AD Will Make Money for TC Holder

    Leo Burke and 15 other commenters state the TC holder is using the 
AD process to make money for the TC holder. They request the AD be 
revised to allow other methods of compliance.
    The FAA disagrees that the AD process is being used for monetary 
gain. We issue ADs when an unsafe condition has been identified and the 
condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same 
type design (14 CFR 39.5). Service history and the NPRM published on 
April 12, 2007, substantiate why we should take corrective action to 
address this unsafe condition. Our regulatory responsibility does not 
address whether the TC holder's service bulletins are profitable, only 
whether they fully address the identified unsafe condition.
    We have reviewed and added another option for addressing the unsafe 
condition in this final rule AD action. We will also review other AMOC 
requests we receive provided they follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19 
and this AD.

Comment Issue No. 13: Add Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. Service Bulletin 101A

    Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. and one other commenter suggest we add 
Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. Navion Service Bulletin No. 106A, dated May 1, 
2007, to the final rule AD.
    FAA agrees to add this service bulletin, which provides 
instructions to replace the fuel selector valve.

Comment Issue No. 14: Difference in Fuel Selector Valve Operation

    Ron Natalie and four other commenters cite that the replacement 
fuel selector valves may operate differently causing pilot confusion 
and fuel mismanagement accidents. They request that the AD address 
potential changes in the fuel selector operation.
    The FAA agrees there are several valve options to replace a 
defective valve and not all these valve options operate exactly the 
same way. One valve design has a mechanical lockout stop that prevents 
the pilot from selecting the fuel shutoff position without a separate 
and distinct action. The valve placard labeling may be somewhat 
different. There can be 3-position or as many as a 5-position valve 
design installed. There may be more than one fuel selector in the fuel 
system. Because of field-approved and supplemental type certificate 
(STC) fuel system modifications, there are variations in the field. It 
is the responsibility of the pilot to understand the fuel system he or 
she is operating and be well versed in the fuel management procedures 
for that particular airplane.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 15: Continued Airworthiness Information

    Andrew B. Woodside suggests that Navion owners have access to the 
continued airworthiness information, acquire it, and use it.
    The FAA agrees. We provide the contact information for obtaining 
additional information from both Sierra Hotel Aero (TC Holder) and the 
American Navion Society in paragraph (h)(2) of this final rule AD 
action.

Comment Issue No. 16: Modified Fuel Systems

    Tony B. Russell and six other commenters state the NPRM does not 
address modified Navion fuel systems accomplished by field approval, 
STC, or other appropriate methods.
    The FAA partially agrees. The FAA recognizes that many Navion 
airplanes have modified fuel systems that can include auxiliary fuel 
and wing tip fuel tanks. However, we have no way of determining which 
airplanes have modified fuel systems that could include auxiliary fuel 
and wing tip fuel tanks, and therefore, we cannot exempt these 
airplanes from the AD.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment. 
The FAA will consider AMOC requests to satisfy the AD compliance 
requirements. This can be accomplished on a case-by-case basis, or in 
the case of an STC holder they can submit an AMOC proposal for their 
STC design approval provided they follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19 
and this AD.

Comment Issue No. 17: Different Testing Acceptance Criteria

    Maynard Keith Franklin and three other commenters cite that other 
Navion service documentation defines different (higher) leak rates for 
other fuel system components (e.g., gascolator) than what is defined in 
the fuel selector valve testing requirements. They request that we 
standardize the leakage rates for the fuel system inspection.
    The FAA partially agrees. The FAA determined that there are other 
acceptable leak rates that might be lower than the rate cited in the TC 
holder's service bulletin. Those previous Navion maintenance 
publications for fuel system components include the fuel system 
gascolator. For this final rule action, we are using the TC holder's 
requirements cited in the current service bulletin to address the test 
and acceptance criteria for the fuel selector. However, if someone 
submits substantiating data, the FAA will review and consider all AMOC 
requests we receive provided they follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19 
and this AD to show compliance with the TC holder's published service 
documentation.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 18: Unsafe Installation of Replacement Fuel Selector 
Valve

    Ron Judy and six other commenters state that the proposed 
replacement valve may cause installation safety issues. They request 
that we or the TC holder provide instructions that address installation 
fit problems for all aircraft.
    The FAA disagrees. After discussing with the TC holder, we have 
confirmed the proposed replacement valve can be properly installed. We 
have also confirmed with a representative of ANS that a replacement 
valve can be properly installed. Any discrepancy that is found during 
installation must be handled on a case-by-case basis and documented 
using FAA Form 337.
    We are not changing the final rule AD action based on this comment.

Comment Issue No. 19: Repair of Fuel Selector Valve

    Mike Pettaway and three other commenters state that an A&P mechanic 
can repair a fuel selector valve since that type of repair is cited in 
the (A&P) practical testing standards.
    The FAA partially agrees. It is true that an A&P mechanic is 
trained to disassemble, repair, and re-assemble various components and 
assemblies; however, even when this type of work

[[Page 13091]]

is performed in the field, the work must be accomplished with some form 
of FAA accepted or approved data (e.g. manufacturer service 
instruction(s), manufacturer's service bulletins, maintenance manuals, 
etc.). The mechanic does not have the authority to perform repairs on 
the fuel selector valve itself without the manufacturer's supporting 
continued airworthiness data or an FAA-approved or accepted procedure.
    We are not changing this final rule AD action based on this 
comment.

Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that 
air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed 
except for the changes previously discussed and minor editorial 
corrections. We have determined that these minor corrections:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 1,500 airplanes in the U.S. 
registry.
    We estimate the following costs to do the inspection:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Total cost per   Total cost on
                          Labor cost                              Parts cost        airplane      U.S. operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 work-hours x $80 per hour = $560...........................             N/A             $560         $840,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements 
that would be required based on the results of the inspection. We have 
no way of determining the number of airplanes that may need this 
repair/replacement:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Total cost
               Labor cost                    Parts cost     per airplane
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 work-hours x $80 per hour = $240......           $1,000        $1,240
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this AD.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD (and 
other information as included in the Regulatory Evaluation) and placed 
it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary by sending a 
request to us at the address listed under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket 
No. FAA-2007-27611; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-024-AD'' in your 
request.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding a new AD to read as follows:

2008-05-14 Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc.: Amendment 39-15408; Docket No. 
FAA-2007-27611; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-024-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD becomes effective on April 16, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Models Navion (L-17A), Navion A (L-17B), 
(L-17C), Navion B, Navion D, Navion E, Navion F, Navion G, and 
Navion H airplanes, all serial numbers, that are certificated in any 
category.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from reported airplane accidents associated 
with leaking or improperly operating fuel system selector valves. We 
are issuing this AD to detect and correct fuel system leaks or 
improperly operating fuel selector valves, which could result in the 
disruption of fuel flow to the engine. This failure could lead to 
engine power loss.

Compliance

    (e) To address this problem, you must do the following actions, 
unless already done:

[[Page 13092]]



              TABLE 1.--Actions, Compliance, and Procedures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Actions                  Compliance          Procedures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Do a one-time inspection of   Within the next     Follow Sierra
 the entire fuel system.           100 hours time-in-  Hotel Aero, Inc.
                                   service (TIS)       Navion Service
                                   after April 16,     Bulletin No.
                                   2008 (the           106A, dated May
                                   effective date of   1, 2007; or
                                   this AD) or         American Navion
                                   within the next     Society, Ltd.
                                   12 months after     Field Service
                                   April 16, 2008      Bulletin No.
                                   (the effective      1001, dated April
                                   date of this AD),   30, 2007.
                                   whichever occurs
                                   first.
(2) Unless within the last 5      Initially within    Follow Sierra
 years you have replaced the       the next 100        Hotel Aero, Inc.
 fuel selector valve with one of   hours time-in-      Navion Service
 the valves specified in           service (TIS)       Bulletin No.
 paragraphs (e)(3)(i) or           after April 16,     106A, dated May
 (e)(3)(ii) of this AD, do the     2008 (the           1, 2007; or
 functional tests of the fuel      effective date of   American Navion
 selector valves. If using         this AD) or         Society, Ltd.
 Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. service   within the next     Field Service
 information, you may allow for    12 months after     Bulletin No.
 a 1 inch of mercury reduction     April 16, 2008      1001, dated April
 from the 24 inches of mercury     (the effective      30, 2007.
 standard for every 1000 feet of   date of this AD),
 altitude over sea level testing   whichever occurs
 conditions.                       first.
                                   Repetitively
                                   thereafter
                                   inspect and do
                                   functional tests
                                   of the fuel
                                   selector valve at
                                   intervals not to
                                   exceed 12 months
                                   until the
                                   replacement
                                   required by
                                   paragraph (e)(3)
                                   of this AD is
                                   done.
(3) If during any of the          Before further      (i) For
 inspections or tests required     flight after any    replacement with
 in paragraphs (e)(1) or (e)(2)    inspection          Navion P/Ns 147-
 of this AD you find any           required by this    30013-201, 147-
 defects, perform any corrective   AD where            30013-202, or 147-
 actions required, including       corrective          30013-203 use the
 replacing the fuel selector       actions are         following service
 valve with one of the part        necessary. You      information:
 numbers (P/N) specified in        may at any time    (A) Sierra Hotel
 paragraphs (e)(3)(i) or           after April 16,     Aero, Inc. Navion
 (e)(3)(ii) of this AD.            2008 (the           Service Bulletin
                                   effective date of   No. 106A, dated
                                   this AD) replace    May 1, 2007.
                                   the fuel selector  (B) Sierra Hotel
                                   valve with the      Aero, Inc. Navion
                                   applicable P/N as   Service Bulletin
                                   specified in the    No. 101A, dated
                                   service             August 23, 2005.
                                   information as     (C) Navion
                                   terminating         Aircraft
                                   action for the      Corporation
                                   repetitive          Navion Service
                                   inspections and     letter 87, dated
                                   required in         February 20,
                                   paragraph (e)(2)    1965.
                                   of this AD.        (ii) For
                                                       replacement with
                                                       Navion P/Ns 145-
                                                       48000-ANSI, 145-
                                                       48000-ANS2, 145-
                                                       48000-ANS3, or
                                                       Osborne Tank Co.
                                                       P/N 4090, submit
                                                       proposed
                                                       installation
                                                       procedures
                                                       following the
                                                       alternative
                                                       method of
                                                       compliance (AMOC)
                                                       procedures
                                                       specified in
                                                       paragraph (g) of
                                                       this AD.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) If within the last 5 years or at any time after April 16, 
2008 (the effective date of this AD) you have replaced the fuel 
selector valve with any of the valves specified in paragraphs 
(e)(3)(i) and (e)(3)(ii) of this AD you may terminate the repetitive 
inspections and functional tests of the fuel selector valve required 
in paragraph (e)(2) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (g) The Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 
ATTN: Tim Smyth, Aerospace Engineer, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Room 
107, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018; telephone: (847) 294-7132; fax: 
(847) 294-7834, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using 
any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify 
your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight 
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (h) You must use the service information specified in Table 2 of 
this AD to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD 
specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact the 
following:
    (i) For Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc. service information contact: 
Sierra Hotel Aero, 1690 Aeronca Lane, South St. Paul, MN 55075; 
phone: (651) 306-1456; fax: (612) 677-3171; Internet: http://www.navion.com/servicebulletins.html; e-mail: 
[email protected].
    (ii) For American Navion Society service information contact: 
American Navion Society, Ltd., PMB 335, 16420 SE McGillivray 
103, Vancouver, WA 98683-3461; telephone: (360) 833-9921; 
fax: (360) 833-1074; e-mail: [email protected].
    (3) You may review copies at the FAA, Central Region, Office of 
the Regional Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-
741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

              Table 2.--Material Incorporated by Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Service Bulletin No.         Revision              Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc., Navion            1  May 1, 2007.
 Service Bulletin No. 106 A.
Sierra Hotel Aero, Inc., Navion            1  August 23, 2005.
 Service Bulletin No. 101A.
Navion Aircraft Corporation      ...........  February 20, 1965.
 Navion Service Letter No. 87.
American Navion Society, Ltd.    ...........  April 30, 2007.
 Field Service Bulletin No.
 1001.
------------------------------------------------------------------------



[[Page 13093]]

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on February 28, 2008.
David R. Showers,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-4267 Filed 3-11-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P